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DECISIONS TO BE BASED ON EVIDENCE.
[Case No. 1
_ WOOD RIVER BANK v. DODGE et al.
(55 N. W. 234. 36 Neb. 708.)
Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 26, 1893.
Error to district court, Hall county; Harri-
son, Judge.
Action by the Wood ltiver Bank against
'Freeman C. Dodge and George F. Dodge.
Defendants had judgment, and piaintiif
brings error. Reversed.
James H. W'oolley and Thompson Bros.,
for plaintiff in error. Thummel & Platt, for
defendants in error.
MAXWELL, C. J. The plaintiff brought
-an action against the defendants to recover
»the sum of $1,884.25, with interest. To the
_petition the defendants flied an answer, as
,-follows: "Comes now the above defendants,
and for answer to the petition of plaintiff
-say that they formed a limited partnership
in the transaction of purchasing and selling
hogs, and conducted said business in the
name of Dodge Bros.; that they kept the
account with the said plaintiff in all the
transactions done, and banked with this
plaintiff as Dodge Bros. for this business;
.that Freeman C. Dodge had a personal ac-
_count with said bank, so did the said George
F. uodge, for their own personal transac-
.tion of business which had no connection
whatever with the said Dodge Bros busi-
ness; that these defendants made all de
posits done under the business in the name
of Dodge Bros., and drew on the said plain-
.tii'f all the checks on the said plaintiff bank
in the name of Dodge Bros. and none other:
that George F. Dodge did all the business
transactions for the said firm, and deposited
all the ftmds for the sale of the property.
and drew all the checks and money from
the plaintiff in the name of Dodge Bros..
and none other; that these defendants admit
they drew from the said plaintiff the said
sum of $21,993.21, and no more; they also
_'admit they deposited the sum of $20,lt)8.‘.3t;
as credited to them in the petition, and also
claim the fact to be that they paid or depos-
ited the additional sum of $7,832.47 to the
said piaintiif, which the said piaintifl has neg-
lected and refused to give them credit for
as follows: On or about June 30, 1387, the
United States National Bank deposited or
paid to the plaintiff, to be placed to the
credit of Dodge Bros., the sum of $5,812.89;
that on the 1.‘-lth day of July, 1887, the said
Dodge Bros. dt'1)usii0d or paid into plaintiff
bank, to be credited to the said Dodge
Bros., the sum of $000; on September 5th,
$789.23; and September 9th, $629.65; that
the said defendants are not indebted to said
plaintiff in any sum whatever, but that the
plaintiff was indebted at the commencement
of this action on the said account the sum of
$5,812.89, which sum the defendants claim
Jll5fl.\' due and wholly unpaid. Therefore
’pray judgment against said piaintiif in the
" said 911111 01 $5,812.39, over and above all
claims so_as' aforesaid mentioned in plain-
riti."s petition, with interest thereon at 7
per cent. per annum from the 18th day of
January, 1888, and costs." The plaintiff tiled
the following reply: “Now comes the above-
named plaiutifl, and for reply states: That
it deities that the said defendants or either
of thcm are entitled to the credit of $7,012.89,
the saute being the $5,812.89 and $1,200 men-
tioned in said defendants’ answer, or any
other or dificrent amount than as mentioned
iii the said plaintiff's petition, or that the s;-.id
plaintiff received the said amounts, or either
of them, except in said petition mentioned
and herein stated; and as further reply
states that the $5312.89 was received by
the said plaintiff in draft in favor of said
Dodge Bros. at the time in said answer men-
tioned, but that the same was claimed by
the said Freeman C. Dodge to be his prop-
erty, or mostly so, and the said Freeman C.
Dodge then and there ordered the same
placed to his credit on his individual ac-
count with thcsaid bank,which the said bank
then and there did; that the same was done
by and with the knowledge and consent of
the said George F. Dodge. and was after-
wards by him ratified and adopted with the
full knowledge of all of the foregoing facts;
that the plaintiff has since the said time
l1i.‘i(18 and effected a settlement with th__e
said Freeman C. Dodge, and by and with
the consent of the said George F. Dodge
allowed and given the said Freeman C. Dodge
entire and full credit for the said sum of
$5,812.89, and that neither of said defendants
are entitled “to the s.-tid credit of the said
amount on the account sued on in this case:
that as to the fact as to whether or not the
said defendants are partners, or were at the
time the said account was made and busi-
ness transacted, this plaintiff has neither
knowledge nor information sufficient to form
a belief, and therefore denies the same, and
puts said defendants upon their proof.
Wherefore the said plaintiff demands judg-
ment agalnst the said defendants as in its
petition prayed." On the trial of the cause
the jury returned a verdict for the defend-
ants for the sum of $4,719.71, upon which
judgment was rendered.
Two errors are relied upon for a. reversal
of the judgment—First, that the verdict is
against the weight of evidence; and, soc-
ond, misconduct of certain jurors.
The testimony is undisputed that about the
first of July, 1887, a large munber of hogs
were shipped in tho name of Dodge Bros.
to South Omaha; that the amount. realized
from these hogs was $5,812.89, which was
placed to the credit of the Wood River
Bank in the United States National Bank of
Omaha. Up to this point there is no dispute.
it is claimed on behalf of plaintiff that the
hogs in question were the property of Free-
n.an C. Dodge, and paid for by him out of
money obtained from the plaintiff, and that
he directed the plaintiff’ to place the same to
the credit 01' his individual account, which
was done. This is denied by-the defend-
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WOOD RIVER BANK v. DODGE et al. 
(M N. W. 234, 36 Neb. 708.) 
Supreme Court of NebrMka. April 26, 1893. 
Error to district court, Hall county; Harri· 
son, Judge. 
Action by the Wood River Banlt against 
:Freeman a Dodge and George F. Dodge. 
Defend11nts had judgment, and plalntllf 
brlnaa error. Reversed. 
.Ta.mes H. Woolley und Tbompaon Bro&, 
for plaintiff Jn error. Thummel & Platt, for 
defendants Jn error. 
MAXWELL, 0. J. The plaJntill' brought 
an action against tbe defendants to recover 
: the sum of $1,88-i.:.!a, with interest. To the 
. petition the defendants filed an answer, 88 
.:follows: "Comes now the above defendants, 
. and for answer to the petition of pluJntlll' 
, say that they formf'd a. Umited pnrlnersWp 
Jn the trnnsaction of purchasing and 11elllng 
bop, and conducted snld business Jn the 
name of Dodge Broe.; that they kept the 
account with the said plaintiff ln nll the 
. transactions done, and banked with this 
. plalntlll' as Dodgl' Bros. for this buslne88; 
. thnt l<'reeman C. Dodge bad a. personal ac-
. count with Bllid bank, 110 did the said George 
F. J.Jodge, for tht>ir own personal trnnsac-
. tlon of business which had no connection 
whatever with tbe said Dodge Broe. busl-
.n~; that these defendants made all de-
posits done under the buslnesa Jn the name 
of Dodge Bros., and drew on the said plain· 
. tlll' all the checks on the said plain till' bank 
. Jn the name ot Dodge Bros. and none other: 
tpnt Gl'orge F. Dodge did all the b\llllnes~ 
transactions for the said llrm, and dep081ted 
all the funds for the sale of the property. 
and drew all the checks and money trom 
the pl1tlntlll' ln the name of Dodge Bl'Oll .. 
·and none other; that these defendll.Dts admit 
·{hey drew trow the said plalntllT the sal!I 
sum of f21,003.21, and no more; they nlse 
.admit tht!Y deposited the sum of $:.!0.108.21i 
as credited to them in the petition, and also 
claim tho fnct to be that they paid or depos-
ited the additional sum of $7,S32.47 to the 
said plalntltr, which the said plalntltr bas neg-
lected and refused to gtve them credit tor 
aa follows: On or about June 30, 1887, the 
United States National Banlt deposited or 
paid to the plalntill', to be placed to the 
credit of Dodge Bros., the sum of ,5,812.89; 
that on the 18th day of .July, 1887, the said 
Dodge Bros. dl.'posited or paid into plalntlll' 
bank, to be credited to the SDld Dodge 
Bros., the sum of $600; on September 6th, 
$789.23; and September 9th, $629.65; that 
the snld defendants are not indebted to 1111ld 
plalntlll' ln any sum whatever, but that the 
plaintiff W88 indebted at the commencement 
of this action on the said account the sum of 
~.812.89, which sum the defendants claim 
j118tly due and wholly unpaid. Therefore 
1 pray judgment against said plaintiff In the 
· llllid BWD of $5,812.89, over and above all 
~ so .aa. aforesaid mentioned Jn plain· 
rtlr's petition, with Interest thereon at .7 
per cent. per annum from the 18th day of 
Janua.ry, 1888, a.nd costs." The plaintiff filed 
the following reply: "Now comes tbe nbove-
nnmed plalntill', and for reply states: That 
it denies that the Bllid defendants or either 
ol them are entitled to the credit of $7,012.89, 
the same IJelng the $:>,812.S9 and $1,200 men-
tioned ln said defendants' answer, or any 
othc-r or dln<•rc-nt amount than ns mentlonro 
ln the said pl11lntilr's petition, or that tlw 11a lcl 
plnlntllf l'L"<"t•h·ed the said amounts, or either 
Of them, ('XCept ill said petition mentioned 
aud herein stated; and as further reply 
sttttes that the $5,812.89 was receh·ed by 
the Bllid plalntltl ln draft Jn favor of said 
Dodge Bros. at the time ln said answer men· 
tloned, but that the same was clalmfd by 
the said Freeman C. Dodge to be his prop-
erty, or mostly so, a.nd the said Freeman C . 
Dodge theu und there ordered the same 
placed to bis credit on his Jndlvidual ac-
count "ith the1mld bank, wblcb the said bnnlt 
thPn nnd there did; tba t the same wns done 
by an<.l with the knowledge and consent of 
the sald George F. Dolli..-e. and was after-
"':\rds by Wm ratified and adopted with the 
full kuowlc-dge of all of the foregoing facts; 
that the plulntllr has shll'e the suld time 
made and f>lfected a settlement wilh the 
sald Freeman a Dodge, and by a.nd witb 
tl1e const>nt of the said George F. Dod~e 
allowed nnd given the said Freeman C. Dodge 
·entire 1tnd tull credit for the said sum of 
$5,812.S9, and that neither of snld def Pndnnt1 
are entitled 'to thL' S'.tltl c1'E'dlt of the said 
amount on the acl'ount sued 011 In this case: 
that as to the fact us to whether or not the 
said dPfrml:mts are partners, or were nt the 
time th~ said account was made and bU11i· 
ness transacted, tbls plalntilf baa neither 
knowlt'<ig•l nor information sufficient to form 
a belief, and therefore denies the same, and 
puts Bald defendants upon their proof. 
Wherefore the said plnlntltr demands judg-
ment against the snld defendants 88 Jn Its 
petition prayed." On tlte trial of the cause 
tl1e jury returned a verdict for the defend~ 
nots for the sum of $4,719.71, upon whlc11 
jnd.t:ment was rendered. 
Two errors are relied upon for a reversal 
of the Judgwent-Flrst, that the verdict ls 
ag:tlnst the weight of evidence; and, sec-
ond, misconduct of certain jurors. 
'.rile testimony ls undisputed that about the 
fil'Bt of July, 1887, a large n1unber of bogs 
were shipped in tbe name of Dodge Bros. 
to South Omnba; that the amount realized 
from these hogs was $5,812.89, which wn.s 
placed to the croolt of the 'Vood River 
Uank ln the L"nlted States National Banlt of 
Omnlul. Up to this point there I.is no dispute. 
It ls clalml'Cl. on hehnlf of plnintltr that the 
ho;,,rs In question were the propl•rty of Free-
11.an C. Dodge, and 1•nld for by him out of 
money obtained from the pluiutlff, and that 
he dil'l'l'kd the plaintiff to pla<'I' the SllWP to 
the credit of his wdh·ic.Iual accouut, which 
wu done. Thia la denied by · the defend-
8 
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DECISIONS TO BE BASED ON EVlDENCE.
ants. Both of the defendants testify that
the money was deposited to the credit of
Dodge Bros., and not to the credit of Free-
man. All the officers of the bank, some of
whom appear to be disinterested, testify that
the credit was given to Freeman. We also find
that in the bank book of George Dodge with
the plaintiff, which is here in the record,
these hogs were not credited to Dodge Bros.
The otiicers of the bank testify that this
book was delivered to George Dodge a. few
weeks after the transaction; that he re
turned, and stated that he and his wife had
looked over it, and found it correct, except
an item of $20. Gcorgc denies receiving the
book until about the month of January after
the transaction. He, in effect, admits the
$20 mistake. The mode of doing business
with the bank seems to have been as fol-
lows: When a shipment of hogs was about
to be made, the defendants would receive
credit for the supposed value of the hogs,
and were permitted to check the same out.
It appears that about the 5th of September
of that year Dodge Bros. made or were
about to make a shipment of hogs to South
Omaha, and received credit at the bank
for $600, a. duplicate deposit slip being
made. It is claimed by the plaintiff that on
the same day a second duplicate deposit for
$600 was made. The defendant George
Dodge testifles, in effect, that this was a
second deposit, and that it was received
from a. second shipment of hogs. On the
other hand, the cashier testifies that original
credit was given in the morning. and the
duplicate slip given to the defendant;
that in the afternoon he came into the bunk,
and stated that he had not received a dupli-
cate in the morning, and that thereupon the
cashier issued a second duplicate slip for
$600, and wrote the abbreviated word
“dupl." instead of "triplicate" on it. The
agent of the railway company at Wood
River was called, and stated in substance
that a record was kept in his oflice of all
shipments made from there, and but one
car of hogs was shipped by Dodge Bros. at
the time stated, and he in effect corrobo-
rates the testimony of the cashier. 1t is
very evident, therefore, that Dodge is mis-
taken in-his testimony, and that the cashier’!
testimony on that point is correct, and the
verdict ls against the weight of evidence.
2. The aiiidavit of one of the jurors was
flied in support of one of the grounds of the
motion for a new trial for the misconduct
of certain jurors. It is as follows: "P. F.
McCullough, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says that he was a. lncmbcr of the jury
to whom the above case was tried on Febr.
15th, 1890; that during the discussion of the
case in the jury room the question came up
as to whether Freeman C. Dodge did author-
ize the Wood River Bank to place the said
$5,812.89 to his own individual credit, when
l\lr. Hollister and hlockenbergcr both
swore he did so authorize, and F. C. Dodge
swore he was not in Wood River, Neb., on
July 2nd, 1887, the date of said credit, but
was in Omaha, l\‘eb.: that many of the ju-
ry were in doubt as to who was mistaken on
this point, and so expressed themselves; that
thereupon one G. C. Robinson, a member of
said jury, stated that he knew Mr. Hollister
and Mr. Hockenberger were mistaken as to
that point, for he was in Omaha, Neb., and
saw the said Freeman C. Dodge there himself
on July 2, 1887, and he could not have been
present in Wood River, Neb., on that day
and ordered said credit; that many of said
jury, and especially this atiiant, having con-
fldcnce in and relying upon the statement
of said C. C. Robinson, became satisfied that
said Hollister and llockenbor;.:er were mis-
taken on this point, and so may be mistaken
on other points, and thereupon he changed his
vote from the plaintiff's favor to and for a.
verdict for this defendant." There is also
an affidavit of W. ll. Thompson to the same
effect. There is also an atiidavit of J. H.
Wooiley that the jury were sent out Satur-
day evcning; that a number of them resid-
ed in the western part of the county, and
were very anxious to return home; that they
inquired of the bailiff the time when the
last train would be due going west, and
having ascertained the time the verdict was
returned before that hour, and presumably
without proper deliberation. The counter
atiidavit of Robinson is in the record as fol-
lows: “Chan C. Robinson, being sworn, do
poses and says that he was one of the panel
in the case of the Wood River Bank of :4":-
braska against Freeman 0. Dodge and
George F. Dodge, which case was tried and
submitted to the jury on the 15th day ot
February, 1890; that afliant has heard rea-l
the aflidavit of P. F. McCullough filed in and
attached to the motion in this case for a
new trial; that the matter in said afl'lda.vit,.
wherein said McCullough swore that this
atiiant said in the jury room while deliber-
ating on their verdict that he, Freeman C.
Dodge, could not have been at Wood River
on the 2d day of July, as he, Uhan Robin-
son, saw him in Omaha on that day, is whol-
ly without foundation, and untrue; that this
atflant did not say he saw said Dodge on the
2d day of July as aforesaid in Omaha; all
afliant did say on this subject in the delib-
eration of said jury was wholly in regard to
the evidence introduced on the trial. Aiiiant
further says that the jury and each of them,
so far as he knows and was informed, tried
all honest means to impress others differing
with them as to their views in the evidence
and the instructions of the court; that aft-
er deliberating several hours on the matter
they iinally agreed upon their verdict
brought into court and aifiant did not in
..._v way attempt (excl-pt by argument) to
convince others differing with him as to
what he thought was right on the evidence
in the case." It will be observed that .\lr.
Robinson does not make a full, unequivocal
denial of the charge against him. The util-
davit, in fact, is a skillful evasion of the
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Case No. l] DEClSIOYS TO BE BASED OY EVIDENCE. 
ants. Both of the defendants testify that 
the money was deposlted to the ct"e<lit of 
Dodge Bros., and not to the credit of l•'rce-
man. All the oftlccrs of the bank, some of 
whom appear to be disinterested, testlty that 
the credit was given to Freeman. We also ftnd 
that in the bank book of George Dodge with 
the plnintltr, which ls here in the record, 
these hop were not credited to Dodge Bl'Oll. 
The om.cen of tile bank testify that this 
book wu delivered t<• George Dodge a few 
WeE'ks afte1· the transaction; that he re-
turned, and stated that he nnd bis wife had 
looked over it, and found it correct, except 
an item of $:!0. George denies receiving tlle 
book witll about the mont.n of January after 
the transaction. He, in efl'ect, admits the 
'20 mlstake. The mode of doing business 
with the bank seems to have been as fol-
lows: When a shipment of hogs waa about 
to be made, the defendants would receive 
credlt for the supposed value of the hop, 
and were permitted to check the same out. 
It appears that about the 5th of September 
of that year Dodge Bros. made or weJ'9 
about to make a shipment of hogs to South 
Omaha, and received credit at the bank 
for ,600, a duplicate deposit Blip belng 
made. It ls claimed by the plaintltr that on 
the same day a tJeCOnd duplicate deposit for 
f{IOO was made. The defendant George 
Dodge testlfies, in etrect, that this was a 
second deposit, and that it was received 
from a second sblpment of hop. On the 
other hand, the cashier testifies that original 
credit was given in the morning, and the 
<lnplicnte sllp given to the defendant; 
that in the afternoon be came into the bank, 
and stated that he bad not received a dupli-
cate in the morning, and that thereupon the 
cashier issued a second duplicate sllp for 
~. and wrote the abbreviated word 
"dupL" instead of "trlpllcate" on it. The 
agent of the railway company at Wood 
River was called, and stated in substance 
that a record was kept in his om.ce of all 
sblpments made from there, and but one 
car of hogs was sWp11£-d by Dodge B1·os. at 
the time stated, and he in effect corrobo-
rates the testimony of the cashier. It ls 
very evldent, therefore, that Dodge is mis-
taken in -his testimony, nod that the cashier'• 
testimony on that point is correct, and the 
verdlct ls against the weight of evidence. 
2. The a1Hdavit of one of the jurors was 
filed 1n support of one of the grounds of the 
motion for a new trinl for the mlsconduct 
of certain jurors. It ls as follows: "P. F. 
)lcCullough, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and snys that he was & member of the jury 
to whom the above <.'a&e was tried on Fcbr. 
15th, 1800; that durlDg the dlsc:uisslon of the 
case in the jury room the que8tlon cume up 
as to whctlwr l<'reemnn C. Dodge did author-
ize the Wood Hlver Bank to 11lace the s:ild 
$;),812.89 to his own lndlvldual credit, when 
~Ir. Hollister and Hockenbergcr both 
!!wore he did so authorize, and F. C. Dulli;e 
swore he Wl\8 not in Wood River, Neb., on 
' 
July 2nd, 1887, the date of mid credit, but 
was in Omaha, Neb.: that man7 of the ju-
ry were in doubt as to who was mlstaken on 
this point, and 80 expn>ssed themselves; that 
thereupon one C. C. Robinson, a member of 
said jury, stated that he knew Mr. Hollister 
and Mr. Hockenberger were mistaken as to 
that point, for he wu in Omaha, Neb., and 
saw the said Freeman c. Dodge there himself 
on July 2, 1887, an1l he could not have been 
present in Wood River, Neb., on. that day 
nnd ordered said crl"dlt; that many of said 
jury, and especially thls atllant, having con-
fidence in and relying upon the statement 
of said O. O. Robln11on, became satisfied that 
81\ld Hollister and Hockenberger were ml&-
taken on this point, and 80 ma)· be mistaken 
on other points, and thereupon be changed his 
vote from the plalntllf's favor to and for a 
verdict for thl1 1lefendant." There is alllo 
an am.davit of W. H. Thompson to the same 
elTect. There ls also an am.davit of J. H. 
Woolley that the jury were sent out Satur-
day evening; that a number of them resid-
ed in the western part of the county, and 
were very an.xlous to return home; that they 
inquired of the ballltr the time wl>.en th" 
last train would be due going west, and 
having ascertained the time the verdict was 
returned before that hour, and presumatily 
without proper dellbe1-atlon. The counter 
am.davit of Robinson is in the record as fol-
lows: "Chun C. Robinson, being sworn, "e--
poses and sa1s that he was one of the panP.l 
in the cue of the Wood River Bank of •"')· 
braska against Freeman Q. Dodge anl1 
George F. Dodge, which case was tried amJ 
submitted to the jury on the 15th day ot 
~'ebruary, 1890; that am.ant has heard reuol 
the am.davit of P. F. McCullough ftled in and 
attached to the inotlon in thls case for a 
new trial; that the matter in said am.davit. 
wherein said McCullough swore that this. 
am.ant said in the jury room while delll>er-
a ting on their verdict that be, Freeman O. 
Dodge, eould not have been at Wood ltlver-
on the 2d day of July, as he, Chan Robin-
son, saw him in Omaha on that dny, ls wbol· 
ly without fowidatlon, and untrue; that tlliif 
am.ant did not say he saw said Dodge on the 
~d day of July as aforesaid in Omaha; all 
atftant did suy on this subject in tll.:i dellb-
l'ratlon of said jury was wholly in regard to-
tbe evidence introduced on the trial. Alliant 
further says that the jury and euch of them, 
so fur as be knows and was informed, tried 
all honest means to impress others dllTl'ring 
with them as to tl1<>lr '·lews In the eYidt•nce 
and the instructions of the eourt; that aft-
Pr dl'llbl'ratlng seYenll hours on the matter 
thpy tinally agrPed upon thPir \"l'l"tliet 
brought Into court and am.ant dlcl not In. 
.... \' way attempt (l'XCPpt by arguuwut l to 
,·ouvince others dlll'erlng wtu1 him as to 
what he thought was right on the evh\rnee 
i 11 the case." It will l>e observed that .\Ir. 
Robinson does not make a full, unl'quivoca.1 
denlnl of the charge ngulnst him. 'l'he nfll. 
davit, in fact, is a skillful evasion of the 
DEClSlONS TO BE BASED ON EVIDENCE.
[Case No. 1
mutter in issue. Hls statement that what
he said was wholly in relation to the evi-
dence in the case, and that he did not in any
way attempt, except by argument, to convince
others diifering from him, tails tar short of a
denial of the charges. In Richards v. State,
(i\'eb.) 53 N. W. Rep. 1028, it was held that
I. juror will not be permitted to state to his
fellow jurors, while they are consulei-mg
their verdict, facts in the case within his
own personal knowledge. He should make
the same known during the trial, and testi-
ty as a witness in the case. It is tor the
court to say what evidence is admissible in
a case, and the adverse party may desire
to cross-examine him. In any event, it is
his duty to be governed by the evidence in-
troduced on the trial, and the instructions
of the court. Otherwise, in case 0! an er-
roneous verdict, it would be impossible to
review the same. The judgment of the dis-
trict court is reversed, and the cause re-
manded tor further proceedings. The other
judges concur.
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DECJSIO~S TO BE BASED 0~ EVIDENCE. [C11se No. 1 
matter In llllme. Bia etatement that what 
he aald was wholly In relation to the evi-
dence lo tbe rase, and that be did uot In any 
way attempt, t>xcept by argumeut, to convince 
others dtt!'erlng from him, tails far short of a 
denial of the charges. In Richards v. State, 
(Neb.) 53 .N. W. Rep. 10'28, It was held that 
a juror will not be permitted to state to bis 
fellow jurors, while they are coru.11 •cmng 
their verdict, facts In the caae wlthl.u hi• 
own personal knowledge. He should u1:1ke 
the same known during the trial, and testl-
ty as & wltnesa In the case. It ls for the 
court to say what evidence 1s admlsslble In 
a case, and the adverse party may desire 
to cross-examine him. In any event, lt Is 
bis duty to be governed by the evidence In-
troduced on the trial, and the Instructions 
of the court. Otherwlse, In case of an er-
roneous verdlct, lt would be lmpoBBible to 
review the same. The judgment of the dla-
trlct court ls reversed, and the cause re-
manded for further proceedlnp. The othet 
ju~ea cow:ur. 
Case No. 2]
RELE VANCY.
l\'1(,II{I<lRSON v. GOULD.
(20 Atl. 86, 82 Me. 512.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. April 3,
1890.
_ Exceptions from supreme judicial court,
Somerset county.
Walton & Walton, for plaintiff. D. D.
Stewart, for defendan t. '
FOSTER, J. Action to recover upon a
promissory note for $500, dated February
9, 1876, payable on demand to E. B. .\'ick-
erson or bearer.
The defense was that the note was a
forgery: that the defendant never signed
it, and never had any dealings with the
alleged payee out of which this note grew
or could grow; that he never received any
money or any property of any kind from
him. except possibly a harness, and that
was allowed on rent due the defendant.
The plain tiff, son of E. B. Nlckerson, tes-
tified that he acquired title to the note in
the fall of 1887.
The exceptions show that much evidence
was~ introduced by both parties tending
to show the transactions and the nature
of them between E. B. Nlckerson and the
defendant in the years 1875 and 1876, as
bearing upon the probability or improb-
ability of the defendant having given the
note in suit.
It was claimed on the part of the plain-
tiff that the note in suit was given to take
up a $300 note and interest, and a balance
in cash at the time sufficient to make up
the sum for which the note was given;
and that the $300 note was made up of
$40 loaned defendant to pay for a mowing-
machine, $50 cash loaned at another time,
and asufiicient amount at the time the
note was given to make up the $300.
It appeared in evidence that in thelatter
part of May, 1888, in response to a letter,
E. B. Nlckerson went to the deiendant’s
house. and there he and the defendant
talked over the matter of the note; that
at that interview, us the defendant and
his wife testified, the defendant said he did
not remember of ever having a dollar of
him in his life; that Nlckerson then asked
the defendant if he did not remember of
his paying him a note of $200 at the Rus-
sell House, to which the defendant replied
that he never did; that Nlckerson then
said to the defendant: “D0n’t you re-
member my paying Henry Sawyer fifteen
dollars for you ? ” And to this the defend-
ant replied: “No,slr; I don’t rememberit,
and you never did."
The defendant then called the said Henry
Sawyer as 9. witness, and asked him if
Nlckerson at any time paid to him $15 for
the defendant. This item did not consti-
tute any part of the consideration of the
note in controversy.
To this inquiry, and the answer thereto,
the plaintiff's counsel objected, and the
court excluded the answer.
The defendant then offered to show by
the same witness that Nickerson never
paid him the $15 for the defendant, and,
objection being interposed by the counsel
for the plaintiff, the court excluded the evi-
dence.
To this ruling, excluding the answer and
the evidence offered. the defendant duly
excepted.
After the evidence had been offered and
excluded, the plaintiff called E. B. Nlcker-
son, and he testified in relation to the in-
terview at the defendant’s house substan-
tially as related by the defendant and his
wife; but the defendant did not thereafter
recall the witness Sawyer, nor again offer
his testimony. _
_. If the only bearing of the evidence offered
1
was to prove a collateral fact, it was not.'
relevant, and was properly excluded. The‘
question is whether it was relevant or not.
Collateral facts are not admissible. The
evidence must be relevant to the issue;
that is, to the facts put in controversy by
the pleadings. This rule prohibits thetrial
of collateral issues,—of facts not put in is-
sue by the p1eadings,—and excludes evi-
dence of such as are incapable of affording
any reasonable presumption or inference
as to the principal fact or matter in dis-
pute. It is oftentimes difllcult to decide
what is and what is not relevant. It de-
pends somewhat upon the nature of the
issue involved. The relevancy of evidence
of other facts, as bearing upon the prob-
ability or non-probability of the main fact
in issue, has been one of the most trouble-
some questions for the courts to decide.
“ Relevancy, "as defined by the text-writ-
ers upon evidence, “is that which conduces
to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis; n
pertinent hypothesis being one which, if
sustained, would logically influence theis-
sue. * * " If the hypothesis set upfor the
defense is forgery, then all facts which are
conditions of forgery are relevant. A
party, for instance, sued on a bill sets up
forgery. To meet this hypothesis, it is
admissible for the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant, at the time of the making
of the bill, was trying to borrow money.
" " “ Hence it is relevant to put in evi-
dence any circumstance which tends to
make the proposition at issue either more
or less improbable," (1 Whart. Ev. §§ 20,
21;) and in accordance with this principle
it was held by this court, in Trull v. True.
33 Me. 367, that “ testimony cannot be ex-
cluded as irrelevant which would have a
tendency. however remote, to establish
the probability or improbabillty of the
fact in controversy.” Tucker v. Peaslee.
36 N. H. 167, 168. So in Huntsman v. Nich-
ols. 116 Mass 521, where it was held that.
although the authenticity of the note in
suit was the only issue, yet the business
transactions between the parties had some
bearing upon the probability of the in-
dorsement having actually been made by
the defendant, and were therefore admissi-
ble in evidence. This same principle. is es-
tablished in Eaton v. Telegraph Co., 68
Me. 63, 67; State v. McAllister, 24 Me. 139;
$tate v. Witham, 72 Me. 531, 537; ‘Marcy v.
Barnes, 16 Gray, 161. Accordingly, where
the issue is whether a certain contract was
made between the parties, and the evi-
dence is conflicting as to what the con-
tract was. it has been held competent for
the defendant to show the value or char-
acter of the property which he was to re-
ceive, as compared with that in the con-
tract claimed by the plaintiff, as tending
to show the improbability of the defend-
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Case No. 2] RELEVANCY. 
NICKERSON v. GOULD. 
(20 At!. 86, 82 Me. 512.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. April 8, 
1890. 
. Exceptions from supreme Judicial court, 
Somerset county. 
Walton & Walton, for plaintiff. D. D. 
Bt,ewa,rt, for defendant. · 
FOSTER, J. Action to recover upon a 
promls1mry note for $500, dated February 
9, 1876, payable on demand to E. B. Nlck-
ersun or bearer. 
The defense was that the note was a 
forgery: that the defendant n~ver signed 
It, and never had any dealings with the 
allt>ged pe.yee out of which this note grew 
or could grow; that be never received any 
money or any property of ony kind from 
him, except possibly a harness, and that 
was ollowed on rent due the defendant. 
'rhe plain tin, eon ot E. B. Nickerson, tes-
tified that he acquired title to the note In 
the fall of 1887. 
The exceptions show that much evidence 
was• Introduced by both parties tendlnK 
to show the tranee.ctlone and the nature 
of them between E. B. Nickerson and the 
defendant in the years l87:i and 1876, as 
bearlnK upon the probability or improb-
ability of the defendant having given the 
note In suit. 
It W&R claimed on the part of the plain-
tiff that the note In suit was given to take 
up a $300 note and interest, and a balance 
In cash at the time 11utHclent to make up 
the sum for which the note was given; 
and that the $300 note wa.R macte up of 
$40 loaned defendant to pay for a mowlng-
machlne, $rJO cash loaned at another time, 
and a suftlclent amount at the time the 
note was given to make up the $3110. 
It appeared in evidence that In thelatter 
part of May, 1888, In response to a letter, 
E. B. Nickerson went to the defendant's 
house. and there he and the defendant 
talkffi over the matter of the nute; that 
at that inter¥1ew, as the defendant and 
his wife testified, the defendant said he did 
not remember of ever having a dollar of 
him In his life; that Nickerson then asked 
the defendant If he did not remember of 
hh1 paying him a note of $200 at the Rus-
sell House, to whil'h the defendant replied 
that be never did; that Nickerson then 
said to the defendant: "Don't you re-
member my paying Henry Sawyer fifteen 
dollars for you?" And to thi• the defend-
ant replied: "No, sir; I don't remember it, 
and you never did." 
Thedefendant then<'alled thesaid Henry 
Sawyer ae a wltne'ls, and asked him If 
Nlckenwn at any time paid to him $15 for 
the defendant. '!'his item did not com1tl-
tute any part of the consideration or the 
note In controversy. 
To this inquiry, and the answer thereto, 
the phl.lntlff's counsel objected, and the 
court excluded the answer. 
The defendant then offered to Rhow by 
the 1mme witnPBS that Nickerson never 
paid him the $15 for the defendant, llnd, 
olJj<'ctlon being Interposed by the counsel 
for the plaintiff, the court excluded the evi-
dence. 
6 
To this ruling, excluding the a.newer and 
the evidence onered, the defendant duly 
excepted. 
After the evidence had been orJered and 
excluded, the ple.lntln ca.lied E. B. Nlr.ker-
son, and he teRtlfled in relation to the in-
terview at the defendant's house substan-' 
tlally as related by the defendant e.nd hie 
wife; but the defendant did not thereafter 
recall the witness Sawyer, nor again offer 
bis testimony. · . 
. If the only bearing of the el'ldence offered 
was to prove a collateral fact, It was nof 
relevant, and was properly excluded. 'rhe" 
question le whether It was relevant or not. 
Collateral facts are not admissible. The 
evidence must be relevant to the Issue; 
that 111, to the facts put in contro¥ersy by 
the pleadings. This rule prohibits thetrlal 
of collateral leeues,-of facts not put in i11-
eue by the pleadlnge,-and excludes evi-
dence of such as are Incapable of affording 
any reatmnable presumption or inference 
as to the prlnclpul fact or 01atter In dl11-
put.e. It ls oftentimes dlfHcult to decide 
what le and whet le not rele\'ant. It de-
pends somewhat upon the natnre of the 
issue Involved. The rele\·ancy of evidence 
of other facts, as bearing npon the proh-
ablll t.v or non-probability of the 111Rln fact 
In h11me, has been one of the most trouble-
some questions for the court11 to decide. 
"Relevancy, "as defined bythetext-wrlt-
ersup0n evklence, "le that which conduce11 
to the proof of a pPrtinent hypothesis; a 
pertinent hypothesl11 tielng one which, if 
eui1tal11ed, would logically Influence the is-
sue. • • • If the h;\'pothesill Ret up for the 
defense le forgery, then all facts which are 
conditions of forgery are relevant. A 
party, for Instance, sued on a blll sets up 
forgery. To meet this hypothesis, it i11 
acl1i1isslble for the plalntin to prove that 
the defenclant, at the time or the making 
of the blll, was trying to borrow money. 
• • • Hence It IA relevant to put in evi-
dence any circumstance which tend11 to 
nrnke the propollitlon at Issue t!lther more 
or les11 improbable," (1 Whart. Ev. §§ 20, 
21;) and In accordance with this principle 
It was held by this court, In 'l'rull v. True. 
S.'i Me. 367. thnt "testimony cannot be ex-
cluded as Irrelevant which would have a 
tendency. however remote, to establish 
the probability or lmprobaLlllty of the 
fact In controverRy." Tucker v. Peaslee. 
36 N. H. 167, HIR. So In Huntsman v. Nich· 
olR. 116 Ma.Rs 521, where It wa11 held that. 
al though the authPntlclty of the note in 
suit was the only issue, yet the buslnes11 
transactions between the parties had some 
bearing npon the probablllty of the in-
dorsement ha \"'Ing actually been made by 
the defendant, and were therefore athnlesl-
ble in evidence. Thie same principle is es-
tablished in Eaton v. Telegraph Co., fi8 
Me. 63, 67; State v. McAlllster, 24 Me. laD; 
State v. Witham, 72 Me. 5.'il, 5!~7; !\iar('y v. 
Barnes, 16 Gray, 161. Accorcllngly, where 
the Issue is whether a certain contra.ct was 
made between the parties, and the evi-
dence ls contllctlng as to what the con-
tract was, It has be!'n held compc~tent for 
the 1lefendant to show the value or char-
e.cter of the property which he was to re-
ceive, as compared with that In the <"ou-
tral't claimed by the plalntiH, 1111 te111ling 
to show the lmprobab11lty of the defend-
RELEVAN CY.
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ant having made the contract as alleged
by the plaintiff. Upton v. Winchester, 106
Mass. 330; Norris v. Spoiford, I27 Mass.
R5; Bradbury v. Dwight. 3 Metc. 31; Par-
ker v. L‘-oburn, 10 Allen. 82.
Moreover, in cases where knowledge or
intent of the party wasa material fact,
evidence of other facts happening before
or after the transactions in issue has
been received in evidence, although they
had no direct or apparent connection with
it. Such facts, if they tend to establish
knowledge or intent, when that is mate-
rial. although apparently collateral and
foreign to the main issue, nevertheless
have a direct bearing, and are admissible.
Thus in Cook v. Moore. ll Cush. 213, 216,
BIGELOW, J ., says: “ Whenever the intent
of a party forms part of the matter in is-
sue upon the pleadings. evidence may be
given of other acts not in issue. provided
they tend to establish the intent of the
party in doing the acts in question. " And
see Nichols v. Baker. 75 Me. 334; Jordan V.
Osgood, 109 Mass. 45?; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 53;
1 \\'hart. Ev. §§ 30-32.
Applying these principles to thequestion
before us, we think the evidence offered
was admissible.
The pleadings denied the genuineness of
the note, and all dealings with the alleged
payee out of which the note could grow,
or the receipt of any money from him.
True, the central point of the issue was
whether or not the note was a forgery.
Around this revolved other facts, intro-
duced by both parties, bearing on the
probability or improbabillty of the defend-
ant having signed the note in suit.
Such evidence was admissible as tending
to lead the mind of the jury to a correct
conclusion upon the real issue presented.
The dealings of the parties, both prior and
subsequent to the date of the note, be-
came a proper subject of inquiry in this
connection. The defendant denied that he
ever signed the note, or had any dealings
whatever with the alleged payee out of
which the note originated. He gives an
interview with Nickerson, and states what
he claims was said at that interview by
Nickerson. At the interview Nickerson vir-
tually asserted a fact, although in an in-
terrogatory form, that he had paid one
Henry Sawyer $15 for the defendant. He
asserted it as a transaction with the de-
fendant. This, the defendant claims, was
a fraudulent assertion to obtain an admis-
sion from him of what was not true in or-
der to affect the main issue before the jury.
it was, in effect, the assertion of a fact to
the defendant bearing on the issue of the
genuineness of the note, and was not coi-
lateral. Either party had a right to prove
the truth or falsehood of the assertion. If
it was not true, the defendant had a. right to
show that the statement made to him was
false; and, in support of his own testi-
mony in denial of its truth, he had a right to
call the man as a. witness to whom bicker-
son claimed he made the payment. Its
tendency in establishing the probability or
improhability of the main fact in contro-
versy may have been remote, but it was
nevertheless admissible. Its weight was
for the jury. .
Exceptions sustained.
PE l'ERS,C. J., and WALTON, VIRGIN,
EM ERY, and HASKELL, JJ., concurred.
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RELEVANCY. [Cllse Xo. 2 
ant ha vlng made the contract as allf'l(ed 
by the plaintlft. Upton v. Wlnche11ter, 106 
Mass. 330; Norris v. Spoftord, 127 Ma88. 
80; Bradbury v. Dwight, S Mete. 81; Par-
ker v. Coburn, 10 Allen, 82. 
Moreover, In cases where knowledge or 
Intent of the party was a material fa.ct, 
evidence of other facts happening before 
or alter the transactions In Issue has 
been received In evidence, although thE>y 
had nodlre<'t or apparent connection with 
It. Such facts, tr they tend to establish 
knowledge or Intent, when that Is mate-
rial, although apparently collateral and 
foreign to the main Issue, nevertheleM 
have a direct bearing, and are Rdml881ble. 
Thus In Cook v. Moore. 11 Cush. 213, 216, 
BmF.r.ow, .J., says: .. Whenever the Intent 
of a party forms part of the matter In ls-
1111e upon the pleadings, evidence may be 
given of other acts not in Issue. provided 
they tend to establish the Intent of the 
party lo doing the acts In question." And 
see ~lchols v. Baker. 76 Me. 334; Jordan v. 
011good, l09 Mass. 457; 1 Green!. Ev.§ 58; 
1 \\'hart. E\·. §§ !Jlh'i:J. 
Applying these principles to theque11tlon 
before ua, we think the evidence oftt>red 
was admlsidble. 
The pleadings dt>nled the genulueut'SI! of 
the note, and all dettllngs with the alleged 
payee out of which the note could grow, 
or the 1-ecelpt of any money from him. 
True, the central point of the issue "'aa 
whether or not the note was a forgery. 
Around this revolved other JactR, Intro-
duced by both parties, bearing on the 
probability or lmprobablllty of the defend-
ant having signed the note In suit. 
Such evldencewaa admlulble aa tendlq 
to IE>ad the mind of the Jury to a correct 
conclusion upon the real Issue presented. 
The dealings of the parties, both prior and 
subsequent to the date of the note, be-
came a proper suhjf"ct of Inquiry In this 
connection. The defendant denied that he 
ever signed the note, or had any deallnp;s 
whatever with the alleged payee out of 
which the note orlginn t.et1. He gl "es an 
interview with Nickerson, an cl states what · 
be claims was said at that lntervluw by 
Slckerson. At the interview Nickerson vir-
tually asserted a fact, although In an ln-
terrop:atory form, that be had paid one 
Benr.v Sawyer $15 for the defendant. He 
asserted It as a tra osactlon with the de-
fendant. This, the defem1ant claims, was 
a fr1111dulent BBRertlon to obtain an admis-
sion from him of what was not true In or-
der to affect the main Issue before the Jury. 
It was, In enect, the a11&ertlon of a fact to 
the <lefendant bearing on the IBBue of the 
genuineneRH of the note, and WRH not col-
lateral. Either party had R right to prove 
the truth or falsehood of the assertion. If 
It wa11 not true, the defendant had a right to 
s-how that the statement made to him waa 
fall!lt'; and, In support of hie own teRti-
mony In denial of Its truth, he had a rlgh t to 
call the man aa a. witness to whom Mcker-
son claimed he made the payment. Its 
tendency In e11tnhllshlng the probability or 
lmprohahillty of the main fact In contro-
''.ersy may have been nnnote, but It was 
nevertheless admissible. lti:J weight was 
for the Jury. . 
Exceptions sustained. 
PEl"ERS,C .• T., and WALTON, VIRGIN, 
! EMERY, and HASKELL, JJ., concurred. 
7 
Case No. 3]
RELEVAN CY.
COMMONWEALTH V. ROBINSON.
(16 N. E. 452, 146 Mass. 571.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Middlesex. May 3, 1888.
Exceptions from supreme judicial court,
Middlesex county; Field and Knowlton,
Judges.
Indictment against Sarah J. Robinson for
the murder of her brother-in-law, Prince
Arthur Freeman, by poisoning. Trial in
the supreme judicial court, where the de-
fendant was found guilty, and she alleged
exceptions.
Andrew J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., for the
Commonwealth. J. B. Goodrich and D. F‘.
Crane, for defendant.
C. ALLEN, J. We have given to this case
a degree of attention commensurate with its
importance. and have come to the conclusion
that there was no error in the conduct of
the trial. While it is well settled in this
commonwealth that, on the trial of an in-
dictment. the government cannot be allowed
to prove other independent crimes, for the
purpose of showing that the defendant is
wicked enough to commit the crime on trial,
this rule does not extend so far as to ex-
clude evidence of acts or crimes which are
shown to have been committed as part of or ‘
in pursuance of the same common purpose.
Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 18; Uoln. v.
Blood, 141 Mass. 575, 6 N. E. 769. In such
cases there is a distinct and significant pro-
bative effect resulting from the continuance
of the same plan or scheme, and from the
doing of other act in pursuance thereof.
it is somewhat of the nature of the acts
cially of preparations for the commission
of the crime which is the subject of the in-
dictment. If, for example, it could be shown
that a defendant had formed a settled pur-
pose to obtain certain property, which could
his purpose. But such purpose may also be
shown by circumstantial evidence. It is,
indeed, usually the case that intentions,
plans, purposes, can only be shown in this
way. Express declarations of intention, or
confessions, are comparatively rare; and
therefore all the circumstances of the de-
fendant‘s situation, conduct, speech, silence,
motives. may be considered. The plan it-
self, and the acts done in pursuance of it.
may all be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence if they are of themselves relevant and
material to the case on trial. And in such a
case it makes no dii'i'erence whether the pre-
liminary acts are criminal or not. Other-
wise the greater the criminal the greater his
immunity. Such preliminary acts are not
competent because they are criminal, but
because they are relevant to the issue on
trial; and the fact that they are criminal
does not render them irrelevant. Suppose,
for further example, one is charged with
breaking a bank, and there is evidence that
he had made preliminary examinations from
a neighboring room; the fact that his occu-
pation of such room was accomplished by a.
criminal breaking and entering would not
render the evidence incompetent. It is
sometimes said that such evidence may be
introduced where the several crimes form
part of one entire transaction; but it is per-
haps better to say, where they have some
connection with each other, as a part of the
same plan, or induced by the same motive.
Precedent acts which render the commis-
sion of the crime charged more easy, more
safe, more certain, more effective, to pro-
duce the ultimate result which formed the
general motive and inducement, if done with
that intention and purpose, have such a.
, connection with the crime charged as to be
or declarations of intention, but more espe- ‘
only be got by doing several preliminary .
things, the last of which in the order of
time was criminal, the government might
show, on his trial for the commission of
that last, criminal act, that he had formed
taining the property, and that he had done
all of the preliminary things which were
necessary to that end. This would be quite
plain if the evidence of the purpose were
direct and clear; as if a letter in the de-
fendant‘s handwriting should be discovered,
stating in terms to a confederate his pur-
pose to obtain the property by the doing of
the several successive acts, the last of which
was the criminal act on trial. In such case
no one would question that proof might be
offered that the defendant had done all the
preliminary acts referred to, which were
admissible, though they are also of them-
selves criminal. We do not understand that
this general view, stated thus, is distinctly
controverted by the counsel for the prisoner;
and it is supported by a great number of
decisions, only a few of which are here
cited. Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass. 222; Com.
v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451; Swan v. Com.,
104 Pa. St. 220; (ioerson v. Com., 99 Pa. St.
388; Shaffner v. (‘0m., 72 Pa. St. 60; Mayer
. v. People, 80 N. 1'. 3t'>i, 375. See, also, .lor-
the purpose to accomplish the result of ob- 7
dan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457. For cases
where such connection was not shown, but
where the principle was recognized, ee
Com. v. Jackson. 132 Mass. 16; State v.
Lapage. 57 N. H. 245, 295; People v. Sharp,
14 N. E. 319, (opinion by Peckham, J.) The
ruling at the trial, therefore, was correct,
that if evidence should be offered and ad-
mitted tending to show that the prisoner
knew. before her sister’s death, of the ex-
istence of the insurance, and that it could
be transferred on the death of her sister to
herself, and made payable to herself on the
death of Freeman. and that, before her sis-
necessary steps in the accomplishment of ter‘s death, she had formed a plan or inten-
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Case No. 3] RXLEVANCY. 
COM.YO!li"WEALTB T. ROBI!llSON. 
(16 N. E. 462, 146 Ma.. 571.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of MaallachW!ett& 
liiddleeex. .Ma7 3, 1888. 
Exceptions from supreme Judicial court. 
Middlesex county; Field and Knowlton, 
Judges. 
Indictment agalut Sarah J. Robinson for 1 
the murder of her brother-In-law, Prince 1 
Artbnr Freeman, by poisoning. '!'rial In ; 
the supreme Judicial court, where the de- ! 
fendaDt wu found guilty, and she alleged : 
exceptlo1111. : 
Andrew J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., for the 
Commonwealth. J. B. Goodrich and D. F. 1 
Crane, for defendant. 
0. ALLEN, J. We have given to this eaee , 
a degree of attention commensurate with Its 
Importance, and have come to the roncluslon 
that there was no error In the conduct of 
the trial. While it is well settled In this 
commonwealth that, on the trial of an in-
dictment, the sovernment cannot be allowed 
to prove other independent crimes, for the 
purpoae of showing that the defendant ls 
wicked enough to commit the crime on trial, 
this rule does not extend so far as to ex-
clude evidence of acts or crimes which are 
shown to have been committed u part of or 
In pursuance of the same common purpoee. 
Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 18; Com. T. 
Blood, 141 Mass. 575, 6 N. E. 769. In such 
cases there Is a distinct and significant pro-
bative effect resulting from the continuance 
of the same plan or scheme, and from the 
doing of other acts in pursuance thereof. 
It ls somewhat of the nature of the acts 
or declarations of Intention, but more espe-
cially of preparations for the comml881on 
of the crime which ls the subject of the In-
dictment. If, for example, It could be 11hown 
that a defendant had tormed a settled pur-
pose to obtain certain property, which <.'Ould 
only be got by doing several preliminary 
things, th~ last of which In the order of 
time was criminal, the government might 
show, on bis trial for the commission of 
that last, criminal act, that be bad formed 
the purpose to accomplish the result of ob-
taining the property, and that he had done 1 
all of the preliminary things which were i 
nece88&ry to that end. This would be quite · 
plain If the evidence of the purpose were 
dlre<-t and clear; as If a letter In the de-
temlant's handwriting should be discovered, 
stating In terms to a confederate his pur-
pose to obtain the property by the doing of 
the several successive acts, the la8t of which 
was the criminal act on trial. In such case 1 
no one would question that proof might be I 
offered that the defendant had done all the 
prellmlnary acts referred to, which were 
necessary steps In the accomplishment of j 
8 
hie purpose. But such purpose ma,r also be 
shown by circumstantial evldt>nce. It ls, 
lnd1't'd, usually the caae that lntent1oll8, 
plan8, purposes, can only be shown In this 
way. Exprees declaratlou of Intention, or 
confessioDB, are comparatively rare; and 
therefore all the clreumstances of the de-
fendant's situation, conduct, epeech, silence, 
motives, may be considered. The plan It· 
self, and the acts done In pursuance of It. 
may all be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence If they are or themtM•lves relevant and 
material to the C1l8e on trial. And In such a 
case It makes no difference whether the pre-
liminary acts are criminal or not. Other-
wise the greater the criminal the greater hla 
Immunity. Such preliminary acts are not 
l'Ompetent becaUBe they are criminal, but 
because they are relevant to the lsaue on 
trial; and the fact that they are criminal 
does not rendPr them lrn>levant. Suppoee, 
for turtlter example, one ls charged with 
brt•aklng a bank, and there 18 evidence that 
he had made preliminary examinatloDB from 
a neighboring room; the fact that hlB occu-
pation of such room wu aceompllahed by a 
criminal breaking and entering would not 
render the evidence 1.ncompetent. It la 
sometimes said that such evidence may be 
introduced where the several crimes form 
part of one entire transaction; but It ls per-
haps better to say, where they have some 
connection with each other, as a part of the 
same plan, or Induced by the same motive. 
Prt'Cedent acta which render the commJ&. 
slon of the crime charged more easy, more 
safe, more certain, more effective, to pro-
duce the ultimate result which formed the 
general motive and Inducement, If done with 
that Intention and purpose, have such a 
l'Onnectlon with the crime charged u to be 
adml11&lble, though they are also of them-
self'es criminal. We do not understand that 
this general view, stated thus, Is distinctly 
controverted by the counsel for the pri~oner; 
and It Is supported by a great number of 
decisions, only a few of which are here 
cited. Com. v. Scott, 123 Mus. 222; Com. 
v. Choate, 105 llass. 451; Swan v. Com., 
104 Pa. St. 220; Ooerson v. Com., 99 Pa. St. 
388; Shaffner v. Com., i2 Pa. St. 60; Mayer 
v. People, 80 N. Y. 364, 375. Bee, also, Jor-
dan v. Osgood, 109 M&88. 457. For cuBeS 
where such connection was not shown, but 
where the principle was recognized, see 
Com. v. Jack110n, 132 Mass. 16; State v. 
J..apajl'e. 57 N. H. 245, 295; People v. Sharp, 
14 N. E . am, (opinion by Peckham, J.) The 
ruling at the trial. therefore, wu correct, 
that If evidence should be offered and ad-
mitted tending to show that the prisoner 
knew, before her sister's death, of the ex-
l11tence of the Insurance, and that It could 
be transferred on the death of her sister to 
herself, and made payable to herself on the 
dellth ot FrN•man. and that, before her sis-
ter's death, sbe bad formed a plan or lDten-
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tion to obtain this insurance for her own
benefit. and this plan or intention continued
to exist or be operative up to the time of
Freeman’s death, then that evidence might
be offered to show that her sister died of
poison. and that the prisoner administered
it, as a part of the method employed by her
to carry this plan or intention into effect, in
connection with evidence that she adminis-
tered poison to Freeman, as another part of
the same plan and with the same general
intention.
The court therefore properly held that evi-
dence of this knowledge and plan or inten-
tion on the part of the prisoner should first
be offered, that the court might judge wheth-
er it was sufiicient to warrant the introduc-
tion of evidence that the sister died of poison
administered by the prisoner. This claim and
offer of proof on the part of the government,
and the arguments of counsel, and the said
ruling of the court thereon, were all made in
open court, in the prisoner's presence, but in
the absence of the jury. The government ac-
cordingly proceeded to introduce, with its
other evidence to the jury, certain testimony
in support of said alleged scheme or inten-
tion on the part of the prisoner, which is
stated in the bill of exceptions; and, after
said testimony had been received, it offered
evidence tending to prove the death of the
prisoner's sister by arsenic knowingly admin-
istered by the prisoner. This evidence was
objected to. on the ground that no sufiicient
evidence had been offered in proof of said ai-
letred scheme or intention, and on other
grounds; but the court overruled the objec-
tion, and admitted the evidence, subject to
the prisoner's exception. In seeking a new
trial on account of the admission of this tes-
llmony, the argument of the prisoner‘s coun-
sel, briefly stated, is as follows: Preliminary
evidence must be given to show that the
acts offered to be proved were done in pur-
nuance and as a part of some plan or scheme
to accomplish the particular result. It is the
exclusive province of the court to determine
if such evidence is suflicient. The decision
of the court, admitting the evidence, is sub-
ject to revision in the present case; the tes-
timony upon which that decision was found-
ed having‘ been reported for the purpose. It
is not enough that there was some evidence,
but the preliminary evidence must amount to
proof. The ruling of the court did not ex-
pressly aiiirm the necessity of such proof;
that is. as we understand the argument, the
necessity of such amount or degree of proof.
And. finally, this court, upon a revision of
the preliminary evidence reported, should now
hold that it was not sufficient to warrant the
introduction of evidence to show that the
prisoner poisoned her sister, Mrs. Freeman.
The last three of these propositions are the
only ones which need an_v further attention.
A consideration of the nature of the question
which is presented to the court when it is
called upon to decide upon a preliminary ques-
tion of fact, in order to determine whether of-
fered evidence shaii be received, will show
that its determination reaches no further than
merely to decide whether the evidence may
or may not go to the jury. The decision upon
this particular question, of the admissibility
of the evidence, is ordinarily concluive, un-
less the judge sees fit to reserve or report
the question for future revision. Dole v.
Thurlow, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 157; Gorton v.
Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508, 511; O'Connor v. Hal-
iinan, 103 Mass. 547; Walker v. Curtis, 116
Mass. 98. And in this respect the rule is the
same in criminal cases. Com. v. Hills, 10
Cush. 530; Com. v. Mullins, 2 Allen, 295;
Com. v. Morreli, 99 Mass. 542; Com. v. Cul-
ver, 126 Mass. 464; Com. v. Gray, 129 Mass.
474. But where, in a case like the present,
the admissibility of testimony depends upon
the determination of some prior fact by the
court. there is no rule of law that, in order
to render the testimony admissible, such prior
fact must be established by a weight of evi-
dence which will amount to a demonstration,
and shut out all doubt or question of its ex-
istence. It is only necessary that there,
should be so much evidence as to make it
proper to submit the whole evidence to the
jury. The fact of the admission of the evi-
dence by the judge does not in a legal sense
give it any greater weight with the jury. It
does not affect the burden of proof, or change
the duty of the jury in weighing the whole
evidence. They must still be satisfied. in a
criminal case, upon the whole evidence, be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Ordinarily, ques-
tions of fact are exclusively for the jury, and
questions of law for the court. But when,
in order to pass upon the admissibility of evi-
dence. the determination of a preliminary
question of fact is necessary, the court, in the
due and orderly course of the trial, must
necessarily determine it, as far as is neces-
sary for that purpose, and usually without
the assistance, at that stage, of the jury. If,
under such circumstances, testimony is ad-
mitted against a party’s objection, it may
often happen that he may still ask the jury
to disregard it.
i\'u1nei'0us illustrations of the foregoing
view might be given, but a few must suf-
fice us. in an indictment for murder. where
the question was as to the admissibility of
certain statements in the nature of confes-
sions, which were objected to as having been
obtained by means of inducements, it was
held by this court as follows: “When a con-
fession is offered in a criminal case, and the
defendant objects that he was induced to
make it by threats or promises, it necessarily
devolves upon the court to determine the pre-
llmluary question whether such inducements
are shown. " ' ' If the presiding judge
is satisfied that there were such inducements,
the confession is to be rejected; if he is not
satisfied, the evidence is admitted. But, if
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Uon to obtain this Insurance for her own 
benefit, and tblB plan or Intention continued 
to exist or be operative up to the Ume of 
Freeman's death, then that evidence might 
be olrered to show that her sister died of 
poliion, and that the prlaoner administered 
tt, as a part of the method employed by her 
to carry this plan or Intention Into effect, In 
-<.'Onnectlon with evidence that she adminis-
tered poison to Freeman. as another part of 
the same plan and with the same general 
lntentloo. 
The court therefore properly held that evi-
dence of thlB knowledge and plan or Inten-
tion on the part of the prisoner should 11.rst 
be offered, that the court might judge wheth-
er It was sufllclent to warrant the Introduc-
tion Of evidence that the Bister died of poison 
administered by the prisoner. This claim and 
~ffer of proof on tbe part of the government, 
and the arguments of counsel, and the said 
rullng of the ('()Urt thereon, were all made lo 
Gpen court, In the prisoner's presence, but In 
the absence of the Jury. The government ac-
~lngly proceeded to lntrodu<-e, with Its 
Gther evidence to ·the jury, certain testimony 
hi support of said alleged scheme or Inten-
tion on the part of the prisoner, which ls 
l!tated In the btll of ex<'eptlons; and, after 
aald testimony bad been received, It olrered 
evidence tending to prove the death of the 
prl8ooer'11 slBter by arsenl<' knowingly admin-
istered by the prisoner. Thie evidence was 
i>bJt>eted to, on the ground that no 11u1ft<•lent 
evidence had been offered In proof of said al-
leged llCheme or Intention, and on other 
xronnda; but the court overruled the objec-
tion, and admitted the evidence, subject to 
the prlaoner's exception. In seeking a new 
trial on account of the admlMlon of this tea-
tlmony, the argument of the prisoner's couo-
tlel, briefly stated, 18 as follows: Preliminary 
evidence must be glv.en to 11bow that the 
acts offered to be proved were done In pur-
llU&nce and a11 a part of some plan or BCheme 
to acrompllBh the particular result. It Is the 
aclUlllve province of the court to determine 
If such evidence ls suftlcient. The decision 
~t the <'ourt, admitting the evidence, is sub-
ject to revision In the present case; the tes-
nmouy upon which that decision was fonnd-
«I having been reported for the lJUr)JURe. It I 
IR not enough that there was some evidence, 
but the preliminary evidence must amount to 
proof. The ruling ot the court did not ex-
pressly aftl.rm the neceRSlty of such proof; 
that ls, as we understand the argument, the 
neceatty of such amount or degree of proof. 
And. finally, tbl11 court, upon a revision ot 
the preliminary evidence reported, should now 
hold that It was not sufficient to warrant the 
Introduction of evidence to show that the 
11rh10ner poisoned her sister, Mrs. Freeman. 
TbP laat three of these propositions are the 
<mly ones wblch need any further attention. 
A conalderatlon of the nature of the question 
Whleh la preaented to the court when lt ls 
called upon to decide upon a preliminary ques-
tion of tact, In order to determine whether of· 
fered evidence shall be recelYed, will show 
that Its determination reac•hes no further than 
merely to decide whether the evidence may 
or may not go to the jury. The decision upon 
thlB particular question, of the adml88lblllty 
of the evldt>nce, ls ordinarily conclusive, un-
less the judge sees flt to rese"e or report 
the question for future revision. Dole v. 
Thurlow, 12 Mete. (MallS.) 157; Gorton v. 
Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508, 511; O'Connor v. Hal-
linan, 103 M888. 547; Walker v. Curtis, 116 
Mass. 98. And In this respect the rule Is the 
same In criminal cases. Com. v. Hllls, 10 
Cush. 580; Com. v. Mulllns, 2 Allen, 295; 
Com. v. Morrell, 99 Matlll. 542; Com. v. Cul-
ver, 126 Ma118. 464; Com. v. Gray, 129 llass. 
474. But where, In a case like the present, 
the admissibility of testimony depend& upon 
the determination of some prior fact by the 
court, there Is no rule of law that, In order 
to render the testimony adml8slble, such prior 
fact must be establlsbed by a weight of evi-
dence which wlll amount to a demonstration, 
and shut out all doubt or question of Its ex-
istence. It Is only necessary that there. 
should be so much evidence 88 to make It 
proper to submit the whole evidence to the 
jury. The fact of the admission of the evi-
dence by the judge does not In a legal sense 
give It any greater weight with the jury. It 
does not aft'ect the burden of proof, or change 
the duty of the jury lo weighing the whole 
evidence. They must still be satisfied, In a 
criminal case, upon the whole evidence, be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Ordinarily, ques-
tions of fact are exclusively for the jury, and 
questions of law for the court. But when, 
In order to pass upon the admi88lblllty of evi-
dence, the determination of a preliminary 
question of fact ls necessary, the court, In the 
due and orderly coul'Be of the trial, must 
nece1188rlly determine It, a11 far as ls neces-
sary for that purpose, and usually without 
the assistance, at that stage, of the jury. If, 
under sm·h circumstances, testimony ls ad-
mitted against a party's objection, It may 
often happen that he may still aak the jury 
to dlsrei.,rard It. 
Numerous Illustrations of the foregoing 
view might be given, but a few must suf-
fice us. In an Indictment for murder. where 
the question was as to the admissibility of 
certain stntemt>nts In the nature of confes-
sions, which were objected to as having been 
obtained by means of lodu<'ements, It was 
held by this eourt as follows: "When a con-
fession Is oft'erl'd in a criminal case, and the 
defendant objects that be was Induced to 
make It by threats or promh1es, It necessarily 
devolves upon the court to dett>rmlne th!! pre-
llmtnnry 11uestlon whether such inducements 
are shown. • • • If the presiding judge 
ls sntbdled thnt there were su<'l1 lndul'ements, 
the <'Ollfesslon ls to be rejected; If be Is not 
satisfied, the evidence ls admitted. But, If 
8 
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there is an_v conflict of testimony or room for
doubt, the court will submit the question to
the jury, with instructions that. if they are
satisfied that there were such inducements.
they shall disregard and reject the confes-
sion." (‘om. v. Piper, 120 .\iass. 190. Simi-
lar questions arise when it is objected that a
witness is not of sufiicient capacity to testify
intelligently; or that a third person, whose
declarations or acts are oflfered in evidence
against a party, was not a partner, agent, or
co-conspirator, and did not stand in such a
relation as to make his declarations or acts
admissible; and in other cases. In Com. v.
Brown, 14 Gray, 419, which was an indict-
ment for causing the death of a woman by
means of an attempt to procure a miscar-
riage. the judge at the trial decided, a matter
of fact, on the preliminary question, that
there was prima facie evidence that the de-
fendant and two other persons were jointly
acting in combination and concert, and aid-
ing and assisting each other in carrying out
a common enterprise of procuring an abor-
tion. so as to make the acts and declarations
of those two persons competent, and admitted
the evidence, and then left the question to be
determined by the jury whether they were
acting in concert with the defendant or not,
with instructions that, if so. the acts and
declarations might be considered by them;
otherwise not. This course was held by this
court to be correct, (pages 425, 426, 432;) the
court saying: “The conspiracy of the parties
was first satisfactorily made to appear to the
court." In Com. v. Growninshield, 10 Pick.
407. a similar doctrine was held. In all such
cases, the court, in deciding to admit the of-
fered testimony, does no more than to hold
that enough has been shown to make it prop-
er to submit the testimony to the jury, leav-
ing its weight and credit for their determina-
tion. The decision of the judge does not re-
lieve the party oflferlng the testimony from
the necessity of establishing every material
fact to the satisfaction of the jury. See, ai-
so, Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass. 235; Com. v.
Waterman, 122 Mass. 43, 59; Com. v. Preece,
140 Mass. 276, 5 N. E. 494; Ormsby v. People,
58 N. Y. 472; Swan v. Com., 104 Pa. St. 218;
1 Green]. Ev. §§ 49, 111; Steph. Dig. Ev.
(Chase's Ed.) art. 4. In this view of the law,
it was not vnecessary that the court should
find that the preliminary evidence amounted
to i'ull proof. beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the prisoner poisoned her sister, in pursu-
ance of a general plan or scheme in which
the poisoning oi’ Mr. Freeman was a later
step.
We are further of the opinion that the pre-
iiminary evidence which was before the court
was sufficient to warrant the introduction of
evidence to show that the prisoner poisoned
her sister, Mrs. Freeman. Certain facts were
not in dispute. Prince Arthur Freeman, the
person whom the prisoner was charged in the
indictment with having poisoned, held a cer-
tificate of membership in a society, which
provided for the payment of $2,000 upon his
death to the beneficiary named therein, with
a po\\'cl' of substitution. His wife, who was
the prisoner's ister, was named as bene-
flciary. She died February 26, 1885, after an
illness of about three weeks. 'l‘he prisoner
called at Freeman’s house, in South Boston,
on February 20th, and on February 23d went
there to take care of Mrs. Freeman, and stay-
ed till her death. Immediately after Mrs.
Freeman's death, Mr. Freeman, with his two
children, went to live with the prisoner at her
house in Cambridge. One of the children died
in April. On or about May 13th, Mr. Free-
man appointed the prisoner as beneficiary un-
der the certificate of membership. He died
-Tune 27th, after an illness of about six days,
from arsenic. The prisoner on September 23,
1885, received $2,000 from the society upon
said certificate. Prior to 1885 the prisoner
was owing several hundred dollars, which
she was unable to pay, and for which she was
hard pressed by her creditors, and which she
paid out of the $2,000 so received by her. As
tending to prove the plan or scheme on her
part to obtain this life insurance money
through the murder of Mrs. Freeman and
then of Mr. Freeman, there was evidence to
the effect that. before Mrs. Freeman's death,
the prisoner knew of the certificate of mem-
bership insuring Mr. Freeman for his wife‘s
benefit; that, during Mrs. Freeman's illness,
the prisoner expressed the opinion that her
sister would never recover, and said that she
(the prisoner) had had a terrible dream, and,
whenever she had a dream like that, one of
the family always died; that, before as well
as after Mrs. Freeman’s death, the prisoner
expressed the wish to have Mr. Freeman,
with his children, come and live with her,
and asked different persons to urge him to do
so; that, on the day of Mrs. Freeman's fu-
neral, the prisoner said that Mr. Freeman's
sister, Mrs. Melvin, was very anxious to have
him live with her, and that all Mrs. Melvin
wanted was to get the insurance made over
to her, but the prisoner said she (herself) had
the best right to it. and it was her sister’s
request that it should be made over to her,
and she wanted it; that on tile same day she
talked with Mr. Freeman about the insurance,
wanted to know if it was made over to her,
and he said it was not, but should be; that
quite frequently afterwards she said she was
afraid he would not make it over to her; that
on June 22d, the same day when he was taken
sick, (which was after it had been made over-
to her,) she sent to the society to see if the
papers were right, in case anything happen-
ed to Mr. Freeman, and whether she would
get the insurance, and to see that all assess-
ments were paid up; that the appointment
for the money to be payable to her was re-
corded in the books of the society no-t earlier
than June 23d; that she also sent over to see
about the insurance once or twice afterwards,
10
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there la any contUct ot testimony or room for 
doubt, the court wm submit the question to 
the jury, with lnstnI<'t1om1 that, 1t they are 
satlsfted that there were such inducements. 
they shall disregard and reject the confeM-
sion." <'om. v. Piper, 120 llass. 190. Simi-
lar questions arise when it ls objected that a 
wltnetcK ls not of sutn.ctent l'npaclty to testify 
intelllgt'ntly; or that a third person,· whose 
declarations or a<:'ts are otrered 1n evidence 
against a party, was not a partner, agent, or 
co-conspirator, and did not stand 1n such a 
relation as to make bis declarations or acts 
admissible; and in other caset. In Com. v. 
Brown, 14 Hruy, 41D, which was an indict-
ment for causing the death of a woman by 
means of an attempt to procure a miscar-
riage. the judire at the trial decided, as matter 
of tact, on the preliminary question, that 
there was prima facie evidence that the de-
femlant and two other persons were jointly 
acting In combination and concert, and aid-
ing and assisting each other In carrying out 
a common enterprbse of procuring an abor-
tion, so as to make the acts and declarations 
of those two persons competent, and admitted 
the evidence, and then left the question to be 
determined by the jury whether they were 
aC'tlng In con<'ert with the defendant or not, 
with instructions that, If so, the acts and 
declarations might be considered by them; 
otherwise not. Tb.ts course was held by this 
court to be correct, (pages 425, 426, 432;) the 
court saying: "The conspiracy of the parties 
was first eatlefactorlly made to appear to the 
<~ourt." In Com. v. Crownlnshield, 10 Pick. 
497, a similar doctrine was held. In all such 
cases. the court, In deciding to admit the of-
fered testimony, dot>S no more than to hold 
that enough has been shown to make It prop-
er to submit the testimony to the jury, leav-
ing Its weight and credit for their deteJ"mlna-
tlon. The decision of the judge does not re-
Ueve the party otrerlng the testimony from 
the necessity of establishing every material 
fact to the satisfaction of the jury. See, al-
so, Com. v. Scott, 123 .Mass. 235; Com. v. 
Waterman, 122 Mase. 43, 59; Com. v. Preece, 
140 Mase. 2i6, 5 N. E. 494; Ormsby v. People, 
53 N. Y. 472; Swan v. Com., 104 Pa. St. 218; 
1 Green). Ev. H 49, 111; Stepb. Dig. Ev. 
(Chase's Ed.) art. 4. In this view of the law, 
tt was not ,necessary that the court should 
find that the preltmtnary evidence amounted 
to full proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the prisoner )'oleoned her sister, in pursu-
ance of a general plan or scheme In which 
the poisoning of Mr. Jl'reeman was a later 
step. 
We are further of the opinion that the pre-
liminary evidence which was before the court 
was sutn.clent to warrant the Introduction of 
evidence to show that the prisoner poisoned 
her sister, l\lr11. Freeman. Certain tacts were 
not in dispute. Prince Arthur Freeman, the 
pt>r~on whom the prisoner was rbarged In the 
Indictment with having poisoned, held a cer-
10 
ttft<'Bte ot membership In a IJOClety, which 
pro"\'lded tor the payment of $2,000 upon hie 
tlt>ath to the benefiC'lary named therein, with 
n power of suhstltutlon. His wife, who was 
the prisoner's sister, was named as bene-
ficiary. She died February 26, 1885, after an 
lllnt'AK of ithout thret> weeks. The prisoner 
called at Freeman's house, In South Boston, 
on lt'ebrnary 20th, and on February 23d went 
there to take care of !>lrs. Freeman, and stay-
ed till her death. Immediately after Mrs.. 
Fret>man'e death, Mr. Freeman, with bis two 
chlldren, wt-nt to live with the prisoner at her 
house in Cambridge. One of the children died. 
in April. On or about "!\.lay 13th, "!\Ir. Free-
man appointed the prlsoner as heneficlary un-
der the certlft<'Bte of membership. He died 
June 27th, after an Illness of about six days. 
trom arsenic. The prteoner on September 28, 
lS&"i, recel ved $2,000 from the society upon 
said certlft<'llte. Prior to 1885 the prteoner 
was owing several hundred dollars, which 
11he was unable to pay, and tor which she was 
bard preBBed by her creditors, and which she 
paid out of the $2,000 110 received by her. As 
tentUng to prove the plan or scheme on her 
part to obtain this lite Insurance money 
through the murder of Mrs. Freeman and 
then of :Ur. Freeman, there was evlllenC'e to 
the etrect that, before Yrs. Freeman's death, 
the 11rlsoner knew of the certificate of mem-
bership Insuring Mr. Freeman tor his wife's 
benefit; that, during Mrs. Frt-eman'11 lllneBB., 
the prisoner expreseed the opinion that her 
sister would never recover, and said that she 
(the prisoner) had had a terrible dream, and. 
whenever she had a dream like that, one of 
the family always died; that, before as well 
as after Mrs. Freeman's death, the prisoner 
expressed the wish to have Mr. Freeman, 
with hie cblldren, come and Uve with her. 
and asked dltrerent persons to urge him to do 
so; that, on the day of Mrs. Freeman's fu-
neral, the prisoner said that Mr. Freeman's 
sister, Mrs. Melvin, was very anxious to have 
him live with her, and that all Mrs. :Melvin 
wanted was to get the insurance made over 
to her, but the prisoner said she (herself) had 
the best right to It, and It was her sister's 
request that It should be made over to her, 
and she wanted It; that 011 the same day she 
talked with l\lr. lt'reeman about the Insurance. 
wanted to know If It was made over to her, 
and he said It was not, but should be; that 
quite frequently afterwards she said she was 
afraid he would not make It over to her; that 
on June 22d, the same day when he was taken 
sick, (which was after 1t had been made over 
to her,) she sent to the society to see if the 
papers were right, In case anything happen-
ed to Mr. Freeman, and whether she would 
get the Insurance, and to see that all a88e88-
ment11 were paid up; that the appointment 
for the money to be payable to her was re-
l'ordl'd In the book11 of the AO<'lety not eal"lier 
tllan June 23d; that she alM<> l'ent over to see 
about the Insurance once or twice afterwards .. 
RELEVANCY. [Case No. 3
before his death, and had an interview with ‘to tell .\ir. ‘Freeman's sister about the insur-
the secretary of the society upon the same‘ ance. This evidence certainly tended to show
subject in Mr. Freeman's presence, the day a scheme and plan, entered into before Mrs.
before his death, and was told that the pa- Freeman's death, to have the insurance mon-
pers were all right, and afterwards, when not iey made payable to the prisoner.
in his presence, requested the secretary not Exceptions overruled.
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HELl!!V A.J.~CY. (Case No. :J 
before hla"dl!ath, and had an lntet'Vlew with 
the secre~ry of the society upon the s1twe 
subject In llr. Freeman's presence, the day 
before hie death, and was told that tht• pa-
per& were all right, and afterwards, when not 
in h18 pre&ence, requested the 11eeretary not 
'to ten lir. ·Freeman's sister about the Insur-
ance. This evidence certalllly tended to show 
a scheme and plan, entered into before llrlrs. 
Freeman's death, to have the tnsurance· moo-
: ey made payable to the prisoner. 
Exceptions overruled. 
11 
· . 
• 
Case N0. 4]
RELEVANCY.
BUDDRE$S V. SCHAFER et al.
(41 Pac. 43.)
Supreme Court of iVashington. July 15, 1895.
Appeal from superior court, King county:
R. Osborn, Judge.
Action by A. W. Buddress against John
Schafer and another. There was a judg-
ment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
Atiirmed.
J. C. Whitlock and Million 8: Houser, for
appellants. A. W. Buddress, Metcalf & Ju-
rey, and Geo. H. Jones, for respondent.
GORDON, J. This action was brought by
respondent to recover the sum of $500 for
services as an attorney and counselor at law
in “prosecuting and conducting certain caus-
es in the superloqcourt of the state of Wash-
ington for the county of Island. in which
said causes said defendants (appellants) were
plaintiffs and Henry Alexander and Kitty
Alexander were respondents.” Respondent
also claims the sum of $50 by way of ex-
penses, costs. and disbursement necessarily
incurred in the prosecution of said suit. In
his complaint it is alleged "that said serv-
ices were reasonably worth the sum of $500,
and that said defendants (appellants) prom-
ised and agreed to pay what the same were
reasonably worth.” ’l‘he answer of the ap-
pellants merely denied that the “services
were worth the sum of $500, or any sum
whatever," and for an aiiirmative defense
set up that the matter had been adjudicated
in a trial between the same parties on the
same subject-matter. There was a. verdict
for respondent in the sum of $225, and from
Judgment entered thereupon. and an order
denying a new trial, this appeal has been
taken.
Upon the trial appellants offered to show
that they had employed other attorneys to
prepare the pleadings and try the identical
causes referred to in respondent's complaint.
The proof was excluded, and this ruling is
assigned as error. The apparent object of
this testimony was to dispute the amount
and extent of plaintiff’s services. The re-
spondent contended, and the court below
held, that appellants could not, under their
answer, deny that the services were rendered
by respondent, and that appellants should be
confined to the question of the value of the
services so rendered; and we think the rul-
lug was correct. it was the right of appel-
lants to have demanded a bill of particulars,
or to have required a more definite state-
ment, if the character and extent oi.‘ the
services were lndclluitely set forth ln the
complaint; but under a mere denial of the
value of the services they were not entitled
to show that the services were not rendered.
Van Dyke v. Maguire, 57 N. Y. 429. The
court committed no error in allowing re-
12
spondent to testify as to the amount expend-
ed by him for hotel and traveling expenses,
nor in limiting the cross-examination of the
witnesses Scott and Coleman, nor in the in-
struction given the jury concerning the ef-
fect to be given the testimony upon the Mill-
ject of the value of professional services. \\'\a
do not think that the language of the instruc»
tion was calculated to mislead the jury, and
it is manifest from the verdict that such
could not have been its effect.
Coming now to the question of former ad-
judication of the matters involved in this
controversy. it appears from the record that
respondent had intltuted a prior suit to re-
cover the sum of $500 as attorney's fees.
That action was founded upon an express
contract to pay said sum for said services.
No other question was litigated therein.
The question of the reasonable value of re-
spondent's services, or of respondent's right
to recover such reasonable value. was with-
held from the consideration of the jury in the
trial of that case. Referring to this prior
suit, which was relied upon as a bar to re-
spondent’s right to recover in this action, the
learned counsel for appellants upon the trial
of this cause below admitted that no evi-
dence was offered in the former trial to
prove what the services were worth, but that
the only question submitted for determina-
tion was upon respondent’s theory of an ex-
press contract. We think the law is well
settled that a judgment in a former suit on
an express contract is not a bar to the sec-
ond suit on a quantum meruit for the same
services, and to determine whether a former
judgment is a bar to a subsequent action it
is necessary to inquire whether the same evi-
dence would have maintained both of such
actions. 1 Freem. Judgm. 5 259; Kirkpat-
rick v. i\lcI<}lroy (N. J. Err. & App.) 7 Atl.
647. In Taylor v. Castle, 42 Cal. 372, the
court say: “The cause of action is said to
be the same where the same evidence will
support both actions; or, rather, the judg-
ment in the former action will be a bar, pro-
vided the evidence necessary to sustain a.
judgment for the plaintiff in the present ac-
tion would have authorized a judgment fo-r
the plaintiff in the former." In 2 Black,
Judgm. ii T26, the learned author says: “For
the purpose of ascertaining the identity of
the causes of action, the authorities gener-
ally agree in accepting the following test as
sutlicient: Would the same evidence support
and establish both the present and the for-
mer cause of action? If so, the former re-
covcry is a bar; if otherwise, it does not
stand in the way oi‘ the second action." We
have examined the error assigned by appel-
lants in permitting respondent to explain the
record of the former trial, but think that no
error was committed. If, however, we were
constrained to the opposite view, the same re-
sult would follow, in view of the admissions
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
05
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Qase Nu. 4) RELEVANCY. 
BUDDRESS v. SOHAFER et al 
(41 Pac. 43.) 
Supreme Colll"t of Walhlngton. July 1~. 1890. 
Appeal from superior oourt, Klug rounty; 
n. Osborn, Judge. 
Action by A. W. Ruddresa against John 
8<'bafer and another. There was a judg· 
ment for plalntltr, and defendants appeal 
Atftrmed. 
J. c. Whitlock and Hllllon & HoW1er, for 
appellants. A. W. Buddress, Met<>alf & Ju· 
rey, and Geo. H. Jones, for respondent. 
GORDON, J. This action was brought by 
respondent to reco\'er the sum of '500 for 
services as an attorney and coulllf'lor at law 
In "prosecuting and conducting certain <'aus-
es In the BUperlor,court of the state of ·wm1h· 
lngton for the county of Island, 1n which 
said caust'll said defendants (appellants) were 
plalntUrs and Henry Aleiander and Kitty 
Alexander were respondents." Respondent 
al8o claims the 1111m of $50 by way of ex-
pe118e8, costs. and dlshul'lleDlents neceBBllrlly 
Incurred in the prosecution of said suit. In 
h1B complaint It le alleged "'that said serv-
ices were reasonably worth the BUID of ,:JOO, 
and that said defendants (appellants) prom-
ised and agreed to pay what the same were 
reasonably worth." The answer of the ap-
pellants merely denied that the "servl<'es 
were worth the sum of '50(), or any sum 
whatever," and for an aftl.rmatlve defense 
set up that the matter bad been adjudicated 
In a trial between the same parties on fbe 
same subjl!<'t-matter. There wu a verdict 
for respondent In the sum of $2'~. and from 
Judgment enteretl thereupon, and an order 
denying a new trial, this approl bas been 
tu ken. 
Upon the trial appellants offered to show 
that they bad employed other attorneys to 
prepare the pleadings and try the identical 
causes referred to In respondent's complaint. 
The proof was excluded, and this ruling 18 
assigned as error. The apparent object of 
this testimony Wall to dispute the amount 
and C'xtent of plalntltr's servl<'es. The re-
spondent contended, and the court below 
held, that appellants could not, under thelr 
answer, deny that the services were rendered 
by respondent, and that appellants should be 
<'On11.oed to the question of the value of the 
services so rendered; and we think the rul· 
ln1t was correct. It was the right of appel· 
!ants to ha\'e demanded a bill of partl<'ulars, 
or to have required a more clPtlnlte state-
ment, If the cham<'ter and extent of the 
services were lncl••H11ltely set forth In the 
complaint; but undt>r a mere denial of the 
value of the services they were not entitled 
to show that the services were not rendered. 
Ynn Dyke v. llagulre, 57 N. Y. 429. The 
«ourt committed no eITOr 1n allowing re-
12 
dpondent to testlf7 as to the amount expend-
ed by him for hotel and traveling expenses, 
nor in llmltlng the crou-examlnatlon of the 
wltnet111e11 Scott and Coleman, nor 1n the ln-
strnctton given the jury concernlDg the ef-
fect to be given the testimony upon the sub-
ject of the value of professional services. We 
do not think that the language of the lnstru1·· 
tlon was calculated to mislead the jury, and 
it ls manifest from the verdict that such 
could not have been its etre<'t. 
Coming now to the question of former ad-
judication of the mattera Involved in this 
rontrover11)·, It appears from the l't'COrd that 
respondent bad Instituted a prior suit to n>-
rover the sum of '500 as attorney's fees. 
That action was founded upon an exprt'llB 
contract to pay said sum for said servkes. 
:So other question wa11 litigated therein. 
The question of the reasonable value of re-
spondent's services, or of respondent's right 
to recover such reasonable value, wu with-
held from the consideration of the jury 1n the 
trial of that case. Referring to this prior 
suit, which was relied upon all a bar to re-
spondent's right to recovE>r In thl11 action, the 
lea1·nett coun8CI for appellants upon thE' trial 
of this cause 1,elow admitted that DO evi-
dence was otTered In the former trial to 
prove what the service. were worth, but that 
the only question submitted for determina-
tion was upon respondent's theory of an ex-
pre11s contract. We think the law ls well 
t1ettled that a judgment In a former suit on 
an expl'\188 contract 111 not a bar to the Bee· 
ond suit on a quantum merult for the same 
services, and to determine w!lether a former 
judgment Is a bar to a subsequent action It 
Is necesaary to inquire whether the same evi-
dence would have maintained both of such 
actions. 1 Freem. Judgm. I 2:>9; Kirkpat-
rick T. AlcF~lroy (N. J. Err. & App.) 7 Atl. 
647. In Taylor v. Castle, 42 Cal. 372, the 
court say: ''The cause of action ls said to 
be the same where the same evidence will 
support both actions; or, rathet", the judg-
ment 1n the former action will be a bar, pro-
vided the evidence necessary to su11tsln a 
judgment for the plalntltT In the present ac-
tion would have authorized a judgment for 
the plalntlft In the former." In 2 Bla<'k, 
.Judgm. 5 726, the learned author says: "l<'or 
the purpose of ascertaining the Identity of 
the cause11 of action, the authorities genef"o 
ally agree lo accepting the following test as 
sulll<'lent: Would the same evidence support 
and establish both the present and the for-
mer cause of action? If so, the former re-
<'OVE"ry ls a bar; If otherwise, It does not 
11tancl In the way of the second action." We 
have examined the error assigned by appel-
lants In permitting respondent to explain the 
reconl of the former trial, but think that no 
error was committed. If, however, we were 
constrained to the opposite view, the same re-
sult would follow, in view of the admlBSlon• 
WHAT FACTS ARE IN ISSUE. [Case No. -1
made by llPI!9“ant5' Qollnsel "D011 the trial 0! pearlng in the record, the Judgment will be
this case in the court below as to the pro- glfiil-nu-(]_ ‘
comings occurring upon the trial of the for-
mer action, which resulted in a. judgment ANDERS and DUNBAR, JJ., concur.
for defendants. No substantial error ap- I-I()YT,(]_ J., dlssents,
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WHAT FACTS ABE IN ISSUE. (Case No. 4-
made by appellants' counsel upon the trial or 
this ~e \n the court below 1111 to the pro-
eel'dlngs occurring upon the trial or the for-
mer action, which resulted tu a judgment 
for defendants. No substantial error ap-
pee.ring In the record, the Judgment will be-
nftinuc<l. 
.A.NDEHS and DUNBAR, JJ., concur. 
HOYT, C. J., dlssents. 
Case No. 5]
RELEVANOY.
ROBINSON CONSOLIDATED MIN. CO. v.
JOHNSON.
(22 Pac. -159, 13 Colo. 258.)
Supreme Court of Colorado. Oct. 11, 1889.
Appeal from district court, Lake county.
The allegations of the complaint in this
action, so far as they are necessary to a cor-
rect understanding of the matters involved
in this appeal, are to the following effect:
That in 1882, William H. Johnson, appcllcc
herein, plaintiff below, entered into a ver-
bal contract with the Robinson Consoli-
dated Mining Company, defendant, a cor-
poration duly organized, to furnish, sell,
and deliver to defendant at its smelting
works, in the town of Robinson, Summit
county, Colo., 240,000 bushels of charcoal
at the stipulated price of 13 cents per bush-
el ; thatin pursuance ofsaid contract,plain-
tiff commenced and continued to furnish,
sell, and deliver said charcoal in divers lots
.and quantities until he had so sold and de-
livered 32,000 bushels thereof to defendant,
all of which was received and accepted by
defendant at its said smelting works; that
plaintiff was ready and willing, and offered,
to deliver the balance of said charcoal ac-
cording to the terms of said contract, but
that defendant absolutely refused to receive,
accept, or pay for the same. The plaintiff,
by reason of defendant’s refusal to accept
the residue of the charcoal contracted for,
was compelled to sell the same for 11 cents
per bushel, which was the best price he could
obtain therefor. There were other ele-
mcnts of damage alleged which need not be
here stated, inasmuch as they were substan-
tially stricken out of the case before the
trial, and do not appear to have been re-
lied on. Defendant demurred to the com-
plaint on several grounds, among others.
that the complaint does notstate facts suf-
ticientto constitute a cause of action. The
demurrer was overruled. The defendant
then answered, denying specifically the al-
legations of the complaint; and the case,
being tried to the court without a jury, re-
sulted in a finding and judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of $4,000. The
defendant appeals.
Teller & Omho0d,for appellant. Patter-
son & Thomas, for appellee.
ELLlOT'1‘.J.. (after stating the facts as
above.) This was an action by a vendor
against a vendee of goods for refusal to ac-
cept and pay for the same. The complaint
alleges thu.t the plantiff entered into a con-
tract with defendant to furnish, sell, and
deliver to defendant a certain quantity of
charcoal at a certain stipulated price. But
itis nowhere alleged that defendant bought,
purchased, or agreed to accept or pay for
the same, or any pa-rt thereof. For this
reason itiscontended by appellant that the
contract as stated is unilateral; and that
the complaint is defective in substance. It
is certain that the usual form of declaring
in cases ofthis kind was not observed. The
nature ofthc action requires that the plead-
ing should be special. 2 Chit. Pl. 264; Pu-
ter. Pl. 130; 1 Estee. Pl. & Pr. § 1375; Beni.
Sales, §§ 75$}-T(i5.
Notwithstanding forms of actions have
been abolished in this state, the substan-
tial requisites of pleadings have not been
changed. Useless fictions, antique phrase-
ology, technical commencements and con-
clusions, have been swept away. but the le-
gal rights and liabilities of parties remain
the same; and the facts upon which these
rights and liabilities depend are required to
be stated in “ordinary and concise lan-
guage.” While particular forms of plead-
ing are no longer essential, yet experience
teaches that it is well to adhere to the “or-
dinary and concise language” of approved
forms in stating causes of action as well as
grounds of defense, lest, in departing too
far from the form, we fail to state the sub-
stance.
It is contended by plaintiffs counsel that
defendant cannot now be heard to object
to the complaint on the ground that it does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, for the reason that he
pleaded over and went to trial. We are
aware it has been held. where an answer by
its terms supplies thedefects of a complaint
otherwise obnoxious to a. general demur-
rer, that the defective complaint is thereby
cured. This is what Mr. Chitty calls “ex-
press aider.” The case of Slack v. Lyon, 9
Pick. 62, is not in point. In that case, the
defendant pleaded over without demurrer,
and in his answer alleged the very facts the
omission of which made the complaint de-
fective, and, upon recovery being had in
favor of the complainant, the defendant
moved in arrest of judgment, which was
denied. In this case, defendant demurred
in the first instance, and his answer there-
after filcd consists of specific denials only.
In Slack v. Lyon, supra, a very old case is
referred to, (Drake v. Corderoy, Cro. Car.
288,) where the complaint was defective in
substance, and the court remarked: " Had
the defendantpleaded the general issue, the
plaintiff could not have had judgment.”
Bliss, Code Pl. §438.
The terms of the contract, as set out in
the complaint,show no promise. undertak-
ing, agreement, or obligationon the part
of defendant to accept or pay for any por-
tion of the charcoal. except that the law
implies a promise on his part to pay for
that which he actually received. As to such
portion, there is no claim that he did not
pay for it; so the case does not fall under
that class of unilateral contracts, in which
a party not bound by the terms thereof
while it remains executory may nevertheless
become bound to the extent he accepts the
benefits thereof. Gordon v. Darnell, 5 Colo.
302; Stiles v. Mc(‘lellan, 6 Colo. 89; Lester v.
Jewett,12 Barb. 502; Railway Co. v. Mitch-
ell, 38 Tex. R5; McKinley v. Watkins. 13 Ill.
140; Richardson v. Hardwick,106 U. S. 252,1
Sup. Ct. Rep. 213; 1 Pars. Cont. 448,note z;
Sykes v. Dixon, 9 Adol. & E. 693; Bean v.
Burbank, 16 Me. 458. It is contended that
the allegation that plaintiff was to furnish,
sell, and deliver to defendant a certain quan-
tity of charcoal, at a certain stipulated
price, implies that defendant agreed to re-
ceive and pay for such quantity at the price
stated. It is true the law implies a prom-
ise to pay on the part of one who actually
receives goods at a price for which the
other party has engaged to deliver; be-
cause it would be unconscionable that the
receiver should accept goods for which he
knew the other party expected payment,
and not render the consideration therefor.
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C1&&e No. 5] .. aELEV .A.NOY. 
ROBINSON CONSOLIDATll:D MIN. CO. "· 
. JOHNSON. 
(22 Pac. 459, 13 Colo. 258.) 
Supreme Court of Colorado. Oct. 11. 1~. 
Appeal from district court, Lake county. 
The allegations of the complaint Jn thl1< 
action, so far aK they arenecefl8arytoa cor-
rect undel'l!tandlngof the matters Involved 
in this appeal, are to the following enect : 
That In 1882, WOiiam H. Johnson, appellt"(' 
herein, plalntln below, entered Into aver-
bal contract with the RoblnRon Consoli-
dated Mining Company, defendant, a cor-
poration duly organized, to furnish, sell, 
and deliver to defendant at Its smelting 
works, In the town of Robinson, 8ummtt 
county, CoJo., 240,000 bushels of charcoal 
at the stipulated price of 13 cents per bush-
el; that In pursuance of said contract,plaln-
tlft commenced and continued to furnish, 
sell, and deliver said charcoal In divers lots 
,and quantities until he had so sold and de-
livered 32,000 bushels thereof to defendant, 
all of which was received and accepted by 
defendant at Its said smelting works; that 
plalntlft was ready and willing, and onered, 
to deliver the balance of said charcoal ac-
cording to the terms of said contract, but 
that defendant absolutely refused to l'el'elve, 
accept, or pay for the ea.me. The plaintiff, 
by reason of defendant's refusal to accept 
the residue of the charcoal contracted for, 
was compelled to sell the same for 11 centH 
per bushel, which was the best price he coulfl 
obtain therefor. There were other ele-
ments of damage alleged which need not be 
here stated, Inasmuch as they were substan-
tially stricken out of the case before the 
trial, and do not appear to have been re-
lied on. Defendant demurred to the com· 
plaint on several grounds, among otherR, 
that the complaint does not state facts suf-
llclenttoconstltute a cause of action. The 
1lf'murrer was overruled. The defendant 
then answered, denying speclflcally the al-
legations of the complaint; and the case, 
being tried to the court without a Jury, re-
sul ted In a finding and Judgment In favor 
of the plaintiff for the sum of f4,000. The 
defendant appeals. 
Teller & Orahood, for appellant. Patter-
son & Thomas, for appellee. 
ELLIOT'l'.J .• (after 1ttatlntp; tbe facts as 
abo\'e,) Thia wfts an action by a vendor 
against a vendee of good11 for refusal to ac-
cept and pay for the same. The comJJlaint 
alleges tho.t t.he plantlff entered Into a con-
tract with defendant to furnish, sell, and 
deliver to defendant a certain quantity of 
charcoal at a certain stipulated price. But 
it is nowbel"t' a.Jleged that defendant bought, 
pul'('hased, or a~reed to accept or pay for 
the 11ame, or any part thereof. For this 
reasooitlscontt>nded by appt•llant that the 
contract as stated Is unilateral; and that 
the complaint Is defective In substanre. It 
ls certain that the usual form of dedarlng 
in caRes of this kind was not observed. The 
nature of the adlon requlresthattheplead-
lng should be special. 2 Chit. Pl. 264; Po-
ter. Pl. 130: 1 E14tee, l'I. & Pr. § 1375; Bent. 
Sales, §§ i5.'l--71i:i. 
Notwlthstnmllng forms of actions have 
oo•n abolished In this state, the substan-
tial requl11ltes of pleadings have not been 
1.&. 
changed. Useless ftctlona, antique phrase-
ology, technical commencements and con-
.cluslons, have been swept away, but the ls-
.gal rlgh ts and llabilltlee of parties remain 
the same; and the facts upon which these 
rights and llabllttlesdepend are required to 
be stated in " ordinary and concise lan-
guage." Wblle particular forms of plead-
ing are no longer essential, yet experience 
teacbeti that It Is well to adhere to the ''or-
dinary and concise language" of approved 
forms In stating causes of action as well as 
grounds of defense, Jest, In departing too 
far from the form, we fall to state ~he sub-
stance. 
It is contended byplalntlft's counsel that 
defendant cannot now be heard to object 
to the complaint on the ground that It does 
not state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action, for the reason that he 
pleaded over and went to trial. We are 
aware It has been held. where an answer by 
Its terms supplies the defects of a complaint 
utherwlse obnoxious to a general demur. 
rer, that the defective complaint Is thereby 
cured. This 18 what Mr. Chitty calls "ex-
press alder." The case of Slack v. Lyon, 9 
Pick. 62, Is not In point. In that ca.se, the 
defendant pleaded over without dewnrrer, 
and In his an11wer alleged the very facts the 
omllllllon of which made the complaint de-
fective, and, upon recovery being had In 
favor of the complainant, the defendant 
moved In arrest of judgment, which was 
denied. In this case, defendant demurred 
In the first instance, and his answer there-
after tllf'd conRists of specific denials only. 
In Slack '"·Lyon, supra, a very old case 18 
referred to, (Drake v. Corderoy, Cro. Car. 
288,) where the complaint was defective In 
substance, and the court remarked: "Had 
the defendant pleaded the general lllllue, the 
plaintiff could not have had judgment." 
Bliss, Code Pl. § 438. 
The terms of the contract, as set. out lo 
the complaint, show no promlMe. undertak-
ing, agreement, or obligation .on the part 
of defendant to accept or pay for any por-
tion of the charcoal, except that the law 
Implies a promise on his part to pay for 
that which he actually received. ARtosuch 
portion, there le no claim that he did not 
pay for It; so the ca.se does not fall under 
that clau of unilateral contracts, In which 
a party not bound by the terms thereof 
w bile it remains e:xecu tory may nevertheless 
become bound to the extent he act.-eptl! the 
benefits thereof. Gordon v. Da.rnell,5 Colo. 
302; Stiles v. McC'lellan,6 Colo.89; Lester v. 
Jewett, 12 Barb. 502; Railway Co. v. :Mitch-
ell, 38 Tex. 81>; !\I<." Kinley v. Watkins. 13 Ill. 
140; Richardson v. Ha.rdwlck,106 U.S. 252,1 
Sup. Ct. Uep. :.!13: 1 Pars. Cont. 448, note•; 
SykeR v. Dixon, 9 Adol. & E. 693: Bean ,., 
Burbank, 16 Me. 458. It Is contended that 
the allegation that phdntlffwaa to furnish, 
sell, and deliver to defendant a certain quan-
tity of charcoal, at a certwn stipulated 
prlre, lmplleR that defendant agreed to re-
ceive and pay for such •1uantlty at the price 
stated. It Is true the law Implies a prom-
ise to pay on the part of one who actually 
receives goods at a. price for which the 
other party has engaged to deliver; be-
cause It would be unconsciouablc that the 
receiver should accept goods for which he 
knew the other party expected payment, 
and not render the consideration therefor. 
:,1 
II 
.... 
'l.l 
WHAT FACTS ARE. IN ISSUE-
B_\_1t there may be an engagement to deliver
lllthout the correspondng engagement to
:°°ei"9- A_D1'0n1ise is a good consideration
°"*l Dronnse ; but the law does not imply
because one pa 1-ty makes apromise that the
llrotnisee Inakes a. promise in return. ' Par-
ties are at liberty to make such contracts
as tile)’ Please. Options may be reserved
by either party to a. contract which may
render the sa Ine unila teral and incapable of
enforcement, except so far as the same may
have been voluntarily carried into effect.
it is strongly urged that the words “en-
tered into a. contract with defendant ” show
that there \v as niutuality in the contract
between the parties, and that both are
bound. These preliminary words doubtless
indicate that two parties made the con-
tract, such as it vvas; and they may induce
- expectation of mutuality in the terms orob-
ligation of the contract thereafter to be
stated. But it does notfollowbecausetwo
parties have made a. contract that therefore
each or either are bound thereby. If mu-
tuallty of obligation necessarily resulted
from a joint making, then therecould be no
such thing as a unilateral contract, since
a contract or agreement is always the prod-
uct of two or more minds. In this connec-
tion counsel for appellee in their printed ar-
gument make use of the following quota-
tion: “A contract is an agreement between
two or more persons to do or not to do a
particular thing. The obligation of a con-
tract is found in the terms of the a
ment." This language is ascribed to Chief
Justice TANEY, who delivered the opinion
of the court in Charles River Bridge v. War-
ren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420. when, in fact, the
_ words occur in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice MCLEAN. This was doubtless
aninadvertence, as the same mistake occurs
in Bou\'ier’s Law Dictionary. But as the
decision oi the case does not turn upon the
' correctness of the abstract definitions thus
announced, they may be accepted as cor-
rect. Havingmade thisquota.tion,counsel
argue that the statement that a. contract
was entered into is a. conclusion arising
from facts under the law, and is a mode of
pleading not prohibited by any system;
that the obligations of the charcoal con-
tract are to be found in its terms, and its
terms are to beiound from the evidence, and
the evidence is a statement ofthefactsfrom
which the conclusion that 1|. contractexists
has been drawn. Hanna v. Barker,6 Colo.
312, and Orman v. City of Pueblo, 8 Colo.
6 Pac. Rep. 931, are relied on to sustain
this course of reasoning. The former case
sustains the proposition that an averment
that certain par1;ies—named—entered into
an agreement in writing with certain other
parties—-named—is a sufficient avermcnt of
the delivery oi the agreement between the
parties; but neither of these cases warrant
the inference that it is not necessary to aver
in the complaint the terms of the contract
sued on so as to show the obligation rest-
ing on the defendant as a condition to hold-
ing him liable for the breach thereof. On
the contrary, in the former case the con-
tract was set out in Iucc verba in the com-
pluint, whilein thelatter the complaint was
not defective-in substance, and the objection
referred to in the opinion could have been
cured by a bill of particulars.
it is assigned for error that the contract
‘.
attemptedtobe Prg 1:5 Q
the contract stafe 11¢»
contractstated ifl ff 00,1) 00,” I
sale and delivery ‘),g O. f1I8;nf’"f2"";- The
coal at defendant? td fall)” bug)”,/S isglfgbe
time being specihe Ii "‘
OI‘ Hg’ W k N
coal,the lawimpl ies that the at-1n»§§-f>"1m§
ered within a rea,sO17abI@ tit Was to be deliv-
in case of controve1‘B.V» us£”"' W/I/B11 111118.
by the court from the facmbe detelm/"ed
stances oi the case. Pars (-0n"t”g9§"'¢,]l,'g1-
contract which tbee\‘1f1cn¢-e 'tende('1't,;’;,Hm be
lish was a contract for the delivery of good.
merchantable kiln pine coal, 2,500 rm-has
to the bushel, 20,000 bushels per month for
12 months. It may be, in attempting to
prove the performance of a con tract to de-
liver 240,000 bushels of charcoal, where no
time for the delivery is specified, that it
would be competent to show that a deliv-
ery at the rate of 20,000 bushels per month
would be a delivery within a reasonable
time. But this was not what was under-
taken to beshown. No evidence as to what
would be a. reasonable time was elicited or
offered. The evidence tended to prove an
express contract to deliver 20,000 bushels
a. month, no more, no less, without refer-
ence to the circumstances or difficulties
of the delivery bearing upon the ques-
tlon of reasonable time. This evidence
was objected to as incompetent under
the statements of the complaint, and as
variantfromitsallegations. Thevariance
is apparent. As a rule, where there is
an express contract, parties cannot aban-
donit and resortto animplied one; but the
contract as made must be the measure of
their respective rights and liabilities. The
defendant had a. right to be advised by the
pleadings in advance of the trial of the sub-
stantial terms and conditions of the con-
tract under which its liability to ajudgment
was sought to be enforced. Hence the va-
riance was material, and the issue underthe
evidence should have been found against the
plaintiff for that reason. Stcph. Pi. 118; 1
Chit. 1’l.318,3l9; Bliss, Code l’l.§438etseq.;
Cheney v. Barber, 1 Colo. 73.
We have carefully considered whether or
not under section 780i the Code, reiatingto
defective pleadings and variances, the er-
rors discussed in this opinion might be prop-
erly disregarded. The provisions of the
Code are liberal in allowing, upon proper
application and terms, the correction of
mistakes in the pleadings and proceedings
in civil actions. We should not be disposed
to allow parties to take advantage of or-
dinary defects for the first time in the appel-
late court. But when a. party makes objec-
tion on account of a material or substan-
tial defect. in a. proper manner, and in apt
time, and the oppositepai-ty,instcad of ap-
plying for leave to amend, succeeds in pro-
curing a ruling in his favor by the trial
court, he does so at his peril.
In view of the foregoing conclusions, we
do not deem it necessary to discuss at
length the other assignments o_i error. ii
there was a contract for the delivery oi the
coal within 12 months, and the buyer ac-
tually received and accPD W13 B \"\\‘i- “\\“_9°l
within that period, the claim that th€e"\o§-
tract was void under t he statute ()i(\\¢\\; ‘st
would seem to he union l\_<19(3-_ 'm“a%§ Que
of the district court 19 Te“ *_
cause remanded- 15
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WHAT FACTS AB.E. IN ISSUE-
Butthere may be an engagement to deliver 
Without the correepondng engagement to ~ve. A pronileele a good consideration 
. beeor & prom lee ; but the law does not Imply 
au11e one party makeeapromleethatthe 
. promleee makes a promise In return. · Par-
tlea are at liberty to make such contracts 
aa they please. Options may be re11erved 
by either party to a contract which may 
renderthe ea1neunllateral and Incapable of 
enloreement, except eo far as the same may 
have been voluntarily carried into effect. 
It le strongly urged that the words "en-
tered into a. contract with derendant" show 
that there -w ae niutuality In the contract 
between the parties, and that both are 
bound. These preliminary wordsdoubtleHS 
Indicate that two parties made the con-
tract, such a.e It 'Was ; and they may Induce 
· expectation of mutualltylnthetermsorob-
\\ga.tlon of the contract thereafter to be 
l\tatro. But ltdoes notronowbeeauRetwo 
part\esbavemadea contract that therefore 
each or either are bound thereby. If mu-
tuality of obligation necessarily resulted 
from a joint mu.king, "then therecould be no 
BUcb thing aa a onnateral contract, since 
a contractoragreementlsalwaysthe prod-
uct of two or more minds. In thlR connec• 
tlon couuRel for appellee lo thelrprlnted ar-
gument make use of the foJJowlng quota-
tion: "Acontract lean agreement between 
two or more persona to do or not to do a 
particular thing. The obligation of a con-
tract ls found In the terms of the agree. 
ment." Thts language ls ascribed to Uhlet 
.Justice TANEY, who delivered the opinion 
of the court In Charles River Brldgev. War-
ren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, when, in fact, the 
words occur ln the dl88entlng opinion of 
Mr. Justice McLEAN. This was doubtless 
an load vertence, as the same mistake occul'B 
In BouYler's Law Dictionary. But as the 
decision of the case does not turn upon the 
correctne&R of the abstract deHnltlonR tbnB 
announced, they may be accepted as cor-
rect. Havlngmade thlequota.tlon,coonseJ 
argue that the statement that a. contract 
was entered into ls a conclusion arising 
from facts under the Jaw, and Is a mode of 
pleading not prohibited by nny system ; 
that the obligations of the chareoal con-
tract are to be found ln Its terms, and Its 
terms are to befound from the evidence, and 
theevldence Is a statement ofthefactsfrom 
which the conclusion that" contractexl1:1ts 
bas been drawn. Hanna v.Barker,6 Colo. 
812, and Orman v. City of Pueblo, 8 Colo. 
292, 6 Pac. Rep. 931,are relied on to sustain 
this course of reasoning. The former case 
sustains the proposition that an avernumt 
that certain parties-named-entered Into 
an agreement In writing with certain other 
parties-named-ts a sufftclentaverment of 
the delivery of the agreement between tbe 
portles; but neither of these ca11es warJ"ant 
the Inference that It le not neceRSary to aver 
In the complaint the terms of the contract 
Rued on so as to show the obligation reMt· 
Ing on the defendant as a condition to hold-
ing him liable for the breach thereof. On 
the contrary, ID the former case the con-
tract was set out in hlPC verbu In the com-
plaint, while In the latter the comphtlntwM 
not defective In substance, and th(' objection 
referred to In the opinion could have been 
cured by a bfll of particulars. 
It te assigned tor error that the contract 
attempted to be pr:f ~~ ft [0- No. s 
the contra<'t state e 'tJ, 't 'tb 
contract stated fn -t;/J 9,..~o~El c-0 ! t7a1,,.11aoot 
sale and delivery <', -~.c11>.:l>1a10 'P. 'lllnt. 'I'be 
coal at defendan-t g ·"'~-UJJ bllRa',rllBfortbe 
time being sy:,1t1ed "Ol- f'/t111,,,. l'.'8 ofcbar-t "' worka. No 
coal, the law mplfeB !~#ft; 1~e deJIJ-ery of the 
ered within a ree.soD v/p JVaa to be dellv-
ln case of controve.ris.'V, 1:t:1.,}1fe, which time, 
by the court frotn t~e I. 8 be determined 
stances or the case. 2 l>a acta and rlz:cum-
t t hi h th Id rs. Coat. 585. The con rac w c eer E'lJC!'etended toe11tab. 
llsh was a contract for the delivery of good 
merchantable ~Un pine eoal, 2,600 lncbt'8 
to the bushel, 20,000 hm1hels per month !or 
12 months. It may be, Jn attemptJng to 
prove the performance of a contra.ct to de-
liver 240,000 buehele of chareoal, where no 
time for the delivery ts speclfted, that It 
would be competent to show that a deliv-
ery at the rate of 20,000 bushels per month 
would be a delivery within a reasonable 
time. But this wu not what was under-
taken tobeshown. No evidence as to what 
would be a reasonable time was elicited or 
offered. The evidence tended to prove an 
expresR contract to deliver 20,000 boehele 
a month, no more, no less, without refer-
ence to the circumstances or dlfftcultles 
of the dell very bearing upon the ques-
tion of reasonable time. This evidence 
was objected to as lncompete.nt under 
the statements of the complaint, and aR 
varfantfrom ttg tlllegatfonR. Thl'I varta111~e 
Is apparent. Aa a rule, where there Je 
an express contract, parties cannot aban-
don It and resortto an Implied one; but the 
contract as made must be the measure or 
their respective rights and Jfabflltles. The 
defendant had a right to be adrleed by the 
pleadings In adYance of the trial of the sub-
stantinl terms and conditions of the con-
tra.ct under w hlch Its liability to a Judgment 
wae sought to be enforced. Hence the va-
riance was material, and the iSBueunderthe 
evidence should ha\"e been found against the 
plaintiff for that reason. Steph. Pl. 118; l 
Chit. I•J. 318, 319; Bliss, Code Pl. § 438 et seq. ; 
Cheney v. Barber, 1 Colo. 73. 
We have carefuJJy eoneldered whether or 
not under se<·tlon 78of the Code, relating to 
defective pleadings and variances, the er-
roni dlMCusRed In this opinion might be prop-
erly disregarded. The prm·lslons or the 
Code are liberal In allowing, upon proper 
applf<oatlon and terms, the correction of 
mlRtftkes In the pleadings and proceedings 
fncivll actlon11. We should not be disposed 
to allow parties to take advantage of or-
dinary defects forthetll'Bttlme ln the appel-
late court. But when a party makes objec-
tion on account of a material or substan-
tial defect. In a proper manner, and in apt 
time, and the oppositeparty, lnetead or ap. 
plying for let1.ve to amend, succeedK In pro-
cul"lng a ruling In his fu.vor by the trial 
court, he does EIO at his peril. 
In view of the foregoing conc\\1Rlone, we 
do not deem tt neeessary to <llscuss at 
length the other as1dgnments ot error. It 
there was a contrat•t for the de\\-.:ery ot the 
coal within 12 months, and the buyer ac-
tually rreelvt>d anil acce1>h..>d a \\B.Tt thcTeOt 
within that JWri()(l, tbe <."ln\m tbat tbt- con-
tract was void un11er the ~tatute ot tTauds 
woul<l ef'Pm to l>P untounc:l.~. 'rbe\udgment 
of the district court is ~-.~?W\, and the 
cause remanded. 
' l I 
\ 
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' Case N0. 6]
RELE VANCY.
CARLTON V. PEOPLE.
(37 N. E. 244, 150 Ill. 181.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. May 5, 1894.
i-Error to circuit court, Johnson county;
A. K. \’ickers, Judge.
Indictment of Jonathan Carlton for arson.
Defendant was convicted, and he brings er-
ror. Afiirmcd.
Morris, Moore & Vankirk, for plaintiff in
error. Maurice T. Moloney, Atty. Gen.. T. J.
Scofield. M. L. Newell, and Geo. G. Gillespie,
for the People.
MAGRUDER, J. This is an indictment
against the plaintiff in error for arson. The
indictment charges him, in the usual form.
with setting fire to and burning the barn of
one Rob Roy Ridenhour. The jury found
him guilty. and fixed his punishment at im-
prisonment in the penitentiary for a term
of four years. Motions for new trial and in
arrest of judgment were made and overruled.
Judgment was rendered, and sentence pro-
nounced, in accordance with "the verdict.
On the afternoon of Saturday. April 9,
1892, plaintiff in error was arrested for a
violation of a town ordinance at Vienna, in
Johnson county, by the town marshal, as-
sisted by one of the deputy sheriffs, and also
by the said Ridenhour. He was taken to
the county jail in an intoxicated condition,
having a knife in his hand and a revolver
in his pocket. He and Ridenhour each lived
in the country, about four and a half miles
from Vienna, and had ridden into town to-
, gether on the morning of that day. His ar-
rest was made with diiiicnity, and after a.
cutiie. By direction of Ridenhour his knife
and revolver were taken away from him.
While he was lying upon his back in the
hallway of the jail, his arms and feet being
held by those who arrested him, he said:
“Oh. yes, Bob Ridenhour, you live in the
country, and you will think of this, God
damn _vou. when your barn is on fire." He
repeated the remark several times, varying
the expression. saying, according to one wit-
ness: “You will think of this when you
see your barn in fiamcs;" according to an-
other: “You will think of this when your
barn is burned. Your barn is on a high hill.
It will look well when it is burning.” He
was released from jail between 10 and 11
o'clock on the night of that same day. and
lcft town about 11 o'clock, in company with
Thomas Verhincs and Edward Hogg, cnch '
of the three riding on horseback. The plain-
tiff in error stopped on the way at the house
of a Mrs. Bridges, and obtained some match-
es. They rode togcther about a mile, when
they scpnratcd, Vcrhincs going east, and
Carlton and llogg going south. Plaintifi’ in
error and Iiogg continued to ride together
about a mile further, where they separated,
the former going southeast. and the latter
going southwest. The home of Carlton was
about. 2 miles, and that of Hogg about
21,5 miles, from the point where they sep-
arated. In going to his home from this
point, plaintiff in error would pass in sight
of Ridenhour’s house. Ridenhour's barns
were burned that night. He says that he
went to bed between 10 and 11 o'clock, and
' that it was after midnight when he first saw
the fire. On the next day—Sunda.y, April
10th—an examination was made of the
prelniscs. Tracks were found south of the
barn. in a path leading to the highway.
winch ran in the general direction of the
house of plaintifl in error. Mud was found
upon the fence at the corner of the field.
indicating that someone had climbed over
the fence. The oats in the field had not
come up. An examination of the tracks
showed that one foot had made a deeper
impression than the other. Carlton was ar-
rested on that Sunday afternoon. A meas-
urement of the tracks showed that they
corresponded in length with tracks made
by Carlton in the road on that day. and
with the shoes worn by him on that after-
noon. It was proven that he was lame, and
walked with "a kind of hop." One of the
witnesses says: “The foot he limped on
corresponded to the irregular tracks in the
field." Two barns were burned, contain-
ing corn, hay, mules, and horses. The horses
escaped, but one of the mules was burned to
death, and the corn and hay were destroyed.
Hogg says that he saw no fire when he
passed with Carlton.
The only evidence introduced on the de-
fense seems to have had for its object the
proof of an alibi. The testimony tends to
show that the barns were on fire afteri mid-
night, and somewhere about 1 o‘clock.
though one of the witnesses says he saw the
fire at 4 o'clock in the morning. and, when
he saw it. went to it from his house, a half
mile distant, and found the barns “pretty
well all burned down." The evidence does
not certainly fix the hour when the plaintiff
in error reached his home on the night of the
fire. His mother swore that “it was about
twelve o‘clock. or near that.” One of his
sisters swore that she heard the clock strike
12, and another that she heard it strike 1.
after his arrival.
Counsel for plaintiff in error make the 2911-
eral objections that there is an absence °f
evidence relative to the corpus delicth and
that the evidence is purely c1l.cumsU1““a1-
“The proof of the charge in q-immal ¢*1\‘s*‘S
involves the proof oi’ two distinct 9Y°\)°s"_
tions: l-‘irst, that the act itself was d°“e'
and. secondly. that it was done
charged. and by none other-,min other “"_“dS‘
proof of the corpus delicti and 'Of the “‘e“'
tity of the prisoner.” 3 Greenl T9
Here the act done, which v,-as to‘ De 1_
was the burning of the barn It 41$ “*1
required to be proven that ‘filo D91‘ “in,
burned by the plaintiff in P“ and iii)‘
such burning was done with fefor: "5 iilieilllt
or, in the language of the Sui n;)tr€1!ltv__“-illftu and maliciously.” 1 Starr & C_ 'App- 5
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·Case No. 6) REI.EV ANCY. 
CARLTON T. PEOPLE. 
(87 N. E. 244, l!W Ill 181.) 
Supreme Court of Dlinola. May 5, 1894. 
!.;nor to l'lrcult court, Johnson 4.'UUnty; 
A. K. Vickers, Judge. 
Indictment of Jonathan C&rlton for arson. 
Defendant was convicted, and be brings er-
ror. Afftrmed. 
Morris, Moore & Vankirk, for plaintiff ln 
error. Maurice T. Moloney, Atty. Gen., T. J. 
Scofield, M. L.. Newell, and Geo. G. Gilespie, 
for the People. 
MAGRUDER., J. Tbla la an Indictment 
airalnst the plalntltr In error for arson. Tbe 
Indictment charges blm, In the 118Ulll torm, 
with setting ftre to and burning the barn of 
one Rob Roy Ridenhour. The Jury found 
him guilty, and fixed bis punishment at Im· 
p1isonment In the penitentiary for a term 
of four years. Motions tor new trial and In 
arrest of Judgment were made and overruled. 
Judgment was rendered, and sentence prO:. 
nouneed, In accordance with the verdict. 
On the afternoon of Satutday, April 9, 
1892, plaintiff In error was arrested for a 
violation of a town ordinance at Vienna, In 
Jobnson county, by the town marshal, as-
sisted by one of the deputy sherUrs, and also 
by the snld Ridenhour. He was taken to 
the county jail In an Intoxicated condition, 
having a knife In bis band and a revolver 
In bis pockt>t. He and Ridenhour each lived 
lo the country, about tour and a halt miles 
from Vienna, and bad ridden Into town to-
gether on the morning of that day. ms ar-
rest was made with dlJftculty, and after a 
seutDe. By direction of Ridenhour his knife 
and revolver were taken away trom him. 
While he was lying upon his back In the 
hallway of the jail, his arms and feet being 
held by those who arr1•Mted him, he said: 
"Oh, yes, Bob Ridenhour, you llve In the 
country, and you will think of this, God 
damn you, when your barn ls on fire." He 
repeated the remark several times, varying 
the exp1·1•sslon. Mylng, according to one wit· 
ness: "You will think of this when you 
see your barn In flames;" aC"cordlng to an· 
otht>r: "You will think of this when your 
harn 111 hurnt'd. Your barn ls on a high hill. 
It will look well when It ls burning." He 
w1111 rPleased from Jail between 10 and 11 
o'clock on the night of that same day, and 
left town about 11 o'clock, In company with 
Thomas Yerhlnes and I·~dward Hoirg, t':t<"h 
of the three riding on horseback. The plain· 
tltr In error stopped on the way at the house 
of a Mrs. Bridges, and obtained some mntch· 
es. They rode together about a mile, when 
they sl'pnrated, Vt•rhln<'s going enst, and 
Carlton and Hogg going south. rlaintltr In 
l'rror and Hogg contlnm'<l to ride tog<"ther 
about a mile further, where they separated, 
the former going southeast. nnd the latter 
going southwl'llt. The home of Carlton was 
nhout 2 miles, and that ot Hogg about 
16 
21Aa miles, from the point where they eep-
ara ted. In going to bis home- from thlR 
point, plaintiff In error would pass In sight 
of Rldenhour'a house. Ridenhour'• barns 
were burned that night. He 11ays that h1• 
went to bed between 10 and 11 o'clock, and 
that It was after midnight when he ftrst saw 
the fire. On the next day-Sunday, Aprll 
lOth-il.n examination was made of the 
prl'ml!ll"B. Tra<"k& were found aoutb of tht--
barn, In a path leading to the highway. 
which ran In the general direction of th<" 
house of plalntll'f In error. Mud was found 
upon the fence at the corner of the fteld. 
lndll'ft.tlng that someone had climbed ovE>r 
the fence. The oats In the field had not 
come up. An examination of the tracktt 
showed that one foot had made a deeJK'r 
lmpre88lon than the other. Carlton was ar· 
rested on that Sunday afternoon. A mea&-
urt>mt>nt of the tracks showed that the-y 
corresponded In length with tracks math• 
by Carlton In the road on that day, and 
with the shoes worn by him on that after-
noon. It was proven that he was lame, and 
walked with "a kind of bop." One of the 
wltnessea aaya: "The toot he limped on 
corresponded to the Irregular tracks In the 
field." Two barns were burned, contain· 
Ing com, hay, mules, and bol'Bee. The hol'SE's 
eacaped, but one of the mules was burned to 
death, and the corn and hay were destroyed. 
Hogg says that be saw no flre when be 
passed with Carlton. 
The only evidence Introduced on the de-
fense seems to baYe bad tor Its object the 
proof of an allbl. The testimony tends to 
show that the barns were on ftre after\ mid-
night, and aomewbere about 1 o'clock. 
though one of the wltneeaes says be saw the 
flre at 4 o'<"loek In the morning, and, when 
be saw It. went to It from bis house, a bait' 
mile distant, and found the barns "pretty 
well all burned down." The t>vidence does 
not certainly fix the hour when the plalntlfr 
In error reached his home on the night of the 
ftre. ms mother swore that "It was about 
twelve o'clock., or near that." One of bis 
sisters swore that she heard the clock strike 
12, and another that she heard It strike 1. 
after bis arrival. 
Counsel for plalntltr In error make the ltE'D· 
eral objections that there ls an absence of 
evidence rt'latlve to the corpus deUctl, and 
that the evidence le purely clrcoJll&tantlal. 
"Tbe proof of the charge In crtmto.sl causes 
ln'volvM the proof of two <ltsttnct proposl~ 
tlons: Flnit, that the act tt!K'}f «as done, 
nnd. H<'<'ondly, tbnt It wu8 done bl' tbe 
chru·J:e1l. 1111<1 by none otber,-tn otlle-r words. 
proof of the corpus delicti and ot t}le \d; 
tlty of the prisoner." 3 Greeul ~~· ' · 
Here the 'l\Ct done, wbl<"h "Was to. ve prO'V~ 
was the burning of the barn It ~118 8 
· n WRR 
required to be proyen thnt th<' 1.,21t' tbnt 
burned by the plalntltr In E>r 11 ~d t 
such burning WM done With f ror, 11~ tnten • 
or, In the language of the 6 l'lonlo •• ~tUfullY 
and mallclous1~" 1 St tatute, St. P· 
.., . nrr &. c. Ai:>J>.-
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DIRECT AND INDIRECT EvtD13 * Q
4??‘ {"1
C
list. 1)’-fib /' 11-96 N0. 6'
was bound fl?
facts and cirvlll 1Q"l1(.
when mnsidered 0012
other evidence e "
minds or the jury '3 1- "89. to create /11 the
759; 3 Green]. Ev. §§ 55,56. It has been
siild that in arson the corpus tlcllcti consists
not only 0! a. fact that a. building has been
burned. but also the fact that it has been
willfully tired by some responsible person.
in
as ‘,1 its """!11wrt such
of Wflre suflicicnl.
ttlou Wltlz all the
\\'inslo\v v. State, 7&3 Ala. 42. The main
tact, hovvever, vvhich is to be proven in the
tirst place, is the burning of the building.
When that fact is established, then it is nec-
essary to show how the act was done. and
by whorn. We think that. in the ])i't'.\‘l'iil
case, the tact that the barns were but-ucd
\\‘tlB~ clearly and satisfactorily pt-oven; and
the circumstances were such as to exclude
accident or natural causes as the origin of
the fire. \\-‘hen the general fact is thus
proved, a. foundation is laid for the introduc-
mm or any legal and suflicient evidence that
the act was committed by the accused, and
that it was done with criminal intcnt. Satn
v. State, 33 Miss. 347; Phillips v. State, 29
Ga. 105. Such evidence need not be direct
and positive, but may be circumstantial, in
its character. \Vinslow v. State, supra. In
both criminal and civil cases “a verdict
may well be founded on circumstances alonc;
and these often lead to a conclusion far more
satisfactory than direct evidence can pro-
duce." 1 Greenl. Ev. 5 1311. After a carc-
rut examination of the evidence in this casc
we are not prepared to say that t.he jury
were not warranted in finding the verdict
returned by them. Among the circumstances
which may be judicially considered as lead-
ing to important and well-grounded pre-
sumptions are "motives to crimes, declara-
tions or acts indicative oi‘. guilty conscious-
ness or intention. land] preparations for tin-
commission of crime." Wills. Circ. Ev. p.
39. It appears trom the facts above recited
that there was evidence here which tended
to show the existence of just such circum-
stances as are thus indicutcd.---1-c\'cn;:e for
arrest and imprisonment, threats that thc
barns would be burned, and halting on thc
way to obtain matches. The evidence of thc
footprints and their correspondence with thi-
defendant's feet was competent, and, though
“not by itself of any independent stremztli
is admissible with other proof as tending to
make out a case." Whart. Cr. Ev. (8th Ed.|
5 1'96. In \Vinslow v. State. supr.-1. whcrr
"he indictment was for arson. and "then-
‘ was evidence tending to show a fresh tracl:
in the lane leading from the road to tht‘
house; [and] that this track and the track oi
the defendant corresponded," it was said:
‘,"l‘he previous threats of the defendant, and
his declarations in the nature of threats.
were, on the same principle, properly ad-
mitted. While they are not of themselves
convincing of guilt, from them, in connec-
tion with the other circumstances, it believed
by the jury, guilt may be a logical sequence."
Whart. Cr. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 756.
As to the defense of an alibi, the burden
of making it out was upon the plaintiff in
error (Ackcrson v. People. 124 Ill. 563, 1|:
N. E. 847*" and, in order to maintain it, hc
wn.oUs.nv.—2
G
truth of the charge :2 "S
People, 107 Ill. 162-‘
Ill. 42. It cannot be
was made out so C‘1P:u-1_,.
as to be availing against
tho state.
It is assigned as error that the court re-
fused to permit the dcft-mi.-int to prove by
two witnesses that they had heard Thomas
Verhincs make threats that he would burn
up evcr_vtliing Ridcnhour had. We do not
regard this ruling as crroneous. Threats of _
a third person, other than the prisoner
on trial, against the victim of the crime
charged, arc mere hearsay, and are inad-
missible.- Evidence of this character tends
to draw away the minds of the jury 1'rom
the point in issue, which is the guilt or in-
nocence of the prisoncr. and to cxcite their
prejudices and mislead them. 1 Greenl. Ev.
§§ 51, 52; Walker v. State, 6 Tex. App. 576;
State v. Duncan, 6 Ired. 236. Such threats
of a third person are inter altos acta; they
are too remote from the inquiry before the
jury to be received, and have no legal tend-
ency to establish the innoccnce of the pris-
oner. Alston v. State, 63 Ala. 178; State v.
Davis. 77 N. C. 483. It is competent for the
defendant to show b_v any legal evidence
that another committed thc crime with
which he is charged, and that he is inno-
cent of any participation in it, but this can-
not he shown by the admissions or confes-
sions ot- a third person not under oath.
which are only hearsay. The proof must
connect such third person with the fact,-
that is, with the perpetratlon of some deed
entering into the crime itself. There must
be proof of such a train of facts and cir-
cumstances as tend clearly to point to him,
rather than to the prisoner. as the guilty
party. “Extrnjudicial statements of third
persons cannot be proved by hearsay. unless
such statements were part of the res gestae."
Whurt. Or. Ev. (8th Ed.) 5 225; Smith v.
State. 9 Ala. 990: State v. Davis. supra;
Grcenticld v. People, S5 Y. 75; Thomas
v. People. 67 N. Y. 218; Owensby v. State,
82 Ala. (S3. 2 Smith. 764; State v. Haynes,
71 -.\'. C. 79; Rhea v. State, 10 Yerg. 258;
Com. v. Chabbock, 1 Mass. 143; State v.
Johnson, 34) La. Ann. 921; People v. Mur-
phy, 45 Cni. 137; State v. Smith, 35 Kan.
618. 11 Pac. 908; State v. May, 4 Dev. 328;
\\'ri;.:ht v. Statc. 9 YPl'iI- 34'2-
lt is n.~1si,~_'nctl as crror that the court in-
stmcmd the j||1-_\' that “the reasonable doubt
the jury are permitted to entertain must be
as to the guilt of the at-c\\.\"o\\ on the whole
llllll satisfactorily
the case made by
of the cvidcuce. lllid 0°‘? as m ‘my \m““""
\ve do not rctzurti the
11 as er\'o\\co\\s. it.
he r\\\e \\'\\'\cl\ we
Der ot cases M\1\'
lar fact in the case.“
doctrine of the instr\1¢I1°
is in accordance with T
have laid down in *1 null‘
ahlfillflble doubt of the
I 6'! him. Gan-Ity v.
"Ulns v. People. 110
811111 that the defense
11
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DIHECT A~D INDIHECT Evrv $ ~ <)~. 
\ 
I 
\ 
! 
iri9; 3 Greenl. Ev. ff 55, ·s6. It bus been 
llllld tllat In urson the corpus 1l<>llctl <'omdsts 
not only o.r a :ract that a building has been 
burned. but also the fact that It has beeu 
willfully fired by some responsible perlj(m. 
ll'lnslol.v v. State, 'i\l Aln. 42. The mnlu 
fac~ hov1rever, ·which Is to be proven In tllt• 
first pince. is the burning ot the bulldini:. 
When that fact ls e!;\t."\bllshed, then It Is nt>e· 
essnry to show how the net was done. nud 
hy whom. We think that, In the pr<>:wnt 
case, the fact that the barns were burned 
wns. clearly and satisfactorily proven; and 
the clrCUIIlstances were such as to exclude 
accident or natural caulle8 ns the orl,i:ln of 
the fire. 'Vhen the gen1•ral f11ct Is thus 
proved, a founda tlon Is laid for thf' lutrodu<.·· 
tion of any legal and sutlident evldt>ncc that 
the act was coIDn1ltted by the acl'UsPd, and 
that lt was done with criminal lntl'nt. &un 
v. State, 83 Miss. 347; Phillips v. State, 29 
Ga. 105. Such evidence need not be direct 
and poeltlve, but Jll'lly be clrcmnstuntlul, In 
ltB cbarncter. Winslow v. State, supra. In 
both criminal and civil ca111!'11 "a v1>rdlct 
may well be founded on clreumstnncPs nlont'; 
and these often lead to a conduslon fllr more 
satisfactory than direct evidence can pro-
duce." 1 Greenl. Ev. f 136. After a care-
ful examination of the eYldeu('{> In this cnioC' 
we are not prepared to say that the jury 
we1·e not warranted In finding the verdl<'t 
rt•turned by them. Among the clt·curnstanct.>t< 
whll·b may be judleially roosldered as lead-
ing to Important and well-grounded prl'-
sumptlons are "'n1otlves to crimes, declara-
tlons or acts lndicntlYe of guilty consclous-
nea or lnU.nttnn. Land] pl'('pnratlons tor tllf' 
oommlBBlon of erlme." Wills. Clrc. Ev. 11. 
89. It appears from the tact:JJ above reclt<'tl 
that there was evidence here which tended 
to show the exlsh•ncP of just sueh circum-
stances as are thm1 lndlt>nh•11.·- -ren•n::e for 
arrest and Imprisonment, threats that th1• 
barns would be burned, and halting on tbl• 
way ro obtain matches. The evidence of th1• 
tootprint:JJ and their correi111011deuce with th•• 
defendant's feet wns competent, and, thougl• 
.. not by Itself ot any lnd<'pt•ndent st1·1>ngth 
Is admissible with other proof Ill! tendlnic t« 
make out a case." \\'hurt. Cr. Nv. (8th }<}d.1 
I 796. In Winslow v. State. supra. wh1•r1· 
the Indictment was for arson, 11nd "'thPI'•' 
was evidence tending to 11how a fresh tra1·k 
In the Jane lending from tbe rond to th1· 
house; [amll that this track nn!I the trnl·k ol 
\he defendnnt c01·responded." It was said : 
·.~l'be previous threats ot the detemlnnt, nutl 
hli declnratlons In the nature ot threab1. 
were, on the Bllme principle, properly ad· 
mltted. While they ore not of themselvPN 
convincing of guilt. from them, in com11'<."-
tlon with the other circumstances, If bellen'fl 
by the jury, guilt may be a logical sequenc1!.'' 
Wbart. Cr. Ev. (8th F,d.) § ii>fl. 
As to the def .. use of an alibi. the bm·den 
of making It out wns upon the plaintiff 111 
error (Ack1>rson v. People. 124 Ill. 563, Iii 
N. E. 8-17'· 11nd, In order to maintain it, he 
~-~ ,,,, re &r. 
wn11 bound 1"<> · R '11 L' Me ... o. 6 
facts and cfre1J 1111· t..·1'1 76 111 lt-d ~ ( f•lj "" Sllpporf BUcb 
when consldere ,.._ ~04 "" W,/!re sullJ. t t 
other evidPnce LO- "<I~ c 11uettoo with anc 'f:e· 
minds of tbe juJ"f ~ i-~11 ~l!le, to crea"te Jn tbe 
truth ot the cbarGe ll~ &onnhle doubt of tbe 
People, 107 Ill. 162; ~:/IJst 11/m. Garrity v. 
Ill. 42. It cnnnot he lll//ns v. People, 110 
CJ &lid t/Jut the defense 
wns made out so <'llrJ.r natl satisfactorily 
as to be avalllng llJ:nfast the case made by 
tht> state. 
It is assigned as error tb11t the eourt re-
fused to permit the dPft•111l1111t to pm,·e by 
two witnesses that they l1ud heard Tbonms 
Verhines make threats that he would burn 
up eYPrythlng Rldrnhonr had. We do not 
regard this ruling us t•n-oneous. Threats of 
a third person, other than the prisoner 
on trial, against the victim ot the crime 
char,i:ed, are mere hearsay, and are inad-
missible, Evidence of thl11 eharacter tends 
to draw away the mlnd11 of the jury from 
the point in issue, which Is the guilt or In-
nocence of the prlsonr1·. and to <>xelte their 
prejudices nnd mislead them. 1 Greenl. Ev. 
ff 51, 52; Walker v. State, 6 Tex. App. 576; 
State v. Duncan, 6 Ired. 286. Such thrl'ats 
ot a third perMon are Inter allos acta; they 
are too remote from the Inquiry before the 
jury to be rect-IYed, and have no 1.-,i:ul tend· 
ency to establish thP lnnoc<>nce of the prls-
on1>r. Alston v. State, 63 Ala. 178; State v. 
Davis, 77 N. C. 483. It is competent tor the 
def Pndunt to show by any ll'Jtal evldl'n<'e 
,that another committed the <'rime with 
which he Is charged, and that he Is inno-
cent of any participation in it, but this can-
not be shown by the admissions or confes-
sions of· a third per11on not under oath, 
which are only henrsuy. ThP proof must 
connect SU<'h third person with the fact.-
that Is, with the perpetration of some deed 
entPt'lng Into thP crime Itself. Tht>re must 
be proof ot such a train of tacts and clr-
cumi<tances as tend clearly to point to him, 
rather than to the prisoner, us the guilty 
party. "Extrnjudlclal statements ot third 
pt>r1101u1 <'annot be proved by heursuy. unless 
sul'!1 stat<>ments were part of the re11 g1>stne." 
Whart. Cr. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 2'..?5; Smith v. 
Htnft'. 9 Ala. 000; Htute v. Davis. supra; 
Grt>PnftPld v. Peoplt>, 1'!.-, N. Y. 'm; Thomas 
v. Pl•oplt>. 67 N. Y. :.!18; Owem~by v. State, 
82 Alu. U:J. 2 South. 764; Htntl' v. Hayn<>s, 
71 N. C. W; Hb1>a v. State, 10 Yerg. 258; 
Com. v. Chabbock, 1 Mass. 143; State v. 
Johnson, ao La. Ann. 921; People v. llur-
phy, 4:; Cal. 137; State v. Smith, 35 Kun. 
li18. 11 Pnc. 008; State v. May, 4 Dev. 328; 
Wrl;.:ht v. Htntr. D YPrjl. 342. 
It ls 111o1sl;.:nPtl 1111 l'l·rm· that t\1e court \n-
strnctt>d thl' jnr.)' that "the ren1<onable doubt 
the jury nre perm\tt<>ll to l'nh•rtu\n mu1<t \w 
as to th<' in11lt of the nc.•c\U<t'I.\ on th~ w\~o\e 
of thr e\·idNwe. and not o.s \() \\UY 11a,·twu-
lur fact In the> <'fl~l'." \V c dQ not'!:'-'~''"'\ t\,,~ 
d trl t tbe instruction as enoueou~. lt 
lsocln n:c~ordnnce wlth t:.be TU\t~ -wn\cb ... ~~ 
1 JJJ "t>er o cases. m.w.-have laid down D a nu 1.l 
Case No. 6]
RELEVAN CY.
_at the time such offense was committed.
iins v. People. supra; Davis v. People, 114
Ill. 86. 29 N. E. 192; Leigh v. People, 113 Ill.
372; Brcssler v. People, 117 Ill. 422. 8 N. E.
(52; Hoge v. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N. E. 796.
There was no error in refusing the defend-
ant’s third refused instruction, because in-
structions given for the state and for the
accused required the jury to believe from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant willfully and maliciously
burned the barn of Itidenhour.
Complaint is made that the court refused
to instruct the jury as follows: “If the jury
entertain any reasonable doubt as to wheth-
er or not the defendant was at his own
home or at the scene of the alleged offense
then it is your duty. under the law, to acquit
him." Such an instruction was held to be
incorrect in Mullins v. People. supra. The
reasonable doubt of guilt which will acquit
the prisoner when his defense is an alibi
is the doubt which arises from a considera-
tion by the jury of all the evidence, “as well
that touching the question of the alibi as
the criminatiug evidence introduced by the
prosecution." Mullins v. People, supra. In
the case at bar, 14 instructions were given
for the state. and 18 for the defendant. The
jury was instructed in regard to the subject
of reasonable doubt in accordance with the
principles laid down by this court in Miller v.
People, 39 Ill. 457; May v. People, 60 Ill. 119;
Connaghan v. People, S8 Ill. 460; Spies v.
People. 122 Ill. 1, 12 N. E. S65, and 17 N. E.,
898. We see no reason for departing from
the views expressed in these cases. -
Counsel for plaintiff in error claim that
the trial court erred in refusing to give their
refused instruction No. 17, which is as fol-
lows: “The jury are instructed, as a mat-
ter of law. that, when a conviction for a
criminal oifense is sought on circumstantial
evidence alone. the people must not only
show, by a preponderance of evidence that
the allc,':ed facts and circumstances are true. .'
but they must be such facts and circum-
stances as are absolutely inconsistent, upon i
any reasonable hypothesis, with the inno-
ccnce of the accused, and incapable of ex- ;
‘ deuce,
planation upon any other theory than that
of the guilt of the accused; and in this case. l
if all the facts and circumstances relied on
by the people to secure a conviction can be ‘
reasonably accounted for upon any theory i
consistent with the innocence of the dei’end- '
ant, they should acquit him." in instruc- i
tion No. 13 given for the people. the court
told the jury that circumstantial evidence '
should be of such a character as to exclude 1'
every reasonable hypothesis other than that
the defendant is ,<:uilt_v.“ In instruction No. I
1 given for the defendant, the court instruct-
ed the jury that "the defendant is presumed I
to be innocent until the contrary appeared '
by the evidence, and such evidence must be
so strong and convincing as to remove every
reasonable doubt of his guilt, to the exclu-
sion of every reasonable hypothesis of his
18
innocence." Irrespective of the question
whether refused instruction No. 17 was right
or wrong, the defendant could not have been
injured by its refusal. in view of the giving
of plaintiff's instruction No. 13, and defend-
ant‘s instruction .\'o. 1, as above quoted,
whether the two last-named instructions
were correct or not. A defendant cannot
complain of the refusal of an instruction if
its substance is embodied in instructions
which are given, and, in so holding. this court
does not necessarily hold such given instruc-
tions to be correct. In addition, however, to
this consideration, said instruction No. 17
was properly refused, because it is so broad
and sweeping in its terms that, if it were
given in every criminal case dependent upon
circumstantial evidence, it would have a
tendency to prevent, in many instances, the
conviction of guilty parties. Gannon v. Peo-
ple. 127 Ill. 507, 21 N. E. 525; Whart. Cr.
Ev. (8th Ed.) § 10. “What circumstances
amount to proof can never be matter of gen-
eral definition. The legal test is the sufli-
ciency of the evidence to satisfy the under-
standing and conscience of the jury. On the
one hand, absolute metaphysical and demon-
strative certainty is not essential to proof by
circumstances. It is sufficient if they pro-
duce moral certainty. to the exclusion of
every reasonable doubt.” Starkie, Ev. § 79;
Otmer v. People. T6 Ill. 1-iii. The circum-
stances must be such as to produce a moral
certainty of guilt, and to exclude any other
reasonable hypothesis. Corn. v. Goodwin. 14
Gray. 55; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 13a. The jury
should he satisfied of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. and if there
be no probable hypothesis of guilt consistent,
beyond reasonable doubt. with the facts of
the case, the defendant must be acquitted.
Com. v. Costlcy, 118 Mass. 1; Wliart. (Jr.
Ev. (Sth Ed.) § 21. In order to warrant a
conviction of crime on circumstantial evi-
the circumstances, taken together,
should be of a conclusive nature and tend-
ency, leading. on the whole. to a satisfac-
tory conclusion. and producing. in effect. a.
reasonable and moral certainty that the. ae-
cused. and no one else, committed the 039059
charged. (‘om. v. Goodwin. supra. ll is
ditiicult to define accurately what $5 a rea-
sonable doubt. but all the authol-mes =\g\‘%
that such a doubt must be actual and sub-
stantial. as contradistinguisheq fro“) a \11*’-1'9
vague apprehension. and must: aflse o\\t_<:‘i
the evidence introduced. 3 green‘ Ev. (Lb-1
Ed.) § 29. note a; Earl v. Poop“, 73
The jury may be said to entertain g
able doubt when. after the entire
iii. fQt\$Ql\-
compari-
son and consideration of an the evld"“°e'
they cannot say that they f
conviction to a. moral certain
of the charge. Com. v. \\';-bat‘)? P Ga
Proof "beyond a reasonable ‘ "
proof as precludes every 1-ea
esis except that which it 1‘
(‘"1 afl
Y)‘. of U
-Jiiitlim!
)4; truth
511. 320.
H is such
doubt Hypoth-
Sllllilillc ‘I-|p])\)l‘t.
. in
i f ant 1 _ uds to ‘ distin-
;:...*..;*.;“;....° ;‘..‘“?.i,‘2..£’.;*.i.“*§,*;§§;;,,*.1’,1.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
05
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Cnse No. 6] RELEVANCY. 
fins v. People, supra; Davis v. People, 114 
m. 86. 29 N. E. 192; Leigh v. People, 113 m 
372; Bressler v. People, 117 Ill. 422, 8 N. E. 
62; Hoge v. People, 117 Ill. a;), 6 :S. E. 700. 
ThE'l'e was no error In rPfuslng the d!'fend-
ant's third refused lnstl"Uctlon, b1>cause In-
structions given for thl• state and for the 
accusro required the jury to believe from 
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant willfully and maliciously 
burned the bnrn of Ridenhour. 
Complaint Is mndt• tlutt the court rl'fUSt'd 
to lnstrtwt the jury as follows: "If the jury 
entertain any ren11onnbl<> doubt as to wheth-
er or not the dt!fl'ndant was at his own 
home or at the scene of the allegt>d offense 
. at the time such offense was <.'Ommltted. 
then It Is your duty, undt>r the law, to acquit 
him." ~ucb an lnstruct1on was held to be 
lncorrt>ct In Mullins v. Pt'Olllt>, suprn. Th<' 
reasonable doubt of guilt which will acquit 
the prisoner when his dt>fense Is an alibi 
Is tbt> doubt which arises from a consldera· 
tlon by the jury of all the evldt>nce, "as well 
that toucbln~ the question of the alibi as 
the crlmlnatlug evldt>nce lntrodu('('(} by tht> 
prosecution." Mullins v. Pt•ople, supra. In 
the case at bar, 14 Instructions were given 
for the state, and 18 for the def Pndant. The 
jury was Instructed In r<'gnrd to the subject 
of reasonable doubt In acrordnnCP with the 
principles laid down by this l'ourt In Miller v. 
People, 39 Ill. 457; May v. People, 00 Ill. 119; 
Connaghnn v. People, 88 Ill. .JOO; Spies v. 
People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N. E . 865, and 17 N. E., 
8U8. We 8l'e no reason for departing from 
tht> views expn>Ased In thesE' casPs. 
Counsel for plaintiff In error claim that 
th!' trial court erred In refusing to give their 
refused Instruction No. 17, which Is as fol-
lows: "The jury are Instructed, as a mat-
ter of law. that, when a conviction for a 
criminal otren11e Is sought on circumstantial 
evldPnce alone. the people must not only 
11how, by a preponderance of evldenl'l' that 
the allegPd facts and circumstances are true. 
but they must be such facts and clrcum· 
stances as are absolutely lncomdstent, upon 
any reasonable hypothesis, with the lnno-
cPnee of the aC'CUSed, and lnl'apable of ex-
planation upon any other theory than that 
of tht> guilt of the accused; and In this case. 
If all the facts and circumstances relied on 
by the people to secure a convll'tlon can be 
reasonably accounted for upon any theory 
consistent with the lnno('('nce of tlw dt>fend-
ant, they shonld acquit him." In lm1trul·· 
tlon No. 13 given for the peoplt>, the court 
told the jury that clrcumKtantlal evldt>nct• 
should be of such a character as to exclude 
every rt>asonable hypothl'Kls othl'r than that 
the deft>ndant 111 guilt~·." In Instruction ::So. 
1 glvt>n for tht> deft>ndant, the court lnstruct-
<.>d the jury that "the defendant ls presumed 
to be Innocent until the contrary appeared 
by the evldt>nce, and such evidence must be 
so strong and convincing as to remove every 
rt>iuionable doubt of his guilt, to the t•xclu-
11lon of every reasonable hypothesla of hla 
18 
Innocence." IrreSpectlve of the question 
whether retused ln11trucUon No. 17 was right 
or wrong, the deft>ml:tnt could not have been 
Injured by Its refusal, In view of the giving 
of plaintiff's Instruction No. 13, and defend-
ant's Instruction Xo. 1, as above quoted, 
whether the two last-named Instructions 
were correct or not. A defendant cannot 
complain of the refusal. of an Instruction If 
Its substance ls embodied In lnstrnctlons 
which are given, and, In so holding. this court 
does not nl'CeBSarlly hold such given Instruc-
tions to be correct. In addition, however, to 
this con11lderatlon, said Instruction :So. 17 
was properly refused, because It Is so hroa'l 
and swet>plng In Its terms that, If It wert> 
given In every criminal case dependent upon 
clrt'umstantlal evidence, It would have a 
tendt>ncy to prevent, In many Instances, the 
conviction of guilty parties. Gannon v. Peo-
ple, 121 Ill. 507, 21 N. E. a2:>; Whart. Cr. 
Ev. (8th Ed.) I 10. "What circumstances 
amount to proof <'RD nevt>r be matter of gen-
eral deftnltJon. The legal test Is the suftl-
clPn<'y of the evlden<-e to 811.tlsty the under-
standing and ronsclenl'I' of the jury. On the 
one band, absolute metaphysical and demon-
strative certainty Is not essential to proof by 
circumstances. n Is sumclent If they pro-
duce moral C'l'l"talnty. to the exclll81on of 
every r(>flsonablt> cloubt." Starkie, Ev. I 79; 
Otmer v. Pt•ople, 76 Ill. 1411. Tht> circum-
stances must be such as to produce a moral 
certainty of guilt, and to exl'lude any other 
reasonable hypothesis. Com. v. Goodwin. 14 
Gray, 55; 1 Greenl. Ev. II l3a. The jury 
shonld be satisfied of the 1h•fPndant's guilt 
~yond a rea1«1mthle douht. and If there 
be no probable hypothesis of guilt consistent, 
beyond reasonable doubt, with the facts of 
the case, the dt>fendant must be acquitted. 
Com. v. Costley, 118 llass. 1; Whart. Cr. 
Ev. (8th Ed.) f 21. In order to warrant a 
conviction of crime on circumstantial evl-
den<'e, the clrl'ltm11tances, taken togetht>r, 
should be of a <.'(mcluslve nature am.I tt>nd-
ency, leading, on the whole. to a satisfac-
tory ronC'lrndon, and prodtwlng, In pftect. a 
reasonable and moral certainty that the ac-
cusPd, and no one else, romrulttl'l.l tbe otfense 
ch:1rg1'1i. ('om. v. <~oodwln, supra. It la 
dlttlcult to dt>line accurately what Is a ren-
soimble doubt, but all the autborlt\eB agree 
' that such a doubt must be actual and sub-
stantial, as contradlstlngulshed frolll a mere 
vague apprelwnslon, and must Rl'tse o\tt -~t 
thP evidence Introduced. 3 Ureeul. J.')'V· (~~·'' 
Ed.) I 29, note a; Earl v. P('()pte- 13 }\\. 329. 
· The Jury may be said to entE>rtni g. reason-
able doubt when, after the entl~ c0uwar\-
son and consideration of all th e,,.-\di>nce, 
they l'llnnot say that they fe>t•l e 11.bltl\ng 
, conviction to a moral ct>rtatnty, 0~tltlle tr.~~ 
! of the charge. Com. v. \Vl•bst<>r ,., C"1:4b. 32ch 
I Proof '"beyond a reasonable ll • ~ •• ts su 
proof as prl'<'l1tdPB every rl'a8( ou t ]:lypoth· 
I l'!!ls exct•pt that which lt tt•t lDa'blC r&tllll'ort. It Is proof "to a moral ce ltls to t1t11tln-~.aahed f ·~- rttllnty .. ~d '.[be 
........ rom an a.._.iute • ....., • certai~--
1)11u@:c'r .-mu mnrunor 1cvm1§
lwo plu-a.ses—“prooi' beyond a reasonable
doubt," and proof “to n mornl certainty"-
nresynonyznous and equivalent. "Each sig-
llifies such proof as satisfies the judgment
and conscience of the jury as reasonable men,
and applying their reason to the evidence be-
o\
\ _
‘1
>1 1/'1‘.
Q .
fore them, that £1319 (‘I-102 [awe M‘ 6
: m a b r11 6 "0 8
(ciigilxlinaaei l§aVe '10 °t "q”nrcb'”“'d 1'“ "““”
" G011; ‘>119, ' fllldso szztis/i1-11
sion possible.’ ' "('11-wuable c'0uz'l”.
C ' .
Judgment of the Cir wt C. CO“?/'11". supra. T110
firmed. °l"'!1salflz-med. A/‘
J0
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two phra.sea-"proot beyond a reasonable 
1loubt," and proof .. to a mornl certalnty''-
nre synonymous and eqnlnllent. ··Each slg-
nllles such proof' as satisfil'l> the judgment 
and conscience or the jury as reasonable men, 
and applying their reason to the evidence be-
··------... 
tP~ r/Y--
tore them, tbU. t £1~ ~I t rAlle Ko. 6 
committed IJy t:b e 00 f'~1,:J:e C'~ 
them as to lPa VOo~ 0 t4Q lllJt, aod ! !':ts1::::: 
slon possllJle." C · l>-. G, r£•1u1ooable cooc/u-
judgment ot the cJ.r lllt Co 'St/f:r, supra. Tk· 
firmed. llrt Is afflrmed. Ar 
19 
.I 
I 
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Case No. 7]
lH'll.l'lV.\.\'(‘Y.
FERRARI et ul. v. .\ll,'llll.\Y.
(25 N. E. 970. 152 Muss. 496.)
Supreme Judicial (‘ourt of .\lai-nmclillsetts.
Sutfolk. .\'ov. 21$, 1890.
Exceptions from superior court. Suffolk
(-ounty; James M. Barker, Judge.
Action by Annlbali Ferrari and others
against Henry Murray for a balance alleged
to he due to plaintiffs on a written oontract
for the making by them for d<~t'¢-mlant of a
granite n1onunu=ut. De-t’omlant alleged ex-
<-options.
J. L. l<Ildri1l;:v_ for plalntlt'f.~‘. S. Z. Bow-
man and W. 1". Prime, for defendant.
20
W. AI,l.E.\'. J. Tho <lofouso was a hrvaoh
of \vnrrant_v that the monument should be
free from all llu|w1'f('t-tionrl. The question
put by the deft-mlaut to the plaintlflfs on
(-runs-1-:\'aminatlon. whether they knew of It
partivnlar prom-0:-in described to him of mend-
ing and oonor\allng cracks in granite, was
Immaterial. The plaiutlfl’s’ knowledge of a
process by which 1-rm-ks could be concealed
had no t0ll(l('.l.l(‘_\‘ to prove that (-rm-ks exist-
ed. and lt (-rm-ks did exist it was innnatvrial
whether the plaintiffs did or did not know
01' them or attempt to (‘0ll('t‘fll them. A ma-
jority of the court are of oplnlon that the
entry should be, exceptions overruled.
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Case No. 7] 111-:LEV .\ X<'Y. 
FEUUARI et al. v. lirHHA\'.. 
(25 N. E. 970, ta:? Mn1111. -400.) 
Supreme .Judicial < ·uurt of '.\J1tll8tH"hllM'ttM. 
Hnffolk. ~1n-. :!ti, 18!JO. 
Exceptions from Slll>"rlor court, Sulrolk 
<'Ounty; James M. Barker, Judgt>. 
A<'tlon by Annlball l<'errarl and othf'rs 
against Henry Murray for a balan~ alleged 
to be due to plalntlft'11 on a wrlttrn ront1"1lct 
for the making by th<>m for 1h•ft>111hmt o( a 
granJte monnmE>nt. Ut>fE'ndnnt allt•ged ex-
<'eptlons. 
J. L . Eldrldgt>. for plnlntUfM. S. Z. Bow-
man and "". I•'. Prime, for defendant. 
20 
W. ALLI<:X. J. ThE' dl'fPnsf' was a brt>a<'h 
of warranty that tbt- monument 11hould be 
t'rl'e from all lmpE>rfN·tlon11. The question 
put by the deft>udant to the plaintiffs on 
<'l"t1SR-examlnntlon. whether they knew of a 
1mrtl<•ulur pn)("eMM deNcrlbed to bJm of mt>nd-
lng and ron<'t'allng c·racks In granite, was 
lmmatt>rlal. Thi' plnlntltfs' knowledge of a 
proC'E'ss by whl<'h 1•rn<•ks could be com•ealed 
had no tentlen1•y to provt> that <'r&<·k11 t>xJst-
ed, and If c•ra1•ks did exll1t It wnM ln111111tt•rlal 
whether the plalntlft's did or did not know 
of them or attt>mpt to ron<'e81 them. A nu1-
jorlty of the C'ourt are of opinion that tile 
entry should be, exceptions overruled. 
.\
»§
FACTS 'i‘i~.‘\'l)l.\G T0 r1t0\'i: F.-tor-5 1’ $880
E‘ v .
FINDL.-11' BRl<I\\'l.\’G co. v. BAUER. the injury c-0111 0,. Q /‘cm M» 8
that these hooks I11
- eg Q5 8
31:11“ any igéflge 1> ot1omt””"'°”' "M
e or pa Q 8]’) 0 of tlze belt the
Error to circuit court, Lucas county. out and 1311 back! liq 5’ 111194 would drop
Action for personal injuries by one Bauer 1111-1-equent occurfebce at this W3, not 3,,
ti‘-'“i1\~=t the Fivdhlr Brewing Comnnnr llfllilienetl, the belt b¢~(._,,“'1'@11, as sometimes
Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant ing the progress of the tine to" 10089. Dur-
hrings error. Atiirtncd. called by the plaintiif, mu *1 Wmleflfl W118
(35 .\*. 55, 50 Ohio St. 51:0.) °'-
Supreme ( ‘onrt of Ohio. Oct. 31. 1893.
If W88 clzzlmezl
_ and 5t-"ted, in answer
\\-aite & Snider, for plaintiff in error.
James E. Pilliod and Ashton H. Coldham,
for defendant in error.
.\lll\’Si;1A1.L, J. The action below was by
an eniployé of the defendant, to recover dam-
ages for a personal injury caused. as claim-
ed, by the negligence of the defendant in
int-uisliing an unsafe appliance with which
to do the work in which he was employed.
The avermeuts are, in substance, that while
operating, by the direction of the superin-
tendent of the company, a lift,-used for the
purpose of elevating barrels and similar
packages from a lower to an upper floor, he
was injured, without fault on his part, by
one of these packages falling back upon him;
and that it resulted from the negligent and
defective construction of the appliance, of
which the defendant had notice, but of
which he had no knowledge, and could not
have had, in the exercise of ordinary care on
his part. issues were joined upon the aver-
tncnts of the petition as to the defective char-
actor of the lift, the negligence of the de-
fendant, and the averment that it happened
without fault on the part of the piaintltf. It
appcarctl that the lift or elevator consisted
of a broad, heavy, rubber belt, with certain
lateral supports and guides of timber, run-
ning nearly perpendicular against a board
the full width of the belt, and over a pulley
Just above the upper floor, and around an-
other just below the wash-room floor. To
the face of this band were attached two ets
of iron hooks or arms, which, as the band
revolved, caught the barrels on the under
side, and carried them up through an open-
ing in the floor; and as they turned on the i
upper pulley the barrels fell away by their
own weight to the floor above, and left the
hooks free to continue their downward move-
ment. The barrels to be elevated were
placed upon a. skid raised above the lower
floor, and inclined towards this revolving
hand. and the man tending the elevator roll-
ed them, one at a. time, against the band,
ready for the hooks coming around and up-
ward from the lower pulley to carry them
over the pulley above; and, as one barrel
was freeing itself from the hooks above, the
_ other set of hooks were about ready to re-
! ccive the next barrel. While the plaintiff was
3 engaged in so placing the barrels ready to be
taken up by the hooks, one of them, a half
barrel, after being carried part way up, fell
from the hooks, and, striking his hand, then
resting on the barrel next to go up, caused
to a question, that, flome _
by the 5:: ‘:2:
same work, and that, wmje so e,,,pk,yed, 3'
barrel fell back and injured mm The calm-
sel for the plaintiff stated that this was of-
fered for the sole purpose of showing the
dangerous character of the machine, and the
defendant's knowledge of that fact, and for
no other purpose. The court then stated
that it would be received for these purposes,
and no other, and so instructed the jury at
the time. Similar evidence as to the falling
back of barrels while the lift was being oper-
ated was given by other witnesses, to which
the defendant excepted at the time. The
jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plain-
tifl’, on which the court, after overruling a
motion for a new trial, rendered Judgment.
The judgment having been aflilrmed by the
circuit court, this proceeding is prosecuted
to obtain a. reveral of both judgments so
rendered.
The only question in the case is as to the
admissibility of the evidence offered to show
that on former occasions, when the elevator
was being operated, barrels and packages
fell back, and injured the persons operating
it, as in this case. It is claimed to be incom-
petent on the ground that it raises collateral
issues tending to mislead the jury and to
surprise the opposite party, by the intro-
ductlon of evidence for which he could not
have been prepared ‘by the nature of the is-
sue. The rule relied on is thus stated by
Greenlcaf: “The evidence offered must cor-
respond with the ailcgations, and be con-
flned to the point in issue." Greenl. Ev. §
51. And he adds, in the following section:
“This rule excludes all evidence of collateral
facts, or those which arc incapable oi’ nfi'ord-
ing any reasonable pi-t-stttiiption or inference
‘ as to the principal matter of fact in dis-
pute." The authorities on the question are
conflicting. The courts of Massachusetts
and some of the other states hold that such
evidence is not within the issue, but collat-
eral to it, and should be rejected. Collins v.
Dorchester, 6 Cush. 396; Aldrich v. Pelham,
1 Gray, 510; Phillips v. Town of Willow, 70
Wis. 6, 34 N. \V. 731. But reason and the
weight of authority are the other way. The
rule, as stated by Greenleaf, excludes only
those facts “which are incapable ot affording
any reasonable presumption or inference as
to the principm matter or fact in dispute.
so that a fact cannot be said to be‘co\\'.\tera\
to the issue if, Wlie“ 95tab“a\\m‘ .“ “)§“\S“§0_
P1,-il.1e\pa\ tact in s
prove or dispr0V9 the
21
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FACTS 'fEXUt:\G TO PRO\'E FAcrs .._ft' ~&o 
...,;IA/ .Ji:. ' 
FL'\\DLA. Y BREWI.XG 00. "· BAUER. 
(35 N. E. 50, 50 Ohio St. ;)(IO.) 
Supreme ( •ourt of Ohio. Oct. 31, 1893. 
Error to circuit court, Lucas couuty. 
Action :ror personal Injuries by one Bauer 
&Jllllnst the 1'"ludlay Brewing Com1>any. 
PlalntHr had judgment, and defendant 
the injury c0zxi_,,,.- O~ ~Gq [l118e So. H 
that these hooJcJB' _,J. .\-... - o~ 
that in any 1rre.Er 't"~~. ~ It w11a <·la/med ge h.. -~Ot ere /co a.bort, 11Dd barrel or pac.kS ~~ lolJ or t.be belt tbe 
brings error. AtHrmed. 
Waite & Snider, for plalntlJr 
Jumes E. Pllllod and Asbtoo H. 
for defendunt in error. 
out and fall ba.C'.JC, '4.tct t'f!' Urted would drop 
infrequent occurr6ll<_>e .uat I.bis w11a Dot 11n 
ha1>1lt'ned, the belt bee . .., lf>belJ, 118 aometlmi!lll 
Ing the progress of t4e ;ne too looae. Dar-
called by the plafntJir, 'rJa/ a wftneBB waa 
t, lllld stated, ID a.Dswer In error. to a question, t.ba. BOl!Je time before be bad 
Coldham, been employed by the defendant to do the 
lllN~HAJ .. L, J. 'rbe action below was by 
11u em11loy6 o~ the defendant, to recover dam· 
Dltl'8 for a. personal Injury caused, a111 <.>lalw-
ed, by the negligence of the defendant in 
furn\shlug an un-fe appliance with whil•h 
to do the work In which he was employed. 
1'be avermentB are, in substance, that while 
o()(>rutl.ng, by the direction of the superln· 
tendent of the company, a lift,· used for the 
purpose of ~levatlng barrels and similar 
packllges from a lower to an upper floor, he 
was injured, without fault on bis part, by 
one of these packages falllng back upon him; 
and that lt resulted from the negligent and 
defective constru<..•tlon of the appliance, of 
which the defendant bad notice, but of 
which he had no knowledge, and could not 
have bad, in the exercise of ordinary care on 
hll!I part. Issues were Joined upon the aver-
ments of the petition as to the detective char-
acter of the utt, the negligence of the de-
fendant, and the averment that it happened 
w\thout fault on the part of tbe plaintiff. It 
appeared that the lift or elevator conelsted 
of a broad, heavy, rubber belt, with certain 
lateral sup1>0rts and guides of timber, run-
ning nearly perpendicular against a board 
the full width of tile belt, and over a pulley 
just above the upper ftoor, and around an-
other just below the wash-room ftoor. To 
the face of this band were attached two sets 
of iron hooks or arms, which, us the band 
revolved, caught the barrels on the under 
Bide, and carried them up through an open-
ing ln the ftoor; and as they turned on the 
upper pulley the barrels tell away by their 
own weight to the floor above, and left tht> 
hooks free to continue their downward move-
ment. 1'be barrels to be elevated were 
placed upon a skid raised above the lower 
floor, and Inclined towards this revolving 
hand, an<l the man tending the elevator roll-
ed them, one at a time, against the band, 
ready for the books coming al'ound and up-
ward from the lower pulley to carry them 
over the pulley above; and, as one barrel 
was freeing Itself from the books above, the 
<'tlier set of books were about ready to re-
t.-elve the next barrel While the plaintiff was 
engaged In so placing the barrels ready to be 
taken up by the books, one ot them, a bait 
barrel, after being carried part way up, fell 
from the books, and, striking his band, then 
rest.In& on the barrel next to go up, cal18ed 
same work, and that, wblle so employed, a 
barrel fell back and Injured him. The coun-
sel for the platntur stated that this was ot-
tered for the sole purpose of showing the 
dau~erous character of the machine, and the 
defendant's knowledge of that tact, and for 
I no other purpose. The court then stated that it would be received for these purposes, 
J and no other, and so instructed the Jury at 
I the tJme. Similar evidence as to the falling 
back of barrels while the lift was being oper-
ated was given by other witnesses, to which 
the defendant excepted at the time. The 
Jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaln-
tltr, on which the court, after overrullng a 
motion for a new trial, rendered Judgment. 
1 '!'he Judgment having been aftlrmed by the 
circuit court, this proceeding is prosecuted 
to obtain a reversal of both jwlgments so 
rendered. 
The only question in the case is as to the 
admissibility ot the evidence offered to show 
that on former occasions, when the elevator 
I was being operated, barrels and pac•knge11 
1 tell back, and injured the persons operating 
It, as in this case. It is claimed to be Incom-
petent on the ground that It raises collateral 
Issues tending to mislead the Jury and to 
surprise the opposite party, by the intro-
1 ductlon of evidence for which be could not I have been prepared ·by the nature of the i• 
1 sue. The rule relied on Is thus stated by 
I Greenleaf: "The evidence otrered must cor-
J respond with the allegations, and be con-
Jined to the point in ie1me." Greenl. Ev. I I 51. And he adds, In the following section: 
"This rule excludes all evidence of 1-'0llateral 
1 facts, or tho11e whl<·h nTr tnc·11pnble or 11trord-
lng any reusouuhle p1·t·Hmupt1011 or Inference 
'! as to the principal matter of tact In di11-
pute." The authorities on the question are 
I conftlctlng. The courts of Massachusetts 
and some of the other states hold that such 
J evidence le not within the iBBue, but collat· 
eral to it, and should be rejected. Colline v. 
Dorchester, 6 Cush. 396; Aldrich v. Pelham, 
1 Gray, 510; Phillips v. Town of Willow, 70 
Wis. 6, 34 N. W. 73L But reason and the 
weight ot authority are the other way. The 
rule, as stated by Greenleaf, excludes only 
those tacts "which are lncapa'tlle ot s.ttord\~g 
any reasonable presumption or \nterence as 
to the principal matter or tact \n d\sl.mte." 
So that a tact cannot be sa\d to 'tle co\\atem\ 
to the Issue it, when est a b\\sn.~, \t tends to 
prove or disprove the p1.·lnc\~ tact m. d\;.;, 
I 
. 
. \ 
. 
· \ 
lase No. 8]
ltEl.E\'ANCY.
pute. In this case a number of principal
facts were in dispute.
the defectiveness of the machine, and the de-
fendant’s knowledge of that fact. as well as
his negligence in the premises. if the evi-
dence objected to tended to prove either of
these facts, there was no error in its admis- t
sion. There is no rule of evidence which re-
quires that what is offered should be rele-
vant to every issue in the case; it may be
relevant to one. and irrelevant to another.
No party can, as a rule. prove his case uno
flatu. He is compelled, in the nature of
things, to proceed step by step; and it not
infrequently happens that what is competent .
for one purpose is not for another. Tile
mixed character of the evidence docs not,
however, render it wholly incompetent. The
cvid-_>nec in such case is admitted with a di-
rection from the court to the jury as to how
it is to be applied, on what issues it is to be
considered, and on what not, as was done in
this case.
as to how this lift or elevator behaved on
former occasions—that at other times, when
bellli-I Operated by other persons, barrels‘
being lifted had fallen, and injured those
0Dvl‘8tiIl£ if, or had simply fallen back, the
conditions remaining substantially the same
~—tvl1d¢‘d to Prove some vice in its con-
struction that rendered its operation dan-
RQPOIIS, and that the company knew or
should have known the tact. Inspection it-
self may llldlcate some defect in a machine,
:lfl‘t‘<'fll1H ii“ -“a7°t.\‘ or usefulness; but, as is
most 1181111"! the case, its defective character,
whatever it may be, is more dearly observ-
ed in its operation. Experiment is the final
and most conclusive test of its safety, as
well as of its usefulness; and the fact that
the carefulncss of the party operating the
machine may he involved in each instance
may 859011 the Welght of the evidence, but
not its adnlisfilbility, as such a limitation
would exclude the result of every experiment
offered in evidence, which would amount to a
reductio ad absurdum. The defectiveness
of the lift, and the company's knowledge of
it, would not. however. alone constitute
‘actionable negiiitence. The character of the
machine and the employer's knowledge be-
ing established. it still remains a question
of fact whether. under all the circumstan-
cog, n case of actionable negligence has been
made out. That which caused the danger
may have been irremediable, and it is no
violation of duty by an employer to put one
in his emvlvy at the operation of a danger-
ous mm-llille. if flit‘ eniplo_\'e is i'ull_v inform-
ed as to its character, and voluntarily ac-
cepts the "mpl°5'm°11t- Whenever force is
applied T0 "'""m‘"‘l'&' there is more or less
danger to ""’=“‘ °l>(‘rating it; so that the
dllfy Of 151"’ "mpl"5"’I' towards his emDlo.‘v'é is
Hot T0 f'"'ni“l' *1 D¢’i'fectly safe machine,
but 0119 as sat‘) as (‘till be Provided in the
exercise of °"d““"‘5‘ care and prudence.
Among these were ~
I that the machine is known by him to be a
I may be upon other issues.
On reason, it seems plain that evidence ’
Whether the employer is negligent in this
regard does not depend solely upon the fact
dtlllgcrmls appliance, but whether, with such
knowledge, be neglected to do what a per-
son of ordinary care could and would have
done under such circumstances. It was.
however, incumbent on the plaintifl. in mak-
ing out his case, tn show the dangerous
character of the machine and the com-
pun_v's knowledge, as well as its negligence:
and, while the evidence was not competent
to prove negligence, it did tend. as we have
shown, to prove the other facts, and -was
therefore admissible. As said by the jlldi~'0
delivering the opinion in Darling v. West-
moreland, 52 N. H. 403: “The evidence to
prove several independent propositions or
distinct facts may be of different kinds, and
drawn from different sources." If evidence
offered be relevant to any issue in the case.
it is admissible. however incompetent it
Commenting on
the rule that contines the evidence to facts
put in issue by the pleadings, and excludes
collateral issues. Doe, J ., in the case just
cited, says: “This rule merely requires the
evidence to be relevant. It merely excludes
what is irrelevant. It is a rule of reason.
and not an arbitrary or technical one, and
. it does not exclude all experimental knowi-
edge." And it was there held that, on the
question whether a pile of lumber Wat‘
likely to frighten horses, evidence is ad-
missible to show that horses passing it were
or were not frightened by it. In .\icCar-
1'9-gher v. Rogers, 120 N. Y. 526. 24 N- E-
312, an action to recover damages mt an
injury sustained by the plaintiff while
working at a machine in the emP1°¥ of the
defendant, 11 pm-son who hm; previously
been lniui-ed while working the mtwltine 1“
the capacity of the plaintiff was w=1<Pd-
"How did the injury occur to you '3" and he
answered, “It jumped out of the socket in
the same way," The H-mence was held
to be relevant and competent as bfllriflg
upon the question 01' the r-ondition of the
machinery; and the court said that, while
the decisions are not in entire harmony 011
the question, such is the rule recognized in
that state. And so in “O;-94>, v. RRUWRY
Co.. 30 Minn. 465, 471, 16 N_ W. 358,
was an action by an emmové of defendant
to recover for an injury caulsed by it-8 1198'"-
senve in Permitting its rm,-as to be and
remain out of order, such evidence W115
held competent. The court said; t-It is, of
0011789, not competent for the purpose of
showing independent acts of I1€;ZligeI1<‘9- bl“
We illlllk on principle it is clearly flame’
sible when it tends to Show the common
cause of these accidents is a dangerous or
f . ,. ii com-
unsa e thing. It would be c¢1tna1?"flme'
petcnt to prove by 3 . t,
either before or afItJe§\::)l‘;rt tngideml “hm
the instrument clnii e ac -e
was in the same com . _
lltlon a
s
'1"! t0 h:1“_hen the ac-
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CMe No.!:!] REJ.E\" .AXCY. 
pule. In this cue a number of prln<'lpal 1 
tacts were In dispute. Among these were 
the defectlveneu of the machine, and the de-
fendant's knowledge of that fact, aa well ae 
his negligence In the premises. If tlu• t>t"I· 
dence objected to tended to prove either of 
these factR, there was no error In Its admls· 
slon. There Is no rule of evidence which re-
quires that what Is otrerl>d 11houlcl be rele-
vant to every 18HUe In the C'llae; It may be 
relevant to onl'. nn<l. lrrt>le\'ant to another. 
No party l'an, 88 a rule, 11r0Ye bis case uno 
fiatu. He la <·om1wlled, In the natuno or 
things, to pro<•t•ed step by ste11: and It not 
Infrequently happens that what Is competent 
for om• JIUfIIO&e Is not for nnother. The 
wl:irnd C!buracter of the evidence does not, 
however, render It wholly ln<'<>IDI)('tent. The 
evldt•U<'C In such case Is admlttl>d with a di· 
re(•tlon from the eourt to the jury as to how 
it ls to be applied, on what l111ues It 111 to be 
ooDBldered, and on what not, as was done lo 
this (!88(>. • 
On reason, It seems plain that evidence 
as to how this lift or elentor behaved on 
former occaslon&-that at other times, when 
being operated by other persoDB, barrels 
being lifted bad fallen, and Injured those 
operating It, or had simply fallen back, the 
<'011dlttons remaining substantially the 11&me 
-tendt>d to prove HOme vice In Its con· 
stru<-tlon that rendered Its operation dan· 
gerous, and that the company knew or 
should have known the fact. ID&peCtlon It· 
self may Indicate some defect In a machine, 
alTt><•tlng lt11 Hafety or usefulneBB; but, as Is 
most wmally the case, ltB de!ec.'tlve character, 
whatever It may be, ls more clearly ob8erv· 
ed In lte operation. Experiment ls the tlnal 
and most <'On<'IU11lve test of Its safety, a8 
well as of Its URefulness; and the f1u•t that 
the <-arefulness of the party upemtl11g the 
mac•blne may he Involved In t>ac·h lulltanee 
may affect the weight of the evidence. but 
not Its admlllslblllty, as such a limitation 
would ex<>lude the result or every experiment 
oft'.ered lo evidence, which would amount to a 
reductlo ad absurdum. The defectiveness 
of the lift, and the company's knowledge of 
It, "·ouhl not, however, alone <>onstltute 
·actionable negligence. The cbarB.<'ter ot the 
maehlne and the employer's knowledge be-
ing eRta bllshed, It still remains a question 
of f1wt whether, under all the clrcumstan· 
c•es, 11 <·ase of a<>tlonable negligence has been 
made· out. That which caused the danger 
may have been Irremediable, and It ls no 
violation of duty by an employer to put one 
In his employ at the operation of a danger· 
01111 mac·lllne. If th<> employ<- 111 fully Inform· 
ed as to Its chara<>ter, and voluntarily ac· 
eepts tbe employment. Whenever force ts 
applied to ma<·hlnery there ls more or less 
danger to thoHe operating It; so that the 
duty of the employer towanfs his employ6 Is 
not to tnrnh~b a Pt>rtec·tly HOf<> machine, 
but one na safe> IL!! <-an be provld<•d In the 
exercise of ordinary care and Ilrudence. 
22 
Whether the employer ls negligent lo this 
rc•gard does not depend solely upon the fact 
that the machine Is known by him to be a 
dangc>rotui a.ppllance, but whether, with su<'l1 
knowh•<l!,re, be neglected to do what a per-
aon or ordinary c•nre <'Ould an<t would ban• 
done under such circumstances. It was. 
how<>¥er, Incumbent on the plaintiff, In mak· 
Ing out his case, to show the dangerous 
rbaracter of the machine and the com· 
pany's knowledge, as well as Its negligence: 
and, while the evldenee was not competent 
to prove negllgeuee, It did tend, ll8 we have 
shown, to prove the oth<>r facts, and ·was 
therc>fore admlMlble. As Raid by the judge 
delivering the opinion In Darling Y. West· 
moreland, ;;2 X. H. 40:~: "The evidence to 
prove several lndc>pendent proposttloDB or 
distinct facts may llt> ot <lltrerent kinds, and 
drawn from dllTerent sources." If evldenee 
otren>d be relevant to any Issue In the case. 
It 111 11dmlnlble, however Incompetent It 
may be upon other lBBut>B. Commenting on 
the rule that confines the evidence to facts 
put In lll8ue by the pleadings, and exclude11 
collateral Issues, Doe. J., In the case just 
cited, says: ''This rule merely l'('(}Ulres the 
evidence to be relevant. It merely excludes 
what ts lrrelennt. It is a rule of reason, 
and not an arbitrary or technical one, and 
It does not exclude all experimental knowl· 
edge." And It was there held tb.a..t, on the 
question whether a pile of lumber was 
likely to frighten horses, evidence ls ad· 
mlBBlble to show that horses passing It were 
or were not frightened by It. In :McCar-
ragher v. Rogers, 120 N. Y. 526, 2-i N. E. 
812, an action to recover damages for an 
Injury swrta.lned by the platntlfr while 
working at a machine In the eroploy of the 
defendant, a person who had previously 
been Injured while working the machine In 
the C'llp&dty of the plalntil'f was uked. 
"How did the Injury ()('('Ur to you?" and he 
answered, "It Jumped out of the socket In 
the same way." The evidence was held 
to be relevant and competent as bearing 
upon the qUl'fltlon of the condition of the 
machinery; and the court said that, while 
the decisions are not In entire harmony on 
the question, 8U<'h la the rule recognized In 
that state. And RO In lloree v. Railway 
co., 30 lllnn. 460, 471, 16 N. w. 358, which 
wu an action by an eruploy6 of defendant 
to recover for an Injury caused by lta negli-
gence In permitting its tracltS to be and 
remain out of order, such evidence was 
held competent. The court as.id: "It ls, ot 
course, not competent for tbe purpose of 
showing lnd<'pendent ac•tM of 11egll!l:ence, but 
we think on prlnelple It Is cl"'adY admls· 
slble when It tends to show tbe common 
cause of these arcidents I da.nlerous or 
unsafe thing. It would :ea crtafnlY com· 
iwtent to prove by an l'X. c flt, a.t a time, 
elthl•r before or after ~:rt tll cldent. wnen 
the Instrument <'lahnt><l t e ac ..,.- caused \t 
was In the same conclltlono .:t• ~)lell the sc-
-‘t-ident coluplained of occurred, he cxamined
and expel-inlented with it, and found it
capable of producing like results. llence
there seelns no reason for excluding ordi-
nary experience, when confined within the
same limits and for
These facts are in the nature oi? experi-
ments to show the actual condition of the
instrulnent. Upon any issue as to the con-
dition or safety of any work of human con-
struction 'de-signed for practical use, evi-
dence slinxving how it has served when put
to the use for which it was designed would
seem to bear directly upon the issue. It is
son1t-times objected that this presents new
and collateral issues of which a defendant.
has no notice. In a. certain sense every
item of evidence material to the main issue
introduces a. new issue; that is, it calls for
a reply. In no other sense does it make a
new issue. Its only iniportance is that it
bears on the main issue, and, ii‘ it docs, it
is cotnpetent." We have quoted thus fully
from the opinion in this case hec:111se it
seems to set forth clearly and fully the
reasons for the admission of such evidence,
and to answer every objection that can be
made.
cases cited above, and relied on by the plain-
titt in error, has generally been regarded as
unsound; and, for this reason, the decisions
have not generally been followed as prec-
the same purpose. -
The reasoning in the .\lassach11setts .
it is said, re
cases, the “'81
the other w:1J'-
42 111. mo, 17‘ f ,-
ton, -iii Iowa, 1'30:
vr. 214:, 251. It is 0
that illustrates, as I re Said that ‘H met
1.!’ an 9X1J9l‘1llI t .
- um r the sub . "" ’ *1"
;.'lgnCOl1€l‘lt1)V°9I'S§', ‘ JP‘ tquattor or the Issue
is "pt collateral to that 13-
ue, but is direct evulom.-e bearing upon it "
City of Aurora V. Brown, 1'.’ lli. App. 122;
Darling v. Wostmoreland, 52 N. H. 401,
Here the Mztssachllsetts cases are consider-
ed and declared unsound. City of Delphi v.
Lowery, 7-i Ind. 520, contains an elaborate
review of the cases. Cook v. New Dur-
ham (N. II.) 13 Atl. 650; Kent v. Town of
Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; Piggot v. Railway 00.,
3 C. B. 229. As the evidence objected to
tended to prove that the lift had in it 11
vice, making it dangerous to operate, and
that the company had notice of this from
its previous behavior, there was no error in
admitting the evidence, with a direction to
the jury that it was to he confined to these
purposes, and could not be considered on
the question of the defendant's negligence
in the premises. Judgment aflirmed.
I: 3: 94 =76; WlI£'1'(.*.
gum fllassacbusettzs
O 1, (701 0 is decidedly
Pp 11":-/we V. Powers,
y-"I '7 ( /U’ 01' Burling-
5’I'l' V. Westfleld, $1
SPEAR and BURKET, JJ'., dissent.
."" '1-'1" L5;-Z _ _ _ M . L"~;;_,:..
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}~.\v.rs TE"YDl~G TO PHOVE FAO'C9 _I~ ':s~ 
~ l'o u.i!..' 
l'«il'UIH by 1:' JJ - ~l" "'"' . £Ca911 No. II 
f 
Osbo .•• e v. cft...T ~ -0 ,., Of' 
It 11!1 llllld, ref~.n 'l.t.llr f!>f"'o11, /J;::,_tJJ_er Bf.lltea. 
Clli'Wl!I the v.-ef.&" 0 _. to th · 36. where 
:c!dent co1u1>lalned of occurrell, hti Pxamlued 
.and expcrlmentetl with it, and round It 
capable of producing like results. llencr 
there seems no reason for ex«luding onli-
na.ry experJenc·e, when coulhu.>c.I within the 
same limits and !or the sume purpot1e. 
These racts are In the natme of exJ.>l'rl-
llll'Uts to show the actual <·omlltlon of the 
instruruen.t. Upon any IBHU<' us to thl' con-
dition or sat'ety o! any work of humun con· 
structlon · designed for pnl!'tical use, evl· 
dence shoTI.·tng how It has sei·ved wht•n 1mt 
to the use ror which It was designed woulrl 
seem to bear directly u110n the l88ue. It Is 
sometin1es object.Pd that this presents nt•w ' 
and collateral Issues of which a defendant 
bas no notice. In a. certain sense every 
ltc>m of evldPnce material to the malu Issue 
Introduces a new Issue; that ls, It calls for 
a l"\'ply. In no other sense does it make a 
new i8H\U'. Its only huportnnc·p Is that It 
bears on tlu• main bisue, and, If It d()(.'s, It 
Is com11<•tt•nt. •• We have quoted thus fully 
from tlw opinion ln this <·usu !Je<·1tuse It 
seems to Hl't forth clearly nnd fully the 
reuons for tbt.• admission of sU<"h evldeuce, 
and to nnliwer eyery objection that cun be 
made. 'l'be reasoning In the ~Inssaehmietts . 
case11 cltPd above, and relied on by the plnin-
tlft In error, has generally been regardrd as 
unsound; and, for this reason, the decbdons 
haw not generally been followed a11 prt-c-
' Cr .. ll e JfRSSllCbuaetts 
tlw other "'·a>r - ~t:.J> 11f/Jo11tJ· Is dee!d-JJ 
· -a - l1 or . =·F 4.2 Ill. ltID, 1 I : .: <:>o,.,. ( '/Jf<'llKo p; Powers, 
ton, 40 Iowa, ::t:Jb, JJ· r: ('/ty o.t Burl/ng-
'
't ., ... , '>'"Jl It I& ,.. llfkt•r v. JJ'esttleld 31J 
• -~, - • -<J{) , 
that Illustrates. Blil b . re said that '"a :faet 
coudltlon or the Sllb'.J ~ 811 expei·Jment, the 
. f'«t-watter o:f the Issue 
in controversy, fs .llot <·o/JatPrnl to that h!-
sue, but ls direct el"ldc>1u_.*' lwartug upon tt." 
City of Aurora v. Brown, l:! III. App. 12'.l; 
Darling v. Wt>stmo1"Pl11nd, 52 x H. 401. 
Here the llnssuchusetts cases ore consider-
ed and dl'<·lnred un110und. City of Delphi v. 
Lowery, 74 Ind. ~:..>o, contains 110 elaborate 
review of the coses. Cook v. New Dur-
hnw (N. II.) 13 Atl. 6:'.U; I~ent v. Town of 
Un<'oln, 3'.2 Vt. 591; Piggot v. Railway Co., 
3 C. B. 229. As the evidence objected to 
tended to prove thnt the lift had in It a 
vice, making it dangerous to opernte, and 
that the company had notk-e of this from 
its previous behavior, there was no error in 
admitting the evidence, with a direction to 
the jury that it was to be conttued ti> these 
purposes, and c-ould not be considrred on 
the question of the defendant"s negligence 
In the premises. Judgnwnt am1·med. 
SPEAR and BURKET, JJ., dissent. 
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Case No. 9]
RELEVANCY.
PI.\'.\'I~11' v. JONES.
(30 Atl. T62, 64 Conn. 5-15.)
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July
9, 11594.
Appeal from superior court, New Haven
county; Prentice, Judge.
Action by Maria W. Pinney. executrix of
the estate of Charles H. Pinney, deceased,
against Emily Jones to foreclose a mortgage.
l-‘rom a decree for plaintiff, entered on the
report of the state referee, defendant appeals.
Attirined.
V. Manger, for appellant William ll. \\‘il-
liams, for appellee.
TORRANCE, J’. This is an action brought
to foreclose a mbrtgage made to secure a note
for sixteen hundred dollars by the defendant,
lilmily Jones, to Charles H. Pinney. now do-
ceased. The defendant claimed to have paid
upon said note to Pinney, during his life-
time, the sum of $1.500, and whether this was
true or not was the main fact in dispute be-
tween the parties. The case was tried be-
fore the Honorable Elisha Carpenter, as state
referee. For the purpose of showing her abil-
ity to make such payment. the defendant of-
fered evidence to prove, and claimed she had
proved. that at the time when she bought
the niortgaged premises, in March. 1892, she
had in her possession the sum of $1.500, in
addition to the sum of $500 which she had
paid on account of said purchase; that this
sum of $1.500 was in a package in her house;
that she moved into the house upon the mort-
gaged premises ln April, 1892. and two or
three weeks thereafter, in the presence of her
daughter Cora, who was produced as a wit-
ness. she counted said $1.500. and. after
counting the same, deducted $15 therefrom.
and placed the remainder in a tin box, and
placed the box. with the money in it. in a
jar. and sealed up the jar with putty: and
that. after leaving the jar upon a shelf to
dry for two or three days, she and her hus-
band, who was produced as a witness. hurled
this jar in the cellar near the bottom of the
stairs, covered it over, and placed a paint
barrel over the spot where the jar was
buried. \Vl1ile Mrs. Jones was upon the wit-
ness stand, her counsel offered to prove by
her that. some time within two months after
the money had been counted as aforesaid,
Mrs. Jones requested her daughter Cora to
go with her to the said place where the
money was then buried, and that thereupon
(Fora and she went to tlie spot from the sit-
lillfl l‘°°m above; that Mrs. Jones then and
there removed the paint barrel. and told
Cora. that the money was in a pol in the
ground. and that she wanted her to know
where it was, “for if she should die she
wanted her to know about it.” The finding
states: “It was not claimed that the earth
was removed from over the jar in which the
money was claimed to have been placed, or
that the jar or other thing, in which it is now
claimed the money then was. was so exposed
or attempted to be exposed to view. The
plaintiff's counsel objected to the admission
in evidence of the conversation betwe:-11 the
said Emily Jones and her daughter Cora up-
on this occasion, and it was excluded: to
which ruling the defendant duly excepted."
Mrs. Jones thereafter upon this point testi-
ficd, without objection, a follows: “Cora
went with me down cellar; went down the
cellar steps to the left hand of the stairs.
just as you go down. I showed her the
money. I took the paint barrel, and moved
it around like this [illustrating], and pointed .
out to her where the money was concealed.
Then I set the barrel back on the same spot
I had removed it from. Then we went up-
stairs. That she, Cora, was the only person,
so far as she knew, besides her husband.
that ever knew or was shown where the
money was." The daughter Cora also testi-
lied, without objection, to her going down in
the cellar with her mother. and being shown
where the money was concealed, substantial-
ly as her mother had done. The referee
found that said claimed payment of $1,500
had not been made. To the report made by
the referee the defendant filed a ren1on-
strance. setting up as the ground of it the ac-
tion of the referee in excluding the conver-
sation aforesaid between Cora and her
mother. He further set up therein that the
plaintiff claimed that Mrs. Jones did not have
said sum of $1.500 at any time after 1891. and
that her entire story with reference to the
possession of said sum was false. The plain-
tiff demurred to the remonstrance. the court
sustained the demurrer, judgment was ren-
dered for the plaintiff, and the defendant
appealed.
This appeal presents but a single question,
and that is whether the statement made by
.\lrs. Jones to her daughter was admissible.
It is apparent that the defendant obtained
the benefit of everything else claimed by her
except this statement. She was allowed to
t@$t11’.\' fully to her acts and conduct in gflillg
into the cellar, and pointing out the place
where she (*]1|_i|11pd the money was concealed,
and from all this Cora understood that the
money was there buried. She says, indeed,
that she there showed Cora the money; but
from her own testimony, and from other
parts of the record, it is clear that all she
meant by this was that she showed her the
Dlflce where the money was concealed. Es-
sentially then, in this view of the mailer»
all that was excluded was her statement of
her reason for having Cora know wheffi U16
mimey W88 concealed; and it is Perhaps
questionable whether, even on the defend-
ant's view of the ease, the exclusion of that
“118 error (Russell v. Frisbie, 19 com» 2°5-
211)'§ 9-116. if it was, the case might Perhaps
be disposed of on the ground that the error
did not harm the defendant. But. as We
think the evidence was rightly excluded, We
Prefer t0 rest the decision upon that ground»
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Case No. 9) REI.EV ANCY. 
PI.XXE i v.. JOXES. 
l:'iO Atl. 702, EH Conn. 545.) 
Ruprl'lnl' Court of Errors of Conne<'ticut. July 
1*, 18tM. 
Appeal from superior court, New Haven 
county; Prentice, .Judge. 
Action by llarta W. Pinney, exec·utrlx of 
the e11tate of Charles H. Pinney, de<-eased, 
anln11t Emily .Jones to foreclose a mortgage. 
l"rom a decree for plnlntflJ, enterPd on the 
re110rt of the state referee, defendant ap1ll'als. 
AIHrmed. 
Y. Munger, for appellant. William ll. Wll· 
llamB, for appellee. 
TORRANCE, J". This Is an action brought 
to for<'«'IORe a mbrtgage made to secure a note 
tor 11lxteen hundred dollars by the defendant, 
Bmll;v .Jon1>11, to Charles H. Pinney. now de-
cealled. The dPfcndnnt clalmt>d to have paid 
upon said note to Pinney, during his life-
time, the sum of $1,500, and whether this was 
true or not was the main fact In dispute be· 
tween the parties. The case was tried be-
fore the Honorable Ell11ha Carpenter, as state 
referee. For the purpose of showing her abil-
ity to make such payment. the defp111Jant of-
fered evidence to prove, and claimed she had 
proved, that at the time when she bought 
tht> mortgngt>d premises, In March. 1892, she 
hn<l In her possession the sum of t\1.:">llO, ID 
a1hlltton to the sum of $fi00 which 11he had 
paid on aC<'ount of said purt'hase; that this 
111m1 of $1.i>OO was In a packag<! In her house; 
that 11he moved Into the hou11e upon the mort-
gaged premises In Aprll, 189'.l. and two or 
three week11 thereafter, In the presence of her 
daughter Cora, who was producl'd as a wit· 
ness. she counted said $1,500, and. after 
counting the same, deducted $15 thPrPfrom. 
and placed the remainder In a tin box, and 
plael'd the box. with the monPy In It. In & 
jar. and t!f'all'd up the jar with 1mtty: and 
that. aftpr )Paving the jar upon a 11hplf to 
dry for two or three days, sht' and hl•r hus-
band, who was produced as a wltDPBR. burled 
this jar In the cellar near the bottom of the 
stal1'8, covered It over, and plat•ed a paint 
barrel over the spot where thP jnr was 
burled. While Mrs . .Jones was upon the wit· 
ness stand, her coun11Pl offered to provp by 
her that. some time within two months after 
the money had been counted as aforesaid, 
Mrs . .Jones requested her daughter Cora to 
go with her to the said place where the 
money was then burled, and that thereupon 
Cora and she went to tlte spot from the sit.-
tin~ room above; that Mrs. Jones then and 
there removed the paint barrel. nnd told 
Cora that the monPy wa11 In a pot In the 
ground, and that she wantl'd her to know 
where it was, "for if she should die she 
wanted her to know about It." 'I'he finding 
states: "It was not claimed that the earth 
was removl'd from over the jar In which the 
money was claimed to have been placed, or 
that the jar or other thing, 1D which it ls now 
2' 
clalml'd the money then was. Wll8 so exposed 
or at.tempted to be exposed to view. The 
plalntltr'a counsel objected t.o the admlRSlon 
In evlden<'e of the convel"lllltlon betwt•i>n 1he 
said Emily .Jones and her daughter Cora up· 
on this occasion, and It was excluded: to 
whlch ruling the defendant duly excepted." 
Mrs. .Jones thereafter upon thta point testl· 
fled, without objection, as follows: "Cora 
went with me down cellar; went down the 
('ellar steps to the left hand of the stairs, 
Just as you go down. I showed her the 
money. I took the paint barrel, and moved 
It around like this [Illustrating], and pointed . 
out to her where the money was concealed. 
Then I set the barrel back on the same spot 
I had removed It from. Then we went up-
11talrs. That she, Cora, was the only perMn, 
HO far as she knew, besides her husband, 
•hat ever knew or was shown where the 
money was." The daughter Cora also testi· 
tll'd, without objection, to her going down In 
the cellar with her mother, and being shown 
where thp money was concealed, substantial-
ly as her mother had done. The referee 
found that said claimed payment ot $1,000 
had not been made. To the report made by 
the referee the defendant flied a remon-
strance, setting up as the ground of tt the ac-
tion of the referee In excluding the conver-
sation aforesaid between Cora and her 
mother. Be further set up therein that the 
plnlntltr <'lalmPd that Mrs. Jones did not have 
1111ld sum of $1,:lOO at any time after 1891, and 
that her entire story with reference to the 
possession of said sum was false. The plaln-
tUr demurrl'd to the remon11trance, the court 
11ustalned the demurrer, judgment was ren-
dered for the plalntlfr, and the defendant 
appeall'd. 
This appeal pre~Pnts but a single question, 
and that ls whether the statement made by 
~Ire. Jones to her daughter was admissible. 
It ls apparent that the defeu<lant obtained 
the benefit of everYthlng else claimed by her 
except this statement She was allowed to 
testify fully to her aets and conduct In going 
Into the cellar, and pointing out the place 
where she <•lahned the money was concealed. 
and from all this Cora understood that the 
money was tht>rt' buried. She says, Indeed, 
that she there showed Cora the money; but 
from her own te11tlmony, and from other 
parts of the record, It ts clear that all Rile 
meant by this wa11 that she showed her the 
place where the money was coDcealed. Es-
sentially then, IJl this view of the matter, 
all that was exduded was her statement of 
her reason for having Cora know where the 
money was eon<'f'alf'd; and It Is perhaps 
questionable whether even on the defend-
ant's view of the c~. the exclusion of that 
was error (Russell v. I<'rlsble, 19 Conn. 205-
211}; and, If It was, the case might perhaps 
be disposed of on the ground that the error 
dld not harm the defendant. But, as we 
think the evidence was rightly excluded, we 
prefer to rest the declalon upon that ground, 
RES GESTJE.
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mther than upon the one stuzgcstcd. .-\s we
have said. what was (10110 ill the cellar was,
without objection. fully testitied to by both
llrs. Jones and Cora.
excluded: and that was, in substance, a
statement by .\Irs. Joncs that thy money was
buried there in a jar, and that she wanted
to have Cora know, for a reason then stated,
where it lay. The defendant strenuously
insisted that this statement characterized the
act oi .\l1-s. J ones in going to the cellar. and
doing what she did there, and was admis-
sible in corroboration of her claim to the
possession 01' the money, and as part of the
res gestac; and in support of these claims she
relies mainly upon the case of Card v. Foot
The general rule
is that a party cannot give in evidence his
own declarations in his own favor, made in
the absence of the other party; but there
is one well-recognized exception to this rule,
where such declaration is part of what. for
want of a. better name, is called the “res
gestae." Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 Metc. tlilass.)
199: Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn. 461.
The nature and limits of this exception are
tolerably wen defined, although the applica-
tion of the rule embodied in the exception,
In particular cases. is sometimes attended
with ditiiculty. Timt rule is thus stated in
Starkie on Evidence (10th Ed., 466-687): "In
me fiygt place, an entry or declaration ac-
_-companying an act seems. on principles ul-
ready announced, to be admissible evidence
in an (-ages whore :1 question arises as to the
nature or quality of that act. Iiiticctl, when-
ever an entry or declaration rctim-is light
upon, or qualifies, an act which is relevant
to the matter in issue, and is evidence in it-
self. it becomes admissible as part of the
res gestae. if it be contemporaneous with the
act.” According to this writer, before a
writtrn declaration made by a party in his
own favor can be admissible as part of the
res gestne. the act which it characterizes,
and of which it forms a part, must be itself
adiuissiiile in evidence in the case; and so
are the authorities. “VVhere an act done is
evidence per se. a declaration accompanying
that uct may well be evidence, if it reflects
li::ht upon or qualifies the act. But I am
not aware of any case where the act done is,
in its own nature. irrelevant to the issue,
and where the declaration per se is inadmis-
sible. in which it has been held that the
union of the two has rendered them admissi-
ble." Coltman, J., in Wright v. Tatham, 7
Adol. & E. 361; Hotel Co. v .\ianning. 1 Ir.
R. Com. Law, 125. “Res zestac are the cir-
rumstances. facts. and declarations which
grow out oi‘ the main fact, are contemporane-
-nus with it. and scrve to illustrate its char-
acter.” Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn.
461. “When the act of a party may be given
in evidence, his declarations, made at the
time. and calculated to elucidate and explain
the character and quality of the act, and so
-connected with it as to constitute one trans-
»
What was said was ‘
to
action. and so agfsaj <79”
actitself, are tl It Db 519 Ye
must be 8. main on Q 1129) ta erideace. T110,-
tion, and only sflc tbec-1,,I_p"1fn¢-t or tmnsac-9
blc as grow out Of e N *‘"/nus are admissi-
illusirate its <-l1al‘1"-‘tel.’ ”"/1”” t1‘-*1"-‘I-'1¢'fI'0",
with it. and deri Ye 80 ea” wnlcfllprlrury
from it." Lund v. Tyllgsb degree of ‘Tflfit
It follows um if the
a t 01' 911811, 9 Cush. 36.
C‘ or Ml‘8.J i
spective of the t1('Cl"np\'-lllyjng ,,,,,,,,,,,‘,§f',‘,"’ 4;:
not in itself admissible in ’
, evidence, then the
statement was inadmissible; and the tact that
the act was admitted without objection does
not make the accompanying statement legal
evidence. The question. then, is whether what
Mrs. Jones did upon the occasion in question
was per se admissible as evidence in the
case, and we arc clearly of the opinion that
it was not. It was offered and received as
an act tending to show that she then had
this money in her possession; but, rightly
considered, it was not in any proper sense,
within the meaning: of the rule in question,
an act or transaction at all. It is true there
were the physical acts of going downstairs,
and over to where it was supposed the
money was buried. and the moving of the
paint barrel, and the pointing to or other-
wise lndicat.in,u: :1 certain spot of earth, but
that was all. There is nothing in all this
tending in the least to show that the money,
or the receptacle which had contained it,
was then in the spot pointed out. For aught
that appears, all that Mrs. Jones could then
know or say about the money was, not that
it was then there. but that she had put it
there some time before, and believed it was
there then; and neither she nor Cora then
knew, or could know, that the money was
then in the possession of Mrs. Jones. or even
in existence at all. Nothing whatever was
done by either of them with, or with refer-
ence to, the money or the jar; they were
not seen, handled, nor dealt with in any
manner whatsoever. Essentially, the so-
called “act” or “acts" of Mrs. Jones are but
statements or declarations that she had
buried the money there some time before,
and believed it was there then.
Suppose Mrs. Jones and her daughter had
remained upstairs, and Mrs. Jones hnd said
to Cora: “I put the money you saw me count
the other day into B. tin box, and the box
into a jar. and buried the jar in the cellar to
the left hand of the stairs, just as you go
down, and put a paint barrel over the spot
where they now are. I tell you this, so- that
in case of my death you will know where to
find the monc_v."——could any one successfully
contend that such a statement was admissi-
ble? Clearly not. It would be a. mere nak-
ed statement or declaration of a past trans-
action in the l'"1\'i3"5 Own f““'°"' ‘ma WW“
clearly mu within the g‘PIl91'i\\ one vi em“-
siom But the Supposed ;-use does not (lifter
essentially from inf-‘ "'31 a(:\§e‘\;:§“‘::s%;
one Mrs. Jones ifldicfiies n1O“€sw w“ms_
place where she b\1l‘\e<1 me 25
1'1?’/I/t from Um
[0-‘I36’ ‘V0. .9
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HES GE.S'fAl. 
rather than upon the one 11ui:::<>><t1•11. A11 we 
hare sa.Jd. what was dom• 111 th" 1't•llnr waa, 
11'lthout objection, fully testified to by both 
lira. Jon<'S nod Cora. ""hat wns said was 
~xcluded: o.nd that wa11, In sullstnlll't'. a 
statement by :\Irs .. Ton('s that tllf 1110111.'y wa~ 
burled there In a jar, and that 11he wunted 
to have Cora know, fur a reason then 11tnted, 
where It lay. The defendant strenuously 
Insisted that this statem1>nt chnracterlzl.'d the 
.aet ot )!rs . .J"ont>s In going to the cellar, and 
doing what she did tht're, and was admis-
sible In corroboration of her <'lalm to the 
P068e881on 0£ the money, and as part of the 
res gestaE>; and In support of tht>se clalm11 she 
rell.-s mainly upon the case of Card v. Foot 
.:it; Conn. 309, :1.5 A ti. :n1. The general rule 
Is that a party cannot give In evidence his 
own declarations In bis own favor, mnd1• In 
the absence of the other party; but thPre 
Is one well-rPcognizcd exception to this rule, 
where such declnrntion Is part of what. for 
want of a. bptter name, Is called tlle "res 
Jl'estae." Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 Mete. (!\lal!S.) 
i911; Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn. 4111. 
The natur~ and limits of this exception are 
tolerably well defined, although the appllca· 
tlon of the rule en1bodied In the eX<'PJ>tlon, 
Jn partl!'ulnr cas(•s. Is sometimes attended 
with dlllknlty. That rule Is thus stated In 
l':tnrkle on Evidence (10th Ed., 466-687): "'In 
the flr11t place, an entry or dedaratlon ac--
. ·•·ompanylug an act Sf"ems. on prlndpiPM ul-
ready anno\tncPd, to be 111\mli111ib\P evl<h•n<'e 
in nil cases where a qlwKtlou al'IMl'M ns to the 
nntnre or quality of that a<·t. InllP1·d. wlwn-
e\·t-r an entry or declarutlon rt'fll'<'t!I lhrht 
upon, or qualifies, an act whll'l1 111 rl.'levunt 
to the matter In Issue. and Is evldl.'nce In lt-
.-lf, It be('omes admissible as part of the 
rps gl'l!tae, If It be contemporaneous with the 
nrt." According to this writer, before a 
writtl>n declaration made by a party 111 his 
own farnr can be adml~lble as part of the 
res gP!'ltae. the act which it characterlze11, 
.and of which it forms a part, must be Itself 
adml88lble In evidence In the case; and so 
.a.re the authorities. "Wht>re an act doue ls 
evidence per se, a. declaration accompanying 
that act may well be evidence, If It refiects 
light upon or qualifies t~ act But I am 
not aware of any case where the act done Is, 
In Its own nature. Irrelevant to the li1sue, 
and where the declaration per se Is lundmls-
slble. In which It has been ht'ld thut the 
union of the two has rendere1l them admissi-
ble."' Coltman, J., In \Vrlght v. 'l'uthum, 7 
.Adol. & E. !{61: Hotel Co. v !\Innnlng. 1 Ir. 
R. Com. J,aw, 125. "Res A'f'!<tat' ure the dr-
-<>umictan<-t>I!. facti1. and ded11r11tlonR which 
i;:row out of the main fa!'t, nre l'ontemporune-
·cntic with It. and serve to Illustrate Its char-
.acter." Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn. 
461. "When the act of a party may be given 
ln evidence, his de1•laratlons, made at the 
ttmP, and calculated to elucidate and explain 
th(' character and quality of the act. and so 
-<·ounected with It as to constitute one trans-
action. and so s--8 l~O fle [Cue .No. 9 
act ltll<>lf, are ad r~ l> 1tie "'"'e c 
must be a main oz:' 1'/ll<'/ 111 er1;:111 .from the 
tlon, nnd only s ucb clec·1,;j>a1 i'ne!!':"tra;:J:' 
ble ns grow out of e "'°' "llffoos are adm1881. 
lllm1tl'ate Its <·114 z-4l{}tel". 11<'/pa/ tran.'<llf!flon, 
with It. and derf'V'S 8o~ llre contemporory 
from It" Lun<l v. 'I'Yl:J.g8 i:: de1rree or credit 
It follows that ff the 11 i'Ougb, 9 Cush. 38. Ct or Mrs. Jones irre-
spective of the ac•coUJPa.nFJng statement 
n.ot In It.self admissible In evidence, the~ ":iis: 
statement was lnadmlssJbJe; snd the tact that 
the act was admitted Without obJectJon does 
not make the accompanyJng statement legal 
evlden<'e. The question. then, Is whether what 
Mrs. Jones did upon the OC<'aslon In qut>11tlon 
was per se adml88ible as evidence In the 
case, and we al'e clearly of the opinion that 
It was not. It was olf Pred and reePlv1>d us 
an act tending to show that she tht>n bud 
this money In her pos.-iesslon; but, rightly 
considered, It was not In any proper Mense, 
within the mennlni: of the rule In queRtlon, 
an act or trnnimetlon at all. It Is true there 
were the physkal aets of going down11tnlrs, 
and over to where It was supposed the 
money was burled. and the moving of the 
paint barrPI, and the pointing to or othPr· 
wise lndkutln~ a <'ertnln spot of earth, but 
that was all. Thne Is nothing In all this 
tending In the least to show that the money, 
or the re<-eptacle which had contained It. 
was then In the spot pointed out. For aught 
that appears, all that :Mrs. Jones could then 
know or say about the money was, not that 
It was then there, but that she had 1mt It 
there some time before, and believed It was 
the1·e then; and neither she nor Cora then 
knew, or could know, that the money was 
then ln the possession of Mrs. Jones, or even 
In existence at all. Nothing whatever was 
done by either of them with, or with refer-
ence to, the money or the jar; they were 
not seen, handled, nor dealt with In any 
manner whatsoever. Esst>ntlally, the so-
<'alled "act" or "nets" of Mrs .• Tones are but 
statements or declarations that she had 
burled the money there some time before, 
and believed It was there then. 
Su11posP Mrs. Jones und her daughter hnd 
remained up-stairs, and l\lrs .• To1ws hurl snlrl 
to Cora: "I put the money you saw mf' <•onnt 
the other day Into a tin llox, and tilt' box 
Into a jnr. anrl burled the jar In the cellar to 
the left hand of the stairs, just as you go 
down, and put a paint barrel over the spot 
where tht>y now are. I tell you this, so• that 
In case of my death yon will know where to 
find the money."-eould any one successfully 
contend thnt icuch a stntemPut was 1u\mls~l­
ble? ClPnrly not. It would be a. mere nak· 
erl statenwnt or cleelnrntlou ot a \)l\St tran11-
netl<>11 In the party's own fnvot, and wo\\\d 
clearly fall within the gE>nera\ t\l\ll ot exl'l\\· 
i,;lon. But the :;mppose1l en~*'~ does not d\ttet 
essPntlally from the real cn~e.-fot \u the 
oue ~lrs .. JonPS indicates nnd l\esct\~ fue 
place where she burled the ~ou111 'l>l word~ 
Case N 0. 9]
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and in the other she indicates and describes
it by acts; and the result of both is but a
statement or declaration to Cora that the
money had been buried there, and that Mrs.
Jones believed it was there at that time.
That in the one case this information is con-
veyed to (fora. by words. and in the other by
acts, can make no dlfl.’e1-ence; in both the re-
sult is only and solely information conveyed.
The difference between an act of the kind
here claimed and the acts done in Russell _v.
Frisbie, 19 Conn. 205, and Card v. Foot, 56
Conn. 369. 15 Atl. 371. is quite obvious. in
the former case the defendant was allowed
to prove what he said to one Hcmpstcad,
when he handed to him for safe-keeping the
ship's papers, which defendant had taken
from a vessel of his in order to revoke the
authority of her captain; in the latter. the
plaintiff was allowed to prove what she said
to Miss Lyon when she delivered to her for
safe-keeping the [):l('k:l;:e containing the
plaintiffs bonds. In both of these cases the
declarations allowed, accompanied. grew out
of, formed part of, and of course qualified
and characterized, acts which themselves
were clearly admissible to prove the then
possession and disposition of the ship's pa-
pers in the one case, and the bonds in the
other. The acts were not in effect mere dec-
26
larations, but acts of possession and dliiposi-
tion in a. real and true sense. In the case
at bar this is not so. 'l‘here the socallcd
“act" is itself, in effect. but a statement or
declaration. Nothing was transacted. noth-
ing was dope, nothing was transplrlng, evi-
dent to any witness. which could confirm um
declarations excluded, or by which, upon
cross-examination or otherwise, the truth of"
those declarations could be tested. “Declara-
tions accompanying: acts are a wide field of
evidence, and to be carefull_v watched," said
Williams, J., in Queen v. Bliss, 7 Ado]. & E.
556, a good many years ago; and we think
this “field" should still be carefully watched.
The exceptions to the general rule excluding"
statements made by one ln'his own favor
ought to be strictly limited; certainly the
scope of the exception in question ouzlit not
to be extended to a case like the one at bar.
. For the reasons given, the claimed act or acts
of Mrs. Jones were not admissible, and
should. and on objection probably would,
have been excluded. They were, however, ad-~
mitted, and of this the defendant does not,
and cannot justly, complain; but. on objec-
tion, the statement accompanying’ the claimed
act was excluded, and we think was right-
fully excluded. There is no error. The oth--
er judges concurred.
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Ca'le No. 9] 
laratlons, but acts of possrMlon and dlsilOld-
tlon In a reel and true sense. In the cafft" 
at bar thl11 le not so. 'l'here the so-callt'tl 
"a<'f' ls ltselr, In t>tr'f'Ct, but a statt>ml'nt or 
declaration. Nothing was transacted, noth-
ing was dov-e, nothing wus transpiring, evl· 
dent to any wltnesR, which could confirm th& 
declarations t>xclmh•d, or by which, upon 
crollll-E'xnmlnatlon or otherwise, the truth ot 
those dednratlone eould be h>eted. "Declara. 
tlons areompanylng acts are a wide fteld ot 
e\'ldence, and to be rort>fully wakh!'d,'' snld 
Williams, J., in QUPl'n v. Bll88, 7 Adol. & E. 
r,;)6, a good many Yl'DrH &,1ro; and we think 
, this "ftt>ld" should still be carefully watched. 
l\Dd In the other she Indicates and descrlbea 1 
It b7 acts; and the result of both la but a 
1tatt>mt>nt or declaration to Cora that the 1 
money had been burled there, and tha.t Mrs. 1 
Jont>S believed It was there at that time. 
'.fhat in the one case this information Is con. 
veyed to Cora by wonts. and in the other by 
acts, can make no dU!'erence; lo both tbe re-
sult· Is only and solely information com·eyed. 
The dlft'l'r<'nee between an act of the kind 
here claimed and the acts done lo Rtu1ttell ,v. 
Frisbie, 19 Conn. 205, and Card v. Foot, M 
Conn. 300, 15 Atl. 371, le quite obvious. In 
the former case the defendant was allowed 
to prove what he said to one Hemp~h·ad, 
when be handed to him for safe-keeping the 
ship's papers. which defendant had taken 
from a vessel of bis in order to revoke the 
authority of her captain; lo the latter, tbe 
plalntltf was allowed to prove what she said 
to }flu Lyon when she dellvrred to her tor 
Mfe..keeplng the Pll<'knge 1•outnlnlng the 
plalnl lft"K bonds. In both o! these cases the 
declarntlons allowed, accompanied, grew out 
of, formed part of, and of course quallfted 
and characterized, acts which themselves 
were clearly adml88ible to prove the then 
poesession and disposition of the ship's pa-
pers in the one caae, and the bonds In th'! 
other. The acts were not in effect mere dee. 
28 
The eJ:<'t'ptlons to the general rule excluding· 
statements made by one In 'his own favor-
ougbt to be strletly limited; certainly tbe-
scope or the excE'ptlon In qnestion ougbt not 
to be extt>nd<'d to a cm1e like the one at bar. 
l<'or the reasons glvt>n, tht> elnlmed &<'t or act& 
of 1\11'8. Jones were not admissible, and 
should, and on objl'<'tlon probably would. 
have been excludt>tl. Tiley were, however, ad-
mitted, and of this the defendant does not,. 
and cannot justly, complain; but. on objt>e-
tlon, the statement a<.>Companylng tbe claimed 
act wa.s excluded, aud we think was right-· 
fully es:clnded. There Is no error. The oth-
er judges concurred. 
HES GE$'l‘1E
VICKSBL-'Il'.(§ & .\l. ii. (TO. v. O'BRIEN et al.1
(T Sup. (ft. 118. 119 U. S. ilil.)
Supreme Court of the United Statcs.
1886.
in error to the circuit court of the United
States for the Southern district of Missis-
slppi.
Wm. L. Nugent, E. M. Johnson, Geo. Houd-
iey, and Edvv. Coeston, for plaintiff in error.
T. C. Catchings, for defendants in error.
Nov. 1,
HARLAN, J. This action was brought by
Mary E. O’Brlen and her husband, John J. .
0’Brien, to recover damages sustained in
consequence of personal injuries received by
the wife in September, 1881, while a pas-
senger upon the Vicksburg & Meridian Rail-
road. '1'he declaration alleges that the com-
pany “so carelessly, negligently, and unskill-
fully constructed and maintained its railroad
track, engine, and cars, and so carelessly.
negligently, and unskillfully conducted itself
in the management, control, and running of
the same," that the car in which Mrs. 0’Brien
was seated as a passenger was thrown from
the railroad track and overturned, whereby
she was seriously injured. There was a ver-
dict and judgment for $9,000 in favor of the
plaintiffs.
1. At the trial the plaintiffs offered to read
to the jury the deposition of a physician,
and did read the first. second, and third inter-
rogatories propounded to him, and the an-
swers thereto. Responding to the first and
second interrogatories, he stated. among
other things, that his attendance upon Hrs.
O'Brien commenced on the sixteenth of Sep-
tember, 1881; that he found her suffering
extreme pain, and in a very nervous condi-
tion, resulting a few hours before from a
railroad accident on defendant‘s road; that
such was the cause of her injuries he knew
from her own answers, from the statement
of her brother-in-law, and from attending
others who were on the train with her. The
third interrogatory and answer were as fol-
lows: “(3) Look on the accompanying state-
ment, dated November 26. 1881, and state if
it was written by you at the date it bears,
for what purpose it was written, and to
whom it was delivered. Does the statement
represent. substantially and correctly. .\i'.rs.
O’Brien‘s condition as it appeared when you
first saw her, and as it continued up to No-
vember 26, 1881? Answer. I have looked up-
on the statement referred to, which was writ-
ten by myself, at Mr. O’Brien’s request. at
the date mentioned, when he was about to
take his wife away from here to his home in
New Orleans. and was intended to convey an
idea of how she was when I was called to see
her, and what her condition was when sht-
mi Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field omit-
flr
left my charge ; :1 Ii ti: 10 [flue No. 11/
ly stated her (-On‘ 1, ‘,1!’ ' ,7 ['10- 01,/Man I
The written Ft‘: - , '91) t ' m”'e"t'
t Ding [-91 [Ted . I!
terrogutory wafl 5“ '10" b1'et'e1-1-9,1 toe!” m:,oI.“_
attached to his 4'e1)03Ip1 J’ the tr/mess, {111/I
was addressed to 11" ' 0,12” as 111) exlublt. It
with much aetn ll. the "8’”Pl1,l1nri sets forth.
received by the wife, and .-1,Z,"’ of "'6 Injuries
bodily and mental c0l1dltlon _§',"’§""" upon hei-
an expression of tllé wjméss» oizagfzflfg .
the probable length 01' time Within which she
might "9c°"9rfl'Om herl11.1l11'Ies. The plaintiff .
before reading the remaining ll1f(‘l'l‘0j,’}1t0l‘]e,q
and answers, offered to read this statement to
the jury as evidence. The companyobjected
upon these grounds: That it was not made
by the witness under oath, and in defendant's
presence, or with its knowledge and consent;
that it was hearsay evidence, and therefore
wholly incompetent; and that, in any event,
it could only be referred to by the witness to
refresh his recollection. The court overruled
I the objection, and permitted the statement to
be read in evidence, the defendant taking an
exception thereto, which was allowed. The
remainder of the deposition was then read to
the jury.
We are of opinion that this ruling cannot
be sustained upon any principle recognized in
the law of evidence. The authorities are uni-
form in holding that a witness is at liberty to
examine a memorandum prepared by him, un-
der the circumstances in which this one was,
for the purpose of refreshing or assisting his
recollection as to the facts stated in it. But
there are adjudged cases which declare that
unless prepared in the discharge of some
public duty, or of some duty arising out of the
business relations of the witness with others, ‘
or in the regular course of his own business,
or with the knowledge and concurrence of the '\
party to be charged, and for the purpose of i
charging him, such a memorandum cannot, '-
under any circumstances, be admitted as an '
instrument of evidence. There are. however,
other cases to the effect that, where the wit-
ness states, under oath, that the memoran- '
dum was made by him presently after the
transaction to which it relates, for the pur-
pose of perpetuating his recollection of the
facts, and that he knows it was correct when
prepared, although after reading it he cannot
recall the circumstances so as to state them
alone from memory. the paper may be re-
ceived as the best evidence of which the case
admits.
The present case does not require us to en-
ter upon an examination of the numerous
authorities upon this general subject; for it
does not appear here but that at the time the
witness testified he had. without even looking
at his written statement, a clear, distinct
recollection of every essential tact stated in
it, If he bad such presel1t_re\‘o\\e('t\on. there
wns no necessity whatever tor reading that
paper to the. jll1'Y- Ahlliying‘ me“ m “vm the most liberal rule anuO“n°-Q5 \“ “*3 ° °'
- ' \B\ “K
authorities, the rulinfi bi! “ “wk ‘mg “ :1
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liE"i GE~TA: 
\1CKSBCRG & lt. H. CO.'" O'BUlE~ et al. 1 
(7' ~l1J>. Ct. llfl. 110 U. ~. !lit.) 
Supreme Court of the L'nitt'U 8tnh•K, ~°'" 1, 
1886. 
In Prror t:o t:he circuit court ot the United 
States tor the Southem district of lllssls· 
sip pl. 
Wm. L. Nugent, E. M. Johnson, Geo. Hoad-
ley, and Ed-w. Coeston, tor plalntllT In error. 
T. C. Catchings, :for defendants In error. 
~· 12(/ ra left my charge; • lrlo' I~ t •4188 ..Vo. 10 
ly stated her· <·OP~ el '' rt lli.)· l!i 
Tiu• wrlttt>u ~tz•;i.l?i'''"'''~: ff10'::::;.~~t­
terrog11tory WR 8 Jf'cJ Pferred to Jn the /n-
uttuehell to hfN ~·rlil/ffo b~ f/Jl' Jrftness, and 
was uddn>l!l!e<I to 1' r. 0•11 'll 118 nn exhibit. It 
with much detnfl. thf> 11 rfen, nnd sets forth. 
received by the wJLe, lllJtJ ~~ure of the Injuries 
bodily and mental COlldJt• l'lr elTe«t upon her 
b •011. It BIBO embodied 
an expression of t e n·Jtness' opinion 88 to 
the probable length ot time within whl<'h 811e 
might recover from her lnJm·les. Tl1e plalntltr. 
beforP rending the ren111fnlng lnterrogntorle:. 
nod all8wers, o!Tered to read thfe statemE>nt to 
the jury as evidence. The company· objected 
upon these grounds: That It was not made 
1 by the witness under oath, and In defendant's i Pretience, 01· with Its knowledge and consent; 
I that It was hearsay eYldence, and therefore 
l wholly Incompetent; aud that, In any event, 
' It eonllt only be referred to by the witness to 
HARLAN. J. This action wa11 brought by 
Mary E. O'Brien and her husband, John J. 
O'Brien, to recover damages sustained In 
eonsl->quence o:f personal injuries recell"ed by 
the wife in September, 1881, while a po11-
senger upon the Vicksburg & Meridian Itall-
road. The de<>larntfon alleges thnt the com-
pany "so carelessly, negligently, and unskill-
fully constructed and maintained Its rallroa1l ! 
track, engine, and cars, and 1;10 cnrelessly. ·1 
negligent!~·. nnd unskillfully condnctell Itself 
In the management, control, aDll running of I 
the same," that the car In which :\lrs. O'Brien 
was seated as a pnsRenger was thrown from 
the railroad track and overtumed, whereby 
she wae seriously Injured. There was a ver-
dlet and judgment for $9,000 In favor of the 
plaintiffs. 
1. At the trial the plaintiffs oft'.ert>d to N'tld 
to the jury the deposition of a physl<-lan, 
and did read the first. second, and third Inter-
rogatories propounded to him, and the an-
11wers thereto. Responding to the first nnd 
sN•ond Interrogatories, ht> stated. among 
other things, that his attendan<'e upon lir11. 
O'Brien commenced on the sixteenth of Sep-
tember, 1881; that he found her sutrerlng 
extreme po.in, and In a very nei·,·ous condi-
tion, resulting a few hours before from a 
railroad a<'<'ldent on defendant'1;1 rood; that 
such was the cause o! her Injuries he knew 
from her own answers, from the statement 
ot her brother-lo-law, and from attending 
others who were on the train with her. 'fhe 
third interrogatory and aDBwer were as fol-
lows: "(3) Look on the accompanying state-
ment, dated November 26. 1881, and state lt 
lt was written by yon at the datP It bears, 
tor what purpose lt was written, and to 
whom It was delivered. Does the statl'ment 
represent, substantially and corre<'tly. )lrs. 
O'Brien's condition as It appeared wbt'n you 
finit MW her, and as lt rontlnned up to ~o­
vember 26, 1881? Answer. I have looked up-
on the statement referred to, which wus writ-
ten by myself, at Mr. O'Brlen'11 request. ot 
the date mentioned, when he was about to 
take his wife away from here to his honw in 
~ew Orleans. and was lntt>nded to <'OUYI'~· nu 
Idea ot how Bhe was when I was called to see 
her, and what her condition was when l!ht· 
1 DisaentiDg opinion of Mr. Justice l•'ield omit-
ted. 
ret'rl't1b his rerollectlon. The court overruled 
the objection, and permitted the statement to 
be rl•1ul lo evidence, the defendant taking an 
exeeptlon thereto, which was allowed. The 
remainder o! the deposition was then read to 
the jury. 
We are of opinion that this rullng cannot 
be sustained 111100 any principle l'e<'ognlzed ln 
the law of e>ldence. The authorities are uni-
form In hQldlng that a witness le at liberty to 
examine a memorandum prepared by him, un-
der the circumstances In which this one was, 
tor the purpose of refreshing or ll88lstlng his 
recollection as to the tacts stated In It. But 
tlwre ure adjudged cases wbkh dt>l"lare thnt 
unless prepared ln the dlschaflre of some 
public· duty, or ot eome duty arising out ot the 
bnslneM relations of the witness with others, 
or In the regular course of his own buslnef!S, 
or with the knowledge und concurrence of the 
party to be charged, and for the purpose of 
charging him, SU<'h a mc>mon111dnm cannot, 
unde1· any clrcumatant'CS, be admitted as an 
Instrument o! evidence. There are. however, 
other cases to the elT~t that, where the wit-
ness states, under oath, that the memoran-
dum was made by him presently after the 
transaction to which lt relotes, tor the pur-
pose ot perpetuating his rC(·ollectfon ot the 
facts, and that he knows It was corre<'t when 
(lrepnn>d, although otter rettdlng It he cannot 
recall the clreumstanceM so as to state them 
alone from memory. tlle paper mny be re-
ceived as the best evldt>nee of which the ease 
admits. 
The present case does not require us to en-
ter upon an examlnnt\on of the numeron11 
authorities upon this ~r1wral sullj~·t; for It 
does not op(l!'t1r hel'e but tllat at tbe time tlw 
witness tE't!tlfted he hod, w\tbo\\t 1->ven loo\dn~ 
at his written statement, a <'\ear, d\st\nl't 
recollection of every f>t'IS{'Dt\a\ fa<'\ stated In 
It. If he had su<'h pretu~nt. Nl.'o\\e<•t\on. there 
wns no oec('ssity whatever tor rem\\ng th.'\t 
paper to the jury. Applying. t\wu, to \\le <'Ul!l~ 
the mOAt liberal rule anuonnc~ \u au-y ot tue 
authorltl('S, tbe ruling by '"'·hk'n \\le \)la\nt\tl'.s 
2'l 
'I 
Case No. iii]
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were allowed to read the ph_vsician’s written
statement to the jury as evidence. in itself,
of the facts therein recited, was erroneous.
It is. however, claimed, in behalf of the
plaintiits that in his answers to other inter-
rogatories the physician testitied, apart from
the certificate. to the material facts embodied
in it. and that, therefore, the reading of it to
the jury could not have prejudiced the rights
of the defendant, and. for that reason. should
not be a ground of reversal. We are unable
to say that the defendant was not injuriously
ai’l'ected by the reading of the physician's cer-
tificate in evidence. it is not easy to deter-
mine what weight was given to it by the jury.
In estimating the damages to be awarded, in
view of the extent and character of the in-
juries received, the jury, for auglit that the
court can know, may have been largely con-
trolled by its statements. 'l‘he practice of ad-
mitting the unsworn statements of witnesses.
prepared, in advance of trial, at the request
of one party, and without the knowledge of
the other party. should not be encouraged by
further departures from the established rules
ot evidence. While this court will not dis-
tu1’b a judgment for an error that did not
operate to the substantial injury of the part_v
against whom it was connnltn-d. it is well
settled that a reversal will he directed unless
it appears, beyond doubt, that the error coni-
piained of did not and could not have prej-
udiced the rights of the party. Smiths v.
Shoemaker, 17 Wall. 630, G39; Decry v. Cray,
5 \\'all. T95; Moores v. National Bank, 10-1
U. S. 630; Gilmer v. Higley, 110 U. S. 50. 3
Sup. Ct. 471.
2. At the trial below plaintiffs introduced
one Roach as a witness, who. during his ex-
amination, was asked whether he did not,
shortly after the accident, have a conversa-
tion with the engineer having charge of de-
fendant's train at the time oi’ the accident
about the rate of speed at which the train
was moving at the time.‘ To that question
the defendant objected, but its objection was
overruled. and the witness permitted to an-
swer. The witness had previously stated
that, on examination of the track after the
accident. he found a cross-tie or cross-ties
under the broken rail in n decayed condition.
liis answer to the above question was: “Be-
tween ten and thirty minutes after the acci-
dent occurred I had such a conversation with
.\l0l'gflIl Herbert, the engineer having charge
of the locomotive attached to the train at the
time of the accident. and he told me that the
trail! was moving at the rate of eighteen
miles an hour.” The defendant renewed its
Objection to this testiniony by a motion to
exclude it from the jury. This motion was
denied. and an exception taken. As bearing
“D011 the Dfilnt here raised it may be stated
that, under the evidence. it became material
-apart from the issue as to the condition of
the track—to inquire whether, at the time cf
the accident, (which occurred at a place on
the line where the rails in the track were.
according to some of the proof, materially
defective.) the train was being run at a speed
exceeding 15 miles an hour. in this view.
the declaration of the engineer may have
had a decisive influence upon the result of
the trial.
There can be no dispute as to the general
rules governing the admissibility of the dec-
larations of an agent to at‘l'cct the principal.
'i‘hc acts of an agent, within the scope of the
authorit_v delegated to him. are deemed the
acts of the principal. \Vhatever he does in
the lawi’nl exercise of that authority is im-
putable to the principal, and may be proven
without calling the agent as a witness. So,
in consequence of the relation between him
and the principal, his statement or declara-
tion is. under some circumstances, regarded
as of the nature of original evidence; “being,”
says Phillips, “the ultimate fact to be proved,
and not an admission of some other fact."
1 Phil. Ev. 381. "But it must be remember-
ed.“ says Greenlcai’, “that the admission of
the agent cannot always he assimilated to the
admission of the principal. The party's own
admission. whenever made, may be given in
evidence against him; but the admission or
tlt‘('i:il'iiilUll of his agent binds him only when
it is made during the continuance of the
agency, in regard to a transaction then de-
pending et dum fervet opus. It is because
it is a. verbal act, and part of the res gestze,
that it is admissible at all; and therefore it
is not necessary to call the agent t0 prove it;
but Wherever what he did is admissible in
evidence, there it is competent to prove what
he said about the act while he was doing it."
1 Greenl. Ev. 5 113. This court had occasion
in Packet C0. v. Clougll. 20 Wall. 540, i0
consider this question. Referring to the rule
‘ as stated by Mr. Justice Story in hi! treatise
on Agency (section 134). that “where the acts
of the agent will bind the prin<‘lr=1l. there his
representations. d9<‘l8-I'I1ti0ll8. and 11dm15$l°!15
respecting the subject-matter will also bind
him. if made at the same time. and con-
stituting part of the res gestze." the court,
Rbeaking by Mr. Justice Story. said: “A close
attention to this rule, which is of universal
acceptance, will solve almost every dith-
cnlt_v. Rm an act done by an agent cannot
be \'-‘tried. qualified, or explained, either by
his declarations. which amount to no more
than a mere narrative of a past occurrence»
01‘ by an Lsoiated convermtion held. or an iso-
lated act done. at a later period. TUE T9894"!
is that the agent to do flit’. act is not a1\tl1\>I'-
l7»P<i to narrate what he had done. or how he
had done it. and his declaration is I10 D311 0f
mi‘ “*5 gt':4i’tl‘."
We are of opinion that the de1'|=l"'ii°" ('7
the engineer. Herbert. to the w'iill(‘-‘l-‘i Road]
“'=l§ not competent against the tlefvllllflllt 1'1"’
the l“"‘llose of proving the rate of -‘il"‘ed at
Which the train was moving at Ill" lime °f
the accident. It is true that. in \'i*‘“' Of the
engineer's experience and position. his state-
ments under oath, as a witness, 111 l'°$Pect ‘°
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<.:ase .No. 10) ltELEV .\XCY. 
wPre allowed to read the physician's written R<'<·ordlng to some ot the l>l'OOt, materially 
Ktatement to the jury as evidence. In 1t11elf, defective,) the tl'11Jo was ht•lng run at a 11pec!1I 
of the fac•t14 therein re<'lted, was e1T0111•ou11. ex<-eedlog l:i mllt'K uu hour. lo this vlt>w, 
It Is. bowt•ver, dalmed, In behalf of the the dedaratloo of the euglnt"t•r may baYe 
111alntUTe tlwt In bis answers to other Inter- bad a dedsl.Ye Influence upon the result of 
rogatorlt>K till' physic-I.au tfstlftell, apart from th<' trial. 
the certltic·ate, to the material facts embodied 'fbere can be no dispute as to the general 
lo It, and that, therefore, the reading of It to nllt'll governing the admlsslblllty of the dec-
the jury could not bnve prejudlct'(l the rights lnrntlous of an agent to atrel't the principal. 
of the defendant. an<l, for that rea11<m, sboultl Thl' uc·tM of an agent, within the scope of the 
not be a ground of reversal. We are unnhle nuthorlty clell'llfttt>d to him. are deemed the 
to say that the defendant wa11 not Injuriously ac·t11 of the 1>rluclpal. Whatever be does In 
. nft'c>cted by the reading of the phyi<h·b111'11 l'l'r- tlw lawful exercise of that authority le lm-
tlflcate In evidence. It le not easy to dl'ter- 1mtable to the prlodpal, and may be proYen 
mine what weight wu11 given to It by the jury. without <'lllllog the agent ae a wlt11t>11M. So, 
In estlmatlng the dam11g4'8 to be awardt>d, In In con11t'(1ut·nce of the relation betwt>t•n him 
view of the 01tent and chara<'ter of the In- and the prln<'lpal, hie etatemL•nt 01· d<>clara-
Jurles received, the Jury, for aught that the tlon le. under some circumstances, regarded 
court can know, may have been largely <'OU· as of the nature of original evldenc.oe; "being," 
trolled by its statements. The practice of ail- M&ye Pbllllpe, "the ultimate fact to be 11r0Yed, 
mlttlng the unsworn statements of witnesses, and not an admleeton of some otbt•r fact." 
prepared, In advance of trial, at the request 1 Phil. f;,., :J8t. "But It wu11t be remember-
of one party, and without the koowleclgc- of eel." llllYR On>enlenr, "that the Rdmlselon of 
the other party, should not be enc·ountgt>d by tlle agent l'annot alway11 be aKHlmllated to the 
further departul.'et!I from thP e11tabll11lwd rufos aclmie8.lon of the principal. 'The party's own 
of evidence. Whlle tble c·ourt will not ells- admlllldon, whenever made, may bt.• given In 
tut'b a judgment for an error that did not I cwhle111·1• ugnln11t him; but the admission or 
operate to the eublltflutlal Injury of the party ' 1kl'l:11111lon of hl11 u,..reut binds him only when 
against whom ft wa11 1•ommlttt'll, It IK wc>ll ~ It 111 111nd1• during the continuance of the 
sPttled that a revenial will lw dh't'(·h•d uuh•RM I ngeuc·y, lo regard to a tranRllctlon then de-
It appAArs, beyond doubt, thut the Prror <'OJU· 11Pndlng et dum fervet opus. It le becau11e 
l'lalned of did not and could not have prc>J· . It le a verbal act, and part of the res ge11tm, 
ucll<'t'd the rights of the party. Smithe v. ; tlmt It Is a1lml.Mlble at all; and therefore It 
8hot>mnker, 17 Wall. u.'\o, !'>39; Dee~· v. Cray, I 18 not nec·1>K.qry to call the agent to prove It; 
5 Wall. 795; Moore8 v. National Bank, 10'1 but wherever what he did Is aclml.88lble In 
U. S. 630; Gilmer v. Higley, 110 U. S. 50, 3 evidt•D<'e, there It le compt>teut to pro,·e what 
Sup. Ct. 471. ' he Raid about the act while he was clolng It." 
2. At the trial below plalntllrs lntroclm•ed j 1 Greenl. J<;v, I 113. ThlR 1'()urt had occasion 
one Roach as a wltne11B, who, during hl11 ex- , In Packt>t Co. v. Clough. 20 Wall. 540, to 
amlnatlon, was aek<'<l whether he did not, · c•onelder this quetitlon. Referring to the ntle 
shortly after the aec•ldeot, have a <"Onn•t'llft· · as stated by Mr. Justice Story In hlB treatise 
tlon with the englnt>Pr having chargl' of dP- , on Agency leectlon 134), that "where the acts 
fendaot's train at the time of the a<'<·ldPnt of the agent will bind the principal, there bis 
about the rate of speed at which th<> train repreeentntlont~. declarations, and admleslODB 
was moving at the time: To that question reept>c•tlng the MtthJ<>ct-matter will also bind 
the dPfendant obje<-ted, but Its objection was him, If ma.de at the same tlme, and con-
overrulecl, and the wltneee pt>rmltted to an- 11tltutlng part of the res geetre," the court, 
11wer. ThP wltnelll! had preYlously stated s1)(•nklng hy :Mr. Justice St<>ry. said: "A cloze 
that, on l'xamlnatlon of th1• track alter the nttentton to this rule, which le of unlvel'l!lll 
a<'c·ldl'ut. be found a l'ro1111·tle or Cl"Otl8-tles aC\'PJ>tanc'(>, wlll solve almost every dlftt· 
nmler the broken rail In a de<'ftyed condltlt>n. culty. Rut an a<'t done by an agf'nt cannot 
11111 au11wPr to the aboYe question wa11: "Be- be Yllrh•d, 11ua1Uled, or explained, either by 
tween ten aml thirty minutl•s after tbP ac·d- bl11 d1>c•larat1ons. which amount to no more 
clent OC'CUrred I bad 11uch a convet'lllltlon with than a mere narratlYe of a poet occurrence, 
:\Jorgan Herbert, the engineer having c•harge or by an lllc>lated conversation beld. or an 1!'40-
of the lO<'omotlve attaehed to the train at the lah>cl a<'t done. at a later period. The reason 
tlrue of the accident. and be told me that the le that the ngent to clo the a<.'t le not autbor-
traln was moving nt the rate of eighteen lzt><l to narrate what he had 1louP. or bow be 
miles an hour." Tlie def<>mlant renewt'll Its luul done It. and blM clel'larntlon IK no part of 
objection to this tt'lltlmony by a motion to thP rt>s g<•stre." 
exclude It from the jury. 'r11ls motion wa11 "'e arp of 0111ulon that the d1>c·lan1tlo11 or 
denh..'11, and an exct-ptlon takl'n. Ae l><'ftrlng the engjiwi•r, llPrhert, to the wltll<'llll Rou1·h 
n11on the point here raised It may be 11tated WHK not <'<>lllpPtt>nt against the defendant for 
that, under the evidence, 1t becumP mnterlnl the l>UrJKJt!e of proving th<> rate of 1111eell at 
-apart from tht• Issue ae to the <.'Ondltlon of wblc-h the train was moYlng nt th<' time of 
the track-to Inquire whether, at the time tf the acdclent. It le true that. In vh•w of the 
the acC'ldent, (whlc·h occurred at a pla1·e on engineer's expt>rlpnc•e and JJtJMltlon. 11111 ~tutc­
the line where the rails In the trac·k were.', ments under oath, as a witness, In re11pect to 
28 
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iili1illlilH’PI‘. if credited. would have influence
with the jury. Although the speed 0! the
tnlin was, in SOIIN‘ degree. subject to his con-
tml. still his authority. in that respect, did
n0tc:u'1'y wvith it authority to make declara-
lions or admissions at a subsequent time, as
In the in-‘Inner in which. on any particular
trip, or at any designated point in his route,
|ll‘illl(i pe1'f0r1n(=d his duty. ills (icclmution,
after the 11(~(-ident had hecome a completed
fart. and wvhen he was not performing the
duties of engineer. that the train, at the mo-
ment the plaintiff was injured. was being
run at the rate of 18 miles an hour. was not
explanatory of anything in which he was
then engaged. It did not accolnpauy the act
from which the injuries in question arose. it
was, in its essence, the mere narration oi‘ a
past occurrence, not a part of the res -,:cst:1~,
-simply an assertion or representation, in the
course of conversation. as to :1 matter not
then pending, and in respect to which his nu-
thority as engineer had been fully exerted.
It is not to be deemed part of the res gt-star
simply because of the brief period inter-
vening between the accident and the making
ot the declaration. The tact remains that the
occurrence had ended when the declaration in
question was made, and the engineer was not
in the act of doing anything that could pos-
sibly atlect it If his declaration had been
made the next day after the accident, it
would scarcely be claimed that it was ad-
_ tions ot the engineI=’1'; [ff
missibic cvl1le11C'f ?1:.Z”ll,§t [awe ‘V0’ 10
yet the circuzn-4' r 5119‘.
tween lo and :51) lnjnlltebat 1; ampaux 4””
_ 8 Was made be.
rlod of time-:1 ff‘ '1 L_:b_e Q0 \"'” 8111111-r-i.uble DP-
principle, make T31 , (#1.; II 911$ 0.-umor, upgy
general rule. If t1l‘~ ('01, 1' 9X¢‘6‘1)fl'0n to the
maintained, it svill 70110;:-vii’-1'I’a1t'1¢;I1v' szoufrl In-
lc cc.-u'u-
liromblet tb- - -
puny, would have 1-"3911 -'ulmi.vs1hIc 711 l;s“I)::-
111111’ 9.3 D1111 of the 1'9-‘1 .::e.vr.-v. Without callimr
111111 as 9- \\'1T11*’~\'5,_3 P""II0sItion that will lind
11° 511PP°1'13 111 the law 01’ evidence. The cases
llflve gone far enough in the adinission of
the subsequent declarations of agents as evi-
dence against their principals. 'i‘hese views
are fully sustained by adjudications in the
highest courts of the states.
We deem it unnecessary to notice other ex-
ceptions taken to the action of the court be-
low.
This case was decided at the last term of
this court, and .\ir. Justice Woods concurred
in the order of reversal upon the grounds
herein stated.
For the errors indicated the judgment is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for a
new trial, and for further proceedings con--
sistent with this opinion.
.\Ir. Chief Justice WAITE, Mr. Justice
FIELD. .\ir. Justice MILLER, and .\ir. Jus-
tice BLATCHFORD, dissent.
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HE~ GEST..-E 
that mntter. Ir ere.lltNl, woulll ha"e tuduenc-e 
with the jury. Althouicb the s1wt>d ot t!t1• 
tniln was, in sonu• dl'/.:l't't'. 1mhjeet to his con-
trol. still his authority. in that respect, 11fcl 
not carry "-Ith It: authority to make deelum-
tlons or admissions at a subsequent time, us 
to the manner in which, on nnr partkulnr 
trl11, or a.t auy dPSlgnated point iu his route, 
hl' luul perror1nNl his 1\uty. .lls clf't•lnrn.tlon, 
oftpr the nc<·ldent: had ht'<·ome a complt>t<'d 
fn!'t. and "'hen he wits not perto1·mlng the 
1lutles o! engineer, tl111t the t.n1.ln, nt the mo-
mt•nt the pla lnt:ftr wn1-1 lnjm't'cl, was bPlng 
run nt the rn te of 18 mllt>H an hour. was uot 
1•xplanatory or anything In whil'h be w•111 
then eugaged. It dlcl not at·compuuy tlw uc·t 
from whlcb the Injuries lu (111ei,itlo11 nrc1:1t•. lt 
was, ln lts eBRen<>e, the mt>re n11m1tlon or a. 
pnst ()('('Urrence, not a part of tlw res gl-i;ta•, 
-><\111\lly an RRsertion or l't'presl'ntutlon. In thi> 
c•oul'lll' of t•ouversa tlon, BR to 11 mutter not 
then pemllug, and In respect to whll'h hlt-1 an-
thorlty as tmglnN>r had been fully exertt'<l. 
It Is not to be deerul'<l part of the rett gl'Rtre 
simply be4.'RURe of the brief period Inter· 
venmg between the a<'cldent and the making 
of the dedamtlon. Tht> tact remains that the 
occurrence bad ended when tbP declaration In 
question was mnlle, and the engineer was not 
In the act of doing anything that could pos-
sibly affect lt If bls declaration had been 
made the next day after the accident, It 
would scarcely be claimed that It wu ad· 
mlsslhle l'vlcle:nce ~~l~t fa1Bt1 Ho. 10-
yet the c-i1·c·uu1.l'J t ~ JJJ l:~ t.he l'om 
twee11 Io aml :ro :6.fl t:Ji 11t~ t It wu.~~~e 1,:~ 
rlod Of ti111t~11ff"taZ- e ll(>~IJ HJ>jl/'W•io/Jle pe-
(Jl'lnclpll', 11111 k4.• t Ii l::; l·11~e 'lde1Jt, eunnot, upo11 
g t>neral ruh•. lf t Jie f·o,,t au ezeeptlon to the 
... <4 111 
umlntahu•d It n-fll 1.0110 . 'Y rlew s/Jo111<1 ,,,. 
tlons ot tlJC• englne~·r, It r. JJ· that tlw dt>d:uu-
puuy, woultl . hu,-e lJee11 ll~/11u·olmblhle1 to, thie <-om-
ss. •' u ts l•e-half as p.urt of tlu.• res l;esflf!, without eullJu,: 
him as a wlt1wl<l!,-ll Pl"oJ10,,,ltlu11 that will 111111 
no support In the law or e\·ftleut•t•. T11e c!U!es 
have gone tar enough Jn the udmisslon of 
the subsequent <1ed11mUons or age11ts as evi-
•lt•nc·c> against tht>lr prlnclpalK. The,.e views 
111-e fully susta lnl:'fl by adjmllca tJom~ In the-
lllghL>Rt courts ot the states. 
\Ye deem It umwce881lry to notlt•e other ex-
cept.Ions taken to the action of the court be-
low. 
This ease was deeidl'd ~lt the luHt term or· 
this c·ourt, an!! :\Ir .. Justlt•e \\-oods concurred 
In till' order of revt>rsal u1xm the grounds 
herein titatt>d. 
1''or the er1·ol'l4 lndlt·ated the judgment ls 
reversed, and the l'RU11e Is remanded tor a 
new trial, and for furtbe1· I)rocet'dlngs con-· 
slstent with this opinion. 
:\Ir. Chief Juittlce W Al'l'E, Mr. Justice 
1~11'11,D. :\lr .• Justice MILLER, and }fr. Jus-· 
tlce BI ... A TCHI<'ORD, dl88ent. 
• • • • • • • 
Case No.11]
HELEVANCY.
OHIO & M. RY. CO. v. STEIN.
(31 N. E. 180, 32 N. E. 831. 133 Ind. 2-43.)
Supreme Oourt of Indiana. May 14, 1892.
Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson coun-
ty; W. T. Fricdiy, Judge.
Action by Williaim Stein against the Ohio
& Mississippi Railway Company to recover
for personal injuries. Verdict and judg-
ment for plaintiiif. Defendant appeals. ite-
versed.
Mc.\Iuilen, Johnston & Mc.\lullen, Ramsey,
Maxwell & Ramsey, and John )icGregor,
(Edward Barton, of counsel.) for appellant.
horbly & Ford, A. G. Smith, and Lincoln
Dixon, tor appellee.
ELI.IO'l"l‘, C. J. The appellee seeks to re-
cover damages against his employer, the ap-
pellant. for injuries alleged to have resulted
to him from the negligence of the employer
in failing to furnish him with safe applian-
ces for use in the performance of the duty
required of him by the service in which he
- was employed. The injury resulted from
the collision of the car upon which the ap-
pellee was performing the duties of a brake-
man with another part of the same train,
which had been detached for the purpose of
making what is commonly called “a running
switch." 'l‘he car upon which the appellee
was a brakcman was a platform car. laden
with large and heavy blocks of stone, and
the appellee was at the front end of the car,
endeavoring to check it by using the brake.
Discovering that he was unable to do so,
and that a collision was inevitable, he at-
tempted to make his way to the rear of the
car, but his feet were caught between two
heavy stones and crushed. In the tirst par-
agraph of the complaint it is alleged that
the accident was caused by the negligence
of the appellant in failing to repair a cyl-
inder cock of the engine, which had been
blown out some time before the accident,
and that the failure to replace the cylinder
cock rendered it impossible for the engineer
to get that part of the train which the car
on which the appellee was standing was foi-
lowim: out of the way. and this brought on
the collision. The second paragraph of the
complaint charges that the brake on the car
“WIS l1PfH'il\'e. and substantially repeats the
nllcitations of the first as to appellant's neg-
ligence in falling to replace or repair the
cylinder cock of the engine. The third par-
agraph is based upon the negligence of the
appellant in regard to the brake. but it also
n.lle::\*-‘I that there was some defect in the
clli-fine, which was unknown to the appellee.
As no question is made upon the complaint,
we have given only a general outline of its
allcirations, which are full and explicit.
'l‘ll'! question to which the appellant's
counsel devote the principal part of their
argument arises on the ruling of the trial
court in permitting the appellee to give in
evidence the declarations of the engineer in
charge of the locomotive which was draw-
ing the train on which the appellee was act-
ing as a brakeman. The appoliee‘s counsel
argue with earnestness that even if there
was error in admitting the evidence, it was
harmless. This contention makes it neces-
sary to dispose of the question as to the ef-
fect of the evidence before considering its
competency, for, if it was harmless, the
judgment cannot be reversed for admitting
it, although it was incompetent. We are
satisfied that, if the evidence be conceded to
be incompetent. the error in admitting it
was not harmless. The appellee‘s counsel
assume that the error was a harmless one.
even if the incompetency of the evidence be
conceded, for the reason that the declara-
tions of the engineer were proved by wit-
nesses called to prove that he had made
statements out of court contradicting those
made by him on the witness stand. Dhis
position is untenable. The witnesses by
wuom the engineer was contradicted were
impeaching witnesses, and their testimony
went to his credibility; but it did not prove,
nor tend to prove, the principal fact. Im-
peaching testimony goes only to the credibil-
ity ot a witness. and it cannot be given 'any
force as evidence in proof or disproof of a
disputed tact, except in so far as it bears
upon the credibility of the witness it tends
to impeach. In Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind.
430-436, it was said of impeaching evidence
that “such evidence does not tend to estab-
lish the truth of the matters embraced in
the contradictory evidence; it simply goes
to the credibility of the witness." Other
cases assert a similar doctrine. David v.
Hardy, 76 Ind, 272; Hicks v. Stone. 13 .\linn.
434, (Gil. 398.)
The positign assumed by appeilee's coun-
BP1. that, as the facts which the declara-
tions of the engineer tended to prove were
established by other testimony, the ruling
in admitting evidence of such declarations.
even if erroneous, was harmless, cannot be
maintained. There may be cases where the
facts are so gully and conclusively pi-oven
by other testimony that the appellate tri-
bunal will not reverse the judgment because
incompetent evidence to the same facts is
admitted: but this is not such =1 <‘I\F1‘- 1'01‘
; here the H-mom-9 was as to a material point.
; and it cannot be justly said that the facts
which the (]9(.]aI-flfl()[1Q 1911,19,] to prove were
established by l1ll(.'OIltl‘1l(]l(‘j[ed evidence.
We cannot, it is evident fr0111 ‘Vimt we
1"“'@ said. l1V0l(1 a decision of the vrin<'l1'=\l
(lllestion upon the. ground that. if the ‘-"'i‘
dence was incompetent. it was nflt l"'*'1"‘“'
cial. We are required to decide Wllefller the
ev.ucnce was competent. because its mate-
rial character creates the presumpiinn "'1"
it “'35 Probably prejudicial. The rule is
Well settled that. where evidence of an in-
fluential character is erroneously "“°“'°d
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Case No. 11) HEU.:VANCY. 
omo & ll. HY. co. v. STEIN. 
(31 N. E. 180, 32 N. E. M:n. ts:l Intl. 243.) 
Supreme Oourt of Indiana. May 14, 1892. 
Appeal from <'lrcult court, Jetfl>rBOn coun-
ty; W. T. Friedly, .Tudge. 
Action by William Stein aJCalntrt the Ohio 
& lllsslsslppl Railway Company to rerover 
for personal lnjurlet1. Verdict and judg-
ment tor plalntllr. Defendant appeals. ite-
versed. 
McMullen, Johnston & Mc:Mullen, Ramsey, 
Maxwell & Ramsey, and John McGl't'gor, 
(Edward Barton, of counsel.) for appellant. 
h.orbly & Ford, A. 0. 8mlth, and Lincoln 
Dixon, tor appellee. 
court In permitting the appellee to give In 
evidence tbe declarations of the t>nglneer In 
charge of the loeowotlve whl<·h was draw-
ing the train on which tbe appellee wu act· 
log u a brakeman. The appellee'e counsel 
argue with earnestneBB that PVen if there 
was error In admitting tbe eYldPn<•e, It wu 
harmless. Thia rootentlon makes it neces-
sary to dl8J>08e of the question as to the ef-
fect of the evidence be-fore consldPrlDIC Its 
compet<>ncy, for, If lt was barmlE'fllll, thP 
judgm<>nt cannot be r<>Yel'MOO for admitting 
it, although it was lnrompetent. We an.> 
satisfied that, if the eYldence be conceded to 
be Incompetent. the error In admitting It 
was not harmless. The appellee's couneel 
D.88Ume that the error wu a harmless one. 
even If the lncompeteney of the evidence be 
<'OD<'eded, for the rt>ason that the de<>lara· 
ELI.IOTT, C. 1. The appt>llee seek& to re- tlone of the engineer were proved by Wh-
rover damagee agalDBt hie employer, tbt> ap- nt>Mt>R called to prove that be bad made 
pellant, for Injuries alleged to have resulted statements out of court contradicting tboae 
to him from the negligence of tbe employer made by him on the witness stand. !'bis 
In fatllng to furnish him with safe appllan- poeltlon ls untenable. '!'be wltneesee by 
<'t'fl for UHt' In the performance of tht> duty I wnom the engineer was eontradlcted were 
required of him by the service In which he , Impeaching wltnesees, and their testimony 
waa em1>loyed. The Injury reeultro from went to hls <'redlblllty; but It did not prove, 
the colllslon of the car upon whl<'h the ap- nor tend to prove, the principal fact. lm-
pellee was J>Prformlng the duties of a brake- peaching testimony goes only to the credlbll-
man with another part of the same train, lty of a wltnt•ss, and lt cannot be given 'an7 
which bad \)l'('D detached for thP purpose of \ force as evldenee In proof or disproof of a 
making what Is rommonly called "a running disputed fact, exeept In 80 tar as It bearB 
flwltch." 'l'he <'ar upon whl<'h the appt>llee I upon the credibility of the witness it tends 
was a brakeman was a platform car, laden to lmpea<'h. In St>ller v. Jenkins, 07 Ind. 
with large and heavy hlocks of stone, and 1 430-436, ft was Mid of Impeaching evldc.>nce 
the appellee was at the front end of the car, that "such evldt-n<'e doe11 not tend to e11rnh-
endPavorln1C to <•heck It by using the brake. llsh the truth of the matters embr&<.'t•d In 
Discovering that he wae unable to do 80, the contradictory evldenee; lt simply goes 
and that a rol1111lon was Inevitable, he at- to the credlblllty of the wltneRS." Other 
tempted to make his way to the rear of the eases assert a simllar doetrlne. David v. 
c•ar, but his feet wel't' <'nuirht betw<>en two Hardy, 76 Ind. 272; Hicks v. Stone, 13 lllnn. 
heavy stonr11 and <'n11"11P1l. In the tlrst par- 434, (GIL 3~.) 
aicrn1,h of the romplalnt It le alleired that The position assumed hy appellee's coun-
tl1r ft.<'<'ldent was <'aused by the negligence sel, that, 88 tbe tacts whl<'b the declara· 
of the appellant In falling to repair a cyl- tione of the engineer t(•nded to prove were 
Imler cock of the engine, which had been established by other te11tlmony, the ruling 
blown out some time l>Pfore the a<'cldent, In admitting evidence of such declarations, 
and that the failure to rPJllll('(' the <'yllnder even If erroneous, wae harmless, cannot be 
<"<>Ck rendered It Impossible tor the engineer maintained. Tbere may be cases whrre tht> 
to get that part of the train which the ear facts are 80 tully and <.•oncluslvely proven 
on whl<'b the lllJI>Pllee was standing was fol- by other testimony that the appellate trl· 
lowing out of the way, and this brought on bunal will not re\·el'lle the judgment b<'1·uullt' 
t lw l'olll11lon. The second paragraph of the ln<'omtlPtt-nt evidence to the same fa1•ts ts 
c·om11l11lnt <·barges that the brake on the car ndmlth'<l; hut this Is not 8ueh a ease, for 
wnM defe1•th·e. nod substantially repeats the lwrt- the t•\•hlNtce was as to n meterlnl 1iolnt. 
nllt>1Ct1tlons of the flnit 1U1 to appellant's nt-g- ; an•I It <'tmnot be justly said that the tacts 
l1,:1•nre In falling to replaee or l'('pnlr the \ whll'!1 the del'laratlons tendl'fl to pron• w<'rt• 
<·yllnder CO<'k of the enitlne. The third 1mr- I e11h1hl111hed by uncontradlcted evidence. 
nirrn11b ls ba11t•d upon the ne1tllicen1·1• of the We <'annot, It 18 evident troID what we 
nppellnnt In regar<l to the brake, hut It also I have said, avoid a de<'lslon of tbe prlo«lpnl 
nlleg\'S that there was some defP<·t In tbe queRtlon upon the ground that. If the e\·l-
t•ngme, which was unknown to th1• at>I>ellt>e. deuce was ln<'ompt>tent. It was not prejudl-
As no question ls made upon thr <'Omplnlnt, clal. We are required to deelde whether the 
we have glvPn only a genernl outline of Its ev.ul'lll'e was l'Ompetent, l>P<'BURt' lt11 11111h•· 
nllPgntlons, whleh are full nnd eXP.llC'lt. rial character <'reates the preRum{ltlon that 
'l'hP. IJlll'Ht lou to whll'11 the appellant's It was probably prejudt<'lal. 'l'lw rull.' IA 
1·ouDHel devott• the l'rlnl'lpal part or their well settted that. where evidence of an In· 
nritumt•nt arls1•s on the ruling of the trial fiuPntlal character ls erroneously allowed 
80 
ltl'J$ G]§S'l'1E
1° to to the jury, it will be presumed to
lure prejudic.-ed the objecting party, and,
unless this prc-.<:u1nption is rebuttcd, the
Judgment niust. be reversed. See authori-
ties cited in Elliott's Appellate Procedure, §
-">94, note 2. It is an elementary rule that
the declarations of an agent are not admis-
sible against the principal unless they were
made while the agent was conducting some
transaction for the principal. or in a matter
where the age-nt‘s act is part of the res ges-
ite. It the declarations of the appellant‘
engineer were not part of the res gcstm,
there was judicial error in permitting them
to be given in evidence. It can hardly be
aiiirmed that there is a general rule which
will tit all cases, for each case is dependent .
upon particular facts. It is. perhaps, safe
to declare that, where the declarations of
the‘ agent are made to the person whose in-
terests are directly involved, at a place
where the transaction or occurrence hap-
pened, so near the occurrence or transaction
in point of time as to be justly and reason-
ably regarded as part of it. refer directly to
the transaction or occurrence, and are not
narratives ot the past, they are ordinarily
to be regarded as part of the res gestrc. If
the declarations are made at a diiierent
place, and are separated from the occur-
rence or transaction by such an interval of
time as requires the inference or conclusion
that they were not part of the act, transac-
tion, or occurrence. then, under all the well-
reasoned cases, they are not part of the res
gestze, and cannot be given in evidence
against the principal. There is wide diver-
sity of opinion and stubborn conflict as to
how great an interval of time must elapse
between the occurrence and the declarations
in order to deprive a party of the right to
give them in evidence. but we think our gen-
eral statement is supported by the weight .
of authority. The difficulty. as we have in-
dicated. is not so much in torinulating gen-
eral statements as in determining under
what phase or branch of a general rule the
particular case falls. That is here the dif-
ficulty, for, while we are satisfied that our
general statement is correct. we have found
it no easy task to determine under what
branch or phase of it this case belongs. The
question as to the competency of the decla-
rations ot the engineer has two branches,
for there is one branch founded on specific
objections interposed to the testimony, and
another upon a motion to strike out part of
the testimony. It will conduce to clearness
to consider each branch separately, al-
though both depend upon the effect and ap-
plication of the rule relating to the compe-
tency of evidence as part of the res gestac.
The appellee testified as a witness in his
own at-nail’, and, after giving an account of
the collision, and the manner in which he
was injured, he said: “In the mean time I
W88 getting up. I went to walk. l went
to step, and when I stepped on this foot I
i
fell. That was fig: "cut
hurt. I reached W0 17
. ‘ll 112
that my foot W39 0 1 l‘b
to the car and Sat Qlpn -
Mr. Brumley, til? en'?10@e' About tlmt time
his torch. 1 “'21-9 ‘£0111 I.’ cllmc to me with
anybody would vvben b °n 1/ke 1 suppose
says, ‘That is too bad, BlZ,"";" 1""?-‘ Hf‘
He said: ‘What was we‘ ,,,,,;‘f,',f.d’ 13,‘;
Didn‘t you understand the “gm”, m.,_;mmu-t’
you set out of the mad?" At this point
an objection was stated, and then folio“-_
ed questions and answers, some of we
questions, as indicated by the stenographer-‘s
report. were interposed by Mr. .\IcMullen,
counsel for the appellant. The statements
elicited by the statements addressed to the
witnesses are, in substance, these: From
the time the collision occurred until the en-
gineer came to the appellee was “not over
a minute or two.” The engineer left his
engine, and walked back to the car where
the appellee was. The engine had “gone
down the track” between two and three
hundred feet ahead of the car on which the
appellee was at work, but when the en-
gineer left the engine it was about a car’s
length from the car on which the appellee
was injured. and, as the witness expressed
it, "the engine was stopped. and the colli-
sion was all over," when the engineer reach-
ed the appcllee, who had at that time crawl-
ed from the end of the car to the center,
and was holding his foot, and moaning. It
appears from this evidence that the direct
collision was over and the injury done at
the time the engineer reached the appellee,
but that the car on which the appellee was
sitting was still at the place where the in-
Jury was received. It also appears that
there was an interval of time. although a
very brief one. in which the engineer walk-
ed from his engine to the appellee after the
engine had been stopped. 'i‘hc appellee, as
we have seen, estimates the time at not
more than one or two minutes. so that.
while there was an interval oi‘ time between
the actual injury and the declarations, it
was a. brief one; but, brief as it was, it was
sufilcicnt to allow the engine to traverse a
short dlstance—a car's length-—fr0m the
place where the engine was stopped to the
place where the car on which the appellee
was sitting was standing. The statement
of the witness that the engine had “gone
down the track two or three hundred feet
from where it was when the collision took
place" does not mean that the engine was
that far from the appellee’s car when it was
stopped, but what it means ls. as the record
shows, that the enizine and the car on which
the appellee was stationed. although de-
tachcd, continued in inntiou for that dis-
tance aftcr the collision tO<>\< \\\‘-\\‘P- 50 that
the engineer did not walk i\‘\i\\~ distance: ‘0(\‘\‘
H“, ,,um|.m._‘._ he “-aiiu-t1 u\\\3 \\\e t sui \
\ \ r ) _ i.
between the car and ti“ ‘~‘“~\‘“~ '““\ “‘“
. . ¢ * “ \ ii. \\'
as the witness suns, WW5 4 Lm“\‘““ \ :1
[Give 1V0. 11
me 1 knew I was
Out 9 dark, and felt
1 crawled over
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to go to the jury, It will be presumed to fell. That ws.S e:;::'tt>IJ~ [Ctse .No. 11 
bare prejudiced the objt><·tlng party, and, hurt. I n>a<~bed 't/ " 4J 'tt.llJe 1 k. 
unless t:bls presumption Is rebutted, the that my foot vtrB-~ ,101 C'lJt the dnrk~~~J;;a 
Judgment: must: be ren'nwd. See nuthori- to the car and B8- lJ>4 · I <'l'llWlf'd over 
Iles eited In Elliott's Appellate Procedure, f Mr. Brumley, tbe eD~/l.lee • About tbnt time 
!>91, nob~ 2. It le an elementary rule that his tor<'h. I wt18 P'OJl.lg ~ enme to me ll'lth 
the declarat.Jons of an agent are not admls· anybody would ~·bell b 012 like I supposu 
slble agahu~t. the prtuclpal unleMll t<ley were say11, 'That Is too bad, IJJ~, wus hurt. He 
made while t:he agent was comllJ(•tlng some I He said: 'What was the. 1 ::'Id, ~~8;' 
trallNlction tor ~he principal. or in a matter I Didn't you understand the stgn::J:'ore;.~ul<ln 'i 
where the ag(•nt e net ls part of the n-s gt'll- you get out of the road?'" At this Jwlnt 
Ill!. 1f the tlPclarations of the appellant's I an objeetlon Wll8 stated, and then l'ollow-
l'ngineer were not part of the rP11 gestre, I ed questions and answers. Some of the 
there was judlelal t•rror In permitting them questions, as indicated by the stenographer's 
to be given tn evidence. It c•un hnrdly be report, were interposed by Mr. llcllullen, 
afll.rmed that there is a gen1>ral rule which counsel for the appellant. 'fhe statements 
will fit all <·uses, ~or E>nch C'l\SE' Is dependent . elicited by the statements addressed to the 
upon pnrtl<•ulnr facts. It Is. perhaps, safe witnesses are, ln substance, these: 1''rom 
to dPdnre thnt, where the llPclaratlons of the time the collision occurred until the en-
the' 11gN1t are made to thE> lM>rson whose In- glnee1• came to the appellee was "not over 
terests are dtreetly lnvoh·!'d, at a place a minute or two." The engineer left hts 
where the traneiu·tlon or OC<'nrrence hap- engine, and walked back to the car whert• 
lll'netl, so near the occurrence or transaction the appellee was. The Pnglne had "gone 
In point of time as to be justly and reason- down thE> tmck" betwet>n two and thrre 
auly rl'garctec\ as port of It, refer directly to hun1lt·E>d ft'l't nhend of tl1t• <'nr on which the 
the trnnsuctlon or occurrence, and nre not appellee was at work, but when the en-
narrntlvet! of the past, they are ordinarily I glueer left the engine It was about a car's 
to hi' rPgnrded ·as part of the res gpstre. It 1 len){th from the ear on whl<'h the nppellee 
the declamtlons are made at a different wns lnjnrt'<l. nod, as the witness ex1>ress!'d 
pL"l<'l', am\ are septtrated from the occur- it, "the engine was stoppPd. and the colll-
n-nel' or transaction by such nn interval of slon was all over," when tlw eni:"tn('('r rea<'11-
tlm1> as requires the inference or con<'luslon ed the npl>f'IIPE', who had at that time crawl· 
that thE>y were not part of th!' net, trnnsn<'- I'd from the end of the <'ar to the center, 
tlon. or O<'<'Urren<'e. then, undPr all thl' WPll- and was holding his foot, and moaning. It 
reasoned cases, tbey are not part of the res appl'Ul'B from this evldt•uce that thr direct 
;:::esta>, and cannot be given In PVlden<'e eolllslon was over and th!' injury done at 
against the prln<>lpal. There IR wldP diver- the time the engineer rt-nehed the nppPllee, 
alty' of opinion and stubborn confll<'t 88 to but that th!' car on whh·h the appellPP waM 
how 1,.rrent an interval of time mm1t elapse Rlttlng waR still at the plaee where the ln-
betwee-n the oecurrenee an1l the declarations I jury waR received. It :t!Ro appenrs that 
ln order to deprive a party of the nght to therP w1111 an lntl'rn1l of tl1111>. although a 
give them In evidence. hut wt• think our gen- 1 VPry h1·lef one, In whl<'h the Pn1-'1neer walk-
t-ral statement is supported by the weight . ed frorn his engine to the 11.(IJll'llE'e after the 
of authority. The dltHt•ulty, 11s we huve In- I engine had been sto11pPll. 'l'lw nppellee, as 
dlcnted. ls not so much in tormulatlng gen- we have 11een, estimates tlw time nt not 
ernl statementlil as In determining nn<ln more than one or two mluutP8. so that, 
what phase or branch of a general rule the while thl'l''e was an interval of time between 
particular Cll8e falls. That Is here the dlf- tne actual injury and the de<'lnmtlons, It 
ttculty, for, while we are satlsfled that our wru1 a. hrlef one; but, brief ns It wns, it was 
general 11tntement Is correct. we have found suflt<'ient to allow the engine to travPrse a 
lt no easy task to determine under what 11hort dlstanctL-a car's lPugth--from the 
hranch or phase of it this case belong11. The pince where the engine wns stopped to the 
que11tlon us to the competency of the decla- pla<•e where the ear on which the nppellee 
ratlon11 of the pnglnrPr hns two branches, was slttlug was standing. 'l'he statement 
for there ls one bran<'h founded on specific of the wltnl'llS that thE> engine hnd "gone 
ohjN•tlons lnterposl'<l to the te11thnony, and down the tn1<·k two or three lmn!\rl'd feet 
nnothE>r upon a motion to strike out part of from wherE' it was when the collision took 
tl1e h•11tlmony. It will conlln<'e to clearnt-ss plnC'e" does not mPnn tlmt tlw \•111tlnP wa" 
to <·ouslller each branch sep1trntely, al- that far from the nppellf.>e's <'ar wlwn It Wiil\ 
thouich both dE>pend upon the eft'N·t nod ap- stoppPd, hut whnt It nwnnN \!\, n11 tbe record 
plication of the rule relating to tl1P compe- Khows, that th!' e nglnt> uni\ t\w ffiT on wbl.cl1 
tency of evidence as part of the res ge11tro. the appellee wns stntiont>l\, n\t\1ough de-
ThP nppellee testlfled as a wltnrl'K In his tached, <•ommuNl \n n1ot\on for that d\11-
-0w11 "'"mlf, and, after giving nn ae<·ount of tancp after the C'ollll'lon too\I. \'\1wl', so that 
tbe collision, and the manner In whi<'h he the en~lnt>t>r 11\tl not wn 1 k tnnt l.\\stnncl" ; on 
was Injured, he said: "In the 11w1111 time I tlw Pontrnrv. h e walkt·•l ou\> \\\ll l.\\stan<•,• 
was getting up. I went to wnlk. I went hetween th~ <•tn· and t\u• ~1.W,\1"'· and t\\\\~ . 
to step, and when I stPpp!'d on thl11 foot I as the wltnPAH f'nys, wus u. cnY 11 \en~\\, \\" 
81. 
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RELEVANCY.
have, therefore, a case where there was a
very brief interval between the collision and
the declarations, and one in which the en-
gineer walked only a few feet after he stop-
ped—he had checked—his engine, back to
the car on which the injured person was sit-
ting. moaning in pain.
We have no disposition to extend the rule
respecting the competency of declarations of
:|n agent upon the ground that they consti- -
tute a part of the res gestze, for we are sat-
isfied that an enlargement of the rule would
very likely make it an instrument of evil.
But. on the other hand. an undue limitation
of the rule might often prevent a party from
availing himself of evidence to which he
was entitled, and which would aid in estab-
lishing the truth. If we can ascertain the
rule as our decisions declare it. we shall
deem it our duty to apply it without ex-
tending or narrowing it. It is necessary to
examine the decided cases in order to ob-
tain the means of solving the vexed ques-
tion which faces us, and we begin this work
by a reference to the cases which declare
the general doctrine. One of the earliest of
Oil!‘ f'=1f~‘~P8 is that of Bland v. State, 2 Ind.
608, wherein it was said: “It has been de-
cided that it is not competent for a prisoner
indicted for murder to give in evidence his
own account of the transaction, related im-
medlately arm it occurred, though no third
person was present when the homicide was
('01I1l11mPd-" The case from which we have
quoted cites as authority for the conclusion
which it declares the case of State v. Tilly,
3 Ired. 424,- wherein it was said: “l'nless
the declarations form a part of the transac-
tion. they are not receivable in evidence.”
The case of Bland v. State, supra. has often
been cited and approved, so that the doc-
trine of that case, in so far as it asserts that
the declarations must be part of the occur-
1'9-1l('9, act, or transaction, is to be accepted
as the law of this transaction. The doctrine
of that. case. as we have stated it, is the
rrcvailinzz Oill‘. for it is Slll1('l'l0il0(l by many
able courts. state and federal. Railroad (To.
v. O'Brien. 119 U. S. 99, 7 Sup. (‘t. 118; Dur-
kee v. Railroad 00.. (59 Cal. 533--‘:31 11 l’ac.
130; State v. Poineroy, 2.5 l\'an. 34!»; Rail-
road (‘o. v. Coleman, 28 .\lich. 4-it)-446;
.\ia_ves v. State. ti-1 Miss. 329. 1 South. 733;
i~'outl|erlaud v. Railroad Co., (N. (‘.) 11 S.
Pl 189; Martin v. Railroad Co., 103 N. Y.
026, 9 N. E. 505; Waldele v. Railroad Co.,
95 N. Y. 274: Lane v. Bryant, 9 tiray, 2-iii;
Luby v. Railroad Co., 17 X. Y. liil; Wil-
lllllIlS0ll \‘. Railroad (‘o.. 144 .\iass. H8. 10
-\'- E- T9"; Railroad Co. v. Becker. 128 ill.
545, 21 N. E. 52-}; Railroad Co. v. .\lara. ‘iii ‘
Uhio St. 185; Adams v. ltnilroad (.‘o., T4 .\io.
553; Railroad Co. v. \Vonmck. $4 .-\ia. 1-iii,
4 South. 618. The general doctrine that the
declarations must be part of the act or oc-
currence is asserted without substantial di-
versity of opinion by the text writers. Ab-
bott, Tr. Ev. 51; Woods, Pr. Ev. -169; 1
Whart. Ev. (3d Ed.) § 259; 'l‘a_vlor, Ev. (Stir.
Eng. Ed.) 5 602; 1 Rice, Ev. 37-'1.
We assume, therefore, that the declarations
of an agent or servant are not competent
unless they are part of the principal act, oc-
currence, or transaction. But in ascertain-
ing the general doctrine we do not complete
our work, for we have still to ascertain and
decide whether the declarations of the en-
gineer can be deemed part of the occurrence
in which the appellee was injured, and, in
order to reach :1 correct conclusion, it is nec-
essary to examine the authorities with some
care; not, however, for the purpose of as-
certaining the general rule, but for the pur-
pose of ascertaining what the cases declare
to be part of the res gestse. In Binns v.
State, 57 Ind. 46. the doctrine of Bland v.
State was held to govern a case where the
witness reached the woman who had been
shot after he had run a distance of two or
thrce hundred yards, and arrived at the
place where the shooting was done a min-
ute and a half after she had been wounded.
nnd the jud,-nnent of the court was that her
deciarations were not part of the res gestm.
A very similar application of the rule was
made in Dukes v. State, 11 ind. 564. The
‘ question arose in the case of Railroad Co.
v. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335, upon this state oi’
facts: The body of the man who had been
killed was on the train. It had been car-
ried to the town of Lanesville, some miles
distant from the place where the accident
occurred, and the fireman of the engine
which ran over the deceased made state-
ments while the body was being removed
from the train. These statements were held
to have been erroneously admitted, the court
citing, as authority for its conclusion. Luby
v. Railroad Co., supra; Moore. v. Meacham,
10 N. Y. 207: Lane v. Bryant, 9 Gray, 242'».
The case of Railroad Co. v. Theobald, 51 Ind.
246, asserts the general doctrine that dec-
larations of trainmen are incompetent un-
less made at the time of the occurrence; but
it does not assert what shall be declined part
of the occurrence, nor does the opinion show
how much time had elapsed between the
performance of the agent's act and the time
of making the declarations. The statements
of the a;:ent which were held rightly exclud-
ed in Railroad Co. v. Wright. 80 Ind. 182.
were made at a place diflerent from where
the injury was received. and 30 minutes or
more after the occurrence which caused it.
In Stephenson v. State. 110 Ind. 359-372, 11
N. E. 360. the declarations excluded were
made after the deceased had left the place
where he was wmnuied, after the accused
had left the spot. and after the deceased had
golie into a saloon and remained for some
time, so that a very considerable interval oi’
time had elapsed. The court held in Jones
v. State, 71 Ind. 68-81. that statements made
l>_v the deceased after he was shot. naming
the person who shot him, and narrating :1
past occurrence, were not competent. So in
32
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Case No. 11] RELEVANCY. 
have, tht-refore, a case where there WRB a Wbart. Ev. (3d Ed) f ZJD; Taylor, Ev. (8th. 
very brlt>f Interval hetwet>n the C'Oltt11lon nncl Eng. 1'~d.) I 602; 1 Rice, Ev. 3i:i. 
the de<>lamtlous, and one In wbkh the en- ·we assumt-, therefore, that tht> decla.ratlon" 
gineer wallwd only a few feet after he stop- ot an agent or servant are not competl"nt 
ped-he bad <·becked-hie engine, back to un)('Se they are part of the principal act, oc-
the car on 1\'hl<'h the Injured person was sit- curren<'t', or transa<'tlon. But In ascertain-
ting, moaning In pain. Ing the general doctrine we do not complete 
We have no lltsposltlon to extend the rulP our work, tor we have still to aB<'t'rtaln and 
reepec·tlng the t'Orupetency of de<·lurntlonM of decide whether the dC<'larnttons of the en-
nn agent upon the ground that tbt>y <'on1dl- · glnN>r can be deemed part of the occurrence 
tute a part of the res gt-ebe, for w<• are eat- ' In whl<'h the appt>llet> was Injured, and, In 
ll'fted that an enlargement ef the rule would order to reach a rorrert t'On<"luslon, It ls nec-
'f'ery likely make It an Instrument of evil. ell8ftry to examine the autborltles with some 
But, on the other band, an undue limitation care; not, bowe'f'er, for the purpoae of ae-
ot the rule might often prevent a party from certalnlng the geneml rule, but tor the pur-
a valllng himself of evidence to whl<'h he j pose of ae<'E'rtalnlng what the cases decllll'& 
was entitled, and which would aid In e11tah- to be part of the res gestre. In Binns v. 
ltshlng the truth. It we <'an aM<·1'1"taln the ~tate, 5i Ind. 46, the doctrine of Bland v. 
rule a11 our dt'<'IMlon11 dt><'lare It, wt> 11hall liltate was ht>ld to govern a case where the 
deem It our duty to a11ply It without ex- wltnf>lle n-1wlwd the woman who had been 
tending or narrowing It. It le neceMMry to shot after ht> had run a dletan<'e of two or 
<>xamlne the de<.>lded cases In order to ob- three lnnuln'<l yards, and arrived at the 
taln the means of solving the vexed que&- place whert> the 11hootlng WRR done a mln-
tlon whl<'h faces us, and wt> begin thl11 work , nte and a half after she had l>N'n wounded. 
by a reference to the <·asee whh•b dt><•lare : and tht> judgment of the court was that her 
the general doctrine. One of the earl11>st of I ded1tratlon11 were not part of the res ge&Ue. 
our <"Mes la that of Bland v. State, 2 Ind. A wry similar application of the rule was 
608, wherein It was said: "It has bet>n de- I madt- In Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 5M. The 
clded that It ls not competent tor a prisoner · queMtlon arose In the case ot Railroad Co. 
Indicted for murder to give In evldenre his 1 v. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335, upon this state or 
own acrount of the transaction, related lm- 1 fa<'ts: The body of the man who had been 
mediately after It occurred, though no third I kllled was on the train. It bad been car-
pereon was llresent when the homicide was 1 rled to tht- town of Lane11vllle, some mllt>s 
committed." Tbe caee from which we have i dlRtant from the place where the accident 
quoted cites as authority for the conl'luslon , occurred, and the fireman of tbt> t-oglne 
which It de<•laree the case of State v. Tilly, : Whl<'h ran over the deceased made state-
3 Ired. 424,· wherein lt was Bald: "t'nleRB i menu while the body wu being removed 
the dec:'laratlons form a part of the transac- from the train. TheSt> statements were held 
tlon, they are not receivable In evidence." I to have bef>n erront>0u11ly admitted, the court 
The c•ase of Bland "· State, supra, hll8 often <.'!ting, a11 authority for Its con<•luslon, J.uby 
bet>n <>ltt'd 1t111l approved, so th1tt the dOt'- 1 v. Railroad Co., supra; llool'e v. lleaC'bam, 
trlne of that <·a11e, In eo far as It a11serte that 1 10 ~. Y. 207; J..ane v. Bryant, 9 Gray, 24.i. 
the d('('laratlon11 mu11t be part of the Ot'cur- ; The <'lllle of Railroad Co. v. Theobald, 51 Ind. 
renre, act, or tranM&<•tlon, ls to be ac<-epted 1 246, asserts tht> gt>neral doctrine that de<'-
as the law of this transa<>tlon. The dOt'trlne i laratlons of trainmen an> Incompetent uo-
ot that <'&Ill'. as we have statt>d It, Is the ! lees madt> at the time of the occurrenN>; but 
prevailing on<>, tor It Is llllll<'tlont>d by many ( It does not al!B('rt what shall b<• dl"t'med part 
able t'Ourts, 11tate and federal. Railroad Co. I of the o<'<'Urrenre, nor does the opinion achow 
v. O'Brlt-n, 119 U. R. 00, 7 8up. ('t. 111'1; Dur- j how mu<·h time had elapsed l.lt'tWt>t•n tht• 
kt>e Y. Ralll'Ojld Co .• 09 Cal. :l:l:J-:-,;~. 11 Pac. , pertorman<'E' of the airent'e act and tht> tlmt• 
130; Htatt- v. Pouwroy, 2."i Kun. :\4U; Hall- 1 of making the de<>laratloWI. The stRtt>mt-nt1& 
rottd ('o. v. Colenulll. 28 :\llt>h. 440-446; of tht• ugt>nt whl<•h wt>rt> ht-Id rightly t>Xl'lud-
~!nyt>M ,., Rtatp, <H ~1188. 329, 1 South. 733; ed lo RallroRd Co. v. Wright, 80 Ind. 182. 
1-"ontht-rlaud v. Railroad Co., (X. ('.) 11 S. wt-rt> madt• at a plllf'C different from when-
!<:. 18U; Martin Y. Railroad Co., 10.'J N. Y. the lnjnry was rt><'E'lved. and 30 minutes or 
626, 9 N. E. 505; Wnldele v. RallroRd Co., ruon• 11fh•r tht• ()('c•urrem't' wbleb <'RUKt'd It. 
95 ~. Y. 274; Lane '"· B~·1mt, o (;my, 24a; In Rteplwmmn ,._ ~tnte. 110 Ind. :ir.R--.q72, 11 
Luby "· Railroad Co., 17 ~. Y. tat; Wll- N. E. 300, thli dt><•laratlon11 ex<'lt1ded we~ 
Hamson v. Rllllrond ('o., 144 :\lllMM. HR 10 mad<• nft<•r the dP<-t•alll'll bad left the plR<'t' 
X. E. 71l0; Railroad Co. v. Jlp1•kPr. 128 Ill. wh<•l"f' lw wa11 wot1mlt'd, aftl•r the ael'UMl'<I 
545, 21 N. E. ;;24; Rallroncl Co. ,., llnra. :.'fl · hRd lert tht> Mpot, and urter tht> dPN'&Ml'<l l11td 
Ohio St. 18;>; Adams v. Unllroiul Co., 74 :\lo. gone into a llllloon and remalnt!d for 11omc> 
r,ria; Railroad C'o. v. Wom1t<·k. SI Ala. 149, tlnw, eo that a very considerable Interval or 
4 South. 618. The general doctrhw that the time had elapR('(l. The court ht•ld In Jone11 
declarations must be part of the a<•t or oc- Y. ~tntt>, 71 Ind. 68-81. that 11tatt>ml'11t11 made 
c•nrn>D<'e le asserte<l without st1bKtantlal di- hy the lle<•eas('(l after be was Mbot, namln~ 
,•pn1lty of 011lnlon by the tt-xt wrtterM. Ab- the 11ersoo who shot him, and narmtlng a 
hott, Tr. E\·. 51; Woods, Pr. Ev. 469; 1 past occurrence, were not t'Ompeteot. So In 
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{_ St&t8,9i Ind. 55;), the evidence was terval of filnel flit‘: 91;; [
lmiefi be ii1'°Pe\'\Y excluded, because, as the tual injil l'.\' an‘ 9 ’l:1lhD&Q C4189 N
l1l‘\<\w9,;id’ ‘“_ was mere‘? 8. narrative of a lamnious is 1103 9° Q B Q pt 0' 11
\‘““" 5a°t‘°“' and ‘mt Dart or the res road Co- v- Buck’ subr at at '11->1 .‘?"‘Pn t1
pal t., None of the cases we nave cited declal-ations were ai-‘I. Q8 t‘ "Ir ,1, '6 30.
ly fits the one before us as to the man was at the D1119 Ge Q11, W85 1'11” d"¢‘-
ilimse nder immediate discussion. In the and the (19019 "3 H0118 ‘vb bile’ as tllez-5-RM"
Wm‘ ePresem‘~‘d by such cases as Binns v. one who llfld taken Dvvebé ere 11 the 18.!’ the
“ms r ge °! the a°t0I'$ In the occurrence was Here there jg even aa~3‘t ; Qlaqee was bated
gigfnt’ that the declarations could not have line of causal ¢"0in:'9Qt10°1ea_l:_e the tlzliro Iva: Z},
“mm dc D1111 Of the res gesta-. \Ve sup- injury and 15119 Z‘ I111-at? Qt; and £3 done
nose it clearnthatt, where one of the prlnci- servant than Ilvas 10113 ore;-‘n the d¢l>l1g,_.,.
pal actors mgtrfil“-*"1<‘Tl0H goes from the road C0. V. Bggid "11 st: the clle flgentlvct
“me where ansaction took place, what supra, it was the D11, b 01'
fluently occurs cannot ordinarily be re- so essential,” and so we "1129
nbsc 1
granted as D1111 Of the res gestzle. In the class time that elapsed flftpr tga-V 59,2110! alway
M cases oi which Railroad (‘o. Y. Hunter is his engine and 1' 93911511
a type, the declarations were made at a. appellee was sitting was no‘: car Wbempped
“W... and at u. time diflfercnt trom that at to break the line 01’ goalie‘. 80 es8en"'9 the
“.h~w1i the transaction took place. The case the acts together. We are sttfoll that [51 as
at our bar dlffeffl from those cited in essen- to the opinion that, Where 10l1gly inc" :51“
rial particillzlrs, for here the declarations
“Tire made at the time and place where the
collision occurred, and they referred to and
illustrated the event, and they were made
while all who Dilrtic-ipated in it were pres-
ent. We may therefore well adjudge that
there was no error in overruling the appel-
laut’s objections without denying the doc-
trines asserted in our cases.
The latest decision ot our court upon the
question before us is that given in the case
of Railroad Co. v. Buck. 116 ind. 566, 19
N_ E. 453. In that case the conductor of the
train on which the intestate of the plaintifl
was employed as a brakeman was on the
“c-aboose" when he received notice that the
deceased had been injured while coupling
cars; that he immediately ran forward. and
fou nd the deceased under the rear end of the
S€('0lld car from the engine. The conductor,
when he took the deceased from under the
r-ar, asked, “How did this happen?" and the
41¢,-(-eased fully described the cause of the ac-
cident The court held that this testimony
was competent, and cited many cases in sup-
port of its conclusion. We think the doctrine
declared in that case decides the point here
under direct consideration against the ap-
pellant Counsel argue with plausibility that
the doctrine of the case cited does not apply
to the case before us. One of the reasons as-
signed in support of their position is that
the declarations admitted in that case were
those of the injured person. While the dec-
larations admitted in this instance were
those of the agent or servant. A @0l11I>l¢'-to
and effective answer to this argument is
that, it the declarations were, as the case re-
ferred to adjudg9B- P1111 0f the 1'9“ in-stae.
they were competent. no matter by whom
they were made. Baker v. Gausin, 76 1nd_
317; 1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed-) §§ 259-261. Our
conclusion receives suDD0I't from the ra-
miliar rule that, where Daft 01 8 Conversa-
lion is competent, the whole is admissible,
unless some part of it is excluded by 03,91-
rules of law, 'In the case before us the in-
wn,ous,n:v.—-8
jured in a collision, all that lse1n.pI0yé is 1n_
stopping the train and re
employé from a. dangerous p0S_ 19 injured
part of one occurrence, but’ wnhltion forms
itatively aflirming this, we out ""1110l'-
where there is such :1 confldo “firm that
acts and events as there W _
all are part of the res gesta;_‘sIitnis“1tl:u:asnes'
Mr. Wharton says, that “1mmed1atem,s’s is
tested by closeness, not of time, but or caus-
al relation." 1 Wllart. Ev. (so Ed.) .5 262.
This conclusion we regard as involved in the
principle thus stated in the case ot Railroad
C0. v. Buck: “It is not always easy to de-
termine when declarations lmving reference
to any act or transaction should be received
as part of the res gestzc, and much difliculty
has been experienced in the effort to for-
mulate general rules applicable to the sub-
Ject. This much may, however. be safely
said, that declarations which are the nat-
ural emanations or outgrowths of the act
or occurrence in litigatioii. altliouizil not pre-
cisely concurrent in point of time, it they
were yet voluntarily and spontaneously
made. so nearly contempormieous as to be
in tho presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made un-
der such circumstances as necessarily to ex-
clude the idea of design or deliberation,
must, upon the closest principles of justice.
be admissible as part of the act or transac-
tion itselt.” Our conclusion is that there
was no error in admitting declarations of the
engineer that did not refer to acts done or
matters which happened prior to the colli-
sion which caused injury to the appcllee.
The other branch of the general question
of the competency of the declarations of the
cm:lneer—tluit rusting on the lnotioll of the
appellant to strike out—requirog only very
brief mention. The motion asked the court
to strike out the statement of the appellce
that the engineer said! “If that man last
night would have fixed that cylinder cock.
as I told him, you would never have been
hurt." This declaration related to the past,
33
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RES GEST.& 
~ _ State, 97 Ind. 555, the evidence will'! 
J)o\e9 ve properly excluded, been use as the 
btld t0~t<l• "lt was merely a. narrati~e ot a 
rou~ r~sactlon, and not part o:f the res 
vaat t.,, ?'lone of the cases we have cited 
ll'lltee· l:Y ftts the one lw-fore us as to the 
preeisE? -oJJ.der immediate discussion. In the 
po\llt. rePT'?Sented by SU(•h (~a.see as Binns v. 
c~ pe of the actors in the occurrence was 
State ~ So that the declarations could not have 
ahs~ .:n.de part of the reM gesta-. We snp-
"oee it. clear that, where one of the prlnc1-
~ a.ct.ors in a transaction goes from tile 
\l ~ e -«bere the transaction took place, what ~i:se\luently occurs C"annot ordinarily be re-
garded p.B part of the res gestt.c. In the c11188 
ot cases of whkh Rall road < •o. v. Hunter le 
a type. the decln.ratlous were made at a 
\'bwe IUld at a time dlft'erent from that at 
wh\cb the transa<•tiou took place. The case 
at our bar dllJers from those cited In essen-
tial particulars, for here the declarations 
were made at the tlme and place where the 
colllelon occurred, and they referred to and 
illustrated the event, and they were made 
while all who participated in it were pres-
ent. We may therefore well adjudge that 
there W:IS DO erl'Or in overruling the a11pel-
lant's objeC'tlons without denying the doc-
trines asserted in our cases. 
The latest decision of our court upon the 
question before us ls that given In the case 
ot Railroad Co. v. Ruck. 116 Ind. 5ll0, 19 
N. E. ~- In that case the conductor of the 
train on which the lntee,itate or the plalntllr 
was employed as a brakeman was on the 
"caboose" when he received notice that the 
deceased had been tn.tured while coupling 
cars; that he Immediately ran forward. and 
:found the deceased undE>r the rear end of the 
second car from the engine. The conductor, 
when he took the decE>niu'tl frnru under the 
c>ar, asked, "How dhl this lut1111en ?" and the 
deceaaed fully described the cause of the ac-
cident. The court held that this testimony 
"vas competent, and cited many cases in eup-
port of Its conclusion. We think the doctrine 
declared In that case decides the point here 
undP.r direct consideration against the ap-
pellant. Counsel argue with plausibility that 
the doctrine of the cnsE> dtetl does not apply 
to the c·ase before us. < >ne of the re1u•ons as-
Kigned In support of their position is that 
the declarations admitted In that CllBe were 
those of the injured person, while the dec-
larations admitted in this lnstanC'e were 
thoi;ie of the ap."ent or servnnt. A complete 
and eft'ectlve answer to this argument le 
that, It the declarations were, as the caKe re-
ferrecl to adjudges. part of the res gt•Kbe. 
they were competent. no matter by whom 
they were made. Baker v. Gausln, 76 Ind. 
317; 1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed.) H 259-261. Our 
conclusion receives support from the fa-
miliar rule that, where part of a conversa-
tion is compc>tt>nt, the whole ls admissible, 
unleBS some part of it Is excluded by other 
rules of law. ·In the case before us the iD-
WJLOus.BV.-8 
~1~~e that · terval of .. A-" t>l~ 
tun! lnj u r_.,.- 8 0 '! t be tlt-0. blii!~Q loaae }{, 
laratlou.s 1~ no BQ ~l'~ ~ 0 l:l.,t 0 • ll 
road Co. v-- ;Buck, eul>l': llt ~ ~ .z.1,.1 ~-PP11 tb declaratf.~.D.B ~ere l'Q,.~· 4 & lt• k,,,~ thee lie. 
man W'&.S at t:be l>J~ e et-~ '"as 1.ll dee. 
and the d.eclarLitloll8 :. '\\>~ °""lJ.11~ as the.re llll!J. 
one who bad ta.kell I> e.z·e el-e hetbe IJJJ~/ebe 
Here there Js eve.ti a~ I~ ~ltde t l4>as bu d 
line of causal conllecti0 ~le.Q~ tbe t/uo bJll1 bl'"t, 
Injury nnd tbe d~'"lltl-llt? b~ter- lllld :i.g do.Ile~ 
servant Uu1n tlJel "'°118 °-lle 1'>-~ll th l'o111:e.r 
road Co. v. Buck. .Ill 1.l.J 't.IJ:r tht> 11;e dJl"ec!t 
supra, It was said "t•- lflte-1>1-. <'Ilse or llt o.r d qe t ~~<>ns ll eo essential " an Bo w i~1~ on 1> 8 Ill/. 
' e e ~ Is · tat 
time that elapsed B:ftp,. tb ~~ he.re 110t lllff>a;:y.e, 
hie engine and renc11ed e eng1n; 2'ie brte; 
appellee was sfttln>r 'W11s flle car ,!'.~stopped 
to break the Jlne Of <'OlJn,:Oot Bo esselJ~l"f! the 
the acts together. We are ec.•tJolJ that baJ as 
to the opinion that, lVhei-e ::iti·ollg/y lIJcIJ~nds 
jured in a collhdon, au that ls eillpJoy(j ls ,:;! 
stopping the train and reJlevi doIJe towards 
employ(! trom a dangProus Dg. tlie lnJured 
part of one occurrence, but, :;:sitton forms 
ltntlvely atHrmlng thls, we do ~out anthor-
where there lM such a contJnuo fflrm that, 
d us chain of acts an events as there was In th 
11 f h Js case a are part o t e res gestse. It Is t: ' 
'" "''h .. rue, as a.1.r. " ai.on says, that ''immediateness Is 
tested by closeness, not of time, but of cau11-
al relation." 1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed.) .§ 262. 
This conclusion we regartl a11 involvecl In the 
principle thus stated In the cnse of Unllroad 
Co. v. Buck: "It Is not always easy to de-
termine when declarntlom1 lmvlug reft>rPnce 
to llny act or transaction should be re<"eived 
as part of the res gestre, and much difficulty 
llas been experienced In the eft'ort to for-
mulate general rules applicable to the sub-
ject. This mnC'h may ho,.·~ver, be safely 
said, that deC'l:tratlo~; which are the nat-
ural emanations or outgrowths or the act 
or OC'eurrt-nce In litigation, although not pre-
cisely concurrent In point of time, if they 
were yet '\"oluutarlly and Mllont11neou11ly 
llillde, so nearly contPmporaneuus as to be 
In tlw presence ot the transaction which they 
Illustrate and explain, and were made un-
der such cirC'umetanC"es as necessarily to ex· 
elude the Idea of design or deliberation, 
m1111t, upon the closest principles of justlC'e, 
he admissible as part of the act or transac-
tion Itself." Our conclusion Is thllt tht-re 
was no error In admitting declara tlons of the 
engineer that did not refer to acts done or 
matters which h11ppeued prior to the colli-
sion which C'aused Injury to the appellt>e. 
The othe1· branC'h of the general question 
of the romprtl>nt•y of thr declarutlons of the 
englneer- thut rt>t1tlng on thP tnotlon of the 
nppt-llant to strike out-requirt-s only very 
brlt>f m<>ntlon. The motion asked the court 
to strike out the statement of the a.ppellee 
that the engineer said: "It that man last 
night would have tu:cd that cylinder c0<·k. 
ae I told him, you would never have been 
hurt." This declaration related to the past, 
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and was a narrative of what had been done
at an entirely diiferent time and place. It
was, indeed, a combination of an opinion and
a narrative of the things that had passed,
£01‘ it was a statement of the engineer's opin-
ion that ii’, on the night before. smncthing
had been done which he had then directed,
the collision could not have taken place. It
is too well settled to excuse the reference to
authorities that neither narratives or past
occurrences nor matter of opinion can be
placed before a jury by proving the decla-
rations of an agent or servant. For the er-
ror in overruling the motion to strike out the
objectionable testimony the judgment must
be reversed, and, although many other ques-
tions are discussed by counsel, we do not
deem it necessary to consider or decide them,
as they may not arise on another trial.
On Rehearing.
(Dee. 17, 1892.)
OLDS, J. Counsel for appellee have filed
a petition for rehearing in this cause. and
by a learned and able argument insist that
a rehearing should be granted. The cause
had due consideration and the questions in-
volvcd were fully considered in the original
opinion, and we deem it necessary to con-
sider but one question only presented by the
petition for rehearing; It is contended by
counsel for appellee that the question dé
cided adversely to the appellee, and for which
the judgment was reversed, was not proper-
ly presented to this court for decision; that
the competency of that portion of the testi-
mony of the plaintifl' as a witness, stating
that the engineer, Brnmley, told him that,
“if that man last night had fixed the cylinder
cock as I told him, you would not have been
hurt,” was only raised by a motion to strike
out; that such statement was made in an-
swer to a competent question, which elicited
other competent testimony in connection
with such incompetent testimony. After
the answer was given by the witness to the
question, counsel for appellant made a mo-
tion to strike out the incompetent part of
the answer, stating his reasons, and the
court overruled the motion, and the appel-
lant excepted. The reason for new trial re-
lating to this evidence alleges "that the
court erred in permitting the plaintiff, while
testifying as a witness in his own behalf, to
testify to the following, to wit: That after
the accident resulting in the injuries com-
plained 01', and after plaintiff had received
said injuries, he (plaintiff) asked the engi-
neer, Brumley, how this happened, [refer-
ring to the aecident.] and that said Brumley
told the plaintiif, in answer to said inquiry,
that he, Brumley, could not throw the re-
verse lever forward, and that ‘if that fellow
had fixed the cylinder cock as I told him to,
this thing would not have happened.’ " And
there was no reason assigned for new trial
based on the error of the court in over-
rulingthe motion to strike out. It appears
by the record that a proper motion was
made to strike out this latter statement of
the witness, which was in the original opin-"
ion held to be erroneous, and an exception to
the ruling was reserved. It would seem that
as a matter of fact the trial court’s attention
was called directly to the question which
was passed upon. and decided by this court.
A motion for new trial was made. in which
one of the reasons assigned was error in
admitting thi statement, together with the
statement that the engineer said he could
not throw the reverse lever forward. On
, appeal in thiscourt the question as to wheth-
er or not these particular statements were
both or either of them competent was dis-
cussed by counsel, and the question as to
whether the latter tatcment of the witness
was competent or not was treated as being
properly presented by the record. It would
seem quite evident from the fact that a sep-
arate motion to strike out the particular
part of the statement of the witness which
was held by this court to be incompetent,
and from the motion for new trial and the
discussion in this court by briefs and orally,
that the question was treated as in the rec-
ord, and the trial court passed upon the
question reviewed by this court in passing
upon the motion for new trial; and, it the
question is not properly before this court,
it is on account of a technical defect in the
form of the motion for new trial. It is not
the practice, and it is not incumbent on a
party in a motion for new trial, to set out in
detail a verbatim copy of the evidence ad-
mitted over objection or oflered and refused,
or a verbatim statement of the objections
made to its introduction. It is suflicient if
the evidence be referred to with such cer-
tainty as to call the attention of the court to
it, and to the ruling in relation thereto, so
that the judge could not mistake the matter
and the ruling alluded to and complained of
by the party filing the motion. (‘lark v.
Bond, 29 Ind. 5.16; Bail v. Balfe. 41 Ind.
222; Meyer v. Bohliing, 44 Ind'. 241.
The motion for new trial bases the error
in permitting the plaintiff, while testifying
as a witness, to testify to the statements.
'.l‘his is in a certain sense true. The error
was in permitting the witness to testify to
the erroneous statement. but bellll; <‘-0\lDled.
as it was, in an answer to a proper question,
with a statement that was competent, the
proper way to save the error in allowing it
to go to the jury was by a motion to strike
out the objectionable statement. The mo-
tion for new trial does not point out the par-
ticular erroneous ruling as clearly as it
might, and possibly not as clearly as it
should, but it is not necessary to decide as to
the technical sufficiency of the motion, for
under the rules of this court the question
was properly decided. Rule 26 of this court
provides, among other things, that “if a
statement of fact is made by counsel, and
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ease No.11] RELEVANCY. 
and was a narrative of what bad been done ruling. the motion to Btrlke ont. It appears 
at an entirely dlft'erent time and place. It by tht> reeonl that a proper motle>n was 
was, Indeed, a combination of an opinion and made to strlkt> out this latter statement of 
a narrative of the things that bad paB&ed, the wlt1wRs, which was lu the original oplu· · 
tor It was a statement of the rnglnt>er's opln- loo held to be erroneous, and an exception to 
Ion that If, on the night brro1·e, 110methlng the ruling was reservl"d .. It would seem that 
bad been done which he ball tbrn diJ'P<'ted, as a matter of fa<'t the trial court's attention 
the colllslon could not have taken pbt('e. It was <'Rllt><l <llrectly to the question wblch 
ls too well settled to ex<·u11e the refl'r(•nce to wa.a paBRe<l upon, and decided by this court. 
authorities that neither narrattvl'11 of pust A motion for new trial waa made, In whieh 
occurrences nor matter of opinion can be one of the reasons aselgned was error In 
placed before a jury by proving the deda- admitting tble statement, together with the 
rations of an agent or se1·vant. l!'or the er- statement thRt the engineer eald be rould 
ror In overruling the motion to strike out the not throw the reverst> lever forward. On 
objectionable testimony the ju<lgment must : appeal lo thls-l'ourt the que11tlon as to wheth-
be reversed, and, although many other quea- er or not tbl"Re particular statPmentR W<'l'!' 
tions are discussed by counsel, we do not both or either of them coru1>t>tent was dl11-
deem It neces11t1ry to consider or decide them, cuesed by counBt'l, and tbe question as to 
IUI they may not arise on another trial wbetht'r the latter statement of the witness 
On Rehearing. 
(Dec, 17, 1892.) 
OLDS, J. Counsel for appellee have fl.led 
a petition for rehearing In this cauRe, and 
by a learned and able argument Insist that 
a rehearing should be granted. The C'ause 
had due consideration and the questions ln-
voln•d were fully considered In the original 
oplnl<>n, and we deem Jt nel'el!88ry to con-
sider but one question only presented by the 
petition for rehearing: It Is contended by 
counsel for appellee that the question d~ 
cldesl adversely to the appellee, and tor wblch 
the judgment was reversed, was not proper-
ly presented to this court tor declslon; that 
tbe competency of that portion of the testi-
mony of the plalntltr as a witness, stating 
that the engineer, Brumley, told him tha.t, 
"if that man last night had fixed the cylinder 
oock aa 1 told blm, y<>u would not have been 
hurt," was only raised by a motion to lltrlke 
out; that such statement was made In an-
swer to a competent question, which elicited 
<>tber competent testimony In connl'l'tlon 
with such Incompetent testimony. After 
the answer was given by the witness to the 
questl<>n, counsel for appellant made a mo-
tion to strike out the incompetent part of 
the answer, stating bis reason11, and the 
court overruled the moth>n, and the appel-
lant excepted. The reason for new trial re-
lating to this evidence alleges "that the 
court erred lo permitting the plalntUr, while 
testlfylng as a witness In bis own bebRlt. to 
testify to the following, to wit: That after 
the accident resulting In the Injuries com-
plained of, and after plalntUr had received 
said Injuries, he (plalntll't) asked the engi-
neer, Brumley, how this happened, [refer-
ring to the accident,] and that said Brumley 
told the plalntltr, In answer to said Inquiry, 
that he, Brumley, <'Ollld not throw the re-
verse le\'er forward, and that 'If thRt fellow 
hnd fixed the cylinder cock as I told him to, 
this thing would not ha"e happt>nE'd.'" And 
there was no reason assigned for new trial 
based on the error of the court lo ovel'-
was rompetent or not was treated as being 
properly presented by the record. It would 
seem quite evident from the fact that a M'P-
arate motion to strike <>ut the partl<•ular 
part of the statement <>f the witness which 
was held by this court to be Incompetent, 
and from the motion for new trial and the 
dlscuselon In this court by brlt>r11 nnd orally, 
that the questl<>n was treated aR In the rec-
ord, and the trial court passed upon the 
question l't'Vlt>wed by this court In passing 
upon the mothm for Dl"W trial; and, If the 
question Is not properly l>t'fore this court, 
It ls on account ot a te<-hnl('ftl tlrfeet In the 
form of the motion for new trial. It Is not 
the practice, nod It ls not lncumtit>nt on a 
party In a motion for new trial, to set out In 
detail a verbatim copy of the evidence ad-
mitted over obje<"tlon or offered and refused, 
or a verbatim Rtatement of the objections 
made to Its lntrodu<'tlon. It Is sufftclent If 
the evlden<'e be referred to with such cer-
tainty as to <'llll the attention of the court to 
It, and to thP ruling In relation thereto, 80 
that the judge <'Otdd not mistake the matter 
and the ruling alluded to and complalne<l of 
by the party filing the motl<>n. Clarie v. 
Bond, 20 Ind. rm6; Ball v. Balfe, 41 Ind. 
22'l; Meyer v. Bohlftng, 44 Ind: 241. 
The motl<>n tor new trial ba11es the error 
In 1)(>rmlttlng thP I>lalntltr, while tl"t\tlfylng 
as a wltneKR, to testify to the statements. 
This Is In a l'ertaln sense true. The error 
' was In permitting the witness to testify to 
I the erroneouK Rtatemt>nt. but being coupled, 
as it was, In on answer to a proper question, 
[ with a statement that was competent, the 
1 proper way to R&ve the error In nllowlng it 
to go to the jury was by a motion to strike 
out the objl'l'tlonnble statement. The m<>-
tlon for new trial does not point out the par-
ticular · erroneous ruling aR <·learly as It 
might, and possibly not as cll•arly as It 
shoulc'l, but It Is not necessney to dr1•lde as to 
the technical suft\clenC'y of thl' motion, for 
under the mlPB of this court the queRtion 
was properly decided. UulP 26 of this court 
proYldes, nmong oth<'r things, tllat "if a 
statement of tact Is made b7 couueel, and 
mas GEs'1"¢-Iii.
not an
eetioned or explained by ()I)pQg[ng
Be ’ itteiizlllobsugsixflitid the court to
cont fa - _ 1‘ e appellant, in
\»ea¢c“;;pl11 b“°f in thifi case, utter discuss-
uwfe adm\§8\b\1“i.V 01! all the statements of
ilifitnfi “(:53 "1 flflfiwel‘ to the question, con-
iiw“ y making the following statement
“W lotion ti! this particular question: “We
“"9 W there was error in refusing to strike
““g‘:ne mat sentence of Stein's evidence of
‘%‘mm\ey’B Smtement It wvas specifically re-
mwd to in the motion for a new trial, and
\s shown 0119889 76, lines 9 to 11. He said:
_“ may man last night would have fixed
Hm cylinder cock as, I told him. you would
‘M mu-9 been hurt. This statement was
mt qug5(i0ll9(l or explained by counsel for
me ._\m,pilee, but, on the contrary. coun-
sel for appellee said in his brief: ‘It fol-
lows’ it seems to us, from the weight of au-
momy and upon principle, that the court
below was right in admitting Brumic_v's
gmtement as evidence, without invoking its
discretionary power over the matter.’ And
the whole of Brumle_v’s' statement, including
the last sentence. ‘If that man last night
would have fixed that cylinder cock as I told
mm, you would never have been hurt,’ was
competent evidence. Two objections were
made to this sentence: (1) That it was ut-
tered in the absence of any agent of the de-
fendant. ‘and the testimony thereof is hear-
ggy.’ (2) Not a part of the res gestae, be-
cause made wholly after the accident and
injury complained of. We have shown that
1){l.l't
‘1v:1s
:1g(’11t is 11 W
notljiflg 111
xxfas it
S the
| it was
that it
feudnnt ' S
need sap’
res gestzxr-
d t <1" -us u
flon(i)1asl‘ls)(<;en 1-’1'eat9(11:st1 ‘
no
Ge -.
:88 ti:
I
d
seliand ("O11-"“i(1ere a
we cannot permit pa
on a petition for rehe
urge as a 1»’l'O'“"d to!‘ thn$’, an
hearing that the riason e
tion for new trial 8 too a 12
to point out with sum Into;-In
ticular mung which was
a practice would lead to
and uncertainti’, and We
why there should be a
general rule In this 0389.
in the record or D1191‘ of 0 91?-' is
lant to excuse 001111891 for
examination 01' the record,
the fact as to whether the
was properly iJ!'e'“’!"9d- The cases where new trials are gum
it is too late, aftelil a new ti-in
granted. to object t at the moti \
reasonably made. Kloster v. Eliistlt Iggt
176, 117, 24 N. E. 99. Partle mug‘; be dill
igent, and make their objection at a reason-
able time; and after they have joined in a
discussion, and obtained a decision. they can-
not he heard to say that the question was
not properly raised. The petition for re-
hearing is overruled.
is
ted» is that
1 has been
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RES GEST&. 
. ~ tlle ~-t;loned or exi>lalned by opposing it was pLart ~ r. 
llll 4 tt wUl be deemed by the court to tbat It w.o.S u~el'e() I~ ~~l!t't 4-0aae lfo ~· ~te." Counsel for the appellant, ID fendant:•e;;s s,geat 8 a ""'o 't°l.l~ ~. ,. • lJ 
'oe L~otll brief ln thls case, aner dlscu88- need say .z;aot:bf.D~ lrlo~ l"t41~ q,,,:,d tbetoer. 
11\J()t\ •(\m'88lblllty o'f all the statements of res ges1:Be- TV'~ t .b~ o~ &~ ObJ ti~ ot °"" !ngt})~t~eSB in answer to the question. con- ed to dtscu.ss t: e q~e ~It.}>- .,.~-0.e q7;t1011. ..:,e.. the~ t:J1' making the following statement tlon has bee.P ~~ lfl 7'o~ '""-e.Qd f11Jt/olJ e 
t1nuedaJ.ttoJ1 to this particular question: "We sel, and c-oruddered 8Jld llt°"' • -<tttei-p~t 
In ~l lt tbere was error ln retuslng to strike we cannot: permit '11ll'fle c}~lq4ialJlJel' b 4 quea. 
111b\llbe iast sentence of Ste\ n's evidence of on a ix-tt tfon for ~.be.,_, e f:o ~ b.,. tbe'F Co111J. 
oat t \eY'8 statement. It was speclftcally re- urge as a ~ou.ud t'ol' t.b ~~. -.';:llle liito Co11l"t, 
~ to tn the motion for a new trial, and hearing that: tbe 1~1f~ e ~~ d 1111<'<'es,,,;:'1ll't 
le o"9'l1 on page 76, llnes 9 to 11. He said: tlon for ne'W t:rla 8 f<>o •eetS'.ne tlrig or 4 lllJJI' ';:~bat inan last night would have fixed to potJlt out "Wlt:h 8Ullf<!le~~ro.,.ni11~ l11 tbe ZIJ';; 
hat cyUnder cock as I told him. you would tlcular ruling -wb~C,b 11>88 Certa111i 81ld r111111 ~ bave been hurt.' This statement wRB j a practice wo11Jd ~d to e errolJE'O~ tbe Par. 
not questioned or explained by counsel for 
1 
anll uncertainty. s.nd ll>e ~dlellB Co Buc1r 
the appeUee, but, on the contrary, eoun- why there should be a dep Bee 110 :,11•011 
Ml for appellee llllld ln his brief: 'It fol- gent>rnl rule In tb1B Clise. 7'~ rro.rn ":;:: 
lows, lt seems to us, froID the weight of au- In the record or l,rfet or COun el'e ls llot.bJIJ 
thor\ty and upon principle, that the c'Ourt Iant to excwie <'011Dsel ror ap ~el ror appe/! 
below was rlght ln adintttlng Bromley's examination of the rE'Cord, &nd'Pe. 1ee t'ro1D a.a 
statement as evidence, without Invoking its the fac·t as to wbethf'r the que:lltrovertlng 
dlseretlonary power over the matter.' .And was properly presented. The rntlJ de<'fded 
the whole of Brumley'& statement, including cases where new trials are Kra.nt e, eYen Jn 
tbe laat sentence, 'If that man last night It 111 too late, after a new trlaJ e~ ts that 
would bave ftxed that <.>yllnder cock aa I tl>ld granted. to object that the motion 8 beent 
h , d K was no lllm, you would never have been urt, was reasonably ma e. loster v. Elliott 12.'J 1 d 
competent evidence. Two objections were 176, 177, 24 N. E. 99. Parties mu~t be ::U~ 
made to thls sentence: (1) That it was ut· !gent, and make their objection at a reason-
tered In the absence of any agent of the de- able time; and after they have joined In a 
fendant, 'alki the testimony thereof ls hear- discussion, and obtained a decision, they can-
sa;y. • (2) Not a part of the res geatse, be- not l:e heard to say that the question was 
cau.e made wholly after the accident and not properly raised. The petition ror re-
1Djur.r complatned of. We have shown that hearing ls overruled. 
Case No. 12]
RELEVANCY.
LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO. Y. HER-
RICK.
(29 N. E. 1052, 49 Ohio St. 25.)
Supreme Court of Ohio. Jan. 19, 1892.
Error to circuit court, Huron county.
Action by Herrick against the Lake Shore
& Michigan Southern Railway Company to
recover damages for personal injuries. From
a judgment of the circuit court reversing a.
judgment of tho common pleas, defendant
brings error. Afilrmed.
John M. Lemon, for plaintiff in errors S.
A. Wildmau and G. '1‘. Stewart, for defend- .
ant in error.
BRADBURY, J’. The defendant in error,
in his petition in the court of common pleas,
avei-red, among other matters, that he had t
bought of the railway company a ticket en-
titling him to travel on its railroad from Nor-
walk to Collins, the station next east from
Norwalk, and return; that on his way to the ‘
liiwsengcr-train to take passage it was neces-
sary to cross a track of defendant on which
a west-bound passenger-train was due; that
the railway company had caused notice to
be posted on its bulletin-board there, that
this latter train was 15 minutes late, and
that defendant in error, relying on said no-
tice, was lawfully crossing said track when
said latter train, hidden from his view by
obstructions, came into the station on time,
or nearly so, and at a reckles and negligent
rate of speed, without signal by bell, whistle,
or otherwise, whereby he was injured with-
out fault on his part by being violently
struck and run upon by said train. The rail-
“'aIv"' ¢‘°"1D€lI1y by answer put in issue all
these averments of the petition, except that
the defendant in error was struck and in-
jured by the train. It also answered that
“the plaintiff was well acquainted with the
movements of trains, and the tracks and
premises where he was injured, and on said
December 8, 1881, without necessity or ex-
cuse therefor, went upon defendantls rail-
road track, and by his own negligence and
want of ordinary care directly contributed
t0 1118 i11J11ry;” which last defense was de-
flied by the reply. The issues thus made up
between the parties required the plaintiff in z
the court of common pleas to prove that he
was at the station in the character of a pas-
8611381". It was also material for him to
show that he was misled and his vigilance
lulled by the statements on the bulletin-
board of the railway company that the train '
was late. He complained in the circuit
court, among other things, that the court of
common pleas had, on the trial in the latter
court, excluded from the jury certain evi-
dence that was admissible to establish his
contention in these particulars, and that in-
competent evidence had been admitted by
that court over his objection. The circuit
‘ there.
‘ he believed the train to be late.
court stated upon its journal that the ground
of its action in reversing the judgment of the
court of common pleas was the rulings of
the latter court in admitting and rejecting
evidence, and that in other respects it found
no error in the proceedings of that court.
This entry on the journal of the circuit court
excludes any inference that the judgment
was reversed because the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, and
therefore the judgment of the circuit court
may be reviewed by this court. The bill of
exceptions does not purport to contain all
the evidence, nor even any considerable part
of it, but is limited to that which was oifer-
ed and rejected or immediately connected
with and explanatory of it, and that which
plaintiff below contends was improperly ad-
mitted. The item of evidence first excluded
from the jury, as shown by the bill of excep-
tions, was in the deposition of Vinton F.
Sheldon, who testified to a declaration of the
porter at the hotel, of which it appears the
plaintiff below was proprietor. The witness
was asked if he was present, and if so, what
he saw of it. etc. He answered: “I was
It was in the morning of the 8th of
December; I was waiting to take a train to
Wakeman. Mr. Herrick sent a porter over
to see about the train, as I was stopping at
Herrit-k’s hotel and wished to take the train.
; The porter reported the train fifteen minutes
late." The last sentence, “The porter report-
ed the train fifteen minutes late," was on
motion of the railway company excluded
from the jury, to which ruling the plaintiff
below excepted. This evidence, we think,
was competent, and should have been admit-
ted; it was not oifered in proof of the fact
that the train was 15 minutes late, or even
late at all. The plaintiff below did not con-
tend that the train was late; it was not his
theory of the accident; on the contrary, he
insisted that it came in on time, or nearly
so. That. in his view, was the immediate
cause of his injury; he acted on the suppo--
sition that the train was late, and crossed
the railroad track to enter as a passenger a.
car of another train of the same company
going in another direction. because he be-
lieved it to be late, The state of his belief
in this respect becomes important upon the
question of his own contributory negligence;
his vigilance had been diam-nied. as he con-
tended, by information that he had no cause
to suspect was false. This it was material
that he should establish, and whatever evi-
dence tended to that end was competent.
The report of his own messenger, whether
true or false, certainly tended to show that
Acting up-
on such information, one might well attempt
to crossarailway track without being charge-
able with negligence, whereas if he acted
heedlessly, without inquiry, the act would
be properly characterized as negligent, or
even reckless. Nor was this evidence less
competent because he had afterwards seen
36
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CIUle No. 12] .RELEV A.:NCY. 
LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO. T. HER· 
RICK. 
(29 N. E. 1052, 49 Ohio St. 25.) 
Supreme Court of Ohio. Jan. 19, 1892. 
oourt stated upon lts journal that the ground 
of Its action In rever11lng the judgment of the 
court of common plPas was the rulings of 
the latter court In admitting and rejecting 
evidence, and that In other respects It found 
no error lo the proceedings of that court. 
This entry on the journal of the circuit court 
excludes any Inference that the Judgment 
was reversed because the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence, and 
therefore the judgment of the clreuit court 
Error to circuit court, Huron county. 
Action by Herrick against the Lake Shore 
& ?tllchlgan Southern Railway Company to 
recover damngea for personal lnjurle111. From 
a judgment of the circuit court reY<>rslng a 
judgment of the common pleas, <k>fendant 
brings error. Affirmed. I 
may be reviewed by this court. The blll of 
exce1>tloos does not purport to contain all 
I the el1dence, nor even any considerable part of It, but ls limited to that which was oft'er-
' ed and reJel"lPd or Immediately connected 
with and explanatory of It, and that which 
John M. Lemon, for plaintiff In erro• 8. 
A. Wildman and G. •.r. ::!tewart, for defend-
ant In e1·ror. 
plalntlft' below contends was Improperly ad-
mitted. The Item of e'l"ldence fir11t excluded 
from the jury, as shown by the bill of excep-
tions, was In the deposition of Vinton F. 
Sheldon, who testified to a declaration of the 
porter at the hotel, of which It appears the 
plaintiff below was proprietor. The wltneSB 
was asked If be was present, and lf so, what 
he saw of It, etc. He answered: "I was 
there. It was in the morning of the 8th of 
December; I was waiting to take a train t<> 
Wakeman. l\lr. Herrick sent a porter over 
to seP about the train, as I wa11 11topplng at 
HerrlC'k'a hot£'1 and wlahe'tl to take the train. 
The porter reported the train tlftpen minutes 
late." The last sentence, "The porter report-
ed the train fifteen minutes late;• was on 
motion of the railway company excludffi 
from the jury, to which ruling the plalntltr 
below excepted. This evidence, we think, 
was competent, and should have been admit-
ted; It was not oft'ered In proof of the fact 
that the train was 15 minutes late, or even 
late at all. The plalntltl' below did not con-
tend that thP train was late; It was not his 
theory of tht> aC'<'ldent; on the contrary, he 
inslstPd that It came In on time, or nearly 
so. That. In his \•lt>w, was the Immediate 
cause of hl11 In.Jury; he acted on the suppo- · 
sltlon that thP train was late, and crossed 
the railroad trat•k to enter as a passenger a. 
car of another train of the aame company 
going In another dlre<'tlon, be<'ause he be-
lieved It to be late. Th·e state of his belief 
In this respect becomes Important upon the 
question of his own contributory negligence; 
his vlgllant-e had been dlsarmPd, as he con-
tended, by Information that he bad no cause 
to suspect W88 false. This It was material 
that he should establish, and whatever evi-
dence tended to that end was competent. 
The report of his own meHsenger, whether 
BRADBURY, J. The defendant ln error, 
In bis petition ln the court of common pleas, 
averred, among other matters, that he had 
bought of the railway company a ticket en-
titling him to travel on Its rallroad from Nor-
walk to Collins, the station next ea.st from 
Norwalk, and return; that on his way to the 1 
passenger-train to take passage lt was neces-
sary to cross a track of defendant on which 
a west-bound passenger-train was due; that 
the railway company bad caused notice to 
be. posted on lts bulletin-board there, that 
this latter train was 15 minutes late, and 
that defendant In error, relying on said no-
tice, was lawfully crossing said track wben 
said latter trnln, hidden from his view by 
obstructions, came Into the station on time, 
or nearly so, and at a reckless and negligent 
rate of speed, without signal by bell, whistle, 
or otherwise, whereby he was Injured with· 
out fault on his part by being violently 
struck and run upon by said train. The ran-
way t'Ompany by answer put In Issue all 
these averments of the petition, except that 
the defendant In error was struck and In-
jured by the train. It also answered that 
"the plalntUr was well acquolnted with the 
movements of trains, and the tracks and 
premises where he was Injured, and on said 
December 8, 1881, without necessity or ex-
cuse therefor, went upon defendant's rail· 
road trac.'k, and by his own negligence and 
want of ordinary care directly contributed 
to bis injury;" which last defense was de-
nied by the reply. The Issues thus made up 
between the parties required the plaintiff In 
the court of common pleas to prove that he 
was at the station In the character of a pas-
aenger. It was also material for him to 
11how that he was misled and his vigilance 
lulled by the statements on the bulletln-
board of the railway company that the train 
was late. He complained in the circuit 
court, among other things, that the court of 
common pleas had, on the trial In the lattPr 
court, excluded from the jury certain evi-
dence that was admissible to establish his 
contention In these particulars, and that In· 
competent evidence had been admitted by 
that court over his obJectlon. The clrcult 
; true or false, certainly tended to show that 
he believed the train to be late. Acting up-
38 
i on such information, one might well attempt 
to croSBarallway track without being charge-
able with negligence, whereas lf he acted 
heedlessly, without Inquiry, the act woul<l 
be properly characterized as negligent, or 
even reckless. Nor was this evidence less 
competent because he had afterwards seen 
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ice “Don the ‘bulletin-board himself.
oglmitted in the rejection of compe-
§d““““ ‘Q not cured because there was
(1 “"9" 5“'°“ge\' Evideiice to establish
‘fie 9*" \l1t1‘0duced to and considered
11>“-
be tm“ 1“ the <fO\1!'i'. of common pleas
defendant in error read in eviriciice to
me jury the 1\PD08ition oi? George E. Miller,
_“.n_g a clerk at the llerrick House, an
of which U19 defendant in error was
1-ietor. In response to a question put to
this witness answered: “In the mum-
mg 3“-_ Heffick W“-1_ injured he started out,
am‘ said he was going to Collins. I asked
mm 3; 110 had his ticket. as he had one in
me mone}"(\l‘aWel'. and I looked to see if he
had “_" Upon the Inotion of the railroad
company the words “said he was going to
Collins" were ruled out, to which ruling de-
iemmnt in error excepted. The defendant
‘in error had averred in his petition “that he
had bought and procured of the defendant a.
ticket as a i1*\$3°!12P1' on its trains to and
from Collins, the station on said railroad
next east of said N01-walk, and at the time oi!
the occurrences hereinafter stated was cross-
ing said track nearest to said platform for
the purpose of taking passage on said eat-
ward-bound train for said Collins.” The rall-
road company had not only denied this, but
had also averted as a separate ground oi’ de-
fense that the defendant in error, "without
necessity or excuse therefor, went upon de-
tendanfs railroad track, and by his own
negligence and want of ordinary care direct-
ly contributed to said injm-_v." It therefore
became material for defendant in error to
show that he was injured while on his way
to the train that ran to Collins, tor the pur-
pose of getting on as a passenger to be car-
ried to that place. \\'as his declaration that
he “was going to Collins" competent evi-
dence oi’ that fact? That depends on wheth-
er the declaration was contemporaneous
with, and explanatory of, the act of de-
parture. One departing from home may
have in view any conceivable place, or any
conceivable purpose. as his destination or oh-
ject. The act of departure is thus in itself
of the most ambiguous character; it docs
not afford the slightest clue to the object of
the journey; it is natural and usual, accord-
ing to the mmon experience of mankind,
that the par y should say Bometlling 1'eBDe¢t-
ing his departure, 01’ an explanatory charac-
ter. Declarations thus made are a part of
the act itself. Starkie in his treatise upon
Evidence lays down the rule as follows: “In
the first place, an entry. or declaration ac-
<.-ompanying an act seems, on Dflllfiiples al-
,.(.,,¢|_v announced, to be admissible evidence
in all cases where 11 qlll‘-Stm" "rises as t0 the
nature or quality of that act. " " ' Such
,.Avm¢-nee is also admissible on the same
principle to show the intention with which
an not is done, where the intention is mate.
mu. Thus, on queflonfl of bankruptcy. dec-
iile not
liuof
tent e
oiilef
\\'\n\
larations llifide by
with, or (illrltrg U98 QC-
from his 11109 Pt re
coxistzlntlfi’ flflflnfled 1
turc and (J"""'“t'Y of
evci-an en tr)’ 0" d'~“0la,_
on or qualifies an 11¢’
the matter In 15_sue- an
it bccoxnes fld1n;sS1'b1Q Q 1
us, ii.’ it be cflnwlllp
1: in Io" (1()t1Il Ed_)
trinc has r0ceIV¢’d the
in u number 01' "'fls@s_
party is admissible In e v
tions at the time’ 9&1, ‘~78
are also admissible as
Wlictmore v. 319"’ 1 O1"
Insurance C0. V- Tobin, _-if; S - -6
gctt v. State, 15 01110, -_,_.“_
2 Uhio St. soc: Dickson V '8 “I001-9 ,,
73. This doctrine is mséu fate, 39 0
taincd by the text-writers (‘wed m
1102; Greenl. Ev. 108;) as ’we" hart. E _ ’
by almost innumerable adJm“11sl1lustmted
only a small number of wh cated cases,
1
terred to, (Milne v. Lcisle;-, °7h geed be re-
781i;Blnke v. Damon, 103 Mass 1 um‘ 8‘ N-
. 99' Ahexn
v. Goodspeed, 72 N. 103. Lo’
_. ' I d .
Blythe, 16 Pa. St. 03°, hcott v. Slilelfirl, 2;;
G1-at. 891; Stephens v. McCl ,_ ._, ,
Golquitt v. State, 3-i Tex. sgslltirybizt
tendment favorable to the ruling of the
court of common pleas should have been in-
dulgcd by the circuit court, and should be by
this court also, the question arises whether
the record discloses with sutlicient certainty
that the declaration excluded was made by
the defendant in error at the time he depart-
ed to take the train rather than upon some
other occasion when he may have left the
hotel. The bill of exceptions is meager; it
does not purport to set forth all the evidence,
or all the other proceedings had at the trial-
All that it discloses on this sublect is as f°1-
lows: “Plaintilf then read in evidence to the
jury the deposition of George E. Miller, who
testiiied that he was clerk of the plalfltifi at
his hotel, the Herrick House, when the Bald
injury to the plaintiff occurred. and, in reply
to the qucstion of what he then saw, the wil-
ness said: ‘In the morning Mr. Iicrrick was
inim-ed he started out, and said he was 8°"
lug to Collins. I asked him if he had lllfl
ticket, as he had one in the money-drawer,
and I looked to sec if he had it.’ To which
words, ‘said he was going to Collins,’ the de-
fendant objected." This witness stated, as
disclosed in another part of the bill of ex-
ceptions, that the ticket was gone when he .
looked to see if Herrick had it. so, take the
entire blll oi.’ exceptions, it shows that the
defendant in error had procured a ticket to
Collins, and had it in the money-drawer of
his hotel; that he had taken it out of the
drawer, and was leaving the hotel when he
made the declaration respecting his destina-
tion. From these circumstances we think it
fair to inter that he W118 M the time depart-
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ot:lce upon the bullettn~board hlmseH. 
1be 9 cotJlmltted ln the ~lectlon ot <'Ompe-
Er!Ot' ~<lt"n('e le not cured b~·au~ there was 
tent ~d e\'en stronger evlden'-·e to establish 
o\bet' ~ 0->e fact introduced to and considered 
the - j~l'Y· bltll~be tr\8.1 ln the court ot common pleas 
~ (le-fendant in error read ln evidence to 
tile jUrY the dt>posltlon ot George E. lllller, 
tile!» ._.ae a clerk at the 'l.l.errl<>k House, an 
w 1 of whlcb the d~tendant In error was note 1 --. rtetor. n ...... ponRe to a question put to ~: t.blS witness answered: "In the mom-
\u ~r. llerrlck was Injured he started out, 
a!d said he was going to Colllns. I asked 
blm u be bad hls ticket. as he had one In 
the money-drawer, and I looked to see tr he 
bad \t." Upon the motion of the railroad 
companf the words .. said he was going to 
eolllns" were ruled out, to which ruling de-
fendant in error exce1lted. The defendant 
\u error bad averred in his petition "that he 
bad bought and procured of the defendant a 
ticket as a passenger on Its trains to and 
from Collln8, the station on said railroad 
next east of said Norwalk, and at the time of 
the occurrences hereinafter stated was cro88-
fng eald track nearest to said platform for 
the purpose of taking passage on said east-
ward-bound train for said Colllns." The rail-
road company had not only denied this, but 
had also averred as a separate ground of de-
.tense that the defendant In error, "without 
neceBBlty or excuse therefor, went upon de-
fendant's railroad track, and by his own 
negligence and want of ordinary care direct-
ly contributed to said Injury." It therefore 
beeame material for dt>ftmdant In error to 
show that he was injured while on his way 
to the train that ran to Collins, for the pur-
pose of getting on aa a passenger to be car-
ried to that place. Was hls declaration that 
be .. was going to ColllllB" competent evi-
dence of that fact? That depends on wheth-
er 'the declaration was contemporaneous 
with, and explanatory of, the act of de-
parture. One departing from home may 
have In view any conceivable pla<'e, or any 
conceivable purpose, as his destination or ob-
ject. The act of dt>parture ls thus ln ltKt>lt 
of the most ambiguous character; it does 
not alford the slightest clue to the object of 
the journey; It ls natural and usual, accord-
ing to the 'l>mmon experience of mankind, 
that the party should say something respect-
ing his departure, of an explanatory charac-
ter. Declarations thus made are a part of 
the act Itself. Starkie in his treatise upon 
Evidence Jays down tbe rule as follows: .. In 
the :first place, an entry. or declaration ac-
companying an act seems, on principles al-
ready announced, to be admissible evidence 
tn all cases where a question arises as to the 
nature or quality of that· act. • • • Such 
evidence Is also admissible on the same 
principle to show the intention with Which 
an act Is done, where the Intention ls mate-
rial. Thus, on quesUons of bankruptcy, dee-
Jaratlon.ll!!S n>ade by ll 
wtth, or d urJrr8 t.be ,.~ ~ Ccaae 
from uls viace or ~8~ o:l" Q~l- }(0· 12 
constant:.IY adwltt~ ltl ~-t.l • -~ Co11telll 
ture and qun1Jty or tll l>~  0~ e:u/Jg .bf°i-a,,. 
ever an e.o t:TY or d~1,.,. ~ - °<>.t> or 'flllliJell#J. lllseir 
on or quaJJLJeS a..Q ll~t ~ti~~ Iii t.be l'etJ ltl'e 
the matter Jn Jssue. ltrJ """'"~ l-e11ec d~ """ lla. 
It becomes adrnlSSlbJe «t le ~i. Is ta lllfbt er. 
tre, If It be <..-oDt':,_ll>1'o,.~11 l>~~~<1e11:ee:,,,_a11t? 
• • ••• (1.0th ...,.cl.) fleo of t.b " ltae1t, 
trlne has recefved tile ~. ;a JJ-it.b et~es Ke11-
ln a nu111 ber oL CBl!1ea ~.Ile~~ 6 7. 1'."-t e act. 
lbl . ··~-.... 011 ., 8 ,. 11arty ls adcnJss 6 l.n rv1i of tb•- "'Oc-e..-1.- el'e "' cou 
tlons at the tJz:ne, e'-1'l1t ""ell<'e bllZl llct or l"t 
are also admfssJble Its 1'a:;ato,,.y' 18 dec1ara a 
Whetmore v. Mell, l 0 111 or t.be or tbat ac~ -
Insurance Co. v. Tob1.n, 3~ St. 26. 'i::'esfle." 
gett '"· State, l.5 Ohio, 28:1-Oh/o St. 78.' also, 
2 Ohio 8t. l"IOO; Dickson 1': ' .lfCl()l'e v ' Leg. 
73. This doetrfne Js dls~u~tate, 89 OhZ,~e, 
talned by the text-Wrftera, (l:ed lllld lJ:Jaln~ 
110'.l; Greenl. Ev. 108;) as l'VelJ hart. Ev. 262 
by almost Innumerable adJud:S Illustrated 
only a small number of Which cated cues, 
ferred to, (Milne v. LelsJe~ 7 ;eed be re. , 
786; Blake v. Damon, 103 ll~ss. 1:L & N. 
v. Goodspeed, 72 N. Y. 106· Lo; d Ahern 
Blythe, 16 Pa. St. 582; Scott 'v. Sh~I~~ ~ 
Grat. 891; Stephens v. McCJy, 36 Iowa 6.19· 
Oolqultt v. State, 34 •rex. 550). As eve;.y In~ 
ten<lment favorable to the ruling of the 
court of common pit-as should have been In-
dulged by the circuit court, and should be by 
this court also, the question arises whether 
the record discloses with su11lclent certainty 
that the declaration excluded was made by 
the defendant In error at the ttme be depart-
ed to take the train rather than upon some 
other occasion when he may have left the 
hotel. The bill of exceptions is meager; it 
does not purport to set forth all the evidence, 
or all the other proceedings bad at the trial. 
All that It discloses on this subject ls as fol-
lows: "Plalntur then read in evidence to the 
jury the deposition of George E. Mlller, who 
testified that he was clerk of the plaintiff at 
his hotel, the Herrick House, when the Bald 
injury to the plalntur occurred. and, In reply 
to thf' qUt>KtlOD of wbllt he then MSW, the wit· 
ness said: 'In the morning Mr. Herrick was 
injured he started out, and said be was go-
ing to Collins. I asked him l~ be bad his 
ticket, as he had one In the money-drawer, 
and I looked to see If he had It.' To which 
words, 'said he was going to Collins,' the de-
fendant objected." This witness stated, as 
disclosed In another part of the bill of ex-
ceptions, that the ticket was gone when he 
looked to see It Herrick had lt. So, take the 
entire bill of exceptions, It shows that the 
defendant In etTor bad procured a. ticket to 
Collins, and had It In the money.drawer of 
his hotel; that he had taken lt out of the 
drawer, and was leaving the hotel when he 
made the declaration respecting his dt•stlna-
tlon. l<'rom these clrcumstan<.>es we think It 
fair to Infer that he was at the time depart-
87 
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lug on his proposed journey; but whether he
was or not, as there are other grounds upon
which the judgment of reversal should be
atiirmed, it is quite proper at this'tilne to de-
clare the true rule respecting this evidence.
as the death of the defendant in error in all
probability makes this declaration the only
evidence now attainable of the intent with
which he left the hotel on the morning of the
accident.
The defendant in error also read in evi-
dence the deposition of W. O. Foidger, who
testified as follows: “I was walking towards
the west end of the depot, my back to the
engine, to cross the track diagonally, when l
heard the call, and turned my head; then en-
gine was then right behind me;” being the
same by which the plaintiff was then and
there injured. And the plaintiff's attorney
then asked the witness in said deposition,
“State whether or not you saw other persons
who were in danger of being run over by
it;" to which the witness answered. "There
were people crossing till the engine was
right there, and some one hallooed. I saw
no one hit except the piaintift';" to which
question and answer the defendant objected, '
and the court sustained the objection, and
ruled out said question and answer from the
deposition, and the same were not read in
evidence to the jury, to which ruling_ of the
court the. plaintiif then and there excepted.
The condition of the crossing at the time of
the accident was material. Was it thronged
with people or otherwise? The train might
not have been chargeable with carelessness,
even though it came into the station at a
high rate of speed, if thetlefendant in error,
alone or with only a few others, was there,
while it might be careless, or even reckless,
to dash in at the same rate among a crowd
of people, who might jostle against and im-
pede each other in their struggles to escape.
T119 question was subject to the criticism
that it called for an opinion of the witness
as to whether there were “other persons who
were in danger of being run over by it," but
the answer was free from that objection; it
was limited to matter of fact. "There were
people crossing till the engine was right
there, and some one hallooed. I saw no one
hit except the plaintiff." This answer was
competent evidence, and should have gone to
the jury; it not only tended to establish neg-
ligence in the running and management of
the train, but also had some tendency to re-
fute the charge of contributory negligence,
by establishing the existence of conditions
at the time likely to create panic and confu-
Si0l1, if, I18 claimed, the rapidly moving train
came Suddenly and unexpectedly upon the
crowd of people at the crossing, thereby
causing the choice of means of escape more
diificult and pqrplexing. The other testi-
mony excluded from the jury is not of suffi-
cient importance to require special notice;
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most, it not all, of it was immaterial, or
came within the well-settled rules of the
books that exclude hearsay evidence. If
there was any that did not in its own nature
fail within either of these two classes, the
bill of exceptions is too meagre to disclose
its materiality, and its exclusion therefore
was not erroneous.
The only remaining question relates to the
admissibility of the ordinance of the village
of Norwalk prescribing the maximum rate
of speed at which trains may be run through
the village. The railway company was not
charged with running its train at this time
at a greater rate of speed than the ordinance
permitted; no issue of the kind was made
up; there was not a word in any of the
pleadings to indicate, even, that the village
of Xorwalk had ever adopted an ordinance
on this ubject. In what manner, therefore,
the ordinance could enlighten the jury re
specting the issues on trial before them is
not shown by an examination of the plead-
ings alone. Surely the plaintiff in error
could not. justify dashing its train, regard-
less of consequences,—-if it did so,-into a
crowd of people crossing its track, because
its rate of speed at the time was within the
limits prescribed by ordinance. If uch use
of the evidence can be supposed to have been
attempted, we must presume that the court
properly limited its operation in the charge
given to the jury, or would have done so up-
on request of the other party if made at the
proper time. It was not error, however, to
admit the ordinance in evidence if it was
competent for any purpose. The pleadings,
as before stated, do not mention it, and the
bill of exceptions is very meager, yet enough
can be gathered from it to disclose that a
controversy arose during the trial as to the
rate of speed at which the train, before it
reached the station, passed through the vil-
lage of Norwalk, though nothing appears to
show the distance it ran within the corporate
limits; the plaintiff ‘in the common pleas
court contending that the train ran through
the village at a rate exceeding 15 miles an
hour, the defendant, on the contrary, claim.-
ing that the rate of speed was less than that.
In this connection it is at least conceivable,
if not apparent, that it might have been ma-
terial for the railway company to show that
in passing through the village, and before it
approached the station near ezkiugh to ena-
ble its employes to see the condition of the
crossing, the train did not move at an unlaw-
ful rate of speed, which would render its
management and control more difiicnlt when
the danger at the crossing was discovered.
W'e cannot say, therefore, that the court
erred in admitting the ordinance in evidence.
Judgment afiirmed.
DICKMAN and SPEAK, JJ., dissent from
the judgment of aflirmance.
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Ing on his proposed Journey; but whether he 
was or not, as there are other grounds upon 
whl<'h the Judgment of revenial should be 
alHrmed, It Is quite proper at tbls'tlme to de-
clare the true rule respecting this evldt>m•r, 
as the death of the defendant In error In all 
probability makes this de<>laratlon the only 
evidence now attainable of the Intent with 
which be It>ft the hotel on the morning of the 
accident. 
The deft>ndant In error also read In evl· 
dence the tll'llosltlon of W. 0. Foldger, who 
testified as follows: "I was walking towards 
the west rnd of the depot, my back to the 
engine, to cross th<~ tm<'k diagonally, when I 
beard the call, and turned my head; then en-
gine was then right behind me;" being the 
1mme by wbl<'h the 1>lnlntltr was then and 
there Injured. And the phtlntltr's attorney 
tlum n11kt>d the wltnel!l'I In Kllld deposition, 
"~tute whl'ther or not you saw other pel'llODS 
who we1·e In danger of being run over by 
It;" to whl<'h the wltnt·~ answered, "There 
were people crossing till the engine was 
right there, and some one hallooed. I saw 
no one hit excl'pt the plalntUl';" to whll'h 
question and answer the defendant objected, 
and the <-'OUrt sustulnE'd the objel'tion, and 
ruled out said question and answer from the 
deposition, and the same were not read In 
evlden(•e to the jury, to which ruling of the 
eourt the plalntlll' then and there eicepted. 
'l'ht• t•ondltlon of the Cl'08slng at the time of 
the 1u·rldent was material. Was It thronged 
with people or otherwise? The train might 
not have been chargeable with l'arrlessness, 
even though It <'ame Into the station at a 
high rate of speed, If the .defendant In error, 
alone or with only a few others, was there, 
while It might be careless, or even rec•kless, 
to dash In at the same rate among a crowd 
of people, who might jostle against and Im-
pede each other In their struggles to efl<'llpe. 
The question was subject to the criticism 
that It callt•d for an opinion of the witness 
as to whether there were "other persons who 
were In danger of being run over by It," but 
the answer WIUI free from that obJe<'tlon; It 
was limited to matter of fact. "There were 
people crossing till the engiue was right 
then•, and some one hallooed. I saw no one 
hit except the plalntltr." This answer was 
t·ompetent evidence, and should ha\·e gone to 
the jury; It not only tended to establish neg-
ligence In the running and management of 
the train, but also had some tendency to re-
fute the charge of contributory negligence, 
by establishing the existence of conditions 
at the time likely to create panic and ronfu-
slon, If, as claimed, the rapidly moving train 
came suddenly and unexpectedly upon the 
crowd of people at the crossing, thereby 
causing the cholc·e of means of escape more 
difficult and Pl\"Plexlng. The other testl-
wony excluded from the jury ls not of su11l-
clent lm~ortan<:e to require special notice; 
88 
most, It not all, of tt was Immaterial, or 
came within the well-settled rules of the 
book8 that exclude hearsay evidence. It 
there was any that did not in Its own nature 
fall within either of these two <·lasses, the 
bill of e.iu.-eptlons Is too meagre to dlscloee 
Its materiality, and Its exclusion therefore 
was not erroneous. 
The only remaining question relates to the 
admlsslblllty of the ordinance of the village 
of Norwalk prescribing the maximum rate 
of speed at which trains DMlY be run through 
the village. The railway eowpany was not 
charged with running Its train at this time 
at a greater rate of speed thnn the ordinance 
permitted; no Issue of the kind was made 
up; there was not a word In any of the 
pleadings to indicate, even, that the village 
of Xorwalk had ever adopted an ordlnanl'l' 
on this subject. In what manner, therefore, 
the ordinance could enlighten the Jury re-
specting the Issues on trial before them 18 
not shown by an examination of the plead-
lngM alone. Surely the plalntltf in error 
could not justify dashing Its train, regard-
less of <•onsequences,--lf it did so,-lnto a 
i crowd of people croMlng its track, because 
Its rate of 11peed at the time was within the 
limits pre&•rll>ed by ordinance. If such use 
of the e\·lden<•e can be sup110sl'd to have been 
attempted, we must presume that the court 
1 properly limited its operation In the charge 
I 
given to the Jury, or would have done so up· 
on request of the other party If made at the 
proper time. It was not error, howe\•er, to 
admit the ordinance Ju e\•ldeuee If It was 
competent for any purpose. The pleudlngs, 
as before stated, do not mention it, and the 
bill of exct>ptlons Is ,·ery meager, yet enough 
can be gathered from it to disclose that a 
controversy arose during the trial as to the 
rate of speed at which the train, before It 
reached the station, passed through the vil-
lage of Norwalk, though nothing appears to 
show the distance It ran within the corporate 
limits; the plalntlll' ·tn the common pleas 
court contending that the train ran through 
the village at a rate exceeding 15 miles an 
hour, the defendant, on the contrary, claim" 
Ing that the rate of speed was less than that. 
In this connection It ls at least conceivable, 
it not apparent, that It might have been ma-
terial tor the railway con1pany to show that 
In passing through the ylllagr, and before It 
approal'hed the station near eiliugh to ena-
ble Its employes to see the condition of the 
crossing, the train did not move at an unlaw-
ful rate of speed, which would render Its 
management and control more d1111cult when 
the danger at the cros1ilng was discovered. 
We cannot Sll:f, therefore, that the court 
erred In admitting the ordinance In evidence. 
Judgment atHrwed. 
DWIC\IAN and SPEAR, JJ., dissent from 
1 the Judgment of afftrn1ance. 
RES GESTrE -
SEVILLE \-. STATE_
(so N. E. o-21, 49 Ohio St. 117.)
Gnvreme (‘ourt of Ohio. 1\1;“-ch 2_ 1892
of to circuit court, Athens county
5,1 Seville was convicted of engaging
m a pr1Z°‘fil=h"-~ and bfiflgs error. Affirmed.
F“ 5- Gumfle and L- M. Jewett, tor plain-
“: in 91'1'°l'- 3- P- “Food, Pros. Atty., and
2‘) B_ Grosvenor, for the State,
w[LL1AMS' 3- _ The Dlaintifl! in error, Da-
V‘.-,6 Seville W118 llldicted for a. violation of
section (>333 0f“the Itevised Statutes, which
wovgdefl fllllli Whoever engages as princi-
pal tn all)‘ Prize-fight shall be imprisoned in
me penitentiary not more than tcn years
not lesfl than ("I9 Year.” The indictment
charges that on the 25th day of February,
A D, 1891, at the county of Athens. he “did
unlawi\1l1.\' engage as principal in an unlaw-
lul and premeditated tight and contention,
commonly called a ‘prize-tight,’ with one
Arthur Majesty, and in said fight the said
~ David Seville and Arthur ‘Majesty did each
the other unlawfully strike and bruise, and
attempt to strike and bruise, for and in con-
sideration of prize and reward." The trial
resulted in a conviction, which was followed
by the sentence of the court, and one of the
grounds upon which a reversal is sought is
that the indictment is defective. The spe-
ciiic objections made to the indictment are
that it falls to allege the fight was in public;
- that it does not negative the existence of the
facts mentioned in the proviso of section
6890 of the Revised Statutes; and that it
contains no direct averment that the ac-
cused engaged in a prize-fight.
1. in support of the first of these objec-
tions, the case of Sullivan v. State, 67 Miss.
3-16, 7 South. 2'75. is relied on, where it was
held that an indictment drawn under the
Mississippi statute of March T, 1882. making
it “unlawful for any person to engage in
prize-figliting.” in that state, was insufli-
cient, because it did not aver that the tight-
ing took place in public; the court holding
that the statute was intended to prohibit
.prize-fighting of n public character only.
“Fe are not inclined to follow that decision.
'YVhile, no doubt, it was one of the purposes
oi.’ our statute to prohibit public exhibitions
of prize-fighting, because they tend to incite
quarrels and breaches of the peace, it was,
we think, none the less its DIIYPOBQ t0 8119'
press all prize-fighting, on account of its
brutality, and consequent danger to human
life, and its demoralizing tendencies, and
pernicious efiects on the pence and good
order of society; and hence we hold it is
not an essential ingredient of the crime of
eflgagmg in 3 prize-fight, in this state, that
it take place in public. The term “prize-
.'flglit” has no technical legal meaning, The
Century Dictlona1'Y defines it "B "11 pugills-
tic encounter or boxing match for prize or
sf‘
oe‘
ot
wa;!C'I‘, ’ ’ 3 Dd he
fine it
tion. I t j S
nary s igllification
and
acter, H
nessed b_J’ "“1_ yg °l' b
2. Sect! O11
or box at fisflcumfi
span-rin,s: OI‘ boxinl? 9
out gloves; for Whie
imprisonxn en l’,
talns a prov1s0
exercises in B11-V
ietic club, if "Titre
shall have been <>bt,,,,, P
of the county 01' mayo‘.
in which the exercises
second objection $0 the 1
should, by pl'0P91‘ ave, Dd
Hlegts 9 that it
existence of the matte » neg-,1fl,.e
proviso. This objectionrsjscontalned in tgll:
It is the well-settled 1-1119 "°_t well taken,
ing that it is not necessary Illlllll-‘ll plead-
ment, to negative the existeécen an indict-
which an exception or proviso mot facts to
relates. unless the matter of the 3“-s<§a3:,t::
or proviso is descriptive of the 'o1{ens: 0,.
qualifies the language creating 1t_ 1111-1'1 v_
State, 1 Ohio St. 16. Engaging in a In-17,,-_
fight, in violation of section 6888. is a sepa-
rate and distinct offense from that defined
and punished by section 6890, and the pro-
viso qualiiies the previous clauses of the lat-
ter section, but has no application to for-
mer sections.
3. N01! do we think the indictment lacks
a direct averment that the accused engaged
as principal in a prize-right. The averment
that he engaged as principal, with another,
in an unlawful and premeditated fight, °°m'
m<>n1.v called a “p1'ize-fight." for a prize and
reward, is suflicient to. ap1n'iS(= the RCCUSEG
oi.’ the nature of the accusation, in this re-
spect. The indictment meets the l‘€<l1111'9'
ment of the rules of criminal pleudllll-5' and
appears to be drawn in accordance with the
forms long in use, and approved by well-
known authors. \Var. Grim. Law, 241; W11‘
son’s Ohio Cr. (‘ode (3d Ed.) 105; Maxw-
Cr. Proc. 230.
4. On the trial, the state gave evidence
tending to prove that Douglas Nelson and
Emil Rosser, two citizens of Nelsonville.
about the It of February, 1891, made an ur-
rangement with Seville, by which the latter
agreed to engage in a fight at Neisonville,
at a. future day to be named, with a per-“I011
not exceeding a specified weight, to be
chosen by them, for a prize of $200, to be
paid to the winner. The arrangement with
Seville was communicated to Majesty, who
at once agreed to en;-H‘-He in the fight against
Seville, which, it W-'18 flfmnged, should take
place at Nelsonville on the night ot Febru-
39
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UES GEST...E-
SE\"ILLE v. STA.TE. 
(80 N. E. 621, 49 Ohio St. 117 .) 
s~Pi:-eme Court of Ohio. l\Inr<.>h 2. l892. 
• -rl-"°.- to elrcuit court. A thens county. 
~ o.~id Seville was convl"ted of engaging 
0..,. prize-1\gbt, and brings error. AtHrmed. m- . ~~ ~- Guthrie and L. M. Jewett, for plaln-
~· 10 error. J. P. Wood, Pros. Atty., and U:, JJ. Grosvenor, for the State. 
w1t...LIAMS, J .. The plaintttr in error, Da· 
"d gevllle, Wll8 indicted for a violation of 
· ~~tloU 6888 of the U.evlsed Statutes which 
""" h .. ' :r<>vldeB t at whoev.er engages as prlncl-~ \n any prize-fight shall be Imprisoned In 
the penitentiary not more than ten years 
nor let!l8 than one year." The Indictment 
charges that on the 2Gth day of l•'ebruary, 
A. D. 1891, at the county of Athens, he "did 
unlawfully engage as prln<>ipttl In an unlaw-
ful and premeditated Hght 11n1l contenUon, 
commonly called a 'prize-fight,' with one 
Arthur Majesty, and In said fight the said 
navld Se'l"llle and Arthur Majesty did each 
the other unlawfully strike 1111d bruise, and 
attempt to strike and bruise, for and In con-
sideration of prize antl reward." The trial 
reamlted In a conviction, which was followed 
by the sent1>nce of the <-ourt, and one of the 
~rounds upon which a reversal ls sought le 
that the Indictment le defective. The spe-
cltlc objections made to the Indictment are 
that It falls to allege the fight was In public; 
· that It does not negative the existence of the 
facts mentioned ln the proviso of section 
6800 of the Revised Statutes; and that It 
contains no direct averment that the ac-
cused engngt>d In a prlze-ftght. 
1. In support of the first of these objec-
tiona, the case of Sullivan v. State, 67 Miss. 
346, 7 South. 27:>. le relled on, where It was 
held that an Indictment drawn under the 
Mississippi statute of l\larch i, 1882. making 
It "unlawful for any person to engage In 
prlze..tlghting," ln that state, was ln1mfll· 
clent, because It did not aver that the fight· 
Ing took place In public; the court holding 
that the statute was lntendl'd to Ilrohibit 
. prlze-tlgbtlng of a public character only. 
"\\re are not Inclined to follow that dt>ehdon. 
·While, no doubt, It was one of the pur1iosee 
of our statute to prohibit pbblle exhibitions 
of prtze.flghtlng, twcause they tend to Incite 
quarrels and breaches of the peaee, It was, 
we think, none the less Its purpose to sup· 
press all prize-fighting, on account of Its 
brutality, and consequent danger to human 
·life, and its demoralizing tendencies, and 
. pernicious eft'ects on the peace anti good 
order of society; anti hence we hold It Is 
not an essential ingredient of the crime or 
engaging in a prtze-ftght, In this state, that 
It take pla<!e In public. The term "prlze-
;ftght" has no technical legal meaning. The 
CE>ntury Dictionary defines It as "11 pugllis-
tlc encounter or boxing match for Prize or 
wager,..... and Ot.bel" l 
fine It: ~1 ve 1t: Bllbs~ ~~. [Oas 
tlon. I -t fs used lfl :tlt.14~·~~ e ltro. 
nary efg:nf1Jca.tJo11 Ot" 'tll~ ll~ ~l>hel'll 
rewu.rd. and Include& ft tt ~t:~/he 8alJJ it•bo dE 
acter :1:10-wever Co11~ ftll ~-llt llte 111 le de1J111 
' ny ~'-!<:- - r0 ts · 
nes11ed by :ma. 01" h t('>.CI ....... ~-Ofll l" a Pl"/. 0 rdl-
2. Section t.JB90 0~ ~ t"e • ~l:Jd or tbllt Ze or 
makes Jt:: an otre~e tJie l:Jt, Sleopthetber eliar-
any t-w-o persons to • <:-1tl1 1'ter1 e. lJ>Jt. 
or box at :tJst/cutte, :~ee e<l E111 ·~i:, Stlltut 
sparring or f>O.XllJg eJc:. t- e~~lJd IJ'J/~J'. l"a.J"," l'o~8 
out gloves; :ror ~.b~.b IJJbJt1 K"e 111 1111 " 1-0- ll1rbt 
lmpriRonin!'ZJt. Ol" botb the ::e11• lJ•Jtb;;;. PllblJc 
tains a pro,•Jso that lt . 7''- 'llafty Is 'Wltb. 
Y 8h ...,e ll11e exercises In an flu/)/f #l/J llot 8ec>tJo11 or 
letlc club, 1:r TI-"l"ltten c• R"..J·n11111,,111PPly to '::i11• 
shall have beeD Obtain Pe1·11118810:lll or atb': 
of the county or lllay0 ,. 0(1 t'rorn tb tberpror 
in whi<.'h the exel"clses or the IIJua~ shenll' 
second objection to the 1 a.re held· cfpuJtty 
.lJdJ t ' lllJd th 
should, by proper avernien c llJeat 18 that 1: 
existence of the matters cots, llegatfre the 
pro\"lso. This objection 18 ntalned In this 
It Is the well-settled rule ot not Well taken 
Ing that It Is not necessary cijmlnuJ plead: 
meot, to negative the exfste~ n an fndlct-
whlch an exc-eptlon or Pro-rfsie1 or fact11 to I t I th n a statute re a es, un ess e matter of th 1 
. e except on 
or proviso Is descrlphv<" of the offense, 01• 
qualifies the language creating ft. Hirn v. 
State, 1 Ohio St. 16. J<Jnguglng In a prl7.<•· 
fight, ln violation of seetlon tlR~. is a s<>pa-
rate and distinct ollense from that <l<>fiued 
and punished by section 6890. and tltt> tJro-
vlso qunlltles the previous clauses of the lat-
ter section, but has no application to for-
mer sections. 
3. Nor do we think the Indictment lacks 
a direct averment that the at-<•nsed engaged 
as principal In a prize-tight. The averment 
that he i>ngaged as priudpal, with another, 
In an unlJlwful and premtaflltated t\ght, com-
monly t-alletl a .. prize-tight." for a prize and 
rewartl, ls sufH<'ient to n11prl1w the accused 
of the nature of the accm~ntion, In this re-
spect. The Indictment n1PetM the requlre-
m1>11ts of the rules of crlmlunl 11leudlng, and 
appears to be drawn In aec:·ordnnce with the 
forms long In use, and apprm•ed by well-
known authors. " 'ar. C1·lm. Law, 241; \Yll-
son's Ohio Cr. Code (3d Ed.) 105; Maxw. 
Cr. Proc. 230. 
4. On the trial, the state gave evidence 
tending to prove that Douglas Nelson and 
Emil Rosser, two citizens of Nel!<Onvllle. 
about the 1st of February, 18U1, made an nr-
rangement with Seville, by -which the Jatti>r 
agreed to engage In a fight at Nelsonville, 
at a future day to be named, with a pen;on 
not exceeding a specified weight, to be 
chosen by them, for a prl:1;e of $200, to he 
paid to the winner. The arrangement with 
Seville was communicated to Majesty, who 
at once agreed to engage In the fight agnlm1t 
Seville, which, It was arrange d, should tnke 
plal.-e at Nelsonville on the night of Febru-
39 
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2-i, 1891. Wlien the agreement was
made with Seville, he did not know the
name of his adversary, nor did he learn it,
until the day set for the fight. Soon after
the details of the engagement were com-
pleted, Majesty, who resided in Toledo, went
to Nelsonvllle with his trainer, and put him-
self in training for the conflict. While
there, he wrote two letters to his friend
Alfred Stephens, which were directed and
mailed to him at Newark, Ohio, and which
were received by Stephens in due course of
mail. These letters were admitted in evi-
dence against the objection of the defendant,
and their admission, it is claimed, \vas error
for which the judgment should be reversed.
The letters are as follows:
"Nelsonvllle, 0., Feb’y 15, 1891. Friend
Alfred: Would like to have you come to
Nelsonvllle. 0., where I am matched to fight
Seville, of Columbus, for a purse of $200.00,
to a finish, with 2-oz. gloves. You can call
on Keere Bros., in the saloon business; they
will be down here. Do not tell them who I
am or that you know me, as I go under the
name of A. B. Tracy. Uur protection is
good, as we have a license. Come if you
possibly can. We fight on Feb. 2-ith. in the
evening. Will see you all right. Am in
training here. If you come this way, stop
and see me. Yours, truly, Arthur .\iajesty.
Addres A. B. 'l‘racy."
“i\'elsonviile, 0., Feb‘y 20th, 1891. Friend
Alfred: The man 1 Illeet is Seville, of Co-
lumbus, and we fight at 120 pounds for a
purse of $200.00, all to go to the winner.
Nelson and Rosser of this place are hand-
ling me. I don't anticipate any trouble in
disposing of him. John Hall. of Toledo, is
with me. You have met him before. Tick-
ets are $3.00 per head, but I will place you
all right; but do not let those people of your
town know of it. If you can, induce them
to come and see the fight.
with two-ounce gloves. in a large hall. with
a seating capacity of 800 on elevated seats
around the ring, same as all first-rate clubs.
Yours, truly, Arthur, alias A. B. Tracy."
An agreement to engage in a prize-tight is
a conspiracy to commit a crime; and the
declarations of either of the parties, written
or verbal, with reference to the common ob-
ject, or in furtherance of the criminal de-
sign, while in its prosecution, are competent
evidence against the other, although the
My
were written he and Majesty had entered
into an agreement, either personally or
through their agents, to engage in a prize-
iight, and that they were written while
Majesty was engaged in preparations for
the fight, and were in furtherance of it.
5. The defendant offered to prove in his
defense that there was an athletic club at
Nelsonvllle, where the pugilistic contest was
held, and that a license authorizing it had
been issued by the mayor of the Village;
and for that purpose the articles of the as-
sociation of the club and license of the
mayor were oflered in evidence, but ex-
cluded. The articles, which bear the date of
_l<‘t-bruary 23, 1891, state that “the under-
signed citizens of Nelsonvllle intend to es-
tablish an athletic club for the purpose of
training in wrestling, boxing, and other ath-
letic exert-ise;” they prescribe the terms of
membership, and designate the oflicers to be
chosen. The only evidence of the execu-
tion of the paper was that of a witness who
testitied that he drew it up, but there was
no proof of the signatures to it, or of any
organization under the articles. The license
offered in evidence is dated February 23,
1891, and purports to grant permission to
the Nelsonvllle Athletic Club to exhibit a
glove contest "for one day only, February
24, 1891." If the defendant had been in-
dicted for a violation of section 6890, the
evidence oifered would have been competent
and material. But such a license, to a club
of the kind mentioned, is no defense to an
indictment under section 6888. If the de-
fendant engaged in a prize-light, it was im-
material whether a license had been issued
to an athletic club for that purpose, or for
the purpose of giving a boxing exhibition,
or not. If he did not, but simply engaged in
; a sparring or boxing exhibition, he must be
It is to a finish, <
acquitted though no license was obtained.
Neither the articles of the club nor license
of the mayor was competent evidence tend-
ing to prove that what actually occurred
constituted a sparring or boxing exhibition.
At most, they tended to show that the
mayor only intended to license a boxing ex-
‘ hibition, and that the club was authorized
agreement was made through and by back- 3
ers or other representatives of the princi- I
pals. and the latter were unknown to each
other.
The letters referred to contained ;
declarations of this character; their purpose -
being to procure the presence of friends and
others at the fight, and thus encourai-ft" and
contribute to the success of the unlawful
enterprise. The court in its charge careful-
ly limited the effect of this evidence by in-
structiug the jlll" that, before it could af-
to give such exhibition; neither of which
facts was material in determining whether
what actually occurred was or was not a
prize-light.
6. The defendant called a witness who tes-
titled that he had been engaged in 52 prize-
iights and boxing matches altogether, and
had spent 6 years in acquiring the art of
boxing. He was then asked by counsel for
the defendant to state what “are the rules
that apply to a glove contest and also to a.
prize-tight.” An objection to the question
was sustained. The purpose of the question.
as stated by counsel, was to prove that by
the rules governing prize-fights there is no
limit as to the time of the rounds. the com-
fect the accused, the jury must find. beyond i batants are permitted to wrestle and throw
a reasonable doubt, that when the letters I each other, the tight is to a tinisb, the fight
40
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ary 24, 1891. When the agreement was 1 were written he and llajt'tlty had entered 
made with &>\"lllf', be did not know the ! Into an agreement, t>lthl•r persolllllly or 
name of his adwl't!tlry, nor did he lt>arn It, through their ageDts, to engage ln a prlze-
untll the day set for the ftght. Soon after i fight, and that they were written while 
the details of the engagement were com- Majesty was engaged In preparations for 
pleted, llajt>sty, who n-shled In Tolt>do, went : the fight, 11011 were ln furtherance of It. 
to NelR<>nvllle with his traint>r, and put him- · 5. The defendant offered to prove In his 
self In training for the conflict. While , defense that there was an athletic club at 
there, he wrote two letters to hl11 friend NelllOnYlllt>, where the pugilistic contest was 
Alfred StephenK, whi<'h were dlrt><'tt>d and 1 held, and that a license authorizing It bad 
malled to him at Xt>wark, Ohio, and which ' been issued by the wayor of the villal(e; 
were re<-elved by 8tepheDB in due t•ounie of and for that purpose the articles of the U-
mali. These letters were admitted In evl- soclation of the club and llc.-ense of the 
denee against the ohjectlon of the defendant, mayor we1-e olfered lo evidence, but ex-
and their admission, It ls claimed, was error c•luded. The articles, which bear the date of 
for which the judgment should be reyel'8t'd., . l<'ebruary 23, 1891, state that "the under-
Tbe letters are as follows: Klgnt>d dtlzens of Nelsonville intend to es-
"Xelaonville, 0., Feb'y 15, 1891. 1''rlend tabll11h an athletic club for the purpose of 
Alfred: Would Uke to have you come to training in wrestling, boxing, and other ath-
Nelsonville, 0., where I am matched to ftgbt letlc t'Xt>rdse;" they prescribe the terms of 
Seville, of Columbus, for a purse of ,200.00, wt>mber11hlp, and designate the oftkers to be 
to a tlnlsh, with ~. gloves. You can call <'hoKeu. The only evidence of the execu-
on Keere Bros., In the saloon buslne1111; they 1 tlon of the paper was that of a witness who 
will be down here. Do not tell them who I testified that he drew It up, but there was 
am or that you know me, as I go under the ! no proof of the signatures to It, or of any 
name of A. B. Tracy. Our prote<'tlon ls organization under the articles. The license 
good, as we have a UcenBf'. Come if you offered In evidence ls dated l<'ebruary 23, 
possibly can. We fight on l<'eb. 24th. In the 18Dl, and purports to grant permission to 
evening. Will see you all right. Am 1n the Nelsonvllle Athletic Club to exhibit a 
training here. If you come this way, stop glove <'Ontest "for one day only, February 
and see mP. Yours, truly, Arthur llnjesty. 24, 18Ul.'' If the defendant bad been ln-
Address A. B. Tracy." dieted for a violation of section 6890, the 
"Nelaonvllle, 0., l<'eb'y 20th, 1891. 1''rlend evldenc.-e olfered would have been competent 
Alfred: The man I meet is Seville, of Co- and material. But such a license, to a club 
lumbus, and we fight at 120 pounds tor a of the kind mentioned, ls no defense to an 
purse ot $200.00, all to ftO to the winner. indictment under section OR88. If the de-
:Selson and Rosser of thl8 place are hand- fendant engaged in a prize-fight, it was im-
Ung me. I don't anticipate any trouble In , material whether a license bad been Issued 
disposing of him. John Hall, of '.folf'llo, Is j to an athletic club for that purpose, or for 
with me. You haYe met him 1M>fo1~. Tick- : the purpose of giving a boxing exhibition, 
ets are $3.00 1>er head, but I wlll pla<'t- you or not. If he did not, but simply engaged in 
all right; but do not let those )>eople of your : a sparring or boxing exhibition, he must be 
town know of It. If you <·an, llllluc·e tht>m , a<'qultted though no license was obtained. 
to come and see the fight. It Is £o a finish, Neither the articles of the club nor license 
with two-ounce gloveK. In a largt> ball, with of the mayor was competent evidence tend-
a seating c.ap1l<'lty of 800 Oil elevated K!'lltS Ing to prove that what actually occurred 
around the ring, same as all first-rah• t•lubs. constituted a sparring or boxing exhibition. 
Yours, truly, Arthur, alias A. B. Trat·y." ' At wost, they tended to show that the 
An agreement to engage In a prize-tight ts mayor only Intended to license a boxing cx-
a conspiracy to commit a crlmt>; and the hibltlon, and that the club was authorized 
de<'lamtions of elthPr of the parties, written to give su<'h exhibition; neither of whl<•h 
or verbal, with reference to the common ob- facts was material In determining whether 
je<·t, or In furtherance of the criminal de- wllat a<'tually tx.'curred waa or was not a 
sign, while ln Its prosecution, are <•om11ett>nt prize.fight. 
evldt!Dce against the other, although the 6. The defendant called a witness who tea-
agrf'l'ml'nt was made through and by bat·k- tlfted that he bad been engaged In 52 prize-
1'1'8 or other ?t'J>reKentath·t'8 of tht> 11rln<'i- tights and boxing matches altogether, and 
pals, and the latter were unknown to 1'1u·h had spent 6 year11 in acquiring the art of 
otlwr. The letters reft>rrPd to t•onh1lne1l boxing. He was then asked by counsel for 
dt>t•lurntlons of thl11 cham<'tt>r; their 1mrpose the defendant to state what "are the rules 
lM>lng to procure the preKelll'l' of frlt•u\111 uml that apply to a glove contest and also to & 
others at the ftgllt, and thus E'lll'OUragt> and prize-fight." An objection to the question 
<'ontrlhute to the succeRS of the uuluwtul 1 was sustained. The purpose of the question, 
entE>rprlse. The court In its charge careful- as stated by counsel, was to pl'Ove that hy 
ly lln1lted the effect of this evidence by in- the rules governing prize-tights therl• 111 no 
structlng the jury that, beforet It could af- limit as to the time of the round!'. th«- rom-
tect the accused, the jury must tlnd, l>l•yond hatants are Jit•nnltted to wn•l4tll' and throw 
a reasonable doubt, that when the letters I each other, the ttght i11 to a lillhsh, the tlght 
'° 
BES GES'1‘.£E.
is
in“? g‘m"esv and spikes are worn in
M 9, while the rules governing glove
tilt *"gt5 1'e‘\“"e the Parties to wvear ;.:lo\'es_.
<-wlieg 111 the 511008 are not allowed. the
spill-es ends at the conclusion of a specified
muted and each round is lirnited in point of
\‘°““ £0 three mh1\1t98- The witness further
iiileifled thflt he Saw the combat between
‘R: degefld”-“t and 1\,I11ic-sty, and was then
asked by defendant S counsel whether it
condflfited aceofding to the rules of a.
ontefl or those or a. prize-fight. This
n was objected to, and the objection
ed. The counsel stated they expect-
witness to answer that it was con-
(mcted according to the rules of a glove con-
‘est Tpereupon the vvitness was handed a
coup“ or papers, one of which he said con-
m-med the Queonsberry rules, and the other
me London prize ring rules. These papers
were then ofl‘.e1'ed in evidence by defendant's
cmmsel, but they were held to be int-ompe~
tent These several rulings of the court are
assigned for error.
The question to be determined by the
Jury was whether what took place between
the defendant and liriajesty, at the time and
place charged in the indictment, was a
prize-tight. The witnesses for the state. and
for the defense, testified in detail to what
occurred on that occasion, and there was
but little, it any, substantial conflict in the
testimony. lt showed, beyond any doubt,
that the combatants met in the ring pre-
pared for the purpose, in pursuance of the
agreement previously made, and fought vi-
ciously to’ a finish. They fought 17 rounds,
and on the eighteenth Majesty was knocked
reeling to the ropes, and carried away in a.
-dazed and unconscious condition, and in a
few hours afterwards died from the effect
of the blows received. The post mortem
-examination disclosed that his vital organs
, by
were in 11- Dealt _ all
skull xva S fra ct!“ ed by so I1
an artery’ of the brai otlgllq
11
ed his de:1t11- His boa;
his bod.\' S110 \rPl1 the 88' 11@(_b€.~q
he had re‘-eI\'¢"1' 0119 VQ
nose cut, his mouth Q-"Q
swollen, and dthe D113.anG “'#l,g b
blows; and yet "D to -
say Seville’S Punisbllze the 1,1 111'” a
than that ad£r11'nI5t91'ed t was eymuqd
Majesty was (331119 ,
from the sc-e119 or the
money was paid over t collfljet, ‘"7 dyjng
parted by the fll'8t t1'&11;_ O S@r'111e
The question for the J“ ' ' ° de.
whether this combat wasp‘, to deem
what the Ql19€'1lSb€I'1'y ml: P1'1Ze_13
rules called it, nor What
tomed to such combats have )
was it, in plain English? An‘; t .
of tact, under a proper lnstmc his qu
court as to what constitutes
the Jury was as competent to
most experienced boxer
The question was not one ofoslkillirz-e;£.%g,t§g'
to be decided upon the opinions 0} ¢1.0'sé
experienced in such practices, or by rules
adopted for the government of association;
of Bllch P91301155 but one within the com-
name
“°11 frofitggg
*1 prize-fight,
decide as the
'prehension of the common understanding,
and the range of common knowledge, which
the jury could decide upon the facts proven,
as well as a professional pugilist $03116
other questions are made in the record. but
they are not of suflicient importance to Cull
for a report. VVe have carefully clianiincli
the whole record, and find no error for
which the judgment should be reversed.
Judgment aflirmed.
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UES GEST& 
.. ,.,1t i;lo\·es, and s1>lkes are worn tn 
11 "'''''~tti whlle the rules governing itlove 
\he i;1l1'.... require the parties to -wear .rlo\'es ~ ~ ' 
<'\)utt> 10 the shoes are not allowed, the 
gp\tes t ellds at the (,"<>nc.-lusion of a spe1·lfte1l 
f'l)ntei;I 11-lld each round is Umitell ln point o! rouB0~0 tbree minutes. The witness rurtht>r 
t\me ed that he saw the combat between test\~efendant and Majesty. and was then 
tlle ed l>Y de!endant's counsel whether tt 
as~ 011ducted according to the rules o! a 
wa• c c0ntest or those of a prlze-flght. '.l'bls 
g\ovedoll WIUI objected to, and the objection 
l\Ue& tned· The counsel stated they ex1wct- I 
sustn t ~ tbe -witness o answer that it was con-
ducted according to the ruleR of a glOl·e con-
test. Thereupon the ""·i tness wns handed a 
<.'OUple of paper11, one of whh:h he said con-1 
ta\ned tbe Qul!l•nli<berry rules, and the other 
the London prl7.e ring rult>s. These 11n1.1ers 
were then offered in evidence by defendant's 
counl!el, but they wt•re held to be lm·ompe-
teut. These several rullngs of the court are 
assigned for error. 
The question to be determined by the 
jury was whether what took place between 
the defendant and Majesty, at the tlme and 
place charged in the indictment, was a 
prlze-ftght. The wltnes1-<t>S for the Rtah•, and 
for the defense, testified In detail to what 
<>ccnrred on that occasion, nnll tlwre was 
but little, If any, substantial conttlct In the 
testimony. It showed, beyond any doubt, 
t:bat the combatants met in the ring pre-
pared for the purpose, In pursuance of the 
.agreement previously made, and fought vl-
-clously to a ftnlsh. They fought 17 rounds, 
:and on the eighteenth Majesty was knOl'ked 
n-ellng to the ropes, ancl carried away In a 
duze<l and unconscious condition, and in a 
few hours afterwards died from the etrect 
-ot tile blows received. The post mortem 
-examination dlsclosed that bis vital organs 
I _.... beaJtby ll"".ra . were n ~ ~..... [ , 
skull was ~~~:~~bl>" :Ql•~«t c,._,e }10• 1 
an artery- o HI ll) .t- -t.t~ C'o S 
ed his d«?S. th- 8 hea<'I trbt o.r t]J IJd/tJolJ 
his bocl~- sh<> ~ed the • -t.t ll1-~<l e blo~ · lits 
be had recel ved. Oll(l> El~\>~ ~C·Jc. ' lr1J1t'b 8' alJd 
nose cut;p .blB .rnDllt.f! e..l·~ l'-lt.l'" ::e lllllJ caus-
11wollen, and :h: llbl'":~<'I ,;'·~ta b11/be bi01!:.d 
neck, ar.rn, a.D dlJ0 <JJ>" "9 c·1~~ lJ& b'°llleked, hJs11 
!rom bru12'1eB pro C'~ b el-e ~ Ila;- "E-VJ alJd 
describe the blO~lJ lft ~ b1 bJac}( tli1tt hl bl~ws; and ye~ UJ> to l°llc.-1c 0 ll·11. ~lJd bJue8 
say Seville's puzil81J.1llell tlJe l4slil11J a11 trie1111et1 
than that udnilDlBtel°ed t "'°as t "°ll.tJ<J. hitter 
Majesty was carried, d/0 llrrv~:e.IJ g;eati;:: 
!row the scene or the ~ bJed Y. ll'h 
money waM paid 0 l'er t eolltlJc·t arid d.FJri;11 
p1u-ted by the first tl"aJlJ. 0 Ser-111;, ~e Prize' 
The queKtlon ~or the Ju bo de. 
whether tbls combat l\'a.s 1:J'" to dee/de 
what the Queensberry. ....1 a Pr/ze-llgbt,' Was 
•u ~ or not 
rules called It, nor What ll&llJe any other 
towed to such combAts hal·e 1 , those accus-
was it, In plain Engllsh? A.n~ 't:n It. lVhnt 
o! !act, under a proper fnstruetJ ls Question 
court as to what constitutes a on from the 
the jury was as competent t prfze..tlght, 
o decide th 
most experleneed boxer or prl .. as1 e Tb ti ze-,,g iter. 
e ques on was not one of skill or science, 
to be decided upon the o:pfnJons or those 
experienced Jn such practice&, or by rules 
adopted for the government of aseoclatJons 
of such 1>e1·sons; but one within the com-
. prehenslon o! the common understanding, 
and the range of common knowledge, which 
the jury could decide upon the facts proven, 
as well as a professional puglllst. So'we 
other questions are made In the record, but 
they aro not of sufllclent Importance to call 
for a report. We have carefully examined 
the whole record, and ftnd no error for 
which the judgment should be reversed. 
Judgment amrmed. 
Case .\'o. 14]
RELEVANCY.
(.‘().\[i\IOXWEALTH v. BRADFORD.
(126 Mass. 42.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Hampshire. Nov. 18, 1878.
Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire
county; Gardner, Judge.
G. R. Train, Atty. Gen., for the Common-
wealth. C. Delano, for defendant.
COLT, J’. The defendant was indicted for
willfully and maliciously burning a. building
belonging to his two sons. The second count
in the indictment charges an intent thereby
to defraud the insurer. At the trial evidence
was admitted in support of the indictment,
against the defendant's objection, tending to
prove that the defendant set fire to the same
mill a few nights before, and that the lire
was then discovered and extinguished by a
neighbor.
The evidence was competent on the ques-
tion of the intent with which the defendant
subsequently bu1'ned the building. and com-
mitted the offense for which he was then
tried. It was carefully limited to the slu-
gle purpose for which it was competent. The
unsuccessful attempt to do the same thing, a
few days before, was evidence that the burn-
ing was willful and intentional, and not the
result of accident or negligence on the part
of the defendant. It was suiiicientiy near
to the time of the commission of the offense
charged to justify the inference that the de-
fendant then had a settled purpose in regard
to it. It is a rule of criminal law that evi-
dence tending to prove a similar but distinct
offense, for the purpose of raising an infer-
ence or presumption that the accused com-
mitted the particuiar act with which he is
charged, is not admissible. But there was
no invasion of this rule in the admission of
this evidence. The intent and disposition
with which one does a particular act must be
ascertained from his acts and declarations be-
fore and at the time; and when a previous act
indicates an existing purpose, which, from
known rules of human conduct, may fairly be
presumed to continue and control the defend-
ant in the doing of the act in question, it is
admissible in evidence. In many cases it is
the only way in which criminal intent can be
proved; and the evidence is not to be reject-
ed because lt might also prove another crime
42
against the defendant. The practical limit
to its admission is that it must he suliiciently
significant in character, and sufllciently near
in point of time, to afford a presumption that
the element sought to be established existed
at the time of the commission of the offense
charged. The limit is largely in the discre-
tion of the judge. and no error in law is here
apparent.
The case at liar is not distinguisluible up-
on this point from Com. v. .\l"c(‘artli_\'. iii)
Mass. 354, where, on the question of intent,
the government was permitted to show that
the defendant a few days before set tire to-
a shed, ten feet distant from the building
burned, and connected therewith by a flight
of steps. The defendant in that case was-
the owner of the building burned. while in
this case the defendant had conveyed the
property to his sons, subject to his mortgage,
which was paid in part from the avails of the-
insurance upon it. It is sufficient that under
the second count the jury in this case must
have found that the defendant willfully burn-
ed the building with intent to injure the in-
surer, and this is enough, whether he owned
the building or not; and besides. the evi-
dence was admissible Without reference to
the alleged intent to injure the insurer. See,
also. Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111.
'.l‘he testimony of the defendant taken at the
flre inquest was clearly admissible. it is ob-
jected “that a judicial oath administered
when the mind is agitated and disturbed by
a criminal charge, or by suspicion of Clima-
may prevent free and voluntary mental ac-
tion.” But this objection, if there is any-
thing in it, is not sust111I1¢’d 11$ *1 matter °f
fact. for there is nothing in the case to show
that he was, at the time his testimony W118
given, proceeded against criminnii.\'- 01' “"13
then under suspicion of ('i'i|ne. Th!’ 19$“-
mony was given voluntarily. and its weiixht
must depend upon the circuuistauccs under
which it was given. Com. v. Kins. 8 Gray,
501; Com. v. Reynolds, 122 Muss. 454-
The defendant's conversation with the in-
surance broker in January. in which he sull-
gested that there shouid he an incl‘Pll$8 of
insurance. taken in connection with his lia-
bility 011 the mortgage note which the $0118
had agreed to assume. tended to slmw will
he had a pecuniary interest in the insurance,
and a motive to commit the offense charged-
Com. v. Hudson, 97 Mass. 565.
Exceptions overruled.
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CMe :So. 14] RELE\T ANCY. 
CO~OIOXWEALTH v. BRADJ.<"'ORD. 
(126 )lau. 42.) 
Supremt> Judlclal Court of Ma11811<'hWM.'tt11. 
Hampehlre. Nov. 18, 18i8. 
Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire 
county; Gardner, Judge. 
C. R. Tl"aln, Atty. Gen., for the Common· 
wealth. C. Delano, tor defendant. 
COLT, J. Tht> defendant was Indicted tor 
willfully and ma.lll'lously burtllng a building 
belonging to his two sons. The second count 
In the Indictment charges an Intent thereby 
to defraud tbe Insurer. At the trial evidence 
was admitted In support of the Indictment, 
against the defendant"s objection, tending to 
prove that the defendant set ftre to the same 
mlll a few nights before, and that the fire 
was then discovered and extinguished by a 
neighbor. 
The evidence was competent on the ques· 
tlon ot the Intent with which the defendant 
subsequently burned the building. and com-
mitted the olrense for which he was then 
tried. It was c8l"efully limited to the sin-
gle purpose for which It was competent. The 
unsuccessful attempt to do the same thing, a 
few days before, was evidence that the burn-
ing was wtlltul and Intentional, and not the 
result of accident or negligence on the part 
of the defendant. It was sulttclently near 
to the time of the commission of the olrense 
charged to Jm1tlfy the Inference that the de-
fendant then bad a settled purpose In regard 
to It. It Is a rule of criminal law that evi-
dence tending to prove a similar but distinct 
offense, tor the purpose of raising an Infer· 
ence or presum11tlon that the accused com-
mitted the partleular act with which he ls 
charged, Is not admissible. But there was 
no Invasion of this rule In the allmlsslon of 
this evidence. The Intent and disposition 
with which one does a particular afi must be 
ascertained from his acts and d~lnratlons be-
fore and at the time; and when a previous act 
lndlcatt>s an existing purpost>, which, from 
known ntles of human conduct, may fairly be 
presumed to continue and control the defend• 
ant In the doing of the act In question, It ls 
admissible In evlden<;e. In many <'ases It ls 
the only way In which criminal Intent can be 
proved; and the evidence Is not to be reject-
ed because It might also prove another crime 
42 
against the defendant. The 11ra<'tlml limit 
to Its admlBSlon Is that It must he sumclently 
slgnlft<'Bnt In character, and 1mdi<•lently nt>tt r 
In point of time, to afford a p~umptlon that 
the element sought to be estabrlshed existed 
at the time of the commlMBlon of the offe~l'­
charged. The limit ls largely In the <lls<'r<'-
tlon of the judge, and no error In law Is hert.'-
apparent. 
The caae at bar Is not distinguishable up. 
on this point from Com. v. ll"cC'arthy. 111> 
M888. 354, where, on the question of Intent~ 
the government WBB permitted to show that 
the defeudant a few days before set ftre to. 
a shed, ten feet distant from the bulldlD~ 
burned, and <'Olllle<'ted thert>wlth by a ftlght 
of steps. 'rhe defendant In that <'B&e was. 
the owner of the building burned. while In 
this l'8se the defendant had l'Onveyed tbe 
property to hie eont1, subJe<>t to his mortJCllge, 
which was paid in part from the avails of tb~ 
ln11umm•e upon It. It Is suftlclent that under-
the second count the jury In this case must 
have found that the defendant willfully burn-
ed the building with lntl'nt to Injure the In-
surer, and this Is enough, wheth('r he owned 
the building or not; an<l besides. the l'Vi-
dence was adml1'18lble without reft'l"t'nce to. 
the alleged Intent to Injure the Insurer. See, 
also. Thayer v. Thayer, 101Mass.111. 
The testimony of the defent'lant taken 11t the-
ftre Inquest was clearly admleslble. It ls ob-
jected "that a judMlll oath 11<lmlnl11tcred 
when the mind Is agitated and (llsturbed by 
a criminal <'harge, or by suspicion of crime~ 
may prevent free and voluntary mental ac-
tion." But this objectl~n. It there ls any-
thing In It, Is not sustained as a matter of' 
fact, for there Is nothing In the t•1111e to show 
that he was, at the time his tt>11timony wa$ 
gh·en, proceeded against t•rlmlu111ly. or was 
then under suspicion of <'rlmt>. The tE'fltl-
mony was given voluntarily, aud it11 Wl'htht 
must depend upon the clrcumMt11u<·e11 undt-i-
whlch It was given. Com. v. King. 8 Gray, 
l".01; Com. v. Reynolds, 122 Mass. ~14. 
The defendant's l'onversatlon with the In-
surance broker In January, In which he sug. 
gested that there should be an lm·rt>at1e of' 
lnsuran<'e, taken In connt'('tion with his lia-
bility on the mortlCftge note which the sons. 
had agrt>f'd to assume. tended to show that 
he bad a pecuniary lnterf'l!t In the Insurance~ 
and a motive to commit the otrense charged_ 
Com. v. Hudson, 97 :Mass. 565. 
Exceptions overruled. 
FACTS snowmo 1,l‘OBl\_ I3 LE
0,\'\\'i~:A1.'rn \-. 'rn1~:1-‘1-1'1-H1.;_\~ ,, ,,1_
_cu.\1'-‘ (31 .\:. E. 91:1, 15': Mass. 180.)
S\1P1'efl,e).{i‘:l(5iil£::G.}X.Co“rt of Masaach“smB'
Och 20. 1892.
E$(_ept\°n3 fmm $\1Derior court, hliddlcsex
is-
wilfdictlllem agilillélt J nines Albert 'l‘refe-
and William H. Sniith for the murder
e11eIl9~ H- Dav“ by drowning. There
M pa vefilifl 01 guilty as to 'i‘refethen,and
‘M guiliy 55 t0 Smith. Defendant Trefe-
me“ 9;;c9lm‘¢1- and asked that the case be
‘W0,-@911 (0 t-hiS"court for determination.
\,“dk.t against irefethen set aside,
A, E- Pm“\““'5'» Att3'- Gem, for the Com-
mol1\\'BB1fl1- 301111 D. Long and Wm. Scho-
fiexm for defendants.
FIELD, 9- 1- The principal exception is
to the refusal of the court to admit the testi-
mgny of Sarah L. Hubert. The exceptions
redte that: "Sarah L. Hubert, a witness
called in behalf of the defendant, testiiied
that her business, which she advertised in
the newspapers, was that of :1 trance medi-
um; that on December 22, 1891. in the tore-
noon, after 10 o’clock, a young woman called
at her place of business in Boston for con-
sultation. There was sufficient evidence to
go to the jury of her identification as Del-
tena J. Davis. Upon objection being made
to the testimony of this witness, counsel for
the defendants stated to the court, aside I
from the jury, that they offered to prove
by this witness that at the interview on
December 22d, the young woman aforesaid
stated to the witness that she was five
months pregnant with child, and had come
to consult as to what to do, and added later
in the interview that she was going to
drown herself. The court -refused to ad-
rnit the testimony, and the defendants duly ‘
‘ excepted." The exceptions also recite that
“the evidence offered in behalf of the com-
monwealth was wholly circumstantial, and
tended to show that on December 23, 1891.
Deltena J. Davis left her home in Everett
at about 7 o'clock in the evening. and was
last seen on the corner of Ferry street and ‘
Broadway, which is near her home in said l
Everett, at about 25 minutes of S, the same L
evening. On the 10th day of January, 1892, I
her dead body was found in the Mystic
river, a short distance below the Welling-
ton bridge, about three miles from her l
home. There were no marks of violence
on the body when found. 11°!‘ W118 there any
evidence that poison had been administered, I
nor did her clothing show any signs of
vio1ence_ 0 1 1 The physicians called in
behalf of the commonwealth testified that ,
the cause of death was drowning. and that.
from the stage which digestion had l‘ea(-l1¢=,d_
death occurred between two and One-half
and three and one-half hours after the 419-
ceased had eaten her last meal. There
was evidence that the deceased ate her sup-
, to be unworthy 01' serious (,0
§
CAUS_E_
’ 109k
per about 5 0 C
1-ember -_2.‘3(l, 1:11?! lib [C385 N-
food f()Il1.l(1 er thgfi °- 1.
with thznt Which 11‘ st!) 11
that ixiea 1- q‘he dezpaa QJQQ Dart]? g of De
and at the tifll“ °l' hfii-s
with a 1111119 child. 'l_
months a4.lv'11l1¢'ed 111
The defendzlllts "°l1r.,“ ...,
out objection. that 81 "90
ced in behalf 01' the
reasonably cunslstght
the deceased 6'31"“ to
There was eVid"“('@
negative the Circunlst
the cu nun on \vPll1, $11,
theory of suicide-
At the ar;.rllll1*’"t in
ney general asked that
amount of evidPl1¢"‘ f(-“(in
theory of suicide Should ‘*7 to s
court to be important, the 8
be amended so as to 81,0 X
this evidence was; and 1,
in his opinion. this evidence was
9 lnth
so i<|l'R‘ht as
\\'e understand that by -~ev|d(,n€§ff1""“"°l1-
torney general meant dlfgvt ew-
. d - -
lug to prove suicide. “'ithout @f,?,§Yd,t§-3,:
what remedy, if any, is open to the attor-
. ney gPneral in a criminal case ‘\'h(-‘If? (‘here
is a reason to suppose that the PXC(sl)t[()u5
taken by the defendant and allowed by the
court are not sufliciently full, we are of
opinion that in the present case the facts
are such that suicide would naturally sug-
gest itself as a possible explanation of the
cause of death. and that, if it be $1119 that
the direct evidence tending to prov? Blllvide
is inconsiderable, yet the circumstances af- 1
forded evidence in support of the theor}' Of i
suicide which must be considered by the _ 1
1l1I'y- The amendment, therefore, if it We"? ‘
made. and were of the character suggested-
would afford no aid to the court in determln- ‘
mg the questions of law raised by the ex"
ceptious. I
A few minor suggestions of the attorney .
general may be briefly disposed of. There j
was evidence on the part of’ the common-
wealth that the deceased dirl not leave 1191‘
home on the 22d of I)ece|nher until 3 o'clock
in the afternoon, and that she returned
home between 8 and 9 o'clock, and the at-
torney general argues Illilt “this furnishes
sufliclent reason for the exclusion of the
evidence" offered "in the discretion oi.’ the
court." But the jury might have disbe-
ileved this evidence of the (‘\)1]]l]l0ll\\'Pilltll,
or. if they believed it, might also have bv.
iieved that the deceased had the im,,1-View
with Sarah L. Hubert in the aft;-11]()()[1,
rather than in the for-enoon, of December
'.".!d. The attorney 5-'1'l1<‘"ll also argues
"that the statement was so renwte 111 point
Of time from the disallilearance and death
of Tena Davis that it was within the dis-
cretion ot the court 110 eX<3lnde it for this
43
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FA.CTS SIIOWDlG PROBA 9..£.,..E CAUS,:e. 
5 o•cJoe1-f.'j.0:'\WEAI.TH , .. TREl•'l<~'rHRX tt al. 
CO~ • (.:Jl ~. E. 001, 1tY7 ~lase. 180.) 
per al><>-..:S 'f:: nd ~ ~~ r 
cember 28d.. ~ .... tlittt l:~ l Caae .'V, 
food 1.'~'-I~d "e.t- t:~ ~ e o. J, ~e .J.udicial Court. of ~[nBRachmlt'tts. s~Pre llultlll'Sex. OL-t. 20, 1892 . 
P tlons from superior court Mlddle1wx ESce ' 
pt~­
cou d\ctlllent against J tunes Albert Trt>te-
111 nud Wllllam H. Sniith for the murder 
t~e~enena H. Davis by drowning: There 
~as a ""Y"erdkt of gnll ty as to Treft>tben ,and 
t gulltY as to ~mltb. "Defendant Trefe-
~~en e~ceptE'd, and aRkell that tlw <"R&e be 
rted to this C'OUrt for tlete1·111luutlon. ~~d\ct against 'l'refethen set a1.dde. 
A. E. Plll11lmry, Atty. Gen .• for the Com-
mo~wealth. John D. Long and Wm. Scho-
field, for deft>nllants. 
FIELD, C. J. The principal exception Is 
with tbaA. t -vtrbfch Jt ~ &1->.t:Q ~ ~ellilJg 
that nae-.,..1. ':rhe cl~'t,;i, "t lt~ll 11:/J' dJ or l>p_ 
and at t:.be tfn.Jt• or h~~&~<t~&"tltJ col'l'es 'llestf'd 
with a. n:ia.Je child. 1· <t 'fy,'4lf'd 8/Je "::.:df>d 
months a.c.Jva.nced 11.1 t;.:lJ.cl. ~ti> w 'lllllJJarl'J. llt 
1'he derend.nnts co.ntell ~ ~t ""~8 118 /Jl'plrll ecJ, 
out obJe~t:Jon. tba.t a11 fleq ~ te or llbout flll.IJt 
ced ln bebal£ o£ tbe t1Je ll.11<1 a,.::,re1:111111<';'~ 
reasonably cu.uslstl'lJt <-'01-0 el'lde11C"e ;d. »·Ith.' 
the deeeased canie to J:"lt1t ;:011n·f!ll/t~trodu­
'l'here was evJdeZJC•e J e1· d e theo ""llB 
nt>gntive the clrcUto8t~ t-Oe ! 4 th by ~1:. 1that 
· • a.It/ «lJ(.• «IJe t I(' de 
till' l~UWIUOU '" p ,, l, llnd es re/fed PlJdf11g to' 
theory of tiukfde. to UJ>o11 0 
.At the ar,..,..uuent In to 8 u1'J.>ort th'; 
ney general nsked tliut 1" COun tb 
amount of evfdeD<.-P t('Ild/ It' the ki:d 11.ttor-
tht'tlQ' of sukJde sl1011J<1 ~ to support ~id 
t•ourt to be Important, the tho11;.:bt by the 
be amt-nded so as to sbo:.xc•t'J>tlous .rnlgh: 
this evldetlC'e was; lllld be 1 t>xactl;y w11at 
iu bis opinion. this l'l"ldence wntliuated that, 
to he unworthy of Herfous as so l.-llight as 
'Ye undt-rstnnd that by "e •J 1 C'OOsJclPmtlon. 
-lfPU<•t>" I t 
t.ot'Ilt>Y genl!rnl meant dlrel•t evJd t •e 11 • 
. • euce tend-ing to prove sul<'lde. VI ftbout consldt-rlng 
to the refusal ot tl1e eourt to admit tht' teiitl· 
mony of 8arah L. Hubert. The exct•ptlons 
recite that: "Snrah L. llulwrt, a wlttwBB 
called ln behalf of the defendant, tPstlftetl 
that her business, which tihe nch·ertlsed In 
the newspapers, was that of a trnnct' medi-
um; that on December 22, 18Ul. lo tbt> fore-
noon, after 10 o'clm•k, a young womnn 1·nllE'd 
at her place of buKlne- In Boston for con-
sultation. There ·was sutftcleut evidence to 
go to tbe jury of her ldentUicatlou as DPl-
tena J. Davis. Upon objection being made 
to the testimony of thit1 witness, counsel for 
the defendants statt>d · to the <'Ourt, as:de 
from the jury, that they otfned to proye 
by this witness that at the Interview on 
December 22d, the youug woman aforesaid 
stated to the witness that she was ftve 
months pregnant with child, and had come 
to CODllUlt as to what to do, and nd<led later 
in the Interview that she was going to 
drown herself. Tbe court -rt>fm;ed to ad-
mit the testimony, and the defendants duly 
(>Xcepted." The ex<:'eptlons al80 recite that 
''the evidence ofl'.ered In behalf ot the l'Om· 
monwealtb was wholly circumstantial, and 
tPnded to show that on December 23, HlSU. 
Df>ltena .J. Davis left her home In Evel'Ptt 
at about i o'clol'k in the evening, and was 
lo.st 11een on the corner of Ferry street und ' 
Broadway, which ls near her home In Mid 
Everett, at about 25 minutes of 8, the 11ame 
e•enlng. On the 10th day of .Jammry, 18!.I:!, 
her dead body was found lu the Mystic 
river, a short distance below the 'Velllng-
ton bridge, about three miles from ht>r 
home. There were no marks or vlolenct> 
on the body when found, nor was there any 
evldi>nce that poison had been admlnistt-n•d, i 
nor did her clothing Rhow any slgnti of 
violence. • • • The physicians enllt-cl in l 
behalf ot the commonwenlth testified that , 
the cause of death was drowning, and thut, 
from the stage whkh digt>Ktlon bad ren<'11ed. 
death occurred between two and one-halt 
and three and one-half hounc after the de-
ceaaed bad eaten her last meal. There 
WIUI evidence that the deceased ate her sup. 
what remedy, ft any, ls open to the uttm·-
uey general In a criminal case wb~r. ... tlwi·e 
Is a reason to suppose that thP excPJltlon11 
1 tuken hy the detPndant and allowe-d by the 
1 (:ourt are not sulticlently tnll, we are of 
opinion that In the present cHse the f1t<'b1 
are such that suicide would nntnrn Uy sug-
gest lttielt as a possible explanation of the 
cunse of death. and tbnt, if lt ht' true that 
the direct evldPnce tending to p1·ovt> sn~c·lde 
ls lnconsldern ble, yet the clrcuin11tiu1ct>s af-
forded evident·e in support of th:e theory of 
suicide which must be con~ldered by the 
jury. The amendment, therefore, If It were 
made, and wert- of the character suggested. 
would utford no aid to the court In tletermln-
lng the qut>stJons of law raised by the ex-
ceptions. 
A few minor suggestions of the n ttomey 
general mny be brleft~· disposed of. Thert> 
Wll8 t'Vldt>lll't' OU tilt' pnrt of the (~OlllWOU· 
Wl'llltb tlmt the dt>ce1u•ed did not leave her 
home on tht• :!:!d of Ut-i·t>mht•r until 3 o'clock 
In the afternoon, and that she returned 
home betw(•eu 8 and II o'do<·k, and the at· 
torney gt-nt>1·ul argueH that .. this furnishes 
sultident reuson fo1· the f'X<"luidon ot the 
evhlt>m•e'' oll'l'red "lo tht> dli,1<"retlon of the 
court.'' But the jury ml~ht have dlshe· 
lle\"t'tl thll:I l'Vhlt'IU'P of tht• ("OlJ)DIOUWPlllth, 
or, if tlw~· lwli1•ved It, might also have bt'· 
lleved thut the deceased had t:he interview 
with 8arah J,, Hubert In the aftPrnoon. 
rnther than In th:e foreuoon, of Del·ember 
:!:!d. Tht' attornt>~· A"Plll'l'll l also argues 
"thnt tht> stntemt>ut wu11 RO remote In point 
of tlnw from tlw dil<llppeura.uce and dPath 
ot Tena. Davis tbat It was Within the dis-
cretion of the court to exclude It for this 
e 
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reason." When evidence of declarations of
any person is oifered for the purpose of
showing the state of mind or intention of
that person at the time the declarations
were made, the declarations undoubtedly
"may be so remote in point of time, or so
altered in import by subsequent change in
the circumstances of the maker, as to be
wholly immaterial, and wisely to be reject-
ed by the judge." It has been many times
said that “some limit must, of course, be
had in applying practically the rules which
govern the admission oi’ this evidence."
This subject is considered in Com. v. Ab-
bott, 130 Mass. 472. and in the cases there
cited. There is undoubtedly a discretion to
be exercised by the judge or judges presid-
ing at the trial in the admission or rejection
of this kind of evidence; but it is not an
absolute discretion, and the exercise of it,
when the facts appear, may be reversed by
this court. if the declaration, evidence of
which was oifered in the present case, had
been made by the deceased two or three
years before her death, when she was not
pregnant with child, and did not know the
dcfendfl-Ilf, it llllght well have been held by
the presiding judges to have been of no
significance in the case.
In the case at bar the evidence offered
was that the declaration of the deceased
was made the day before her death, and
was made in a conversation concerning her
pregnancy, which continued until her death.
The declaration, therefore, was not made
at a time remote from the time of her
death, and there had been no change of
circumstances which made it inapplicable
to the condition of the deceased at the time
of her death. It was clearly competent for
the jury t0 find from the evidence recited
in the exceptions that, if Deltena J. Davis
had an intention to commit suicide on De-
cember '."_£d, she continued to have the same
intention on December 23d. If the evidence,
in its nature, was admissible, the court, on
the facts Stated, could not exclude it on the
gmillld that fl‘0Il1 the lapse of time 01'
chfilli-If‘ Of Cirvlllustance it had ceased to be
material. It ought to be said that there is
ugtliing in the 9-Xi-Pptions indicathn: that the
liresitlilli-‘.' j“‘l!~'-“'5 “‘f1\$l'd to admit the evi-
(lQ1]('(-E on the i-rrouud that it was in their
discretion to "unlit 01' 1'e.icct it. They Prob"
ably considered the question presented as
settled by the dwisioll Of this court in Com.
\-_ 109101,, 132 .\iass. 22.
The main argument of the attorney general
is: First. that it is -immaterial whether the
deceased, at °1' b9f0l‘9 the time of her death.
had or had 110i an intention to commit sui-
cide; find’ secondly’ that, if she had such an
intention. it could "lit be proved by evidence
of her l1*’clm"‘ti°n5 that she was going to
drown l10l‘-"‘(’lf- The burden was on the com-
monwealth t° pmve beyond a reasonable
doubt that fl1P defendant killed the deceased.
and to do ""8 the iilry must be satisfied be-
yond a reasonable doubt that she did not km
herself. The nature of the case proved by
the commonwealth was such that it was llut
impossible that she had committed suicide.
If it could be shown that she actually had
an intention to commit suicide, it would be
more probable that she did in tact commit it
than if she had had no such intention. Ii’ ii
could be shown that during the week before
her death she had actually attempted to
drown herself, and had been prevented from
doing it, it seems manifest that this fact, ac-
cording to the general experience of mankind,
would have some tendency to show that she
might have made a second attempt, and ac-
complished her purpose. It may be true that
an unmarried woman, pregnant with child,
may some time say that she will commit sui-
cide when she has no serious intention of do-
ing it; or, if she ha such an intention, she-
may not carry it into eifect, although she
may have an opportunity; but it is impos-
sible to say that the actual existence of such
an intention does not tend to throw some
light upon the cause of death of such a
woman when found dead under circumstan-
ces not inconsistent with the theory of sui-
cide. it is a question of more difiiculty
whether evidence of the declarations of the
deceased can be admitted to show such an
intention. The argument, in short, is that
such evidence is hearsay. It is argued that
such declarations are not made under the
sanction of an oath, and that there is no op-
portunity to examine and cross-examine the
person making them, so as to test his sin-
cerity and truthfulness, or the accuracy and
completeness with which the declarations de-
scribe his intention or state of mind; and
that, even if such declarations would have
some moral weight in the determination of
the issue before the court, they are not with-
in any of the exceptions, to the exclusion of
hearsay, which the common law recognizes.
The counsel for the defendant concede
that the declaration in this case is not» 1111-
der our decisions, admissible as a part of
what has been called the “res Sefitlfi,” ul-
though they contend that some courts have
admitted similar declarations on that ground.
'i‘he_v concede that to make a declaration ad-
missible on that ground it must accompany
an act which, directly or indirectly, 18 P610-
vant to the issue to be tried, and must in
some way qualify, explain, or characterize
that act, and be, in a legal Sense, 11 part of
it. They concede that it this declaration is
a part of the act of visiting Sarah L. Hubert,
and tends to show the nature or purpose of
that visit, the fagi; of the visit is not rele-
vant to the issue. It (1095 not tend to show,
directly or indirectly, that the defendant kill-
ed the deceascd. or that she killed herself.
They concede that if the evidence of this dec-
laration is admissible, it is on account of the
nature of the declaration. and not because
it was made at this interview; and that. if
made to anybody else under the same cir-
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t"t~son." When evidence of declarations of yond n rea1mnable doubt tl:aa t she did not kill 
any person ls ottered for the purpose of herself. The nature of tll~ t·ase proved by 
!!ho wing the state of mind or Intention of the commonwealth was sue h that It was not 
that person at tire time the de..•laratlons lmpo881ble that she had <.•01111llitted 1mlclde. 
wt>re made, the declarations undoubtedly It it could be shown that she actually h11d 
··may be 80 remote lo point of time, or 80 an intention to commit suicide, it would be 
altered lo import by subsequent change in more probable that she did In fact commit lt 
the circumstances of the maker, as to be than if she bad had no such hltentlon. It It 
wholly Immaterial, and wisely to be ri>je<·t- 1 l'ould be shown that during the week before 
ed by the judge." It has been many tlmi>s her death she had actually attempted to 
said that "some limit must, of <'Ourse, be drown her11elf, and had been prevented froin 
had in applying practically the rules which doing it, it seems manifest that this fact, ac-
go,·ern the admil'l8ion of this evlden1·t>."' cording to the general t>xperJence or mankind, 
'I'hls 1.mbject is con11ldered in Vow. v. Ab- would have some tendency to show that she 
bott, 130 lla11s. 47:!. and In the <'lllleS there might have made a second attempt, and nc-
<:lted. There is undoubtt>dly a clh1cretion to compllshed her purpose. It may be true that 
be exercl11ed by the Judg1~ or judges p1·esld- an unmarried woman, pregnant with chfld, 
Ing at the trial in the admltU1lon or rejection may some time say that she wlll commit sul-
of this kind of evidence; but It ls not an clde when she has no serious Jntentlon of do-
absolute dlB<•retlon, and the exerdlll' of it, Ing It; or, if she bas sti<>h an intention, she · 
when tire fn<·ts appe.ar, may be reversed by may not <'8rry it Into etrt'<.'t, although she 
this court. It the declaration, evldt>uee of may have an opportunity; but It ls lmpoe-
whlch was otfE>red in the present ca11e, had slble to say that the actual existence of such 
been made by the deceased two or three 110 Intention does not tend to throw some 
yea.rs before her death, when she was not light upon the cause of death of such a 
pregnant with child, and did not know tm• wuman when found dead under clrcumstan-
defendant, it might well have been ht>ld by t'eH not lm•onsJstent with the theory of sul-
the presiding judges to have been of no <:Ide. It ls a question of more dltlkulty 
slgnltlcance in the ca11e. whether evidence of the declarations of the 
In the case at bar the evldeutoe otfere1l deeeased can be admitted to show such an 
was that the de<>lnrutlon of the dec.•eitl!t'd Intention. The argument, in short, Is that 
was made the day before her death, and 11u<·h evidence ls hearsay. It ls argued that 
was made In a convt•rsatlon c.-onc.-erning her such dec·laratlons are not made under the 
11regnancy, which continued until her deatJl. 11an<·tlon of an oath, and tbAt there Is no op-
The declaration, therefore, was not made portunlty to examine and cross-examine the 
at a time n>mote from the time of ht>r per11on making them, ao as to test his sln-
<leath, and there had been no chan~ of cerlty and tn1thtulness, or the accuracy nn<l 
c.·h·c.·umflhtm•t>H which uuult> it ina11pll<>11ble co111pletene11S with which the declarations de-
to the condition of the dt><-t>UMt>d at the time B<'ribe hl11 Intention or state of mind; and 
of her death. It was 1·learly t.'Ompetent for that, eYen if such tlec.·larations would have 
the jury to flnd from the evidence recited some moral weight In the determination of 
in the exet>ptions that, if Deltena J. Du·ls the ls11ue bt'fore the court, they are not with-
had an intention to commit sulellle on De- In any of the exceptions, to the exclusion of 
<·ember :!'.!d, Rhe cont1nue1l to h11,·e the HSme heal'll&y, which the common law recognizes. 
Intention on Decembt-r 2.'Jd. It tht> evidence, The counsel for the dt>fendant concede 
ln itlf nature, was adwlsslble, the t"tmrt, on that the declaration in this case ls not, un-
the factfl stated, could not ex<'lude It on the der our decisions, admllillllble as a part of 
ground that from the lapse of time or what has been called the "res gestre," al-
c•bangE> of circumstance it had cea11e<l to be though tht>y <>ontend that some courts have 
material. It ought to be said that there ls admltte<l similar declarattona on that ground. 
nothing in the exi·eptlons lndh·atlntt that the Tltt>y c•once<le thnt to make a declaration ad-
presldlug Jmlgt>s rt>f.n8l'd to admit tilt> <'YI- mlsslble on that ground it must accompany 
1ltmce ou the ground that It WIUI in tht>lr 1 an act whlc•h, directly or Indirectly, ls rele-
disl'retlon to admit or rejt•1·t it. 'rhey prob- vant to the issue to be tried, and must lo 
ably contddered the question (ll"(>flentt>d as some way qualify, explain, or characterize 
settled by the decl11lon of this court in Com. that act, and be In a legal sense, a part of 
v. I<'elch, 132 lla11S. 22.. it. They concede that it this declaration ls 
The main argument or the attorney gt>nernl a part of the act of vhlltlng Sarah L. Hubert, 
Is: First. that it ls bnmaterlal whether the and tends to 11how the nature or purpose of 
deceased. at or before the time of ht•r death. that vl11lt, the fact of the visit ls not rele-
had or bad not an intention to commit sul- vant to the issue. It does not tend to show, 
clde; aud, secondly, that, if she had such an dlre<•tly or lndlre<'tlY, that the defendant klll-
lntentlon. It could not be proved by evidence ed the' de<•ea11eil. 0~ that she killed herself. 
of her t1eclara.tlons that she was going to They cont·e<le that If the evidence of this dec-
drowu herself. The burden was on the com- laratlon ls a1lmls11lble, it ts on acrount ot the 
monwee.Ith to 1Prove beyond a reasonable nature of the de<•laratlon. and not because 
doubt that the < efendant killed the decea'Je<l, It was made at this interview; and that, If 
and to do thlll the Jury must be satts1led be- made to anybody else nuder the same clr-
44 
the existing state of mind or intention ot the
speaker or actor. The fundamental proposi-
tlon is that an intention in the mind of a per-
son can only be shown by some external man-
ifestation, which must be some look or ap-
pearance oi! the face or body, or some act or
speech; and that proof of either or all of
these, for the sole purpose ot howing the
existing state oi‘ mind or intention, may be
inferred. For example, the exceptions recite
that on the day when the deceased disappear-
ed Tretethen called at the house of her moth-
er “about 10 in the forenoon, and was there
some time with Tena, and that Tena that
day appeared bright and cheerful, and ‘full
of smiles,’ but at times during the month
prior thereto had been depressed in spirits."
The only apparent object of this testimony
was to show that on the day she disappeared
she was happy, and. therefore, could not have
contemplated suicide. Her bright and cheer-
ful appearance might have been real or feign-
ed, but this was for the jury. It the deceas-
ed at the same interview had said, “I was
never so happy in my life as I am to-day,"
it is contended that this declaration might he
as significant of her state ot mind a her
cheerful appearance, and that speaking. as
an indication of what is in the mind of the
speaker, is as much an act as smiling or con-
duct generally. The only obvious distinction
between speech and conduct is that speech is
often not only an indication of the existing
state or mind or the speaker, but a State-
ment of a fact external to the mind, and 35
evidence or that it is clearly hearsay. There
is, of course, danger that a 1111'!’ may not al-
ways observe this distinction, but that has
not availed to exclude testimony which is ad-
llliSS")i(‘ for one p1l1'1>0SB and not admissible
for another, to which there is danger the jut-y
may apply It. A common instance of this is
when it ls a material fact in the case whether
K
FACT-S S}IO\VlNG PR0B.\i$J_1 [5 (J.-LU.>1<,_
ces, it would have the shine si nifi- a erso11 at 8 €'_9l't;“
tuintflflrfllei‘ contend that the dot-laratign is thilng. '1‘he testlznon: uh; [Case v
We‘ -idence °t the 8&8-It‘. of mind or intcn- heard 111111 S“-7' It 18 Qt * 0"-15
semi evtne deceased at \'-he time she made it though t].1iS is not 8»-1&1 - Q said H
tiono we intention which 1 .’ * -_ q-as true ‘lo. ‘Kr “'11 "elm,
at t tends to proie person sdiql - - ‘ I . llcgs u
‘““nn tefml met’ which, in connection with closes anotlner in-stance 114 Q t1; a'I'"I'tt W110
““‘ma c-ts Droved. tends to suphort the the- tified to conversation ' lye D1-,8 at n»1,,,e‘I' 121.
Mm £ uiC5de- They contend that the staie about the distll"P""“"1l1? lvltany right “fist Um’
°;'(Y;§n 01' '\l1'¢t**11t‘l({!1 in the mind of a per- his connection W1‘ itfe °l' 3, tb9”:9"8e,:;cZS_
Mn’ wnenhglfldgglfirktcggs be‘ pro‘,-ed by evi- him, and luvs stiélernéls 01- his\\..-bailla Da::Z~’lz<1,,ut
“me 0£_t_lc“lm_1y when “I2: \‘\ ell as of his admissible Hes to his l__i1-,D”et11e_,. s81»da,,,,
ms‘ 31 d cannot be can) 1 person has de- ply, or his n_1')‘unm tn it-ha t- nure F; ,,.el_e 0 1,,
ceased, an “(ms were u as witness, and under the cnc I Ht)“ nus \\- S 0 make 111;-
me aedara 8 wmch Earle before the con- that he was gu D], but, tenaezilld to bilge-
mwtsy a1‘0 9 the subject of the what was said to t tnl it-as the test! to 81'0":
may _ self, evidence till!‘ be Sta "0, In any of
The evidence that declarations were made him were true. b_'-'1'lm.~;@ telzu-Hts ""17 o1'1t_
must, of course. be ot the same character a view between the ¢7¢‘<'c.»|_,,eu hat t tbmade to
the evidence that the acts were done; that is, Hubert, it‘ there was such and e 9 111te1_
both must be proved by the testimony or deceased had said that 1' interfle “Boss
witnesses under oath, and subject to cross- father of her child; ewden letben was, the.
examination, and in either case the examlna- ceased said this is clearly heace that the $119
“on may extend to all the circumstances admissible to prove that he S"-1 , and is no?
which tend to show the significance of the But suppose that 11,- had bee Was the r'at1,e,.
decinrtltiolls or ot the acts as indications or tr-1111 that the deceased kne; denied at thé
pregnant, testimony that she 1111181: she was
she was pregnant would -be goggle said that
that she knew it. 11', the day be§"'de"¢<f
death, she had written a ngte, add!-_e<;redhe1
her mother, stating her condition, and (is:-1-1111-(.)
lug her intention to drown herself, and 1,8,,
left it in her desk when she went from 1101110
the following day. the admissibility ot Sll('ll
a letter in evidence, after proot that she had
Wriftell it, depends “D011 the same considera-
tions as the adm 'ibility of evidence of
similar oral declarations. Such a written dec-
laration differs from an oral decimation only
in this: that writing is often a more de~
liberate act than speaking; but this affects
only the weight of the evidence. It may also
be thought that speech is a less trustworthy
indication of what is really in the mind of
the Speaker than acts or appearance. but this,
if it be so, also affects the weight of the evi-
dence. Certainly, to confine the evidence to
acts, appearance, or speech which ls wholly
involuntary, would be impracticable and un-
reasonable, tor almost- every expression of
fllollilllf 01' feeling can he simulated; and, al-
though evidence of the conscious declarations
of a person as indications of his state oi’
mind has in it some of the elements of hear-
say, yet it closely resembles evidence of the
natural expressions 01' feeling, which has 3|-
ways been regarded in the law not as hear-
say, but as original evidence,-1 Green], Ev.
5 102, (5th Ed.;) and when the pg]-50“ mak-
ing the declaratlons is dead, such Q‘-1¢1en<_-9 is
often not only the best, but the only, evidence
of what was in his mind at the time. On
principle, therefore, we think it clear that
when evidence of the declarations of a per-
son is introduced solely for the pm-pose of
showing what the state of mind or mtention
of that person was at the time the declara-
tions were made, the declarations are to be
_ regarded as acts from which the state or
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-~e. lt would have the aa~e Blgn11l-
cuia~tj:'J:J.ey contend that the det.•laratlon is 
_. tclence of the state ot mlnd or lnten-
lllllle e~~e deceased at the tlme she made it, 11ou~ t:. ~e Intention Which lt tends to proYe and~ t.ertal fact. whlch, ln connectton with 
la 1. ~.._ct.S proved, tends to support the the-
ollle? t 8 ,pclde. They contend that the stafe 
OQ' <> d or Intention ln the mind of a per-
ot m1J1 bell material, can be proved by eYi· 
'°"' -w of bls declaratlona as well aa of hla 
\\elite particularly when that person has de-~ and cannot be called as witness, and 
tlli 11eeiar&tions were made before the con-
u!vel.'SY arose which la the subJoc>t of the 
tr\a\. 
'tne evidence that declara tlons were made 
must, of counie, be of the same character as 
the evidence that the acts were done; that Is, 
both mnBt be proved by the testimony of 
wltnesse& under oath, an<l subject to cross-
ex.ammation, and In either case the examina-
tion may extend to all the ctrcumstancca 
whl<'b tend to show the slgnlf:lcance of the 
t\l'(·Jaratlons or ot the acta as lndicatlona ot 
the e:xlsUng state of mlnd or intention of the 
speaker or actor. The fundamental proposi-
tion 11 that an intention ID the mind of a per-
son can only be shown by some external man-
lft>Ktatlon, which must be aome look or ap-
i>earance ot the face or body, or sowe aet or 
speech; and that proof of either or all of 
these, tor the sole pUl"J.>OBe of showing the 
extsting state of mind or intention, may be 
Inferred. For example, the exeeptlona recite 
that on the day when the deceased disappear-
ed Trefethen called at the house of her moth-
er .. abont 10 in the forenoon, and was there 
some time with Tena, and that Tena that 
day appeared bright and cheerful, and ·tull 
of emllee,' but at times during the month 
prior thereto had been depressed in spirits." 
The only apparent object of tht11 testimony 
was to show that on the day she disappeared 
she waa happy, and. therefore, could not have 
contemplated suicide. Her bright and ebeer-
ful a11pearance might have been real or feign-
ed. but this WBB tor the jury. If the deceas-
ed at the same interview had said, "I waa 
never eo happy In my llfe as I am to-day," 
It le contended that this declaration might be 
ae aignltlcant of her eta te of mind as her 
cheerful appearance, and that speaking. as 
an Indication of what ls ln the mind of the 
speaker, Is aa much an act as smlllng or con-
duct generally. The only obvious distinction 
between speech and conduct la that speech 18 
often llOt only an Indication of the existing 
state of mind of the speaker, but a state-
ment of a fact external to the mind, and aa 
evidence of that it Is clearly ht>al"Blly. There 
Is. of course, clJUlger that a jury may not al-
ways observe thla dlstinctlon, but that has 
not avaJled to exclude testimony whieh is ad-
missible tor one purpose and not admlsslble 
for another, to which there la danger the Ju1-y 
may apply ft. A common Instance of tbia ls 
wbeD It la a material tact ln the case whether 
a peraon. .a.-.: a cer~ltt [ 
tb.1ng ":J. .... he tet1tfinol!J· tf.t.t Q,_,8 ~ 
beard b.I~ SSY Jt ~ It u~ ~~ ~ ... o.· lt;. 
though th.ls 1S not e.,..ltJ~l\-& It l'f.~1 a ce,. 
peraoD 88.... ~BB true. •.tc:_. ~ t11f'tla ~llJ 
closes ano.-.1.1er J:nsta.11~. 'l.·.l)~ ~ ~~<liiiittetl. "'bo. 
titted t<> con versa t1olle ~It l>~ae lt>Jiat ~ aJ. 
about the dfSSPP~:b.l'Ql!ce ~It~ :fl~ °lJ'/:: ('Ilse r11f::_t 
hlB connectfo.D W' It. 0 ?" ~ 'tlie l etlses te8 
him, and hfs sllenee ol" 4 l\,>~ ~4 .l>~ erelJd11lJt. 
admi88lble so rar ~ '11,. 1"' ~t- t tbe.r '"'~ llJJ<J 
ply, or his re1JlleB t~ ll>~ L1t11'Q~lles, 1J'er.8ltid to 
under the cf1-cun7R•qlJ(,•f t l\•a e to~~ OJJJ;r 
that be was gulltY; bn:· te11~ 8/ifd to %t_ "e-
whnt was snfd to bllJJ "'°a t:J1e t E!d to s}J JJi, 
self, e\•l<l<•nce tbD t tb<! l:ft 8 ~ot, i:stt~olJ~ ~; 
hlm were true. SUJJJJo11~ :tellJ"''ta a 11r1 o:r It. 
view between the dt'<'«•11,.,e<1 bat at t}J IJJllde to 
Hubert, If there was IJUcb lllld t/Je e flJte,.. 
deceased had se.fd that X'r all /1Jterviei;:.t11ess 
father of her child; evldeneretben lVa.s' f:"' 
ceased said this ls clearly hea~e t/Jat the de': 
admissible to prove that he ~ 88.y, and ls not 
But suppose that it had been :s the .father. 
trial that the deceased knew tbenled at the 
pregnant, testimony that she ba~t Bbe was 
she was pregnant would ·be som Bald that 
that she knew It. It, the day :e;:!1e:: 
death, she bad written a note, addressed to 
her mother, Rtatlng her condition, and declar-
ing her intention to drown herself, and bad 
left It In her desk when she went from honll' 
the following day, the adml88lbllfty ot suc·h 
a letter In evidence. atter proof thnt she bad 
written It, depends upon the samt> <'OllMhlera-
ttons aa the ndm~lblllty of evldt>nee of 
similar ornl deelnratlons. Sn<>h a wt ltten det·-
lamtlon dUl'erB from an ornl declaration only 
1n thta: that writing l8 often a more de-
liberate act than speaking; but this aft'ects 
only the weight of the evidence. It may also 
be thought that speech ls a less trustworthy 
Indication of what ls really in the mind ot: 
the speaker than acts or appearance, but this, 
It It be so, also atl'eeta the wE>lght of the evi-
dence. Certainly, to confine the evidence t() 
acts, appearance, or spee<>h which Is wholly 
Involuntary, would be im1>rectl<.-able and un-
reasonable, for almost· every expreBSlon of 
thought or feeling can lie- Mlmuln tt><l; and, al-
though evldenee of the con·sc1ous declaratlonfl 
of a perBon a11 Indications ot his state ot: 
mind bas In It some of the elements of hear-
say, yet lt closely resembles evidence of the 
natural expressions of feeling, Which bas al-
ways been regarded In the law not as hear-
say, but as original evidence,-1 Green!. Ev. 
I 100, (5th Ed.;) and when the perBOn mak-
ing the declarations IB dead, BU<'h e\·ldence Is 
often not only the best, but the only, evldeD('e 
of what was In bis mind at the time. On 
prlnclple, therefore, we think it elenr that 
when evidence of the de<>lnratlons of a per-
son ls Introduced solely for tbe purpose of 
showing what the state of mind or Intention 
of that perBOn was at the time the declara-
tions were made, the declnrattons are to be 
regarded aa acts from which the state of 
45 
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mind or intention may be inferred in the
same manner as from the appearance of the
person, or his behavior, or his actions gener-
ally. 1n the present case the declaration.
evidence of which was offered. contained
nothing in the nature of narrative, and was
significant only as showing the state of mind
or intention of the deceased.
But it is argued that this is not the law,
and that it is not competent for this court
to change the established rules of evidence.
We have been shown no case exactly like
the present.- but there are decisions closely
analogous, and, while they are not uniform,
yet we think the weight of modern authority
is in favor of admitting evidence like that
offered in the present case for the purpose
stated. The latest decision on the subject is
Hillmon v. insurance C0., 145 U. S. 283'». 12
Sup. Ct. 909, and many of the cases are
cited in the opinion. See. also. l’ur_vear v.
Com., 1 S. E. 512; Blackburn v. State,
23 Ohio St. 146; Boyd v. State. 14 Lea, 162;
Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. St. 388; Jumpcrtz
v. People, 21 Ill. 375: Reg. v. Jess0p_ 14$ i‘oX.
Cr. Gas. 204; Com. v. Fenno, 134 Mass.
217. It is argued that the decision of the
supreme court of the I‘nited States in in-
surance Co. v. .\Iosley. 8 Wall. 397. shows
that that court is somewhat more liberal
than our decisions warrant in admitting dec-
larations as a part of the res gestaz, and that,
fl1PI‘9f0I‘9, this court will not follow the de-
cision in Hillmon v. Insurance Co., ubi su-
pra. But, without considering whether we
should follow Insurance ('0. v. Alosley on
the subject "I PPS I-Iestae, we are aware of no
diiference in the decisions of the two courts
on the admission of declarations to show the
existing condition of the mimi of the dwisi-_
flllf, if we except our decision in Com. v.
Felch. ubi supra. which we will consider
hereafter. This court admits exclamations
and declarations as evidence of existing pain
in case of injuries. In the case of wills.
"P011 the issue of sanity or undue influence.
this Court 1139 alwfiys admitted evidence of
declarations which tend to simw the mn-
dition of the mind of the testhtor, and his iii.
tention with regard to the disposition of his
Dl‘0l><*I'ty, or his fear of the person alleged to
have exercised undue influence. Shailer v.
B'.li1Sif('t1(]. 99 Mass. 112; Lewis v_ Mason,
199 M115?“ 169; May “- Bradlee, 127 Mass.
414; P039!‘ "- Baldwin, 133 Mass. 427; ‘Vood-
\\'ai-(] V, Sullivan. 152 Q1888. 470, 25 N. E.
337; pi(-kt-us \'. Davis. 13-i Mass. 252. UI)on
flu 188119 “'l“’“""' filer? was an intentional
gift 01' Rift (‘fill-18 niortis the same rule pre-
vans, \\'11itu9.i' Y. \Vh1'cler. 116 Mass. 490;
wiiitwoii v. Vi-'inslow, 132 Mass. 307; Lane
v. Moore. 151 “ass. 87, 23 N. E. 828. In
Lane v. 31°‘_"'“ thi ¢'0urt say: “Where the
mental condition of :1 Person at a particular
time is in issue. his appearance, conduct
acts, and <1P('lfll'utions. after as well as be-
fore the fllufi 111 question, have been held
admissiblt‘ ill 9"i<1@I1€'e if sufficiently near in
point of time. and if they appear to have any
tendency to show what that lnentnl cosiiiiimi
was. The question has usually arisen hi
cases involving the validity of wills, but the
principle is the same where the validity of a
gift is questioned, and where responsibility
for crime is to be determined.” See also,
Howe v. Howe. 99 Mass. 88. It is to be no-
ticed that in all these cases the person, evi-
dence of whose declarations was admitted,
was dead at the time of the trial. In ac-
tions by the husband for seducing his wife
and alienating her aflections from him the
declarationsand statements of the wife,m.1de
before the alleged seduction, indicating the
state of her affections towards her husband,
have uniformly been admitted upon the ques-
tion of damages. Palmer v. Crook, 7 Gray,
418; Jacobs v. \\'hitcomb, 10 Cush. 255. In
the last case the court say: “Whenever the
mental feelings of an individual are to be
proved, the usual expressions of such feel-
ings are original evidence, and often the only
proof of them which can be had." At com-
mon law the wife could not be a witness in
such a case. In Com. v. Abbott, ubi supra,
the defendant, who was not the husband.
"P1118 on trial for the murder of a married
woman, for the purpose of showing “the ex-
istence of motive on the part of the imsband
of the deceased to commit the crime," offered
evidence that the husband and wife quarrel-
ed some years before the homicide: that
about six years before the homicide the hus-
band was seen entering his own house with
an axe in his hand, and that he then uttered
threats against his wife and a man not
named; and also offered to show the ill-
feeling of the husband towards the wife. by
statements not in the nature of threats. made
by the husband to a witness. The evidence
offered was confined to acts done or state-
ments made on or before the year 1877. The
homicide was in January» 1330- The Pep"-
tation of the wife for chastity between the
years 1873 and 1877 had been bad. There
was uncontroverted evidence that from May.
1879, the reputation of the deceased was not
questioned, and that the husband and Wlfi‘
continued to live together until her death.
The justices trying the case excluded the
evidence, and the defendant excepted. In
that case this court say: “The existence of 11
criminal motive is an element which it is
often necessary to establish in order to give
character to the acts and c0udu0t Of 8 i)9~1't.Y
charged with or suspected of crime. In such
case the conduct or declarations of 11 D8113’-
both before and after the principal fact in
issue, are admissibie, provided they are suf-
ficiently near in point of time, and sufficient-
ly significant of the motive or intent to be
proved. The rules which govern human con-
duct are to be reasonably !1l.'iD1i@(1 in these
cases, as in all other iuvestigiiilmis of fact.
They are to be so applied in all cases where
the inquiry is as to the mental or moral con-
dition of a perflnu at int» time a particular act
-16
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mind or intention may be Inferred ln tbe 
same manner as from tbe appearance ot the 
person, or bis behavior, or bis actions gener-
ally. In the present cue the declaration, 
evidence ot which waa offered, contained 
notWng In the nature of narrative, and was 
significant only as showing the state of mlnd 
or intention or the deceaS('(l. 
But It Is arguPd thnt this Is not the Jaw, 
and that 1t Is not <'Ompetent for tbls court 
to change the e11tabll11bed rules or evlden<'E'. 
We have he<•n shown no ('llKe exactly like 
the present• but there are decisions closely 
analogous, and. while they are not uniform, 
yet we think the weight ot modern authority 
la In favor of admitting evidence like that 
otrered In the prest>nt •'aJIE.' tor the purpose 
sta.ted. The latest decision on the subJM't IR 
Hlllmon v. Insuran<'e Co., 14.'> U. R !?~. 12 
Sup. Ct. 909, and many or the <'aKeB are 
cited In the opinion. See, all!O. Puryear v. 
Com., 1 S. E. 512; Bla<'kbum v. Rtate, 
23 Ohio St. 146; Boyd v. Mtate, 14 I..ea, 1H2; 
Got>r-n v. Cow., 99 Pa. Rt. 388; .Jum1K'rtz 
"'· People, 21 Ill. 37;;; Reg. v. Jt>RHOp, rn ('ox, 
Cr. Cas. 204; Com. v. Fenno, 134 )fall8. 
217. It ls argued that tht> dt>elslon ot thP 
supreme court ot the rnltPd Htate11 In In-
surance Co. v. l\Iosley, 8 Wall. 39i. 11how11 
that that r•ourt Is somewhat more llheml 
than our d1•<·l11loDB warrant In admitting dt'<'-
lamtlons 011 a part of the re11 gestee, and that, 
thprefore, this court wlll not follow the de-
<'lsion In Hlllmon v. Insurance Co., ubl su-
pra. But, without <'ODBlderlng whether wt> 
should follow Insurance Co. v. lloslt>y on 
the subject of res gestie, we are aware of no 
dltrerenre In the decisions of the two rourts 
on the admission ot de<'laratlons to show the 
existing condition of the mind of the dt'<'lar-
ant, If we exc•Ppt our dt'<'lsion In Com. v. 
Felch, ubl supra, Which we wlll con11hter 
hereafter. This court admits exclamations 
and declarntlons as evidence ot exlatinii: Jlllln 
In case ot Injuries. In the case of wllla. 
upon the Issue of sanity or undue lnfluenet.>, 
this court bas always admitted evidence of 
declnratloos which tend to sbow the ron-
dltlon of the mind of tht> testator, and bla In-
tention with regard to the dl11posltlon ot bis 
property, or his fear ot the person alleged to 
have exerc•il'led undue Influence. Sballer ¥. 
B •mstf'a<l. 00 MaBB. 112; Lewis v. Mason, 
109 Mass. 10!}; May v. Bradlee, 127 Mass. 
414; Pottc>r , •. Baldwin, la3 Mass. 427; Wood-
ward v. ~ulllvan, 152 :\Ines. 4i0, 25 N. E. 
R37; Plck(•us '" Davis, 134 Mass. 252. Upon 
an Issue whether tbel'(> wns an Intentional 
gift <>l' gift cau11a mortls the RBme rule pre-
valls. '\"\·bltney v. "Wht'\•ler, 116 Mass. 490; 
Whltwt"ll v. Wln11low, 1a2 l\Iass. 307; Lane 
v. Moore. lol l\laRB. 87, 23 N. E. 828. In 
I.ane v. ~foorP this court say: "Where the 
mental condition ot a Pel."Ron at a particular 
time ls lll IR14ue, his llI>Pt>arance, conduct, 
acts, and dt"<'laratlona, atter aa well as be-
fore the time In question, have been held 
adml~tdl>l(> In evidence If sutllclently near In 
46 
point of time, and lf they a1>1war to haft' aor 
tendency to show what tba t: mental condlttoii 
waa. The question bas usually arisen in 
cases Involving the validity or wills, but the 
principle ls the same where tlJe valldlty ot a 
gift Is questioned, and ~here responslblllty 
tor crime ls to be detennlned." See also, 
Howe v. Howe, 99 Ma88. 88. It ls to be no-
ticed that In all these <'&sea the person, evi-
dence ot whose declarations was admitted, 
was dead at the time of the trial. In ac-
tions by the husband for seducing his wife 
and alienating her affections from blm the 
declarations and statements of the wlte, made 
before the alleged Beduetlon, Indicating the 
lltate of her affections towards her husband, 
bnve uniformly been admitted upon the ques-
tion ot damages. Palmer v. Crook, 7 Gray, 
418; Jacol.>8 v. Wbltromb, 10 Cush. 2M. In 
the lal'lt <'aae the court 11ay: "Whenever the 
mt>ntal teellngs of au Individual are to be 
11roved, the usual expressions of BU<'h feel-
ings are original evidence, and often the on17 
proot of them which can be had." At com-
mon law the wltt> could not be a witness In 
such a calW'. Io Com. v. Abbott, ubl supra, 
the detendRnt, who was not the husband. 
being on trial tor the murder of a married 
woman, for the purpose of showing "the ex-
lsten<'e ot motive on the part of the husband 
ot the deN'ftsed to commit the <"rime," otrered 
evidence that the husband and wlte qual'N'l-
ed some years hetore the homicide; that 
about six years betore the homklde tht> hus-
band was seen entering bis own houtte with 
an axe In bis hand, and that he then uttered 
threats against his wlte and a man not 
nnmed; and also offered to show the lll-
teellng ot the husband towards the wife, by 
statements not In the nature ot thl"l'ftts. made 
by the huRband to a wltne&11. The evlclen<'f' 
otTered was confined to acts done or Rtate--
ments made on or before the year 18i7. The 
homi<'lde was 1D January, 18RO. The repu-
tation of the wife for cbaRtlty betwet>n the 
years 1873 and 1877 bad been bad. There 
was uncontroverted evidence that from May, 
1879, the reputation of the de<•eased was not 
questioned, and that the husband and wife 
continued to live together until her death. 
The justices trying the <"ase excluded the 
evidence, and the defendant excepted. In 
that case this court say: "The exlsten<'e of a 
criminal motive Is an element whl<'h It ls 
otten neceBBary to establish In order to give 
cbamcter to the acts and conduct of a party 
charged with or 11uspeeted of crime. In such 
case tbe conduct or declarations of a party, 
both before and alter the principal taet In 
Issue, are admlBSlble, provided they are sut-
tlclently near In point of time, and sumclent-
lf slgnlfl<'ant of the motive or Intent to be 
proved. The rules which govern human con-
duct are to be reasonably applied In thest> 
<'Riie&, as In all other Investigations ot fft<'I . 
They are to be so applied In all (•ases WhE'M' 
the inquiry Is H to the mental or moral con-
dition ot a pe~on at the time a partkular act 
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GA U-SE.
The intent or disposition when
(1o1;t"1tes an element or crime, can only
;-tflmed= 35 811 moral qualities are,
acts and declarations "of the l,m.ty_-~
1"“ tnuriv after saying that a certain dis-
ust be left to the j\1g\~j(»es trying the
eid that it did not appear that the
me‘ L-e5 1“ exclllflillg the evidence offered
e of its "em°te1\e88, and of a subse-
chaflge in the relations of the husband
The court also say, what has been
mm many H1119!‘ in Criminal cases where it
was (:0
gténded '¢b11i_8on1e other person than
“R aegendflllt ¢°111l111itt‘d the crime. that “the
existence 01 in f°°“I18 BS a luotivc for the
commission of crime will not alone justify
“bmitting to I1 iury the question of tilt‘
gum of a person entertaining such feeling.
1; becomes niatcrial only when oflcred in
mun“-(ion with other evidence proper to be
gubmittt-(l, showing that the person chamell
with such ill fcelinf-Z was in fact implicated
in the commission of the crime.” 'l‘here is
no intimation anywhere in the opinion that
11 the evidence had related to a time very
near the homicide, and if there had been evi-
dence implicating the husband in the com-
mission of the crime, evidence of his threats
against the wife. and of his statements show-
ing ill feeling towards her, would not have
been admitted; and the language of the
opinion implies that they would have been.
The admission of evidence of declarations in
Elmer v. Fcssenden, 151 l\-lass. 359. 24 .\'. E.
2(B. and in actions involving the question of
dolnicile,-Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 “etc. (Mass)
199.—-and in bankruptcy cases,»—Bateman v.
Bailey, 5 Term R. 512,—may perhaps be sup-
ported on the ground that the declarations
were a part of the res gestae; but, if these
cases were not decided on this ground, they
must be considered as applicable to the
present case.
It is also argued that the deceased, with
reference to the indictment, is not u party;
and the qiie.~liion whether her declarations
should be received as evidence is the same
as if they were the declarations of any other
person than the defendant, and that evidence
of a confession by a third person that he
killed tho deceased, or threats to injure the
deceased. made by him, cannot be received.
The decisions appear to he uniform that con-
fessions of third persons cannot be received
as evidence that they committed the crime,
and that the defendant did not; and this for
the plain reason that they are hearsay. They
are stri<-ti_v narratives of past transactions.
not made under oath. and are only competent
as admissions against the persons making
them. The decisions are not uniform wheth_
or evidence of threats made by third pefflons
to injure the deceased should be admitted or
not as evidence for the defendant. In 111051;
of the cases where the evidence of such
threats by third persons has been rejected
in trials for murder. the fllrcfiifl were made
too long before the homicide to be significant,
or the \\'<31-'9 made 11
(!lll11Si’.£{[l(_.’€S T1186‘; "‘°s:Ze1‘ v
ceased was K111 ’,°1‘ ti, ‘lot Q‘?
deuce tencllng to tmpjio W
the conznnais-S1011 0 the ate as
dence was 1'9-790 ted 0
grounds. I<JW'1d'¥‘-‘nee 01' orig, 9,
against t
when the quesflon Was
ant or the def-"-‘aged 111a(“'1 D 'd
and whether the def nd
tense. \Vig;:1'1lS V" P9091“
on a trial for lllurdell
that another pvrson 11811 1 do
deceased. and had an 01 I
the murder, and was 1'0“
the murder was collllhltt
the murder. nude!‘ 5"sp1(,,0u's1'=-‘&1- be ‘"7 When
with a weapon whlch In
instrument with w'1li('h theiglft have beetznces»
ed, and that the conduct or te("’3-‘I was Mtge
the murder was such as to 1:518 ‘-‘rs "
had committed it, it would 8 1""
deuce that this person, on the deem t
murder, had threatened to km ti] before the
1: he could find him, and Said thstdeceased
searching for him that he might “he was
would be significant of an intent ll him’
and ought to be admitted; and ,t:ekg:1:lm'
well-considered case where, on this State 1:1)’
facts, such evidence has been rejected. See
State v- Boulder. 53 Conn. nae, 4 Atl. 2.-:7,
and cases cited: Holt v. State, 9 Tex. App,
571; Cluverius v. Com., 81 Va. ‘T87, 8215; Walk-
er v. State, 63 Ala. .105; Howard v. State, 23
TeX- ADIL 206, 5 S. W. 231; Puryear v. C-0m.,
ubi supra; Worth v. Railroad co-. 51 Fed-
1T1. ‘In (lom. v. Feich. ubi supra, the de-
fendant was charged with attempting to pro-
cure the miscarriage of Mary Ann Finley 011
July 2, 1881, by the use of some instrument
to the Jurors unknown. in consequence of _
which she died on the same day. He con-
tended at the trial “that the operation W88
Performed by Mary on herself; and thcre
was evidence tending to show that it would
have been possible for her to perform the
Operation on herself, considered as an opera-
tion, using for the purpose an ordinary lend
pencil." He offered to prove by one Hughes
“that in the month of June next preceding
the time of the alleged offense Mary told her
that she was pregnant by one Edward Tit-
comb, and that if Tltcomb did not perform
an operation to procure a miscarriage, or get
some one to do so, she should perform the
operation on herself with :1 lead pencil. It ap-
pcarcd that said declarations neither accom-
panied nor were explanatory of any act then
done by her." The evidence was excluded,
and the defendant excepted. This com-t_ in
the opinion. treat the evidence as l1(>a['gfly,
and say: “Such evidence is gene,-any mad.
missibie. There arc. IIOWPVBI‘, several excep-
tions to this rule. and it is contended by the
defendant that this evidence niay properly
be brought within some one of th@m_ The on-
ly exception particularly defllgliated is that re-
I .
the defends“ hie“ Q or am]
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FACTS SHOWING PROBABI-..E: CA US.E_ 
i>e' The lntent or dlspoaltlon, when 
111 60t.li::..,.tee an element ot crhne, can only 
nro.,t) ~ined, as all mo-ra\ qualities are, 
'oe. ,ece e ~ta and deelaratlons ·of the party.'' 
!lOlll ;!~ after saying that a certain dls-
'l'bll Jl>'1St be left to tb.e Justk·es trying the 
~l>~eld that lt dld not 11.Pllellr that the 
rue. ~ ln excluding the evldence offered 
tourt !e of lta remotenesa, and of a subae-
~~ cbflnge ln the relations of the husband 
l\:!.1.fe- Tbe court also say, what bas been 
a d rnauY times ln crlmlnal <'ftses where It 
w contended that MOn1e otlwr pe1"80n than 
~ detendant committed the <-rlmt>, that "the 
e.dste'l1ce of ll1 feeling as a 1notlvt- for the 
eomm\e8lon of crime wlll not alone justify 
aubmltting to a jury the question of the 
pllt of a pel'80n entertaining such feeling. 
lt \l(>(>ODle& material only wheu offered in 
collDectlon with other evlt'.lenee proper to be 
trobm\tted. showing that the pel'l1on <'hat'Ked 
with sueh Ill ft-ellng was ln fact lmpllmt~d 
tn tbe comml88lon of the crime." 'l'hel'e ls 
no lntlmatlon anywhere In the opinion that 
1f the evidence had related to a time very 
uear the homlelde, and lf there bad been evl· 
dence Implicating the husband In the com-
mfSBIOD of the erlme, evidence of bJs threats 
against the wife, aml ot hls statements show-
ing lll feeling towards her, would not have 
been admitted; and the lanJ..'llage of the 
oplnlon Implies that they would have been. 
The admlBBlon of evidence of declarations In 
Elmer v. Ff'88enden, 151 Mau. :'159, :.?4 X. E. 
208. and In a<'tlons tnvolvlng the qm-'Ktlon of 
oomlcUe,-Kllburn v. Bennett, 31.'tletc. (Ma88.) 
199,-ud In bankruptey cases,--Bateman 'I". 
Balley, II Term R. 512,-may perhaps be sup-
ported on the ground that the declarations 
were a part of the rea gestl2; but, If tht!se 
cases were not decided on this ground, they 
must be CODl'lldered as npplleable to the 
present case. 
H 18 alllO argued that the deceased, with 
ref'enmee to the Indictment, 111 not 11. party; 
and the qul!l'tion whether her decl11.ratlo1U1 
should be received as evidence ts the same 
BB If' they were the declarations ot any other 
pereon than the defendant, and that evidence 
of a conteBBlon by a third person that be 
killed the deceased, or threats to Injure the 
decealed. made by him, cannot be received. 
The deel8lons appear to be uniform that con-
feeslons of third peraons cannot be received 
att evlden<'e that they committed the crime, 
and that the defendant dld not; and this for 
the plain reuon that they are hearsay. They 
ore strictly nanattves of past transactions. 
not made under oath, and are only competent 
us adml881ons against the persons making 
them. The decisions are not uniform wheth-
er evidence of threats made by third persons 
to Injure the deceased should be admitted or 
not aa evidence for the defendant. In moat 
of the cases where the evidence of such 
threats by tblrd pt>rsons has been rejected 
In trlalll for murder, the threats were made 
too long before the bomlcllle to be slgnUl<.-ant, 
or they w-~re _n:utde 'llllt:t~ ,.., cum1tanc~S "tJUUl tboae ~ "\>- «..011.te }(. 
ceaaed w.-s kJUe4 °.r t~ ~~1,,.t: ~~ 0 • 16 
dence teII<I.Lllg' 1:o :ltll>lJ(.~'t-~ ~:tl~ .,,.~tterer,t 
the comnafssJo.n ° t.be. ftt~ ~ ~ tb C!Jz.. 
dence was re1ectecl 0 11 ~...,.;l:)"'ee lJo Otber e de. 
grounds. i--~v-Jdence O:t tl! o~~ ~. 1111:el'aoria e;:· 
against t:be de~eD<f.eillt l"e~ t-~ ol" Ill/ t:be el>/ 
when the q uesuon ll>ae lllt~ 0 :r t1J or tb~ • 
ant or the deceasefl ltl1t "'"~t ~ e dec-ea8ed 
and whether the derell~E> t 1/ 1el" tbe "dlJ:IJttfld 
fense. 'V'fg~fns v. l">~Pl lit ~/! lll'st 11 <tere.od. 
on a trial ror UJurde.r. t:Q!' f~ /_;f!<l hi 11ef:_u1t, 
that another person lla<l 111 clere11d. 8. ~ ff'.. 
deceased. and bad Bll op.Po 'f's,·111 t IJt Prove:-
the murder, and was t'oulld 1-t11111t;r ~""11l'cl8 tbe 
the murder was colllllJJtt~ 0 iJ tbe J:i COllJlllJt 
the murder. under Bll&lJJc-lo bear tbe ;:. "'bea 
wtth a weapon whlcb lnlg::" clrculll ace or 
lnstrumt>nt with wbf<•b the d t lJave bee~cee, 
t"d, and that the conduc·t or te;;:"Bed wllB kl~ 
tbe munler was SU<'h as to Ind~ Pel'filon arter 
had eommltted ft, 1t WouJd 8 <·ate that he 
den<·t> thut this person, on the :J:llJ that evl-
murder, had threatened to kill t~ bet'ore the 
lt he could tlnd him, and &aid th: deceased 
searching for him that he might ithe was 
would be sllOlltlcant of an Intent to kl~l !::: 
and ought to be admitted; and we find no 
well-considered case where, on this state ot 
facts, such evidence bas beE'n rejected. See 
State v. Beaudet, 53 Conn. rias, 4 A tl. 2:i7, 
and cases elted; Holt v. State, 9 Tex. App. 
071; Cluverlus v. Com., 81 Ya. 787, 82U; Walk· 
er v. State, fl3 Ala. 100; Howard v. State, 23 
Tex. App. 206, 5 S. W. 231; Puryear v. Com., 
ubl supra; Worth v. Railroad Co., 51 !!'ed. 
171. ·ID Com. v. Felch, ubl supra, the de-
fendant was charged with attempting to pro-
cure the mlscarrtage of Mary Ann Flnley on 
July 2, 1881, by thP use of some Instrument 
to the jurors unknown, In consequence of 
wbleh she died on tbe same day. He con· 
tended at the trial "that the operation was 
performed by Macy on herself; and there 
was evidence tending to show that It would 
have been poBBlble tor her to perform the 
operation on herself, romddered as an opera· 
tlon, using for the purp<ise an ordinary lead 
pencil." He offered to prove by one Hughes 
"that In the month of June next preeedtng 
the time of the alleged offense Mary told her 
that she was pregnant by one Edward Tit· 
comb, and that If Titcomb did not perform 
an operation to procure a miscarriage, or get 
aome one to do so, she should perform the 
operation on herself with a lead pencil. It ap-
I>earPd that said declarations neither accom· 
panted nor were explanatory or any a<'t then 
done by her." The e'l"ldence waa ~xeluded, 
and the defendant excepted. This court, In 
the opinion, tl'ellt the evidence as benrsay, 
and say: "~uch evidence le generally lnad· 
mlsslble. There are. however, Be¥eral exrep-
tlone to this rul~. nnd It le eontended by the 
1letendant tb11t thlM evidence n1ay properly 
be brought within some one of tb@'m. The on· 
ly exception 11artlc•ularl7 designated ls that re-
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lating to pedigree. This is, indeed, one of the i siding judges erred in refusing to 1'o(-Q1‘-eflllg
well-recognized exceptions to the general rule.
That which is technically hearsay evidence
is competent evidence upon a question of
pedigree.” An examination of the original
papers hows that one of the contentions of
the defendant was that the evidence that
Mary said that Tltcomb was the fa-tiier of the
child was some evidence in the case that he
was the father, on the ground that it was a
declaration in relation to the pedigree of the
child; and the argument was that, if Tit-
comb was the father, and the defendant was
not, it was improbable that the defendant
would attempt to procure a l1llSt':ll'l'l:l;_'P. The ‘
decision of the court that no question of pedi-
gree was involved in the case, and that for
the purpose of proving that Titcomb was the
father of the child the evidence was hearsay,
and inadmissible, is undoubtedly correct.
But the counsel for the defendant in that
case also contended that evidence of this ,
declaration was admissible to show an inten-
tion in the mind of the deceased to perform
the operation, in connection with the evi-
dence that the operation was one which she
might have performed. There are ome pas- ‘
sages in the latter part: of the opinion which
perhaps tend to show that this argument did
110i Wholly 999808 the mind of the justice
W110 Wl‘0te it, but this particular aspect of the
evidence is certainly not considered, and no
cases are cited, and the whole discussion in
the opinion is that this point in the considera-
tion of the case might not have received the
attention It deserved. Upon 9, 1-9-exmningtion
Qf the question, we are of opinion that under
the circumstances shown in Com. v. Feich
a. part of the evidence should have been ad.
m“t"d 1'91‘ the P“1'Dose of showing the inten-
tion in the mind of the deceased, and that to
this extent that decision must be overruled.
It is not necessary, in the present case, to de-
termine wiiat limitations. if any, in practice
must be put upon the admission of this kind
of evidence. because all the limitations exist
which have ever been Suggegtgd as nones-
sm'.v- The DPYBOII making the declaration, if
one was made. is dead. She had ml ()pp()1'- ‘
tunity to commit suicide, and it was com-
iictcnt for the jury to find that she had a
motive to ¢°m"11i it; and the declaration, if
imide, was made under circiiinstauces which
exclude any suspicion of an intention to make
ovlllonce to be used at the trial. We cannot
RIIOW Whether the J\"'.V would or would not
have folllld that the deceased was the Person
W110 had the interview with the witness, or
whether file?’ W011l(l have believed the wit-
I1c-'-=- or “'he“‘°'» if "Icy did believe her, they
would have found that the deceased had real-
15' the intvllfioll which the declaration liidi-
cated. ul’ “'h"fl“‘1' U18 testimony, in view of
an the g\'l(l9lll‘U, would have iiffei-ted the
minds of the _|ur_v. \\'e can onl_v say ilmt on
the facts‘ 1"*"“°d ill the exceptions the evi-
deuce cannot be_consldered as immaterial 01-
uiilmportant. We are of opinion that the pre-
evidence, and that, for this reason, the ver-
dict against Trefethen must be set agldg
The remaining exceptions may be noticed,
although it is not absolutely necessary to
decide them. The first exception is to the
refusal of the court to permit the counsel
for the defendant to ask Charles E. Ray,
one of the jurors. who was under e.\':iiiilna-
'tion by the court upon the volr dire, "to
what extent he had read about the case in
the newspapers." Ray was sworn as a ju-
ror. and sat as a juror at the trial. The
court read to all the jurors summoned Pub.
St. c. 170, § 35, and chapter 214, § 7, and {lion
‘ read a portion of what was said by .\'lihw.
C. J._. speakiiig for the full court in COIN.
v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 297, 298, viz.: “The
' statute intends to exclude any person who
* has made up his mind or formed a. judg-
ment iu advance in favor of either side. Yet
the opinion or judgment must be something
more than a vague impression, formed from
l casual conversations with others, or from
‘reading imperfect, abbreviated, newspaper
reports. It must be such an opinion upon the
merits of the question as would be likely to
bias or prevent a. candid judgment upon a
full hearing of the evidence." The court al-
so read the statement made by Chapman,
G. J., speaking for the full court, in the trial
of Samuel M. Andrews. Report of Trial of
Andrews, by Charles G. Davis, p. 8. In the
l present case, the court, having put to the
juror Ray all the statutory questions, which
he had answered to its satisfaction, refused
to permit the counsel for the defendant to
put the question we have quoted above. The
statutes we have cited. as also St. 1887, c.
149, undoubtedly contemplate that other
questions besides the statutory questions
may be put to jurors b_v the court. or by the
parties or their attorneys under the direc-
tion of the court. Pub. St. c. 170, § 35. also
provides that “the party objectinl! l0 K119
juror may introduce any other competent ev-
idence ln support of the objection." To de-
termine whether a juror has such bias or
prejudice that he does not stand indifferent
1 in the cause is often a infltter Of 8- 80°11 deal
of delicacy and difllculty, because persons
mot affected with bias or prejudice are
sometimes the least sensible of it; but the
extent to which the examination of the lu-
. ror should be carried after the statutory
questions have been answered has been said
to be within the sound Judgment and J11dt~
cial discretion of the trial judge or judges.
Com. v. Burroughs, 145 Mass. 2.42, 13 N. E.
884. It is plainly lnipossible to exclude every
juror who has read in the nevv8i>=ll>PI‘$ B0111“
statement of the case, because this might
exclude every intelligent man in the coun-
tr_v. It is well known. however. that there
is a growing teiideiicy in i“"'“‘h1 11*’\\'-“'i"\l"'I‘-‘l
to publish not only the evideiii-e fiiveii iii any
preliminary hearing on a charge of crime,
but all sorts of unverified rumors and of
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Case No. 11>] RELEVANCY. 
latlng to pedigree. This ls, Indeed, one of the • siding judges erred lo refuAlng to l"f'<'ei'fe this 
well-recognized ex<~eptlons to the general rule. evidence, and that, for this reason, the ver-
That which ls teehnlcally h.earllay evidence diet against Trefethen must be set aside. 
ls competent evidence upon a question ot The remaining exceptions may be noticed, 
pedigree." An examination of the original although It 18 not abeolu t:ely neeessary t() 
papers shows that one of the contentions of de<'lde them. The first ex<.•eptlon Is to the-
the defendant was that the evidence that refusal of the court to 1>errnlt the counsel 
.Mary said that Titcomb was the father of the for t111• dc•ft•ndant to ask l 'harlt>s E. Ray, 
<'hlld was some evidence In the <"aHe that he one of the Jurors, who wati under examlna-
was the father, on the ground that It was a · tlon by the court UJIOU the volr dire, "to 
declaration In relation to the pedigree of the what extt>nt be had n>ad H bout thl' <·ase In 
chlld; and the argumt>nt was that, If Tit- the news}Hlpere." Ray was sworn as a Ju-
comb was the father, and the defendant was ror, an1t sat as a Juror at the trial. Tbe 
not, lt was Improbable that the defemlant court read to all the jurors summoned Pub. 
would attempt to 1mwm·e 11 mlHt·arrlagP. The St. c. 170, I 3:i, and chapter 214, § 7, and then 
decision of the court that no 11uestlon of 1ielll- ' read a portion of what was said by Shi. w. 
gree was Involved In the ease, and that for 1 C. J., s11eaklng for the full <'OUrt In Com. 
the purpose of proving that Titcomb was the 1 v. Webster, o Cush. 296, 297, 298, viz.: .. The> 
father of the child the evlden<'e was hearsay, ' statute Intends to exclude any lWreon wb() 
and lnadmlselble, Is undoubtedly corre<>t. •
1 
bae made up hie mind or formed a Judg-
But the counsel for the defendant In that ment In advance In favor of either side. Yet 
case also contended that evidence of this , the 011inlon or judgment WUbt bt' HOwethlng 
declaration was admleslble to show an tnten- more than a vague lmpreselon. formed from 
tlon in the mind of the deceased to perform , casual conversations with others, or from 
the operation, In <.'Onnectlon with the evl- 1 rending Imperfect, abbreviated, newepapt•r 
dence that the operation was one whl<·h she re11orts. It must be such an opinion u1wn tht• 
might have performed. There are some pas- · merits of the question as would be likely to 
sages In the latter part of the opinion which bias or prevent a candid judgment upon a 
perhaps tend to show that this argument did j full hearing of the evidence." The court al-
not wholly escape the mind of the justice so read the statement made by Chapman. 
who wrote It, but thla particular aRpect of the 
1
1 C. J., speaking for the full court, In the trial 
ef"ldence ls certainly not considered, and no of Samuel M. Andrews. Report of Trial of 
<'llses are cited, and the whole discussion In I Andrews, by Charles G. Davis, p. 8. In the 
the opinion ls that this point In the ronsldera- ' present case, the court, having put to the 
tlon of the case might not have received the juror Ray all the statutory quesUons, which 
attention It deserved. Upon a re-examination he had answered to its satisfaction. refused 
o.f the question, we are of oplnlon that under to permit the counsel for the defendant to 
the circumstances shown In Com. v. Felch put the question we have quoted above. 'l'he 
a part of the evidence should have been ad- statutes we have cited, as also St. 1887, c. 
mlttf'd for the purpose of showing the lnten- 149, undoubtedly contemplate that other 
tlon lo the mind of the deceased, and that to questions bt>sldes the Btatatory QUPl'ltlons 
this extent that decision must be overruled. may be put to jurors by the <.'OUrt, or by tile 
It le not necessary, ln the present <'8se, to de- parties or their attonwys under the dln-c-
termlne what llmltatlons. If any, In practice tlon of the court. Pub. St. c. 170, § 35. altJO 
must be put upon the admlBBlon of this kind provides that "the party objecting to the 
of evlden<>e, because an the limitations exist juror may Introduce any other competent ev-
Whl<'h have ever been suggested as ne<>es- 1dence In support of the objection." To de-
eary. The 1wrson making the declaration, If termlne whether a juror bas such bias or 
one was wade, Is dead. She had an oppor· prejudice that be d<X"S not stand Indifferent 
tunlty to commit sul<"ide, and It was eom- In the cause le often a matter of a good cleal 
11etent for the Jury to find that she bad a of delicacy and dlftl<'Ulty, because persons 
motive to commit It; and the declaration, lf most atre<·ted with bias or prejudice are 
rnude. was made under clrcumHtan<>es which sometime!! the least sensible of It; but the 
exl'lude any suspicion of an Intention to make extent to which the examination of the Ju· 
e\·ltlem•e to be Used at the trial. We c·annot . ror should be carried after the statutory 
kuow whether the Jury would or would not questions have been answered has been said 
ha \·e round that the deceased was the person to be within the sound judgment and judi-
who had the Interview with the wltuesR, or clal discretion of the trial judge or judges. 
wht>thel" they would have belle\"ed the wit- Com. v. Burroughs. 145 M1uu1. 242, 13 X. E. 
nt'HH, or whether, If they did l>Plleve her, they 884. It le plainly Impossible to exclude every 
would have found that the dt'<'eased bad real- juror who has read lo the newspapers some 
ly the lutentlon Which the de<•laratlon lndi- statement of the case, because this might 
<'att'<l, or wlwtber the tet1tlwony, In view or t'X<'lude every lntelligPnt man In the coun-
all the eYhlt>nt·e, wouhl haYe al'f('(•ted the trr It le well known. boWt'VPr. that tht•n> 
mlndtt of' tht• Jury. "'e ean only !lily that on Is.~ growing tt•rnlent·1· In c..-rtaln llt'WKfJ1tf1t•rs 
the fact~ re<·l~ In the exceptions the evl- to publish not onlx tl~e e,·hlt>u1·P gtveu In any 
d<'n<'e caunot W considered as Immaterial or prellmlnnry hearing on a charge of crime, 
unimportant. e are of opinion that the pre- but all sorts of unverUled rumors and of 
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(mile Ce-flee of Suspected persons.
@H11“0;v1° Pracilce in 8. case. vvhich excites
like? 1v0P“1ar_mte'~'e3t may sometimes re-
ilif-‘ egtffiofdlnary care on the part of the
opinlons concerning the probable guilt
This rep-
the selection of jurors, if the ac-
'15 t° have an h11Dartial trial. If the
ion °t the ‘-'°“1't t1'Yil1:-‘r the case in the
of illfi t‘X1lmiuation of jurors, after
wtutory questions have been put and
ct°"“Y 9-‘-lswered, is absolute, we can-
not revise iii if it is DOE we cannot say, as
of 111W, 011 the soniewliut meager
smte““>11t Wliiililled in the exceptions. and
in the absence of anything indicating what
mnabie exception in pi-oving_ that the court
erred in excluding the question.
The mother of the deceased. Mrs. Davis,
tesiiiled to a conversation with the defend-
am on the morning of December 24th, a
pan of which is as follows: “I asked him
where Tena was. He said he hadn't seen
he,-_ ~ * ' Says I, ‘Don't lie. She went
out to meet you last night on the corner of
Ferry street, and you have carried her oti.’
He said he had not. Said I, ‘You have.”'
The counsel for the defendant asked that
this be stricken out, and objected to its ad-
mission. The court overruled the request,
and admitted the testimony, and the defend-
ant excepted. There are other examples of
the admission of similar Ti‘$i.iill()Ily against
the objection of the defendant. It does not
appear that the defendant testifled as a wit-
ness in his own behalf, and no question aris-
es of the admissibility of evidence to affect
his credit as a witness. The exceptions re-
cite that, “after Mrs. Davis had testlfied, the
commonwealth introduced a large amount of
i(*>ifilll0Iiy relating to the conduct of Trefe-
then after the disappearance of Tenn, includ-
ing statements, dz"-<-larutions. conversations,
and conduct of Trefethen with Mrs. Davis"
and other persons named, the general char-
acter of which is set out in the exceptions;
and “that at the interview with Mrs. Davis
on the morning of December 2-ith, when ac-
cused by her of '1‘ena's disappearance, he
[Trefethcn] shed tears, and was greatly ex-
cited; and also * “ “'
time-s in these interviews, during the period
between December 23d and January 10th, he
met the statements quoted in this bill, H1869
to Mrs. Davis by Tenn, and repeated to him
by Mrs. Davis or the oflicers, in various
qg-a§-'3’ sometimes by QXPHCHI délliill, SOIll8-
times by silence, and sometimes by eql1iV0-
cal expressions, such as ‘it must be a mis-
take,’ ‘it is all a mistake,’ ‘it must be some
other party;’ from all which evidence \he
commonwealth claimed and argued. without
objection, that these denials of his relations
with Tena, of her seduction. Of the 11~DD0lnt-
ment with her for the evening of December
23d. and his connection with her disappear.
once and death, Wm‘? f“lS°' and were made
;and hearing of 3 dfifemade 1
the counsel of the defendant had any rea- “
. no reply is made, is not
that at various ‘
in evide11<? .. >
Fitzgcr.-1113 7- Y‘ “H1111; hill) an and
E. 100- If all-l Part ’ 1<18*ls
the defendant Put In 1' a. +\1 an ‘Wm
directly or l'nd_1‘:§°t1_\-,evidenQ°l1ve '
the crime 0113" G» th thate
right to hfl "9 ?ub ee Clef
said to and I 1938812112 vi ellda
relatin to f 1e 9 I11
in his gfavor. C0111. v_sgb.I'e(.t salve
When a statelll‘-“It is ‘°.Y@s' ‘utbvu
tends to show flint he
mains silent, OI’ makes
the rule of lavv 11-'75 been
lows: "The rule is that
in the presence Of U19 de stllteme
him, unless it aplle-‘lrs tbata
to make a reply, and that 1;
made by such person, and
cumstances, as naturally to
unless he intends to adm;
makes a. reply wholly or pa
the truth of the facts state
he statement was
under Such cir.
can 1'01’ a reply,
¢ it. But if he
""111? tldmitting
di both the state-
lllpete t _
Com. v. Kenney. 12 Metc. (M11555) 2;:-‘,’.idf;'f,‘,’,'§_
v. Galavan, 9 Alien, 271," com_ v_ Brown‘
121 Mass. 69, 80. See Com. v. Densniore, 12
Allen, 535. Com. v. Brown was an indict-
ment for procuring the miscarriage of one
Ann Powers, otherwise cailed Emma L.
Smith, and one Frances Ordway, otherwise
called Frances A. Chase. In that case one
Geflfge, a police oflicer, testified that he
“took the defendant into the presence of
Emma L. Smith and Frances A. Chase, and
asked them in the defendant's hearing and
presence it they knew him. Both S8141 that
they knew him. One knew him as Dr. King,
the other knew him as Dr. Brown. I asked
them if he performed an operation on them-
They said he did. The defendant asked if
they had been operated on previously by any
other person. They said, ‘No,’ " etc. This
testimony was admitted against the objec-
tion of the defendant. The full court Sill/'1
“in this case, when Emma L. Smith and
Frances A. Chase stated that the defend-
ant had performed an operation on them, he
did not remain silent, but asked them in re-
ply if they had been previously operated up-
on by another person. The jury might infer
from this an admission by him of the truth
of their statements.“ It is obvious that when
the reply of a defendant to a Statement made
to him, which, if true, tends directly or in-
directly to prove that he is guilty of the
crime charged, is not an unc'qui vocal aflirma-
tlon or denial of the truth of the gt1l,[9lllt‘ili'.,
diflicult questions must often arise in (le-
termining whether the reply is of such a
character that it has any tendency to show
a consciousness of guilt which will warrant
to protect himself again.-it the charge of mur- 1 its admission as evidence against him. Per-
wn.ous.Ev. --4
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'FACTS :SHOWING J?UOB~~.z..-E C.AUS~. 
0 9tnlona concerning the probable guilt der." Z~ a. de~;::ida.nt f [ 
C!llll" oCeJlce of auspect.ed persona. Thie rep· and un~c-:1-..-aJV~tf: <le-tl: ~" °""9.~0. 
otljlll tt:>le practice in a CWH. whlch excites whole c<'i:& ver. .n, lt ~~ J 41-~ '6 
rebesi8 ~pular inte-rest may eouietimee re- in evld~iice 8~':i.,.fii8t ~t~~ t. ,.:: 'Jll>'ftb. <!l1. 
gm1-t e"--t;n.ordlnary care on the part of the lt'ltsger&.id -v. llt41~ tQ ~0t be t/JJs 18 l21e, qmre ~P the selection of jurors, lt the ac· E. 100. Z~ a.DY 1;1.ll'f: o,r -l~,s ~o& all lll~ll t.be 
court 1-' to have an llnpartlal t.rlal It the the de:f'e:o.da.P"t pu 1.Q e ~ ~aaa ltdlll1881, C!ed ~ tlOll Of the court trying.the C~ ln the directly or J.ocU~tJ,. "'tcte~<..'Q~l'e~ '~ 2() OJl. 
dlle'r:r of the examlnatlon of jurors. attet the crime cbB.rg~ ~ t~~t ~e tell</. 'llt/oll ,,.1f:; 
mltt st.a tutory que8tlons have been put and right to ba ve P~ 1.Q e e Cler. Ile 18 ; to Bbo"1'. ~t\Bfactorlly &DBWered., ls absolute, we can· said to and bY ltt:t l.lt 1"/cl<•..r.i e~dllrJt hll!Jt.r or 
st: t re~lse lt; If lt la not, we cannot aay, aa relating to -the 88llle 811b flJe ;: ll.JJ tba':'1 tbe 
:..tteT Of law, on the 80Inevo'i1Ut WPa.ger in his ~avor. CODl. l>'. ~ '.J~t, llJe tlllJe lVas 
atatetut>Ut contained l:n the exc"ptions, aml Whesa a statezneDt le tt:I e.J>es ftbo111rb 1 111Jd 
ln the 11\>lle'nce of anything lndlcatiug what and llearlog 0£ a <lerellri~~e 1;, J Gra,., 8~8 
the counsel of the defendant had any re&· tends to show -tbBt he 1~t. TVhJe: PreaelJce· 
10nable exception ln proving_ that the court mains silent, or .llltUce8 a lfnllt,., llll' Jr f.zoue, 
erred lD exeludlng the question. the rule of law bsB bee..n ~ eqllil'oe.1 be re. 
The Dlother of the· deceased, Mra. Davie, lows: "The rule Is that ~ted to ;; l'epJ.F, 
teat\tted to a conversation wltb the defend- in the presence ot the det: 8 tatel1Jeat 48 ro1. 
ant on the morning of December 24th, a no reply le made, Is not a;Zldaat, to w~:de 
pa\t of wblch ls aa foll<!ws: .. I asked him him, unless it appears that ~1118lbJe llgaJIJ':/: 
where Tena was. He e8.ld he hadn't seen I to make a reply, and that the Was at Uberty 
her. • • • Says I, •Don't Ile. She went made by such person, and u BtateJ:UeIJt waa 
out to meet you last night on the corner of I cumetances, as naturally to ca~1er such cfr. 
Fem atreet, and you have <.'ftrrled her off.' unless he lntPnds to admit ft r;r a reply, 
Ile aa.ld be bad not. Said I, 'You have.'" makes a reply 'vholly or partfaJl ut ff he 
The counael for the defendant asked that the truth of the facts stated, 00J: ::mlttlng 
thls be stricken out. and objected to its ad- ment and the reply are competent e:idS:!!!: 
ml•lon. The court overruled the request, Com. v. Kenney, 12 Mete. (MaBB.) 28€1; Com. 
and admitted the testllnony, and the defend- v. Galavan, 9 Allen, 271." Com. v. Brown, 
ant excepted. There are other examples of 121 Mass. 69, 80. See Com. v. Dens:more, 12 
the admlaslon of slmllar teKtlmony against Allen, 33:>. Com. v. Brown was an lndfct-
the objection of the defendant. It does not ment for procuring the miscarriage of one 
appear that the defendant teeWled as a wit· Ann Powel'll, otben\rlae ca.lled EDlma L. 
ness In bis own behalf, and no question arle- Smith, and one Frances Ordway, otherwise 
es of the admleslblllty of evidence to affect called Frances A. Chase. In that case one 
his credit as a witness. The exceptions re- George, a police oftlcer, testltled that he 
cite that, "after Mrs. Davis had teetltled, the "took the defendant into the presence of 
coIDmonwealth introduced a large amount of Emma L. Smith and Frances A. Chase, and 
te~tlmony relating to the conduct of Trefe- asked them In the defendant's hearing and 
then atter the disappearance of Tena. lnclud· presence If they knew him. Both said that 
Ing Btatement.s, declarations. conversations, they knew hlm. One knew hlm as Dr. King, 
and conduct of Trefethen with Mrs. Davie" tbe other knew him as Dr. Rrown. I asked 
and other persons named, the general char· them If he performell an operation on them. 
acter of which ls set ont In the exceptions; They said he did. The defendant asked if 
and "that at the Interview with Mrs. Davie they had been operated on prevloUBlY by any 
on the morning of DecemlM1r 24th, when ac- other person. They sutd, 'No,'" etc. This 
cosed by her of Tena•s ttlsappearance, he te11tlmony was admitted against the objec· 
[Trefethen) abed tears, and was greatly ex· 1 tton of the defendant. The full court aay: 
<·lted; and also • • • that at various ·\ "In this case, when Emma L. Smith and 
tlnlea In these interviews, during the period Frances A. Chase stated that the defend· 
between December 23d and January 10th, he ant had performed an operation on them, be 
met the statements quoted In this bill, made did not remain sllent, but asked them In re-
to Mra. Davis by Tena., and repPated to hlm ply If they bad been previously operated up-
by Mrs. Davis or the ofllcere, lo various 1 on by another person. The jury might Infer 
waya, BOmetlmes by explicit denial, some- , from this an admlBBlon by him of the truth 
times by silence, and sometimes by equlvo- : of their statements." It ls obvious that when 
eal expreMlons. su<"h . as 'it mUBt be a mis- the reply of a defPndant to a statement made 
take,' 'It Is all a mistake,' 'it must be some to him, wbl<'b, If true, tends directly or In· 
other party;' trom all which evidence \.he directly to prove that he Is guilty of the 
commonwealth claimed and argued, without crime charged, le not an une'quivoca.l aftlrma· 
objection, that theere denials of bis relations tlon or denial of the truth of the statement, 
with Tena. of her seduction, of the appoint- dltftc·ult 11uestlons must often arise in de-
ment with her for the evening of December termlning whether thP reply Is ot such a 
23d. and his connection with her disappear- character that It bas any tendency to show 
ance and death, Wt>n> false, and Wert' made a cone<'lousness of guilt which will warrant 
to protect himself a11:aim•t the charge of mur- its admlKslon as e\·ldence against him. Per· 
wa.aus.•v .--4 49 
Case No. 1-5]
RELEVAN CY.
haps a certain discretion must be left to the - a reasonable doubt that the defendant made
presiding judge or judges, in view of all the
circumstances of the case. The same is true
‘when the conduct and declarations of the
defendant are put in evidence for the pur-
pose of showing a consciousness of guilt on
his part. See Com. v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185,
189.
The exceptions in the present case do not
set out verbatim the whole conversation be-
tween Mrs. Davis and the defendant on the
morning of December 24th, and of that set
out we cannot say, as matter of law, that
some of the replies were not such as to War-
rant their admission as evidence against the
defendant. If these were admitted, the de-
fendant had the right to have the whole con-
versation on that subject put in evidence.
The logical effect of an unequivocal denial
of guilt, if it have any effect, is in favor of
the defendant; and the admission of the
denials of the defendant, if the jury prop-
erly considered the evidence, was in favor of
the defendant. This is shown in the at-
tempt, often made by a defendant when the
government has introduced evidence of a
confession made on one occasion, to intro-
duce evidence that on other occasions he has
denied that he was guilty. While evidence
that the defendant has made false state-
ments in regard to many facts which are rel-
evant to the issue is admitted against him
a tending to show his guilt, it is not com-
petent for the government to contend that a
denial of guilt is of itself evidence against
the defendant. To argue that by the other
evidence the defendant is shown to be prob-
ably guilty, and that therefore his denial of
guilt ls false, and is additional evidence
against him. ought not to be permitted.
When a defendant in a. criminal case is
shown to have made certain false statements
of facts, and these facts are relevant to the
issue, the fact that the defendant has know-
ingly made the false statements may have
some tendency to show that he is guilty;
but the jury must first be satisfied beyond i
50
the statements, and that they were false,
and that the defendant knew that they were
false, before any weight can be given to
this evidence, unless the statements of them-
selves have some tendency to show his guilt.
But when the defendant denies generally
that he is guilty, this statement cannot be
shown to be false, except by proving that
he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and
then it is unnecessary. If there is a rea-
sonnble doubt of his guilt on all the other
evidence. the fact that he unequivocally de-
nied his guilt is not, of itself, evidence
against him; and the denial cannot be as-
sumed to be false because it has not been
proved to be false by suflicient evidence.
Some of the denials of the defendant in the
present case were denials of facts which
were relevant to the issue, and not a gen-
eral denial of guilt, and we do not know
whether the evidence was not such as to
satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that these denials were knowingly false.
Some of the evidence recited was competent
on the ground that the conduct or replies of
the defendant, in view of the statements
made to him, had some tendency to show
guilt on his part. If in one conversation
some of the replies of the defendant had
some tendency to show guilt, and some were
explicit denials of guilt, we cannot say that
the defendant has been prejudiced by the
. admission in evidence of all that was said
at that interview directly or indirectly re-
lating to his guilt or innocence if the jury
were properly instructed upon the applica-
tion to be made of this evidence. We cannot
presume that the court did not take pains
properly to instruct the jury upon the legiti-
mate use to be made of the evidence admit-
ted, and warn the jury that the statements
made to the defendant were not to be consid-
ered. in and of themselves, as any evidence
of the facts stated. On this part of the case
the exceptions disclose no error of law.
Verdict against Trefethen set aside.
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Cue No. 15] RELEVANCY. 
haps a certain diacretton must be left to the a reasonable doubt that the defendant made 
presiding judgt> or judges, in view of all the the statements, and that they were falee, 
clr<'umstancea of tile case. The same la true and that the defendant knew that they were 
when the conduct and declarations of the false, before any weight can be given to 
defendant are put In evidence for the pur- this evidence, unle88 the statements of them-
pose of showing a consciousness of guilt on selves have some tendency to show bis guilt. 
his part. See Com. v. Piper, 120 l\la88. llm, But when the defendant denies generally 
189. that he ls guilty, this statement cannot be 
The exceptions In the present ca11e do not shown to be false, except by proving that 
set out verbatim the whole convel'l!atlon be- he ls guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and 
tween Mrs. Davis and the dt>fen<lant on the then It Is unnecessary. It there ls a rea-
11101·1,1tng of DeC't>mber 24th, and of that set aonallle doubt of his guilt on all the other 
out we cannot say, as matter of law, that t>vldt-n<•e, the tact that he unequivocally dt>-
aome of the replies were not such 88 to war- nled his guilt ls not, of Itself, evlden<'t' 
rant their admit111lon as evldenC'e against the , against him; and the denial cannot be as-
defendant. It these were admitted, the de- I aumt>d to be false because It bas not been 
fendant had the right to have the wholt> con- proved to be false by su1Bclent evidence. 
versatlon on that subject put lo evidence. Some of the denials of the defendant In the 
The logical effect of an une'qulvocal denial present case were denials of facts which 
of guilt, If It have any effect, la In favor of were rt>leYant to the l•ue, and not a gen-
the defendant; and the admlBBlon of the eral denial of guilt, and we do not know 
den'lals of the defendant, If the jury prop- whether the evidence was not such a.a to 
erly considered the evidence, was In favor of satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt 
the defendant. This ls shown In the at- that these denials were knowingly false. 
tem1>t, often made by a deft-ndant when the Rome of the evidence redted was competent 
government bas Introduced eYldence of a on the ground that the ronduct or replies of 
confesalon made on one occasion. to Intro- I tile defendant, In view of the statements 
duce evidence that on other occasions he has made to him, had some tendency to show 
denied that he was guilty. While evidence guilt on bis part. If In one conversation 
that the defendant has made false state- some of the replies of the defendant had 
ments to regard to many facts which are rel- some tendency to show guilt, and some were 
evant to the Issue ls admitted against him explicit denials of guilt, we cannot say that 
as tending to show his guilt, lt la not com- the defendant bas been prejudiced by the 
petent for the government to contend that a , admission In evldt>n<'e of all that was sald 
denial of guilt ls of lb1elf evidence against I at that Interview directly or Indirectly re-
the dt>fendant. To argue that by the other latlng to his guilt or Innocence lf the jury 
t>vidt•nce the defendant ls shown to be prob- I were properly Instructed upon the appllca-
ably J."llllty, and that therefore hla denial of tlon to be made of this evidence. We cannot 
guilt Is false, and ls additional eYldence presume that the court did not take paln11 
against him, ought not to be permitted. properly to Instruct the jury upon the legltl-
When a defendant In a criminal case la mate use to be made of the evidence admlt-
shown to have made certain false statements ted, and warn the jury that the statements 
of facts, and these fact8' are relevant to the mmle to the dt>fendant were not to be consld-
lflsue, the fact that the defendant has know- N'ed, In and of themselves, as any evidence 
lngly made the false statemt>nts may have ' of tht> facts stated. On this part of the cue 
some tendency to show that he ta guilty; I the exct>ptions disclose no error of law. 
but the juey must ftrst be satlafted beyond i Verdict against Trefethen set aside. 
fl() 
ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS.
[Case No. 16
J1-iissmx v. 1\£[cCORKELL.
(36 Atl. ace, 154 Pa. St. 323.)
Court of Peninsyivania. April 17,
1893.
Mme“ {1‘0m court of common pleas, Phil-
ade\\l\\\“ c0.unty'
ASs\\mpslt by Anna M. Jensen against
Mm, G_ B. McCorkell. From a judgment
my p\a\ntifi, defendant appeals. Aflirmed.
Ernest L.
$\\p\'\>\D e
“'“\\g\(n Gorman, tor appellant.
Tustin. for am1e1lee-
STERliET'l‘, C. J. This suit is on a note
at 90 days from Liar-ch 28, 1890, made b_v
Rodger Convery to the order of P. C. Con-
very, indorsed by him and by the defendant,
etc. it is conceded the note was duly pre-
sented to the maker at maturity and protest-
ed for nonpayment. The only question was
whether defendant was legally notified of
the dishonor of the note. Alonzo R. Ruther-
ford. the notary by whom it was protested,
testified in substance, that on the day named
he inclosed notice of protest in an envelope
addressed to defendant, “Philadelphia Driv-
ing Park, Philadelphia," l‘is then place of
residence. in said city, and mailed the same
on that day in the Philadelphia post oflice.
He further testifled that on the envelope in
which he sent the notice the‘w0rds “Return
to Alonzo R. Rutherford if not delivered,"
etc., were stamped, and that said lettcr was
never returned to him. It was also in evi-
dence that the then United States carrier
delivery service did not cover ‘Thilaulelphia
Driving Park," but those who resided there,
including defendant, received their n1uilmat-
ter regularly at the sub post oflice or station
located in that section of the city near de-
fendant's residence. The defendant denied
having received the notice of protest; and
his man of business, who was accustomed
to call at the sub post oflice daily, once,
tvvice, and occasionally thrice, for his em-
pl0yer's mail, and sometimes, in his absence,
opening the same, testified that he knew
nothing of the receipt of said notice. No
points for charge were submitted to the
court by either party. After referring to
plaintiffs evidence, tending to show that the
notice of protest was duly mailed to and re-
ceived by defendant, and also to defendant’s
I“(—'l)lltt'iDg testimony, the learned judge in-
gt|"l1Cted the Jury to flnd, from all the evi-
deuce before them, whether or not the no-
“(.9 “'38 sent and reached defendant's place
of business, and, among other things. said:
“If it (-ame to either of them, it was a suf-
fi,.i,_.nt notice, within the requirements of the
1,,“-_ if it came within a reasonable time:”
and that “the date. July 12th, which has been
mentioned in the course of the case, would
be too ]flt€."
Considering the two peciiications in their
inverse order, we think dei’end:1nt unjustly
conlplajng of the court for not charging the
jury that, “under all the evidence in the
case, their verdict should be for the defend-
ant." The learned judge was not requested
to thus instruct the jury, and thereby with-
draw the case from their consideration. If
such instruction had been asked, in view of
the evidence referred to, it would have been
error to have given it.
The only other specification is the follow-
ing excerpt from the learned judge's charge:
“The United States government has taken
hold of the distribution of the mails, and, in
the city of Philadelphia, letters deposited in
the mail are delivered daily; and, where there
is upon the back of an envelope a stamp of
thename of the person who sends letters,
: the letters are returned if they are not de-
livered.” “Under this condition of things, I
instruct you there is a presumption, when
the letter is mailed to the proper address
within the city, that it is delivered in ac-
cordance with the direction." The plaintiff's
evidence, as we have seen, was to the effect
that. on the day the note was dishonored, a
notice of protest, properly addressed to de-
fendant, was deposited in the Philadelphia
post ofiice. In due course of mail the letter
thus deposited by the notary would be prop-
erly transmitted to the sub post otiice, in the
vicinity of defendant's residence, where he
was accustomed to regularly receive his let-
ters and other mail matter. The plaintiff's
evidence on that subject was suriicient to
warrant the jury in finding the fact on which
their verdict is necessarily predicated, viz.
that the letter reached its destination—de-
fendant‘s place of business or residcnce—by
due course of mail, etc. As we said in Whit-
more v. Insurance 00., 148 Pa. St. 405, 23
Atl. Rep. 1131, it is well settled that the fact
of depositing in the post office a properly ad-
dressed, prepaid letter raises a natural pre-
sumption, founded in common experience,
that it reached its destination by due course
of mail; in other words, it is prima facie
evidence that it was received by the person
to whom it was addressed; but that prima
facie proof may be rebutted by evidence
showing it was not received. The question
is one of fact solely for the determination of
the jury under all the evidence. Folsom v.
Cook, 115 Pa, St. 549, 9 Atl. Rep. 93; Susque-
hanna M. F. Ins. Co. v. Tunkhannock Toy
Co., 97 Pa. St. 424; Huntley v. Whittier, 105
Mass. 391; Briggs v. Hervey, 130 Mass. 188.
In the case at bar that presumption is
strengthened by the undisputed evidence that
the name and addless of the notary were
stamped on the envelope covering the notice
of protest. So greatly, indeed, does that
fact strengthen the presumption, that it be-
comes well-nigh conclusive. At least it would
be entitled to considerable weight in con-
nection with other facts and circumstances
in the case. In view of the evidence. and
submission of the questions arising there-
on to the jury, their verdict, in favor of plain-
tifl, by necessary implication establishes the
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OHDJNARY COU:RSE OF HUSINE8S. [Case No. 16 
s:JJ.NSE~ T. MceoRKELL. 
(216 A.tl. 806, 134 Pa. St. 323.) 
"'· ~elDe Court 0£ Pennsylvania. April 17, 
g\\\) 1893. 
A.\l\WJI.\ f~m court or common pleas, Phil· 
a.de\\l\l.\a c0nnty. 
A.B&umps\t by Anna M. Jensen aga!Jlst 
Jo\l.n G. 1\. McCorkell. From a judgment 
foT \l~nt\tf, defendant appeals. A.dinned. 
W\U\atn Gorman. 'for appellant. Ernest L. 
TUBtin. for appellee. 
STERRETT, C. J. This suit ls on a note 
at 00 days from l\larch 28, 1800, made by I 
Rodger Convery to the order ot P. C. Con· ! 
very, lndorsed by him and by the defendant, 1 
etc. It la conce<led the oote was duly pre- I 
sented to the maker at maturity and protest-
ed tor nonpayment. The only question was 
whether defendant was legally notffted of 
the dishonor of the note. Alonzo R. Ruther-
ford, the notary by whom It was protested, 
testified in eubstan<'e, that on the day named 
he lnclosed notice of protest In an envelope 
addre88ed to defl'11dnnt, "PWladelphla Driv· 
Ing Park, Philadelphia," Ms tllen place ot 
resldt•nc-e 1n said city, and malled the same 
on that day in the Phlladelphfa post office. 
He further testUled that on the en¥elope In 
which he sent the notice the'words "Return 
to Alonzo R. Rutherford It not d<>ll¥Pred," 
~tc., were stamped, and that said letter was 
ne¥er returned to blm. It was also In e\'i· 
dence that the then United States mrrler 
deUvery service did not cover "Phlln<Jelphla 
Driving Park," but those who resided there, 
Including defendant, received their mall mat-
t:er rPgUlarly at the sub post oftlce or station 
)O<"ated In that section of the city near de-
t'endant's residence. The defendant dt>nled 
ha vlng receh·ed the notice of protest; and 
bis man of business, who was accustomed 
t:o call at the sub post ofllce dally. once, 
twJce, and occasionally thrice, for bis em-
ployer's mall, and sometimes, In hfs absence, 
opening the same, testified that be knew 
nothing of the receipt of said notice. No 
points for charge were submitted to the 
court by either party. After referring to 
plaintflr's evidence, tending to show that the 
notfce ot protest was duly malled to and re-
~ ved by defendant, and also to defendant's 
rebutting testimony, the learned judge In-
structed the jury to ftnd, from all the evi-
dence before them, whether or not the no-
tice was aent and reached defendant's place 
of businese, and, among other things, said: 
"If ft came to either ot them, It was a suf-
dclent notice, wlthfn the 1equlrementB of the 
Jaw, fL It came wlthfn a reasonable time:" 
and that "the date, July 12th, which has been 
menttoned In the course of the case, would 
be too 1ate." 
Considering the two Bpeelft<.'8tlons In their 
'Inverse order, we think defendant unjustly 
compJaJ.mt of the court for not charging the 
jury that, "under all the evidence in the 
case, their verdict should be tor the defend-
ant." The learned judge was not requested 
to · thus Instruct the jury, and thereby with· 
draw the case trom their consideration. It 
such Instruction bad beeu asked, In view ot 
the evidence referred to, It would have been 
error to have given It. 
The only other specUlcatlon le the follow-
ing excerpt from the learned judge's eharge: 
"The 'Lnlted States government has taken 
hold of the distribution ot the malls, and, 1n 
the city ot Philadelphia, letters deposited In 
the mall are delivered dally; and, where there 
ls upon the back of an envelope a stamp of 
the ·name of the person who sends letters, 
the letten are returned It they are not de-
livered." "Under this condition of tbfngs, I 
instruct you there Is a presumption, when 
the letter ls malled to the proper addreBB 
within the city, that It ls delivered 1n ac-
cordance with the direction." The plalntUr's 
e¥1den<'e, as we have seen, was to the etfe<"t 
that. on the day tht> note was aienonored, a 
notice of protest, properly addressed to de-
fendant, was deposited In the Philadelphia 
post offtce. In due course ot mall the letter 
thus deposited by the notary would be prop-
erly transmitted to the sub post offtce, In the 
vicinity of defendant's residence, where he 
was accustomed to regularly receive hie let-
ters and other mall matter. The plalntltr's 
evidence on that subject was sufficient to 
warrant the jury In tlndlng the fact on whfcb 
their verdict ls D(>('e&sarily pi-edlcated, viz. 
that the letter rea<'hed Its destlnutlon-de-
tendant's place of business or rt>sldt>nC'e-by 
due co11n1e of mall, etc. As we said In Whit-
more v. Insurance Co., 148 Pa. St. 405, 23 
A.tl. Rep. 1131, It ls well settled that the fact 
ot depositing In the post ofllee a properly ad-
dressed, prepaid letter raises a natural pre-
sumption, founded 1n rommon experience, 
that It rea<>hed Its destination by due course 
of mall; In other words, It le prima facle 
evidence that It was received by tlle person 
to whom lt was addressed; but that prlma 
facle proof may be rebutted by evidence 
showing It was not received. The question 
ls one of fact solely for the determination of 
the jury under all the evidence. Folsom v. 
Cook, 115 Pa1 St. 549, 9 Atl. Rep. 93; Susque-
hanna M. F. Ins. Co. v. Tunkhannock Toy 
Co., 97 Pa. St. 424; Huntley v. '\\"bittier, 100 
Mau. 391; Briggs v. He"ey, 130 Maes. 188. 
In the case at bar that presumption ls 
strengthened by the undisputed evidence that 
the name and add1eBS ot the notary were 
stamped on the envelope covering the notice 
of protest. So greatly, Indeed, does that 
fact strengthen the presumption, that It be-
comes well-nigh conclusive. At least It would 
be entitled to considerable weight ln con-
nection with other facts and circumstances 
In the <.'8Be. In view of the evidence, and 
submission of the questions arising there-
on to the jury, their verdict, 1n tavor of plaln-
wr, by necessary Implication establishes the 
51 
Case N0. 16] RELEVANCY.
facts that the notice oi! protest, properly there received by him or some one author-
addressed and maiiled to defendant, was ized to receive the same from that ofiice.
promptly transmitted to the sub post oflice That is S\lfl1('i(-‘llt to fix his liability as in-
in the vicinity of his well-known residence dorser.
at “Philadelphia Driving Park,” and was Judgment atflrmed.
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Case No. 16J REI,EVANCY. 
facts that the notl<'e ot protest, properly 
addressed and mli.lled to (letendant, was 
promptly transmitted to the sub post oftlce 
In the vicinity of bis well-known residence 
at ''Pblladelpbla Driving Park," and was 
02 
there received by him or aome one author-
ized to recelYe the same from that omce. 
That ls euftklent to dx bis llablllty u in-
dorser. 
Judgment amrmed. 
SIMILAR OCCURIEENCES SHOWING INTENTION. ETC. [Case No." 17"
S\\“remE
5'!-RTE v. LZIINTON et al.-
(22 s. W. sos, 116 M0. 00.3.)
(jourt of 1\Iissouri. Division No. 2.
June 13, 1893.
from circuit court, Clinton county;
lame“ -AL Saudtrsky, Judge.
W-‘“\am E. .\1inton and George W. Sea-
shoits were convicted of forging a deed in
me name of a fictitious person, and they
appeap Reverse-ti.
Huston & Parrish, for appellants. R. B‘.
Walker, Atty. Gen., for the State.
sores‘
BURui-JSS, J. At the March term, 1891,
of the criminal court of Buchanan county,
Robert F. Zook, ¥Villiam E. Minton, and
George W. Scasholts were indicted for mak-
ing and forging a. false and forged deed pur-
porting to be the act of one Youngberger, a
fictitious person, to convey certain land in
Stone county, Mo., to one Rachel Cross.
The indictment is in two counts.
Zook was acquitted. Ai'ter\\'nrds a change
of venue was awarded the defendants Min-
ton and Seasholts, to the circuit court of
Clinton county, where on trial had at the
January term, 1892, of said circuit court of
Clinton county, defendants were acquitted
on the second count, and found guilty on the
first count, in the indictment, and the pun-
ishment of each one fixed at 10 years’ im-
prisonment in the penitentiary. The count
of the indictment under which defendants
were convicted, leaving out the" formal‘
parts, is as follows: “' ‘ ' did unlawful-
ly and feloniously and falsely make and
forge a certain false and forged deed, pur-
porting to be the act of one William '1‘.
Younghcrger, a fictitious person, by which
a" right and interest in certain real property,
which in said deed purports to lie and be sit-
uate in the county of Stone, state of Mis-
souri, and which in said deed was described
as follows, to wit, all the east one-half of
the northeast quarter of section number
¢-l;:l1 teen, township number twenty-three,
range number twenty-four, containing eighty
9;-res, more or less, purported to be convey-
ed and transferred to one Rachel Cross,
with intent then and there and thereby to
defraud, contrary to the form of the statute
in such cases made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the state
of _\[is=:-=ouri." After conviction, defendants
filed their motion for new trial, and in ar-
rest’ which being overruled, they appealed
to this court.
The first contention on part of defendants
is that there is no evidence to support the
verdict. This court has so often decided
that it will not interfere with a verdict un-
less it is evident that it is the result of pas-
prejudice, or pnrflallty on t1|e part of
I-0;-3 that it is scarcely necessary to
rities on that point. State v, N91-
son’ 98 M0, 414, 11 S. ‘V. 997, and authorj-
fleg cited; State v. Howell, 100 Mm 633, 14
sion,
the jl-1
cite flutho
On a trial, '
S. W. 4; State v. Glahn, 97 Mo. 679, 11 S.
W. 260. We are not prepared to say that
there is a total failure of evidence, or that
it is so weak as to Justify the inference that
the verdict is the result of passion, preju-
dice, or partiality. In fact the evidence
leaves room for little doubt, if any, of their
guilt.
The action of the trial court in admitting
evidence as to other transactions with other
parties. and in admitting in evidence other
deeds than the one described in the indict-
ment, and in admitting proof of the declara-
tions of the defendants with reference
thereto, is assigned for error. Tin-re was SUI.‘
flcient foundation laid to justify the admis-
sion and statements of the defendants, as
against either or both, while their relations
existed as partners in dealing in real estate,
and the sale of lands, and the execution of
deeds therefor, as charged in the indict-
meut. The evidence tends strongly to show
that they were engaged in one common en-
terprise, selling and trading lands in the
county of Stone, in the name of !oungberg-
er, enjoying the proceeds and profits aris-
ing from such transactions, and that while
thus engaged they entered into a conspiracy
to defraud, by selling lands to which they
nor Youngberger, in whose name the con-
veyances were made, so far as the evidence
tends to show, had any right or title. Alon-
‘zo Cross, a. witness for the state. testified
that he made the trade for the land describ-
ed in the indictment with the defendant‘
Seasholts, and that Seasholts told him that
the title thereto was good, that Youngberg-*
er lived n'ear Plattsburg, and that he traded
a good deal in lands. Dillard, also a witness
for the state, stated that the defendants told
him that Youngberger lived in Stone coun-
ty, Mo., and that he went from St. Joe to
Kansas; that he traded with defendants for
a. tract of land, also in Stone county; and
that the decd was signed by Youugberger,
and delivered to him by defendant Sea-
sholts. Charles T. Miller, another witness
for the state, testified that he made a trade
with defendant Mintnn for a tract of land
in Stone county, which Minton caused to be
deeded to him (witness) by William T.
Youngberger, and that he got the impression
from what Minton said that Youngberger
was a traveling man, and was at that time
connected with the coal business in the city.
John Howard, also a witness for the state,
testiiied that he had another and still differ-
ent deal for a tract of land in Stone county,
with defendant Minton, and that he stated
to witness that he would give him a good
warranty deed. a clear title, and a good ab-
stract; that this conversation occurred late
in the evening: that Minton said Youngberg-
er was not there then, but he would make
his deed out, and that he (witness) could
come in the morning and get it, which he
did. It also purported to have been execut-
ed by Youngberger. George Howard, also
53 .
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~lMlLAR. OCCULrnE~CEs SHOWI1'G INTE.YTlO.Y, ETC. [Dase No.17 
e'!A..TE v. MINTON et al. 
(~ S. W. 808, 116 Mo. 605.) 
me Court of MiBSouri. Division No. 2. Su~tt! J"une 13. 1893. 
A.\l\)e8l ~m circuit court, Clinton county; 
Jamee. 14. Sandusky. .Tudge. 
W\\\\atn E. Minton and George W. Sea-
sho\UI were eonvlc1:ed. of forging a df't'd Lo 
tbe name of a tlc-tltlous person, and they 
appeal. '(leversP.d. 
Ruston & Parrish, for appt>llanl8. R. F. 
Walker, A.tty. Gen_, for the State. 
BURlr~SS, J. At the March term, 1891, 
of tbe criminal court or Buc>hanan county, 
Robert F. 1..ook, William E. l.llnton, and 
George 'w. &>asholts were Indicted for mak-
ing and forging a false and forged deed pur-
porting to be the act of one Youngberger, a 
fictitious person, to C'Onvey et>rtaln land In I 
Stone county, Mo., to one Rachel Cross. 
Tbe lndlctment la ln two counts. On a trial, ' 
Zook was acquitted. Afti>rwnnlM a <·bange 
<If venue was awarded the tlc>fl'ntlants Min-
ton and Sensholts, to the circuit court of 
Cllnton county, where on trial had at the 
January tem1, 18U'.l, of said circuit court of 
Clinton county, defendants were acquitted 
on the second count, and round guilty on the 
11.rst oount, In the Indictment, and the pun-
ishment of each one fixed at 10 years' Im· 
11rtsonment In the penitentiary. The count 
<>t the Indictment under which defendants 
'1Vere convicted, leaving out the formal 
parts, ls as follo:ws: "• • • did unlawful-
ly and felonlousty anti falsely make and 
1'orge a certain fnlt;ie nrut forged df'ed, pur-
porting to be the act of one William T. 
Y oungberger, a fl<·tltlous person, by which 
a· right and Interest In certain real property, 
wblcb In said deed purports to lie and be slt-
ua1:e In the county of Stone, state of Mis· 
11<>Uri, and which In said deed was descrtbed 
as .t'ollows, to wit, all the east one-half of 
"Lbe northeast quarter or section number 
el~bteen, township number twenty.three, 
range numlM>r twenty-four, containing eighty 
aeres. more or lf'sR, purported to be convey. 
eel and transf(•rn>d to one Ra<·bel Cros1t, 
wtt:b Intent then and thPre and thereby to 
de:traud, contrary to the form of the statute. 
fn such cases made and provided, and 
agafns1: the peace and dignity of the state 
at :\flflffOUrl." After convletlon, defendants 
tiled t:belr motion for new trial, and In ar· 
rest. which bPtng overruled, they appealed 
to this court. 
The t1rst contention on part of def Pndunts 
ls that tbere ls no evidence to support the 
verdict.. This court has 110 oftPn dt>C'ldt>d 
that it will not Interfere with a vPr<llc>t un· 
lf"SB It Is evident that It Is the result ot pas-
tdon, prejudice, or partiality on the part of 
the jurors that It ls scn1·ct>ly neces!lary to 
·lte authorities on that point. State v. Nel-
'- 98 Mo. 414, 11 S. W. 997, and author!-
::· cited; 8tate v. Howell, 100 :Mo.~. 14 
S. W. 4; State v. Glahn, 97 Mo. 679, 11 S. 
W. :.mo. We are not prepared to say that 
thel'e ls a total failure of evidence, or that 
It Is so weak as to justify the Inference that 
the verdict Is the result of passion, preju-
dice, or partiality. In fact the evldenc~ 
leaves room for little doubt, If any, of their 
guilt. 
The action of the trial court In admitting 
evidence as to other transactions with other 
parties, and In admitting In evidence other 
deeds than the one described In the Indict-
ment, and In admlt~lng proof of the declara-
tions of the defendants with reference 
thereto, ls assigned for error. There was Slu-
tlclent foundation laid to justify the admis-
sion and statements of the defendants, as 
ag11ln11t either or both, whlle their relations 
existed as partners In dealing In real estate, 
and the sale of lands, and the execution of 
deeds therefor, . as c>harged In the Indict· 
ment. The evidence tends strongly to show 
that they were engaged In one common en-
terprise, selling and trading lands In the 
county of Stone, in the name of :t:oungberg-
er, enjoying the proceeds and profits aris-
ing from such transactions, and that while 
thus engaged they Pntered Into a conspiracy 
to defraud, by selllng lands to which tuey 
nor Youngberger, In whose name the con-
veyances were made, so far as the evidence 
tends to show, had any right or title. Alon-
, zo Cross, a witness for the state. testified 
that he made the trade for the land describ-
ed In the lndl<>tmPnt with the defendant' 
Seasholts, and that Sensholts told him that 
the title thereto was good, that Youngberg-· 
er lived near Plattsburg, and that he traded 
a good deal In lands. Dillard, also a witness 
for the Rtate, stated that the defendants told 
him that Youngherger lived In Stone coun-
ty, l\Io., and that he went from St. Joe to 
Kansas; that he traded with defendants for 
a tract of land, also In Stone county; and 
that the deed was signed by Youngberger; 
and dellvered to him by defendant 15ea-
sholts. Charles T . Miller, another wltnesa 
for the state, testltled that he made a trade 
with defendant Minton for a trnc>t of land 
In f:.tone c·ounty, wltll'l1 ~llnton cnui;ed to be 
deeded to him (wltut>tis) by Wllllam T. 
Youngberger, aud thut be got the Impression 
from what Minton said that Youngberger 
was a travt>llng man, and was at that time 
connected with the coal business In the city. 
John Howard, 11180 a witness for the state, 
te1ttltlPd that he had another and still dltrer-
ent deal for a tract of land In Stone county, 
with dE"fendnnt Minton, and that he stated 
to wltnesR that he would give him a good 
warranty deed. a clear title, and a good ab-
struct; that this conversation occurred late 
In the evening; that Minton said Youngberg-
er wnR not there then, but he would make 
his deed out, and that he (witness) could 
come In the morning and get It, which he 
did. It al110 purportl'd to have been execut-
ed by Youngberger. George How8l'd, also 
63. 
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a witness, testified on behalf of the state v. Bank tllio. Sup.) 3 S. W. 876, and authori-
that he had a similar transaction with de-
fendant .\iinton for land in Stone county;
that Minton caused deeds to be executed to
him in the name of Yonngberger, and stat-
ed to him that Youngberger was a banker in
_Atcnison, Kan. Similar statements were
made by defendants to other persons who
were witnesses, on different occasions, which
were contradictory, and, when taken in con-
nection with the other facts and circumstan-
ces in proof, show conclusively that there
was a conspiracy existing between the de-
fendants to defraud, and jnstlfied the admis-
sion of proof of the statements of the one
against the other, as long as such conspira-
cy existed. State v. Melrose, 98 Mo. 594,
12 S. W. 250.
There was no error in admitting in evi-
dence deeds other than the one described in
the indictment. While such deeds had a
tendency to show that defendants were
guilty of other crimes than the one with
which they stand charged, and were upon
trial, they were not for that reason, alone,
inadmissible, but they were admissible for
the purpose of showing the intent with
which the act was done, being as they were
of similar character, executed, not only in
the same place, but purported to be signed
and acknowledged by the same party,
(Yonngbergen) and several of them purport-
ed to have been acknowledged before the
same notary. This subject underwent an
exnaustive review by this court in the case
of State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558, and under the
ruling in that case the deeds were clearly
admissible for the purpose of showing guilty
knowledge on the part of defendants. State
v. Bayne, 88 Mo. 604.
The court, over the objections of the de-
fendants, allowed the jury, at the sugges-
tion of the prosecuting attorney, to compare
the signature of William '1‘. Youngberger,
as it appeared on the deed from him to
George Seasholts, and the two deeds from
him to Howard, with the signature of
Youngberger to the deed described in the in-
dictment. They were no part of the record
in the case, not admitted to be in the hand-
writing of either one of the defendants, and
clearly inadmissible for the purpose of com-
parison. “When there are other writings in
the case, conceded to be genuine, they may
be used as standards of comparison, and the
comparison may be made by the jury, with
or without the aid of experts. 1 Grecnl. Ev.
§ 578; State v. Scott, 45 Mo. 302; State v.
Tompkins, 71 Mo. 614. But, with us, such
papers can only be used when no collateral
issue can be raised concerning them. 1
lreenl. Ev. § 581: State v. Clinton, 67 Mo.
380." The signatures on the deeds, other
than the one described in the indictment,
did present collateral issues; and the jury
_ should not ha\'e been permitted to compare
the signature of Youngbcrger, on them, with
the one described in the indictment. Rose
ties cited. It is only when the writing of-
fered in evidence is connected with the case
on trial, or is admitted to be genuine, that
it is the subject of comparison with the
writing in controversy, or. as in this case.
that which the defendants are charged with
having signed the name of some fictitious
person thereto, unlawfully.
There was no error in permitting the wit-
ness Eugene Spratt to testify that the name
of William T. Younguerger, signed to the
deed described in the indictment, was in the
handwriting of the defendant Seasholts.
He had already testified that he was ac-
quainted with the handwriting of Seasholts,
and that was all that was necessary in or-
der to qualify him to testify in the case, and
to give his opinion as to whether or not the
name signed to the deed was in the hand-
writing of defendant Seasholts. Fash \'.
Blake, 38 Ill. 363; Clark v. Freeman, 25 Pa.
St. 133; Watson v. Brewster, 1 Pa. St. 381;
Garrells v. Alexander, 4 Esp. 3"‘.
Nothing, however, that was said by either
of the defendants after the conspiracy end-
ed, and not in the presence of the other, was
admissible in evidence against the one not
making the statements or admissions. State
v. Melrose, 9H .\io. 594, 12 S. W. 250; State
v. Hilderbrand, 105 Mo. 318, 16 S. W. 948;
State v. Mt-Graw. 87 Mo. 161.
The admission of the -postal card purport-
ing to have been written by L. H. Smith,
recorder, and addressed to L. L. Martin, St.
Joseph, M0,, dated Galena. M0,, October 1,
1890, was immaterial, hearsay, and inadmis-
sible for any purpose. Its effect could only
have been injurious to the defendants, and
should have been excluded.
While the instructions, or some of them.
at least, are subject to verbal criticism, tak-
en as a whole, they presented the case very
fairly to the jury, and as favorably to the
defendants as they could expect. There is
no objection to them, when taken altogeth-
er, that would justify a reversal.
We come now to the consideration of the
sutflciency of the indictment. Section 3653,
Rev. St. 1889, under which it is drawn, is
as follows: “The false making, forging, or
counterfeiting any instrument or writing.
being or purporting to be the act of anoth-
er, by which any pecuniary demand or ob-
ligation, or any right, interest, or claim to
money, right in action, or property, shall be,
or purport to he, or intended to be, convey-
ed, transferred, created, increased, dischar-
ged, diminished, or in any manner affected,
to which shall be atiixed a fictitious name,
or the name of any person, or pretended sig-
nature of any person. not in existence, shall
be deemed a forgery, in the same degree and
in the same manner as if the name so atiix-
ed was the name of a person in being, or
purporting to be the signature of a person in
existence." The indictment is manifestly
bad, and charges no offense against the de-
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Case No. 17] REL.EV ANCY. 
a wltnell8, testified on behalf of the state 
that be bad a similar transaction with de-
fendant lilnton for land In Stone county; 
tbat .Minton caused deeds to be exe<·uted to 
him In the name of Youngberger, and stat-
ed to him that Youngberger was a banker In 
Atcui11<>n, Kan. Similar statements were 
ina .. e by defendants to other persone who 
were wltnee11ee, on different occasions, which 
W('re contradictory, and, when taken ln con-
nection with the other facts and clrcumstan-
(•es In proof, show conclusively that there 
was a conspiracy existing between the de-
fendants to defraud, and justified the admis-
sion of proof of the statements of the one 
against the other, as long as such conspira-
cy existed. State v. Melrose, 98 Mo. 504, 
12 s. w. 200. 
There was no error In admitting In evl· 
dence deeds other than the one described In 
the Indictment. While sn<'h deeds bad a 
tendency to show that defendants were 
guilty of other crimes than the one with 
which they stand chahted, and were upon 
trial, they were not for that renson, alone, 
lnadmlBBlble, but they were admissible for 
the purpoae of showing the Intent with 
which the act was done, being as they were 
of similar character, executed, not only In 
the same pla<'e, but purported to be stgned 
and a<'knowledged by the same party, 
(Youngberger,) and several of them purport-
ed. to have been acknowledged. before the 
same notary. '.rhls subject underwent an 
exuaustlve review by this court In tbe case 
of State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558, and under the 
rullog In that cnse tlae deeds were clearly 
admissible for the purpose of showing guilty 
knowledge on the part of defendants. State 
v. Bayne, 88 'Mo. 604. 
The court, over the objections of tbe de-
fendants, allowed the jury, at the sugges-
tion of the prosecuting attorney, to compare 
the signature of William T. Youngberger, 
as It appenred on the deed from him to 
George Seasholts, and the two deeds from 
him to Boward, with the signature of 
Youngberger to the deed described In the In-
dictment. They were no pnrt of the record 
In the case, not admitted to be In the hand-
wrl tlng of either one of the defendants, and 
clearly inadmissible for the purpose of com-
parison. "When there are other writings In 
the case, conceded. to be genuine, they may 
be used. as standards of comparison, and the 
comparison may be made by the jury, with 
or without the aid ot experts. 1 Greenl. Ev. 
S 578; btate v. Scott, 45 llo. 302; State v. 
Tompkins, 71 'Mo. 614. But, with us, such 
papers can only be used. when no collateral 
Issue can be raised concerning them. 1 
Green!. Ev. § G81; State v. Clinton, 67 'Mo. 
:{80." The signatures on the deeds, other 
tluin the one dN1<•rlbed In the Indictment, 
<lid present collateral Issues; and the jury 
. 11llould not have been pPrmltted to compare 
the signature of Youngberger, on them, with 
the one deserlbed in the indictment. Rose 
M 
v. Bank (Mo. Sop.) 3 S. W. 876, and authori-
ties cited. It Is only when the writing of-
fered ln evidence ls connected with the c&lle 
on trial, or ls admitted. to be genuine, that 
It ts the subject of comparison with the 
writing In controversy, or. as In this case, 
that which the defendants are charged with 
having signed thf! name of some fictitious 
person thereto, unlawfully. 
There waa no error In permitting tbe wlt-
nesa Eugene Spratt to testify that the name 
of William T. Younguerger, signed to the 
deed described In the lndl(•tment. was In the 
handwriting of the defendant Seasholts. 
He had already testified that he was ac-
quainted with the handwriting of St'nsholts. 
and that was all that was neceaaey in or-
der to quality him to testify In the che, and 
to give his opinion as to whether or not the 
name lligned to the deed was In the hand-
writing of defendant Seasholtll. Fash v. 
Blake, 38 Jll. 363; Clark v. Freeman, 25 Pa. 
St. 133; Watson v. Brewster, 1 Pa. St. 381: 
Garrells v. Alexander, 4 Esp. 37. 
Nothing, however, that was said b7 either 
ot the defendants after the coneplracy end-
ed, and not In the presence of the other, was 
adml881ble In evidence against the one not 
making the statements or adml111lona. State 
v. Mell'Ofl(>, 91'1 'Mo. 594, 12 S. W. 200; State 
v. Hilderbrand, 105 Mo. 318, 16 S. W. 948: 
State v. llC'Graw, 87 'Mo. 161. 
The admission of the .postal card purport-
ing to have been written by L. H. Smith. 
recorder, and addressed to L. L. Martin, St. 
Joseph, Mo., dated Galena, Mo., October 1. 
1890, was Immaterial, hearsay, and Inadmis-
sible for an7 purpose. Its effect could only 
have been Injurious to the defendants, and 
should have been excluded. 
While the Instructions. or some of them. 
at least, are 8Ubject to verbal criticism, tak· 
en as a whole, they presented the Mlse verr 
fairly to the jury, and as favorably to the 
defendants as they could expect. There Is 
no objection to them, when taken altogeth-
er, that would justify a reversal. 
We come now to the consideration of the 
sumclency of the Indictment. Section 3653, 
Rev. St. l,889, under which It ls drawn, ls 
as follows: '"l'he false making, forging, or 
rounterfeltlng any instrument or writing, 
bt>lng or purporting to be the act of anoth-
er, oy which any pecuniary demand or ob-
ligation, or any right, interest, or clatm to 
money, right In action, or property, shall be, 
or purport to be, or intended to bt>, convey-
ed, transferred, created, Increased, dischar-
ged, diminished, or In any manner affected, 
to which shall be am:xed a fictitious name, 
or the name of any person, or pretended sig-
nature of any person, not In existence, shall 
be deemed a forgery, in the same degree and 
In the same manner as it the name so amx-
ed was the name of a perff<>n In being, or 
purporting to be the slgnaturt' of a person in 
existence." The lndktment ls manifestly 
bad, and charges no offense against the de--
• 
$IM1L¢\1{ OCCURRENCES SHOWING INTENTION, ETC. [Case No. 17
It does not allege that a fictitious
v1‘9\E‘D<le<1 signature of any person
1:-‘\f'-IK-‘Q was affixed to the deed de-
cflwa in the indie-tlnent. This is absolute-
‘; “cceasafy, under the statute, unless the
gee“ E get forth according to its tenor,
mowmg we fact to he that the name OI. the
m_mm“s person vvas amxed to the deed.
“Mm when the tenor is exact and completc,
“n5 mm;-lently gives the purport, then the
pm?“-“mg clause may be rejected as sur-
p“mage_" 1 Y\’hart. Cr. Law, § 737. The
purport of the instrument necessarily ap-
pears when the instrument is set forth ac-
cording to the tenor. 2 Russ. Crimes, (9th
15¢) 305-, Chit. Cr. Law, 10-11; State v.
YQ1-get, 36 Mo. 33. While the indictment in
ieul\M\t9'
Mme Of
“gt, “S ex
this case does allege that the defendants did
unlawfully and feloniously make and forge
a certain false and forged deed, purporting
to be the act of one William '1‘. Youngberg-
er, a fictitious person, it does not allege that
a fictitious name, or the name of any per-
son not in existence, was atflxed thereto, nor
does it set out the deed in full. We must,
therefore. for these considerations, hold that
it does not charge the defendants with any
criminal offense. The judgment is revers-
ed, and arrested, and cause remanded, with
directions that the indictment be quashed.
and dcfenuants held to answer a new indict-
mcnt to be preferred against them by the
grand jury of Buchanan county. All con-
cur.
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SIM.I.LAH. OCCURHENCES SHOWING lNTENTION, ETC. (Case No. 17 
te 1t does not allege that a ftctltlous 
fend&.D'. • 9 .-etended signature of any person 
name or "l'-t~tence -was affixed to the deNI de-
no~~ \D the indictment. This ls absolnh'-
llC e(.-ees&l"Y• under t.be statute, unless the 
\y :a \a set forth a.ccordlng to lts tenor, ~now\ntc t.be fact to be that the name o~ the 
\\ct\Uous person ~as aftlxed to the dt't'1l. 
"A.nd when thP tenor Is exnC't and compll'h', 
and aum.c\ently gt,~es the purport, then the 
pu\'\10rt\ng clause may be n•J.-i•t1>d 11111 111ur· 
pl~·" 1 Wbart. Cr. Lew, I 737. The 
put'\)Ort of the instrument necessurlly ap-
pears when the ln.Ntrument ls set !orth ac-
cording to the tPnor. 2 RUBB. Crimes, (llth 
}<;d.) 805; 3 Chit. Cr. Law, 10.U; State v. 
Yerger, 88 M.o. 33.. While the Indictment In 
this <'Ilse does allege that the defendants did 
unlawfully and feloniously make and forge 
a <'<'rtnlu false and forged deed, purporting 
to be the act of one Wiiliam T. Youngberg-
er, a tktltlous person, It does not allege that 
a fktltlous name, or the name of any per-
son not In exlstt>nC'e, was altlxed thereto, nor 
does It set out the deNI In full. We must, 
thert•forf>. for the11c considt•mtlons, hold that 
It does not t•hnrge the defendants with any 
criminal offense. The judgment ls revtt11-
ed, and arn-sted, and eam1e n>manded, with 
directions that the Indictment be quashed. 
and d<'ft>nunnts held to answer a new Indict-
ment to be preferred against them by the 
grand jury of Buchanan county. All con-
cur. 
• 
Case No. 18]
RELEVANCY.
COMMONWEALTH v. RUSSELL.
(30 N. E. 763, 156 Mass. 196.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Sufiolk. April 25, 1892.
Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk
county; Daniel W. Bond, Judge.
Charles H. Russell was convicted of for-
gery, and excepts. Exceptions overruled.
Geo. G. Travis, for the Commonwealth.
Frank M. Davis and Chas. F. Spear, for
defendant.
BARKER, J. It is an established excep-
tion to the rule forbidding proof of collat-
eral facts that in prosecutions for forgery
and for uttering forged paper proof is ad-
missible, in order to show an intent to de-
fraud by the forgery, and also to show
knowledge on the part of the accused with
reference to the particular document which
he is charged with uttering, that at or near
the time of committing the alleged offense
he had passed or had in his possession other
similar forged documents. Com. v. Miller,
3 Cush. 243, 250; Com. v. Stone, 4 Metc.
(Mass) 43, 47; Rex v. Ball, Russ. & R. 132;
Rex v. Wylie, 1 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 92; Rex
v. Smith-, 2 Car. & P. 633; Sunderland‘s
Case, and other cases, 1 Lewin, Cr. Cas.
102-104; Rex v. Whiley, 2 Leach, 983; Com.
v. White, 145 Mass. 392, 395, 14 .\'. E. 611.
The admission of such evidence is necessary,
because guilty knowledge is a fact not sus-
ceptible of proof by direct evidence, and can
rarely be shown by explicit admissions, but
only by acts and conduct. Intent to de-
fraud often sufllciently appears from the
circumstances of the transaction, where its
immediate and necessary effect is to de-
fraud; but there are many cases of the false
making of instruments which have no such
necessary effect, and in which the fraudu-
lent intention must be proved by other and
collateral circumstances. Although the in-
troduction of such evidence compels the de-
fendant to meet acts not charged, and may
lead the Jury to convict of one crime upon
proof of another, it is admitted when the
occasion arises. Com. v. Stone. ubl supra;
Com. v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 173, 206. This
doctrine is a. branch of a more general ex-
ception, which, when knowledge or intent
must be proved. allows evidence of acts
not in issue, but which tend to show such
knowledge or intent,—as in the trial of
indictments for passing counterfeit money,
(Com. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472, 476; Com. v.
Hall, 4 Allen, 302;) for obtaining goods up-
on false pretenses. (Com. v. Stone, ubi
supra;) for embezzlement, (Com. v. East-
man, 1 Cush. 216; Com. v. Miller, 3 Cush.
250; Com. v. Tucker-man, ubi supra; Com.
v. Shepard. 1 Allen, 575;) and for adultery,
(Com. v. .\[er|-lam, 14 Pick. 519, 520.) As
said by Bigelow, C. J., in Com. v. Shep-
ard, ubi supra, “it is essential to the rights
of the accused that when such evidence is
admitted it should be carefully limited and
guarded by instructions to the jury, so that
its operation and effect may be confined to
the single legitimate purpose for which it is
competent." In the case at bar the defend-
ant was tried upon an indictment charging
him with the forgery of a check upon a.
bank, purporting to be drawn to his order
by one Andrews, and, in a second count,
with uttering the same check, knowing it to
have been forged. It was shown that when
arrested he had three other checks upon the
same bank, payable to his own order, one of
which purported to be drawn by Andrews;
and evidence, consisting in part of his own
alleged confessions, was admitted, subject
to his exception, tending to show that the
checks found upon him, and also two others
passed by him about the same time as the
one set out in the indictment, were for-
geries. Under the principle above stated, all
the evidence excepted to was competent.
both to show his knowledge that the check
set out in the indictment was forged, and
that his purpose in the forgery and the
uttering was to defraud. It is to be pro-
sumed that correct and appropriate iI1Stl'ui'-
tions, to enable the jury to make a proper
application of the evidence, were given.
Com. v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575, 582; Adams
v. Nantucket. 11 Allen, 203. 205.
Reserving for the present the questions
raised as to the alleged confessions, these
considerations require us to overrule the
other exceptions to the admission of evi-
dence, and also to that portion of the charge
which allowed the jury, on the quetion of
the defendant’s intention to defraud by the
forgery, to consider the fact that he had in
his possession at the time of his arrest other
forged cheeks.
2. The defendant excepted to the admis-
sion of evidence of his alleged confessions.
Before such evidence was received, the wit-
nesses were examined by the defendant's
counsel with reference to any inducements
or statements made to him by the oflleers,
and the bill of exceptions states that it
appeared that no inducements were held
out. When the examination disclosed that
his statements related in part to the other
checks above mentioned, the defendant's
counsel objected to the admission of any
statement or confession about checks other
than the one mentioned in the indictment,
and excepted to all evidence of his state-
ments as to the other checks; but, as all
the statements were pertinent to the ques-
tion whether the che(-ks were forgeries, and
as that question was in law pertinent to
the issue. the evidence was competent. Dur-
ing the charge the court instructed the jury
that, if the testimony of the oiiicers showed
that any inducement or hope of reward
was held out to the defendant, they were
to disregard any confession that might have
been testified to. At the close of the charge
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Case No. 18) RELEVANCY. 
COMMO:'l."WEALTH v. RUSSELL. 
(30 N. E. 763, 156 Ma111. 196.) 
l:!upreme Judicial Court of Maaaacbuaett&. 
l:!utrolk. April 25, 1892. 
Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk 
county; Daniel W. Bond, Judge. 
Charles H. RWJSell was convicted of for-
gery, and excepts. Exceptions overruled. 
Geo. O. Travis, for the Commonwealth. 
l<'rank M. Davis and Cha& F. l:!1>t>ar, tor 
defendant. 
BARKER, J. It ls an establl8hed excep-
tion to the rule forbidding proof of collat-
eral facts that in prosecutions for forgery 
and for uttering forged paper proof ls ad-
inisslble, in order to show an Intent to de-
fraud by the forgery, and also to show 
knowledge on the part of the ac<'used with 
reference to the particular document whkh 
he ls charged with uttering, that at or near 
the time of committing the alleged QtreDSe 
he had passed or had In his possession other 
similar forged documents. Com. v. Miller, 
3 Cush. 243, 230; Com. v. !:!tone, 4 Mete. 
tM8B8.) 43, 47; Rex v. Ball, Russ. & R. 132; 
Rex v. Wylie, 1 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 9'..!; Rex 
v. Smith, 2 Car. & P. 633; Sunderland's 
Case, o.nd other cases, 1 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 
102-104; Rex v. Whiley, 2 Leach, 983; Com. 
v. White, 145 Mass. 392, 395, 14 :\. E. 611. 
The admission of such evidence ls necessary, 
because guilty knowledge ls a fact not sus-
ceptible of proof by direct evidence, and can 
rarely be shown by explicit admissions, but 
only by acts and conduct. Intent to de-
fraud often sutticlently appears from the 
clrcumstanees of the transaction, where Its 
Immediate and necessary etrect Is to de-
fraud; but there are many cases of the false 
making of lnstrflments which have no such 
neceBBary effect, and In which the fraudu-
lent Intention must be proved by other and 
collateral circumstances. Although the In-
troduction of such evidence compels the de-
fendant to meet acts not charged, and may 
lead the jury to convict of one crime upon 
proof of another, It Is admitted when the 
occasion arh1e11. Com. v. Stone. ubl supra: 
Com. v. Tu<·kerman, 10 Gray, 173, 206. This 
doctrine ls a branch of a more general ex-
«eptlon, which, when knowledge or Intent 
must be proved, allows evidence of acts 
not In Issue, but which tend to show such 
knowledge or lntent,-as In the trial of 
Indictments for pasidng counterfeit money, 
(Com. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472, 476; Com. v. 
Hall, 4 Allen, 30'2;) for obtaining goods up-
on false pretenses, (Com. v. Stone, uhl 
11upra;) for embezzlement, (Com. v. Eal!t· 
man, 1 Cush. 216; Com. v. :\llller, 3 Cush. 
200; Com. v. Tuckerman, ubl supra; Com. 
v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575;) and for adultery, 
(Com. v. :\h•rrlam, 14 Pick. 519, 520.) As 
said by Bigelow, C. J., ln Com. v. Shep-
ard, ubl supra, "It ls essential to the rights 
56 
of the accused that when such evidence la 
admitted it should be carefully limited and 
guarded by llllltructlons to the jury, so that 
Its operation and effect may be confined to 
the single legitimate purpose for which It la 
competent." In the <.'ll.Be at bar the defend-
ant was tried upon an Indictment cbtlrglng 
him with the forgery of a check upon a 
bank, purporting to be drawn to his order 
by one Andrews, and, In a second count. 
with uttering the same check, knowing It to 
have been forged. It was shown that when 
arrested he had three other checks upon the 
same bank, payable to his own order, one of 
which purported to be drawn by Andrews; 
ancl evidence, consisting lo part of bis own 
alleged confessions, was admitted, subject 
to his exception, tending to show that the 
checks found upon him, and also two othe1 e 
pall8ed by him about the same time as th!! 
one set out In the Indictment, were for-
geries. Under the principle above stated, all 
the evidence excepted to was competent, 
both to show his knowledge that the check 
set out In the Indictment was forged, and 
that his purpose In the forgery and the 
uttering was to defraud. It ls to be pre-
sumed that correct and appropriate lnstru<'-
tlons, to enable the jury to make a proper 
application of the evidence, were ~ven. 
Com. v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575, ~; Adams 
v. Nantucket, 11 Allen, 203, 205. 
Re&f'rVing for the present the questions 
raised as to the alleged confessions, thelW 
conslderatlons require us to OYerrule the 
other exceptions to the admission of evi-
dence, and also to that portion of the charge 
which allowed the jury, on the question of 
the defendant's Intention to defraud by the 
forgery, to cooslder the fact that be hacl In 
his poBSesslon at the time of his arrest other 
forged checks. 
2. The defendant excepted to the admf&. 
slon of evidence of hie alleged confessions. 
1 Before such evidence was re<"elYed, the wit-
nesses were examined by the defendant's 
counsel with reference to any Inducements 
or statements made to him by the oftlcers, 
and the b11l of exceptions states that lt 
appeared that no Inducements were held 
out. When the examination dls<'losed that 
his statements related in part to the· other 
checks above mentioned, the defend11J1t's 
counsel objected to the admission of any 
statement or confession about checks othPr 
than the one mentioned in the Indictment, 
' and ex<•epted to all evidence of his state-
. meuts as to the other checks; but, as all 
! the statements were pertinent to the ques-i tlon whether the cheeks were forgeries, and 
I as that question was In law pertinent to 
I the Issue, the evidence was competent. Dur-ing the charge the court Instructed the jury 
' that, If the testimony of the officers showed 
that any Inducement or hope of reward 
was held out to the defendant, they were 
to disregard any confe11slon that might have 
been testified to. At the close of the charge 
SIMILAR OCCURRENCES SHOWING INTENTION, ETC. [Case N0. 18
the defendant requested the court to further
instruct the jury “that if they believed,
taking all the circumstances of the case
into consideration, that the ofiicers held out
any inducement or hope of reward to de-
fendant if he would confess, their testimony
as to any confession or admissions which
might have been made by the defendant
must be disregarded." As there was no
evidence bearing upon this question, except
the testimony oi.’ the ofilcers, the instruction
given and that requested were the same,
in substance, and that requested was proper-
ly refused.
3. There was no evidence that Andrews
ever had an account with the bankon
which the chm-k purported to be drawn,
or any right to draw upon the bank. The
court refused to rule that for this reason
there was no evidence to warrant a c011\'i<'-
tion, or that there was a variance between
the allegation and the proof, in that the
words “order for money" in the indictment
implied a. mandatory power in the maker of
the check, while -upon the proof it did not
appear that Andrews had any right to
command the bank to pay the check, or
any check. These requests were properly
refused. The indictment alleges the make-
ing and uttering of a false order for money
of a certain tenor. Whether, if the false
order had been genuine, it would have been
a document which the bank on which it
purported to have been drawn would have
been bound to honor, or even whether or
not there was such a bank, was not alleged
‘in the indictment, and was immaterial.
Exceptions overruled.
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SI.MILAR OCCURRENCES SHOWING INTENTION, .ETC. (Case No. 18 
the defendant requested the court to further 
Instruct the Jury "that If they bellen~d. 
taking all the circumstances of the case 
Into consldera tlon, that the ofth-ers held out 
any lndtH'P.Dlent or hope of reward to de-
fendant lf he would confess, their testimony 
as to any conresston or admlBSlons which 
might have been made by the defendant 
must be disregarded." As there was no 
evidence bearing ui>on this question, except 
the testimony of the otneers, the Instruction 
given and that requested were the same, 
Ill substance, and that requested was proper-
ly refused. 
3. 'fh('re was no evidence that Andrews 
ever had an account with the bank· on 
which tlw ehf><"k purported to be drawn, 
<Jr any right to draw upon th<' bank. The 
court refused to rule that for this reason 
there was no evidence to warrant a ronYie-
tlon, or that there was a nrlance between 
the allegation and the proof, ln that the 
words "order for money" ln the Indictment 
Implied a mandatory power In the makn of 
the check, while -upon the proof lt did not 
appear that Andrews had any rl&"ht to 
command the bank to pay the check, or 
any check. These requests were properly 
refused. 1'he indictment alleges the mak- · 
I.Ilg and uttering of a false order for money 
of a certain tenor. Whether, If the false 
order had been genuine, it would have been 
a document which the bank on whil'h it 
purported to have been drawn would have 
been b01n1d to honor, or eyen whether or 
not there was such a bank, was not alleged 
'In the ln<llctment, and was imma.tel'ial. 
Exceptions overruled. 
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Case No. 19]
RELEVAN CY.
CONTINENTAL INS. CO. OF CITY OF
NEW’ YORK v. i.\'SlTl{Al\'L‘E CO.
OF PE;\'.\'SYL\'A_\'IA.
(2 C. C. A. 535, 51 Fed. 884.)
Circuit Court of Appears, Second Circuit.
March 15, 1892.
Error to the circuit court of the United
_States 1'or the Southern district of New York.
At Law. Action by the insurance Oom-
pany of the State of Pennsylvania against
the Continental inurauce Company of the
Uity of New York to recover $33,105, with
interest. Defendant in its answer, by way
of counterclaim, demanded judgment against
plaintifi for $5,252.88, with interest. Verdict
for plaintitf in the sum of $16,420.73, and mo-
tion for new trial denied. Judgment for said
amount, and for interest thereon, the whole
amounting to $18,732.20. Defendant brings
error. Atflrined.
Butler, Stillman & Hubbard (Thomas H.
Hubbard and John Notman, of counsel), for
plaintiff in error. Evarts, Uhoate & Beaman
(Treadweli Cleveland, of counsel), for defend-
ant in error.
Before WALLACE and LACUMBE, Cir-
cuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. This is a writ of error by
the defendant in the suit below to review a
judgment of the circuit court for the plaintiff
entered upon the verdict of a jury. The as-
signments of error impugn the rulings of the
trial judge in admitting evidence. and in re
fusing to instruct the jury to find a verdict
for the defendant as to all, and especially as
to several, of the causes of action in contro-
versy. Error is also assigned of some of the
instructions given to the jury.
'i‘he complaint contains 23 counts, each of
which sets forth a different and distinct cause
of action. Each of them charges that, by the
fraudulent acts of an agent employed by both
the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff was
made to pay to a third party a sum of money
which should have been paid by the defend-
ant. The averments general to all are, in
substance, that in the years 1882 and 1883
one Lorenzo Dimick was the general agent
at Buffalo of the plaintiff, the defendant, and
also of the two other insurance companies
having local agents in other places, who ac-
cepted applications and issued certificates for
marine insurance; that the general agent con-
ducted at Buflalo the whole business of in-
land marine insurance for the several com-
panies, and, in the usual course of his busi-
ness, issued policies of insurance and effected
rcinsurances in behalf of the several com-
panics for risks accepted by him. or by the
local agents, and adjusted all losses arising in
the business by drawing drafts on the. com-
pany insuring, or paying them. and charging
the amount against its moneys in his hands.
Seventeen of the counts set forth causes of
action of a similar character, and, in effect,
allege that, after Dimick had received in-
formation of a. marine peril aflccting a partic-
ular risk which had been insured by the de-
fendant, he fraudulently shifted the risk, or
some part of it, upon the plaintiff, by rein-
suring it in the name of the plaintiff, and,
when loss ensued which the defendant was
in fact liable to pay, he caused the plaintifl"
to pay it as a reinsurance upon the risk; that
each of the payments so made was received
by the defendant, and was obtained through
the fraudulent acts of Dimick, done with the
intention of cheating and defrauding the
plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant.
These 17 causes of action relate to different
risks, and involve different voyages, dates,
and amounts. The fifteenth and nineteenth
counts contain similar averments, except that
the risks were first insured by the defendant,
1 and, after information of peril or disaster was
received, Dimick substituted the plaintiff as
the original insurer. Four of the other
counts, the twentieth to the twenty-third, in-
clusive, are for similar causes of action, ex-
cept that they allege that. risks were original-
ly insured by the piaintltf, and had been
reinsured by the defendant, but, after news
of peril or disaster, the reinsurance was con-
cealed so as to relieve the defendant from the
whole or part of its obligation. It appeared
upon the trial that separate books were kept
by Dimick for each company, in which the
particulars of the insurances and reinsur-
ances were entered; that the local agents
who accepted applications and issued certifi-
cates for insurance transmitted reports, call-
ed "daily reports," to Dimick, specifying the
particulars of the risks taken by them; that
the particulars of these risks were entered in
the books kept at Buifalo; that twice in each
week Dimick reinsured risks which had been
taken by the local agents, distributing the
amount of reinsurance between the several
companies as he saw tit; and that reports
were forwarded by him, showing the particu-
lars of risks insured or reinsured, daily to the
defendant, and twice in each week to the
other companies. According to his course of
business with the plaintiff and the defendant,
he was to remit to each on the 20th of every
month all moneys in his hands belonging to
it, and render to each a full abstract of his
business with it, including a statement oi’
losses paid and the proofs relating to the
same. The evidence authorized the jury to
find that in many cases, after a risk had been
insured by a local agent with the defendant,
or by Dimick himself. he received news of
peril, by telegram or otherwise. and would re-
insure the risk with one or more of the other
companies, by causing appropriate entries to
be made in the books, and. in some cases,
would cancel the original insumnce, and sub-
stittite one or more of the other companies
in the place of defendant, and, if the risk
had been originally insured with the plaintiff,
or either of the companies other than the de-
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Case No. 19) RELEVANCY. 
CONTINEXTAJ, IXR. CO. OF CITY OF 
NEW YOitK v. IN8l'UA.'<l'E CO. 
OF PENXSYLYA.'<IA. 
(2 c. c. A. Ci30, 511''ed. 884.) 
Circuit Court of Appeal's. Second Circuit. 
March lu, 1892. 
Error to the 1.'ircult court of the United 
States tor the ~them district of New York. 
· At Law. Action by tbe Insurance Com· 
paoy of the State of Pennsylvania agalDBt 
tbe Conttnenlal Insurance Company of the 
City of New York to re(.'OVer ~,11.JU, with 
Interest. Defendant In lt11 answer, by way 
of counterelalm, demanded Judgment agalDBt 
plalntur for f:;,252.88, with luterest. Verdict 
for plaluttrr In the nm of ,16,420.7:1, aud mo-
tion tor new trial denied. Judgment for said 
amount, and tor tntereet thereon, the whole 
amounting to •ts, 732.20. Defendant brings 
error. AtHrmed. 
Butler, Stillman & Hubbard (Thomas H. 
Hubbard and John Notman, ot couuMel), for 
plalutltr In error. Evarts, Choate & Beaman 
(Tn>atlwell Cleveland, of counsel), for defend-
ant In error. 
Before WALJ,ACE llDd LA.COMBE, Cir· 
cult Judges. 
PEit CURIAM. Thia la a writ of error by 
the defendant In the eult below to review a 
judgment of the circuit court for the plalntltr 
entered upon the verdict of a jury. The as-
algnment11 of error Impugn the rulings of the 
trial judge In admitting evlden<.-e, and lu r& 
fusing to Instruct the jury to ttud a verdict 
for the defendant as to all, and espeelally as 
to several, of the causes of action In contro-
v.ersy. Error ls also assigned of l!Ome of the 
Instructions glnn to the jury. 
The complaint contains 23 counts, each of 
which sets forth a different and distinct cause 
ot action. Each ot them charges that, by the 
fraudulent acts of an agent employed by both 
the plalntur and defendant, the plalntur was 
made to pay to a third party a sum of money 
which should have been paid by the defend-
ant. The averments general to all are, In 
substance, that In the years 1882 and 1883 
ODE' I.ol"l'uzo Dimick was the general agent 
at Rull'alo ot the plalntur. the defendant, and 
also of the two other luaurance companies 
hn,·lng local agents In other places, who ac-
<'Pl>ted applications and IBSued eertlfteates tor 
marine lnsuranee; that the general agent con-
ducted at Bull'.alo the whole business of In-
land marine Insurance for the several com-
panies, and, In the usual course ot his busi-
ness, Issued poll<'les ot Insurance and errected 
reln11urances In bE>balf ot the several com-
panies for risks accepted by him. or by the 
local agents, and adjustt>d all losses arlfdng In 
the buslneRs by drawing drafts on the com-
pany Insuring, or paying them, and clmrglng 
the amount against Its moneys In his hands. 
Seventeen ot the counts set forth <'&Uses ot 
GS 
action of a similar character, and, In dectp 
atlege that. after Dimick bad reeelved In-
formation of a marine IM'rll all't>ctlng a partic-
ular risk which had been Insured by the de-
fendant, he fraudulently shifted the ridk, or 
some part ot It. upon the plalntur, by reln-
surlng It in the name ot the plalntlll', and.. 
when loss ensued which the defendant was 
In fact liable to pay, he caused the plalntift' 
to pay It aa a reinsurance upon the rlllk; that 
each of the payments so made was received 
by the defendant, and wu obtained through 
the fraudnlent acts ot Dlmlck, done with the 
Intention ot cheating and defrauding the-
plalntur tor the benefit of the defendant. 
These 17 cauaes ot action relate to dlll'.erent 
risks, and Involve different voyages, dates. 
and amounts. The 11.fteenth and nineteenth 
counts contain similar averments, except that 
the rlllkll were 11.nt lnBured by the defendant. 
! and, after Information ot peril or disaster was 
received, Dimick substituted the plaintiff as. 
the original lnBurer. Four ot the other 
counts, the twentieth to the twenty-third, In-
clusive, are for similar causes ot action, ex-
cept that they allege that. rleka were original-
ly Insured by the plalntitr, and had been 
relnsured by the defendant. but, after news. 
ot peril or disaster, the reinsurance was con-
cealed BO as to relieve the defendant trom the-
whole or part ot Its obligation. It appeared 
upon the trial that separate books were kept 
by Dimick for each company, In which the-
1 
particulars or tbe Insurances and reinsur-
ances were entered; that thE' local agents 
who accepted applications and Issued certifi-
cates tor Insurance transmitted reports, call· 
ed "dally reports," to Dimick, specifying the 
particulars ot the risks taken by them; that 
the particulars ot these risks were entered in 
the books kept at Buft'alo; that twice In each 
week Dimick relnsured risks which had been 
taken by the local agents, dlstrlbutlng the-
amount ot reinsurance between the several 
companle11 as be saw ftt; and that reports 
were torwardPd by him, showing the particu-
lars ot risks Insured or relnaured, dally to the 
defendant, and twice In each week to the-
otber companies. AC<'Ordlng to bis course of 
buBlnesa with the plalntllr and the defendant. 
be was to remit to each on the 20th ot every 
mouth all moneys In his hands oelouglng to 
It, and render to each a full abstract of his 
business with It, Including a statement ot 
1os1w11 paid and the proofs relating to the 
same. The evidence authol'lzed the Jury to 
ftnd that In many cases, after a risk had been 
Insured by a local agent with the defendant, 
or by Dimick himself, be re<>elved news of 
peril, by telegram or otherwlee, and would re-
Insure the risk with one or wore ot the other 
companies, by causing appropriate entries to 
be made In the books, and, In aome cases, 
would <'&Deel the orlJrlnal lnsumnce, and sub-
Mtltute one or more of thP other ('()mpanles 
In the place of defendant, and, It thl:' risk 
had been originally Insured with the plalntlll', 
or either ot the companies other than the de-
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fendant, and relnsurcd in part with the de-
fendant, would cancel the reinsurance with
the llefelldflllf. and transfer it to one or more
of the other companies; that in these cases
the reports transmitted by him to the several
companies would not give any information of
the real transaction, but only of the sub-
stituted insurance; that when a loss was in-
curred in any of these cases, he would ad-
just it on the basis of the fraudulent insur-
ance or reinsurance, and obtain payment
thereof from the company or companies ap-
parently liable therefor, by drawing drafts,
or by charging the amount against funds in
his hands, thus exoneratlng the defendant to
the extent to which he had fraudulently re-
lieved it of its original obligation; and that
all this was done by means of fraudulent in-
structions by Dimlck to his clerks, by fraud-
ulent entries in his books and papers, and
by fraudulent statements in his reports and
accounts rendered. Evidence was given by
the plaintiff upon the trial tending to prove‘
the particular frauds in suit, and also tend-
ing to prove similar frauds by Ditnick, coin-
mitted in some instances as part of the same
transaction, and in others in a different trans-
action, about the same time, by which he
shifted losses of the defendant upon one or
both of the other two companies. The theory
of the case for the plaintiff was that these
frauds were part of a deliberate system de-
vised by Ditnlck to defraud the plaintiff for
the benefit of the defendant, from motives of
persgnal interest on his part. The evidence
did not show that defendant had any knowl-
edge of the fraudulent acts of Dimick.
In considering the assignments of error,
those only will be noticed which have been
relied upon at the bar, and in the brief of
the coungel fgr the plaintiff in error. As to
those which relate to the admission of evi-
dence, a few general considerations are per- t
tinent. In actions founded upon fraud,
where intent 15 a, necessary ingredient, the
largest latitude is allowed in the introduc- ‘
tion of evidence, circumstantial as well as
direct, to disclose the motive and prove the
fraud; and any evidence having a tendency
to prove the offense, though it may be slight,
is not incompetent. Such actions necessa-
rily give rise to a wide range of investlga- I
tion, for the reason that the motive of the
defendant is involved in the issue. When-
ever the necessity arises for a resort to cir-
cumstantial evidence, either from the nature
of the inquiry, or the failure of direct proof,
objections to testimony on the ground of ir- ‘
relevancy are not favored, for the reason
that the force and effect of circumstantial .
facts usually and almost necessarily depend
upon their connection with each other, and
circumstances altogether inconclusive, if
Separately considered, may, by their number
and joint operation, especially when cor-
roborated by moral coincidences, be suffi-
cient to constitute conclusive proof. Castle
v. Ballard, 23 How. 172, 187; Hubbard v.
Briggs, 31 N. Y. 518, 538; Beardsley v.
Duntley, 69 N. Y. 577, 581.
The case of fraud is one of the few ex-
ceptions to the general rule that other of-
fenses of the accused are not relevant to
establish the main charge; and it is the set-
tled rule that, to establish fraud in a given
transaction, evidence is admissible to show
the commission of similar frauds in similar
transactions had with other persons about
the same time. Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall.
132; Butler v. Watkins, 13 Wall. -£56; In-
surance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 6
Sup. Ct. 877. It was entirely competent for
the plaintiff to show that, during the period
covered by the frauds in suit, Dimick was
committing other and a series of similar
frauds upon the other insurance companies
for the benefit of the defendant. All the
entries made in Din|lck's books or papers by
his clerks, pursuant to his directions, were
the acts of Dimick, and the entries them-
selves. as well as his instructions, general
or special, to the clerks, were verbal acts,
and, as such, a part of the res gestae of the
transactions which were sought to be
shown. '1‘he evidence was therefore prop-
erly admitted, which tended to show that,
in shifting any one of the particular losses
in suit from the defendant to the plaintifl,
Dimick did so by relnsuring it in part with
the plaintiff, and in part with the other two
companies for which he was an agent; or
which tended to show that, in independent
transactions occurring about the some time,
he committed similar frauds, or attempted
to, upon one or both of the other two com-
panies; and the books and papers contain-
ing the entries by means of which these
frauds were in part effected, as well as tes-
timony of the general and special instruc-
tions of Dimick to his clerks, were compe-
tent evidence. It is of no consequence
whether the evidence consisting of such
entries was introduced and admitted upon
a different. theory of its competency; it was
competent for the reason stated. and, if it
also tended to corroborate witnesses whose
credibility was doubtful, that circumstance
did not impair its competency.
We proceed to notice more particularly
some of the rulings in admitting testimony
which are complained of. The pages from
the insurance registers kept by Dimick con-
tained, it is true, entries as to many risks
which were in no wise concerned with this
case, but no specific objection was taken on
that ground. The pages were offered and
marked as exhibits, properly so, even if for
identification only, and the plaintiff proved
and read the entries upon them relating to
insurances of risks taken on vessels which
were the subject of the action. To these ob-
jection was taken as immaterial and irrele-
vant, and in the light of that objection only
is the action of the trial judge to be re-
viewed. He cannot be held to have erred
in allowing the jury to see the entries as
59
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
06
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
.. 
SIMILAR OCCURRE~CES SHOWING lNTE:STlON, ETC. (Case No. 19 
fendant, and n>IDBUN'd lo part with the de- Briggs, 81 N. Y. 518, 5.18; Beardsley T. 
fendant, would ca1wel the relll8uranl·e with Duntley, 69 N. Y. 577, G81. 
the defendant, and traDBfer It to one or more The case of fraud la one of the few ex-
of the other CODlpanlea; that ln these caaetr ceptlons to the gent-ral rule that other of-
tlle reports tran&Dlltted by him to the several tenses of the accused are not relevant to 
companlee would not give any lnfonnatlon of establlsh the main charge; and lt la the aet-
the real transaction, but only of the sub- tied rule that, to establl11b fraud In a given 
ltltuted Insurance; that when a 1088 was In- tranaal'tlon, evidence la adml8slble to show 
curred ID any o:f these caaea, be would ad- the commlaalon of similar frauds In similar 
JWJt lt on the baJda of the fraudulent Insur- traJUlllctlons bad with other persons about 
anl't! or reinsurance, and obtain payment the same time. Lincoln v. Claftlo, 7 Wall 
thereof from the company or companies llP- 132; Butler v. WaWDB, lB Wall. 466; In· 
pareutlr llable therefor, by drawing drafta, aurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. H. 591, 6 
or by <>barging the amount aplDBt tund11 lD Sup. ~'t. ff17. It was entirely competent for 
hla bands, thus exonerating the defendant to the plaintiff to 11bow that, during the period 
the extt-nt to which he had fraudulently re- covered by the frauds lo suit, Dimick was 
lleved It of ltB original obligation; and that committing otht-r and a aeries of almllar 
all this was done by meam of fraudulent ID- frauds upon the other IDBurance companlee 
atructlOWJ by Dimick to hi• clerks, by fraud- for the beneftt of the defendant. All the 
ulent entries ID his books and papera, and entries made In Dlmlck'11 book.a or papers by 
by fraudulent statements lo hl8 reports and his clerks, pursuant to hla dlrectloDll, were 
accounts rendered. Evidence was given by the ac•ts of Dimick. and the entries them-
tbe plalntUr upon the trial tending to prove &elves, as well aa bis Instructions, general 
the particular trauda ln autt, and also tend- or special, to the clerka, were verbal act&. 
log to prove slml1ar frauds by Dimick, com- and, as such, a part of the res geabe of the 
mltted lo B01De lnatancee as part of the same transaction& which were sought to be 
tran&actlon, and ID others lo a different traDB- shown. The evidence was therefore prop-
actton. about the same time, by which be erly admitted, which tended to show that. 
shifted l0118e8 of tbe defendant upon one or lD shifting any one of the particular 108888 
both of the other two companies. The theory lo suit from the defendant to the plaintiff, 
of the caae for the plaint!« waa that these Dimick did so by relnsurlng It lD part with 
frauds were part of a deliberate system de- the plaintiff, and in part with the other two 
vlaed by Dimick to defraud tb.e plaintiff for companies for which be was an agent; or 
the beneftt of the defendant, from motives of which tended to show that, ln Independent 
peraonal lnterest on his part. The evidence transactions occurring about the same time, 
did not ahow that defendant bad any kn?wl- be committed similar frauds, or attempted 
edge of the fraudulent acts of Dlml<>k. to, upon one or both of the other two com-
ln CODAlderlng the &88lgnments of error, panlea; and the book.a and papers contaln-
those only will be noticed which have been tog the entries by means of whkh these 
relted upon at the bar, and In the brief of \ frauds were In part effected, as well u tee-
the counsel for the plaintiff In error. As to I tlmony of the general and special lnatruc-
thoee which relate t.o the admiBBlon of evl- : tlons of Dimick to bis clerks, were compe-
denee, a few general considerations are per- · tent evidence. It la of no consequence 
ttnent. In actions founded upon fraud, . wht-ther the evidence consisting of such 
wht-re intent la a necessary ingredient, the ! entries was Introduced and admitted upon 
largest latitude la allowed In the lntroduc- •
1 
a different theory of Its competenc·y; It was 
tlon of evidence, circumstantial as well as compett-nt for the reason stated. and, If It 
direct, to disclose the motive and prove the also tended to corroborate wltnessea whose 
fraud; and any evidence having a tendency credlblllty was doubtful, that circumstance 
to prove the otrense, though lt may be slight, 11 did not Impair lt.9 competency. Is not lnrompetent. Such actions Dect>!IB&· , We proc-eed to notice more particularly 
rlly rtve rise to a wide range of lnvestlga- : some of the rulings lo admitting testimony 
tlon, tor the reason that the motive of the I which are complained of. The pages from 
I defendant la Involved In the IBBut-. When- I the Insurance registers kt-pt by Dimick con-
ever the necessity arises for a resort to cir- talned, It ls true, entries as to many risks 
cumatantlal t-vldence, either from tht'> nature I which were In no wise concerned with this 
of the Inquiry, or the failure of dlre<>t proof, case, but no specific objection was taken on 
obJectloD11 to testimony on the ground of Ir- J that ground. The pages were ottered and 
n.-lt-van<>y are not favored, for the reason marked as exhibits, properly so, even If for 
that the force and etrect of clrcumirtantlal ! ldentlftcatlon only, and the plaintiff proved 
facts usually aDll almost necell8llrlly depend I and read the entries upon them relating to 
upon their ronnectlon with each other, and I Insurances of risks takPn on vesaels which 
c-lreumatao<>eR altogether lncon<>luslve, If I were the subject of the ac•tlon. To thPse ob-
aeparately conaldel't'd, may, by their number jectlon waR taken as lrumatt•rlal and lrrele-
and joint operation, t-ape<"lally when cor- vant, and In the light of that objection only 
roborated by moral colneldt-ncea, be sutn- la the action of the trial judge to be re-
clent to constitute conclusive proof. Castle viewed. Ile cannot be held to have t-rrt'd 
T. Bullard~ 28 How. 172, 187; Hubbard v. ln allowing the jury to see the entries aR 
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they stood on the pages, in the absence of a
specific request that the other entries on the
page should in some way be kept from them,
and, in the absence of anything to that ef-
fect on the record, we cannot assume that
he allowed entries which so plainly had
nothing to do with the case to be read to
the jury. People v. Diinlck, 107 .\'. Y. 13,
25, 1-i N. E. 178. The entries which were
read to the Jury against the defendant’s ob-
jection were in each instance indisputably
parts of the transaction in question, which
was as much a reinsurance of the defendant
as it was an insurance in the plaintiff. The
proposition to be established was that rein-
surances of the defendant's risks were ef-
fected with the plaintiff, after notice of
disaster, to save it from loss. Dimick‘s re-
lations with the three reinsuring companies
were such that he was able to effect rein-
surances in all of them without exciting
suspicion. The single fact that, in the case
of the Ackley. for instance, where the de-
fendant had $;i.~<,900 at risk, only the com-
paratively small sum of $2,5'>00 was rein-
sured in the plaintiff, might indicate the
mere exercise of ordinary discretion; but
simultaneous reinsurance of all the amount
at risk, (except $5,000,) in the other com-
panies, might well be persuasive to the in-
ference that he did so after the receipt of
information that led him to believe the ves-
sel was a loss, other evidence tending to
show that whenever there was no loss there
was no reinsurance. If the transaction, as
plaintiff .claimed, was an effort to shift the
burden of a known loss from the defend-
ant's shoulders, it was not completed till all
that was done by Dimick to eflect that ob-
ject had been accomplished.
Whether the various entries testiiied to by
the witnesses whose former perjury was
conceded did or did not corroborate their
evidence on this trial is not material on the
question of their admissibility. They were
offered, not as independent evidence, or re-
ceived as such, but were a part of the testi-
mony of the witness himself, memoranda
made by him at the time, sworn to by him-
self to have been true statements when
made, and minuting a multitude of dates,
names, figures, and values, the details of
which no witness could be expected to re-
tain in his unaided memory. As such they
were admissible in connection with his tes-
timony. Insurance Co. v. Weides, 14 Wall.
375. They were not “unproved copies of un-
proved accounts," as in Mining Co. V.
Fraser, 130 U. S. 611, 610, 9 Sup. Ct. G65.
To the refusal of the trial judge to strike
out evidence as to instructions given by Dim-
lck to deduct certain percentages from premi-
ums, no exception was taken. and it cannot
be considered here. The testiniony as to the
James Wade and the Gleniffer, not included
in this action, was offered to show knowledge
on the part of defendant's manager in New
York of Dimick‘s practice of protecting de-
fendant by reinsurance when he heard of loss
or peril to the property insured. lt tended to
prove this if supplemented by further proof.
Plaintiff failed to so supplement it, and the
court expressly charged that no knowledge
was proved on the part of the defendant,
which is all that was required, (Pennsylvania
Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451,) certainly, in the
absence of a motion to strike out, or to in-
struct the jury that all evidence as to these
two vessels was to be disregarded.
The testimony as to entries touching the
(‘oyne, Jennie Matthews, Potomac. and Call-
fornia, vessels not in this action, was offered
to prove dates of reinsurances which were
the subject of suit. The dates when rein-
surance was eifected nowhere appeared, and
it was not to be expected that any witness,
even if he remembered the fact of reinsur-
ances, could carry all the dates in his un-
aided memory. It was only by the position»
of the entries in the books, relatively to oth-
er entries where dates were minuted, (such
as acceptance of original risk, reports to the
companies, etc.,) that the witness who made
the entries was able to testify that the elect-
ing of the reinsurance in issue was on, before,
or after some calendar date. To an extent
sutiicient to enable him to fix such date, it
was proper for the witness to testify from
the entrie he had himself made, and we can-
not find that the testimony exceeded that
limit. If competent to prove the dates, as we
are satisfied it was, it was admissible, al-
though it also disclosed other fraudulent rein-
surances. Dutchess Co. v. Harding, 49 N. Y.
321, 825.
The defendant's protection against infer-
ences from the other frauds, thus incidentally
shown, lay in a request to direct the jury to
disregard them. But, as we have before
shown, it was entitled to no such direction.
The evidence was proper for the jury to con-
sider as showing fraudulent acts similar to
those which were the subject of complaint,
and performed at the same time. The evi-
dence showing the lines of insurance and re-
insurance which the defendant had carried
during the year in question was relevant and
material. Showing, as it did. a general sys-
tem or course of business. the result of which
was that the Continental was found to be re-
insured when there was a loss to be paid,
and not to be reinsured, however large its
risks, when there was none, it was a fact
from which, taken in connection with others.
it might be fairly inferred that these results
were secured, not by the exercise of sound
judgment, nor by rare good chance, but by
fraudulent practices of the kind testified to
by Dlmick's accomplices.
The. assignment of error based ‘upon the re-
fusal of the trial judge to direct a verdict for
the defendant rests upon the proposition that
it did not appear by the evidence that the
defendant had received the fruits of any of
the frauds committed by Dimiek upon the
pinintifl. It was proved that in each case of
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they stood on the pages, In the absence of a l fentlant by rt>lnsurance when he beard of lOBB 
specUlc request that the other entries on the or peril to the property Insured. It tended to 
page should In some way be kept from them, pro,·e this Ir supplemented by further proof. 
and, In the absence of anything to that ef- Plalntltr fallt.'d to 80 supplement It, and the 
feet on the record, we cannot as1mme that court expretlllly charged that no knowledge 
he allowed entries which so plainly bad Willi proved on the part of the defendant, 
nothing to do with the case to be read to I whl<'b Is all that was required, (Pennsylvania 
the Jury. People v. Dlml<'k, 107 ~. l'.. 13, Co. ,., ·noy, 102 lI. S . .fill,) eertalnly, In the 
20, 14 N. E. 178. The entries wbkh were ahllt•nee of a motion to strike out, or to In-
read to the jury against the defendant's ob- I 11tn1ct the jury that all evidence as to these 
jectlon were In each Instance Indisputably I h\'O veuels was to be disregarded. 
parts of the transaction In question, wbleh The testimony as to entries tou<'blng the 
was as much a reinsurance of the defendant <'o)'De, Jennie Matthews, Potomae, and Call-
as It was an lrumranre In the plaintiff. The I fornla, vessels not In thl8 action, wu offered 
proposition to be establlebed was that rein- to prove dates of relDBurancee which were 
surances of the tlt>ft>ndant's risks wt>re et- the subje<"t of 11ult. The dates when rein-
fected with the plaintiff, after notke of 111urance was efrt>eted nowben> ap1ieared, and 
di8118ter, to save it from losa. Dlmlt•k's re- It was not to be expected that any witness, 
latloDB with the thl'\'e rt>lnsurlng <'Olll&>anlee I e\·en If he remembered the fact of relnsur~ 
were such that be was ablP to t•lrt><.·I rein- unc-es, could carry all the dates In hl11 un-
auranees in all of them without t'Xcitlng 'I aiftl'd memory. It was only by the position 
suspicion. '.rhe sln~le fact that, In the case of thP PntrlPll In the hooks, relatively to oth-
ot the AcklPy, tor lnstant't', where the de- j er entrlPB where dates were minuted, (llU<'h 
fendant had :i;::x,900 at risk, only the <.'Om- • as at't'E.'ptance of original rtak, reports to the 
paratlvely small sum of $2,riOO was rein- I companies, etc.,) that the wltne&11 who made 
sured In the plaintiff, might lndkate the the entries was able to telltlfy that the etrect-
mere exercise of ordinary dlft<'retlon; but Ing of the rehumrance In 188ue was on, before, 
simultaneous relneuranc.>e of all the amount or after aome calendar date. To an extent 
at risk, (except $5,000,) In the other com- Mutftelent to enable him to ftx such date, It 
panles, might well be persuasive to the in- was proper for the witness to testify from 
fert>nce that he did so after the receipt of the entries he bad himself made, and we can-
lnformatlon that led him to believe the ves- not find that the testimony excoeeded that 
eel was a loee, other evidence tending to limit. It <'Ompetent to prove the dates, as we 
show that whenever there was no loss there art> 88tlsfied It was, It was admlselble, al-
wu no reinsurance. If the traD11aetlon, aa though It also disclosed other fraudulent reln-
plalntltr .claimed, was an ell'ort to shift the I 11urances. Dutehe&11 Co. v. Barding, 49 N. Y.· 
burden of. a known 1088 from the defend- ' 321, 325. 
ant's shoulders, It was not <'Ompletetl till all The defendant's protection against lnfer-
tb&t waa done by Dlmlek to ell'ect that ob- ences from the other frauds, thus Incidentally 
ject bad been a<"t.'Ompl111hed. 11hown, lay In a request to direct the Jury to 
Whether the various entries testified to by tllaregard them. But, as we have before 
the wltne!l8t's whose former perjury was shown, It was entitled to no such direction. 
t.'Onceded did or did not corroborate their The evidence was proper for the jury to con-
evidence on this trial Is not material on the 11lder as showing fraudulent acts similar to 
question of their admissibility. They were tho11e which were the subject of complaint, 
oll'ered, not as Independent evidence, or re- and performed at the same time. The evl-
celved as such, but were a part of the testt- tlent•e showing the lines of Insurance and re-
mony of the witness himself, memoranda [ ln11nrnn<'e which the defendant had calTled 
made by him at the time, sworn to by him- tlurlng the year In question was relevant and 
self to have been true statements when , matt•rlal Showing, as It did, a 1teneral 11ys-
made, and minuting a multitude of dates, I tern or t'OUrRe of buslnl'lls. the result of which 
names, figures, and values, the details .>f • wall that the Continental wa"' found to be re-
whlch no witness could be expeetl'd to re- i ln1mred whPn there was a loss to be paid, 
taln In his unaided memory. As such they 1 and not to be relnsured, however large lta 
were admlaslble In connection with his tell· : rlsk11, wht>n there was none, It waM a tact 
tlmony. Insurance Co. v. Weldes, 14 Wall. I from whlt•b, taken In connection with others, 
37u. They were not "unpro\•ed copies of un- It wight be fairly Inferred that theHP rNmlts 
11roved aecounte," as In lllnlng Co. v. were secured, not by the t-xerl'lse ot H<Juml 
Fraser, 1:JO U. S. 611, 61D, 9 Sup. Ct. 665. judgment, nor by rare good chance. but by 
To the retuaal of the trial judge to strike fraudulent practices of the kind testified to 
out evltlt>nce as to Instructions given by Dim- by Dlml<'k's accomplices. 
lt'k to deduct certain 1iercentages from preml- The 0111dgnment of error based 'upon the re-
nms, no ex<'eptlon was taken. and It <'Ounot fu11ol of th<' trial judge to direct a verdict tor 
be consltleretl here. The tt'!ltlwony as to the the cletenc'tant rests upon the proposition that 
.Tames Wade and the Glenlffer, not lnl'luded. It did not appear by thP evlden<>e that the 
In tht11 a<'tlon, was offered to show knowledge defendant bad ret•elved the fruits of any of 
on the part of defendant's manairer In !'iew the fraud11 committed by Dlmll'k upon the 
York of Dlmlck's praetlce of prott•1·tlng de- plalntlll'. It was proyed that ln each case of 
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-a loss upon a risk insured by the defendant,
part of which had been ostensibly reinsured
by the plaintiff, Dimick adjusted the loss,
and paid it to the assured out of funds of the
defendant in his hands, charged the whole
amount to the defendant in his account with
it, drew a draft on the plaintiff for its pro-
portion as a reinsurer, credited the proceeds
-of the draft to the defendant in his account,
and sent the plaintiff a receipt, signed by
him as agent for the defendant, acknowledg-
ing payment of the amount received. When-
ever a loss was settled he informed the de-
fendant that the transaction was closed, and
of its net loss after deducting the reinsur-
ance. by sending to it the “loss p0cket;" and
in each monthly statement he informed the
defendant that out of its funds in his hands
he had paid its whole loss by appropriating
therefrom only the amount of the net loss.
The moneys thus received and applied by
Dilnick to pay the defendant's losses were
received by the defendant as completely, for
all practical purposes, as they would have
been if he had transmitted them to the de-
fendant, and the defendant had paid them
over to the assured in settlement of the loss.
Pratt v. Foote, 9 N. Y. 463. The law looks at
the substance of the transaction, and is quite
unconcerned about its form. The defendant
got the benefit of these moneys because they
were applied to extinguish its debts to the as-
surcd, and because they increased its funds
in the hands of its own agent It is quite im-
material that the moneys were not physically
transferred by Dimick to the defendant, or
that, after Dimick received them, and had
used them to extinguish the debt of the de-
fondant, he guhseqllelltly became and remain-
ed indebted to the defendant in an amount
13;-get than the aggregate of these moneys.
Dimlck not only assumed to act in obtaining
them as agent for the defendant, but he ap-
propriated them to discharge the debts of the
(lgfendant The case is one for the applica-
tion of the rule that he who seeks to avail
himself of the advantages of the act of an-
other. after knowledge of its fraudulent char-
acter, must be held to adopt the fraud, al-
though at the time of the act he was igno-
rant of it. The doctrine is elementary, and
prevails at law as well as in equity, that a
person, though innocent himself. cannot re-
tain an advantage obtained by the fraud of
another, in the absence of some considera-
tion moving from himself.
The assignment of error founded upon the
refusal of the judge to direct the jury to flnd
for the defendant as to the cause of action
for the loss of the cargo of the Manistee pro-
ceeds upon the theory that the jury were not
authorized to find for the plaintiff upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the witness
Richard Dlmlck, who concededly had testi-
fied falsely in respect to the same facts upon
a previous occasion. There is modern au-
thority to the effect that the question of the
credibility of such a witness is entirely one
for the jury. when submitted to them under
prudential instructions. Dunn‘ v. People, 29
N. Y. 523, 529; People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y.
251, 16 N. E. 68. But this assignment of er-
ror is invalid because of the testimony of the
witness Netf. a witness whose credibility was
not impeached to the same purport as that of
Richard Dimick.
The assignment of error, because the judge
refused to direct the jury to find a verdict for
the defendant as to the cause of action for the
loss of the cargo of the Nyack, proceeds upon
the ground that there was no evidence that
the plaintifl paid any part of the l-oss. It was
not shown that Diihick had drawn any draft
on the plaintiff for the amount of its rein-
surance upon this loss, or that the plaintiff
had remitted the amount to him; but it did
appear that he charged it with the amount,
and credited the defendant with a like
amount in his cash book. As Dlmlck was
the common agent of both parties, this was
suflicient prima facie evidence that he had V
paid the reinsurance for t-he plaintiff. If he
had paid it, the case was as though the plain-
tiff had paid it. Unless he or the plaintifi
had paid it, the defendant would not have
been entitled to be credited, as it was, for the
amount. The assignments of error thus con-
sidered are the only ones which seem tn re‘
quire discussion.
The judgment is aflii-med.
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·& 1088 upon a risk Insured by the defendant, 
part of whleh had been oeteuslbly relnsured 
by the plalntltr, Dimick adjusted the loss, 
and pald it to the assured out of funds of the 
defemlant In his hands, charged the whole 
amount to the defendant In hle account with 
It, drew a draft on the plaintiff for Its pro-
portion 88 a relnsurer, credited the proceeds 
·Of the 1lratt to the defendant In his account, 
and sent the plalntltr a receipt, signed by 
him as agent .for the defendant, acknowledg-
ing payment of the amount received. When· 
ever a 1088 was settled he Informed the de-
fendant that the transaction was closed, and 
of Its net 1088 after deducting the relnsur-
anee. by sending to it the ''loss pocket;" and 
ln each monthly statement he Informed the 
defendant that out ot Its funds tn hle hands 
he- had paid its whole 1088 by appropriating 
therefrom only the amount of the net lose. 
The moneys thus received and applied by 
Dimick to pay the defendant's losses were 
received by the defendant 88 completely, for 
all practical purposes, 88 they would have 
been If he bad transmitted them to the de-
fendant, and the defendant bad paid them 
over to the assured In settlement of the loss. 
Pratt v. Foote, 9 N. Y. 463. The law looks at 
the substance of the transaction, and ls qulte 
unconcerned about Its form. The de-fendant 
got the beneftt of these moneys be-<'lluee they 
were applied to extinguish Its debts to the as-
sured, and because they Increased its funds 
ln the bands of Its own agent. It ls quite Im-
material that the moneys were not physically 
tranBferred by Dimick to the defendant, or 
that, after Dimick received them, and had 
ll8ed them to extinguish the debt of the de-
fendant, he subsequently became and remain-
ed lnde-bted to the defendant In an amount 
larger than the aggregate of these moneys. 
Dlmlck not only assumed to act in obtaining 
them u agent for the defendant, but he ap-
propriated them to discharge the debts of the 
defendant. The case ls one for the applica-
tion of the rule that he who seeks to avail 
hlnu!elf of the advantages of the act of an-
other, after knowledge of Its fraudulent char· 
acter, must be beld to adopt the fraud, al-
though at the time of the act he was lgno-
rant of It. The doctrine ls elementary, and 
prevalle at law as well aa in equity, that a 
person, though Innocent himself, cannot re-
tain an advantage obtained by the fraud of 
another, tn the absence of some considera-
tion moving from himself. 
The aeelgnment of error founded upon the 
refusal of the judge to direct the jury to find 
for the defendant 88 to the cause of action 
for the loss of the cargo of the Manistee pro-
ceetla upon the theory that tile Jury were not 
authorized to find for the plaintiff upon the 
uncorroboratt>d te-stlmony of the witness 
Rlehard Dimick, who concededly had testl· 
fled falsely In respect to the same facts upon 
a previous 0<•easlon. There ls modern au-
thority to the effect that the question of the 
credlblllty of such a witness le entirely one 
for the Jury, when submitted to them under 
prudential Instructions. Dunn' v. People, 29 
N. Y. 523, 529; People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 
251, 16 N. E. 68. But this assignment of er-
ror ls invalid because of the testimony of the 
witness Neff. a wttnt'SS whose credlblllty was 
not Impeached to the same purport 88 that of 
Richard Dimick. 
The assigome-nt of error, because the judge 
refused to direct the jury to find a verdict for 
the defendant u to the cause of action for the 
loM ot. the cargo of the Nyack, proceeds upon 
the ground that there was no evidence that 
the plalntur paid any part of the losa. It was 
not shown that Dimick had cirawn any draft 
on the plaintiff for the amount of Its retn-
aurance upon this loss, or that the plaintiff 
bad remitted the amount to him; but It dld 
appear that he charged It with the amount, 
and credited the defendant with a lib 
amount In his caah book. As Dimick was 
tht> common agent of both parties, this was 
suftlclent prlma facle evidence that he bad 
paid the retnsuran<oe for tbe plalntllt. It he 
hRd paid it, the case was as though the plaln-
tUf had paid It. Unleee he or the plalntUr 
had paid It, the defendant would not have· 
been entitled to be credited, 88 It was, for the 
amount. Theo aftslJ[Dmt-nts of error thus oon-
slderetl are the only ones which ireem to re-; 
quire dlsc·usslon. 
The judgment le affirmed. 
61 
éase No. 20]
RELE VANCY
WALLACE v. KENNELLY.
(47 N. J. Law, 242.)
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
1885.
Certlorari to court of common pleas, Hud-
son county.
Action by James Wallace against John
Kennelly for two months’ rent for October
and November, 1883, at $35 a month, under
a lease for the term of two years and ten
months from July 1, 1883. By assignment
defendant transferred the lease to Joseph
Kennelly. Judgment for defendant.
Argued February term, 1885, before DE-
PUE, VAN SYCKEL, and SCUDDI-JR, JJ.
W. B. Gilmore, for plaintiff. J. Flemming,
for defendant.
June Term,
SCUDDER, 'J. By section 174 of the dis-
trict court act (Revision, p. 1330), from the
order, determination, or decision of the court
of common pleas an appeal may be removed
into this court by writ of certiorari, and the
writ shall remove said order or determina-
tion and the case agreed upon or settled as
therein mentioned. What the state of the
case must contain is indicated in Benedict
v. Howell, 39 N. J. Law, 221. In brief, it
must contain only enough of the facts to
enable the court on appeal to determine the
legality of the rulings in the court below.
By section 170 of the act‘ the determination
of the judge (or in cases where there is a
jury, the verdict of a jury and any judg-
ment thereupon). shall be final and conclu-
sive between the parties upon questions of
fact, except as therein provided. The facts
most favorable to the plaintiffs or defend-
ant’s case, which are essential to support
the judgment, shall be taken as found, and
will not be weighed in this court against op-
posing evidence. Here the facts as shown
by the state of the case must, after verdict,
be most liberally construed in favor of the
defendant.
The first objection urged is that the di-
trict judge. instead of deciding on the evi-
dence that, as there was no surrender in
writing of the lease signed by the lessor,
or by act and operation of law, under the
statute of frauds, permitted the evidence to
go to the jury, and charged: “That if a. ten-
ant and landlord verbally agree that the
lease shall end, and the leased premises are
by such agreement given up by the tenant,
and his possession of them ends, and the
landlord agrees with and accepts another
person as his tenant, who, as such tenant,
occupies the premises, and pays the rents
to the landlord. this will, in law, operate as
a surrender by the first tenant.”
The judge also charged: “That if the land-
lord or the agent assented to an assignment
and agreed that the lease should be assign-
ed by John Kennelly to Joseph Kennelly,
and if it was actually assigned in writing,
pursuant to such assent, the assignment
would not be an ending of the lease or
term."
The substance of the charge in the words
used by the court was, as I understand it,
that an assignment of the lease with the
verbal consent of the landlord. and the sub-
sequent acceptance of rent by him, would
not be a surrender of the lease in writing or
by act and operation of law, but that other
facts in the case, if found by the jury, might
effect a surrender by act and operation of
law.
On demurrer to a plea in Hunt v. Gard-
ner, 39 N. J. Law, 530, it was held that
where the facts set out in the plea are that
the lessee assigned away his interest in the
lease, and that the lessor received the rent
i from the assignee, and accepted him as his
tenant under the lease, these constitute no
bar'to an action of covenant for rent on
the lease against the original tenant.
The utmost effect of these averments is
that the privity of estate is ended, but not
the privity of contract. There must be the
further avermcnt that such assignee was sub-
, stituted in the place of the original lessee,
with the intent on the part of the parties
to the demise to annul its obligations. If
this be established by competent proof. in
writing or by parol, then there are no more
contract relations between the parties re-
maining upon which either an action of cove-
nant or debt can be maintained. See cases
collected in notes, Woodf. Land]. 8: Ten. 496.
Here there is evidence that there was an oral
agreement between the lessor, James Wal-
lace, and John Kennelly, the lessee; that by
it not only was there a consent to the as-
signment of the lease by John to Joseph
Kennelly, but it was also agreed that a
lease should be drawn and executed by the
lessor to Joseph, and that he should be sub-
stituted as tenant, and that, although no
lease was drawn, Joseph was in fact substi-
tuted for John, and thereupon took posses-
sion of the premises, and paid rent for two
successive months thereafter, which was ac-
cepted by the landlord, and receipts given to
him as tenant. These facts, if believed by
the jury, are a suflicient surrender to deter-
mine the former tenancy. Woodf. Landl. 8:
Ten. § 498; Nickells v. Atherstone. 10 Q. B.
'94-4; Murray v. Shave, 2 Duer, 182; Ran-
dall v. Rich, 11 Mass. 494; Dodd v. Acklom,
6 Man. & G. 672; Grimnian v. Legge, 8 Barn.
& O. 324. A fact corroborative of such sub-
stituted tenancy is found in the second re-
ceipt given by the landlord, James Wallace,
dated September 1, 1883, for rent up to Oc-
tober 1st. The last sentence in this receipt
reads, “Let for one month only." This is not
according to the term in the lease to John
Kennelly, but the receipt. being given to
Joseph Kennelly for rent paid by him, must
indicate that the term of his tenancy was
monthly, and under a new letting to him.
There was no error in leaving this question
to the jury on the disputed question of facts,
62
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
06
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
' Case No. 20] RELEVAXCY 
would not be an endlq ot the lease or 
term." 
The substance of the charge 1n the words 
used by the court was, as I understand lt, 
that an assignment of the lease wlth the 
Certiorari to court of common pleas, Bud- verbal ronsent of the landlord. and the sub-
WALLA.CE v. KENNELLY. 
(47 N. J. Law, 242.) 
Supreme Court of New Jeree7. June Term, 
1885. 
aon county. sequent acceptan<.-e of rent by him, would 
Action by James Wallace against John not be a surrender of the lease In writing or 
Kennelly for two months' rent for October by act and opt>ratlon of law, but that other 
and November, 1883, at $35 a month, under 1 fads In the c·aee, If found by the jury, might 
a lease for the term of two years and ten effect a surrenller by act and operation of 
months from July 1, 1883. By aBSlgnment ! law. 
defendant transferred the lease to Joseph I On demurrer to a plea In Hunt v. Gard-
Kennelly. Judgment for defendant. ner, 89 :N. J. Law, u30, It was held that 
Argued February term, 1885, before DE- I where the facts set out In the plea are that 
PUE, VAN SYCKEL, and SCUDDER, JJ. ! the lease.. aHSlg1wd away bis Interest In the 
W. B. Gilmore, for plaintiff. J. Flemming, ; lease, and that the lessor reee!Yed the rent 
for defendant. , from the assignee, and accepted him as his 
tenant under the leaBE', these constitute no 
SCUDDER, 'J. By section 174 of the di.- 1 bar· to an action of coYenant for rent on 
trlct court act (Revision, p. 1330), from the ' the lease against the ~rlglnal tenant. 
order, determination, or decision of the court The utmost effect of these averments lB 
of common pleas an appeal may be removed that the prlvlty of estate Is ended, but not 
Into this court by writ of certiorari, and the the prh·lty of contract. There must be the 
writ shall remove said order or determlna- 1 further averment that such assignee was sub-
tlon and the case agreed upon or settled as atltuted In the i>lace of the orlglnal lessee. 
therein mentioned. What the state of the with the Intent on the part of the parties 
case must contain ls Indicated ln Benedict to the demise to annul lts obligations. If 
v. Howell, 39 N. J. Law, 221. In brief, lt this be established by competent proof. ln 
must ceutaln only enough of the ffurts to writing or by parol, then there are no more 
enable the court on appeal to determine the contract relations between the parties re-
legallty of the rollnp 1n the court below. malnlng upon whl<'h either an action of cove-
By ~ctlon 170 of the act the determination nant or debt <'an be malntalnPd. SPe cases 
of the judge (or lo cases where there la a collected In notes, Woodf. Landi. & Ten. 496. 
jury, the verdict of a jury and any judg- Here there ls evidence that there was an oral 
ment thereuponJ, shall be final and conclu- agreement between the lessor, James Wal-
slve between the parties upon questions of lace, and John Kennelly, the lessee; that by 
fact, except as therein provided. The facts It not only was there a consent to the a.s-
most favorable to the plali..hfr's or defend- I slgnment of the lease by John to .Joseph 
ant's case, which are essential to support 'I Kennelly, but It was also agreed that a 
the judgment, shall be taken as found, and ; lease should be drawn and executed by the 
will not be weighed. In this court against op- I leBBOr to Joseph, and that he should be sub-
poslng evidence. Here the facts as shown ! stltuted u tenant, and that, although no 
by the state of the case must, after verdict, ! lease was drawn, Joseph was In fact substl-
be most liberally construed ln favor of the .
1
 tuted for John, and thereupon took posses-
defendant. alon of the premises, and paid rent for two 
The first objection urged la that the dla- I succeMive months thereafter, which was ac-
trlct judgP, Instead of deciding on the evl- ! cepted by the landlord, and receipts given to 
dence th11t, as there was no auITender In : him as tenant. These tacts, lf believed by 
wrltlng of the lease signed by the le88or, : the jury, are a suftlclent suITender to deter-
or by act and operation of law, under the i mine the former tenancy. Woodf. Landl & 
statute of frauds, permitted the evidence to 1 Ten. f 498; Nlckells v. Atherstone. 10 Q. B. 
go to the jury. and charged: ''That If a ten- ; 944; Murray v. Shave, 2 Duer, 182; Ran-
ant and landlord verbally agree that the I dall v. Rieb, 11 Mass. 494; Dodd v. Acklom, 
lease shall end, and the leased premises are 1 6 l\Ian. & G. 672; Grlmman v. Legge, 8 Barn. 
by such agreement given up by the tenant, I & C. 324. A fact corroborative of such sub-
and hla possession of them ends, and the stltuted tenancy Is found tn the second re-
landlord agrees with· and accepts another celpt given by the landlord, James Wallace, 
person as bis tenant, who, as sueb tenant, , dated September 1, 1883, for rent up to Oc-
oct•uples the prl•rulsPs, and pays the rents tober lat. The last sentence 1n this receipt 
to the landlord, this wlll, In law, opemte as , reads, "Let for one month only." This ls not 
a SUl'l'('nder by the first tenant." I according to the term In the lease to John 
The Judge also t•hargPd: "That If the land- Kennelly, but the receipt, being given to 
lord or the agent assented to an assignment I Joseph Kennelly for rent paid by him, must 
and agreed that the lease should be aBBigu- Indicate that the term of bis tenancy Wll8 
ed by John Kennelly to Joseph Kennelly, monthly, and under a new letting to blm. 
and If It was actually assigned In writing, I 'rhere was no error In leaving this question 
pursuant to such assent, the aSBlgnmeut to the Jury on the disputed question of facts, 
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and the defendant's testimony, it believed,
was suflicient to establish a surrender by
operation of lavv- The effect of such subse-
quent letting, as stated by Lord Dcnman in
Iilckclls v. Atherstone, is: “As far as the
plaintiff, the landlord, is concerned. he has
created an estate in the new tenant which
he is estopped from disputing with him, and
which is inc-unsistent with the continuance
of the defemla nt’s term."
The other reason assigned is that the judge
admitted illegal evidence in defense of the
action. There was a clause in the lease that
"this lease is upon condition that no ales or
porter shall be sold by the tenant on said
premises excepting that manufactured and
bought from the landlord, James Wallace."
This was a condition subsequent, and the
breach of it would not defeat the lease. A
breach might subject the lessee to damages.
The judge admitted this evidence, and said
he would control it afterwards. It was clear-
ly irrelevant to show that the landlord de-
livered bad ale, which, on notice, he took
back, and sent other ale. which was no bet-
ter. If the ale was unfit for use, the ten-
ant might defend for that cause, if sued for
not taking it, or if he bought from others,
and sold it on the premises. For such cause
it might be a. defense in an action for breach
of the covenant, but it was no defense to
the lnndlord‘s action for rent. If admitted,
therefore, as matter of direct defense, the
error would not be cured by a subsequent
charge directing the jury to disregard it.
But there is a view in which this testimony
is relevant and admissible. There was a
dispute about the quality of the ale between
the landlord and tenant. The defendant tes-
tifies: “I notified the plaintiff the ale was
bad. and told him to send for it. He sent
for it. and took it back, and said he would
gend 3, gample package. H6 did S0, and Whili‘.
he then sent went flat. I could not sell any
of the ale. No one would drink it about
there. I told plaintiff the place would not
pay, and I would give up the lease. That
the ale would not sell there. Plaintiff asked
me if I had anybody to take the place. I
told him, ‘yes,’ and asked him if he was
satisfied to do so.” He says he sent over
his brother, and the arrangement was made
with him as above stated. Stephen's Digest
of the Law of Evidence (part 1, c. 2, art. 8)
says: “Facts necessary to be known to ex-
plain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant
fact, or which support or rebut an infer-
ence suggested by a fact in issue or rele-
vant fact, etc., are relevant in so far as they
are necessary for these purposes respective-
ly.” The dealings of these parties in the
ale being the cause of complaint, and wish
to be released from the lease on- one side,
and the motive for the alleged consent and
willingness of the other to the substitution
of another tenant, brings the evidence within
the rule above stated. It tends to show how
the parties came together, and why they
acted as it is claimed they did, for it ap-
pears to be the immediate and only cause
assigned for the change in the tenancy, and
ending the prlvity of contract, which is the
fact in issue. The judge said to the jury,
in his charge: “The delivery of bad ale, or
ale that spoiled, would not in this ease end
the lease, or be a defense. VVliat the facts
are as to the quality of any ale the plain-
tiff furnished to defendant, you are to use
only to throw light upon or help you to
conclude what the parties said in New York.
and agreed upon at the interview between
them about the premises." There was no
error in admitting the evidence and limiting
it to the purpose for which it was alone
relevant to the issue.
The judgment will be aflirmed.
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EXPLANA.TOUY FACTS. [Cue No. 20 
and the derendant'a testimony, It believed, 
was so11lclent to establish a surrender by 
operation or law. The effect of auch subae-
~uent letting, as stated by Lord Deowan lo 
Nlckells v. .A..t.herstone, la: .. As tar aa the 
plalnM, the landlord, 18 concerned, he bas 
-created an estate in the new tenant which 
he iB estopped from dlsputlog wlth him, and 
which ls ln<.·oDBistent with the continuance 
ot the defendant's term." 
The other reason aBSlgoed Is tha.t the judge 
admitted illegal evidence lo deteDBe of the 
action. There was a clause lo the le1µ1e that 
'"thl8 lease ls upon coodltloo that.no alee or 
porter shall be sold by the tenant on 88.ld 
premises excepting that manufactured and 
bought from the landlord, Jomes Wallace." 
Thia was a condition sobsettueot, and the 
breach of lt would not defeat the lease. A. 
breach might subject the leesee to damages. 
The judge admitted this evidence, and suld 
be w<Juld control it afterwards. It was cle&J.'-
Jy lrl'elevant to show that the landlord de-
llvered bad ale, which, on notice, he took 
back, and sent other a.le, which was no bet· 
ter. It the ale was unftt for use, the teo-
aut might defend tor that cause, If sued tor 
not taking It, or if he bought from others, 
and BOid It on the preml8es. For such cause 
It might be a defense in an action for breach 
of the covenant, but it was no defense to 
the landlord's action tor rent. It admitted, 
therefol't', as matter of direct defense, the 
error would not be cured by a subsequent 
charge directing the jury to dlsregurd It. 
But there ls a view In which this testimony 
Is relevant and admlBBlble. There was a 
dispute about the quality of the ale between 
the landlord and tenant. The defendant tes-
tlftes: "I notified the plalotur the a.le waa 
bad, and told him to send for it. He sent 
for it, and took It back, and said be would 
aend a. sample package. He did so, and what 
he then aent went ti.at. 1 could not sell any 
of the ale. No one would drink It about 
there. I told plaiotltr the place would not 
pay, and I would give up the lease. That 
the a.le would not sell there. Plalntur asked 
me if I had anybody to take the place. I 
told him, 'yes,' and asked him 1f he was 
satisfted to do BO." He says be sent over 
his .brother, and the arrangement was made 
with blm as above stated. Stephen's Digest 
of the Law of Evldeoce (part 1, c. 2, art. 8) 
aays: "Facts necessary to be known to ex-
plalD or Introduce a fact lo lssue or relevant 
fact, or which support or rebut an lofer-
ence suggested by a fact in Issue or rele-
vant tact, etc., are relevant lo so ta.r as they 
are necessary for these purposes reepectfve-
ly." The dee.lings of these partlee In tb.e 
a.le being the l·ause of complaint, and wish 
to be released from the lease on· one side, 
and the motive for the a.Uesed coosent and 
willingness of the other to the substitution 
of another tenant, brings the evidence wlthlu 
the role above stated. It tends to show how 
the parties came togetht>r, and why they 
acted a.e it la claimed they did, tor it ap-
pears to be the Immediate and only cause 
a.sslgoed tor the change In the tenancy, and 
ending the prlvity of contract, whll'h ie the 
tact In IBBue. The judge said to the jury, 
lo bis charge: "The delivery of bad a.le, or 
ale that spoiled, would not In this l'a&e end 
the lease, or be a defense. What the fa<'ts 
are a.e to the quality of any a.le the plaln-
tltr furnished to defendant, you an• to use 
only to throw light upon or help you to 
conclude what the parties said In :Sew York, 
and agreed upon at the interview between 
them about the premises.'' There was no 
error In admitting the evidence and llmltlng 
It to the purpose for which It was alone 
relevant to the issue. 
The judgment will be aftlrmed. 
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RELEVANCY.
BELL et al. v. BREWSTER et al.
(10 N. E. 679, 44 Ohio St. 690.)
Supreme Court of Ohio. March 1, 1887.
Error to district court, Union county.
The original action was a suit by the plain-
tlffs below to quiet their title to certain lands
situated in L‘-nion county, and which they
claimed as the heirs at law of the person
last seized. He died in that county on Sep-
tember 11, 1873, and was then known by the
name of Robson L. Broome. The plaintiifs,
however, claimed that his right name was
Levi Brewster; that he was a son of Sea-
bury Brewster, late of Norwich, Connecticut;
that he intermarried with Lucy Waterman
on March 13, 1820, by whom he had two
sons, Richard Brewster, a plaintiff, and Sher- i
man Brewster, deceased, whose widow and
children were the other plaintitfs; that he
afterwards abandoned his family, assumed ‘
the name of Robson L. Broome, removed to
Union county, and there resided to the time
of his death, and was possesed of a large
amount of real and personal property, the
subject of controversy. A number of rival
claims were set up to that of the piaintii'fs,— '
in one that his right name was Elisha Case;
and in another that it was George Washing-
ton Broome; and the heirs of these persons
were made parties defendant. An appeal
was taken from the judgment of the common 1
pleas court to the district court of the coun-
ty, where judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs below.
W. B. Loomis and C. H. Grosvenor, for
plaintiffs in error. J. W. Robinson, for de-
fendants in error.
MINSHALL, J. The principal issue of
fact in the case was whether Levi Brewster, ‘
the ancestor of the plaintiifs, was the same
person who was known in Union county by
the name -If Robson L. Broome, and died
possessed of the property in controversy. As
tending to support the issue on their part, the
plaintiffs introduced (1) a letter purporting
to have been written by Levi Brewster in
the year 1810, from an academy in Connecti-
cut, addressed to Elisha Brewster as his
brother._ No other evidence was introduced
that it had been so written than that it had
been obtained from the family papers of
P1118118 Bl'8W$t9I‘, then deceased, \vh0 wag
the brother of Levi. Also (2) a pay-roll of
Colllilfllly 7. Regiment 20, in the war of 1812, '
on which one Levi Brewster app9lll’B 118 1'9-
Celptiug I0!‘ D11)’ 88 a private in said com-
pany, with evidence tending to show that he
had been a. private in the same; but he W1-
deuce was introduced to Show that he in fact
signed the roll, other than that it was pro-
duced from the archives of the government
in the war department at Washington city.
As standards of coniparisom they also hm-0-
duced (3) ¢@l'Y1liI1 books and writings, admit-
ted or duly proven to be in the genuine hand-
1 5°“ fmm P1'°D91' depositorie8-
, document purporting or proved to be 30
writing of the decedent, written by him
while living at Marysville, in Union county.
under the name of Robson L. Broome. Ex-
perts were then called, who, upon a compari-
son of the writings, testified that in their
opinions the letter and the signature to the
pay-roll were in the same handwriting as
were the books and writings that had been
introduced as standards of comparison.
Two objections are made to the admissi-
bility of this evidence: (1) That it is not
shown that the letter was written, nor that
the pay-roll was signed, by the Levi Brew-
ster whom the plaintiffs claim to have been
their ancestor; (2) that proof of handwriting
by comparison of hands is not competent for
the purpose of proving the identity of a per-
son.
1. We do not understand, from the bill of
exceptions, that there was any serious con-
troversy in the case as to the name of the
ancestor of the plaintiffs, or as to who were
his relatives. These facts, we may llsfillme.
were reduced to reasonable, if not absolute.
certainty; so that this objection must be un-
derstood as applying to the introduction 01'
the letter and pay-roll for comparison with
the admitted writing of Broolne, without
other evidence that the letter had been writ-
, ten, or the pay-roll signed, by Levi Brewster,
the ancestor of the plaintiffs, than as before
stated. It is true there was no direvl
. evidence as to who wrote the letter. 01‘ 35
to who signed the pay-roll. The letter was
written in 1810, and the pay-roll was signed
in 1814. It would have been diflicult, if not
impossible, to show the fact by direct test?
mony, after such a lapse of time. But more
‘ or less credit has always been attached to
ancient documents, without other proof of
their authenticity than that of their produc-
Where any
years old is produced from its proper cus-
tody, it is presumed that the signature, and
every other part of such document which
Pl1I'D0rts to be in the handwriting of an)’
Pam°“1‘" Imson. is in that PeYB°"'s 1“"“"
writing. Steph. Dig. Ev, 156; Whart. Ev.
§ 194 et seq.; id, § 702
This exception to the general rules of evi-
dence rests upon a conceded necessity (Payi-
Ev. § 187-1), and applies, not only to such in-
struments as are of a formal character, such
as wills, bonds, and other deeds, but also to
receipts. letters, entries, and all other an-
cient writings. 2 Phil. Ev. (10th E11B- and
'4th Am. Ed.) -181.
Thus, in Bere v. Ward, on the trial of an is-
sue as to the kigmnmcy of a p9,i'ti('lli8.l' per-
. “mi '1 very old letter, purporting t0 bi‘-111‘ 11"’
Siillluture of the head of the family. and
b1'°\1ie’-11!; from among the title deeds kel-it at
“"1 family seat, was admitted as genuine-
“’1"10\1t further proof of handwriting. by
Dallas, (j_ _]__ and also by Lord Tenterden on
5 59¢0Ild trial, 2 Phil. Ev., supra, note 4.
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Case No. 21] RELEV .ANCY. 
BELL et al. T. BREWSTER et U. 
(10 N. E. 679, 44: Ohio St. 690.) 
writing of the decedent, written by him 
while living at Marysvllle, In Union rounty~ 
untler the name of Rolison L. Broome. Jo~x-
Supreme Court of Ohio. March 1, 1887. perts were then called, who, upon a compari-
Error to dlRtrlct court, Union county. son of the writings, testified that in their 
The original action was a suit by the plain- opinions the letter and the signature to the 
turs below to quiet their title to certain lands pay-roll were in the same handwriting u 
situated 1n Union county, and which they were the bookR and writings that bad been 
claimed as the heirs at law of the person introduced u standards of comparison. 
last seized. He died In that county on Sep- Two objections are made to the admiMi-
teml>er 11, 1873, and was then known by the blllty of this evidence: (1) That It 1B not 
name of Robson L. Broome. The plalnturs, shown that the letter wu written, nor that 
however, claimed that his right name was the pay-roll was signed, by the Levi Brew-
Levl Brewster; that be was a son of Sea- ster whom the plalnttl!'s elaim to hnve bet'n 
bury Brewster, late of Norwich, Connecticut; their ancestor; (2) that proof of handwriting 
· that he Intermarried with Lucy Waterman by comparison or hands ts not com11etent for-
on March 13, 1820, by whom he had two the purpose of proving the identity or a per-
sons, Richard Brewster, a plaintur, and Sher- son. 
man Brewster, deceased, whose widow and 1. We do not understand, from the bill of 
children were the other plaintllfs; that be exceptions, that there was any serious con-
arterwards abandoned his family, a1vmmed troversy in the case as to the name of the-
the name of Robson L. Broome, removed to ancestor of the plalntUrs, or as to who were 
Union county, and there resided to the time his relatives. These facts, we may assume. 
of his death, and was possessed of a large I were reduced to reasonable, if not absolute. 
amount of real and personal property, the , certainty; so that this objection must be UD-
subJeet of controversy. A number of rival J derstood as applying to the introduction of 
claims were set up to that of the plalntUrs,- · the letter and pay-roll for comparison with 
in one that his right name was Elisha Case; I the admitted writings of Broome, without 
and In another that it was George Washing- other evidence that the letter had beell writ-
ton Broome; and the heirs of these persons 1 ten, or the pay-roll signed, by Levi ::Brewster, 
were made parties defendant. An appeal I the ancestor of the plaintiffs, than as before 
was taken from the Judgment of the common stated. It ls true there was no direct 
pleas court to the district court of the coun- evidence as to who wrote the letter, or as 
ty, where judgment was rendered In favor to who signed the pay-roll. The letter waa 
of the plalntUrs below. written in 1810, and the pay-roll was signed 
W. B. Loomis and O. H. Grosvenor, for 1n 1814. It would have been diftlcult., If not 
plalntift's in error. J. w. Robinson, for de- impossible, to show the fact by direct testl-
fendanta 1n error. mony, after such a lapse of time. But more 
or leBB credit has always been attached to 
MINSHALL, J. The principal l88ue of ancient documents, without other proof of 
fact In the case was whether Levi Brewster, their authenticity than that of thl'lr produc-
the ancestor of the plaintiffs, was the same don from proper depositories. Where any 
person who was known in Union county by document purporting or proved to be 00 
the name .,f Robson L. Broome, and died years old Is produced from Its proper cus-
posseeeed of the property tu controversy. As tody, It ls presumed that the signature, and 
tending to support the Issue on their part, the every other part of such document which 
plaintUrs introduced (1) a letter purporting purports to be in the bandw1·ttlng of any 
to have been written by Levi Brewster in particular person, ls 1n that person's band-
the year 1810, from an academy in Connectl- writing. Stepb. Dig. Ev. 106; Wbart. ll.'v. 
cut, addressed to Elisha Brewster as bis I 194 et seq.; Id. s 702. 
brother. . No other evidence was introduced This exeeptlon to the general rules of ev1-
that it had been 80 written than that it bad I dence n-sts upon a conceded necessity lTayl. 
been obtained from the family papers of J Ev. I l8i4), and applies not only to such ln-
}o;Jisba Brewster, then deceased, who was struments as are of a f~rmal character, such 
ti.le brother of Levi. Also (2) a pay-roll of I as wllls, bonds and other deeds. but also to 
Company 7, Hegiment 20, In the war of 1812, 1 receipts, lette~ entries, and all other an-
on which one I..evt Brewster appears as re- ; cient writings. 2 Phll. Ev. (10th Eng. and 
celptlng for pay as a p1·lvate in said t'om- 1 '4th Am. Ed.) 481. 
pany, with evidence tending to show that he I Thus, in Bere v. Ward, on the trial of an hl-
bad been a private In the same; but no evt- sue as to the lt>ldtlmacy ot a partlt•ular per-
dence was introduced to show that he In fact ; son, a very old letter, purporting to bear the 
signed the roll, other than that it was pro- 1 signature of the beatl of the family, and 
duced from the archives of the government brought from among the title deeds kept at 
in the war department at Washington city. the family seat, was admitted as gen11lne. 
AR standards of comparison, the;\' also Intro- without further proof of handw1·itlng, by 
dueed (3) certain books and writings, admit- Dallas, c. J ., and al"° by I..ortl Tenter<leu on 
ted or duly proveo to be lo the geuuioe hand- a &econd trial. 2 Phil. Ev., supra, note 4. 
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EXPLA NATORY F ACTS.
LCaso No. '21
This ruling vvas followed in Doe v. Bey-
non, 12 Adol. & E. 431, where certain old let-
ters were admitted in evidence upon the is-
sue in the case whetherthe person clalmingas
devisee of the vvritor was the person intend-
ed. They were admitted without proof of
handwriting. - or other proof of their genuine-
ness than that they found among the pa-
pers of the person to whom they had been
addressed at the time of her death.
in Bertie v. Beaumont, 2 Price, 308. an old
receipt, produced by the defendant, was ad-
mitted as evidence tending to prove a modus,
without proof of handwriting. There was
some question made as to the custody of it
having been given to a person other than the
one who produced it. Upon this the chief
baron observed: “It was not given to this
Mr. Beaumont, but to another person of the
same name, and who, of course, occupied
lands in Buckiand, for none but an occupier
could have acquired such a receipt. That
person being of the same name with the
present defendant. there is a reasonable in-
ference that they were so connected as to
make this the propercustody; and reasonable
evidence of proper custody is all that can be
required, and is sufficient.”
In Fenwick v. Reed, 6 Madd. 7, it was rul-
ed “that a letter, appearing upon the face of
it to be written by the defendant's attorney,
upon the subject of the suit. and coming out
of the custody of the representative of his
attorney, and dated in_1T-i8, was admissible
without proof of handwriting; the contents
of a letter, like the contents of a deed. afford-
ing intrinsic evidence in its favor." The
case was determined ill 1821- A116 in “T1111?
v. Tyrwhitt, -1 Barn. & Aid. 376, it was said
1,; the court; “'1'he rule is not contined to
deeds or wills, but extends to letters and oth-
er written documents coining from the prop-
er custody. It is founded on the antiquity
of the instrument, and the great dlm°“".\',
nay, impossibility, of proving the handwrit-
ing of 3 party after such lapse of time.”
it is true that the admission of written in-
struments, without other proof of their genu-
lneness than that which arises from their age
and ¢usmdy_ opens the door to error and
fraud; but this is no more so when they are
introduced for the purpose of establishing
the identity of a person by a comparison of
hands than when introduced for any other
purpose. In commenting on the possibility
of en-or and 1|-and attending the admission oi’
ancient docunients tlS_€\’ltl9ll('E. Prof. \\'iltll‘-
ton says: "No doubt. ancient documents, as
well as modern. may be forget ." To this he
makes two replies: “in the first place, whiic
(lO(:\1me11t_g attested by witnesses. since de-
ceased. have been forged. the fact that there
is a possibility of such falsification is an ob-
jection to credibility. but not to competency.
In the second place. bv requiring that the
document should be taken from the proper
depository, the probability of falsification is
wn.oos,sv.—-5
greatly diminished." 1 Whart. Ev. 5 194.
This has been regarded as an adequate
ground for the admission of such documents
in evidence, without further proof of their
authenticity, by most writers on evidence. 2
Phil. Ev. (10th Eng. and -ith Am. Ed.) -180.
No evidence is entirely free from infirmi-
ties of some kind. An honest witness may
err in his recollection in what he has seen or
heard, or his own senses may have been de-
ceived in what passed under his observation,
or, on the other hand, the witness may be
dishonest, and not tell the truth. But the
possibility of error is not a ground for the
rejection of evidence in any case. It goes
to its weight, and is to be considered by the
jury or the court trying the case.
2. It is a well-settled rule in this state that,
where the genuineness of handwriting is in-
volved, well-attested standards of the hand
of the person whose writing ls in question
may be introduced i'or the purpose of com-
parison with that which is disputed; and that
this comparison may be made, not only by
persons who have seen the party write, or
have acquired a knowledge of his hand by
corresponding or transacting business with
him, but also by persons skilled in hand-
writing, such as are usually called "experts."
Bragg v. Colweil, 19 Ohio St. 407; Pavey v.
Pavcy. 30 Ohio St. 600; Caikins v.‘ State, 14
Ohio St. 222.
While this is not controverted. it is argued
that the letter and pay-roll should not have
been admitted for the purpose of comparison
with the admitted writings of Brooms upon
any evidence less certain than that required
in the case of standards. This is illogical.
The fallacy consists in assuming that the let-
ter and pay-roll are the standards, or else that
the writing in dispute shall be ascertained
with as much certainty as that with which it
is compared before the comparison is made.
But neither assumption is true. The matter
to be determined by comparison of hands was
whether the deceased, Broonie, had written
the letter or not, and so as to the pay-roll;
and to require the same certainty as to who
wrote the letter or .-‘zned the pay-roll as is
required as to the standards of the party's
hand in question would in no way aid the
inquiry. as neither could, under such a rule,
be introduced until such conditions had been
complied with as would render the introduc-
tion of either wholly unnecessary. This is
inconsistent with the principle upon which
such evidence is introduced, which is to de-
termine the authorship of that which is un-
known and disputed by a cmnparison with
that which is known and undisputed. llere
the known factors in the casc. as present-
ed by the bill of exceptions, were ihc writ-
in;.:s of thc deceased. Broomc, introduced
as standards. Whether he had written
the letter or signed the pay-roll was a fact
to be proved: and a comparison of hands
would tend, at least, to solve the question.
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EXPL.\N ATORY FACTS. f.Clue No. 21 
Thia ruling W"as followed ln Doe v. Bey-
non, 12 Adol. & E. 431, where certain old let-
ters were adrnltted In e\'ldence upon the Is-
sue In the ease whetberthe person claiming as 
devlsee of the writer was the pe1·son Intend-
ed. Tbe;t· were admitted without proof of 
handwriting, -or other proof of their genuine-
net111 than that they found among the pa-
pel'8 of the person to whom they bad been 
addreMed at the time of ber death. 
In Bertie v. Beaumont, 2 Price, 308. an old 
Je(•t>lpt, produc·ed by tbe defendant, was ad-
mitted a11 evidence tending to prove a mudus, 
without proof of handwriting. Tbt>re was 
110me question made as to the custody of it 
having been given to a penion other than the 
one wbo procluced It. Upon this the chief 
baron observed: "It was not given to this 
~Ir. Beaumont. but to another person of the 
11tme name, and wbo, of course, occupied 
lands In Buckland, for none but an occupier 
could have acquired such a rec•elpt. 'l'hat 
pel'8c>n being of the same name with the 
present defendant. there ls a reasonable ln-
teren<'e that they were so conne<·ted as to 
make this the proper .custody; and reasonable 
evidence of proper <'Ustody h1 all that can be 
re<)Uire<l, and ls sutHclent." 
In .I<'enwlck v. Reed, tJ :\ladd. 7, It was rul-
ed "that a Jetter. appearing upon the face or 
It to be w11tten by the defendant's attorney, 
upon the subject of the suit, and coming out 
of the custody of the reprPsentntlve of his 
attorney, and dated In 17-18, was admissible 
without proof ot handwriting; the c·outents 
ot a Jetter, like the contents or a deed, atronl-
lng lntrlll8lc evidence In Its favor." The 
ease was determined In 1821. And In Wynne 
v. Tyrwhltt, 4 Barn. & Aid. 370, It wns 111tld 
by the court: ·•The rule ls not confined to 
deeds or wills. but t.>Xtends to letters and oth-
er written documents coming from the prop-
er custody. It ls rounded on the antiquity 
of the Instrument, and the great dltHculty, 
nay, impossibility, of proving the haudwrlt· 
Ing of a party atter sm•h lapse of time." 
It 111 true that the admls1do11 of written in-
struments, without other proof of their genu-
lnenes11 than that which arises from their age 
and custody, opens the door to error nod 
fraud; but this Is no more so when they nre 
lntroclm·ed for the pur1K>ee of e11ttthlh~hlng 
the Identity of a pt>rMon by a compnrhmn of 
bonds than when introdm•ed for nn.r othe1· 
I>Ul'Jl08e. In comnwntlng on the pot!tdhlllty 
of e1Tor and fmud attending the ndmlt!t!lon of 
nn<"lent documents as evldenre. Prof. \Yhnr-
ton says: "No llouht. 'an<'lent doc~m11e11t11, ne 
well as modern. may be forged.'' To this hP 
n1akt>11 two replies: "In the first pince, whllP 
documents atteMtt>d by wltne11ee11. sln<'e dl'-
ce1111ed, bave been forged, th<! fact that tht>n• 
Is a possibility of such falslttcatlop ls an ob-
jection to credlblllty. but not to c·om1wte1wy. 
In the second place. bv rf.'qulrlng that th!' 
dO<'ument 11bould be taken from the p1·opt>r 
depository, the probahlllty of talelficatlon ls 
WILGUS, EV ,-6 
greatly cllmlnlsbecl." 1 Whart. Ev. 5 194.. 
This bas been regarded as an adequate 
ground for the admission of 11uch documents 
In evldt>n<'e, without further proof of their 
authenticity, by mOflt writers on evidence. 2 
Phil. I<~v. (loth Eng. nod ~th Am. Ed.) 480. 
No evidence le entlt·l'iy free from inttrml-
tles of some kind. An honest witness may 
en· in his rec·olleetlon In what he bas 11een or 
heard, or his own senses may have been de-
ceived In what paseett under his obserYntlon, 
or, on the other hand, the witness may be 
dishonest, and not tell the truth. But the 
posslblllty of error Is not a ground tor the 
rejection of evidence In any case. It goes 
to Its weight, and ls to be c·onslctered by the 
jury or the court trylnir the c..'tlse. 
2. It Is a well-11ettled rule 111 this state that, 
where the genuineness of handwriting ls In-
volved, well-attested standarcl11 ot the band 
of the person whose writing ls In question 
tony be Introduced tor the 1mrpose of com-
parison with that which Is disputed; and that 
this comparison may he made, not only by 
persons who have seen the party write, or 
have acquired a knowledge or his hand by 
corresponding or tranBnctlng business with 
him, but also by persons skllled In hand-
writing, such as are usually calle<l ·•exf>Prte." 
Bmgg v. Colwt>ll, 10 Ohio St. 407; Pavey v. 
Pavl'y, 30 Ohio St. 000; Calkins v; 8tnte, 14 
Ohio Rt. 222. 
While this ls not controvertPd, It is argued 
that the letter and pay-roll should not have 
been admitted for the pnrr1ol!e of compartnon 
with the admitted writings of Broome upon 
any evidence less certain than that required 
lo the <'ftSe of standards. This ls lllogical. 
The fnllac•y cont1ists In as1mmlng that the let-
ter and pay-roll are the standards, or else that 
the writing In dl11pute shall be asce1·talned 
with as much certainty as that with which it 
ls compared before the comparison le made. 
But neither assumption Is true. The matter 
to be determined by <"omparlson of hands was 
whether the deceased, Broome, had written 
the letter or not, and RO ns to the pny-roll; 
and to require the same <·ertalnty as to who 
wrote the letter or 1'1l..'11Pd the pay-roll as ls 
requlrP<l as to the standards of the party's 
hnnd In question would In no wny nld the 
ln11ulry, as neither could, undPr such a rult>. 
be lntroduc..'l'd until SU<'h conditions hnd ht-en 
complll'd with as wonhl render the lntrodn<'-
tlon of either wholly unnPc•es11ary. 'l'hls Is 
lnconsl11tent with the prln<'lple upon which 
1md1 e\"lc11•m·e he lntrmhwecl. whlrh i11 to dt>-
ter111l11f' the authorship of tlutt whlc·h ls nn· 
known nod <ll111rnh•<I by a <'OlllJllll'hmn with 
thnt whic-h ts known and 11ncl1Rp11IP11. Ilf'rP 
thP known f1wtors In thl' 1·ni;!'. UR pre~eut­
Pd hy thP hill of eX<'PlJtlonM, wne t Ill' wrlt-
ln;.."M of th1• clec:·1•111<t'cl. RrnomP, lntrrnhl<'e1l 
nR 1<t11111lar:I:<. \\'h!'thPr hP bad wrltt<'n 
tlw lt'ttl't' or sl;.:-nf'I! tlw par-roll was a f:td 
to he proved: and n c·om1J(lril'lon of hancl!! 
would tend, at least. to solve the question. 
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and might reduce it to reasonable certainty;
for it is self-evident that proof that two writ-
ings are in the same hand is evidence that
they were written by the same person.
The uncertainty that may have arisen upon
a more comparison of hands, as to whether
Brooine wrote the letter or signed the pay-
roll, is not, on the competency of the evidence,
to be confused with the uncertainty there .
may have existed as to whether the one had
been written and the other signed by the an-
cestor ot the plaintiffs. It is true that, on a
question of proot',—that is to say, the weight
of evident-e,—the one is connected with and
depends upon the other; but on a question of
competency each is independent and separate.
The admissibility ot the letter and pay-roll
rest upon their antiquity, and the custody
from which each was produced; the com-
parison of hands, upon the evidence which is
in general attached to such evidence. We are
not now considering the weight of the evi-
deuce.
record is the admissibility of that which was
received and objected to, as shown by the
bill of exceptions.
The spirit of the law of evidence permits
a resort to every reasonable source of int'or-
matlon upon a disputed question oi.‘ tact aris-
ing in a cae. Unless excluded by some
positive exception, everything relative to the
issue is regarded as admissible; and this is
extended to every hypothesis pertinent to the
issue. 1 Whart. Ev. § 20. Here the hypothe-
sis proposed by the plaintiffs below was that
the letter written from the academy by a 1
Levi Brewster, and the signature of a. person
of the same name to the pay-roll, were in the
same handwriting as were the writings in-
troduced as standards, and admitted to be in
that of the decedent. '.l‘he pertinency of this
hypothesis is apparent. If the tact were cs-
tabilshed, it would only remain to the plain-
tiffs. in order to make out their case. to show
that the Levi Brewster who wrote the letter
or signed the pay-roll was their ancester.
Hence, upon principle, the ¢0mpetency of the
evidence seems very plain.
But it is argued that I19 instance of a case
can 1* in-oduced where a comparison of hands
was resorted to for the purpose of proving
the memity 0! a person, except in what is
¢'1"“11l?(l tv be 11 very questionable one,-—
the Tichborne Case. ln the first place, the
case Just ref8l‘l'€d to is" not regarded as one
of questionable authority by writers on the
law of evidence. 1 \viiai-i_ Ev, § 9 er 5eq_
In U19 11BX11 1111196, many instances may be
produced, other than that of Queen v. Ca-
t0l', 4 E5P- 117, in which a comparison of
hands has been resorted to for this purpose.
in (‘oni. v. \\'ebster, 5 (iusii 2g;;',_ rmcii 9‘-i-
deuce was introduced for the purpose of
sliowing that certain anonymous letters. writ-
ten ln a disguised 1111116, addressed to the city
marshal of BOSt0Il,- between the disappear-
ance of the deceased and the arrest ot’ the de-
The only question presented by the 1
‘ like purpose, in suits for libel.
fendant, containing various suggestions cal-
culated to mislead the officers of the law, had
been written by the defendant. The object
was to incriminate the accused by identifying
him with the person who wrote the anony-
mous letters. Such evidence has been receiv-
ed as competent for the purpose of identity-
ing the defendant in prosecutions for sending
threatening letters, and in arson; also, tor a
Com. v. Web-
ster. supra, 301; 2 Greenl. Ev. Q 416. Among
the various circumstances relied on as tend-
ing to show that Sir Phillip Francis was the
author of Jnnius, were, as enumerated by
Prof. Wharton, that his handwriting had cer-
tain marked peculiarities. 1 Whart. Ev. 5
23. This, however, could only be determined
by a comparison instituted between the writ-
ings of the supposed, and the manuscript of
the real, author.
Again it is resorted to in a large class of
cases where there is a question as to whether
the party sued is the person who signed the
instrument on which suit is brought. 1
Greenl. aw. § 575. In all such cases, it will
be observed, the question is not as to the
genuineness of the paper, but 11* to me me"-
tity of the party sued with the person who
signed and is liable upon it, The object ot
offering such evidence may arise in a variety
of forms. A writing may be in a disguised
hand, as in the Webster Case, 5 Cush. 295;
or it may have been intended as an imitation
of that of some third person, as in U16 (‘B88
ot a forgery; or it may be neither disguised
nor imitated, as is assumed in this case.
Now, it is evident that in either of the first
two instances the liability to error in torm-
ing an opinion, even by experts, will be great-
; 61' than in the last one; because in both ot
the flrfit two instances the writing is execut-
ed for the express purpose of deceivimz.
while in the latter there has been neither dis-
simulatlon nor forgery, and one specimen ot
ilellllille writing is simply compared with an;
other; so tliat, on principle, there is less
room for questioning the propi-iety of a re-
sort to a comparison of hands in the latter
than in either of the twdfoi-met‘ instances.
The value of such evidence on a question of
Dersonal identity is strikingly illustrated in
the case above 1-ere,-red to as that of '1‘ich-
borne. A comparison of the writings intro-
flllced in the case would convince ally lute!‘
llgellt Derson that there was 110 "'11"! “'h“t'
BYE!‘ in the claim of the defendant. It dis-
pwves his identity with the real Sir R011“
Tichborne. What was true in that case must
be "He. to a greater or less extent, in even’
instance where a case of personal identity is
involved. Judicial proof is not a matter of
me"! arblti-aI'.V rules. Its l>l'l|l(?iP19B "Ye
draw" fl'0m the experience and 0b86l'V11tl°"
°f mi‘-I1. and should be applied as they 9-Fe 113'
me" in general. Every lawyer and illdlle Or
*‘XP“l'iBnce will confirm what is said by Ml‘-
Phmills in his work on Evidence: “It ma!
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and might reduce tt to reasonable certainty; fendant, containing various suuesttons cal-
tor It ls selt~vldent that proof that two writ- culated to mislead the odlcers of the law, had 
lugs are In the same hand ls evidence that been written by the defendant. 1.1le object 
they were written by the same 1ierM<m. was to Incriminate the accused by ldentitylng 
The uncertainty that may have m·h~eu upon Wm with the person who wrote the anony-
a mere comparison of hands, as tu wlh•ther moUll letters. Such evidence has been recelv-
Bruome wrote the letter or signed the 1my- ed as ('()Olpetent for the purpose of ldentlty-
roll, ls not, on the competency ot the t•\•lden<'e, lug the defendant In proeeeutlons tor sending 
to be contused with the uncertalnt.r thet·p thrmtenlng letters, and In arson; also, for 11 
may have existed as to whether the one hnd I like purpose, In BUlts tor llbeL Com. v. Web-
been written and the other 1:Jl1<ued by the an- 1 ster, supra, 301; 2 Greenl. Ev. I 416. Among 
.. >estot· ot the plalutllf11. It ls true that, on a ~ the various circumstances relied on as tend-
questlon ot 11roor,-that ls to say, the weight Ing to show that Sir Phllllp Francis was the 
of evldence,-tbc one ls connected with and author of Junius, were, as enumerated by 
depends upon the othet·; but on a question of Prof. Wharton, that bis handwriting had rer-
competency each Is Independent and separate. taln marked pecullaritlee. 1 Whart. Ev. I 
The adml88lblllty of the letter and pay-roll 23. This, however, could only be detennlned 
rest upon their antiquity, and the custody I by a comparison Instituted between the wrlt-
trom which each was produced; the com- lop of the supposed, and the manuscript of 
parlsuu of hands, upon the t•vldent't! which ls the real, author. 
ln general attached to such evidence. We are Again It is resorted to 1D a large clasa of 
not now considering the weight of the evl- I cases where there ls a question as to whether 
dence. '.rhe only question pre~uted by the , the party sued is the person who signed the 
record is the admissibility of that which was \ instrument on which sult ls brought. 1 
recelved and objected to, us shown by the . Greenl. Ev. § 57;;. In all such ca!M!B, lt will 
bill of excepUons. i be observed, the queatlon ls not .as to the 
The spirit of the law of evidence permits i genulneneu of the }Nlpc:•r, but a11 tc> the lden-
a resort to every l"t'aBOnnble Moun:e or lntor- i tlty of the party sued with the person who 
matlon upon a disputed question of fa<'t arlB- : signed and ls liable UPon It. The object ot 
Ing In a case. Unless excluded by some • olTerlng such evidence may arise In a variety 
positive exeeptloo, everything relative to the i ot forms. A writing may be In a dlsgnlsed 
188ue is regudeu as adml88lble; and this ls ' hand, as in the Webeter Case, o CUsh. :!95; 
extenclt'<l to every hypotbeals pe11:lnent to the or It may have been Intended as an Imitation 
188ue. 1 Whart. Ev. f 20. Here the bypotbe- of that of some third person, as In the <'A8e 
slls proposed by the plaintiffs below was that of a forgery; or It may be neither disguised 
the letter written from the academy by a nor Imitated, as la aaaumed In this cue. 
Levi Brewster, and the signature of a person ; Now, It ls evident that In either of the 1rst 
of the same name to tl1e pay-roll, were In the ! two Instances the Uablllty to error in form-
Rame handwriting as were the writings In- i Ing an opinion, even by experts, will be great-
troduced as standards, and admitted to be In I er than In the last one; beeause In both of 
that of the tlec.·edent. 'Ihe pertlnency of this the first two Instances the writing la exeent-
hyt)()the1ds Is nppnrent. It the tact were cs- ed for the expre88 purpose of deceiving, 
tabllshec.l, It would only 1·emaln to the plain- wblle lo the latter there ball been neither dls-
tltrs. In order to make out their (•ase, to show simulation nor forgery, and one lqleClmen ot 
tlmt the Levi Brewster who wrote the letter genuine Wl'ltlng 18 simply compared with an: 
or tJlgued the pay-roll was their ancester. other; so that, on principle, there i11 less 
Ilen<·e, upon prln<'lple, the com1wtency of the room for questioning the propriety of a re-
evldence seems very plain. I sort to a <'ompartson ot band& 111 the latter 
But It ls :irgued that no Instance of a case than in either of the two· fonner lustancea. 
can 1*- l>rodnced where a comparison of bands The value of such evidence on a question of 
was resorted to for the purpose of proving I pel"!lonal Identity Is strikingly Illustrated In 
the Identity of a person, exrept In what Is the case above referred to as that of Tlch-
elnlmetl to be a very questlounble one,- J borne. A comparison of the writings lntro-
thc Tlchborne Caite. In the ttrst place, the duced In the <'llBe would convince any Intel-
case Just refeITed to Is· not regarded as one llgent I>el'l!On that there was 00 truth what-
ot questionable authority by writers on the ever In the claim of the defendant. It dls-
Iaw of evidence. 1 Wbart. Ev. t 9 et seq. proves his Identity with the real Sir Robert 
In the next place, many Instances may be 'flchborne. What was true In that case 1nust 
produced, other than that of Queen v. Ca- be true, to a greater or less extent, In ev<!ry 
tor, 4 Esp. 117, In which a com1»arlson of Instance where a case of personal Identity ls 
bands has ~n resort~ to tor t~ls purpose. involved. .Tudlclal proof Is not a matter of 
Jn ('om. v. "ebster, u Cush. 21),1, such evl- mere arbitrary rules. Its 11rtuciples are 
<l<>m'<' was Introduced for th(• pur1>011e of drawn from the experience and observation 
showing that <>ertaln anonymous lt•ttf'ni, writ- ot men, and should be applied as they are by 
tf'n ht a dh•irulsed hand, addressed to the city men In general. Every lawyer and judge of 
marshal of Hoston, between the disappear- experlellce wlll confirm what 18 said by llr. 
nnre of the deceased and the arrest of the de- l'hllltps In bis work on :&vitlence: "It m&T 
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be laid du\v11 as a first principle that ex- our c0u1'ts'lm.s suffered, not from too free
clusion is ,<:e11¢--1‘:|ll_\' an evil, and admission admission of evidence, but from too rigid ex-
genelflll_\' safe and wise;" to which he adds: clusiou." 2 Phil. Ev. (Edward’s Ed.) 623.
“It is certain the administration of justice in Judgment afllrmed.
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EXPLA~A'fORY FACTS. (Caae No. 21 
be laid do"·n ns a first pl"luclple th11t ex-
cluslou ls genentlly an evil, and admh11don 
geneiully ea:fe and wise;" to which he adds: 
"It ls certain the administration of justice in 
"l 
. 
our courts 'has sutrered, not from too free 
a<lw1111!lon of evidence, but from too rigid ex· 
clusion." 2 Phll. Ev. (Edward's Ed.) 628. 
Judgment a1ftrmed. 
67 
Case No. 23]
RELEVANCY.
In re THOMPSON, Commissioner of Public
\Vo1-ks.
In rc BYTLER.
(28 N. E. 38!). 127 N. Y. 463.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Second Divi-
sion. Oct. 6, 1891.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, second department.
Application of Hubert O. Thompson,
commissioner of public works. etc., to ex-
tinguish certain water-rights for the use
oi the city of New York. The award of
commissioners appointed to assess dam-
ages was uflirmed by the special term. and
again by the general term. Claimant,
Butler. appeals. Afiirmed.
William Allen Butler and Willa rd Parker
Butler. for appellant. Arthur H. Maston,
for respondent.
PARKER, J. This proceeding was
brought pursuant to the powersconferred
on the commissioner of public works of ths
city of New York by chapter-H5 ofthe La we
of 1877. and the various acts amendatory
thereof, to acquire the right to divert and
keep diverted from the Bronx river all the
water of the river north of and above the ‘
dam at Kensico. 'I‘he commissioners
awarded to the claimant, who was the
owner of a large and valuable farm
through which the river ran. damages in
the suin of $7.270. From tii9\)l‘(18l' con-
firming such report and award successive
appeals have been taken by the claimant
to this court. the latter appeal being es-
peciaily authorized by the act of 1877. But
the fact that an appeal to this court is
permitted does not bring up for review a
question of fact arising unon conflicting
evidence, and this court has nojurisdic-
tion to review the decision of the general
term,uniess error of law in the proceedings
he found. In rc 'l‘ho|npson. 121 N. Y. 277.
24 N. E. Rep. 472.1 That case had its ori-
gin in proceedings taken under chapter 490.
Laws18s3. but the provision permitting
an appeal to the court oi appeals is the
same as in the act authorizing the pro-
ceedings before us. and the decision cited
is therefore applicable and controlling.
Unless, then, some error of law requires a
reversal, the decision oi the general term
must stand.
The only exception to which our atten-
tion is called relates to an effort on the
part oi the owner to prove what had been
paid by the petitioner for water-rights ap-
purtenant to a neighboring parcel on the
same river. At folio 7467 the counsel for
the owner offered to prove that the city
of New York purchased from Robert White
the right to divert the waters from one-
half of the water-shed of the Bronx river,
and paid him the sum of $:21.'Jill.66 for
such rights, and his privileges in connec-
‘ This case was decided under the authority of’
Code Civil Proc. N. Y. 5 1337, which provides
thata question of fact arising upon conflicting
evidence cannot be determined upon an appeal to
the court of appeals from a. tinal judgment. or
from an order granting or refusing a new trial,
unless where special provision for the determi-
nation thereof is mado by law.
tion with a certain mill upon what is
known as the "Powder-Mill Property " at
Scarsdale. The commission declined to
rule on the offer. at the same time, by its
chairman. saying. in effect. that a ruling
would be made as the evidence should be
presented. In that connection no other
evidence was offered, and the exception
then taken is. of course. not available.
But, in view of the stipulation making the
evidenceas to all parcels applicable to any
other, it is claimed that this appellant is
entitled to the benefit of any exception
taken to the rejection oi evidence bearing
on the question of the value of nis water-
power. We shall assume. without decid-
ing. that this claim is well founded. Rob-
ert White was vested in fee with the ripa-
rian ownership in such premises at the time
of the commencement of the proceedings
to acquire title by the city. Pending the
proceedings he died. Subsequently. pur-
suant to an agreement with his heirs. a
conveyance was made to the city. Re-
spectlng the manner in which the proof
w as sought to be made, the owner otfered
in evidence the deed, which expressed o
consideration. But. for the purpose of
proving the price paid. it was not compe-
tent. Mayor. etc., v. McCarthy. 102 N. Y.
630, 8 N. E. Rep.R5. One or more witnesses
were asked to state the sum paid, and, as
the obiection went solely to the compe-
tency of the evidence for any purpose. it
must be assumed that the witnesses were
competent to answer the question. And
the question, then. is, was the rejection of
the evidence as to the amount paid by the
city for the White water-power error for
which a reversal should be had?
This question has been presented to the
courts of last resort in several ofthestates,
but not with the same result. In Massa-
chusetts. New Hampshire. Illinois. luwa.
and Wisconsin it is held that actual sales
of other similar land in the vicinity, made
near the time at which the value of the
land taken is to be determined. are admis-
sible as evidence for the purpose of arriv-
ing attheamountoicompensation. Gard-
ner v. Brookline, 127 Mass. 358; Packing,
etc., Co. v. City of Chicago, 111 Ill. 651;
Town oi‘ Cherokee v. Land Co., 52 Iowa. 279,
3 N. W. Rep. 42; Railroad Co. v. Greely, 23
N. H. 242; Washburn v. Railroad Co.. 59
Wis. 364. 18 N. W. Rep. 328. While in some
of the other iurisdictions,notably Pennsyl-
vania, New Jersey. Georgia, and Califor-
nia. it is held that sales of similar prop-
erty are not admissible for the purpose of
proving the value of property about to be
taken. Railroad Co. v. I-Iiester. 40 Pa. St.
53; Railroad, etc.,(.‘o. v. Bunnell.8l Pa.St.
414; Railroad (‘o. v. Zieiner, 124 Pa.St.5(il).
17 Atl. llep. 187; Railroad Co. v. lit-nson.36
N. J. Law, 557; Railroad C0. v. Pearson.
35 Cal.2-17-262; Railroad (‘o. v. Keith, 53
Ga. 17$. The reasons assigned for the con-
clusion reached in the cases last cited are.
in the main, that the test in legal proceed-
ings is, what is the prcscnt market value
Oi The Dl'Operty which is thesubjcctof con-
Yl‘°\'9l‘9.Y? it may be shown by the testi-
mony of competent witnesses, and on
cross-exnmina lion, for the purpose of test-
ing their knowledge respecting the market
value of land in that vlcinit_v.they may be
asked to name such sales of property, and
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Case No. 2.?] RELEVANCY. 
In re THO}IPSON, Commlaaioner of Public 
Worn. 
In rl' Bt'TLER. 
(28 N. E. 389. 127 N. Y. 463.) 
Court of Appeals of New York, St>cond Dlvl-
sion. Oct. 6, 18tll. 
Appeal from supreme court, general 
term, BeCond llepartment. 
Application of Hubert 0. Thompson 
commissioner of public works, Pte., to ex: 
tlnglliBh certain water-rights for the ol!E' 
of the city of New York. The award of 
commiAsionera appointed to 1:1.ssess dam-
ages was atftrm~d by the epechtl term, And 
again by the gent'ral tllrm. Claimant, 
Butler, appeals. Affirmed. 
William Allen Dutler and Willard Parker 
Butler. for appellant. Arth11r H. Maston, 
for respondent. 
PARKER, J. This proceeding was 
brought pursuant to the powArscouferl't'd 
on thf'l commlsHloner of public worksoftha 
city of New York bychapter445oftheLawe 
of 1877, and the various acts ameudatory 
thereof, to acquire the right to divert and 
keep diverted from the Bronx river all the 
wRter of the river north of and above tlle 
dam at Kenslco. Thf' comrulludoners 
awarded to the claluannt, who was the 
owner of a large and valuable farm 
through which the river ran, dllmagee In 
the st1m of f7,270. From the ->rder con-
firming 1mcb report ancl award sm·ceaielve 
1t11pe1tls have been taken by thP claimant 
to this court, the latter appeal bclug es-
pecially authorized by the act of 1877. But 
the fact that an appeal to this court la 
11ermitted does not bring op for review a 
question of fact arising anon conflicting 
evidenl'e, anrl this court bu no Jurisdic-
tion to l'f>Vlew the decision of the general 
tPrm,unlees error of law lo theprm·eedlngs 
hf' fouurl. In re ThnmpRon, l~l N. Y. zt7. 
24 N. E. Rep. •12.1 That cue bad lte orl-
~ln In proceedlnga taken under chttpter 490. 
' La we 1~~. but the pro\"lslon permitting 
an appeal to the court of appealR ls the 
aame as In the at't authorlZfng the pro-
ceedings before us. and the decision cited 
111 thprefore applicable and controlllng. 
lTnleHB, then, sowe error or law reqilires a 
re,·el'llal, the decision ot the general term 
must stand. 
The only ex:!eptlon to which our atten-
tion le callPd relates to an enort on the 
part or the owner to prove whet hod bet>n 
Jutltl by the petitlom"r for water-rlghts np· 
purtenant to a. nelii;hborln~ parcel on thl' 
e1twe river. At folio 7467 the counsel for 
the o\\'ner offered to prove thu t the city 
of New York purchased from Robert White 
thl.' rb?ht to dit"ert the waterR from 011e-
ht1lf of the water-shed o~ the Bronx rh·er 
and l',atd him the sum of ':!l,991.66 fo~ 
such rights, and his privileges in l'Onuec. 
1 Thia case was decided under the authority of 
Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 13:-17, which provides 
that a question of fact arising upon coutlieting 
evidence caunot be determined upon an appeal to 
the court or appeals from a tlnal Judgm<>nt. or 
from an order ICl'anting or refusing a new trial 
unless where special provision for the determi: 
nation thereof is made by law. 
68 
tlon with a certain mllJ upon wh1:1. t lB 
known aa the" Powder-Miil Property" at 
Scarsdale. 'rhe commlst1lon declined to 
rule on the oner, at the same time, by Its 
chairman, saying, In enect. that a ruling 
would he made as the evldenl'e aibould be 
presented. lo that connection no other 
evidence was onered, 11nd the exception 
then taken la, of courae, not available. 
But, In view of the etlpula.tlon making the 
P.\•ldenceas to all parcels applicable to any 
other, It le claimed that this appellant ht 
entitled to the beneHt of any exception 
taken to the rejection of Pvldence bearing 
on the question of the value of nls water-
power. We 11hall aB1Jume. without decid-
ing, that thla claim Is wPll founded. Rob-
Prt White wae veett'd ht fee with the ripa-
rian ownership In sucb premlBt's at tbe time 
of the commenl'emeot of the proceedings 
to acquire title by the city. Pending the 
proceedlnp he died. Subeeque11tly, pur· 
suant to an agreement wltb his hell'H. a 
conn•yance was made to the city. Re-
spectlug the manner In which tho vroof 
was eou;r:ht to be mnde, .the owner onered 
lo f'\"ldence the df'ed, which expreMed a 
conshle1'atlon. But, for the purpose of 
provln~ the price paid, It wa11 not com11e-
tent. Mayor, etc., v. McCarthy, 10:.! N. Y. 
630, 8 :N. E. Rep. 85. On& or more wltneSBes 
were asked to state the sum paid, and, as. 
thl' objection went solely to the compe· 
tency of the evldeuce for any purpose, It 
must be aSBumed that the wltneeses were 
competent to answer the question. And 
tbfl question, then, la, was the reJ~tlon or 
the Pvidence OB to the amount paid by the 
city for the WhltP water-power e1Tor for 
which a reversal should be bad? 
Thie question haa been presented to the 
conrtsof last rPsort In several of the eta tee, 
but not with the same result. In Massa--
chueett.a, New Hampshire. Illinois, Iowa, 
and Wlaconsln It IR held that actual sales 
of other similar land In the vicinity, mad& 
near t.he time at which the value of the 
land taken Is to be determined, are admls-
elblr. ns evidence for the pu1·pose or arriv-
ing attheamountofeompensatlon. Hard-
ner v. Brookline, 127 Mau. 358; Packing, 
etc., Co. v. City of C'hlcugo, 111 Ill. 6.'ll; 
Town of Cherokee v. Land Co., 52 Iowa, 279, 
8 N. W. Rep. 42; Railroad Co. v. Greely, 23 
N. H. 242; Wa11hburn v. Railroad Co .. 55> 
Wis. 364, 18 N. W. Hep. 3:.'8. While In some 
of the other Jurledll'tlons, notably PennRyt. 
vanla, New Jersey, Georgia, and Califor-
nia, It Is held that 881t'H of shnllar prop. 
erty are not admissible for the purpose or 
proving the value of property about to be 
taken. Railroad Co. v. Hiester. 40 Pa. St. 
53; Rellroart, etc.,Co. v. Bunnell.!U Pa.~t. 
414; Rallrond Co. v. Zlt>mer, 124 Pa. 8t. 560, 
17 Atl. Ht>p.187; Rallroa<l l'o. v. RPmmn.36 
~· J. Law, 557; Rallrnnd Co. v. Pearson, 
35 Cal. 247-262; Railroad <.'o. v. Keith, 53 
Ga..171'. '!'he reaRonR asRlgnPd for the con-
clusion reached In the Clltlt'S lmct cited ure, 
In the main, that tht• test In ll'gnl procf't><l-
lngR Is, whet le the present market value 
of the proptirty whlrh IH theRllhject of con-
troversy? It mev be s110wn by th~ testl· 
mony of eompetent wltnl'RRl'B, end on 
~r111-1R-exnmin11 tlon, for the p11rpoHE'Of teHt· 
11111: their kuowle<liite 1'('8pectlnll tbe market 
\'Blue of laud in that vicinity. they muy bo 
a11ked to name l:IUl'h sales of property, and 
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thcpricefi Paid therefor, as have come to
me“. attention. But _a party may not es-
mmsh the value of his land by showing"
wlmtvvas Daicl for another parcel similar-
lv situated, because it operates to give to
"he am-eelnent of the grantor and grantee
the eiiect of evidence by them that the con-
sideration for the conveyance was the
market value. witliout giving to the op-
poslte party the benefit oi cross-examina-
tlon to show that one or both were mis-
taken. 1! some evidence of value, then
prima facie a case may be made out, so
iar as the question of damages is con-
cerned. by proof of a single sale, and thus
the agreement of the parties which may
have been the result of necessity or cap-
rlce would be evidence of the market value
Q1 land similarly situated, and become a.
gtandiird by which tn measure the value
oi land in controversy. This would lead
to an attempt by the opposing party to
gho\v—F1rst. the dissimilarity of the two
parcels oi‘ land; and, second, the circum-
stances surrounding the parties which in-
duced the conveyance.—such as a sale by
one in danger of insolvency, in order to
realize money to support his business. or
a sale in any other eniergcncy which for-
bids a-grantor to wait a reasonable time
for the Iubllc to be informed of the fact
that his property is in the market: 018011
the olher hand, that the price raid was
excessive, and occasioned by the fact that
the grantee was not a resident ol the lo-
culity,nor acquainted with real values, and
was thus readily induced to pay 11- Bum
far exceeding the xnarket value. Thus
each transaction in real estate claimed to
be similarly situated might llreflellt “V0
side issues, which could be made the sub-
ject oi 88VllTOr0l1Q contention as the main
issue. and.’ if the transactions were nu-
|ncruus,it would result in unduly prolong‘-
ing the trial. and unnecessarily confusing
the issues, with the added disadvantage
oi rendering preparation I01‘ trill! (1itfiC111T--
Our attention has not been called to a
case in this court where the (lllesuoll has
been passed upon in the manner here pre-
sented,but there are a number of decisions
indicating the tendency of the court to be
flgiilllst proving value by evidence Of the
selling price oi slmilarproperty. In Hunt-
ington v. Attrill, 118 N. Y. 365. 23 N. E.
Relh 544, the dei'enda.nt-s flttenipted t0
prove the value oi certain sea-side Pl‘0P-
'~‘~1‘tY by showing the value 01' other DMD-
erty oi the same general character situated
in dillerent places, and Judge Bl(Al)l.l<2\.,
speaking ior thc court. said: “it may be
that such evidence would have furnished
some guide ior estimate of the value ol the
property, hut might not. Such evidence
would present collateral issues. which
might. and very likcly would. illvvlve a.
variety of considerations ha vim: relation
to similarity or difference. 1111'] to all V1111-
$8298 and disadvantages 0‘ the dmerent
properties in numerous respects. as com_
pared with that in ql19$fl°"- It "F quite
well settled that evidence of that charac-
1iP1' is not admissible upon the question 01
the value of property in °°"t"°V°"LV-”
Tim quggtjog was nut necessarily before
the courtin Mayor. etc., v. l\icl‘~&I‘_th.V. l02 N.
Y,6I_${).63g, 8 N_ E_ Rep_ 55; but Chief Justice
Ruosn, referring to the question whether
frflld On [GI-98 No. 22
we price; i vlriiialn sales
tween inf . ,, I
of value. st‘2'gt' H iv: 8r],,_,,-gs’, real estnfe be-
. bleas evld
hO\VUl‘el'-v HQ’ thin]; ‘t ence
view. 00111 I7et€nt 9; Price Isl I)?)LI!1ti(-2018",’
Blanchard "- Mes id ’ 8”-7
the deffillljunt at empt d
“<‘ 1'0 show the
value ofu Bullken st
the value 0' other st 98111-boat by proving
she cook] he cam 98m-boats with which
that the evfd p““'@¢l- and It was held
ellcfl W
Langdon v. City of 135 1"" 1'-‘olllpetent. In
N_ Y. Supp_ 864’ the cg‘; York, (Sup. C-'t.)13
other evidence should bjecuon was “mt
tablish the fact sou -h
866,) so that r1-e'qui'?s¢iot|i°<§’F’§’ii'§’ ‘l'¢§i'él='i’i'§'-"°
of the evidence was not before the ¢-mnffy
We are of the opinion that the value of
property which depends upon the pres-
ence or absence oi’ inherent qualities not
necessarily present or absent in other and
similar property cannot be proved by
showing the price paid for such other and
similar property. The value of property
having a recognized market value, such
as No. 1 wheat and corn, may, of course,
be proven by showing the market prices:
but the value oi property which is depend-
ent upon locality, adaptability for a par-
ticular use, as well as the use made of
property immediately adjoining, may not
be shown by evidence oi the price paid for
similar property. Even under the Massa-
chusetts rule, a reversal would not he jus-
titled because of the extent of the discre-
tion vested in thejudge or ofiicer presid-
ing at the trial to determine whether such
evidenceis admissible, depending. ofcourse,
on various elements. such as the nearness
or remoteness oi the time oi sale; whether
the premises are far separated; the cou-
dition of the property about the parcel
sold, and the use made of it, which may
have operated to enhance or diminish its
selling value; the similarity of the ["09-
erty, not only as to description. but as t0
its availability for use. Chandler v.J&r\-_
muica. Pond Aqueduct Corp-, l‘-3'-"1-\'1a5‘*':?0(£3'
Gardner v. Brookline, 127 Mass. 358-5 0
and cases cited.
in point oi time. the White i3fl\:e‘Z:§e?,
year and one-halt prior to the ,€‘\“,w\,\;e
the offer was made to Prove ‘Le in the op- A
water-power was in actual “S“.uge\--pOW°T \
eration of a mill. while i“ent\\‘\-1.et\ in any \
oi Mr. Butler had not. been “\\1c\\ :"¥“"' \\
. - . ‘ .
l ltlgve %“eg “Qt. \
_ 91108 of value.” 1 .
t B"BtL'0., 591v, y_ 292:’
degree whatever.
will be diverted lrom t at
as the White property. follow that the reaper-ti\e‘u
are of equal value. The V?\’a_
power depends on its aV3' )“
and. as a matter o_i comimng; fk
that at certain points 8\° V‘,
water-power can be “Wr ix! _
cheamy mgde uvailableiigoq if‘ ,;11\a“o“.e¢.
Poses than at others. dm.“_;,;l De “
contention as to the a coufiie cg ev ‘
denceof that. 1:hnra_ctei‘ C“ tn ca G acts?
we should I‘-1“’Q5BaH‘ylim£d\-isle1’ 19- 9 3 “w'
that th|e ni€;§*‘J;'\v'e‘lé‘illOtt in i-i\\L'\E) I 0
to slmiar . _ ‘ h LP- , 1‘ " . x\\°>
as to auth01"7‘e {'2 (t:it\)e“r:-E>rt1ii\13‘5'kJx1 1 f '3 ‘Qt
‘er of law’ thutheir (list-r€‘fl0 1
erly 6-‘"=""“"'ed 1 or the v\"‘°'e
to admit PTO‘) '
White p*1\'°e‘- - we‘
The appellant “SSH”
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RES INTER ALH> ;_ 
thepr\cef'I paid t.herefor, as ha\·e come to 
their attention. But a party ma.y not es-
tablish tbe value of hlH hrntl by Rhowlng 
what was paid for another pareel 1o!lmllar-
1v s\tuated, beca.uRe It operates to gh·e to 
the 1111:reeinent of the grantor and grant.ee 
the efter.t of evidence by them that the con-
slderatloD fur the conveyance was the 
market value, -without glvlnir to the op-
posite partY tbP. benefit of croRR·examlna-
tton to show that one or both were mis-
taken. lf sOJne eYldence of value, then 
prfma facle a case may be made out, RO 
far a.e the question of damag<'S Is con-
cerned, by proof of a Hingle sale, and tlius 
the agreement of the parties which may 
ba.\"e bet>n the result of necessity or cap. 
nee would be evidence of the market value 
of land similarly eltnated, and bPcome a 
staudard by which t•• mPHRUre the value 
of land In controversy. This would lead 
to an attempt by the opposing party to 
sho\V-Flrst, the dissimilarity of the two 
pa.reels ol hmd; an if, second, the circum-
stances surrounding the parties which in-
duced the conveyence,-1mch as a 11ale by 
one In danKer of Insolvency, In order to 
realize monP-y to support his buRlne11s, or 
a sale In any other f"tnergency which for-
bids a.grantor to waft a reusonahle time 
for the I ubllc to be informed nf the fact 
that hie property is In the market: or, on 
the other hand, tha f'. the price 1>ald was 
excessive, and uccusloned by the fllct that 
the jl;r11ntee was not a resident of the lo-
callty,nor acqnainted -with real values, and 
w11s t.hus n,a.dlly. induced to pay o. sum 
far exceeding the market \"alue. Thus 
ear.h transaction in real estate clalm,d to 
be similarly situated might pre11ent two 
side IB1me11, which cuuld be made the 11ub-
Ject of asvlirorous contention as the m1tln 
Issue, and, If the trnnsactlons were nu-
merous, It would result in unduly prolong-
lntr the trial, and unnecessarily confnslng 
the Issues, with the added dlsadvantuge 
of rendering preparation for trial difficult. 
Our attention baa not been called to a 
caae lo this court where the question has 
been passed upon In the manner here pre-
Reoted, but there are a num her of decisions 
Indicating the tendency of the court to be 
&f!:11lnst proTlng value by evidence of the 
selling price of 11lmllar proporty. In Hunt-
ington v. Attrill, 118 N. Y. 3!l5, 23 N. E. 
Rep. 544, the defencle.nte attempted to 
prove the value of certain sea·slcle proP-
erty by showing the volue of other prop-
erty of tht!Rame genPral character 11ltunted 
in dlnerent IJlaces and Judge IlUADI.EY, 
speaking for the c'ourt. said: "It may be 
that eueh e\'ldence would have furnished 
1mme irulde for estimate of the value of the 
JJroperty, hut mlp.ht not. 8uch evidence 
wouhl p!'PBent collateral ls1mes, which 
might, and very likely would, luvoll"e a 
\'Orlety of conRldera t1011e ha ,·Ing rela tlon 
to 11lmllarlty or difference, anrl to a1h·an-
tages and dlsadvanta~ea or the different 
propertle11 In numerom1 respects, u11 com-
parPtl with that In question. It lri quite 
well settlecl that evidence of that charac-
ter Is not admlslllble upon the que11tion of 
the valoe or property lo con truversy." 
Tb11 qoestloo was not neef's~arlly before 
the court In Mayor, etc., v. )fr< '!'rthy, 102 N . 
Y.6:~,81'\.E.Rep. 85; hutChlefJustfce 
RUGER, referring to the question whether 
the price ,,aid 0 11 . [Cass No. 22 tweeuindf~ldU1tltt 1e*tles 
of value. s 9 ld: "~It #tdrv1.01 real estate be-
howuver. ~~~t k11e1.Je thJ,;kllll:~leq8,,~:V'd1eace \•lew eorP •' Cllt e Price 18 e c e11r, Blan~hard v. 7teallJ~kdence 011:.~:~:~ .. 8JY 
the defe.n <.l nn It t te oat l'o., 69 N. y 292° 
value of & 8UDkea 8 111Pted to sb/Jw ·the 
the valne ol other 1Jt!eam-b011t b,i· provln1r 
she could he com am-bonts with which 
that the f!lvldene11 vfarcd, and lt was held 
Langdon v- (,'ltv ot ;,s 0 '}! competent. 11J 
N. Y. 8upp. ti64, the eobJ~~~;/Sup.C~.)18 
other e\•lcleoce should be pi·odu'::ci8 t hnt 
tabllsh the faet BOUflht to be proven 1 ° e8-
866,) so that tl1e qoe11tfon ot the rel~,.~~~ 
of the evidence was not before the court 
We are of the opinion that the value oi 
property which depends upon the 1,res-
ence or absence of Inherent qualities not 
necessarily preHent or absent In other and 
slmllflr property cannot be proved by 
showing the price paid for snch other aud 
similar property. The value of property 
having a recoirntzed market value, such 
as No. 1 wheat and corn, may, of coune, 
be prm·en by showing the market prices; 
b11t the valne of property which IH dPpend. 
ent upon locality, adaptability for a par-
ticular use, as well as the use made of 
property lmmedlatel;v adjoining, may not 
be shown by evidence or the price paid for 
similar prope1·ty. Even under the MaKHa-
chusetts rule, a reversal "·ould not be Jus-
tified because of the extent of the discre-
tion ve&tPd lo the juclge or offlcpr preHld-
lng at the trial to determine whether 11uch 
evidence is admissible, depending, of course, 
on various elements, such as the nearnesR 
or remoteness of the time or sale; whether 
the premises are far separatud; the con-
dition of the property abont the parcel 
t1old, and the u11e made of it, which may 
have operated to enhance or diminish Its 
selling value; the similarity of the prop-
erty, not only as to description. but as to 
Its 8.''allablllty for use. Chandler v. Ja-
maica. Pond Aquoooct Corp., \2~Mass.306; 
Gardner v. Brookline, 127 Mu.ss. 358-363, 
and cases cited. . 
In point of timo tbe Wh\te sale wa;:e'! 
year nnd one-half p;\or to i~e ~~: Wb\te 
the orferwasmade to prove 'e \n tl\e o-p-
water-power was \n actual "~ateT-\>oweT 
eratlon of a mm, wblle u-ieu t\\\T.~d \\\ans 
ol Mr. Butler had not. been 8 rouc\\ w&t~T 
degree whnte\'er. True, 6u-t\eT \l-ro\le~Jt. \ 
will be diverted from the t \t. nu~wen\ 
as the White \ll'Operty. b'll ~at.e-r·\lw&.te'l:-
lollow that the respect\l'e 1~e ~~;\oT uv.e·, 
are of equal value. Tbe vfl. o.P~' seT"'at.\on. 
power depenus on \ls a~a.il t> ~bet.Teti.\\\ t.\\~ 
and, as a 1natter ot comn10 fi1' ~ 6'!0 .u\\'J ti.~1:-
that at certain points a\01:-~ { ~-ot.T\&.\~\\.~e. 
water-power can be tn° 1~ c ~p\le\ ~-a~\­
cheaply made u.vn\\o.b\e toy<>. J f I:•' ).'i\.!\~o«ed· 
posPs than at others. b , 14..-l pe "c\u'c\\o\\. 
contention as 1:0 1:he adfll lll~ c<> tte'"e\\ ae. 
denceof tt1at c:horncter c~1 tP~e o~~Te.\:.t.e;,. 
we should ncce1:1Harl\y ren<:,,de>:> ~ c a e. ,,.,a . 
that the nature of thee~ uc'tl ~ • 8 \~'Q'I::.~" 
to >'lmlloritY 'WUH not ot II 110•,'-"~ ._-ct~ ~\\<a 
as to authorize a court to \e-t-4 • -i ~J ~o-i: 
ter of hi~: ~1~1ti!rre~~:~~~t~0 ·.~ 1' 0~1>"'': .. 
erly exerc i,.;e f of the vr\ce e c -
to admit proo · c:;V 
Wh\te parcf~;_nt asserts tbBt; 
The appe 
\ 
\ 
Case No. 22]
RELEVA NCY.
sion reiused to award damages for the in- |
jury to the claimant's water-power, and
insists that in so doing they committed
an error in principle which may be re-
viewed in this court. After a thorough
examination of the record, and a careful
consideration of the argument in behalf oi
appellant, the conclusion is reached that
this court is not warranted in determin-
ing that an award was not made for such
damages as, in the judgment oi the com-
mission, the claimant will sustain because
of injury to his water-power. The claim-
ant owned about 358 acres oi laud, cover-
ing 4,238 ieet on the cast bank oi the
Bronx river, and about 4.636 feet upon the
west bank; and for the reduction in the
volume of water which naturally flows
over this course, occasioned b.v the diver-
sion on the part of the city, the co|nmis-
sion awarded to him $7.270. This award
was made in gross. no items being given,
and it is therefore impossible to determine
what portion of it was allowed for in-
jury to the tract because of the iesseninir
of the flow of the stream, or what part oi
it was an award ior damages to the wa-
ter-power. Neither in the report nor in
the conduct oi the trial is there any indi-
cation that it was determined that the
water-power was oi no value. On the
contrary, the commission received a large '
amount of expert testimony offered by the
claimant, tending to show that the water-
70
power was of considerable value. No evi-
dence in that direction was i'('jP1'l'(’ll, save
that which tended to prove the price paid
by the city for the White water-power;
and it should be assumed that they gave
to this evidence such weight as it was en-
titled to. Claimant's experts, it is true.
testifled that the water-power alone was
of fur greater value than the entire
amount of the award, but, on the other
hand, the evidence on the part of the city
tended to show that it had little or no
value. in making their appraisal they
were not required to adopt the estimate
oi clai1nant‘s experts, but were manifest-
ly called upon to base their award upon
all the information obtained,“not only
from the evidence produced before them.
but froln their view oi the real estate.”
in re Thompson, 121 N. Y. 277, 24 N. E.
Rep. 472. This we are bound to assume.
in the light afforded by the record, was
done. Our attention is called to the ex-
pressions of opinion. both at special and
general term. to the effect that the water-
powerhas no apparent value. But it does
not follow that such was the determina-
tion oi the commissioners; nor can itbe
assumed, because of the opinion of the
judges sitting in review, that the commis-
sion entertained the same view. There
are no other questions requiring consid-
eration. The order should be aflirmed.
Alleoncur.
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Case No. 22] HELEVAYCY. 
11iun refm1ed to u ward damageH for the In-jury to the claimant's water-power, and 
Insist" that tu 110 doing they committed 
an erru1· In principle which may be re-
Yiewed In this court. After a thorough 
examination of the record, and a cureful 
consideration of the argument lu behalf of 
appellant, the conclusion ls reached that 
this court Is not warranted In determln· 
Ing that an award waK not made for such 
damages as, In the Judgment of the coru-
mill11ion, the claimant will sustain because 
of Injury to his water-power. The claim-
ant owued abont 358 acreR of land, cover-
hlg 4,238 feet on the east bank of the 
Bronx river, aud about 4,636 feet upon the 
wPBt bank; and for the reduction In the 
volume of water which naturally flows 
over this course, occa.aioned by the diver-
sion on the part of the city, the commls· 
Ilion awarded to him t7.:nO. This award 
was modi> In gross. no Items being given, 
nod it is therefore lmpos1:1lble to determine 
what portion of ft. was nllowecl for In· jury to the tract he<'ause of the les11enlnir 
of the flow of the stream, or what part of 
It was an award for damages to the wa-
ter-power. Neither In the report nor In 
the conduct of the trial le there any indi-
cation that It was determined that the 
water-power was of no value. On the 
contrary, tbe comml1:1slon received a large 
amount of expert testimony offered hy the 
duhnant, tending to show that the water-
70 
power wm1 of conslderahle value. No evi-
dence In that dlrt'rtlon wnH rP)rd1•d, 1>11\"I' 
that which tended tu 111·0\'e tbe )lrlce paid 
by the city for the White water-power; 
enc! It 11hould be assumed that they gave 
to thie evidence such weight as It was en-
titled to. Claimant's expert11, ft le troe, 
testified that the water-power alone wu11 
or for greater value than the entire 
amount of the award, but, on the otlJPr 
IJRnd, the evhlence on the part oft hr l'ity 
tPnrled to Hhow tlmt It had ltttle or no 
,·nlue. In making their ap11ralHul they 
were nut required to adopt the e11tlmate 
of elnl11111ut"11 expertH, hut were man1ff'tlt-
ly l'!llled uµon to base their award upon 
all thl' Information <'htnlned, "not only 
from the evidence produced before them. 
but from their view of the real estate." 
In re Thompson, 121 N. Y. '1:17, 24 N. E. 
RP.p. 4i2. 1'hls we at•e bound to aBBuwe. 
In the light afforded by the record, was 
dom•. Our a ttentlo;1 i11 called to thee:.:-
pre11Hlons of opinion. lioth at epel"iul tmd 
general term, to tl1P l'ffect thot the wntn-
powerhas no apparent value. But It doee 
not follow tbet such wa.s the determln1t-
tlon of the eomml11slonel"8; nor can It be 
ussnmed, because of the opinion of the 
judgeK sitting In review, that the commls-
Hlon en tertalned the Httme \"lcw. 1'here 
are no other questions l"ef1ulrlng eon1:1ld-
eratlon. The order should be affirmed. 
All concur. 
F _.;(;'r.>- POSSIBLY coxxscrnn AS CAUSI3
In
.AND ER
BIA & P. s. R. co. v. HAW-
COLUM Tnonxn.
(12 Sup. Ct. 591, 14-1 U. S. ‘_’U’Z.l
Supreme Court of the United States. April 4,
1892.
1n error to the supreme court of the ter-
mo;-y of Vvashington.
Action by \Villard C. Hawthorne against
the Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad Com-
pany for damages for a personal injury.
Verdict and judgnient for plaintiff, which
was aflirined in the supreme court of the ter-
ritory. Defendant brings error. Reversed.
statement b_v Mr. Justice GR.-\Y:_
This was an action brought in a district
(.0111-t of the territory of YVashington against
,1 Q01-p0i‘ati0I1 owning a saw-mill, by a man
employed in operating a machine therein,
called 11 “trimmer,” to recover damages for
me defendant‘s negligence in providing an
unsafe and defective lnacllinc, whereby one
of the pulleys, over Whicli ran the belt trans-
mining power to the saw, fell upon and in-
jured the plaintifi. The defendant denied
any negligence on its part, and averred neg-
ligence on the part of the Dl11iIl’£hT-
At the trial, the plaintiff introduced evi-
dence tending to sl10\v that the pulley,
weighing about 50 pounds, revolved around
a stationa1'_v shaft made of 811$-Pipe, With
nothing to hold the pulley 011 but 11 common <
cap or nut screwed on the end Of the nine,
and its thread running in the -‘lame \\'fl.\' flfl
the pulley, and liable to be unscrewed hi‘
the working of the pulley; that the hut ht?-
came unscrewed, and cznne ofl’, $0 that the
pulley fell upon and greatly inillred the
plaintiff; and that if the nut had been Pl'°D-
erly put on, with a bolt through the shaft, i
the accident could not have lial>D9h9d-
The plaintiffs counsel
whether there had been nn.\' @h"1h~'9 in thi‘
machinery since thg acv:(1911t-
the following colloquy took Place:
Defendant's counsel: “VV9 Ohllect t° that-
The rule is well understood, and as 370111‘ holl-
or has already given it in other cases, thflt H
person is not bound to furnish the best
known machinery, but to furnish machinery
reasonably safe. It is not =1 'l\19sfl°h as to
what we have done with the machinery in
the last few years or niontlis sinfie the ac-
cident occurred, but what was the condition
then."
The Court; “The rule is quite well settled,
1 think’ that where an accident occurs
through defwtive machinery or defective fix.
mi-es or the mm-nine itself, if that is shown
to be true, then a change, repair, 0'1- gubstitu. ,
tion of something else for the defective ina-
chinery is admissible as showing or tending
to show the fact.
settled."
Defendant’s counsel: “I tl1oro118'hl.i' 00110111"
with the court as to the rule.”
Plaintiffs counsel: “We PP°P°Se t° Sh°“'
‘ 3 Wash. T. 353, 19 Pac. 25.
asked a witness t
Thereupou t
1 unless at the close of the wk”
1 Q1-mu v. Perkins, 129 U. $-
I think that is quite well |
130.
The Cou1'f;.5_ think 1" /7/use Nu. 23
D9f0ll(]fl11t -.8 "ls@1_ it 13 admisslbl n
ception." “ _ "W e‘
The C011 1'1’ -' E30 0 Wm save an ex"
‘The witness "'91:
been changes sh"-‘e
they consisfe" I
Gpt .
u 1011 8110;;-ed H
s“'e1'9d that there bad
“ butt! e "cement. and that
shaft. and 3'-‘lmhiozm nu?‘ ‘ ""1 tl"'<>l1gh the
rod to keep the Dlllleys O: on dale end _°t the
501119 planks Underneath urlélli IID Dllftlllg U1)
them from falling C] Pu Joys to. keel’
exception was taken by
allowed by the judge,
At the close of all the evidence for the
plaintiff (which it is unnecessary to state)
the defendant moved “for a judgment of
nonsuit, on the ground that the plaintiff
had failed to prove a sufficient cause for the
jui-_v;" and an exception to the overruling
of this motion was taken by the defendant
and allowed by the court.
The defendant then introduced evidence,
and the case was argued by counsel, and
sulnnitted by the court to the jury, who re-
turned a verdict of $10,000 for the plaintiff,
upon which judgment was rendered. The
defendant appealed to the supreme court of
the territory, which affirmed the judgment.
The defendant
the defendant and
sued out this writ of error.
A. H. Holmes, for plaintiff in error. John
B. Allen, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the facts
in the foregoing language, delivered the opin-
ion of the court. _
The question of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence for the plaintiff to Support his action
cannot be considered by this court. It I188
1-epeatcdiy been decided that a 1'e(l\\eSi £0‘ *1
ruling that upon the evidence introduced tile
plaintiff is not entitled to recover cannot e
\
ti r of Vigil‘-
made by the defendant as 11 111*‘ ‘Q evmence.‘
~_*~ ..._ __
%_=_,%-'
oi the
and that if the defendant, a_t1th\e‘tc\\?::\ing his ‘,‘
plaintiff's cvidcncc, and W“ ‘O eh u ru - Q
own case, requests and is 1"? _ _
ing. tho refusal cannot be flS"“§’:‘. ‘3_ S "
Railway Co. v. (‘.\uninini§5, 1
Sup. Ct. 493; Insurance G?"
U. s. 527, 7 Sun Ct 635' . I -
Mares, 123 U. s. no. 8 S‘“"-g.J$- ‘
219. M-gfle
The only other excepi\°“mfl,g
admission of evidence of 9
chincry after the accident mtiff
It was argued for the pmthe ‘é .
ception was 110‘ °Pe‘§_m by Di’ 0‘“
cause it had been ‘wan ed oi t
ing, after the first ruling 0“,
--1 tnoroughis C0“
as to the rule." Assumiig not
be accurately 1'e?°"tte:’fli‘te “lie
whether they re er
changes."
. es OT to
of subsequent chant; ,
subj oct .
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~,-~CT.~ POSSIBI..Y CON~ECTED .AS CAUSE: ,A.ND~~ . ~L• 
COLUM~IA. & P. S. R. CO. v. HAW· 
'rl:IOR~E. 
(12 ~U}l. Ct. :'.>91, 144 u. s. 20'2.) 
Supreme Court of the United ~t11tes. April 4, 
1892. 
In err()r to the supreme court of the ter-
ritory of Washington. 
Action by "'lllard C. Hawthorne against 
the Columbia & Puget Sound Rallroull Com-
pany for damages for a personal Injury. 
verdict and judgn1ent for plnlnti!T, which 
was atnrmed in the supreme court of the ter-
ritory. Defemlnnt l>rlng11 ert"Ol'. Reyersed. 
statement by :\Ir. Ju~tice <:RAY:. 
This was an action. brought in a district 
c·ont't of the ten·ito.ry of ·wa11hington against 
a corporation owning a saw-mill, by a man 
employed in ope1u ting a machine therelu, 
called a "trimmer," to i•ecover damages for 
the defendant's neglfgence in pro¥idlng an 
unsafe and defective nu1chlue, whereby oue 
ot the pulleys, over which ran the belt trnnM· 
mlttlng power to the saw, ft>ll upon 11nll iu-
jured the l>lnintlft'. Tile cleft>ndnnt <lenll'd 
nny negligence on Its part, and averred neg· 
llgence on the part of the plnintl!T. 
At the trial, the plnintifT introduced evl-
(lence tending to sho"· that the pulley, 
weighing about GO poun<ls, revolved around 
a stationary shaft made of gas-pipe, with 
nothing to hold the pulley on but a common 
cnp or nut screwed on the ettd ot the pipe, 
and its thread running In the snme wnr 1u1 
the pulley, nnd llahlf> to be umw1·ewed hy 
the working of the lJUllt·~- ; that the nut be· 
came unecrew<'<l, and c:une oil', 110 that the 
pulley fell upon nnd greatly injured the 
plalntifl; and that if the nut luul been prop· 
erly put on, with a bolt through the shaft, 
the accident coultl not hnve huppened. 
The plil.lntltrs counsel ni:-ked n wltuesM 
whether there had beeu au~· change In thP 
machinery since thil ncc;dent. Thereupon 
the following colloquy took place: 
Defendant's counsel: "'Ve object to that. 
The rule Is ·well understood, and as your hon· 
or has already given it in other cases, that a 
person is not bound to furnish the best 
kuown machinery, but to fnt'lliHh machinery 
reaS<>nably safe. It ls not n •1uestion as to 
,\.·hat we have done with the mnchlnery In 
tile last few years or months 1dnce the ac· 
cldent occun'ed, but whnt was the conditlon 
then." 
The Court: ''The rule is quite well settled, 
I think, that where an nedtli>nt occurs 
through defective machinery or clefl't>tlve fix-
tures or the machine itself, If tl!nt Is shown 
to be true, then n change, repair, or HnbHtltu-
tlon of something else for the deftocth·e ma-
chinery ls admissible as showing or teu<llug 
to show the fact. I think that ls 11ulte wen 
settled." 
Defendant's counsel: "I thoroughly coucur 
wltb the court as to the rule." 
Plaintltr's counsel: "We pro}>Ose to show 
cb:inges." 
"'I -c:..vr. l The C<>U~: t~l~ . {Gise i'fo. 23 Defl'n~!~ur">- -t; "B co11n~e1: !,t la admfssfble • ., 
<'l'Jltlo11. "E lf'~ wOJ Bllve 
1 The Cou 1·t: ·'t<'ept. an er. 
0T'he witness thell " 1011 Bl/owed" 
B Bin .. lls1 . been change <'e th Vere<1 that there had 
they consfst:ed In l>llttJ e ace/dent, and that 
ehatt, and gs.wnion lJ ng a rod through the 
rod to keep t1ie lllllle:y Uts on the end or the 
some pl11nks vnde1·1Jea:bon, and Jn putting uv 
them from -ralllng d the JJulleys to keer> 
own. To the admission 
ot the evidence ot each or these changes 1111 
exception was taken by the defendant and 
allowed by the Judge. 
I At the close of all the evidence for the I plaiutlft' (which Jt is unnecPssnry to state) 
the defendant moved ".for n judgment of I nonsuit, on the ground that the plalntltr 
· luul fnllc>d to prove a sulf:lefent cause for the 
: jurr;" nrnl nn exception to the overrnJfng 
I of this motion was taken by the rl.-fendnnt 
i anll allowed by the court. 
, TltP <1Pft>11iln11t tlwu lntro(lueed t•\'ldPnce, 
: arnl the <·ase was argued by counsel, and 
I submitted by the court to the jury, who re-
tnrnP(l a ¥erdlct ot $10,000 for tbe plalntlft'. 
upon which judgment was 1'E'mlered. The 
defendant appenled to the supreme <•om1: of 
1 the teITitory, which affirmecl the judgmPnt. 
j 3 Wash. T. 3':>3, 19 Pac. ~-.. The defendant 
/ sued out this writ of eITor. 
I: A. H. Holmes, tor plalntltr In error. Johu B. Allen, for defendant in error. 
Mr. Jm~tice GRAY, after stating the fuetR 
In the foregoing language, delivered the opin-
ion of the com·t. 
Tbe question of the suftleiency of the evi-
dence for the plalntitT to sn11port bis action 
1 cannot be considered by this court. It bas 
repentedly been declrled tbat a request tor a. 
rnllng that u1xm the pvldence introduced tbe 
plulntiff Is not entltlecl to recover cannot be 
1ruule by the defendant as a matter of rlgbt,_ 
b whole evidence, 
unless at the elORe of t e \ ot tb.e 
and that if the d(•fP11d11nt, nt thet. c ~\ug b.\S 
plnlntlft"s m·lde1i<."e, and witl1°'-'.o. Ts"l."l.cb. a ru\-
own l'l.l&'. re<1m•sts aml ls i·i>f'-~~=ned to-r \'Tl'Cl"r· 
Ing, thl' refusal enuuot be ns~;;t; -u. s. '10\.l, ~ 
Rail way Co. v. <. ~\umu\ngs, l. ~ _ craulla\, 1:-v. 
Sup. Ct. 493; lusurauce 0?· ~\'\T°?'~ ~~o"\l· 
U. S. 527, 7 Sup. Ct. 685, . 4..~"t. ~-~~W C\. 
llat·es, 123 U. S. 710, S SUP· ~93· '-' ~ · 
I ertson v. Perkins, 129 U · s. d \\\ \o 'l)l.e 279. r~..,e \\\. \\}.e 1111\.-
The only other except\oD ~ .... ~e~ e~ 
i admission of evidence ot c\111 ~11e.t. tb.\~ ~ 
; chlnl'rY after the acc\dent. ti~ :e.en\\~ ~ ~"· 
· It ":ns argued for tbe 11\tl\ll ~e co'-'''\!>~ \~e 
\ ceptlon was not open to file pi~ cD''y\. o:\\eo'I.'\'-°" 
cause It bad been wah·ed bf t;Pe ~ ~ ~ ~ ~:~<'.\% \o 
\ Ing after the first 'l"Ul\ng 0 1• "'"' ~e :\'\'S' c\e~"t 
\, 
I 
' ., 
I 1•1 t "l tho-oug\1\'· cone'' ~.,..e· _.,.1•0 L-"~\\~e RU l I'<' L ~ • ,.. ..,.._. ~ ~u~ 
1 • • l •• Ast'lum\11~ t .-o e ~e\\" I as to the ru e. 1 oo ~ ... ~,:\.e• ...i. be accurutely reportell, it ~ \e ~ e :... - · ~ .. wbctber they re1'.er to U1e n~o i:P 
•f subsequent changes, or 
Case No. 23]
HELEVAN CY.
tioned just before, as to the degree of care
required of the defendant. That they were
not understood, either by the counsel or by
the court. as waiving the objection to evl- ‘
dence of subsequent changes, is shown by
the plaintiff's counsel thereupon sa_ving. “\‘\'e
propose to show changes," and by the court
ruling them to be admissible, and allowing
an exception to this ruling, and immediately
afterwards allowing two other exceptions to
evidence on the same subject. And the
question of the admissibility of this testimo-
ny was considered and decided by the su-
preme court of the territory. 3 Wash. T.
353, 364, 19 Pac. 25.
This writ of error, therefore, directly pre-
sents for the decision of this court the ques-
tion whether, in an action for injuries caused
by a machine alleged to be negligently con-
structed, a subsequent alteration or repair
of the machine by the defendant is compe-
tent evidcnce of negligence in its original
construction. »
Upon this question there has been some
difference of opinion in the courts of the sev-
eral states; but it is now settled, Upon much
consideration, by the decisions of the highest
courts of most of the states in which the
question has arisen. that the evidence is in-
competent. because the taking of such pre-
cautions against the future is not to be con-
strued as an admission of responsibility for
the past. has no legitimate tendency to prove
that the defendant had been negligent be-
fore the accident happened, and is calculated
to distract the minds of the jury from the
real issue, and to create a prejudice against
the defendant. Morse v. Railway Co.. 30
Minn. 465, 16 N. W’. 358; Corcoran v. Peeks- ‘
kill, 108 N. Y. 151. 15 N. E. 309: Nalley v.
Carpet Co., 51 Conn. 524; Ely v. Railway
Co., 77 Mo. 34; Railway Co. v. Hennessey, ;
75 Tex. 155. 12 S. W’. 608; Railroad Co. v.
Clem, 123 ind. 15, 23 N. E. 965; Hodges v.
Percival, 132 Ill. 53. 23 N. E. 423: Lombard
v. Village of East Tawas. 86 Mich. 14. -i8 N. t
W. 947; Shinners v. Proprietors, 154 Mass.
168, 2s N. E. 10. '
As was pointed out by the court in the
last case, the decision in Readman v. Con-
way, 126 Mass. 374, 377, cited by this plain-
tiff. has no bearing upon this question, but
simply held that in an action for injuries
from a defect in a platform. brought against
the owners of the land, who defended on
the ground that the duty of keeping the plat-
form in repair belonged to their tenants, and
not to themselves. the defendants‘ acts in
making general repairs of the platform after
the accident “were in the nature of admis- '
sions that it was their dut_v to keep the
platform in repair, and were therefore com-
petent."
72
The only states, so far as we are informed,
in which subsequent changes are held to be
evidence of prior negligence. are Pennsylva-
nia and Kansas. the dccisions in which are
supported by no satisfactory reasons. Mc-
Kee v. Bidwell, 74 Pa. St. 218, 2%, and cases
cited; Railway Co. v. Weaver, 35 Kan. 412,
11 Pac. 408.
The true rule and the reasons for it were
well expressed in Morse v. Railway Co.,
above cited, in which Mr. Justice Mitchell,
delivering the unanimous opinion of the su-
preme court of Minnesota, after referring to
earlier opinions of the same court the other
way. said: “But, on mature reflection, we
have concluded that evidence of this kind
ought not to "be admitted under any circum-
stances. and that the rule heretofore adopted
by this court is on principle wrong; not for
the reason given by some courts, that the
acts of the employes in making such repairs
are not admissible against their principals,
but upon the broader ground that such acts
afford no legitimate basis for construing
such an act as an admission of previous neg-
lect of duty. A person may have exercised
all the care which the law required, and
yet, in the light of his new experience, after
an unexpected accident has occurred, and as
a measure of extreme caution, he may adopt
additional safeguards. The more careful a
person is, the more regard he has for the
lives of others, the more likely he would be
to do so; and it would seem unjust that he
could not do so without being liable to have
p such acts construed as an admission of prior
‘. negligence.
We think such a rule puts an
unfair interpretation upon human conduct,
and virtually holds out an inducement for
continued negligence." 30 Minn. 46.’, 468.
The same rule appears to be well settled in
lngland. In a case in which it was affirm-
ed by the court of exchequer. Baron Bram-
well said: “People do not furnish evidence
against themselves simply by adopting a
new plan in order to prevent the recurrence
of an accident. I think that a proposition to
the contrary would be barbarous. It would
be, as I have often had occasion to tell ju-
ries, to hold that. because the world gets
wiser as it gets older, therefore it was fool-
ish before.“ Hart v. Railway, 21 Law T.
(N. S.) 261, 21:3.
As the incompetent evidence admitted
against the defendants exception bore up-
on one of the principal issues on trial, and
. tended to prejudice the jury against the de-
fendant, a-nd it cannot be known how much
the jury were influenced by it, its admission
requires that the judgment be reversed. and
the case remanded to the supreme court of
the state of Washington, with directions to
set aside the verdict and to order a new trial.
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Case No. 23] HELEVANCY. 
tloned just before, as to the degree of care I 
required of thP dPf Pndant. That they were 
not urult•t'Mtood, Plther by the t-oumwl or by 
the court. as waiving the objection to evi- i 
dence of subsequt>nt changes, Is shown by 
the pla111tltf'11 eounsel thereupon saying. "We 
propoeP to show changes," and by thP eourt 
ruling them to be admissible, and allowing 
an exc·l'ptlon to this ruling, and Immediately 
atterwurds allowing two other excPptlons to 
evldenc·e on the same eubjec-t. And the 
question of the adrnl88lblllty of this testimo-
ny was consldt>red and decldt'd by the su-
preme court of the territory. 3 Wash. T. 
!J53, 364, 19 Pac. 25. 
This writ of error, therefore, directly pre-
sents for the decision of this court the ques-
tion whether, In an action tor Injuries cauBe(l 1 
by a machine alleged to be negligently con- I 
structed, a subsequent alteration or repair 1 
of the machine by the defendant Is compe- I 
tent e\"ldPnce of nPgllgence In Its original 1 
conetru<'tlon. I 
The only states, 80 far as we are Informed, 
In which subsequent changes are held to be 
evldt.>n<.-e of prior negligence. are Pennsylva-
nia and Kan88s, the 1ll•<'lslons in which are 
supported by no satisfactory reasons. 'Mc-
Kee v. Bidwell, 74 Pa. 8t. 218, 225, and cases 
cited; Railway Co. v. Weaver, 3:) Kan. 412, 
11 Pac. 408. 
The true rule and the reasons for It were 
well expre8fled In .Morse v. Railway Co., 
above cited, In which llr. Justice Mitchell, 
delivering the unanimous opinion of the su-
preme court of Mlnne110ta, after referring to 
earlier oplnlons of the Bl!me court the other 
way, said: "But. on mature reftectlon, we 
have concluded that evidence of this kind 
ought not to be aclmlttt'd under any clrcum-
stan<•es. and that the rule heretofore adopted 
by this rourt ls on principle wron1t; not tor 
the reason given by some rourts, that the 
acts of the employ@e In making such repairs 
are not admissible against their principals, 
but upon the broader ground that such acts 
a1l'ord no legitimate basis tor construing 
such an act as an admission of previous neg-
le<"t of duty. A person may have exercised 
all the care which the law required, and 
yet, In the light of his new experience, aftt>r 
an 1mex1iectt>d accident has occurred, and as 
a measure of extreme caution, he may adopt 
additional safeguards. The more careful a 
Pf'l'Son Is, the mo~ reir;ard he bas for the 
lives of otht>rs, the more ltkt>ly he would be 
to do so; and It would seem unjust that he 
could not do 80 without being liable to have 
SU<'h R<'ts construt'd as an admlBSlon of prior 
nt>gllgen<'e. ·we think such a rule puts an 
unfah' Interpretation upon human conduct, 
and virtually holds out an Inducement for 
<·ontlnued negllgenC'e." 30 Minn. 465, 468. 
Upon this question there has been some 
dlfrereuce of opinion lo the courts of the sev- I 
eral states; but It Is now :iettled, upon mu<'h 
consideration, by the decisions of the highest 
courts of most of the states In whl<'h the 
question has arisen. that the evlden<>e is In-
competent. bt><'ause the taking of sueb pre-
<~autlons agulnst tht> future ls not to be con-
strued as an admission of responsibility for 
the past, has no legitimate tendem·y to prove 
that the defendant had been negllg<•nt be-
fore the accident ha11pened, and ls calculatt'd 
to distract the minds ot the jury from the 
real Issue, and to create a prejudice against 
the defendant. Morse v. Railway Co., 30 
Minn. 465, 16 N. W. 358; Corcoran v. Peeks-
kill, 108 N. Y. 151, 15 N. E. 309; Nalley v. 
Carpet Co., 51 C-0nu. 524; Ely v. Railway 
Co., 77 Mo. 34; Railway Co. v. Hennessey, 
75 Tex. 15:>. 12 8. W. 608; Railroad Co. v. 
Clem, 1:?3 Ind. 15, 23 N. E. 9f,;'i; Hodges v. 
Percival, 132 Ill. 5.'-l. 23 N'. E. 423: Lombard 
v. Village of East Tawas, 86 l\ll<'h. 14, 48 X. 
W. 947; Shinners v. Pt'Oprletors, 154 l\lass. 
ThP same rule appears to be well settled In 
: England. In a case ln whl<'h It was amrm-
' ed ln- the c-ourt of excbequt>r, Baron Bram-! well 0 snld: "Pt'Ople do not furnish evidence 
1 against themselves simply by adopting a ! new plan In order to prevent the recurrence 
168, 28 N. E. 10. . 
As was pointed out by the <>ourt In the 
last case, the decision In Readman v. Con-
way, 126 Mass. 374, 377, <>lted by this plaln-
rnr, has no bearing upon this question, but 
simply held that in an action for Injuries 
from a defect In a platform, brought against 
the owners of the land, who defended on 
the ground that the duty of kPeplng the plat-
form In repair belonged to their tenants, and 
not to themselves, the defendants' acts In 
making general repairs of the platform after 
the accident "were In the nature ot admis-
sions that It was their duty to keep the 
platform ln repair, and were therefore com-
pt>tent." 
72 
of an acC'ldent. I think that a proposition to 
the contrary would be barbarous. It would 
be, a11 I have often bad OC'C!lslon to tell Ju-
ries, to bold that, because the world gets 
wiser as It gets older, tben>fore lt was fool-
ish before." Hart v. Railway, 21 Law T. 
I (X. S.) 261, 21i3. 
1
1 
As the lnrompetent evidence admitted 
against the d<>fendant's exception bore up-
1 on one of the prlnelpal Issues on trial, and 
, tended to })rejudl<'e the jury against the de-
fenclant, and It cannot be known bow much 
the jury were lnftuenced by it, Its admission 
requires that the judgment be reversed, and 
the case remanded to the supreme court of 
the state of Washington, with directions to 
set aside the verdict and to order a new trial. 
EVIDENCE or CHARACTER-WHEN AnM1sS1BLL;
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-QOUTHERN KAN. RY. CO. V. ROBBINS.
('23 Pac. 113, 43 Knii. 145.)
$upren1e Court of Kansas. Feb. 8, 1890.
Error from district court, Franklin coun-
ty; A. W. Bmnson, Judge.
George R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robert
Dunlap. for plaintiff in error. H. P. Welsh
and John W. Deford, for ilefeniliiiit in error.
JOH.\'S'l‘()N,'J. On June 30. 1886. John
F. Patterson was employed in the service of
the Southern Kansas Railway Company, as a
pzisseiiger conductor. At that time" a Sun-
day-Scliool assembly was in session at Otta-
wa, and the railway company were running
(*‘\'0lll‘Sl0ll trains from several points in the
state to that place. On the morning of the
day mentioned Patterson went from Ottawa
to Lawrence in charge of a passenger train,
where it was loaded with excursionists bound
for the assembly at Ottawa. On the return
trip he stopped at Baldwin City, where there
were a number of pcople intending to join
the excursion to Ottawa, and, being short of
passenger cars to accommodate them, the
company had placed two cabooses and a box-
car, temporarily arranged for passengers, on
a siile track, and directed Patterson to at-
tach them to the rear of his train, for the
use of passengers. There is testimony to the
ellect that Patterson was directed to place
the cars in his train in the same order that
they were staiidiii;,'.—lii'st a caboose. then
the box-car, and then another caboose; and
this was the order in which they were at-
tached to the train. After the train left
Baldwin City, Patterson proceeded to collect
fares, beginning at the front, and passing
towards the rear, of the train. When he had
completed taking fares in the first caboose,
he passed out of the reardoor, and proceeded"
to climb over the box-car. in an effort to
reach the other caboose, in which there were
passengers. There were no doors in the
ends of the car, nor any platforms on the
ends of the same, and the only way to get
over the car was to cliinh up a. ladder on the
side and near the corner of the car, made of
iron rods, called “lizind-liolds” or “rungs,”
which were screwed to the side and top of
the car. These rods were about a foot
apart, and extended out from the side of the
C31‘ about three inches. While he was in the
act of ascending this ladder, the train was
running at a rapid rate. and just as it passed
overs bridge he in some way fell from the
car. and was fatally injure-I. The witnesses
who saw the occurrence state that he had '~
nearly reached the top of the car, when he
appeared to grasp with one hand for a rung
which should have been upon the top of the
car, but probably W8-8 Ml. and at the seine
time let go his hold upon the top H1118 ‘"1 the
side of the car with the other hand, when he
reeled back, and fell from the train. He was
found lying in the angle of two braces of the
bridge. his skull fractiired, and his left leg
broken. He was unconscious when f°"11<1-
. dicular ladder in
and remained so until his (1931),, w;,,'¢.), 00-
curred the day of the 3CCI(1en|§, This action
is brought by the repI'f‘$£‘hlative of the de-
ceased, to recover damages for the benefit of
the widow and child, it being alleged that
his life was lost in consequence of the negli-
gem-e of the railway conipany. i‘he compa-
ny alleged and contended that Patterson was
guilty of negligence contributing to the ac-
cident. The plaintiff prevailed, and recov-
cred a judgment for $5.-500. _
Errors are assigned here upon the rulings
of the court in admitting evidence. The dep-
osition of a witness was rei-ei\'ed_ that was
not taken in the exact place stated in the no-
tice. The notice named the offlce of Win-
slow P. Hyatt, Colorado street, Pasadena.
Los Angeles county, Cal., as the place of tak-
ing the deposition; but, as he had moved
about a block away on another street, the no-
tary met the plaintiif's attoi'ney at that place
at the proper time. and adjourned the taking
of the deposition to another office, on anoth-
er street in Pasadena, and there the d6[>051'
tion was continued. completed. sealed ugé
and properly addressed. In the aftei"n0€>?vas
that day, the attorney for the tiefelitidn done’
found, and informed what had beeullq then
and, by consent, the deposition \_‘\fl*‘*(_d am;
opened, and the witness was l'e°_‘“ey_ The
cross-examined by defendanlfs zittfg “Q ¢e';»'
court properly refused to suppreijon _ m
sition. The taking of a depo-‘l 9 '
other place than that stated in U‘ ’
the absence of the opposing partyv
cient objection to the deposition?‘
regularity was cured by the v0 {,9
pearance of the defendantfis co"
pikltfe where the deposition was if,
his participation in the proceed ‘,5’
important that the deposition shot‘
at the place mentioned in the notice V
notice is only given to furnish tlld ,1 \-¢\"*“~\¢,o'
party an opportunity to appear, an a t '
the appearance waives a defect. in tl'a 5 (1
the irregularity of a chaiige iii ti! pg/7’ Z
taking the deposition. None of i 1 1
tions to the deposition can be sued?"
A witness was asked, and oV' ,
tion was permitted to state, wlietlll
ceased was a careful and Skliif\1o“ -K, ’
man. This was clearly err°“e¢ i? 7 5 11
question whethei-_ Patte_i's<>T1 "_Xe:v_,é I Q , go?
care in this particular iI\\?'.-5‘-"5-etllaia
P0i'ta.nt ifssue.l_ Itncvgasgnrzl eigewas C
uilt ' 0 I16 189 '
git“? the absegiice of the ha(T;_¢1'1“:;‘ (1 7 9
"f the car was an “M must “'.:;§J6n.d -er 1 I 1 6: 4
ent to any 0119» "nd that 0 ' - hic I1 £ "
the mariner in W bl fz
hold of the rung O11 '
laying holdaif the
was i1egl1ge1‘_‘ec‘:;’
sue of his want of °}dll:;:i{:l?‘testin1O'1.
i-l19]""'Y» and there "E as nduct at the 1 I
iiiilted concerning his co .e_“.itneS§=,¢»:5 ,
- - . There were _P.‘/ _ n 11¢ _
the mljmgt the trial described the ‘I111-Elle Q
eiit w io adder, an
which he asceudfili “*9 1
211p,
'\
I
by letting 11° his '4
of the car before
the top of the car.
fl‘.
f
1,7
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~UTHFlRN KA:X. RY. CO. v. ROBBINS. 
(23 Pac. 113, 43 Knu. H;J.) 
Su11n>mr Court of KanR811. 1'\•b. 8, 1890. 
Error from district court, Franklin coun-
ty; A. w. HENSON, Judge. 
GerJl'gB R. P(:ck, A . ...t. Hurd, and Robert 
Dtmlap, for plaintiff in error. H.P. Welsh 
and Juh1i W. Deful'd, for d~ft'nclant in error. 
JOHNSTON. 'J. On .June 30, H~86. John 
}'.Patterson wHS employt'<l In the service of 
the SouLhero Kansas Railway Company, as a 
passenger conductol'. At that time· a Sun-
day-School assembly was in session at Otta-
wa, and the rail way company were running 
e~cul'!lion trains from se\·eral poinbl in the 
atllle to that place. On the morning of the 
d11y mentioned P11ttl'rson went from Ottawa 
to Lawrence in charge of a passenger train, 
where it was loadetl with excursionists bound 
for the assemuly at Ottawa. On the return 
trip he stopped at Baldwin City, where there 
were a number of people Intending to join 
the excursion to Ottawa, and, being shol'tof 
p11Ssenger cars to accommodate them, the 
company had placed two cabooses and a box-
ciu, temporarily arranged for passengers, on 
a siile track, and dirl'cte<l Plltterson to at-
tach them to the rear of his train, for the 
use of passengers. There i~ t-eslimony to the 
~liect that l:'attt'rson was dirncted to place 
the ca~ in hiR train in thl' same order that 
they were stanillng.-flrst a caboose, then 
the box-car, anJ then another cabo011e; and 
this Wll8 the order in which they were at-
tached to the train. After the train left 
Baldwin City, Patterson proceeded to collect 
fares, beginning at the front, and passing 
towards the rear, or the train. When he had 
completed talcing fares in the flrst caboose, 
he pnssed out of the rear door, and proceeded· 
·to climb over the box-car, in an effort to 
reach the other caboose, in which there were 
passengers. '.rhere were no doors in the 
ends of the car, nor any platforms on the 
-ends of the same, and the only wuy to 1ret 
over the car was to climb up a lmlder on the 
Rid11 and near the corner of the car, made of 
iron rocls, called "hand-holds" or "rungs," 
wliicb were screwed to the side and top ot 
the car. These rods were about a foot 
apart., and extended out frnm the side of the 
car about three inches. Whil~ he was in th.,, 
act or ascending this ladder, the train was 
running at a rapid rate, and just as it passpd 
over a l>ridge he in some way fell from the 
car, and was fatally injured. The witnt'sses 
who saw the occurrt'nce state that he had 
nearl1 real' heel the top of the car, when he 
.appeared to grasp with one band for a l'Ung 
which should have been upon the top of the 
~ar, but probably was not, and at the sa1ne 
time Jet go his hold upon the top rung on the 
s1dP. of the car with the other l1and, when he 
ret>led back, and feU from the train. He was 
fo11111l lying in the an,!fle of two braces of the 
\•rhJ~e. his skull fractured, and his left leg 
broi.;eo. He wu unconscious when found, 
and remained so until h~s deat/J, w/Jic/J uc-
cune<l the day of the aCCldent. This action 
is brought by the representative of the de-
ceased, to recover damage& for the benetJt ot 
the widow and child, it being alleged that 
his life was Jost in consequt>uce of the negli· 
genC'e of the railway company. The compa-
ny alleged and contended that Pattt>rson was 
guilty of negligt'nce contributing Lo the ac-
cident. The plaintiff pre\·aiieu, 11nd l'ecov-
ered a judgment for $5,500. 
Errors are assigned here upon the rulings 
of the court in admitting evi1lence. The dep-
oeitlon of a witness was rel'el\"ed tbat was 
not taken in the exact place stated in the nc-
tice. The notice named the office of Win-
slow P. Hyatt, Colorado stl'eet, Pasadena, 
I..os Angeles county, Cal:• as the place of tak-
ing the deposition; but, as he had moved 
about a block away on another stret-t, the n~ 
tary met the plaintiff's attorney at that pl~Lce 
at the proper time. and adjourned the taking 
of the deposition to another office, on anoth-
er street in Pasadena, and there the deposi-
tion was continued, completed, sealed upf 
and properly addressed. In the afternoon ° 
that day the 11ttorney for the defendant was 
• . h d be n done, found, and tnformed what . ~ ~ then 
nnd, by consent., the deposttwn ~,~ d and 
opened, and the witness was rec11 f'y •rhe 
· f d t' ttot"ne · cross-exam med by de en an s a t.ue de~o-
con rt properly refused to suppri:r-0~ at 3~~ 
sition. Tht1 taking of a depo~' ;, ~·~\.\ce~,t\\­
other place than that stated in t\'4' ~ \.& &\.~e \~ 
the absence of the opposing riart;17~t. &\'.'1 \\.Ye 
cient objection to the deposition• 1._. ~\; ~ y,.'I. ""~~ 
re~ulal'ity was cured by the vo ~~el'• ~" \~ 
pearance of the defendant's coll~~- .,_,."f.e~ 
plare where the deposition was ~I!!""~ ~" \.\.,e 
his participation in the proceeJ\~, ~ ~'!>\t'\~e 
impo1·tant that the deposition sbotl &' ~f 0~e\0 0~ 
at the place mentioned in the not.i~ .. --. .o'-'\ee 0t 
notice is only give_n to furnish t.ll~ "'~ \.~e~\eP" 
party an opportunity to appear, an el ... ~ 4' 
theappearancewaivesadefectintl• ~ ii 'XJ)'l!-• 
the irregularity of a change iu tb":,_,.,. _,. ~ "e ~e-~ 
taking the deposition. None of j ~ - _., ,.., ~o?' 
tions to the deposition can be sustfl-~~ -A- i \ •S\'0 
A witness was asked, an1\ o'fJ e ~ , ... :¥- ,\\,e 
tlon was pel'mitted to state. whet.1• ~,, .. ~ 1\1\' 
ceased was a careful nnd skillful , • 'l~ ~ ..,,.:w°' 
man. This was clearly "rrone<7; ~ ~~ '-\el\ 
question wht-thet· Patt~rson exer~ •• ~ •, ~ .,-. a,o\) 
care in thill particular instance w«, ~ p 74\ 1•• 
portant issue. It was alkged tha 0 ,- 6 11 ? l ,11 • 
guilty of negligence, and it was c 0 -£- s-• !.-J '\1, 
that the aMt>nce of the hand-hold o ~ J ~ ,,,._ "J _J 1e 
of the car was an obvious danger, K ~ ., ~ ~ J "f'J 
ent to any one, ancl that to a~cend. ~ t"> I &~ ~ ... 
dicular ladtler in I.he micnner in wh1c: c-1 ~ ~ i;; 
:r ;~~t~:~ riif~~~= ;;~~~~;r i~~~~:,:~~:0 ·-~.Z,~; :;~ 
the top of the car, "\; .~s. n;:r ~are was ~ ~ 01-
sue of his waut of ~.r!1i:un~h testin101'"!~-. C::e~­
the jury, and t~ere . conduct at the t.~ 7 • J ~ 
mittetl concern mg Ins re eye-witness'='~ ~ ,- ._-~ j the injury. The~el ~!scribed the man r• c~ ~V eut who at the tna tl ladder. and t;ber 
which be ascended ie 
Case N 0. '24]
RELE VANCY.
which he exercised at the time the accident
occurred; and hence there was no necessity
nor propriety in admitting the opinion of an
expert as to whether he was generallya care-
ful and skillful man. The determination of
whether he was exercising due care when he
fell from the car does not depend upon the
care c\‘erciSed by him at other times, or l
whether he was usually careful in the per-
formance of his duties as a railroad man, but
does depend upon his conduct at the time of
the accident. The witness who gave the tes-
timony was a conductor on the same railroad,
had been acquainted with him fora year, and
claimed to have the means of knowing as to
whether he was a careful railroad man, and
his testimony may have had much weight
with thejury in determining that the deceased
was in the exercise of due care. With the
evidence before them as to the care he used
at the time, the jury could determine better
than any expert whether or not he was neg-
ligent; and the fact that he was generally 1
careful would be unavailing if the testimony i
showed that his negligence in this instance 1
contributed to the injury. Testimony of this
character is no more admissible than an offer
by the railroad company to show his want of
care at the time of the accident by proving
that he was pegligeiit at other times, or gen-
erally careless. Exceptions are made in some
cases where there are no eye-witnesses of
the accident, and better evidence cannot be
obtained as to whether the injured person
exercised due care; but all the authorities
hold such testimony to be inadmissible where
the testimony of persons who witnessed the
accident is available. Bryant v. Railroad
Co., 56 Vt. 710; Dunham v. Racklifl’, 71 Me.
345; Hays v. Millar, 77 Pa. St. 238; Tenney p
v. Tattle, 1 Allen, 185; McDonald v. Savoy, 4
110 Mass. 49; Chase v. Railroad Co., 19 V
Amer. & Eng. R. Gas. 356; Morris v. Town
of East Haven, 41 Conn. 252; Baldwin v.
Railroad Co., 4 Gray. 333; Railroad Co. v.
Roach, 64 Ga. 635; Railroad Co. v. Clark,
108 Ill. 113; Elliot v. Railroad Co., 41 N. W. '
Rep. 758: 1 Greenl. Ev. § 84. Neither was
the testimony introduced in regard to how
railroad men should and do ascend the ladder
of a box-car relevant nor competent. The ,
practice followed by others throws no light l
on the care used by Patterson in this case. -
it is not claimed that the opinions of experts ‘~
74
are necessary in the case, and to allow testi-
mony as to how others climbed the ladder
would be to create collateral issues as to the
prudence of their conduct, and to unneces-
sarily protract the trial. The question of
whether Patterson was guilty of such negli-
gence as would preclude a recovery was an
issue before the jury, and the practice or
usage of others would not tend to prove care
on his part, and such testimony should not
have been received. Railroad O0. v. Clark,
supra; Lawrence v. Hudson, 12 Heisk. 671;
Railroad C0. v. Moranda, 108 Ill. 576; Rail-
way Co. v. Evansich. 61 Tex. 3; Bl'_\‘fl.l'l|§ v.
Railroad Co., supra; Bailey v. Northampton
Co., 107 Mass. 496; Koons v. Railroad Co., 65-
.\Io. 592; Crocker v. Schureman. 7 Mo. App.
358; Cleveland v. Steam-Boat Co., 5 Hun,
523; Lawson, Usages &, (Just. 328.
To account for the fall, a witness, who was
not present at the time, gave the following
testimony: “Question. You say you have
passed over this road a great many times?
Answer. I have. Q. And over this bridge?
A. Yes, sir. Q. Now. can you state to the
jury, under the circumstances which sur-
rounded Mr. Patterson there, whether or
not there was any cause why he should have
ascended that car with great speed and haste,
and, it‘ so, what that cause was? Explain to
the jury. A. Well, the way that man started
in to go up the side of the car, he couldn‘tsee-
the bridge when he started; and at the speed
the train was running, and him climbing up
the side of the car, by the time the engine
struck the bridge, he would be towards the
top, and, when he heard the thundering noise
that the engine makes when it strikes a
bridge. he hurried to get on top of the car.”
This testimony was given over the objection
of the plaintiff in error. The witness was the
conductor of another train, who was far
away when Patterson fell from the box-car.
lle did not know and could not state whether
Patterson could see the bridge when he start-
ed to ascend the ladder, nor how far he had
ascended when the bridge was reached; nei-
ther was he competent to state what causes
operated on the mind of Patterson that led
him to ascend the ladder with great speed
and haste. The admission of the incompe-—
tent testimony was error, for which thejudg-
ment will be reversed. and the cause remand-
ed for a new trial; all thejustices concurring.
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Case No. 24] RELEVANCY. 
which he exer<:ised at the time the accident 
occurred; and hence there was no necessity 
nor propriety in admitting the opinion of an 
expert as to whether be was generally a care-
ful and skillful man. The determination of 
whethe1· he was exercising due care when he 
fell from the car does not depend upon the 
care exercised by him Kt other times, or 
whether he was usually careful in the pe1·-
formance of hi~ duties as a 1·ai!road man, but 
does depend upon his conduct at the time of 
th1, 1tcci•ll'nt. The witness who gave the tes-
timony was a conductor on the same railroad, 
had been ac'l nainted with him for a year, and 
claimed to have the mea11a of knowing aa to 
whether ho was a carefttl railroad man, and 
his testimony ·ruay have had much weight 
with the jury in determining that the deceased 
was in the exercise uf due care. With the 
evidence before them as to the care he used 
at the time, the jury could determine better 
than any expert whether or not he was neg-
ligent; and the fact tlutt he was generally 
careful would be unavailing if the testinlllny 
showe1l that his negligence in this instltnce 
contributed to the injury. 'festimony ot this 
character is no more admissilJle than an offer 
by lhe railroad company to show his w1mt of 
car~ at the time of the accident by proving 
that he was ,negligt>nt at other times, or gen-
erally careless. Exceptions are made in some 
cases where the1·e are no eye-witnesses of 
the accident, and better eviden1·e cunnot be 
obtained as to whether the injured 11erson 
exercised due care; but all the authorities 
hold such teslirnony to be inadmissible where 
the t't'Stimony of persons who witnesst>d the 
accident is availalJle. Bryant v. Railroad 
Co., 56 Vt. 710; Dunham v. RacklilT, 71 Me. 
:J45; Hays v. Millar, 77 Pa. St. 238; Tenney 
v. Tuttle, l Allen, 185; McDonald v. Savoy, 
110 Mass. 49; Chasti v . Hailroad Co.. 19 
Amer. & Eng. H. Cas. 356; Monis v. Town 
of .East Haven, 41 Conn. 252; Baldwin v. 
Hailr<md Co., 4 Gray, 333; Hailroad Co. v. 
Hoach, 64 Ga. 635; Railroad Co. v. Clark, 
lOt! Ill. 113; Elliot v. Hnilroad Co., 41 N. W. 
Uep. 758; 1 Greenl. Ev. ~ 84. Nt>ither was 
the testimony introduced in regard to how 
railroad men should and do ascend the ladder 
of a box-ear relevant nor competent. The 
practice followed by others throws no light 
on the care used by Patte1son in this cMe. 
It is not claimed that the opinions of experts 
74. 
are necessary in the ease, and to allow testi-
mony as to how others climhed the laddt>r 
would be to c1·eate collateral issues as to the 
prudence of their con1lnct, and to unneces-
sarily protract the trial. The question of 
whether Patterson was guilty of such negli-
g1'n\!e as would preclude a recovery was an 
issue berore the jury, and the practice 01· 
U'lage of others would not tend to prnve care 
on his part, and such teslimony should not 
have been received. RailroBd Co. v. Clark, 
supra; Lawrence v. Hudson, 12 Heisk. 671;. 
Railroad Co. v. Mor11nda, 108 Ill. 576; Rail-
wav Co. v. Evansich, 61 Tex. 3; Un·ant v. 
Uailroad Co., supra; Balley v. Northampton 
Co., 107 .Mass. 496; Koons v. Hailroad Co., 65· 
Mo. 592; Crocker v. Schureman, 7 Mo. App. 
31"18; Cleveland v. Steam-Boat Co., 5 Hun,. 
523; Lawson, Usnges & Cust. 328. 
To account for the fall, a witness, who was. 
not present at the time, gave the following 
testimony: "Qttestion. You say you ha\"e 
passed over this road a. great many times? 
Answer. I have. Q. And over this bridge?-
A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, can you state to the 
jury, under the circumstances which sur-
rounded Mr. Patterson there, whether 01· 
not there was any cauBe why be should have 
ascended that car with great 11peed and haste. 
and, if so, what that cause was? Explain to· 
the jury. A. Well, the way that man started 
in to go up the side of the car, he couldn't see· 
the bridge when he sta1·ted; and at the speed 
the train Wll8 running, and him climbing up-
the side of the car, IJy the time the engine 
strnck the bridge, he would be towards the 
top, 11nd, when he heard the thundering noise 
that the engine makes when it sti·ikes a 
bridge. he hurried to get on top of the car." 
This te11timony was given over the objection 
of the plaintiff in error. The witness was the-
conc.luctor of another train, who was far 
away when Patterson fell from the box-car. 
lie did not know and could not st11te whether 
Patterson could see the bridge when he start-
ed to ascend the ladder, nor how far he had 
ascended when the bridge was reached; nei-
ther was he competent to state what causes 
ope1·ated on the mind of Patterson that led 
him to ascend the ladder with great speed 
and haste. The admission ot the Incompe-
tent testimony was error, for which the judg-
ment will be reversed, and the cause remand· 
ed for a new trial; all the justices concurring. 
EVIDENCE or CI~l'AltACTER—WHEN ADMISSIBLE‘. [Cm M, 25
NORFOLK & ‘V. R. CO. V. IIOOYER.
(29 Ail- 99-}, T9 hid. 253.)
C0“?! of Appeals of Maryland. June 19, 1894.
Allpeai from circuit court, Washington
county,
Action by William Hoover against the Nor-
folk & Western Railroad Company for per-
-*'°l1fl1 injuries. Judgment for plaintiff, and
tit-fondant appeals. Reversed.
Ahmed before ROBINSON, c. J., and BRY-
A.\. BRISCOE. 1HcSHl<}RRY, FOWLER,
ROBERTS, PAGE, and BOYD, J-T.
'Hy. Kyd. Douglass, for appellant. M. L.
heedy and VV. C. Grifiith, for appeliee.
McSi-IERRY, J. This is an action brought
10 recover damages for personal injuries re-
(‘9iV0d b_v the uppellee, an employe of the
Norfolk & \Vestern Railroad Company, as the
result 01' alleged negligence on the part of his
fellow servant. The verdict and judgment
were in his favor, and the company has ap-
pealed. In the record there are three bills of
exception. upon wvhich the questions to be
considered arise. Two of these exceptions
were reversed by the appellant, and one by
the appellce. '
It appears that in May, 1891, an extra
train of loaded freight cars was started from
Shenandoah, Va., about 11:30 p. m., to run
through to Hagcrstown, Md. The crew con-
sisted of a conductor, an engineman, a fire-
man, a flagman, and two hrakemen. Hoo-
ver, the appeilee, was the engincman. As the
train proceeded northward, it descended some
heavy grades, and the engineman noticed
that its speed was not kept under proper
control by the brakemen. At Luray the
train laid over for an hour, and the engine-
man requested the brakemen not to let him
down the hills so rapidly, as the night was
quite foggy. After leaving Luray. they as-
cended the grade to Vaughn's Summit, turn-
ing the point at a speed of about 10 miles an
hour. Immediately upon passing the sum-
mit the appellcc shut oi! the steam, so that
the train might descend by gravity alone,
without aid from the engine. When about a
train's length over the hill, he discovered that
the train was increasing its speed, and he ap-
plied the tank brake; but, this producing no
effect, he blew for brakes, turned on the
driver brakes, and applied sand to the track.
This not checking the train, he again blew
for brakes, and reversed his engine. He re-
peatcd his signals for brakes at least once,
and probably twice. afterwards. but they
seem not to have been heeded by the brake-
inen, for the train moved rapidly onward
down the grade. The packing blew out ot
the cylinder, andvthis caused the train to
plunge forward, throwing the appellcc back
‘into the tender. At this jllncture they were
mpidly approaching, and were only $01118 10
or 12 car lengths distant from, Possum Hol-
low, which is crossed 119011 8. trestle 75 01' 80
feet high. The appellee -saw that a collision
with another freight train 8tan(11ng_ 01- mm»-
lng very slowly northward, on the 3.933,.‘
was imminent and unavoidable, nml, to save
himself, jumped from his engine, and re-
ceived the injuries for which he has brought
the pending suit. There was evidence of-
fered tending to prove that Huyett, one or
the brakemen, had bocn drinking that night
before the accident happened; and, within 30
minutes prior to the collision, his breath gave
unmistakable evidence of it. in this state of
the proof, a witness was asked whether he
knew the general reputation of Huyett and
Reese, the two brakemen, for sobriety for one
or two years before the accident and follow-
ing that, and, if so, to state what that repu-
tation was. To this question "and the evi-
dence sought to be elicited -thereby, the ap-
pellant objected, but the court permitted the
question to be asked and answered, and this.
ruling forms the subject of the first excep-
tion. ,
It has been repeatedly held by this court;
and is the settled and established doctrine 0_
Maryland, that in actions of this ciiaraclqelé
where a servant sues his master for l11l\1l1lO@‘-V
resulting from the negligence of 8 ‘Grove
servant, the plaintiff, to succeed, must ipenow
not only that some negligence of thihat the
servant caused the injury, but 9.150)‘; énce»
master had himself been guilty of "flit K
either in the selection of the negllge 1.9,tfl\“\“ \
servant in the first instance, or “lie,-e “e
him in his service afterwards. 3
gence on the part of a fellow servflit
resulting in injury, will not suflicc 9
the action, because the master (106 /$14 -
sure one eniployé against the carcle ‘, %c<<'
another; but he owes to each of hi9 gt’ 4 ‘ 0‘
the duty of using reasonable care 111 ’_ g, toeéfi
tion in the selection of competent £?‘é’.‘l ,,fl 30° _.
ants, and in the retention in his PA 1 9
none but those \vh0 arc. It he doe",¢ -’
form this duty, and an injury is 0‘ ’ /
by the negligence of an incoinpetcn‘ 14/’ }/ 5 \o
less servant. the master is responsil) ‘L’ 1,’ 53 59'
injured employé, not for the tnere 1 1"7""’1‘33‘
act or omission of the inC0l1\[)etQ“t¢‘ {f 1161?:
less servant, but for his own neg“ :4, Z 5 '91
not discharging hi8 Own duty t0\\‘=1\"’{1’»‘r4 1;’ ‘ts
jured servant. As this negligence 05 1 ‘F 4} pg
ter must be proved, it 111113’ be D!‘_°"9d 6, i § “-
other fact,—eit.her by direct Q\’l(lPI1§V1, §
the proof of circumstances tfi-om t £5 1 ¢
existence may, as a. conclus1on 0 1; I /'
fairly and reasonably iI\fe1‘1'ed- Thiov’ ‘/,2’ 1
encss on the part of a railroad emi) '9-.9 13
. 111
. an incompetent servant w ’ ,
deis him it be quesnollf,
~ 1 Q;
ly be disputed; nor can 1 , =5‘ £1461»
=1 mm who -er‘; 11¢’
servant, or who, know 1, ,,
. ilty of 9' f -w
him in his sertvlcehlfzgstiidotfiedfitly, not" £7111 1
less and wan 011 ‘ . loyé in his 1’ ¢,
the P“b“"' 1"“ to efi(I3J1eyll:(l_‘I’ 3:1 the 1'°°°"‘1'- t I-11.1
ice. There is 11° 8‘ 7 restion, that (‘lint-Ital’:/} 1
has there been 8. 9'15!’ flagmnn of the
r
conductor, fireman. 0
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EVIDEYCE OF CH·AHACTER-WHEY' ADMissr».C.l?. {CIUB No. 25 
:-\ORFOLK & W. R. CO. "· HOOYEU. 
(2U Atl. 004, 79 Md. 253.) 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. June 19, 1894. 
ApPeal troni circuit court, Washington 
rounty. 
Action by Willlani Hoover against the NOl'-
folk & Western Railroad Company tor per-
'"llla.I Injuries. Judgment tor plaintiff, and 
ll<>fPndant appeals. Re"Versed. 
Argued before ROBINSON, C. J., 11n1l BRY· 
A."i, BRISCOE, McSHJ<rnRY, FOWLER, 
UOBERTS, PA.GE, and BOYD, JJ. 
Hy. Kyd. Douglass, tor a11r11•ll11nt. M. L. 
Keedy and W. 0. Grltllth, for appellee. 
McSHEHRY, J. This ls an action brought 
to recover da iunges for personal Injuries re-
Pelved by the uppellee, an employll of the 
~orfolk & "'eRtern Railroad Company, as the 
result of nlle,;ed negligence on the part of his 
fellow ser"Vant. The verdict and judgment 
were In his fa""or, and the company has ap-
(tffiled. In the record there are three bills of 
•·xl't'ptlon. u11on 'vhlch the questions to be 
1·onslderl•d arll«'. Two of these exceptions 
were rewrae<l by the appellant, and one by 
the appellee. · 
It appears that in :May, 1891, an extra 
train of loaded freight cars was started from 
Shenandoah, Va., about 11:30 p. m., to run 
through to Hagerstown, Md. The crew con-
~lsted ot a conductor, an englneman, a fire-
man, a 'flagman, and two brakemen. Hoo-
rer, the appellee, was the englm.'lnan. As the 
train proceeded northward, It descended some 
heavy grades, and the engtneman noticed 
that Its speed was not kept under proper 
rontrol by the brakemen. At Lurny the 
train laid over tor an hour, and the engine-
man requested the brakemen not to let him 
down the hills so rapidly, as the night was 
c1ulte foggy. After leaving J,urny. they as-
cended the grade to Vaughn's Summit, turn-
ing the point at a speed of about 10 miles an 
hour. Immediately upon passing the sum-
mit the appellee shut otr the steam. so that 
the train might descend by gravity alone, 
without aid trom the engine. When about a 
traln's length over the hill, he discovered that 
the train was Increasing Its speed, and he a.p-
plled the tank brake; but, this producing no 
Ptrect, he blew tor brakes, turned on the 
driver brakes, and applied sand to the track. 
This not checking the train, he again ble"' 
for brakes, and reversed his engine. He l"e-
pea ted his sljl'D8ls for brnkes at leaAt once, 
and probably twice, afterwards, but they 
seem not to ba"Ve been heeded by the brake-
men, tor the train moved rapidly 01rn•ard 
down the grade. The packing blew out o:r 
the cylinder, and this caused the train to 
plunge forward, throwing the appellce back 
Into the tender. At this juncture tlley were 
rapidly at>proachlng, and were only some 10 
or 12 car lengths distant from, Possum Hol-
low, which 18 crossed upon a trestle 75 or 80 
feet high. The appellee SIJ. lt' that a cofilslon 
with another freight train Btandlng, or mov-
ing very slowly northward, on the trestle, 
was Imminent and unavoidable, and, to save 
himself, jumped from bis engine, and re-
ceived the injuries tor which he has brought 
the pending suit. There was evidence of-
fered tending to prove that Huyett, one or 
the brakemen, had ooen drinking that night 
before the accident happened; and, within 30 
minutes prior to the collision, his breath gave 
unmistakable e"Vldence ot It. In this state of 
the proof, a witness was asked whether he 
knew the general reputation of Huyett and 
Reese, the two brakemen, for· sobriety for one 
or two years before the accident and follow-
ing that, and, If so, to state what that repu-
tation was. To thlfl que11tlon ·and the evi-
dence sought to be ellcltetl ·thereby, the ap-
pellant objected, but the court permitted the 
question to be asked and answered, and this . 
ruling forms the subject of the tlrst excep-
tion. 
It has been repeatedly held by thlB court. 
and Is the settled and establlshed doctrine of 
Maryland that In actions of this cbnmcter. 
where a ~ervant sues his master tor ln:Jnrtes 
t telloW rl'sultlng from the negllgence o a ve 
st pro 
serYant, the plalutllT, to succeed, mu renovr 
not only that some negll~nce of th~at t\\C 
ser"Vant caused the Injury, but also \\g~nce. 
master bad himself been guilty of pe~1'.. te\\o"1" 
either in the selection of the negll~e'~e.ta\n\:~­
servant In the tlrst Instance, or \t\i£P'·e ~:,,g'\~ 
him in his sen·lce afterwards. ) 1:. t'\: ~V"-i:t 
gence on the part of a fellow servi\1>0 e~ot \n-~ 
resulting in Injury, wlll not sumcc t: ~ ~e#> \t» 
the action, because the master doc·¢"~ e\'...;i~n~~ 
\ \ \ 
'\ 
eure one employ(! against the carel~ ~ .p-3- ~e~-
another; but he owes to each ot n\~ ~ ~ ~ o'-
the duty of lll!lng re11sonab\c care j. .t7,.-... \. ~ ~~ 
tlon in the seleetlon of N>mpetent rel e.,, ~"' ~o'P' :te' 
ants, and ln the r<'tentlon ln h\s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~e 
none but those who are. Tr he doe~.~~v~--c-0 '\:e~'\. 
form this duty, and an. injury ls <1c 1-"-~ :te· 
by the negligence of an lncon~peten t: J. V ~ c,fJ.. \~ 
less servant, the master ls respon11\V ~ ~ ~~ \'IY 
Injured employ(!, not for the mere ~· ~ ~ p e ~~­
act or omlselon of the incon~petent ~~., _.:. ~ ~i 
less servant, but for his own neizll ~ #_ ""7 ~ l>'1 
not dlscharizlnA' bls own duty t.owar<'J. ~~ ~ ~ its 
jured servant. As this nep;l\gence of :J.... ~ p ve 
ter must be proved, it mny be proved e# ~ ., J.t· 
other fact,-elther by direct evidE>nc V • ~ ~ ~1' ll' 
the proof of clrcumstnnc<-s :from ~ <~ ._ 1'-" ~e _ 
existence may, as a conclusion of .c:;. LP ~cC t 
fairly and reasonably ln:ferred. Tba ....., ..... ~~ ;i-.£1 
eul•Ss on the part of a rnllroad emp\0-~ ~ tJ. 
ders him an Incompetent. servnnt will~~..: . . ~P,;1~J~ 
ly be disputed· nor can It be que!ltfo1 ~ ._.._ ~ ~­
a master wh~ knoW'in1dY e1nploys ·i_-e '~rO 
k W'lng bis habits, ~ -... servant, or who, no n of 9' ~ ..,..--
him In his service, W,0?~d o~d':::y~ot· o~e-,:~~­
less and wnnton brc.u~ m loyll in hi8 ~· ~ 
the public, but to e,; e1y e ipn tbe re<.-01·<-•- , -J-J __.._ 
•ldeUCP - I~ Ice. 'fhe1·e ls no e" tl n that p\tlie:a: ~ # 
has there been a sugge~a~~nu of the ~ 'tr'&:' 
conductor, flreroaJJ.. or 
Case No. 25]
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was negligent or incompetent. The negli-
gence which directly caused the accident is
attributed solely to the hrakemen; and the
appellant's negligence, which, as it is claim-
ed, fixes its liability. lies in its employment
of, or continuing to retain in its service. these
dissipated or iniemperate hrakemen. But,
as we have stated, it was necessary for the
_..aintiff to show, not only their employment,
but that the company had not used due and
ordinary care in selecting them. There was
no direct evidence adduced to show the ab-
sence of such care; but the question except-
ed to, and the evidence elicited in response
to it, were designed to show by indirect or
circumstantial evidence that the company had
not used the degree of care and caution in
the selection of these hrakemen that its duty
imperatively required it to use. So the ques-
tion is, can you fix upon the master a failure
to use due care in selecting careful servants
by showing such notorious or general reputa-
tion respecting the servant’s uniltuess or in-
competency as that the master could not,
without negligence on his part, have been ig-
norant of it when he employed the servant?
About this there ought to be no difficulty. If
the servant’s general reputation before em-
ployment is so notorious as to unfitness as
that it must have been known to the master
but for his (the master's) negligence in not
informing himself,—li' he could have been
ignorant of it only because he failed to mnke
investigation,—then it is obvious that he had
not used the care and caution which the law
demands of him in selecting his employes.
Hence “the servant's general reputation for
unfitness may be sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the master used due care
in his selection, even though actual knowl-
edge of such reputation for unfltness on the
master’s part is not shown.” Wood, Mast.
& Serv. § 420. In Davis v. Railroad Co.,
20 Mich. 112. Cooley, J., speaking for the
court, adopts the case of Gihnan v. Railroad
Co., 13 Allen, 433, which puts upon the em-
ployer the responsibility of negligently em-
ploying an unflt person. generally known and
reputed to be such, notwithstanding the em-
ployer may in fact have been ignorant of
such uniitness. Continuing. he said: “The
ignorance itself is negligence in a case in
which any proper inquiry would have ob-
tained the necessary information, and where
the duty to inquire was plainly imperative.”
So, in Hilts v. Railway, 55 Mich. 437. 21 N.
W. 878, where a track hand was killed by an
engine backing rapidly along a switch, and
the engineman was drunk, the court said:
"When. however, as in this case, it is shown
that the accident occurred through the negli-
gent act of the servant, who was in an intoxi-
cated condition, and when it is shown. fur-
ther, that'he was in the habit of drinking in-
toxicating liquors to excess, and such habit
had extended over a. period of nine months
while in defendant’s employ, and no actual
knowledg," or notice ever reached any supe-
rior oflicer of the engineer. we think the jury
may be justified in concluding from such evi-
dence that the defendant was negligent in
tailing to learn such habit, and in retaining
the engineer in its employment." See, also,
Gilmau v. Railroad Co., 13 Allen, 433; Wright
v. Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 566; Railroad Co. v.
Sullivan, (£3 Ill. 293; Chapman v. Railway
Co., 55 N Y. 579. The evidence offered and '
admitted had no relation to specific or iso-
lated acts of negligence. These, unless
brought home to the knowledge of the mas-
ter. would not have been admissible as re
fleeting on the question of the master's care.
Elevator Co. v. Neal, 65 Md. 438, 5 Atl. 338.
We think, for the reasons we have given and
upon the authorities we have cited, there was
no error committed in allowing the question
excepted to in the first bill of exceptions to
be put and answered.
Under the ruling. quite a number of wit-
nesses testifled to Huyett’s general reputa-
tion for intemperance, extending from a.
period long anterior to his employment by the
appellant, up to and after the accident. One
witness, Eyier, gave evidence as to Reese's
general reputation. With respect to Huyett,
the evidence, if credited by the jury, showed
a. general reputation, covering many years,
uninterruptcdly, and of such a notorious
character that a jury might well have in-
ferred it was known to the master when
Hnyett was employed, or else that the master
failed to know it only because of neglecting
to make proper inquiry. There was conse-
quently evidence legally sufllcient to go to
the jury upon the subject of the company's
negligence; and therefore there was no error
in rejecting the appellant's first and fifth
prayers. which sought to take the case from
the consideration of the jury, nor in rejecting
its fourth prayer, which sought to exclude
this evidence from the case.
There was error in rejecting the second
prayer of the appellant. It asked the court
to say to the jury that, if the injury to the
plaintiff was caused by the intoxication or
negligence of the brakemen, or either of
them; that the brakemen were employed by
Shull, the train dispatcher, and were sent out
by him on the train in question; and, further,
that Shull was guilty of negligence in sending
out these hrakemen, or either of them, on
the train,—“yet the jury are further instruct-
ed that Shull and the plaintiff were coen1-
ployés of the defendant in the sending out
of said hrakemen, and the defendant is not
responsible to the plaintiff for the neglect or
want of care of the said Shull, unless they
shall further find that there was negligence
on the part of the defendant in the employ-
ment of Shull; and there is nolegaily sufficient
evidence in the cause from which the jury
can so find." Now, whether Shall was a
deputy master, or vice principal, or only a
fellow servant of the plaintiff. is a question of
law to be determined by the court, it the
facts be undisputed or conceded. Yates v.
76
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r,ase No. 25) BEI.E\" ANCY. · 
was negligent or Incompetent. The nPgll-
gence which directly caused the accident Is 
attributed solely to the brakemen; and the 
a1>pellllnt's negligence, which, as It Is claim-
ed, fixes Its llablllty, lies In Its employment 
ot, or continuing to retain In Its servkt•, these 
dissipated or lntt>mperate brakemen. But, 
as we have stated, It waa n~Sdllcy tor the 
..• alntUr to show, not only their employment, 
Lmt that the company had not used due and 
ordinary care In selecting them. There was 
no direct evidence adduced to show the ab-
11ence of BUch care; but the question except-
t'd to, and the evidence elicited In response 
to lt, were designed to 11bow by Indirect or 
clrcum11tantlal evidence that the company bad 
not used the degree of care and <'8.utlon ln 
the selretlon of these brakemen that Its duty 
Imperatively required It to use. Ro the ques-
tion ls, can you fix upon the master a failure 
to use due care in seleetlng careful servants 
by showing such notorioUB or general reputa-
tion respecting the servant's unfitness or In-
competency as that the master could not, 
without negligence on bis part, have been Ig-
norant of ft wbt>n he employed the servant? 
About this there ought to be no dlfticulty. It 
the servant's gent>ral reputation before em-
ployment ts so notorious as to unfitnf'llS as 
that it must have been known to the master 
but for bis (the master"s) Dt>gllgence In not 
tnronnlD.Jt blmself,-lf be could have bt'E'n 
Ignorant of lt only because be failed to mnke 
lnvestlgntlon,-then lt Is obvious that he had 
not used the care and caution which the law 
demnnds of hlm in selecting his em11loy~s. 
Hence "the servant's general reputation for 
unfitness may be suftlclent to overcome the 
presumption that the master used due care 
in his selection. even though actual knowl-
edge of such reputation for unfitness on the 
master's part ts not shown." Wood, Mast. 
& Serv. t 420. In Davis v. Railroad Co., 
20 Mich. 112, Coolt>y, J., speaking for the 1 
court, adopts the case of Gilman v. Railroad 
Oo •• 13 Allen, 433, which puts upon the em-
ployer the responsibility of negligently em-
ploying an unfit person, generally known and 
reputed to be such, notwithstanding the em-
ployer may In fact have been Ignorant of 
such unfitness. Continuing. he said: ''The 
Ignorance Itself Is negllgt>nce In a case In 
which any proper Inquiry would have ob-
talnro the nece!lllllry lnformntlon, and where 
the duty to inquire was plainly Imperative." 
So, In Hilts v. Railway, w lllch. 437. 21 N. 
W. 818, where a track band was killed by an 
engine backing rapidly along a switch, and 
the engtneman was drunk, the court 11ald: 
"Wht>n, however, as In this case, It Is shown 
that the accident occurred through the negll-
Kent act of the S('rvant, who was In an lntoxt-
<'Rted condition, and when ft Is shown. fur· 
ther. that· he was In the habit of <lrlnklng In· 
toxtmting liquors to excess, and such habit 
had exteodPd o\·er a period of nine monthM 
while In defendant's employ, and no Rl'tual 
knowledge or notice ever reached any 11upe-
76 
rlor officer of the engineer, we think the jury 
may be justlfled In concluding from such evi-
dence that the defendant was negligent In 
falling to leam such habit, and In retaining 
tbe engineer In Its employment." See, also, 
Gilman v. Railroad Co., 13 Allen, 433; Wright 
v. Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 566; Railroad Co. v. 
Sulllrnn, Cl3 Ill. !.>oo; Chapman v. Railway 
Oo., rm N Y. 579. Tbt> evidence olfered and 
admitted hsd no relation to specific or Iso-
lated acts of Dt>gll~nce. These, unless 
brought home to the knowledge ot the IIUlS-
ter, would not have been admissible as re-
fle<"tlog on the que11tlon of the master's care. 
Elevator Co. v. :Xeal, 65 :Md. 438, 5 Atl. 338. 
\Ve think, for th~ reasons we have given and 
upon the authorities we have cited, there was 
no error committed In allowing the question 
excepted to In the first bill ot exceptions to 
be put nod answered. 
Under the ruling, quite a number of wit-
nesses testified to Huyett's general reputa-
tion for Intemperance, extending from a 
pel'fod long anterior to his employment by the 
appellant, up to and after the accident. One 
witness, Eyler, gave evidence as to ReE'Se's 
general reputation. Wlth respect to Huyett, 
the evidence, If <'redlted by th~ jury, showed 
a general rPputntton, covering many years, 
unlnterrupt1•1lly, and of such a notorious 
character that a Jory might well have In-
ferred It was known to the master when 
Huyett was employed, or else that the ma.<(ter 
failed to know It only becausl' of neglecting 
to make proper Inquiry. There was conse-
quently evidence legally sufticlent to go to 
the jury upon the subject of the company's 
negligence; and therefore there was no error 
lo rejecting the appellant's ftrst and fifth 
prayers, which sought to take the case from 
the consideration of the Jury, nor In rejecting 
Its fourth prayer, which sought to exclude 
this evldt>nce from the case. 
'l'here was error In rejecting the second 
prayer of the appellant. It asked the court 
to say to the jury that, lf the Injury to the 
plalntlll' was caUBed by the Intoxication or 
negligence ot the brakemen, or either of 
them; that the brakemen were employed by 
Shull, the train dispatcher, and were sent out 
by him on the train In question; and, further, 
that Shull was guilty of negligence In sending 
out these brakt>men, or either of them, on 
the traln,-"yet the Jury are further Instruct-
ed that Shull and the plalntlll' were coem-
ploy~s of the defendant In the sending out 
or said brakemen, and the defendant Is not 
res1>0nslble to the plalntlft' for the neglect or 
want of care of the snld Shull, unless they 
shull further find that there was negligence 
on the part of the defendant In the employ-
mt>nt of Shull; and there Is nole~ally sutficlmt 
evldt•DC'l' In the cause from wh11:h the Jury 
cau l!o find." :'\ow, whether Shull was a 
d1•1mty master, or vice principal, or only a 
fellow serrnnt of the plalntUT. Is a question of 
law to be dt•tPrmlned by the court, tf the 
facts be undisputed or conceded. Yates v. 
EVIDENCE or CHAit.\CTER-WHEN ADMISSI 1-‘L12. [gm N0, 25
IP01: Go., 60 hid. 2, 16 Atl. 280. Shull was
8 mere dispatcher of trains, with power to
employ and discharge flagnien and brakenien,
and having general charge of the trainmen of
tile first division ot the road, and the move-
ment of trains thereon. He was employed
bl’ the division superintendent. who had the
general management of the division. The en-
Kinsmen and iircinen are also under the in-
Siructious of the division superintendent.
This is all the evidence (and it is entirely un-
disputed) to show that Shull was a vice prin-
cipal, and not a fellow servant. In Wonder's
Case, -‘$2. Md. 418, the general rule was iaid
down that all who serve the same master,
work under the same control, derive au-
thority and colupensation from the same
source, and are engaged in the same general
business, though it may be in diflerent grades
and departments oil it, are fellow servants,
each taking the risk of the other's negligence.
In that case, a brakeman, who was injured
while using a defective brake, was held to
be a fellow servant with the mechanics in the
shops, the inspector of machinery and rolling
stock, and the superintendent of the move-
ment of trains. And so in State v. Malster,
57 .\id. 287, it was held that a superintendent
or manager is a fellow servant, within the
rule which exonerates the master. In Ele-
vator Co. v. Neal, 65 Md. 438, 5 Atl. 338. the
captain of a steam tug owned by the com-
pany was held to be a fellow servant of ii
laborer who was injured in the company's
service. This court said in that case: “Nor
is the liability of the master enlarged or made
ditlerent by the fact that the servant who has
suffered the injury occupied a grade in the
common service interior to that of the serv-
ant whose misconduct caused the injury com-
piaine(l of.” And in Yates v. Iron Co., 69
Md. 370, 16 Atl. 280, the authorities were all
reviewed, and it was held that the chief man-
ager or the carbon works, who hired and dis-
charged the hands, kept their time, etc., was
only a fellow servant of a laborer who was
injured while operating the machinoi-y. 1\Iay-
or, etc., v. War, 77 Md. 593, 27 Atl. 85. In
the face of these decisions, it is impossible
to treat Shull as anything more than a fol.
low servant. The maiiagenient of the (11-
vision upon which he was train dispatclu-r
was not committed to him. He was a sub-
ordinate, appointed by the superintendent;
and though he had charge of the tl'1liilll‘|(_1];)_
and of the movement of trains on his (11-
vision. and could employ and discliiirge fl21g_
iuen and brakeinen, it is far from D0111 g
shown that the master had relinquished 1111
supervision of the work on that division. ii nd
intrusted its direction, as well as the procur_-
in;: of materials and niachinei-_v and other in_
striinientalitics necessary for the SO1‘\'i@(‘~- to
his judgment and discretion. The eniriiiemun
and fireman were not employed by him, but
by the division superintendent; and, if The
[.'1‘tl(]L‘ of his position W-"8 Superior t0 iiliit Of
the engineuian, that fact did not niuiie ililu
a vice principal as respf-‘fits the Mtge;-_
WGIB b0ti1 engaged ill the game common
work, employed by the Same agent or the
common master, and were performing duties
pertaining to the same general business; and,
unless the whole current of the Maryland de-
cislons is to be reversed, they were fellow
servants of the railroad company, upon the
evidence no\v before us. If this be so, then.
even if Shull had been negligent in sending
out these brakemen. and if that negligence
caused the injury sued tor, still the plaintiff
could not recover, unless the company had
not used due cure in the selection of Shull,
and of this there was not a particle or evi-
dence oifered.
The appellants sixth prayer was properly
rejected. There was no necessiif *0 DPOV9
that the company had been incorporated.
That tact was averred in the declaration, and
was not denied by the pleas, and under sec-
tion 108, art. 75, of the Code, must be taken to
be admitted. d b
This brings us ts the lnrafirs nP§'@‘<*‘{\::mn_§'_
the appeilec. Un era oca aw 0 -
ton county (sections 69, 70, art. 22. C<>_d_°“_P:::'
Loco! Laws). we are required to consulife has
rrfected prayers of the plaintiff, it the fie.
excepted; and this he has done. 1,3? fluted
tendant‘s exception, the plaintiff 96
prayers and the detenda.nt’s rejede \
are brought before us. By the
exception. his rejected prayers, as egg
de1'endant’s granted ones, are 111'
review. The court granted the
tlrst, seventh, and eighth prayers» , 9
understand that the seventh and d‘ or.
seriously questioned. Without 9
them, we need only say they are
to substantial objection. 4/
The nppellee‘s first prayer, howeg
not to have been granted. It W9
in the argninent that there was o‘;4; ‘Z
to support some of the hypotheses ‘g ’
ed, but as no special exception bi 4 it
that objection, and signed and seal ’
They
f~ 1'
judge, appears in the record, we 9%‘-I’?
liberty to consider it. Albert v.
Md. 334. 7 Atl. om. The prI\Y°\'~ K 51
ting mi-tn the facts. pre¢"<*<is= “'“?¢ 4
said injury to the plflillflff “"18 °““*(/.44’
want of (,1-(1-may-y skill and experielll C I
er untitness on the Part Qt the Md‘ { _
or any of them. in charge of saiv ‘_‘,,
inanage and conduct the sa1ne{t_b_\n
the intemperate state or c0‘n,(l dive
of them," the plaintiff using“ ‘tier
“the phlintiff 13 (qatiiloil ‘CO :;‘;0evk'1(3
the jury flil-tl1el.iinln(’:l(§\f.‘01‘1Y:9 rcasonn I
the defeni ant 4 1 ' In mmnt
in the selection and e‘“‘p_ 10‘-I-.
hr.-ikeiiieii or otiim-_ ]l:.\ll\::-‘(')I;:;‘lt.?]]1'I|)*',_', sail
gml with the plmnufi In injury result<_'¢
that is to SM" if t1;)e the iuteinin-r':1
ll(‘j.'iiiZ‘£‘ilC€ cikused ax; the defendant
=m.\' "1' ‘he tram hzlinr-fried to use due .
be iiiliiii-_ if itoilaeiuier or the eu1P1°3'
the S0i\'t-iiuil
1!-
0
(ii
Q11
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EVIDE~CE OF CHAHACTER-WHEN ADMISSI JJJ:..l!.: [C1tse No. 35 
Iron Co., 00 l\fd. 38:.?, 16 Atl. 280. Shull WllS 
a lllere dlspatcher of trnlns, with power to 
employ and discharge :flagmen and brakemen, 
and having general charge of the trainmen of 
the first dlvlslon of the road, and the move-
ment of trains thereon. He was employed 
by the division superintendent, who had the 
general management of the division. The en-
gfnt>men ana Hrt~men are also under the In-
structions ot the division 11uperlntendent. 
This Is all the evidence (and It Is entirely un· 
disputed) to show that Shull was a vice prin-
cipal, and not a i"ellow servant. In Wonder's 
Case, 32 Md. 418, the general rule was laid 
down that all who sern! the same ml\ster, 
work under the same control, derive au-
thority and co1npensation from the same 
source, and are engaged in the same general 
bustness, though lt may be In different grades 
and departments ot It, are fellow servants, 
each taking the risk of the other's negligence. 
In that case, a brakeman, who was Injured 
while .using a defective brake, was held to 
be a fellow servant with the mPChanlcs In the 
Bho)JIJ, the Inspector of machinery and rolling 
stock, and the superintendent of the move-
ment of trains. And so In State v. Malster, 
57 Md. 287, It was held that a superintendent 
or manager ls a fellow servant, within the 
rule which exonerates the master. In Ele-
vator Co. v. Neal, 65 Md. 438, 5 Atl. 338, the 
captain of a steam tug owned by the com-
pany was held to be a fellow servant of a 
laborer who was injured In the company's 
eernce. This court &'lid In that case: "Xor 
18 the liability of ~be master enlarged or made 
dill'erent by the fact that the servant who has 
sulfered the Injury occupied a grade In the 
common service Inferior to that of the serv-
ant whose misconduct caused the Injury com-
plained of." And In Yates v. Iron Co., 69 
Md. 370, 16 AtL 280, the authorities were all 
reviewed, and It was held that the chief man-
ager of the carbon works, who hired and dis-
charged the hands, kept their time, etc., was 
only a fellow servant of a lalJorE>r who was 
Injured whlle operating the machinery. May. 
or, etc., v. War, 77 lid. 503, 27 Atl. 85. In 
the face of these decisions, It ls Impossible 
to treat Shull as anythln.I:' mor+> than a fel-
low servant. The management of the dl-
vh1ion upon which he was trnln dls1latelH•r 
wns not committed to him. He was a sub-
ordinate, appointed by the superintendc-n t. 
nnd though h+> had charge of the trulrunc_•~ 
and of the movement of trains on his di-
vision. and could employ and disehar~P flag-
men and brakemen, It Is fnr from hl•ing 
shown that the master had relin1]l1lshf.'d u u 
supNvlslon of the work on that division, aud 
intrnstcd Its dlr'ectlon, as well aR the procur-
inr:- of materials and mnchlnt>ry and otller hl-
strumentulltles necessary for the 1wrvicc, to 
his judgment and discretion. The en~hwmu.n 
and :fireman were not employed by him, but 
by the division superintendent; and, If the 
1-'l"nde of bis position w:ti1 superior to tl111t of 
the englneman, that fact did not wake llil.U 
a vice principal as resp4."cts the latter. They 
were both engaged In the same common 
work, employed by tbe Bame a,i:-ent of the 
common master, and were performing duties 
pertaining to the same general business; and, 
unless the whole cunent of the :\faryland de-
cisions Is to be reversed, they were fellow 
servants of the railroad company, upon the 
e\·itlence now bt•fore us. If this be so, then. 
e\·pn It Shull bud been negligent In sending 
out these brakemen, and If that negligence 
caused the Injury sued for, still the plalntlt'I' 
could not re<..'O\"er, unless the company had 
not used due care In the selection of Shull, 
and of this there was not a purtlcle of evi· 
dence offered. 
The appellant's sixth prayer was properly 
rejected. There was no nece11slty to prove 
that the company had been lncorpomted. 
That fo:ct was averred In the declaration, and 
was not denied by the pleas, and under sec· 
tion 108, art. 75, of the Code, must be taken to 
be admitted. 
This brings us to the prayers pre!!ented by 
the appt>llee. Under a local law of \V1111111n·-. 
ton cowity (11ectlons 69, 70, art. 22, Code Pub. 
· ·nr tlw Lot·~ Laws), we are requll•t>d to <·on::1111~ ha"' 
~ected prayers of the p!aintitT, lf h~e de-
excepted; and this he has done. BY t · nnted 
fendant's exception, the plalntlff:!i ~-ayers 
prayers and the defendant's reject: ;\tl.\nt\ft·s 
are brought before us. By the ..:eu. ns t~~T 
exception, his rejected prayers, as ~en'-e.t\ t\tf. .• -
defendant's granted ones, are pr--· 9\11\'~0 no\ 
review. Tbe court granted u1e ~~e ~\:."o- "'\'." 
tlrst. seventh, and eighth prayers. e'~~c~s\'>';!'n 
understand that the seventh and i)'- 0 :\ 0 
seriously questioned. Without ~ ~"'""'" 
them, we need only say they &$~ ~· 0 ec~ 
to substantial objection. < .e' pu { t\e~~\¥ 
The appellee's first prnyer, bowe ~ P~ 0~\)).:0~ 
I 
1 
I 
t 
not to hnve been granted. It wtl- ~ '-'"~e 
lo the argument thnt there was lJ.';,,::;. ..t?"' p v1 :\ 9-'-
to support some of the hypotheses ~ _. •-:>o ~ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
ed, but !18 no special exceptton bt e~~ ~t>· ~e'I: 
that objection, and signed nncl seal ._~ '~e--= \"0-c: 
judge, appears In the record. we ti.~/~· •-!. 'V\'' 
liberty to consider it. Albc_•rt v. • ~ _, ..,_.~> &J\\\·' 
Md. a:H. 7 Atl. 697. The prayer, ~~ #! ._:- j:l(}S• 
ting forth the facts. proc.-eds: "T~ • ~ ,.. ~- '? ,_ s"' \O 
said Injury to the plaint\ ff 'vas cnu..;'--" v ~ j ~· o< 
want of N'uinary skill nnd experlen~._... ~ ~~ll('l" 
er unfitness on the part o:t' the otll ...-> • p • ~ cC· 
or nny of them. In char~e of f'nid _._~;;. ~ .. ~•:J1ed 
manage and connnC't the sa1ne, by • 0~ ~,., < ~ t 
the Intemperate i,\tnte or conclltlon 'fl.:f.~+ .-t;l1• t.' 
of them." th<' plalntltT using due c. ~ ~ ~~i,J" 
" the plalntlfl' ls ('J1t\tlt•1l to T(•('oTer. ~C -f; }Je 
the jury further tlnd :t'r()tn the evidO~I ~ 'J. ~ _,. • ,,.;1 , 
th~ dpfpmlant illd not lll"P r<>m•ou~ '-7~~.,.. ._ -.=:;; - ~ 
In tilt> st>lcl'tiuu and e 111ploymen . r-~ --- :11-- ,.,. .. 
hr:tkPlllt'll or otlu•r hands or t•nl1plo~ 1(• ~~1-" ~..-71" 
1 . t ·fl' in con.duet ni:: s~ ~ & 1.wd with the P ni~ I tile injury resnlt<..·c.• c.-L~ •"I. LI 
thnt Is to say, bv the lntemi1t•r.ti :l'.'1 ,.-,7 • ~ :#-., m·~llgence cnus~d d-s the defPnllnn. t °" ._-~ ~ 
nny of the train 111nf'·1li1.."'<l to use due c~ ~ ~~ 
be linltlP. If It hn~ .er ~ t.he emplo~~6 -# 
the seketl<!n of e1tll 
Case N 0. 2-5]
RELEVANCY.
that train, even though that particular em-
ployé, thus carelessly selected, had been guil-
ty of no negligence, and had in no way occa-
sioned the accident. Consequently, if the
jury thought the injury was caused by the
drunkenness of the brakemen, and that the
company had not used due care in the selec-
tion of the fireman, the company would be
liable, notwithstanding the fact that the tire-
man had been guilty of no negligence, and
had in no way produced or helped to produce
the injury. Thus, the negligence of one serv-
ant, and the independent negligence of the
master in employing some other servant, who
had no connection with the accident, estab-
lished. under this instruction, the plaintiffs
right to recover. This is not the law. On
the contrary, it is the negligence of a fellow
servant, and the additional negligence of the
master in employing that servant. whose neg-
ligence actually caused the injury. which
must concur before a plaintiff can recover in
a case of this character. The instruction
therefore announced an obviously erroneous
proposition. and was calculated to mislead
the jury, because there was evidence before
them from which they might have inferred
that due care had not been used in the selec-
tion of the fireman, though there was no evi-
dence from which they could have found
that the tlreman was responsible for the ac-
cident. The instruction should have clearly
restricted the negligence of the defendant in
selecting the plaintiff's fellow servants to the
selection of such of them as by their incompe-
tency. growing out of their intemperance, ac-
tually caused the injury.
The appellee’s second, third, fourth, and
fltth prayers were properly rejected. There
was no legally sufficient evidence adduced to
support them, or the several hypotheses as-
sumed in them; and, it they had been free
from other objections, this one was sutiicient
to justify the court in refusing to grant them.
There remains the appellant’s third prayer,
which the court granted, but we think erro-
neously gramed. It told the jury, in sub-
stance, that unless the brakeman Huyett
was drunk at the time of the accident, and
his negligence, by reason of such drunken-
ness, produced or contributed to the accident.
the evidence of general reputation as to his
intemperance was not relevant, and could
not be considered by the jury, “unless such
reputation was brought home 10 the knowl-
edge of the defendant before the acc.'denl;”
and there is no such evidence of such knowl-
edge. Had the prayer omitted the words
italicized, it would have been correct, but
those words superadded a condition which
is manifestly inaccurate. Now, it is obvious
that if Huyett was not drunk and was not
negligent when the accident happened. and
therefore did not cause or contribute to it.
the evidence of his general reputation for in-
temperance was wholly irrelevant, even
though that reputation nad been brought
home to the knowledge of the appellant be-
fore the accident. because, if he did not occa-
sion the injury by his negligeuce, the fact
that the master had knowledge of his bad
reputation would in no way have made the
master liable for an injury not caused by
Huyett at all. In other words, the master's
knowledge of Huyett‘s bad reputation had
nothing whatever to do with the case if Huy-
ett did not cause or contribute to the acci-
dent; and if Huyett did, by his intemper-
ance, cause the accident, then it was imma-
teriai whether the master had knowledge of
his bad reputation or not. becau>'e. as already
stated, the master was negligent in not know-
ing it. S0, in either view of the question, the
prayer was wrong, because of the addition of
the words indicated.
For the error in granting the appellee‘s
first instruction and the appeliant’s third. and
for the error in rejecting the appellant's sec-
ond prayer, the judgment must be reversed.
and a new trial be ordered. Judgment re-
versed, with costs above and below, and new
trial awarded.
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Case No. 2a] BELEV A...'1\fCY. 
that train, even though that particular em-
ploy6, thus careleesly selected, bad been guil-
ty of no negligence, and bad In no way occa-
sioned the accident. Consequently, if the 
Jury thought the Injury wu caused by the 
drunkenness of the brakemen, and that the 
company hnd not used due care In the selec-
tion ot the fireman, the company would be 
liable, notwlthetnndlng the fact that the flre-
IDlln bnd been guilty of no negligence, and 
bnd ln no way produced or helped to produce 
the injury. Thus, the negligence of one serv-
ant, and the independent negligence of the 
master ln employing some other servant, who 
had no connection with the accident, estab-
llsbed, undei· thla Instruction, the plalntlf!'s 
right to recover. Tbl8 18 not the law. On 
the contrary, lt la the negligence of a fellow 
servant, and the additional negll!l'ence of the 
master In employing that servant, whose neg-
ligence actually caused the Injury, which 
must concur bt>fore a plalntlf! can recover ln 
a case of this character. The Instruction 
therefore announced an obviously erroneous 
proposition. and waa calculated to ml&ll'lld 
the jury, bet'llwie there waa evidence before 
them from which they might have interred 
that due care bnd not been used ln the selec-
tion of the fireman, though there was no evi-
dence from which they could have found 
that the fireman was responsible for the :w-
cldent. The IDMtructlon should have clenl'ly 
restricted the negligence of the defendant In 
selecting the plalntl1!'11 fellow servants to the 
selection of such of them 811 by their Incompe-
tency. growing out of their intemperance, ac-
tually caused the Injury. 
The appellee's second, third, fourth, and 
dfth pmyers were properly rejected. There 
was no legally suftlclent evidence adduced to 
support them, or the several hypothe&e111 n~-
11wned In them; and, If they had been ft•ee 
from other objections, this one was suftl<"lt>nt 
to justify the court In refusing to grant them. 
There remains the appellant's third prnyt>r, 
whl<>h the court granted, but we think erro-
11 
neously graroted. It told the jury, In sub-
stance, that unleea the brakeman Huyett 
was drunk at the time of the accident, and 
bla negligence, by reason at such dnmken-
neu, produced or contributed. to the accident. 
the evidence of general reputation as to bla 
Intemperance was not relevant, and could 
not be con1ldered by the jury. "unltu nck 
r1putation '°"' brt11.1gkt k011U to t1u k1UN'l-
«Jge of t1u def mdant before tkl acc:dent; • 
and there la no such evidence of such knowl-
edge. Had the prnyer omitted the word.>1 
ltallclzed, lt would bnve been correct, but 
those words supemdcled a t.'Ondltlon which 
ls manifestly Inaccurate. Now, It la obvious 
that If Huyett wns not drunk and was not 
negligent when the accident happPned, and 
therefore did not cause or contribute to It. 
the evidence of hls general repututlon for In-
temperance WIUI wholly irrelevant. even 
though that reputation nad been brought 
home to the knowledge of the appellant }>('-
fore the accident. becawie, If he did not occa-
al.oo the Injury by his negligence, the fact 
that the master bad knowledge of hls bad 
reputation would In no way have made the 
master llable for an Injury not caused by 
Huyett at all. In other words, the master's 
knowledF of Huyett's bad reputation had 
nothing whatever to do with the case It H07-
ett did not cause or contribute to the acci-
dent; and If Huyett did, by his intemper-
ance, caUHe the 11cctdent, then It WBA Imma-
terial whether the master bad knowledge of 
his bad reputation or not. J>t.t'alL"t>. rui ah-endy 
stntecl, the master w11a nt>gllgt>nt In not know-
ing It. So, In either view of the question, the 
prayer was wrong, because of the addition of 
the words Indicated. 
For the e1T0r ln granting the appellee's 
first Instruction and the appellant's third. and 
for the error ln rejeetlng the appellant's aec-
ond prayer, the judgment must be reversed. 
and a new trial be ordered. Judgment ~ 
versed, with eoets above and below, and new 
trial a warded. 
HEABSAY GENERALLY EXCLUDED-
[Case N0. :20‘
ANDERSON v. FETZER et al.
'(44 N. \V. S38, 75 Wis. 562.)
sllllreine Court of \Visc-onsiii. Jan. 28, 1890.
‘ Appeal from circuit court. Door county;
banuiii. D. HASTINGS, Jr.. Judge.
This action is to recover $411.02, being
the proceeds of 6.603 cedar posts sold by
the defendants on commission for the
Plaintiff. T he defendants con nter-clai med ,
and alleged. in effect, that January 27, 1887,
the plaintiff entered into a contract in
yritiiig with the defendants as follows:
Received of Youngs & Fetzerfive hundred
dollars on account of ties now on hand on
Harris dock, at Bay View, Door county.
Said Youngs & Fetzer is to advance E. N.
Anderson at the rate of 18 cents on each
good cedar tie bought by him, said ties to
be owned by said Youngs & Fetzer; and
when shipped all profits on said ties to be
equally’ divided between Youngs & Fetzer
and said E N. Anderson, said Youngs &.
Fetzer to furnish above amount on each
good tie, and said Anderson to do all nec-
essary labor in buying, shipping, etc., to
offset the use of money furnished by said
Youngs & Fetzer. There isupto date 3.625
cedar ties on above dock. E. N. ANDER-
so.\". Bay View. Jamim-y 27th, 1887. Ac-
cepted. YOUNGS & FETZER.” That under
said contract the defendants advanced
iiioncys to the plaintiff on said ties, as
therein mentioned. and also on said posts
indiscriminately, to the aniount of $1,800.
The plaintiff replied to the counter-claim,
and denied each and every allegation there-
of. A jury being waived bythe pa1'ties,the
cause was tried by the court, and at the
conclusion the court found, as matters of
fact: (1) That, during the year 1887, the
defendants were copartners, doing busi-
ness in Door county, Wis.: (2) that Janu-
ary 27, 1887, the plaintiff and defendants
entered into the written contract of which
a copy is given above: (3) that prior to
March 18, 1887, the defendants had ad-
vanced to the plaintiff nndersaid contract
the sum of $900, and said plaintiff had
bought for said defendants about 6,000
ties, including culls; (4) that March 18,
1887. said plaintiff had on hand, belonging
to himself, about 6,000 cedar posts; (5)
that on March 18. 1887, the plaintiff was in
great need of funds to meet an obligation
to a third party then
der said contract, and posts at an &(1\’a,n¢e
of one-half centeach over the price paid ior '
them by the plaintiff; (6) that pursuant to
said agreement the plaintiff delivered to the
defendant 6,603 cedar posts of four different
sizes and prices. and which, at the in-i(;@,,
agreed upon for them, amountecl tn
$411.04: (7) that the plaintiff plll‘Cllt\fl(>|']
and delivered to the defendants, under
said written contract. 7,568 good ties,
amounting. at the contract pi'ice_ of $319
each, to $1,362.24: (3) that no [H'0fi'fB Wei-e
realized on the sale of said ties; (9) that
the plaintiff paid the sum of $33 for d0ck-
age on said cedar posts. but it docs not
appear that lie was aiithorizcd or l'@<lll@-<it-
cd to do so by said defendants. AB C011-
-lusions of law the court finds ' (1) That
. that the
pressing‘ him, and .
obtained from the defendants a. further ad- '
vance of $700, to be repaid in good ties, un- ‘
the plaintiff is entitled tojudg-mentagagnst
the defendants for the sum of $411.04 for
posts, and said sum Oi‘ $1,36g_24 for ties,
less the sum of $1,600, advanced as afore-
said, to-wit: for tlic sum of $173.27, with
interest from February 11, 1883, amounting
in the whole to $180.48, with costs, and
judgment was ordered to be entered there-
on accordingly. From the judgment so
entered the defendants bring this appeal.
Hamilton & Baclius, (Turner& Timlin,
of counsel.) for appellants. O. E. & Y. V.
Dreutzer, for respondent.
CASSO DAY, J., (after stating thefacts us
above.) It is claimed that the trial court
found a. balance due the plaintiff on the
counter-cluiin of the defendants, and not
upon the plaint.iff’s cause of action. The
compaint was for the proceeds of cedar
posts, as stated. The coun ter-claims were
for advances and payments made _onfiac-
count of the ties and fence posts indisc ni-
inately. The trial court found, in eff? ,
$900 was advanced upon the 1:1 9141-:
and the $700 on ties and posts, and Ygiefd
the proceeds of the ties and posts 190:1“ up
by the defendantsirom theplalntiff at; "3 28
ed, in the aggi-egafe, to $1.173-1*» °:d '
in excess of the moneys so advangf t-he ,s_
cannot hold that the mere form weave;--
sues precluded the plaintiff f1'i°‘:,‘0;- on ac-
ing the true balance in his 9* cc an
count of both ties and posts- u
considerably less than the aino
in thecomplaint. 1 he <}f‘"‘,‘Z,‘l§-~_
The principal contention 0 9 eoaw “\>i:\‘;_
ants is that the evidence fa.“ {,0 “Xe p\aae¢
the seventh finding of fact, 89 Dy \,@_\1‘\‘“,eo
her of “good ties” purchased ‘)fl"&3c,\“,;\ege\\\\
tiff, and delivered to the defefl 14? ea ‘“¢ 5\‘,\»<,
the writtencontractsetfortli. /05 , 9‘\\e “$6
that a large per cent. of the ‘flo\o~_o“e-
mentioned were culls, or reiefit § ' e 3. De as
not pass inspection in (‘hica§t,@§r '5“ ,3
was understood they xvere to 1 J‘ Dove;
were in fact sold by \l\v’m. iii? 9_g_e 9 ox.
as agents for and on acconnfi 2 9" ‘-0 “ o\
feiidants. ‘ 5 ” ’e‘\'\°€‘B,6°
The eviden e principally rel‘? »/1);‘, west“
the defendan s to prove that ‘J 4, Oi _9~;,°
cent. of the ties thus deliverc ff?’ § ,.p\"e Y3:
“Stood cedar ties. ” witliin the fr, 4/ 1* 6a“e
the contract. is a. written state f ? ‘K’,/;1""g,\9,
by Win. Ripley &- Sons. of a. ca £7’ 0 \g‘?>*'
i ties the;-einsaid to have aridvedfjy Z 449, ‘me-
April 18. 1ss7. by the vessel fit?‘/,1 4 0 e,,vB
Si_iiith,0n account of the deiendtlt 1, 611 yay.
other such statement rn ade byjhj 1/; 17¢“.
therein said to have arrived c 011/’, , ’4 1-vi U‘.
by the vessel Eliza. Day, on ac 94;‘ f / ‘, ow,‘
defendants. Neither of _thgI!ein g ’1 ’ ‘nil an
were sworn to. 1101‘ ‘ exlffie R‘ 16-_y 11- , ‘.7 lit K]
Neither of the 111"“ -oi ‘V “T. ' go!’ 7 1~‘/ ; -01‘-l
"":.;2.,%;*.;*‘::".*::.‘ 6;, ~ L.-.=»;;.,
er ])Ul'SOIl- 1 1) "
in either of those state(I)ltl whic 1’ I g'f,e be
contract contains nn-tH evidence‘ ¢ ’ 1,11?
make such mig(;iéteti)J';_eag_e“ts 0’ tn? I , 1/ / 1", 1
BtB.tPlI'lGll -H ' - - ible in ‘ ' ) K ‘E
.we\-e no inure adiniss ,4- , I _ 15/ C_ ,
ggltfb than }:'.ll(;‘i1"L(V)\\;:‘(;5ti?.g,§Eé€m;'e1;;7I 1 :11 1-.
were iiiei-0 O&\l"h“ _ . _ _ “ants ) ( 1 1 ”
e1'l.\' 1'ci"1'““1- l(l;eST‘I.1l‘;lf:1ll]\1l‘(\ for :3"; 11 f ‘i , 1 ‘Z
that thwe “.?fsl‘Iflt \\;hQ1f\lt¥l' a. given ‘.7 1 ‘
in Ciiii-.a,‘-'5";
_ action there
ty of t-193 Pflsfled map
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
06
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
HEAUSAY GE.NEHALLY EXCLUDED- [Cass No. 26 
A.NDERSON v. FETZER et al. 
'(44 N. W. 838, 7;; Wis. 562.) 
Supreme Court of \Visconsiu. Jan. 28, 1890. 
Appeal from circuit court, Door county; 
HAMUEL D. HASTING!!, Jr .. Jud~!'. 
the phtinttff ts entitled to Judgment against 
the defendants for "the lfum of $411.04 for 
posts. and 1.1ul<1 sum Of $1,962.24 for ties, 
less the sum of $1.600, advanced as afol'!'-
eald, to-wit: for the sum of $173.27, with 
interest from }'ellruary 11, 1883, amounting 
In the whole to $180.48, with costs, and judgment was ordered to be entered then'-
on accordingly. From the judgment 110 
entered the defendants bring this appeal. 
Harniltou & Bach11s, ( T11ri1er & Timlin, 
of counsel,) for appt>llnnts. O. E. & Y. V. 
Dreutzer, for respondent. 
This actton ts to recover $411.02, being 
the proceeds of 6,603 cedar po!!!tl! sold by 
the defendants on commtselou for the 
plaintiff. Thedefendantscounter-clnlmr<l, 
nnd allegf'cl. in effect, thut January 27, 1887, 
the plaintiff entered Into a contract in 
writing with the defendunte as follows: 
"Recelvt>d of Youngs & Fetlerftve hundred CASSODAY, J ., (after etatingthefacts ae 
dolla.re on account of ties now on hand on abovr.) It 18 claimed thnt the trial court 
Harrie dock, at Bay View, Door county. found a balance due the plnlnttft on the 
Said Youngs & Fetzer le to aclvance 1'~. N. counter-claim of the defenclante, and not 
Anderson at the rate of 18 cents on each upon the plo.lntlff'e cause of action. The 
good cedar tie bought by him, said tics to compalnt was for the proceeds of cedar 
be owned by said Younge & Fetzer; and poets, 88 stated. The counter-claims were 
when shipped all profits on said ties to be for advances and payments made on ac-
equally dl vtded between YoungK & Fetzer count of the tlesund fence poets lndlscrlm-
and 11atd E N. Anderson, said YoungK & lnately. The trial court round, In efft>et, 
Fetzer to furnish abo\•e amount on each that the $900 was o.dvanced upon the tleH. 
good tie, and said Anderson to do all nee- and the $7W on ties and posts, and ~bat 
eeeary labor in buying, shipping, etc., to the proceeds of the ties and po11t11 received 
olfllet the use of monry furnished by said bythedefendant~fromthephtlnttnamf73°Jg 
Youngs & Fetzer. Thrre ts up to date 3.625 ed, In theaggrrgate, to $1,773.~. o'!1 we 
i:e<lar ties on above dock. E . N. ANDER- In excess of the moneys eo ad vane f tbe 1s-
so:s. Bay Vle-w, Januery 27th, 1887. Ac- cannot hold that the mere form 0 ·ecover-
cepted. You:->os & FETZER." That under sues precluded the plaintiff from 1 on ac-
sald contract thA defendant.a advanced Ing the true balance in hte fav~.~ \t -we." 
moneys to the plaintiff on said ties, 1U1 count of both ties and posts. 8~t c\o.\'[l\e<\ 
therein mentioned, and also on said posts considerably less than theamou et ;0u· tndlscrlmtne.tel~-. to the a.mount of $1,800. In thecomplalnt. -t.\\e <\ ~o'"" 
·rhe plaintiff replled to thr count.er-elatm, The princlt>al contention of to "'~i ~~""• 
and dented each and every allegation there- nn te ts that the evidence ta.Off -t;o ~~e 9\s.lr;'t' 
of. A Jury being waived by the 11artles, the the seventh tlndlng of facli, e.e p:'f '-"'•~~"-"et\ 
cause was tried by the court, and at the her of "good ties" purchnsecl iJ:p.1-;e.c'~ei:e\" 
conclusion the court found, ae matters of tlff,an<l delivered to the l\eteJl ci:-t:.~ee \"l\ t\'\~~ 
fact: (1) That, during the year 1887, the thewrtttencontractsetforth. -c:;.iJ •!i\'\ei:e 1'\~ 
defendants were copartnere. doing buel- that a large per cent. of the e 0,~·~-0"'' 
neu In Door county, Wis.: (2) that Janu- mentioned were culls, 01· re\eC~~ • ~ /5- -00 ~er 
ary ZT, 1887, the plaintiff and defendants not pass tmipectton In <:'h\cs.n ~-:/: "-~ 
ent.ered Into the written contract of which WWI understood they "'1'ere to t; ~~· o\\- 'O!~ 
a copy ts gt ven above: (3) that 1>rior to were in fact sold by Wm. mt' ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 'V 
March 18, 1887, the defendants had ad- a.e ugents tor and on acco·uuil /...,._ p-~ "'e. ~ o\ 
vanced to the plaintiff undersald contract femlirnts. r-- ~ .,Je \~""'0-~e 
the sum of $000, and said plaintiff bad The evtden~e · principally re\t ~ p.·"1' ~ ~c\\ 
bought for ea.Id defendants about 6,000 I the defendants to prove that :) ~ ~ ..c; (,\\I> ~'IP 
ties, Including culls; (4) that March 18, \cent. of the ties thue dellvere ~~~ _.\'\C~ \:\· 
181$7, said plaintiff had on hand, belonging "good cedar ties," -within the~-;;£ L./~~ ~0-\\'" 
to himself, about 6,000 cedar posts; (5) I the contract. le a written eta.te .-_#"-7~ -.~J'~ t\e'! 
that on March 18, 1887, the plalntlffwae tn by Wm. Ripley & Sons. ot a ca. ,_ ~ 0 \S°''' 
great need of funds to meet an obllgatton ; ties thereln1mld to have arrived'!'."~~ ---6~ \ tlle 
to a third party then pressing him, and : April 18, 1887, by the VeRHel ..... -,.;;~ ~:;. 0 i\ts 
-Obtained from thedefendanb1 a ·furtherad- l Smith,onaccouutofthede'fenda .. p.~ ~ ~~••'e o.!i· 
vance of $700, to be repaid In ~ood ties, un- i other such stnt{>men t in a.de hy t; "J ~ ~~ ~~ ~11 ~i\• 
dersaid contract,und postH atan a<h·a.nce 1 therein said to have arrived J~._.~ • :'0 t\\' 
of one-bulf cente.ach over the price paid for .
1 
by the vesHel Eliza. Day• on ace e-t;; ~~ ~, O ed themb~·theplalnttff; (6)thatpursnunt to defend1mts. Neither ?f -~~~n ~ ~~;f~jf~ell 
aaldagreementtheplalntlffdelivererltothe were sworn to, nor 'er1 ieY ~ -1 t; \O defe11dant6,608cedarpo1.1tHorfourdlff~·rent 1 Neither or the fir1n of 'Vm. Rt~,7 •• ~:II~ >.ci.1 1 
sises and priceH and which at the JlrlceH 1 nor uny one tn their employ, e ~ .....,. c~_,c 
8'{reed upon for them, ~mountPrl 1:n ; er J1l•r11on. teHUfled to the fact.!}peJ:._ ef'lCI 
$411.04: (7) tha.t the plulntftr purchaHerl fneltherorthose sta.t.eni1e~~s. wb"i~ ~< pt: 
and delh·ered to the defrncluntH, nn<Ier contract contains ll'\t 1 e';ldence- '-.._ :l~~J•"" 
11ald written contract, 7,56H good tieH, make such Htntem_en ~nts of t:J=-.e 1,. ~ ,-_,_._. 7 1 
8monntlng, at the contract price of $.18 etatrments made b~ cft~iHsible in -.::; -. , ~ ~4:~ 
each, to Sl,362.24: (8) that no profits "VVere ants were no ntore n. Kt.a tcmen "t:"f"4 - • ,, I --1:/ i L 
realized on the sale of said ties; (ll) that half thnn their <>'"~~ul iience V\~e~~ ... •-. -t. -~ 
the plaintiff 11ald the Kum of •a:J for dock- ·ere 1111'1'(' hen rHU.Y • l t u '::: - • ~, _ .., :.-. _.., 
... w d 'l'he clefPn• nn s , ._.... - ,. ~
8ge on said cedar posts, but it doPR not erlv rejPcte · "tnnclnrd for g~ a"6. .z -. • 
"ppear that he "\\·a11 anthorlzN1 or requ<"~t- thi1t tl1t·re wnFI no "'~bether a gh~ey1 a<.-7 . ._- ~ 
ed to do so by said deft>ndnntR. AH con- In ('l1kni.to; tltu t "inspection there 
•lustone of Jaw the court ttmltJ · (1) That ty of ties pnel'eu 
Case No. 26]
RELEVANCY.
depended very much upon the supply nnd
demand; that at times perfectly good ties
were classed as inferior in that market, and
at other times the reverse: that a good
tie in Door county meant a tie of certain
dimensions and sound. Their proofs fail
to show that the ties delivered fell below
that standard. They were not kept sepa-
rately in Chicago, but piled in with others.
The written contract states that there
were 3,625 on the dock at the time it was
made. The defendants saw them at the
S0
time. There is evidence to the effect that
when the advances were made, March 18,
1887, there were some 6,000 ties on the
dock, open to the inspection of the defend-
ants: that all the bad ties were thrown
out before shipment; and that the plain-
tiff delivered thenumber of good ties found
by the court. Upon the evidence in the
record, we would not he lustified in dis-
turbing the seventh, nor any, of the find-
ings of the trial court. 'I‘he judgment of
the circuit court is affirmed.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
06
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Case No. :.!6] RELEVANCY. 
depended very much upon the supply and 
demand; that at tlml'ff perfectly good ties 
wereclaeeed as tnferlorln that market, and 
nt other times the reverse: that a good 
tte In Door county meant a tie of ct'rtaln 
dlmenslone ancl sound. Their proofH fall 
to show that the ties dellvered fell below 
that standard. They were not kept sepa-
rately In Chicago, but plied ln with others. 
The written contract states that there 
wen' 8,625 on the dock at the time It was 
mad.,_ The defendants saw them at the 
so 
time. There IR evidence to the elft>Ct that 
when the advanct'R were made. March 18, 
lAAi, there were some 6,000 ties on the 
do<·k, open to the lIIBpectlon of the defend-
ants: that all the bad th'H were thrown 
out before shipment: and that the plain-
tiff delh·ered the number of good ties found 
by the court. Cpon the e\·ldenee ln the 
re<•ord, we would not be Justified in dis-
turbing the seventh, nor any, of the flnd-
ln~ of the trial court. The judgment of 
the circuit court la affirmed. 
HEARSAY GEN ERA LLY EXCLUD El).
[Case No. 27
OSKALIP et 8.]. V. GADSDEN.
(52 N. ‘V. 718, 35 Neb. 7.)
supreme Court of Nebraska. June 11, 1892.
Error to district court, Douglas county;
Olarkson, Judge.
Action by Clemens Oskamp and others
llgninst James Gadsden for damages for the
alleged breach of a contract to deliver a
quantity of hay. Verdict and judgment for
defendant. Plaintiffs bring error. Aiiirmed.
Isaac Adams. for plaintiiis in error. Rich-
mond & Legge, for defendant in error.
NORVAL, J. Plaintitfs in error brought
suit in the court below to recover damages
for the alleged breach of contract by the
defendant in his refusing to deliver a quan-
tity of hay claimed to have been purchased
by them from him. The jury returned a
verdict for defendant, upon which judgment
was entered.
In 1888 plaintiffs were engaged in the city
of Omaha in the flour, teed, grain, and hay
business. Defendant resided at Schuyler,
and had about 150 tons of hay which he de-
sired to sell. Prior to the middle of April
of that year plaintifls and defendant had
some correspondence about the purchase and
sale of this hay, but no contract was en-
tered into at that time.
called at the telephone om“. 1,, Schuyler’
and requested the op€I‘1lt°l' to call up plain-
tiffs, as he desired to talk to them. Plain-
tlfls have a telephone In their oflice, and
Mr. Haines, one of the firm, answered the
call, but, owing to the condition of the at-
mosphere, the line was not working well. so
that the parties were unable to communicate
directly with each other. 'i‘he telephone
operator at Fremont, an intermediate sta-
tion between Omaha and Schuyler, proposed
to and did transmit defendant's message to
plaintiffs, and repeated their answer to the
defendant. The entire conversation was
carried on through the assistance of the
operator at Fremont. she repeating the mes-
. sage of each party. It is agreed that a con-
tract was entered into at that time by tele-
phone, but there is a conflict in the evidence
as to its terms. The plaintiffs introduced
testimony tending to show that defendant
sold his entire lot of hay at $8.25 per ton on
track in Omaha, to be shipped two 0&1‘
loads per day. On the other hand, the testi-
mony oi? the defendant goes to show that
plaintiffs’ proposition contained in their let‘
. (1-
. ter of May 2d was not accepted by dew“
On May 1, 1888, de- ,
tendant sent the following letter to plain- i
tih's: “Oskamp, Haines & Co., Omaha, Ne-
braska—Gentlemen :
pressed hay now? Mine is still for sale, it I
can get as much as others are getting. 1
would rather close out the entire amount at
once it I can flnd a. eustomer, and will give
the use of my barn till July 1-ith, it buyer
wants to speculate. There is scarcely any
hay left here. Some on the prairie will not
Vi-'ha1 is your price for ‘
be hauled this season on account oi‘ bottoms ‘
being covered with water.
Yours, truly,
James Gadsden."
in answer to the above,
plaintifls wrote defendant as follows:
“Omaha, May 2d, 1888. Mr. James Gadsden,
Schuyler, Neb.-Dear Sir: Answering yours
of the 1st, the market seems to be glutted
\
1
l
i
v
Y
\
now with hay. Have bought some at $7.75 :
on truck since we bought that of yours.
you want to sell now, and mean business,
we will give you $8.25 per ton on track here,
if it is all -like the cars we had; but we do
not leave this ofler open longer than Satur-
day, but we prefer acceptance by wire, as
we are figuring upon 800 tons at a trifle bet-
ter price, sample car now coming, and, 11
we get that all, have got to crowd the mu;-_
ket here. Have about 140 tons bought now,
and would not want yours at any price with
that large lot. VVe would not take the risks
of your barn an hour, and you could ship it
all as fast as you plellfie. having storage 1'01-
500 tons. Our full storage capacity here is
1,000 tons. Now. about weights, you can
have any one wcigll It 119119 lifter tcstini: our
track scale, or we will pay you by the bale,
Oskamp & Haines." On May 7th defendant
wn.ous,nv.—O
Iii
only two
y werli
Sn"
ant, but that the contract was f0!‘
car loads. 'i‘wo car loads of hay °“:
shipped to and received by plalflflfl"
sequently defendant brought M‘
against plaintiffs to recover for 8”
Q
1-
loads of hay, in which Gadsden
the full amount claimed, whl(‘n
plaintiffs in error have paid. ii
The burden was upon the plfllflf
tablish the contract and breach 0
substantially as alleged by then!’ ,1‘ ’ e ‘
passed upon the conflicting tes“(1‘ 0°” *2
by the verdict found that the te ‘7 t/,9 .)
contract respecting the quantity 41:31 ‘
sold were as claimed by the detc1“4/ 113,0
are satisfied that there is not 9‘ 1 4/
ponderance of the evidence in the’
favor as to justify us in distnrbiil /I?)
lng. '“ ,
Error is assigned liecuuse tho 00" 1 I
ted the testimony oi! the (lvfvllllilllf 4' 44"’ 1
conversation over the telephone ll?‘
witness and i\ir. Haines, one of
tiffs, as repeated over the wirl‘ r
Cummings, the telephone opera“? i
inout. It is contended that the W5
the witness of what the operuivxi.
to hini as the conversatio_n 1>1'f’:i~P
being mid by Mr. Ilaines 1s irlt 6
hearsay. The question thus plc_f-ire
Y‘
new one to this court, nnd tliicle i 11
decided cases which aid. us 11._‘l"‘N H»
tion. But upvll l"'““.nfl0 -‘ttS(:‘\ll(l itf‘ t
flw wsmnony is c0n‘pPtf‘ n>\".i(lcn<-§._ I
5km ‘violated no rule. O (IL of ill!-§(‘.'ll('
aduiissiblc on the I-I1 Ouvgs the M=(.;;t
0w_,.nt<>r at 1<~1-@1n011t_ Yin“ defendant-
f‘*nd‘mtIiInicommunk a I S also the
gage to a nos. _ -
- 1
fisvczrt tii1n<:r¢telt{1l>mt’rl.>l I defendant-
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HEARSAY GE~ElULLY EXCI.UDED. [Case No. 2'1 
OSKAMP et al . .,, GADSDE~. 
(52 N. W. 718, 35 Neb. 7.) 
Snpreme Court of Nebraska. June 11, 1892. 
Error to district court, Douglas county; 
Clarkson, .Judge. 
Action by Clemens Oekamp and others 
against James Gadsden for damages for the , 
alleged breach of a contract to deliver a 
quantity of bay. Verdict and judgment for 
defendant. Plaintiffs b1'1ng error. Attlrmed. 
I1111ac Adams, for plaintiffs In error. Rich-
mond & Legge, for defendant In error. 
called nt the teleph1>ne O/llce Jn Schuyler, 
and reque11ted the opentto1• to cull up plain-
tiffs, as he desired to talk to them. Plain-
tiffs have a telephone Jn their otHce, and 
Mr. Haines, one of the firm, answered the 
call, but, owing to the condition of the at-
mosphere, the line was not working well, llO 
that the parties were unable to communicate 
directly with each other. The telephone 
operator at l<'remont, an Intermediate sta-
tion between Omaha and Schuyler, proposed 
to and did transmit defendant's me881lge to 
plaintiffs, and repeated their answer to the 
defendant. The entire conversation was 
NORVAL. J. Plaintiffs In error brought carried on through the assistance of the 
suit In the <..>ourt below to recove1· damages operator at Fremont, she repeating the mes-
tor the alleged breach of contract by the sage of each party. It le ugreed that a con·' 
defendant In his refusing to deliver a quan- tract was entered Into at that time by tele-
tlty of hay claimed to have been purchased phone, but there le a condlct ln the evidence 
by them from him. The jury returned a ' as to Its terms. The plaintiffs Introduced 
verdict for defendant, upon which judgment testimony tending to show that defendant 
was entered. sold hie entire lot of hay at $8.2:i 1ier ton on 
In 1888 plalntUl's were enl{llged In the city track ln Omaha, to be shlp11ed two car 
of Omaha In the flour, feed, gmln, and hay 1 loads per day. On the other baud, the testl-
buslneee. Defendant resided at ~ebuyler, mony of the deff'ullant goes to show that 
and had about 150 tons of hay whkll be de- plaintiffs' proposition t·ontnlned ln their le~­
alred to sell. Prior to the middle of April ter of May 2d wnH not 1u·cepted by defen ~ 
of that year plalntUrs and defendant bud ant, but that the t·ontnwt was for only twre 
some correspondenC"e about the purchase und • car loads. Two eur loalls of haY on~t ~~b­
sale of this bay. but no contract was en- shipped to and n•t·elved by plliintUI · 0 cnon 
tered Into at that time. On May 1, 1888, de- arequently defendant brought ~: t.v<O c~:~ 
fPndant sent the following letter to plain· against plaintiffs to recover for - -reco.;e~ ut. 
tilrs: "Osknmp. Haines & Co., Omaha, ~e- loads of bay, In which GndsdeP :)~n\!.~e 
bra1:1kn--Oentlemen: \\'hut Is your price for the full amount claimed, wh\Cp \O e!I¥" 
pressed hay now? Mine ls still for sale, If I plaintiffs In error have lmld. .-.-t.\~~e ~~~ 
can get as much as others are getting. I '.fhe burden was upon the \llf\\ -I'- ~):~e \'O:"'u~ 
would rather close out the entire amount at tablh~h the contract and breacb ~ 0 1>--s' ~ 'l.'f:>e 
ont.'e If I can find a eustomer, and will gh·e substantially as alleged by theJJl·\ ••"> ,_j§. 0 ~9-"'.l 
the use of my barn till July 14th, If buyer passed upon the conftktinJt test ,._.. "-~~ ~e 
wants to speculate. There Is scnrcely any by the verdict found that the tC' '7 ~ ..,-., 1> ·>). V"'~i, 
hay left here. 8ome on the prairie will not contract respe<•tlng the qunn.t\ty ".,. ,.-. s:t-\"'"'"\¢1}~ 
be hauled this eea8<m on at•1·ount or bottoms sold were as elnlmed by the (\eft'J .. • ~ 7 -. \.">e ~ 
being ('O\'ered with water. Yours, truly, are satlstled that there la not ~t. ~ ..,, ~\V 
.James Gadsden." In answer to the above, pondemnce of the evldenc-e ln tl1e ~ .P.~ \~e 
plaintiffs wrote defendant as follows: 1 favor as to justify us ln disturb\!> ~ ~ \.~ \\,c . 
"Omaha, May 2d, 1888. Mr .• James Gadsden, : Ing. ._, ~ • 'F-~C :\~\\' 
Schuyler, Neb.-Dear Sir: Answt>rlng ;\'ours 1 Error is aBBlgnNl bt•(•nuMe th" t~ ~.....- 9 ~\~· 
of the let, the market St>ems to be glutted • ted the testimony of tlu~ deft.~udt\11 t:: .- - P " >'.f~' .. { 
now with hay. Have bought some at $7.75 : convt"rsatlon over the t:Plephone ~ -t:: --~ ,,,;:Jr -t:;;- .; (l 
on track since we bought that of yourl'I. It ; witness and Mr. Haines, one of . ~ r ~ JJ-,t,''\ 
you want to sell now, and wean hm!lness, tl!Ts. as repeated over the w\r(> .,:- .__ -'1J-~·~~ :\S 
we will give you $8.2:; per ton on track here, . Cummings, the tt-lt>phone opertth7 -C::. f ,_~, ~ ~·' i,111\ 
It Jt Is all lJke the care we had; but we <lo . mont. It ls couh•nded tbnt the te~ .,,_. _s. ~ " · S l\ 
not leave this ofl'er open longer than Sa.tur- the wltne11s of what the operator -L?".,.. -16~. ~e'" 
day, but we prefer acceptance by wire, as to him 11s the conversu. tlon pro~~ ....... ~ • _ '--- .;::;. · · ,. 
we are figuring upon 800 tons at a t11fle bet- being 1mld hy Mr. Haines la ln·d,-~ -C. ~ 11--_,,_ t · U~a t 
ter price, 11UlllJ1le car now coming, uud, It hearsn~·. The qUPRtion thus prPS'-" ·-~ ._.~~ I'. J1.l:. 
we get that nil, have got to crowd the n1ar- new one to this court, and th<>re are~~ ~ ~J JI•·· 
ket here. Have about 140 tons bought now. decided <'HllE'H whl<'l• uh.l us in our 10 ._, , '# ,.-.:•~ 
and would not want yours at any prieP with tlou. But upon priueiph.• it ~wPJllH !t~ s• ,.~- 114:~ 
that large lot. \Ve would not take the risks thP tP>1tl111ony is eonipPtl'nt .. nncl .• 1 · ~ ~ 4 J 4: ·-
f ba b d I,, 11 I I l t d no rule of evulen< I . - __. - -o your man our, an you cou u s 1 I> t slon ,. o u e 1 of ni.wnc·~ - ~ ~ .:-
all tu1 fast as you please, having storage :for . admhuliblP on the J.trounl tlle U"PU. t e7 ,-. 6 • -· ;:-.:. 
.. -"" f 11 t It h I , t L• • •1uont '\YRS ... - r4 ~ -5uu tons. Our u s orage cnpac Y ere s , 01wmtor a r H 1 • i.tln~ dl'femlu 11 t _ ~ -6 . •• -l,000 tons. Now, about weights, you can fendnnt In co111nnin c.:t · 1 th~ :J·• .z• _..__ I h I I nd slle '\YtlS n so J-= ~ ,_..--ha\·e any one weigh t ere after test n~ out· sage to Haines. 11 r reportlu~ JJ. • · ~ .... 
rrack S<·ale, or we wlll pay you by the bale. I agent In trammiittin~ d~t. . The bOol' ~~ 
Oskamp & Haines." On :Uay 7th defendant awer thereto to def en 
WILGUB,BY ....... 
Case No. 27]
RELEVANCY.
evidence, as well as the adjudicated cases,
lay down the rule that the statements of an
agent within the line of his authority are ad-
missible in evidence against his principal.
Likewise, it has been held that, where a
conversation is carried on between persons
or dii'ferent nationalities through an inter-
preter, the statement made by the latter at
the time the conversation occurred as to
what was then said by the parties is coin-
petent evidence, and may be proven by call-
ing persons who were present and heard it.
This is too well ettled to require the cita-
tion of authorities.
stronger "easons for holding the statement
made by the operator and testified to by de-
fendant is admissible than in the case of an
interpreter. Both Haines and defendant
heard and understood the operator at Fre-
mont, and knew what she was aying, or at ,
least could have done so. Each knew
whether his message was being correctly
repeated to the other by the operator. Not
so where persons converse through an in-
terprctcr. If the testimony objected to was
incompetent, and hearsay, then the testi- '
mony of Haines, relating to the same con-
versation, should, for the same reason, have
been excluded. He did not hear what de- '
fendant said, but testiiied to what the oper-
ator reported as having been said. The
operator at Fremont was not the agent of
the defendant alone, but she was plaintiffs’
agent in repeating their answer to defend-
ant's message. That conversations held
through the medium of telephone are admis-
sible as evidence in proper cases cannot be
doubted. Such have been the holdings of
the courts in cases where the question has I
been before them. In a criminal case—Peo-
ple v. Ward, 3 N. Y. Cr. R. 483—lt was held
that, where a witness testifles that he con-
versed with a particular person over the
telephone, and recognized his voice, it was
competent for him to state the communica-
tion which he made. In Wolfe v. Railway
Co., 97 Mo. 473, 11 S. W. 49, it was ruled
that if the voice is not identified or recog-
nized,- but the conversation is held through
a telephone kept in a business house or of-
82
I tlce, it is admissible;
There are certainly ;
the effect or weight
of such evidence, when admitted, to be de-
termined by the jury. See Printing Co. v.
Stahl, 23 Mo. App. 451.
A case quite analogous to the one at bar
is Sullivan v. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483. In
that case the partie did not have conversa-
tion directly with each other over the tele-
phone, but conversation was conducted by
1 an operator in charge of a public telephone
station at one end of the linc. It was held
that the conversation was admissible in evi-
dence, and that it was competent for the
person receiving the message to state what
; the operator at the time reported as being
said by the sender. The court in the opin-
ion say: "When one is using the telephone,
if he knows that he is talking to the opera-
tor, he alo knows that he is making him an
agent to repeat what he is saying to an-
other party; and in such a case certainly
the statements of the operator arc compe-
tent, being the declarations of the agent,
and made during the progress of the trans-
action. If he is ignorant whether he is
talking to the person with whom he wishes
to communicate or with the operator, or
even any third party, yet he does it with the
expectation and intention on his part that,
in case he is not talking with the one for
whom the information is intended, it will be
communicated to that person; and he there-
by makes the person receiving it his agent
to communicate what he may have said.
This should certainly be the rule as to an
operator, because a person using a telephone
knows that there is one at each station,
whose business it is to so act; and we think
that the necessities of a growing business
require this rule, and that it is sanctioned
by the known rules of evidence.” Our con-
clusion is that the court did not err in ad-
mitting the testimony of the defendant.
fusing certain instructions requested by
plaintiif, but. as they raise the same ques-
tion we have been considering, the objec-
tions will be overruled without further com-
" ment. The judgment below is aflirmed.
3 The other judges concur. -
‘ It is claimed that the court erred in re _
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Caae No. 27] RELEVANCY. 
evidence, as well aa the adjudicated casea, flee, It 18 adml88lble; the effect or weight 
lay down the rule that the statements of an of 11uch evidence, when admitted, to be de-
agent within the line of his authority are ad- termlned by the jury. See Printing Co. v. 
ml11Slble In evidence against bis principal. Stahl, 23 Mo. App. 451. 
Likewise, It has been held that, where a A case quite analogous to the one at bl1.r 
con\·ersatlon ls carried on between persons ls Sullivan v. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483. In 
of different nationalities through an Inter- that case the parties did not have conversa-
preter, the statement made by the latter at tlon directly with each other over the tele-
the time the conversation occurred as to phone, but conversation was conducted by 
what was then said by the parties ls com· an opt>mtor In char..,-e of a public telephone 
petent evJdence, and may be proven by call· station at one end of the line. It was held 
lng persons who were present and beard lt. that the conversation was admissible In evl-
Tbls ls too well settled to require the clta- dence, and that It was competent for the 
tlon of authorities. There are certainly person n><>elvlng the me&Bage to state what 
stronger '"e&Sons for holding the statement • the operator at the time reported as being 
made by the operator and testified to by de- said by the sender. The court In the opln-
fendant ls admlBSJble than In the <·ase of an Ion say: "Whell one l8 using the telephone, 
Interpreter. Both Haines and defendant It be knows that he ls talking to the opera-
heard and understood the operator at Fre- tor, be al80 knows that he ls making him an 
moot, and knew what she was saying, or at agent to repeat what be ls saying to an-
least could have doue so. Each knew other party; and In such a case certainly 
whether hl8 message was being correctly the statements of the opemtor are compe-
repeated to the other by the operator. Not tent, being the declarations of the agent, 
80 where persons converse through an In- and made during the progress of the trans-
terpreter. If the testimony objected to was action. If he ls Ignorant whether he ls 
Incompetent, and hearsay, then the testi- talking to the person with whom be wishes 
mony of Haloes, relating to the same con- to communlcate or with the operator, or 
versatlon, should, tor the same reason, have even any third party, yet be does It wlth the 
been excludt.'<I. He did not hear what de- expectation and Intention on his part that, 
fendant Bald, but testified to what the oper- In case he ls not talking with the one fOI' 
at.or repor.ted as having been said. The I whom the Information ls Intended, It will be 
operator at Il'remont was not the agent of j communicated to that person; and he there-
the defendant alone, but she waa plaintiffs' I by makes the person receiving It his agent 
agent In repeating their answer to defend- 1 to communicate what he may have said. 
ant's me888ge. That convel'll8.tlons held This should certainly be the rule as to an 
through the medium ot telephone are admla- J operator, because a person using a telephone 
sible as evidence In proper cases cannot be knows that there ls one at each station. 
doubted. Such have been the boldlng11 of whose business It ls to 80 act; and we think 
the com-ts In cases where the question bas I that the neceesltles of a ,;rowing business 
been bet01-e them. In a criminal case-Peo- require this rule, and that It Is sanctioned 
pie v. Ward, 3 N. Y. Cr. R. 483-lt was held by the known rules of evidence." Our con-
that, where a wltne88 testifies that he con- cluslon 18 that the court did not err ln ad-
versed with a particular person over the witting the testimony of the defendant. 
telephone, and recognized hie voice, It was It 18 clalnied that the court erred In re. 
competent for him to state the comruunlca- fusing certain Instructions requested by 
tlon which he made. In Wolfe v. Railway plalnttff, but, as they rnllll' the same ques-
Oo., 97 Mo. 473, 11 S. W. 49, It was ruled tlon we have been considering, the objec-
that If the voice 18 not Identified or recog- tlons will be overruled without further com-
.med,. but the conversation ls held through ; ment. The judgment below is afftrmed. 
a telephone kept In a business house or of· : The other judges concur. 
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ADMISSIONS.
[Case N0. 28
PROCTOR V. OLD COLONY R. C0.
(28 N. E. 13, 154 Mass. 251.)
Supi-cine Judicial Court of Massuchiietta.
Barnstable. June 29, 1891.
Exceptions from superior court, Barn-
stubie county : ROBERT C. PITMAN, Judge.
Action by Joseph L. Proctor against
the Old (‘oloiiy Railroad L‘-ompany for
damages for i-ietting back fresh water up-
on his premises. ’l‘he evidence tended to
show that \Vh9ll the road was built the
waters of a creek were discharged from
the premises by a stone culvert. After-
wards the culvert was filled, and a drum
substituted. Defendant offered evidence
tending to showthat the change had been
made at the request of plaintiffs grantor.
'l‘he plaintiff testified that he had had
numerous conversations with the ofiicers
oftiiecoinpany as to his damages. He l
was then asked the following questions:
“(l) Whether or not, at any time, any l
denial of iiahility has been made by de-
fendant or any of its officers. (2) Whether K
or not, in these interviews, the officers
ever referred to any agreement by you or
your graiitor about handling the water
through a drum. (3) When did you first
hPi1l'.li at all, that the company denied
liability"! (4) \\'liether or not the coni-
pziny or its oflicers ever denied your right
to have a culvert at this point.” The
court excluded these questions on the
ground that the conversations, and not
the inferences or understanding of plain-
tiff.wcre adniissible. Plaintiff also offered
to prove that when he called on the pres-
ident of the company about his claim he
was referred to Judge Harriman, the
president saying. “ We want to leave it to ‘
our attorney. Judge Harriman,” and that
after examining plaintiffs books and evi-
dence Judge I-Iarrimau stated that acer-
tain sum of money was due plaintiff.
The court refused this offer. Afterwards
the defendant's superintendent testified l
that the company and plaintiff had agreed
to refer the claim to Judge Harriiiinn;
and after the testimony was closed plain-
tiff formally offered to show this agree-
ment, which consisted of letters. but the
court excluded it as not rebutting. There
was a verdict and judgnicnt for defend-
ant, and plaintiff brings exceptions.
Charles F. Ghnnibcrlayrle, for plain tiff.
J. H. Benton, Jr., and G. F. Clwate, J1-,,
for defendant.
C. ALLEN,J. The plaintiff testified that
he had numerous interviews with thy
president, general manager, and division
superintendent of the defendant company
concerning his damages caused by the
setting back of the waters of Bridge Creek
upon his premises. and then sumrht to
allow that in the discussions which took
place between him and them they did not
deny the defendant’s liability for damages,
There was no obiection on the g_'r0und
that these officers were not authorized to
speak for the defendant upon the Sllbjegty
but the court excluded the queB_fl0nB on
the ground that the coliversntlvnfl. and
not the inferences or understamlinl; Of the
plaintiff, were admissible. it seems to us
that this was too narrow a. view 0! the
matter. If, in point 0! I'M-¢,t1,e dpf9n¢1_
ant’s ofiicers, in diacufl-‘ilng fl“: plg1nfiff'5
claim for damages vvifh him, did not deny
the defendant's liability for damages, the
omission to make such denial might be
considered by the jury. It would be in
the nature of an admission, subject, of
course, to be explained. but competent
and proper to bc laid before the j_ury.
This is not like cases where a party ls B0
situated that no inference can be drawn
from his silence. when a statement is
made in his presence. Com. v. Kenney, 12
Metc. (Mass.) 235; Com. v. Harvey, 1 Gray,
487. lfa party is so situated that he is
not called upon to say anything, and does‘
not say anything. his silence, under such
circumstances. is not to be taken as fur-
nishinguiiy ground foran inference that he
thereby made any admission. But in the
. case at bar there was evidence tending to
show that the plaintiff had presented to
the defeiidant‘s ofiiccrsa claim for dain-
ages. and that the matter was under dis-
cussion at different. interviews. If, undell'
these circumstances, they made no _denlfl
of the defendant’:-i liability while d1§¢\1‘"S|;
ing the subject, the fact of such oiniss ‘ov
nilglli properly be considered by the bitlilt-1*
It does not amount to an estoppeh esflon
is evidence as beai-int: uilo" the ‘whm, is
to be deteriilined. It is conducgi .
in the nature of an admission. em
discussion the defendants um‘;
iio pretense that the defendfln
liable. Parsons v. Martin, 11
Pray v. Stcbbins, 141 Mass. 21 '_ U6 ‘on go
N. E. Rep. en; Hayes v. Kelley ,n\ee‘“,,.\s\\
300. It is somewhat like an 11°
'-15. A
9 ¢“"’§ie@°-
of cg) ‘\‘e“e?
testify, or to produce books, _ c, an
explanations, when called OTQ75 ’“1\"-“‘£\\‘1-
\Villtlh?fV v. Bll_\’i(.‘y, 4 Allen. _ 11 1\v\;.,,\Bi~_
v. Gleason, 125 Mass. lee. its-‘)0 v}c“.., co‘,
v.‘ lfichols. 116 Mass. :)21 ', Mc 4, ;,¢:\0x\ “cw-_
O Mel. 113 Mass. 92. hldrirlge , e 6 \\0~.~
115 Mass. 410. The presiiiing 1;’ ’{,(\ ‘°“,e=§$
pears to have excluded the" q‘ 4%} ‘ 0° <§\\_\e\
the ground that the coii verso ‘, (‘:8-6 '0‘ \,e
selves, when testified to. W ¢7‘)%\0\;\¢ “W
wiietller or not the (.1('3iGl\(i{1Il\.'r‘i¢-¢ ‘g ax _‘__"\x\
nied that the defendant was la; , ‘)3 ¢e\\e 0
would he so if there wei'e a cf f/$240 @\\\_
conversation. the Wh‘“° U‘ Wm /*7 £>“e 9\‘
given. But, where there inn" 4 ; U gee
incrous interviews wvlth diff9l'€“‘a {,5 ‘\\\‘£$'e
is not to be supposed that th 6‘ Ii U‘ til
every conversation_ can be gig ga $3 {he
such case the Dlfilnflfl 0"?!“ of? 1 f ,4’ we
lowed to testify, once for alli of?’ 1‘) ‘ cum.
at any time was there a denia-W /f , 4 yflofls.
The practical qllf‘-="»“’n is’ -h“ 0% § iiiwcd
result be reached of 5;?-‘ttlifg ‘I6 K10 rill
im-_v the fact that no suite‘. H, W , V ‘, I] “W
made? It sgfirtlcasri tboy‘t?\’eu\‘i1iil of 97‘ 1/, 4 y-7' ‘lie
stances prefl 11 , y , , -
the plaintiff Ought ‘_"°t h:ev(f‘o::_e ¢ r ‘I f ; es-#1
to answer the fin! ' ut to hi lit 1 ‘V9’;
questions which ygefgblié to pres? II _‘,; /If -rill“
couiisei,so as to 9] ‘nu that tn 1 f 1' inc
1'"-"' dismwuy bisicl: of liability» f‘) 9 (11"
had been aI!1l.¥h‘_1e‘;:, aproper to call ti 5, ‘s"_l "1
of course e _ flung; I - ;
whee “":.‘;:;:.*:*... .....r-.'.1 .. 1 1:.
it is not to be 9“pp lnintlff slim" ¢/"_ g 1 1
tea the ll l ,-9 ; 1
can bellregszfil tO,fiSl{ the» gentetriul‘ (1 11 Q4 2 1 Z
been a 0 Ti‘? i 1'\ >
which was excluded _ - I
, is only slsnlfiw"
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AD.MIBSIONS. [Cue No. SS 
PROCTOR T. OLD COLONY R. CO. 
(28 N. E. 18, lM Mau. ~1.) 
Supreme J"udlcial Court of MAAMl\l'husetta. 
Barnstable. June 29, 1891. 
Exr.eptlons from superior court, Barn-
atuble conn ty; ROBERT c. PITM.\S, Judge. 
Action by J naeph L. Proctor ngatnst 
the Old Colony Railroad Company for 
damage11 for Hetttnir: back fresh water up-
on bis premlseH. 'fhe evtclence tended to 
•how that when the ru1td wu built the 
"'atel'B of a cn>ek were d18charge<I from 
the premises by a stone culvert. After-
wards the col vert was filled, and a drum 
aulultltuted. Defendant offered evidence 
tending to show that the chnnge had been 
made at the request of plaintiff's grantor. 
The plalntlft testified that he bad had 
numeroua con versatton11 with thP olHcent 
or the compan.v as to bis damaget1. He 
was then asked the following que11tlons: 
•(I) WhPther or not, at nny time, any 
denial of Hahllity ha11 been made by de-
fendant or any of ttB oftlcera. (2) Whether 
or not, In these Interviews, the ofHeere 
ever referred to any agreement by you or 
your grftntor at.bout handling the water 
tbrongb a drum. (8) When did you llrat 
b1>ar, If at all. thut the coir.pany denied 
llublllty•t (4J "'bether or nut the com-
pany or tta omce.1'8 ever denletl your rlir:ht 
to hove a colvert at thlR point." The 
wort exclul1ed these questions on the 
around that the eonveraattons, and not 
the lnftirencea or understanding of platn-
tllf, were admlsatble. Plaintiff also offered 
to provt1 that when he called on the pres. 
ldAot of tbe company about bis claim he 
wu referred to Judge Harriman, the 
preatdent sayln1t. "We want to leave It to 
our attorney.Judge Harriman," and that 
after examining phdnttff's books and evi-
dence Judge Ht.trrlmau stated that acer-
tain sum or money was due plaintiff. 
The court refused this oner. Aftfarwarda 
the defendant's snperlratPndent testified 
that the company a11d plRlntlff had ngreec:1 
to refpr the claim to JudgP Harri mun; 
and after the tetttlmooy was closed ph,ln-
tllf formally offered to show tht11 agree-
meot, which cooslst.ed of letters, but the 
court excluded It as not rebutting. '.rhere 
waa a verlltet and Judgment for drfencl-
ant, and plaintiff briuA'tl exceptions. 
Cbarlet1 F. <Jb11mber/11y11e, for plllln ttrr. 
J. H. Beatoa, Jr., and C. F'. Choat~. Jr., 
for defendant. 
C. ALLEN,J. Tbeplalntlrtteatlfled t'bat 
be had numerous totervlewa with tbe 
president, general 1naoager, and division 
auperloteodeot of tbe defo1ulaut compuoy 
concemlu.,; hla damages cauR~d by the 
setting back of the waters of Bridge creek 
upon bis premises, nnd then sou11;bt to 
show tbnt In the d18em1stooR whlr.h took 
J>lare between him and them they did not 
deny the defendant's liability for damages. 
There was no obJectluo on the ground 
that these omcers were not authorlzP.d t;o 
Rpeak for the defendant u11on the subJect, 
but the court excluded the q ueetlone on 
the ir:round that the convPrsRUons, and 
nut the fnferenceti or unrll'rittancltng of tho 
plofnttrf, were adrulsMible. It tot.-ems to u 8 
tbat this wu too narrow a \•leW of the 
matter. If, In poln-t' ot laet, tbe dPfend-
ant's officers, In dlscuss/111r t/Je plalntltl's 
claim for damagee with him, dld not d~ny 
the defendant's llal>Ufty for damsJ{eB, the 
oml1n1lon to make su~b denial might be 
con11ldered by the Jory. It woultl be In 
tbe nature of an admlicsloo, subject, of 
coul'l!e, to be explained, bot competent 
and proper to bl' laid before t!1e Jury. 
Thia fa not like cases where a party la so 
situated that no lnferem·e c&n be drawn 
from his Rllence, when a statement 111 
made In his pre11Pnce. l'om. v. Kenney, 12 
Mete. (Ma118.) 235; Com. v. Harvey, l Gray, 
487. If a party la so situated that be ta 
not called upon to say anything, aud doett' 
not say anything, his silence, undP.r such 
clreumataneea, la not to be taken as fur· 
nlshlng imy ground for an Inference that be 
thProby made any admlHlon. But in the 
rHBP at bar there was evidence tending to 
Rhow that the plnlnttn had presented to 
the defendant's officers a claim for dam-
age11, and tbat the matter wfta under dis· 
cusHlon at dltterent Interviews. If, under 
the8l' clrcum11tance1t, they made no denial 
of the defl'ndant'R llnblllty whtle dlscm1s-
ln11: the subject. the f1act of such omission ml~ht pru1>erly be conslden>d by thA J0 [{i 
It doPB not amount to an estoppel. u ton 
ts evidence as bearlnir upon tbe q 11::h 18 
to be determined. It Is conduc,, 'fu such 
In th" nature of an aclmlssfon. T9 roade-
dl11cusslon the defendant's oft\~ -we• not 
no pretense that the defendan oreY• 1"11 ~ 
llehle. Pareon11 v. Martin, 11. ~"'·<r1:.~•· 
l'ray v. StehblnH, 141 Mass. 21!; 1,"\6 ~ -o. '-" 
N. E. Rt>p. 824: Hayes v. Kl'lle~~\e'\~~'"''' 
31)(). It ls somewhat Jlke an ~ t 0 ao • 0 · 
tutlfy, or to produce book11, O ~~ C:\'e-o.~-o. 
explunatloU8, when l'Rllec\ 0~ ~ U~\.¥>:'\\ ~· 
Whltue~ v. Buyley, 4 Allen, 'j. '7~<.~~"'~e~~ 
v. GleaMon, 125 YaHB. 166, 176~~ ~\c"- 6 0 \\ 
v. Slehols, 116 Mat18. 521.; MC 4'~#>\o"""e"" 
O'NIPl, 113 MaBS. 92; Elc\rhlge j ~ C: ~ '.: ;\,o<fl 
115 Mas11. 410. The preRhUnf; -e- ~ c) ~~ ~e· 
1ieal't1 to have excluded the· q'1 i '-!-c ~&.-.e rt\'\~~\ thP~round that the con,•ersnt~~..,-'le·8 'O~-oe 
selve11, when testified to. vi ...,., ,._? ~' 'I)\\> \\. 
whttber or not the oefendant.'e* .~~ ~v e~ ;,\'-
nled that the defendant was 1...,,f ~; __,,~~e 0 o\ 
would beso If there were a.,.... ___ ....-#-,..to"~\\"\ 
conversation, the whole ol wl\l~ ~~ P ~ ~ &,\-
given. But, where there haV :.r-~ u 0 0~0t 
ml'rous Interview& with dlfteren:; ~ _,.,.., "\\\t$• 
la not to be supposed that tb e~ ~ .::. P t\\0 
evP.ry conversation can be g\\f' ~--~ l \ t\10 
such c&Be the plalntlll ought.,~ ._ .., ,..,.-~e ~~i 
10 ,ved to testify. once for all. <7~ ~ • ~ l \llll' 
at any tlmewaa there a denla\ ~'-' 4 ~ .,-£ 11s. 1'he practical qUAStloD Is. ho• V~ __.. .JI""'~. -(;JO ot\ 
reRult be reacbect of gettlng ,.e~ ~. ,,« t\l 
Jurv the fact that no such t~e .-~ JI , 11':.\~ 
made" JtseemB to OS• under ~-~ ""-' 4; 1• e 
stances presented by the blll of e~ p.-T t,\1 
the platntln ought to havfll bee ~ .. .,,- ~"evct 
to answer the tlt"fft, sE"<"ond.h• ·-:. _l:J ""1'f't'! 
queatlunK whleb were put to .,..~ . -t:l1• 
counsel. so a1:1 to be able to pre~be_.-e:;:-~""' ,,c1 
Jury distinctly bls1 c~n!-;~ ~~~~lltY _ ,...,, "'J 0 1·• bad be<tn any den 8 er to ca 11 C,,. .,-•,... ., v 
ofcounie entirely prop atlous· l:>..:.S ~~.I: ,1 
whole of all the con v:~s t:bet e;,er'-~ ~-- ~ J '- : 
tt Is not to be :;0i:g~~,Jntnt1n tih<-' .... !, e-~ c .I~ I can be repeate • k -the .ieneral q .. ~~ ~ • been allowed tc; ':i8 d Tht-> third <-J a. e "* Z. 
which was exc 0 ti ~ui supporting t: ~ 
, ts only sl.:nlfleaD 
Case No. 28]
RELEVAN CY.
view, and ofitseli alone would properly
be excluded.
The plaintlli, in putting in his casein
chief. ofiered to show certain statements
by Judge Harriman as the result oi an ex-
ainination oi the premises made by him.
This evidence was properly excluded. It
would notiollow from the plaintiffs ofler
ol proof that Judge Harriman was re-
84
Ierred to in such a way as to constitute
him an agent for the defendant, with
authority to make admissions or prom-
ises to the plaintill. Rosenbury v. Angeil.
6 Mich. 508. The subsequent more iormal
offer after the close oi the defendants case
might properly be excluded. in the discre-
tion oi the court, as too late. Exceptions
sustained.
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. Case No. 28] RELEVA:'.llCY. 
view, and of itself alone would properly 
be eiccluded. 
The plalntllr, In pottln~ In bis case In 
chief, oftered to show certain 11tatemente 
by Jurtge HarrlmRD ae the result of an ex-
amiuatiun nf the premlee.. made by him. 
Tbls el'ldence wae p1·operly exrluded. It 
would nut follow from the plaintlrf'11 offer 
of proof that Judge Harriman wae r& 
84 
ft>rred te In each a way ae to con11tltute 
him an agent for the defendant, with 
authority to make admlselons ur prom-
IRew to the plalntllr. RoRenbury v. Angell. 
6 Mich. 501l. 'rhtJ 1mbeequent more formal 
offer after the cloHtJ of the d~fendant's caee 
might properly be excluded, In the dlacre-
tlon of the court, a11 too late. Exceptions 
suetalned. 
ADMISSIONS.
[Case No. 29
MCLEOD et al. Y. SWAIN.
(13 S. E. 315. 87 Ga. 156.)
supreme Court of Georgia. April 20, 1891.
Error iroln superior court, Emanuel
i’-Ulmtyz James K. Hines, Judge.
Williams & Brannen, Saiiold & Warren.
find Rogers & Potter, for plaintiffs in er-
ror. Tsviggs & Verdery and H. R. Daniel,
'01‘ defendant in error.
LUMPKll\' . J.
action oi ejectment against McLeod ct al.
for the recovery of a tract oi land in
Eluannel county. The evidence was con-
tllcting. and sufficient to sustain a verdict
ior either side. 'l‘he jury found for the
plaintiff. After Mrs. Swain had proved
by her own testimony that a. certain Mrs.
Wiggins, who at one timd was in posses-
sion oi the land and remained in posses-
sion for many years, until her death, was
her tenant. the court. over defendants‘ ob-
jection, admitted prooi oi declarations
made by Mrs. Wiggins, while in possession
oi the land, to the effect that she held it as
the tenant of pla.intiii,nnd that it was
the land oi’ plaintiff. The only question
oi law nresen ted in this case for our deter-
mination is whether or not this testimony
was properly admitted. rsection 3776 oi the
Code declares that “ the declarations and
entries oi n person, since deceased, against
his interest, and not made with a view to
bending litigation, are admissible in evi-
dence in any case. ” It was contended in
the argument that such declarations
should be received only against the de-
clarant. and those in privity with or
claiming under him; but this view does
notseem to be sustained by the authorities.
It was held in the case oi Peaceable v.
Watson,-4 Taunt. 16, that“the declara-
tions oi a deceased occupier oi land oi
whom hc held the land are evidence oi the
seisin oi that person;" and in Davies v.
Pierce. 2 Term R. 53. that "declarations
by tenants are admissible evidence after
Mrs. Swain brought an V
their death to show that 8 certain plcce 0!‘
land is parcel oi the 99 ta te which they oc-
cupied." In both these cases the declara-
tions admitted were made by persons not
in privity with any oi’ the parties _t0 the
record, nor did any oi such parties In any
way claim title through or under the de-
clarnnts. Again: “S_‘tatements oi a de-
ceased occupier touching his title are ad-
missible in evidence_gcneraliy. without rei-
erence to the ]')i1l"tl(.'l'i’l8l“ effect tl1e__vl1}1a2_}_
Droduce in _the cause. Larne v. Nico i. "1
E. C. L. 701. See, also, l§arr_\ v. Bcbh _n.--
ton, 4 Term R. 514. We hnd the fullu\\'1n;:
in 1 Taylor, Ev. § 684: “Under the head oi
declarations against proprietary interest
may be classed the statements made by
persons while in possession oi land. ex-
planatory oi the character oi their posses-
sion; and it is now well settled that such’
declarations, if made in disparagement ot
the declarant’s title. are re¢e1v=1,bl@- Ii")
only as original admissions against 1112111-
seli and all persons who ' claim‘ t if
through him, but also as eVl(]PIl(‘€‘]U1t't(Zr
against strangers. iVhether in this‘ afme
event they are admissible in the ll 0-hlere
oi the declarant, or only in casest ivishich
his death can be proved. Ir‘ 6 P°ld"isflncuy
does not appear t0l1flV9 bee" here the
decided. ln most oi the cases \gccm,._._“,1-,
evidence has been received, the
was dead: but on two UC('.aSlOn3=
the evidence was admitted, thoflg \ 0
clarant was living." Whart(_?§'e b
down the rule that such evli rivlei» cm.
miss-ible, not only against PD“;
gt]-angers. “The reason ior ‘I,-ii \
slon is that possessionunplies. I éf.9‘\9a6 .
an absolute interest, a_nd any D,
which would tend t_o innit it ? 1;
terest is seli-dissei-v1ng._" 2 { 9e
§]]56. The same principle is 901 9,
Grcenl. Ev. § 109, and the so cieé “e
for the admissibility oi such de ; 44 ¢¢
is there given. These authoritf fa?“
dantly sustain the correctness 0_"
lng made by the court. be\0¢’
J
judgment is thereiore atfirxned.
atiirmed.
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A.DMISSlONS. [Ca8 No. 29 
McLEOD et al. "'· SWAIN. 
(13 S. E. 315, 87 Ga. 156.) 
Supreme Court of Georgia. April 20, 1891. 
Error fro1n superior court, Emanuel 
r.oonty: Jftrne>R K. Hinllll, Judge. 
Williams & Brannen, Saftold & Warren, 
llDd Rogera & Pnttn, for plelntlftM In er-
fror. Twlgga & Vl.'rdery and H. R. Daniel, 
or defendant In error. 
LUMPKIJ\". J. Mre. Swain brouwht an 
11ctiou of ejectmeut al{alnst McLel)li et itl. 
for the l'ef'o,·ery of a tract of land in 
1-;1uanuel coun~y. The evidence was co11-
fllrth1g, and auftl~lent to eu11taln a \"erlllct 
for either side. The Jury found for the 
plaintiff. After Mrs. 8waln h•id proved 
by her own testimony that a certain Mr8 • 
WlgglnH, who at one tlmd was in posse11-
llion or the land and n>malned In po11l!ee-
1lon for many yea1·e, until her death, wn11 
her tenant. the court, over defendants' ob-jection, all mltted proof of del·laratione 
made by M1"tl. Wiggins, while In posMeKt!lon 
of the land, to the effect that ehe held It ae 
the tetltint of pla.lntlff, and that It was 
the land of plelotltt. The only question 
of law prel!leD ted In this caee for our dett'r· 
mlnatlon le whether or not tbll! teetlmuny 
WBHproperly admitted . .t3El<'tlon 3776of the 
Code declares tba t "the declarations and 
entrlee of n 1>eraon, efnce deceased, a,;alnet 
his tntereMt, and not made with a view to 
oendlng litigation. ani adml88lhle In evl· 
dence In any case." It wae contt:'nded In 
the argument thnt such declarations 
11hould be racelved only agalnHt the de· 
clarant, and those In prlvlty with or 
claiming under him; but this view does 
noteeem to be Roe talned by the authorities. 
It wae held In the case of Peaceable v. 
Watson, 4 •raunt. 16, that .. the declare· 
tlon11 of a deceased occupier of land or 
whom he held the land are evidence of the 
11ellln of that pen1011;" and In Davies v. 
Pierce, 2 •rerm R. 53, that "deel11ratlone 
by tenants are admleslble evidence after 
their death to ehow f;hSt a certs.Ju pler.e ol ' 
land le pareel of the efftate which thev oc-
cupied." In both theHB cases the deciara-
tloue admitted were made by persons not 
In prll"lty with any of thf' parties to the 
record, nor dltl any of eoch partiea1 fn any 
way clahn title through or under the de-
clarant11. Again: "Statement11 of a de· 
ceased occupier touching hie title are ad· 
mleelble In evidence generally, without ref-
erence to the particular flnect they mu~· 
produce In the cau11e." Carne v. Nicoll, 2i 
E. C. L. 707. See, ·aleo, Barry v. BE>hhlnii;-
ton, 4 Term R. 514. We flud the fulluwi11;.:-
fn 1 Taylor, Ev.§ 684: "Under the bead or 
declaratloue against proprietary Interest 
may be clae11ed the etatemente made by 
perMoue while fn po118eHHlon of lancl, ex-
planatory of the character of their po1Jsee-
11lon ; and It fat now well settled that euch 
declnratluue, If made In dltiparagement of 
the declarant's title, are receivable, not 
only as original udwlselona agnlnet him-
self and all penione who claim title 
through him, but aleo as evidence for or 
against strangers. Whether In this latter 
ev~nt they are admleMlbll:l In the life-time 
of the cJeclarant, or only In cuee whTr~ 
his death can be proved, Is a point wh c 
doe!' not appeRr to have been dletlnct:Y 
deelded. In moet of the cal!les where.!~~ 
evldPnce hae been received, tbe dec;~!ast.. 
was dead: but on two occa11tons, at.be de-
the evidence was admitted, thoug~80 \aY• 
clarant wu living." WhartaP 8 ce \s e.dt 
down the rule that such evtder~\P8• ~~n­
mls1!lble, not only against v;;,e c0{1lcie. 
etra ngt'rs. "The reason for t r-ff1lt' e~e"~ 
slon le that poeseselon Implies. P _,t~~e!O"" ~~-
an absolute interf'st, and an)' P '(°(.· '\. 
which would tend to limit it .!:-t~~ -t:et\ ~oo 
tereet le self-dls11ervlng.'" 2 Y" .c; P -ce '\.\.0 o., . 
§ 1156. 'rile ea me p11ncl ple \8 tJ ~ 4li!' .,,...-c'\,.\l~o~ . 
Orl't.'nl. l<~v. § 109, and the 8~ ~j ~ e "t'\ ... 
for the adml11elblllty of tmch d~-e ~~ ~(\ ~~" 
le there given. These authorl ~ ~f/t>-0:-
dantly euittnln the correctness 0 _ _., '-' ti> 
lnJC made by the court be\o~; .,..... 
Jadgmentle therefore afftrmed. ., 
affirmed. 
Case No. 30]
RELEVANCY.
HILLS v. LUDWIG.
(24 N. E. 596, 46 Ohio St. 373.)
Supreme Court of Ohio. March 26, 1889.
Error to circuit court.Crawford county.
Ejectment by Solomon Ludwig against
Jededlah Hiilsfor a strip of land bounding
plaintiff's tract on the east. Besides a.
general denial, the answer set up the 2]-
year statute of limitations, and alleged
additional defenses, as follows: “ (3) That
in 1860, the location oi the true lines between
the lands _of plaintiff and the adjoining
tracts not being ascertained, a surve_v was
had by agreement between plaintiff and
defendant’s grantors. and a dividing line
established,which has eversincebeen recog-
nized by the owners of the lands; (i) that
defendant owns lands both on the east
and on the west sides of plaintiff's lands;
that the lines on both sides of plaintiff‘s
land wereestablished as stated in the third
defense; and that the quantity of land cut
off by the new line from the east side of
plaintiffs land was compensated by the
strip thus added on the west side, where-
by plaintiff received as much land as his‘
deed called for." The judgment of the
court of common pleas in favor of plaintiff
was affirmed by the circuit court, and de-
fendant briu s error.
S. R. Hart s nnd Ii. Blakford, for plain-
tiff in error. I"i1m-_\', Ia‘.-iron & Bennett and
W. Z. Du vis, for defendant in error.
BRADBURY, J. The lands oiLudwig lie
west. and those of ilills cast, of the ms-
puted line; and this line was originally
identical with that between sections 5 and
6, in which the lands lie. This section line
had been the subject of dispute between
adjoining proprietors for many years prior
to 1860. Early in that year, an agrcemen
was made between a number of iand-own-
ers in those sections for a survey of this
line. which survey. pursuant thereto, was
made in March, 1860, by Horace Martin,
the then county surveyor. At the same
time. and as part of the same plan, the
north and south middle line of section 6
was surveyed. By this survey both lines
were located further west than they were
before, so that Ludwig gained thereby on
the west substantially the quantity of
land he lost on the east. Soon thereafter
Ludwig, Hills‘ grantor, and some other
adjoining owners began to occupy and
improve their lauds according to the new
line, which was called the “ Martin Linc, ”
though with considerable dissatisfaction
and some litigation between certain of the
adjoining proprietors respecting it. Soon
after this line was established. Hills pur-
chased lands lying east oi and adjoining
those of Ludwig, and also a tract adjoin-
ing Ludwig on the west; both of which
he has continued to occupy and improve
ever since, up to the Martin line. Twenty
years and 10 months elapsed from the time
Ludwig went out of possession of the
lands in dispute until this action was be-
gun, and more than 22 years elapsed be-
fore the amcnded petition was filed. The
trial resulted in a verdict and judgment
for Ludwig for the recovery of all the
lands described in his amended petition.
i
t\q
”
i
Hills took a bill of exceptions, which ex-
hibits, _ among others. the fact above
stated. it also discloses certain excep-
tions taken by Hills to the rulings of the
trial court in admitting and rejecting evi-
dence, and in charging and refusing to
charge the jury certain propositions of
law. The judgment was afiirmed by the
circuit court, whereupon the defeated
party brought the case here for review.
Some of the interesting questions ar-
gued by counsel for plaintiff in error are
not presented by the record in a way to
enablethis court to review them upon their
merits. This is notably the case with re-
spect to two important questions, al-
luded to by counsel for plaintiff. in his
brief,-—that of estoppel. nml that relating
to the rejection of the evidence of Miiliron,
respecting the acts and admissions of the
plaintiff below, Ludwig.
The question of estoppel is raised by the
fourth defense. That defense, plaintiff in
error claims, sets forth facts which est-op
Ludwig from asserting his title to the
lands in dispute: or, at least, that he
ought not to be permitted to do so, even
if he was honestly mistaken in supposing
the Martin line to be the true one. until he
first offered to yield up no Hills the equiv-
alent therefor, which he still holds on the
west side of his farm; and there is evi-
dence tending to establish this defense. it
is u. grave question whether Ludwig can
be permitted to repudiate the Martin line
on one side of his land. where it cuts a
strip from his farm. and cling to it on the
other side, where it gives him a strip of
land that otherwise would belong to Hills.
The court said nothing to the jury on this
uestion that is applicable to the facts as
Hills claims them to be, and thereis nothing
in the record to show whether it was con-
sidered by the jury or not. This omission,
standing alone, does not constitute error
for which the judgment will be reversed
b_v this court. Taft v. \\'ildma-n, 15 ()hio,
123: Jones r. Ohio, 20 Ohio St.34; Schryver
v. Hawkes, 22 Ohio, 308: Smith v. Railway
Co., 23 Ohio St. 10. The defendant below,
however, did request instructions on this
point which the court refused to give to
the jury; but these instructions, while
fairly applicable to a state of facts testi-
fled to by Hills, were not. at least, fully
applicable to the facts pleaded by Hills in
his fourth defense. and for that reason the
refusal was not error. In addition to this,
Hills, when he requested the charge on
this point, also requested the court to give
to the jury eight other propositions of
law, some of which, being unsound, were
properly refused; while others,containing
sound legal propositions, should have
been given to the jury if presented by them-
selves. Ali. however, were refused; but
the exception thereto being general, it
failed to point out to the court the error
of which complaint is now made, and for
that reason error cannot be predicated on
this action of the trial court. Railway v.
Probst,1l0 Ohio b‘t.104; Everett v.Sumner,
32 Ohio St. 562: Powers v. Railway Co.,33
Ohio St. 429. It remains apparent, how-
ever. that thecourt did not instruct tbejury
on this point, notwitlistandlng its atten-
tion wascalled to the matter. Though d one
through the medium of an instruction, it
86
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Caae No. 30] RELEVANCY. 
HILI,S v. LUDWIG. 
(24 N. E. 596, 46 Ohio St. 878.) 
Supreme Court of Ohio. March 26, 1889. 
Error to ch-cult court,Crewford county. 
EJectmtmt by Solomon Ludwig against 
Jedediah Hills for a strip of land bounding 
plaintiff's tract on the ea11t. Be11ldes a. 
general denial, the an1:1wer set up the 21· 
year statute of llmltatlonR, and alleged 
additional defenses, aR follows: "(3) That 
In 1860, the loco.ti on or tht> tn1e lines bet ween 
the la.nd11 .of pla.tntlft and the udjolntng 
tract& not being ascertalrwd, a. Rurvt'~· was 
bad by agreement betw1.,"l'n plalntlft and 
defendant's grantors, and a dividing line 
eetabllsh<:!d, which ha.se,·erslnce been r<>cog-
nlzed by the owners of the landR; (I) that 
defendant owns lands both on th<' l'aHt 
and on the west Rldeff of plntnttff's lands; 
that the lines on both aides of platntlff'a 
land were established as eta ted In the third 
defense; and that the quantity of land cut 
otr by the new Jtne from the ea11t 11lde of 
plaintiff's land was compensated by the 
Rtrlp th1111 added on the west side, where-
hv plaintiff recehed &H lllll<'h land as hla · 
df>t•d calll'd for." The Judgment of the 
con rt of <~ommon pleBK In favor of plaintiff 
wa11 R.IHrme1l bv thl' circuit court, and de-
fendu n t brlngs0err•1r. 
S. R. Harris r.nd If. Blnkford, for pJaln-
tlft In error. F"i11i1-y, f,'utor1 &- Rennf!t't and 
ll'. Z. Davis, for defendant In error. 
BRADBURY, J. The laodsofLudwlp lle 1 
w~t. und those of HlllR east, of the ll1K-
puted line; and this line was originally 
Identical wttb that between sections 5 and 
6. lo which the Ja11d11 lie. This stietlon line 
had been the subject of dispute between 
adjoining proprietors for many years prior 
to 1860. Early to that year, an agrt'ement 
was mnde between a number of land-own-
ers lo tho11c sections for a aurve,v or tbla 
llne. whleh aurvey, pul'l!uant thereto, wa11 
made In March, 1860, by Horace Martin, 
the then county surveyor. At the same 
time, and as part of the same plan, the 
north and aouth middle line of section 6 
was surveyed. By tbts survey both lines 
were located further west than they were 
before, so that Ludwig gained thereby on 
the west substantially the quantity or 
land he loHt on the eaBt. Soon thereafter 
Lurlwlg, Hills' grantor, and some other 
adjoining owners began to occupy and 
Improve their lands according to the new 
line, which was ca.lied the" Martin Line," 
though with considerable dtssatlHfactlon 
and 1mme litigation between certain of the 
adjoining proprietors respecting It. Soon 
after this line wa11 established. HllJs pur-
chased lands lying east or and adjoining 
ttwse of Ludwl'1:, and also a tract adjoin-
ing Ludwig on the west: both of which 
be has continued to occupy and Improve 
ever slnct', up to the Martin line. Twenty 
years and 10 months elapaed from the time 
Ludwig went out of possession of the 
lands tn dispute until this action was be-
gun, and more than 22 years elapsed be-
fore the amended petition was flied. The 
trial reHultcd In a n•rdict un<l Judgment 
for Ludwig for th!' recovery of all the 
lands dl'SCrllJed In bis amended petition. 
86 
Hiiia took a btll or except1ona, wntch ex-
hibits, among othe™· the fa.et above 
etatect: It also dlll<.'Joeee certain excep-
tlontt takt>n by Hms to the rulings of the 
trial conrt In admitting and rejecting evi-
dence, and to charging and refusing to 
charge the Jury certain propositions of 
lnw. Th~ Juclgmeut was affirmed by the 
circuit court, whereupon the defeated 
party brought the case here for review. 
Some of the lntereRtlog questions ar-
gued by counsel for plaintiff In error are 
not preRented by the record In a way to 
enablethlRl'ourt to review them upon their 
merits. This ls notably tho l'Me with re-
111pect to two Important quPHtlonR, al-
lucled to by counet'I for plalntltt, In hl11 
brlt'f,-thftt of t'Rtop11t>I, and that relnttng 
to the rejection of thl' C'\'hlence of Mllllron, 
rettpectlna,; the acts amt al1111l11Slons of the 
plalnttn lwlow, Ludwig. 
The CJUt'lltlon of estopJH!I Is raiKt'<l by the 
fourth defense. That <lefl'nse, (llalntlff In 
l'rror cla.lms, set11 forth facts which e11top 
Ludwig from &stlf'rtlng his title to the 
JamlR In dl11pute: or, at least, that hf' 
ought not to be permitted to do so, e\"'eo 
ff hP waH honeKtly mlstnken In 11upp0Rlng 
the lfartln line to be the true ont'. until he 
firRt offered to yield up co Hills the equiv-
alent therefor, whkh be still holds on thf't 
west 11lde of bl11 farm; encl there la evi-
dence tending to l"l!tabllsh thlR defen11e. It 
Is n gra Vl' 11uestlon whether Lnd wig l'an 
be peru1lt tffi t.o n>1rndtate the Mm·tln line 
on one side of hie land, where It cutR a 
strip from his farm, and cling to it on the 
other slcle, where It gives him a Rtrlp of 
land thatothnwlBt' would helon){ to HlllK. 
The court said nothlnir to the jnr.v on thlK 
Qll<'Mtlon thnt IR applll'nble to the f1u•t11 a11 
Hlllsclalmtttht'm to be, and therelsnothl11g 
In the record to Rhow wht-ther It wnK con-
sidered by the Jury or not. Thltt omiK11lon. 
11tandlug a.Jone, does not conKtituh~ t•rror 
for which the judgment will be r{•venied 
h;r thlH court. Taft v. Wlldmnn, 15 Ohio. 
12:1: .JoneR \".Ohlo,20 Ohlo8t.34; Schryver 
v. llawkee, 22 Ohio, 308: Smith v. Railway 
Co., 23 Ohio St. 10. The defendant below, 
however, did request inatructlono on this 
point which the court refused to glve to 
the Jury; but these inatructlons, whlle 
fairly applicable to a state of facts testi-
fied to by Hills, were not. at least, folly 
appllc1tble to the fact& plea.tied by Hllls In 
hltt fourth defense. and for thnt reason the 
refusal was not error. lo addition to tbls, 
Hills, when he requested the char,re on 
this poln t, also l°t'q ue1:1ted the court to give 
to the jury eight other 11roposlttone of 
law, some of which, bt'lng unsound, were 
properly refused; while others, containing 
11ound legal propo11ltlons, should ha \'e 
been glven to the Jury If presented by them-
seln~s. All, howevt:'r, were refused; but 
the exception thereto being general, lt 
fatle(l to point out to the court the error 
of which complaint ls now made, and for 
that l'<'R11on error cannot be predicated on 
this aetlon of the trial court. Railway v. 
ProhRt, :JO Ohio St.104; Everett v. Sumner, 
32 Ohio St. 562: Powers v. RR.llwa.y Co.,33 
Ohio St. 429. It remains apparent, how-
en~r. that thecourt did not lm1truct tbejury 
on thlH point, notwlthatandlng Its atten-
tion was called to theurntter. Though done 
through the medium of an Instruction, It 
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was not error to refuse to give it to the ju ry ;
and it may be said that the record raises
the question whether it is error for the
court to fail to give instructions on a
question involved in the trial, when, by
any means, its attention is directed to it.
The record. however. does not disclose
that this question was made to the trial
court on the motion for a. new trial, or to
the circuit court on error; and there is
nothing in this case that calls for us to
disregard the general rule that errors not
assigned in thecourt below will not he con-
sidered here. Levi v. Daniels. 22 Ohio St.,
38. The rule applies with special emphasis
to the case at bar, for the additional rea-
son that that omission is not especially
assigned in this court. of error, but is in-
sisted on in argument only, as an error
appearing on the face of the record. We
therefore hold that the question is not
properly before us for review.
Respecting the evidence of the witness
Milllron, it may be said that while. as a.
general proposition of law, the pertinent
acts and admissions of a partv are com-
petent evidence against him, yet, unless
they are offered at the proper time, it is
within the discretion of thecourt to admit
or reject them, and, unless the record dis-
closes an abuse of discretion. its action
will not be reviewed on error. Webb v.
Stn.te.i?9 Ohio St., 351. If.ou the trial, Mil-
llron’s evidence was competent at all, it
was evidence in chief for the defendant,
Hills. He did not offer it then, and, with-
out explaining the omission, offered it in
rebu1;ta]_ Under these circumstances, the
"Won oi the trial court in rejecting the
evidence does not appear to be erroneous.
Then-ialcourt admitted in evidence, over
the Objection of Hills. the record of an ac-
tion brought in 1865 by Rufus Page against
fllP[)|ninflff below. Ludwig. This action
related to the north and south line. before
referred to, that divided section 6 into half
B90tiong_a,n(1 which was run and estab-
llshed 9,1; the same time. and was part of
the scheme of the 1\fa.rtin survey. If that
line had been placed too far west by the
Elam“ gm-vev. then the line in dispute had
been also pfacefj the same distance too
im-west_ This record shows that Page,
"Iltler whom Hills claimed title. alleged
that the mmdie line of section 6 was too
far “'(\flt‘ and that he prevailed in the ac-
tion, Now thig allegation and adjudica-
tion 1 to the ears of the jury could
"Qt bgeiltlhlehigwise than Dreiudicial to Hills;
and,“ 1 etent evidence, is error to
his D,-e;,,'('1ci§:l plt is not merely an admis-
sion, but 3, g\\‘()1']1 statement, made by one
llflflcr whom Hills claims title, that ihe
line ig not where Hills claims it to be,
1\'0w,1|1t had been 1I1fl_(1°“'hm*P9geowne(l
the laudy especially if it 1‘(-ilfliféd 1'0 the fine
M the land Hills afterward" bought. it
would have been admissible against; H“]s_
Bil! {big wag 11011 the case; It related fI()
other lands, and was made after Hills had
"qlllred nu title. Page’ “t the "me. had
no interest in this "Hid of Hms’ and Could
"°t» by any act, 8.d1IHSBiOIl, or stafemen t,
make evidence 8£'B'm‘.'t ms‘ was
therefore el'1‘() r to admr'€1f£3)';"“8;d in 9;-i-
Ilcnce. F ,-a mt’ ,
meut b8t\2€6i1h(1e)8hg‘€ @1114 L“d“'3- and the
record of the action between Ludwig and
Frey, were incompetent evidence, and
their admission erroneous.
The defendant below specially excepted
to certain propositions contained in the
charge of the court. These charges are
properly before us for review, and will now
be considered. Hills excepted to the rule
laid down by the court respecting the
method of retracing the line between sec-
tions5a.nd6. This was an important ques-
tion in the trial court, and might have
been decisive. in view of the evidence then
adduced; but we have no assurance that
the evidence at the next trial will be the
same thatit was at the last in thisrespect.
This is a. species of evidence peculiarly lia-
ble to change. A new line. run even by
the. same surveyor, upon the same prin-
ciple, may vary considerably from the
former line run by him, according to the
method approved by the court below.
New corners may be found, or new lines
run, or new facts discovered, that would
render the view this court might take
wholly inapplicable; and, besides, the oth-
er principles laid down by the court are
lkely to be decisive of the rights of these
parties. The court charged the jury that
the contract or agreement by which 8.
boundary line could be established must
be one “that would transfer the title or
right of possession to defendant. Hills-"
The second clu use of the syllabus in Bobo
v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St.,]15, reads: “The
fixing of a. boundary line by parol is not;
within the operation of the statutebgt
frauds. No estate is thereby created . the
where the boundary line is fixed \_\t3\"e"O!
parties, they hold up to it by V“ 0; the
their title-deeds, and not by V\ Ptueo‘ the
parol transfer.” The langutlge t“e wry
charge is calculated to impress at to ad-
wlth the belief that an agreeine t,
“B
B
just and settle the boundary lifle mu
s\\‘* °‘_
one sufiicient to transfer title '9r;:d@\‘““6n’c
possession by its inherent force, 1)u\‘““i{,\;e
ent of the acts of the pan-,ie6 e‘.i\“;a
thereto. This is contrary to {D991-“ “vofl
above quoted. Hills am not rat, \Jt“‘.‘\eT“'
fense upon the agreement alone. 0
it and the acts of the adioinin €
done pursuant thereto; and 1:? , £’
ought to have been as broad as (1 G‘
in this particular. 1
The court also char Q th, j‘
“when the line bet.\\*e§: o\v1€c-1'?
cannot with certaint ' ’£ ‘/
said owners, in the \'iZ\S*)€r.'>fa€l?;(i3;-11-,t:1;g’f£' Livia)“
flIl'i Gfilililllfih H “I10, Rug)‘ an ‘f \9“\‘
settles the line.” it is clainicd ~¢-‘ 4 ‘:(~\\ °‘“
ment that the tie-fen(\u.nt. below F ‘V 4* >'~\°
prejudiced by this C\\ai'ge,eve1\i z ,9,’
correct, because no evidence was i 1 It 1
trial which tended to prove y,
agreement. To this claim it m¥\'-,<,./ ‘
that what the parties \~ t-his 8"‘ (1
and did was before the i\\\'.\‘-mijf‘ ~:
competent for the-In to dcteri" t,¢/ 7
their object W218 in causing W to“; 7 1, <7
Ludwig clainued t.he.ir pm-pose 6
certain the true line; tiini» he
that they had done 30', mat»
better for znany Years the"
that when he <1iscn\~erc<\ t\“’ -,\\.~=.
endeavored to correct it.
other hand, claimed the 9“
e’;
£7
{Z
I
f
1'?
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
06
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
.AD.MISSIONS. (Case No. 30 
~asnoterl'Ortorerusetoglvelttothejury; record of the action between L<1dwlg and 
and It may be said that the record ral;it•H 1''rey, were lncom~tt>nt evidence, and 
the quef!tlon whether It Is error for tile their admission erroneous. 
court to fall to give lnetructlone on a 'fhe defendant below specially excepted 
question Involved In the trial, when, by to certain propositions contained In the 
any means, Its attention ts directed to it. charge of the court. These charges -are 
The record, however, does not disclose properlybefore us rorreview,andwlll now 
that this question .WAH made to the trial be considered. Hills excepted to the rule 
court on the motion for a new trial, or to la.Id down by the conrt reRpeetlng the 
thP circuit court on error; and there IH method of retracing the line between sec-
nothing In this case that calls for us to tlons 5 and 6. This was an Important que&-
dlert>gard the general rule that errors not tlon In the trial court, and might have 
&ll8lgned In thecourt below will not be con- been declHlve. in view of the evidence then 
eidered here. Levi v. Danleh•. 2'..? Ohio 8t., addured; but we have no aBsurance that 
38. The rule appllea with Hpt>clu.1 emphasis the evidence at the next trial wlll be the 
to the case at bar, for the acldltlonul rea- ea.me that It was at the last In this respect. 
eon that that omiHHlon IH not especially This le a species of evidence peculiarly Jia-
ae.slirned in this court of error, but Is In- ble to change. A new line. run even by 
Misted on fn argument only, as an error the same surveyor, upon the same prln-
appearlng on the face or the J't>Cord. We clple, may vary considerably from the 
therefore hold that the question le not former lfne run by him, according to the 
properly before us for review. method approved by the court below. 
RPllpectlng the evidence of the :wltneBB New cornet"!! may be found, or new lfnes 
Milliron, It may b~ euid that while, as a run, or new factH discovered, that would 
general proposition of law, the pertinent reml!'r the view this court might tnkP 
acts and a.dml.r-;elone of a partv are com- wholly Inapplicable; and, beRklee, the oth-
petent evidence against him, yet, unless er prlnclple11 laid down by the court are 
tbe,v al'P. otrered at the propt•r time, It le lkely to be decisive of the rlgh ts of tlwse 
within the discretion of the court. to aclmlt pRrtlPR. The court chnrged the Jury that 
or l'f!ject them, and, unless t':le record <lie- the contract or ajl:reemt!nt by which a 
rloeee an abuse of dlRcretlon, Its action boundary line could be eHtnbllRhed must 
will not he re\·iffwetl on error. WPbh v. he one" that would transfer the title or 
State,29 Ohio St., 351. If.on the trial, Mil- right of poBRPHHlon to defendant, Hills." 
llron's e\•ltlence was compl'tE'nt at all, It The second ch1m1e of the RyllnbuA In Boho 
was evidence in chief for the defc>ndnnt, v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St., 115, reads: "The 
Hiiis. He did not offer It then, und, with- fixing of a boundary line by parol Is no~ 
out explaining the omlRHion, offered It In within the operation of the stat~~eb~t 
rebuttal. (Tnder these clrcumHt·llllCE'8, the frttuds. No estate Is thereby create< • tbe 
action ot the trial court In rejecting the where the boundary line IH flxe1\ \ blll'; ot 
evidence does not nppear to he erroneous. parties, they hold up to It l.Jy v 1" ~t ·nw 
Tbetrfalcourt ad mltted In evidence, over their title-deeds, and not by v\ rtue o\ t,\\0 
the ohjectlon of H Ille, the record of an ac- parol transfer." The lan11;uage toe\'-''"~ 
tlon hronl!,'h t in 1~65 by Ru rm~ Pal!,'e against charge Is calculated to impress nt to u.d-
thp plnlntlrr below. Ludwlji;. This action with the belief that an agreerl'e ~uy,t \l~\ 
related to the north and south line,. before jnst and Hettie the boundary UPe \"\~\\\. &-
referred to, that divided section 6 Into half one sufficient to transfer title o~pae\'e~\\t 
sections and which was run ancl et1tab- possession by Its lnhf'rent force.. p'1'\'.~~ :\:.l\l.s 
llBhed at the 8 ame time, and was part or ent of the a<:ts of the part\eS ~~\: ~~ ae-
the scheme of the l\1artln survPy. If thnt thereto. ThlR ls C'ontrnry to t~~~-t. ~ ~vo\\ 
lint> had been placed too far weRt by the above· quottld. Hills d\cl not r vv -q:\\e"t">· 
Martin Rurl·ev then the line In dlApute bad fense upon the agmement alone.•__.. C e\\&ol'.~ 
heeu allm pla~·ed the same rll14tance too It and the actf.1 of the 11<1lo\n\rJ~- ~ 3e\e1' 
far west. This record shows that Page, done pursuant thereto~ und -t;:t-.i-. e' ~-\.. 
llhr!er whom Hille claimed title, alll'j!;erl ouii;bt to haw heen as broad 8.11 t: -i ~ 'l~~\\l\ 
t11at the middle line of sect.Ion 6 wns too In this particular. .._ .-~· t'"'l\ 
far wi•Rt and that be prevnllerl In the ac- The court nlso chara;ed the j ~ ~'--°'' \'~'"' 
tlou. N~w this allegation and adjudl~a- "when the line bct"\veen ownc~- ~ -__.e \l ,e1\\. 
tlou coming to the en rs ?f the Jury could cnnnot with <·et·tn\nty be as;icert~ t $-~~c:.~.,,,\ 
notbeotherwiee than Prt'JUdlclnl to lllllH; Hnhl ownPt"R, In the""'"""'" of th1R,ll~£" ~ _ ~ "'o _ 
l\Dd, if lncom~tP.nt eYlrlence, ts error to nn•I eHt11hllHh a 1\n(', Rtwh nn ~-"i" ~ .s ._ \"' \1\, 
his prejudice. It ts not merely un a!lmlH- RettlPH thl' line." l t iH chtimeil ~-.... .._. -: ,,..,,, o~\\ 
Rion, but a. sworn statement, made by one ment thut the 1lelen<ln.nt heloW 'I -ti- - ,;\\\11 
nnderwhom Hille claims title, that the prejudlcPd by this charge, even :I ~ ~ ~ ;i,l\.\' 
line 18 not where Hiiie claims It to be. correct, becauKe no ev\dence was _.-. ~-? - ;i,l\ 1 Now,tllthad beE>nma.dewhllePageowned trial which tended to prove c;- . -; ,...: 
the land eepeclallY If It related to the Jlne agreement. To th\~ e\n\m \t m11--._.-~ , ~\' 
ol the l~nd Hille afterwards bought, ft that what the pa.rue~ -t ·· tb\R sll~ c:1l _ .._-.a~ 
would have been admfsslhle against Hills.) und did waH before t\u1 \\\TY· ar...-.--- :ll'---«:::-" 
But tble was not t:be CBBe; Jt related t;o competent for them to detern' ._7~ 7 <. 
otherlanda und was madeafter Hiils had their object vvnM \n eaus\ng \tt~~---!-? ....__.;; 
acquired bl~ title. page, at the time, had Ludwig c1ahnm1. tll.e\r pur\)O~e ~~ ~ ~ 
no iutereet In this Ja~d of HJlls, 8 Dd could certain the true \\ne; t\\l\t ll~e '4 -::..- -~ • 
not, by any act, adlJJJBBtlonilnf state111e1Jt. that they ho.<l done so~ tnat ea.t-te-t:. -=---- .._._. 
make evidence agalnfl 8 • It was bl'tter for n1a.n:v yea.\"8 t\\el" ~\~ ~ ~ 
therefore error to admit the rec:brd 111 erl- j tltl\t when he d\Mco,·e~d t\'~\\\a• ~ 
ilence. For the sarJJe dreLl1H<:p8;1 e agree- enfleavored to corre\:t \t. \°\lo~"' 
ment between Pa/le an u " g, lllJd tlle other band. clahned tl\e \l\l 
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survey was not to flnd the true line, but
to adjust and settle one which had long
been the subject of contention, and about
which there was then a dispute. This be-
ing the issue. the court, we think, placed
the right oi adjoining proprietors to ad-
just and settle disputed boundaries on too
narrow a basis. It is not essential that
the disputed boundary line be incapable
oi ascertainment; but ii’ it has been the
subject oi dispute and contention, and
the parties. with the view to settle the
dispute, agree upon and settle a line be-
tween their land, it is a finality, and can-
not be disturbed, though they afterwards
learn that the true line could have been
iound. Avery’s Lessee v. Baum‘s Heirs,
Wright. 576; Walker v. Lessee oi Devlin, 2
Ohio h‘t., 593. This view is entirely consist-
ent with the rinciple that whereadloining
proprietors, n attempting to find the true
line between them, by mistake fix upon an
incorrect one, they may repudiate the
88
spurious line at any time beiore the stat-
ute oi limitation has run.
The court further charged the jury that
“this action was commenced on January
11. 1881. It is conceded that was 20 years
and 10 months alter the piaintlfl went out
oi the possession oi the premises; there-
iore the statute oi limitations does not ap-
ply." This statement ignores the fact
that part oi the lands sought to be recor-
ered were not described in the original
petition. Over 22 years had in fact elapsed
from the time plaintiff below went out oi
possession heiore he liled his amended pe-
tition, so that, as to the land then for the
first time included. the statute oi limita-
tions had attached, and deiendant’s title
made perfect by lapse of time, unless the
amendment had a retroactive operation,
and went back, by relation, to the orig-
inal petition. This proposition, we think.
is not supported by either reason or au-
thority. Judgment reversed.
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CU. No. 30] BELEV ANCY. 
survey was not to find the true line, but 
to adjust and flettle one whkh had long 
been the subject or contenttori, and about 
which there was then a dls1mte. Thlfl be-
ing the lsaoe, tbP court, we think, pJaeed 
the right of adjoining proprletol'R to ad-just and settle dlefuted boundaries on too 
narrow a basts. t Is not eKHentlol that 
the disputed boundary line be Incapable 
of ascertainment; hut If It bas been the 
subject of Jlspute and contention, and 
the parties, with the view to settle the 
dispute, Agree upon and settle a line be-
tween their land, It Is a flnallty, and can-
not be disturbed, though they afterwards 
Jeam that the true line coold have been 
found. Avery•11 l.eeaee v. Baum's Hell'B, 
Wright, 576; Walker v. Lessee of De\"llo, 2 
Ohio Ht., 593. This view Is eotlrelyconelst-
ent with the p.rtnelple that where adjoining; 
proprietors, n attt-mptlnll to find th!' trne 
line between them, by mistake ftx opon an 
incorrect one, they may repudlat.e tbe 
88 
spurious line at any time before the stat. 
ate of limitation has run. 
The court further charged the Jury that 
•this action was commenced on January 
11, 1R81. It Is conceded that Wftll 20 years 
and 10 months after the plalntlft went out 
of the poMeesloo of the premises; the~ 
fore tbestatute of limitations does not ap-
ply." Thie stntement Ignores the fact 
that part of the lands sou.cht to be recot'-
flred wel'f' not dPt11r.rlbecl In the orfJ[lnat 
petition. Over 22 years bad lo fact elapsed 
from tho time plalntlft below went out or 
posHes11lon before he Hied bis amended pe. 
tftlon, so that, as to the land then for the 
flnt time Included. the statute of limita-
tions bad attached, and defendant's title 
made perfect by lapse of time, unless the 
amendment bad a retroactive operation, 
Rnd went back, by relation, to the orig-
inal petition. Thia propoeltlon, we think, 
Is not supported by either reason or au-
thority. Judgment revel'lled. 
• 
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S.\II'l"H et al. v. BOYER ct ni.
(45 N. W. 265, 29 Neb. 76.)
Supreme Court of Nebraska. March 11. 1890.
Error to district court, Red Willow
county; Cocanns, Judge.
R. .lI. Snavely and E. M. Bartlett, ior
plaintiffs in error. G. M. Lambertsou, Rit-
tenlmuse & btarr, and H. W. Keyes,ior \le'
iendants in error.
MAXWEl.L.J. On the 2-iihoi Septem-
ber, 1887, the defendants executed and de-
livered to ihe First National Bank oi Indi-
anolu and L. J . Holland a chattel morti.'.uge
upon “ all our general stock oi merchandise,
consisting oi dry goods, groceries, boots
and shoes. hats & cups,crockery,clothing.
notions,jewelry, saic. and show-cases, fixt-
ures, and all our other goods and mer-
chandise contained in the brick building,
store-houses, and basement, situate on lot
6. block 33, in the town oi Indianola, Ne-
braska. Also our books and book-ac-
countg held and owing to us.the said firm
oi Boyer & Davidson, on account oi our
business in said store above na.med.”—to
secure the payment oi $5336.46. oi which
su|n $2,000 is alleged to have been due the
bank,and the remainder to Holland. The
exact value oi the property mortgaged
does nut appear. but there is testimony
that the goods were oi the value oi about
$12,000, while the amount due on the ac-
counts is not shown. On the 26th day oi
September, 1387, the plaintiiis commenced
an in-tion by attachment against the de-
iendnngs; the grounds thereior, as stated
in the nrudavit for an attachment, being
"that the defend an ts have sold, assigned,
and disposed of their property with the
iraudnn;-nt intent to_ cheat and defraud
their creditors, and hinder and delay them
in the collection of their debts, and are
about to sen, assign, and dispose oi their
property with the iraudulent intent to
(‘heat and defraud their creditors, and
|,i,,(|..,. and delay them in the collection oi
their d,.bts_ and that they are about to
Q-(,nm.t their property into money ior the
placing it beyond the reach oi
_ ;l arereibout t‘o sell, as-
mgnyand dis ose 0 a pa 0 the r proper-
ty with meg: to deiraud their creditors,
and have sold, as:-5igned,and disposed oi a
part 0! prQI)0l't)' “Flth intent to
dmaud their creditors. “Upon this afli-
dam being flied. and a like ntiidavit ior
,_.,,,.mBhment, and an order oi the court
.,bt,mw/G’ part of the debt not then being
due‘ a Wm; of at gachment was’issued and
.1.-11,-Q,-9.1 to the sheriii at“ 8 0 clock P. M.
(,1 ,.,,,m day, and returned, not being able
to come at the property oi Boyer and D9,.
vmaomor James J. Boyer or Charles B.
Dlivldson mem hers oi said flrm. claimed to
be in the possession °f.L' J‘ H0]-land»-L W -
Doing, the 1~‘i1'|-it Natl Bank’ 9150. NO-
tice was served "P0" tge perpmlfi gar"
uished. naming them’ an ¢.-re“¥""'|s H1811!
t° appear and aflflwtirve d m‘dc!end-
mm nu-<1 a motion, Bull?" ° by
"limo dissolve the “tn” Imezt "P011 su D-
stantially two g1'0"“"“' "b"'Psu1m-ir_y
in Drocuring the flame’ "D
9°" "Be cu 0
grounds upon which “'8 attachment was
granted were un true-
Afida vita in opp
I
1
l
l
I
I
,s-.
‘~ deuce. and in in us-at ca.s\“~"‘ “efifsta-1’,
. be shown by iacts and cn‘<‘“ \
sition to and in support oi the attachment
were thereupon filed,a.nd on the final hear-
ing the attachment was discharged, and
the garnishees released. The dissolution
oi the attachment ls now assigned ior er-
1-or.
It seems to be conceded by the attorneys
ior the pluintiii that the claim oi the na-
tional bank is Dona. fide, and probably
that oi Holland. The chattel mortgage
seems to have been procured through the
instrumentality oi the latter. A debtor in
failing circumstances may pay one or more
oi his creditors, provided he deliver him
no more than suflicient to pay the debt.
In Elwood v. May, 24 Neb. 37:). 38 N. W.
Rep. 793, it is said: "A creditor may ob-
tain irom a iailjng debtor payment in iull
oi his claim, and he will not be chargea-
ble, upon that ground alone, oi seeking
to deiraud other creditors. Neither will
the iact that the claim is paid in goods oi
no greater value than the amount oi the
claim oi itseli establish the iraudulent
character oi the transaction. So iar us
the testimony discloses, the deiendauts in
error were paid in goods oi value not ex-
ceeding the amount oi their claims against
Cramer.” To the same eiiect, Rothell v.
Grimes, 22 Neb. 526. 35 N. W. Rep. 3922 Lel-
iel v. Schcrmerhorn, 13 Neb. 342,14 i*I._ Rep. 418; Shelly v. Heater, 17 heb. 00;). 53
N. W. Rep. 521. The case oi (armies 1!’;-
Farrington, 19 Neb. 49, 26 N. W. Rel>~ fithé
is not in conflict with these decisions‘. not’
exact value oi the goods mortiiflflie ta m
being shown. The highest eflilitime the
that case was about $l4.000, “édm “Qt.
debts secured exceeded $9.000- ‘Q sell ior
appear that the property Wolflhe (pants-
more than the amount 01 \'- fight
While a. bona fide creditor has :2‘
secure his claim, yet he has n0 atom
up all the property oi his Ge em"
all oi such property greatly exfe-ed -_ \n
the amount oi the debt secufe oats‘-
words, while he may take adea
rity ior his own claim. he cann0t
delay, ii not deiraud, other ,“
the collection oi their claims ‘De \\\\\\
the debtor’s property beyond 0
Ii he do so, he violates the luv‘?
iraudulent conveyances. The 1
is a. creditor does not ive him
tie up property oi the fiebtornqéf,
ior his own security, am} Dre‘ LT; 9 .\\\'¢
plicatiou to the payment, 01 0 _‘: 1 9 kg“
owing by the debtor; aud,ii 1‘
assign him all his ])i‘()pQ[-{_v 15
grossly inadequate debt, othei’
have good cause to complfll
transier is iraudulent as to the‘
case at bar the deiendants bi!‘
all their property to the I13
Such property 18 shown to
greatly in excess oi adequate ‘*6
the debts} argli prima fuc\i‘e 3:‘
cie t to us y an attac in --t,
irrgunds Bl)ec\l'ie(1 in the ufi\\1“‘“ ca
Fraud can rarely be pr0\'9“ Daft‘
Y
(at &\Q\l\'O
§
among those vv hich may he ii‘
himself are the (1QL‘\2:\\‘i‘i\\U“8 e
the debtor xv h He c\a\\\\\\\$§‘,t5 Y1
the propre-_1't._v xv hiclfv he ass?‘ q_ Y1
vey9(]__ 1_l1 us it‘, '\,a.mp\>€_'»_1, we
Neb_ 096, 5» N. \v . 1\ep.bi
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
06
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
ADMISSIONS. (Cue No. 81 
SMITH et al. v. ·BOYER et al. 
(45 X. W. 265, 29 Neb. 76.) 
8upreme Court of Nebra11ka. Marcil 11, 1890. 
Error to district court, Red Willow 
eoonty; CoCRRAN, Judge. 
R. M. Saavel.v and E. M. Bartlett, for 
plaintiffs In error. G. M. La.mbPrtsou, Rit-
tenhouse .t ~tarr, and H. W. Keyes, for ,1e-
fendantR In error. 
MAXWEl~L,J. On the 2-ltbof Sept11m-
ber, 11'187, the defeudHnbi exeentell an1l de-
livered to tbe 1~1r11t National Bank of lndi· 
anola and L. J. Holland a chattel mort&ra~ 
upon" all uur general atoek of merebamlhie, 
l'onRIRtlnJt of dry 1roods, groceries, boots 
and Mhoes. hate & caps,crockery,clothlnir. 
notions, Jewelry, eafo. and tihow-eal!e8, fh::t-
uree, and all our other goods and mer-
~handlee contained lo the brick building, 
titore-bouees, and ba&eement, tiltuate on lot 
~. block 33, In the town of Indianola, Ne-
braska. Also our book11 and book-ac-
eounts held and owing to us, the eaid firm 
of Boyer & Daf'irlson, on account of oar 
business In said store above named. "-to 
8t'(·ure the payment of fi).336.46, of which 
sum •2.000 Js alleged to ha\'e been doe the 
bank, and the remainder to H1Jll&nd. The 
exact valul• of the property mortguged 
does not appear, but tht\re 111 testlo1ouy 
that the goods were of the vaJue of about 
f12,000, while the amount due on the ac-
founts ls not shown. On the 26th day of 
Sept.ember 1887, 1:he plalntlfts commenced 
an action 'by attachment against the de-
fendants; the srouudH therefor, as stated 
In the atHda vi t for an 11.ttachmeot, belnK 
"that the def111ndantll have sold, aeslgned, 
and disposed of their property wl th the 
fraudulent Intent to cheat and defraud 
their creditors. and binder and delay them 
in the eollectloD of their debts, 11.od are 
about to sell, assign, and dlapoi..e of their 
property with the fraudulent Intent to 
rbeat and defl'aud their creditors, and 
hinder and delay them lo the collection of 
their debts and "that they are about to 
fonvert their property Into money for the 
purp011e of placing It beyond the reach of 
their creditor&, and are about to sell, as-
tllgn and dispose of a part of their proper-
ty with Intent to defraud their creditol'll, 
and have sold asstiroed, and disposed of a 
part of their property with the Intent to 
dl'fraud t."lelr creditors." Upon thi11 atll-
davlt belug ftled. and a like afHdavlt for 
garnishment and a.n order of the court 
obtained part of the 11ebt not then being 
due a wrlt of at tacbment was Issued a.ud 
dell~ered to the sherlft. at 8 o'clock P. M. 
of said day and returned, "not being ahle 
to come at •tbe property of Boyer and Da.-
'1daou or J amett J. Boyer or Charlf>8 .B. 
Davld~on members of said llrm, claJmE>d to 
be in the poHHE'eslon of,L. J. Ho~and,J. w. 
Dolan the .First Nat I Bank, et.c. No-
tice W&S aerved Upon tbe persons gar-
nlshe<J naming 1:bem, and requfrb1g them 
to apiiear and answer, etc. Tl1e dl'fend-
anta ftled a motJoJJ, sup~orte~ by aflfdE&-
tita, t.o dissolve the atrac meo 0 Poa su 1.>-
lltanttally two grounds, v-I•., lrl"E>l?uJarlt-y 
In Procurtn the 1Jame, llDd because tac 
grounds uiJ'n which t1::mJ!~~1/.,,m,e_nt wa.s 
iranted were CJD trU•· ll4l oppo-
sitlon toand in 111upport of thea.ttaebment 
werethereopon 61ed,and on the final bear-
In&' the attachment w88 dll!Charged, and 
the garnl&bet'8 release1l. 'J'he dl88olutlon 
of the attachment 18 now asalgned for er-
. ror. 
It l'eems to beeonceded bytbe attorneys 
for the plaintiff that the claim of the na-
tional bank Is bona tide, and probably 
that of Holland. The chattel mortgage 
seems to ha Ye been procured through the 
Instrumentality of the latter. A debtor In 
falling circumstances maypayoneor more 
of bl8 credltora, provided he deliver him 
no more than sumeieot to pay the debt. 
In Elwood v. May, 24 Neb. 875, 88 N. W. 
Rep. 793, it is said: "A cre~ltor may ob-
tain from a lall}ng deb~or pa.ymeut in lull 
of Ide claim, and be will not be chargea-
ble, upon that gronod alone, of seeking 
to defraud other credltot'll. Neither wlll 
the fact that the claim ls paid in goods or 
no greater value than the amount of the 
claim of lteell establish the fraudulent 
character of the transaction. S\l far as 
the testimony dl.l!closes, the df'fendants In 
error were pH-id In goods of value not ex-
ceeding the amount of their clalmsagalnet 
Cramer." To the same effect, Rothell v. 
Orlmes, 22 Neb. 528, 85 N. W. Rep. 892; Lef-
fel v. Srhermerhoro, 18 Neb. a42, 14 N. W. 
Rep. 418; Shelly v. Heater, 17 Neb. 505, 23 
N. W. Rep. 621. The case ol Grimes \"". 
Farrington, 19 Neb. 49, 26 N. W. Rep. 61~. 
Is not In conflict with these decltdon11, the 
exact value of the goods mortJl:age~ n~! 
being shown. The highest est\ma.e et.be 
that ca&e was about "$14,000, wb\ld not 
debtR aecured excet-ded $9,000. ~~ dse\\ tot' 
appear that the proprrty wo~be debt.a• 
more than the amount of 'f\gbt. w 
While a boa& tlde creditor b&B rg'\\t. t.O t.~ 
aeeure his l'lalm, yet he bas no :,t.oT. ~\\~oe 
up all the property of his de 46 \n "''\~e\" 
all of such property greatly eSC'~; \no~~-
the amount of the debt aecui---uat.e i\:al\a 
words, while he may take ade4 p\na~~ \1\ rityforhi&ownclatm.hecanno:;~~\\,\e.e\n: 
delay, II not defraud, other -p"f ~ ~ac g 
the collection of their cla\ln_. -.,P~b\\l\~~~e 
the debtor's property beyond __,, t.\\e.'V 'VO 
If he do so, he viola.tee the la~ ~~"\\e~e.-d 
fraudulent conveyances. The f ~ $>e"'\v. e.\)" 
18 a creditor does not g\ve ht~ ~ -t; ae"U\.~1'. 
tie op property of the debtorn O ~:: e:-,c ae'\lt.0 tlt 
for his own security. a.nd pre....-~ 0 \lt0 ~ 
plication to the payment ot O ~ ,,._ -~\'-~"" 
owing by the debtor; and, If ~ ~ p\\t. t\\e 
assign him all b\a property ._ < -ti&- '\~ :set' 
1rrouly inadequate debt, otbeJ .-~'1\'1eeee 
ha\"e good cause 'to comp\a\_..~ ~e.~e,e 
transfer ls fraudulent a.a to th:; --:--,,:::;.~ :'i \• 
eaee at bar the delendanta bll ~ ~ ~ ._-\t.. ~ 
'lll their pTopel.-ty to the u>p ~--. _.,,. ~ e"' . 
Such property 1.8 shown to e'~ ~ £>~ 
greatly i.c.. execas ot adequate r.- ~ ~~ ~~ 
the debts, and prfrna fucle tb ......--....-:;- ~ ~, 
eleqt to Justify an a.ttacnmen\-c:;. _. ~~ I grd'und11 epec\t\ecl. \n the aft\dll-q ~ 1li-~~ 
.Frnud can rarely be pTo"ed :ls_.....-~ ~ ~ 
I dence, and ln 1nost eases nee t_.~ ~ 
: be shown by tacts and c\'!"CU'1180 1l'e -~ ~ ! amongtboKe which tna;(ne t>T p.~~~~ ~ 
I himself are the dec\arnt\0118 e.n \~ ~ ~ 1 
I the llebtoi- ~·h\\e c\a.\m\n~t"t.e ~~ .... • ...,.. 
J the property 'W'b\ch he asse, ~· ~ 0 .::? veyell. Tl!_US ln Ca.m\)be\ ~e 
· Neb. 596. 3U N. W. Rep. S'i•• 
Case No. 31]
RELE VAN CY.
Conn, C. J.. quoting from Carney v. (‘ar-
ney. 7 Baxt. says: “As a general rule,
the declarations oi a party made after he
has parted with his interest in the subject-
matter of litigation cannot be received to
disparage the title or right of a party ac-
quired in good faith previous to the time
of making such declarations. But this
very just and reasonable principle must be
taken as inapplicable to cases of fraudu-
lent sales of property. If, for example, a
conveyance is made absolute on its face,
and the vendor continues to retain pos-
session of the property as before. this be-
ing prlma fucie evidence of fraud, a cred-
itor impeaehing such conveyance on the
ground of fraud may be admitted to prove
the declarations of the vendor. thus re-
taining the possession in relation to the
ownership, or the character of his posses-
sion of the property.”
A number of statements made b_v lio_v<-r,
and acts done by him, shortly after the
attachment was levied. and while he still
claimed an interest in the proptrty, that
tend to support the charge that the trans-
fer was made to defeat certain oi his cred-
itors, are shown by the record. while the
sheriff in an affidavit states “tlmt on the
\i9th day of October. 1887. I had suhptrnas
put into my hands by J. H. Berge. of In-
dianoia, a notarypublic, in the above-en-
titled cases, and also in behalf of Nave &
Mc(‘0rd in their claim against Boyer 8:
Davidson, to subpoena said James J. Boyer
in all of said cases. and (‘has. B. Davidson
and Matilda Davidson and others in said
above-entitled ca.ses,to appear before said
notary public, and give their depositions
in said cases, respectively, on the 21st and
22d days of ()ctober, 1887. as shown by
my returns on said subpoenas, and that
said subpd-nas were received on the 19th
of October, 1887. That about the time
said subpmnas were received, said James
J. Boyer was here in town, but I made
diligent search for him, and could not flnd
him anywhere. His wife had already gone
away. I went to his house on the lilth
and on the 20th and on the 21st of October,
1887. and knocked at the door, and it was
locked. After some talking of some per-
sons in the house, and after some little
time, L. J. Holland came to the door, and,
on being asked where Boyer was, said he
was not there. and did not know where
he was, and that L. J . Holland was the only
one to be seen in the house, although affi-
ant did not search the house. I searched
diligently ill the country and in this town
for said James J. Boyer, but could not
find him. I learned that he had been seen
90
riding his trotting horse across into Kan-
sas since I received said subpoenas. I have
good reasons to believe that the said
James J. Boyer knew that said subpoenas
were in my hands before he left, and that
he secreted himself, and hid awayirom me,
and absconded into the state of Kansas. to
avoid the service of said subpoenas, and to
avoid giving his testimony in the above-en-
titled and above-mentioned cases. That
said .\iatilda Davidson left on the train on
the very sa meday that said subptenas were
placed in my hands to take her deposi-
tions, and as I am informed went to Den-
ver. The suid James J. Boyer said to me,
about the time I was serving the execu-
tion on said oats heretofore mentioned,
that I would not get his horse, referring
to the trotting horse which I had had or-
ders to serve execution against; that I
thought l was pretty sharp, but I would
not get the horse. He knew where it was,
but I would not get. it. and he would not
tell me where it was. I was told that
some one was seen driving that horse that
evening, out west of town. Went out to
Steve Lyons‘ place, but, not finding the
horse there, came back. Met said James
J Boyer in the road about a mile out oi
town. and he skuiked off in the weeds to
keep me from knowing who he was. I
searched tiiligentlyfor the horse, but could
not find him. 1 verily believe. and have
good reasons to believe, that he was hid-
ing away, secreting, and concealing said
home to Prevent me from serving the ex-
ecution against it. and to prevent his cred-
HOPE IP01" appropriating it to the pay-
ment oi their demands, and that he has
removed said animalout of this state with
intent 130 k"€'p me from serving said execu-
U0" at thfl-t time in my hands. ” These
statements are not denied by Boyer.
In the affidavits of the defendants for
the dissolution of the attachment they
swear to the honesty of their intentions.
This statement would have had much
KPPMBT Weight if they had come into court.
find 1118-d_e a full and detailed statement of
their business, and the assets still in their
hands, if any,
Had they done so, perhaps it would
have been unnecessary to swear to a more
¢°"¢'|"§l011. and the latter is entitled to
h"_t Mme Welflht. The evidence fully sus-
tmns the grounds for the attachment, and
the court erred in discharging it.
The llldgment of the district court ls rc-
\’el‘Bed. the attachment reinsta ted, and
the cause remanded for further proceed-
ings. Reversed and remanded. The other
11111288 concur.
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C1.,e .So. 31] RELEVANCY. 
Coon, C. J .. quoting from Camey v. C'itr-
ney. 7 Bax t. 2>!4. Rays: "As a general mle, 
the declarations of a party madt> aftt>r he 
hRB partt>d with bis In tert'llt In tht> Rubjt~t. 
matter of Utlgatlon eoooot be rt>C·elved to 
dl111>arage the title or right of a party ac-
quired In good faith 11revloaM to the tlwe 
of making such dechtratlon11. But this 
very Just and reasonable prloclpfo must be 
taken a11 Inapplicable to c&BeH of framlu-
lent sales of property. It, for example, a 
conveyance le made absolute on Its face, 
and the vendor continues to retain l>Oll-
aeeslon of the property aR before. this be-
ing prlma farle evidence of fraud, a cl"f'd-
ltor Impeaching such conveyance on the 
ground of fraud may be admitted to prove 
the declarations of the vendor. thus re-
taining the po88e811lon In relation to the 
ownership, or the character of his pos11es-
alon of the property. " 
A number of statements made by Ho.n•r, 
and acts done by him, shortly after the 
attachment was levied, and while be i;t.lll 
claimed an Interest In the prop< rty, that 
ten<l to support the charge that the trans-
fer was made t-0 defeat certain of hlM errd-
ltors. are shown by the record, while the 
eberlft In an affldavlt etatt'fl "tlwt on the 
, 19th day of October, 1887, J had eubptl'nas 
put Into my hande by J . H. Berge, of In-
dianola, a notary. public, In the above~n­
tltled cases, and ahm In behalf of Ntwc & 
McCord In their <.:!aim against Boyer & 
Da vJdson, to subpama said James J. Boyer 
In all of said ca11ee, and Ch1t11. B. DavldHon 
and l!atllda Davidson and othel'B In said 
above-entitled cases, to appear before said 
notary puhllc, and give their depositions 
In Auld roses, rl'tlpectlvely, on the 2ltit and 
2"ld 1lays of October, 18R7, 88 shown by 
my returns on said subpamas, and that 
said subpn.•nas were received on the 19th 
of October, 1887. That about the time 
said subprenas were reeelved, said Jamee 
J. Boyer w&.B here In town, but I made 
diligent search for him, and could not find 
him anywhere. His wife had already gone 
away. I went to hie house on the l!lth 
and on the 20th a.nd on the 21st of Oc tolmr, 
1887. a.nd knocked at the door, a.od It was 
locked. After 1mme talking of some )Jer-
sons In the house, and after some little 
tlmP, L. J. Holland came to the door, and, 
on helng nKked where Boyer w111.1, Kaid he 
was not therl>, and did not know where 
be was, and that L. J. Holland wtts the only 
one to be seen In the house, although afti-
an t did not search the house. I 11curched 
dlllgen tly in the country and In this town 
for sold .Jamee J. Boyer, but could not 
find him. I learned that he ha.rl been seen 
90 
rldlns hie trottln,r: horse acl'Oll8 Into 'Kan-
sae smce I received eafd aubp12na11. I havt-
good reasons to belleve that the 1ald 
James J. Boyer knew that Hid 11ubpcl!nB1L 
were In my hands before he left, and that 
he &ecreted hlmRelf,and lddawayfrom me, 
and absconded In to the Htate of K a.nsas. to 
avoid the service of said subprenu, and to 
avoid gl vlng his tt'tltlmony In the above-en-
tltlNI and above-mentioned cases. That 
Maid 1-fatllda Da.,•hleon left on the train on 
the v.-ry81lmedaythateald euhpamaswere 
plac~l In my hands to take her de1msl-
tlone, and us I am Informed went to Den-
ver. The saltl James J. Boyer said to me, 
about the time I was serving t;he execu-
tion on said oats heretofore mentioned, 
that I would not get his horse, referring 
to the trotting horse which I had had or-
det"M to Ht>rve execution against; that I 
thou~ht I was pretty shar1>. bot I would 
not K<'t thft horse. He knew whett It was, 
but I would not get It. and hP would not 
tell rue where It wM. I waM told that 
1mme one was seen driving tha.t h0t11ethat 
evening, out WPHt of town. Went out to 
Steve LyonH' pince, but, not ftndtng the 
hoM!e there, came bark. Met said Jame& 
J Boyer In thP road nhout a mile out of 
town, and hP Mknlked oft tn the weeds tr> 
kf't'p me from knowing who he was. I 
searched diligently for the horse, but could 
not find him. I verily believe, and ha'l"l' 
good reasom1 to believe, that be was hid-
ing away, Bl'<'retlng, and concealing said 
honie to pre\'Pnt me from ser\'lng the ex-
ecu tlon agtllnRt It, and to prevent his cl"Pd-
ttors from appropriating It to the pay-
ment of their demands, and that be has 
removed 11ald animal out of thls11tate with 
Intent to k•'<'P me from ~rvlng said execu-
tion at that time In my hands." These 
statement11 n.re not denied by Boyer. 
In the affidavits of the defendants for 
the dl88olutlon of the attachment they 
swear to thP honesty of their Intentions. 
ThlH statement would have had much 
~renter weight tfthey had<'ome lntoeourt. 
and made a full and detalletl statement of 
their business, and the 888ets stlll In their 
hands, If any. 
Had they done 110, perhaps It would 
ha ,.e been unneceHHa.ry to sw~ar to a ml're 
conclusion, and the latter ts entitled to 
hut little weight. The evidence fully sus-
tains the grounds for the attachment, and 
the court erred In dlscha.rglng it. 
The Judgment of the district court Is re-
versed, the attachment reinstated, and 
the cause remanded for further proceed-
ings. Reversed and remanded. The other 
Judges concur. 
ADM iSSi ONS.
[Case ' No. 32
IDAHO FORWARDING CO v. FlRE1\iA.\"S
FUND INQ CO.
(29 Pac. 826, 8 Utah, 41.)
Supreme Court of Utah. April 1. 1892.
Appeal from district court, Weber county;
James A. Miner, Justice.
Action by the ldaho Forwarding (‘ompany
against the Fireman's Fund Insurance Com- -
puny on an alleged contract of lire insur-
ance. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant
appeals. Reversed.
Bennett, Marshall & Bradley, for appel-
lant. _A. R. Heywood, for respondent.
ZANE, C. J. The respondent alleged in
its complaint that on the 1st day oi.’ Febru-
9-1'1’, 1889, in consideration of $46.20 paid as
premium, its stock of goods at Hailey, Idaho,
was insured in the sum of $2,000 by ‘appel-
lant, for one year from the 13th day of the
same month, and that on the 2d day of the
following July the goods were destroyed
by fire. The plaintiiif relies upon a con-
tract in praesenti, not a contract to there-
after insure. Albert Kiesel, who had an
interest in plaintiffs business, and was man-
tiger thereof, testifled that-B. M. Mallory, the
agent of both parties, said to h-im about the
last of January or the first of February,
1889, that $5,000 of the insurance would ex-
pire; that witness told him to renew the
insurance, and that he said he would; that i
the poll;-leg of the North British & Mercan-
tile and F“-en1an’s Fund and Commercial
Union were about to expire; that Mallory
said he would reinsure him in the Fireman's
Fund for $2,000.
Mercantile for $1,000, and in the Commercial
Union for $2,000, \Vitness also said that the
insurance was to be for one year, and that
the premium wvas to be $2.20 per $100. B.
i.l_ _\[,,“m.y, the agent of both plaintiff and
defendant, testifled that, soon after his em- i
pioyment as bookkefiperv Albert Kiesel, man-
age; Qt the plaintifl’, instructed him to re-
new an policies upon expiration, and to keep
the amount of insurance to $14,500, and. to
my premiums 64) days after issuance of
policies; that he was under the impression
that the lapsed policies had been renewed;
that his intention was to renew them, but
he negligently had allowed them to lapse;
than as (flshier of the plaintiff. he was an-
ti10|-mid to use its funds I0 pay premiums,
and was dlrected by plaintiffs IIl1lllil,L‘.'Pl' to
do so, am 11, keep the insurance to $14,500.
The pl-emlwn was n0t Dflid, but‘ was tender-
cti six days after the 5t°¢'k 01' E°°d8 had been
consumed by fire.
The proof is that -‘fallow Who vvns
cashier of the P19-mtm’ and who Wits all-
thorized and instrllfli-’<’d "Y its "“"1llge1' to
have its stock of goods insured, and ‘Vho
was also the agent of the (l(.*f(>I|(I;|ur' al1(1
authorized to H13-kle ('0l1f1.ac_ts of gurance and to issue policies. Iieg-Ieote (1 to
do as he was instructed, fwd What be In-omis-
in the North British 8:‘
1 178; Myers v. Insurance Co., 121
_ tii‘i.' contends that he did.
ed piaintlifs manager he would do. He -had
an impression, as he-said, that the prop-
erty was insured, and neglected to issue the
policy. He was authorized to appropriate
piaintiiT’s money, in his hands as its cashier,
to the payment 01' the premium, but neglect-
ed to do that. If he had done so, he would
have acted as piaintii'|."s agent in so doing.
At the time of the conversation, about the
1st of February, relied upon to establish
the contract declared on, insurance then on
the property to be renewed had not expired.
It did not expire until the 13th day of that
month. It was the duty of Mallory, un-
der the instructions of plaintiff's manager,
to continue the risk after the old policy ex-
pired by reinsuring, but the evidence shows
that he neglected to do this. For the fail-
ure to follow plaintiff's orders the defend-
ant cannot bc held responsible. It is ap-
parent that .\iailor ' tailed to make the con-
tract that he was authorized and instruct-
ed- by plaintiff to make. An agreement to
make a contract at a future day is not the
equivalent of the one to be made, or of a
present contract, though all the terms to
be put in the lilttel‘ are agreed uxwm If
one of the parties to the first a.‘.'1'¢‘i-'l1l1‘llt
refuses to bind himself when the time
comes, the court may compel a specific Pm"
formance of it, if from the facts it would
be equitable to do so; and if pcrfoi-man¢‘®
is decreed a judmnent may be ente1‘\“1 ‘K.
the same case for the amount found mm“.
due the plaintifi’ on the coi1tl‘&('@; weyma,
amount is then due the plaintiff D3’ “S teither
or an action may be instituted 01\_ “ K y the
party refuses to comply with V &\\°
language used on the ist of F" i\m'
defendant did not assume the rig’
vl<1\l‘
pg
a
‘4 \=\
n’i‘°‘
to "°
had reference to insurance the!
made. _ c°“‘“e 0°‘-
The plaintlfl has set up in l1i’:¢i°“ “t-.\\\"_
a contract in praesenti. T1115 :1 ",- "' \\ ‘
for specific performance. Taylo -/
aiice Co., 47 \\'is. 366, 2 1\Y_ W’.
N. W. 584; Sargent v, 153,“-¢1~
N- Y- 626; Dlllllillir. V. Insurance
414; Markey v. Insur-um-,9 Q0.-
\o\“‘
()’ltelll_v v. Corporation, 101 N-_~
N. E. 568. C0nii\\e\'(-ial _\;M1Qm\i
O0. v. Union hlut. Ins. Co., 19
cited by counsel for respondelil &
equity cause to (3()\\)D\(_~tg the 9f’, i
formance of a contract to make 7:’ 43 ‘K’
The court in that case held in 14,-! i 1-1, \‘
for the specific performance of \i:;<.’ 1 1‘ ;;0
should be inuintnined, and W “1 i, =':'; ,5
admitted that defendants “'°“u1 ‘F 1‘
as for a total loss on the D°“cy 9‘) 4 '
conformity vvith the contract‘ \
amount was then payable. am
ther question reunained to
was proper to <1e(-rec the
money \\-'ll\('1'l \v0\\1\\ \\-.\\'c _
the policy if it had been “J”
p
if-I’;
i-S
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ADMISSIONS. [Case No. 3<? 
IDAHO FORWARDING CO v. FIRE~lA..'\'S 
FUND INS. CO. 
(29 Pac. 826, 8 \:tab, 41.) 
Supl'('me Court of Utah. April 1. 1892. 
Appeal from district court, Weber county; 
James A. ll.lner, Justice. 
Action by the Idaho l~orwardlng ( 'om1111ny 
agalDBt the J<'ireman·s J<'und Insura1wi> Com-
IJllny on nn allt>ged contract of tire lnsur-
anct>. .Judgment tor plaintiff. Defendant 
appeals. Reversed. 
Bennett, .Marshall & Bradley, tor appel-
lant .A. R. Heywood, for respondent. 
ed plaintiff's manager be would do. He had 
a.n Impression, as he said, that the pl'Op-
erty was Insured, and negle<'ted to Issue the 
polll'y. He was authorb1ed to appropriate 
plalntllf's money, In his hnncls us Its rosbler, 
to the payment of the premium. hut neglect-
ed to do that. If he had done so, he would 
have al'ted as l>lalntl!T's agent In so doing. 
At the time ot the conversation, nbout the 
1st of February, relied upon to establish 
the contract de<•lared on, lnsurmwe then on 
the property to be renewed lmd not expired. 
It did not expire until the t:3th dny of that 
month. It was the duty of linllory, un-
der the Instructions of plaintift''s manager, 
ZANE, C. J. The respondent alleged in to continue the risk n!ter the olcl policy ex-
its complaint that on the lat day of Febru- pired by relnsurlng, but the t~\·ldenee shows 
ary, 1889, in consideration of $!6.20 pald as that he negle<"ted to do this. For thP fnll-
premlum, Its stock of goods at Halley, Idaho, ure to follow plaintiff's orders the tl1•f1•ml-
was Jnsured In the sum of $2,000 by appel- ant cannot be held responslhh•. It 111 1111-
Iant, f<>r one year from the 13th day of the parent that llnllory failed to mnkl' till' eon-
l!Bme month, and that on the 2d day of the tract that he was authorized 111111 hu~truet­
tolloWfng July the goods were destroyed ed- by plaintift' to make. An agreement to 
by fire. The plaintltr relies upon a con- make a contn1et at a future dny Is not the 
tract Jn pnesenti, not a contract to there- equivalent of the one to be mn<lt>, or of 11. 
after Jnsure. Albert Kiesel, who had an present contract, though all the terms to 
lllterest Jn pJaJntilf"s buslneBB, and was man- be put in the latter are agre1•d upon. If 
ager thereof, testified that ·B. ll. Mallory, the one of the parties to the tln1t ngreenwnt 
agent of both parties, said to him about the refuses to bind himself when the ttuw 
last ot January or the first ot February, comes, the court may compel n s11t>dfiP pPr-
1880, that $5,000 o~ the Insurance would ex- formance of It, It from the fncts It would 
Plre; that witness told him to renew the be equitable to do so; and If p!'rfonnn.nce 
Insurance, and tllat he said he would; that Is deert>l'd a jmlgtnent may he enter~~ ~~­
the policies or the North British & Mercau- the same c1uit• for the amount found f nnY 
Ille and I<'lreman's Fund and Commercial due the pl11l11tltr on the contract. \ teTlU"• 
Union were about: to expin•; that llallory 111nount Is tlwn due the plalntitI l>Y \t~t e\t\\el" 
l!llld he would reinsure him In the Fh-emun·s or an nl"tlon 11111y be i11stitutPll on \t Y>Y -t\''' 
J.'und for $2,000. in the :Xorth British & party refuses to comply with \t.. ~ t.\''-' 
- .1wwa \-n-Mercantlle for $1,000, and in the Commercial language usPd on thP lst of l· "' . \\,e \'\t\. e 
Union tor $2,000- "Vitness also ,j)ald that the , defendant did not ui,;s11111e tl1e ri t-4~~ \\'u~n.1te 
Insurance "·as t:o be for one year, an<l that tllf contends that he llhl. ·rl••• ... iW'C '-0 
the prt-wlum ·was to be $2.20 per $I<IO. B. had ref!'rt•nce to lnsurunce th~,,-._•t )\n.\U'-
ll. llnllory, the agent of both plaintiff and made. ~ .co'"\'11 ~o'­
defeudant, testified tbat, soon after his em- The plalntllf has set up 1.11 1••·:_.-~(.'~ \""""''C: 
ployll).ent as bo<>kkeeper, Albert Kiesel, n1an- a contract In pIWsentl. Tbls a•~--.. - "'· \,u~ ~-
tr 1 0,,... ,,,.,,.,._,.... o'' ager of the plalntl , nstructed him to re- for specific pertormnnce. Tayl p- •· CP"' \\\. 
new all polic•ies upon expiration, and to keep unet• Co. 47 " "Is. 3HH 2 .,., "1'. .1-e ~ . 
'!" .: ' .i..'"'i. H ' ---~ -40•" ,\\\.':°';-\· 
the amount of Insurance to $14,500, and. to N. \\. ;:,84; Sargent v. lnsnrt._....-  :i..S • ·~.\~·. 
!Jlly Pl"emhtnis 60 days after IBRunnce of N. Y. 620; Dinning v. lnsuruncC ~ .,_#': .. :~ :. 
policies; that be was under the lmpl"l.'tislon 414; Markey v. lnsurnnl~e cod ';:!!"' ~ _ '5~'\w' · 
that the lapsed policies had been r1mewed; ; li8; llyers v. Iusurnuce Co., 12j.. ~ • .._-\''. · ·;,\"i'-· 
that his Intention was to renew them, but · O'Ht>llly v. Col"pOrnt\on. 101 N". ~- -!.,,.--" ''." ~ '"'' 
he negligently bad allowed them to lapse; I N'. E. ;;os. Connnerl"inl ~ul\ounl ~ y~ ._,~-i: \!''~ 
that, as msbier of the plnintilf, lie w11t1 au- : Co. v. Union ~lut. lus. Co., 1~ -C:::::""' JC.-~ i\'~'°'~,,.: • 
thorlzl'd to use tts fundA to 1:11y premiums. \ elted by counsel for re~ponde~ ..:- -,r ,,e '' 
and was directed by pll1fntl.tf s mtUUJJ!°Pl" to ' equity l'DUs<> to cu1uplete the EJ$l'°' • ~ -«:. .,t~ b I - ,~ ~n· do so, and to keep t P usnrance to :fi14,a0ll. forman<'e of a contract to make ~ 4:.-- i; t 
The premlq,JD '\11."&S not paid, but"' wus fon<ft!r- The <·ourt \u that. case be\t\ tl•· -i.• "..,,. -tl .. ~ \' 
ed six days after the stock ot goods Ji.ad been for the s1w<•lt\c })ert'.ormance of t ~ ----.. _?~ ~\.' 
consumed by tlre- should be u1u.\uta\ned, and it ~ ~ ,_ ~ ._ :1.1' 
The proof ts that Jfallory, l\"ho w·:1s admitted that dPfenl\ants woulL~< -C:: ~, 
cashier of the pJa.Jntflf, and Who lVas au- I as for a totul loss on t\1e -po\\cS pc:Jl. ~· 
tborlzed and Instructed fly Its ll1un11Ki>l" t:o conformity vvit:h the couttact. P. t'~•-s- ..... ...,. 
have Its stock o~ goods Insured, :1n<1 who 11mount ·waM then pn)'ab\e, aud t~~e-' ~ :11 
was nlso the agent ot the defP1Jrl11nt and i ther quc>Rtion. remu'ixU.'l\ to \JC.,_~£>._-..--_.!:. 
authorized by Jt to wake contracts ~t lLi- was proper to d ... ~ .... ,.,,~ \\W \)u.'J :i. '->._-. - ...--
surance and to Jssue policies, lleg/f'C'ted t<> money 'vhl<·h 'voul'\ \1a\"C ,,e•·~.:-~ -
do as he w88 Instructed, and what he JJl'OwlE/6- the policy tr lt hu.d bl.~n \t!>~ 
Case No. 32]
BELEVANCY.
born v. insurance Co., 16 Gray, 44s, and
Putnam v. insurance Co., 123 Mass. 3'.’-1,
relied upon by respondent's counsel, it was
held that the evidence tended to show that
tl1e risk was to commence at the time the
contracts sued on were made. The facts of
these cases are not analogous to the case in
hand. in them the insurers assumed the
risk by the contracts sued on.
After the witness Albert Kiesel bad nar-
rated the conversation between himself and
Mallory on the 1st day of February, plain-
tilY‘s counsel propounded this question:
"Now, if you know, how long was the in-
surance to be?" To which counsel for de-
fendant objected on the ground that the
conclusion of the witness was called for,
and not the language used, or the substance
of it. The objection was overruled by the
court, and defendant excepted. This rul-
ing is assigned as error. The intentions of
the parties to contracts must be ascertained
from the language used in them, or in mak-
ing them, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, and this rule applies to the
interpretation of verbal contracts as well as
to written ones. It \vas improper to call
for the conclusion of the witness as to the
term of the insurance, or as to the premium
to be paid. Those facts should have been
found from the language used by the con-
tractors. They could not be ascertained
from the inferences and conclusions of the
witness.
\Vitnesses were pernilttedp over the ob-
jections ot defendant’s counsel. to testify
to admissions of the agent. Mallory. made
long after the alleged contract was made,
to the effect that the property was insured-
To the ruling of the court in overruling such
objections the counsel for the defendant ex-
cepted, and assigns the same as error. A
witness may testify to the language of an
agent in making an oral contract. because
such language is within the agent's author-
ity. Bcing authorized to make the contract.
his language in making it is authorized by
the principal. But authority to make a
Q2 .
contract does not empower the agent at a.
subsequent time to admit away his prin-
cipal‘s rights. The admissions of an agent
are admissible so far as lllc principal has
authorized them to be made, and no fur-
ther. Greenleaf says: "But it must be re-
membered that the admission of the agent
cannot always be assimilated to the ad-
mission of the principal. The party's own
admission. whenever lnade, may be given
in evidence against him; but the admission
or declaration of his agent binds him only
\\‘hcll it is made during the continuance of
the agency in regard to a transaction then
depending. et dum tervet opus. It is be-
cause it is a verbal act, and part of the res
gestm, that it is admissible at all; and there-
fore it is not necessary to call the agent
himself to prove it." 1 Greenl. Ev. Q 113.
The court said in the case oi’ Railroad G0.
v. O'Brien. 119 U. S. 99, T Sup. Ct. 118: “Re-
ferring to the rule as stated by Mr. Justice
Story in his treatise on Agency. (section
13-i.) that, ‘where the acts of the agent will
bind the principal, there his representations,
declarations, and admissions respecting the
subject-matter will also bind him. if made
at the same time. and constituting a part of
the res gesta-.‘ 'l‘hc court. speaking by Mr.
Justice Strong, said: ‘A close attention to
this rule. which is of universal acceptance.
will solve almost every difliculty. But an
act done by an agent cannot be varied,
qualified, or explained either by his declara-
tions. which amount to no more than a mere
narrative of a past occurrence, or by an
isolated conversation held. or an isolated act
done, at a later period. The reason is that
the agent to do the act is not authorized to
narrate what he had done. or how he had
done it, and his declaration is no part of the
res gestae.’ " For the reasons above indicat-
ed the court is of the opinion that the judg-
ment of the court below should be reversed.
and that a new trial should be granted.
ANDERSON and BLACKBURN, J.i., con-
cur.
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Case No. 82] BELEV.\NCY. 
born v. Insurance Co., 16 Grn,r, 4-1.'4, anll 
Putnam v. Inaurance Co., 123 Mus. 3:!4, 
relled upon by re11pondenfs counsel, It watt 
held that the evidence tended to show that 
the risk was to commenre at the ttme the 
<·ontra<·ts stwd on wen> mnde. The f1wt11 of 
these <'lll1t'S are not analogous to the <·nse ln 
hand. In them the Insurers &1111tmwd the 
risk by the contracts sued on. 
After the wltnt>SK Albf'rt KIPl!t'l had nar-
rated the ronversatlon between hlm8f'l! aml 
Mallory on the 1st day of February, plaln-
tUl"s counsel propounded this <1ue.-t1011: 
":Sow, lf you know, how long was tht> In-
surance to be?" To whl<•h <'Ounsel for de-
fendant objected on the ground that the 
conclusion of the witness WR.II called !or, 
and not the language used, or the s11l)llta11<-e 
ot tt. The objection was overruled h,r the 
rourt, and defendant exl'epted. This rul-
ing la ll88lgned as error. The Intentions ot 
the parties to contracts must be aS<.'t'rtitlnt><l 
from the language used ln thew, or ln wak-
ing them, In the light of the surrounding 
circumstances, and thlB rule a1111ll<•11 to the 
Interpretation of verbal contra<·ts as well as 
to written ones. It was lm11n1pt•r to call 
for the con<"luslon of the wltne1111 1111 to the 
term of the lnsurau<-e, or as to the premium 
to be paid. Those facts should have been 
found fron1 the lanJCUage used by the <'<>n-
tra<'tol'll. They could not bf' as<'f'rtalned 
from the lnferenC'eS and ron<'lusloDB ot the 
wltneaa. 
Wltne88e8 were permitted, · over the ob-
jections of defendant's rounsel, to tt-stlty 
to adm1881ons of the 111:ent, Mallory. made 
long after the alleged contract was wade, 
to the effect that the property was Insured. 
To the nutng of the rourt in overruling such 
objectloDB the couDBel for the defendant ex-
cepted, and assigns the same as error. A 
witness may testify to the language of an 
agent in making aa oral contnu·t, h<'<·nutte 
such language la within the agent'& author-
ity. Being authorized to make the rontl"llet. 
· his language lo making It ls authorized by 
the principal. But authority to make & 
9'J . 
<'Ontnu·t does not em1>0wer the agent at a 
1ubsequent time to admit nway his prtn-
<'lpal's rlghtM. Thl" 1tdmh11doll8 of an agent 
al"t' adwl111Jlble BO far a11 tht> principal hlul 
authorized them to be wnde, and no fur-
ther. Greenlt-af says: "But It must be re-
membered that the adml881on of the agent 
eannot always be a88lmUated to the ad-
mission of the principal. The party's own 
admlRHlon, whenever ·made, may be given 
ln el'ldt>n<-e against him; but the admlaslon 
or dedaratlon of his agent blndtt him only 
wh1•11 It ls wade doling the continuance of 
the ageney ln regard to a transaction then 
<lependlng, et dum fervet opus. It le be-
<·auee It Is a verbal act, and part of the ree 
gt>Btll', that It la admlsslble at all; and there-
fore It ls not nece888ry to call the agent 
hlm111•lf to prove it." 1 Hreenl. Ev. I 113. 
Tht• <-ourt Mid In the <'&Be of Railroad Co. 
v. O'Brh•n, UH U. S. 00, 7 Hu11. Ct. 118: "Re-
ferring to the rult> as statl'<I by Mr. Justice 
8tory In hb1 treatise on .A~n<'y, (eectlon 
134,) that, ·where the acts of the agent will 
hind the prlnelpal, tbt>re his re11rt'tlentatlons, 
declarations, and admi88lon1 ree1iectlng the 
subject-matter will also bind hlw, if made 
at the samt> time. and constituting a part of 
the res Kt'llta•.' The rourt. speaking by Mr. 
Justlre Strong, said: 'A <'lose attention to 
this rule. whl<·h Is of unlvel'll81 8(-ceptnn<'f'. 
will solve almost every dltDcult,r. But an 
act done by an agent cannot be varied, 
quall,ded, or explained either by his declara-
tions, whl<'h amount to no more than a mere 
narratl\'e of a past oceurren<'P, or by an 
Isolated ronvel'IVl.tlon held. or an Isolated &<'t 
done, at a later period. The reason Is that 
the agent to do the act Is not authorized te 
narrate what he had done, or bow be had 
done It, and hie deC'laratlon la no part of the 
res geetJP..' " 14'or the l'EeBOne above Indicat-
ed the rourt IA of the opinion that the judg-
ment of the court below should be revertled, 
and that a new trial should be granted. 
ANDERSON and BLACKBURN, JJ., con-
cur. 
• 
ADMISSIONS.
[Case No. 33
OVER v. SCIIIFFLING.
(26 N. E. 91. 102 Ind. 191.)
S“m-Qynq Court of Indiana. April 24. 1897».
Appeal from circuit court, Marlon coun-
tyh. Dailey and G. IV. IVinpcun_r, for ap-
llant. S. Cla_i'poul_ IV. A. Ken-ham,und
B, F. ii/‘atts, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J. The coin plaint of the ap-
pellee alleges that the a |>peilantmalicious-
iy published a libel; that clielihelcius nutm-
ter was contained in a letter wr ttcn >y
the latter to a corporation called the“ En-
¢au‘stic '1‘lle Company, ’]’ by ;Vh%_l:1 fl}ett"l>-
lee was then cmp oyec . Ic e cr.
‘rinitting the date. address, signature, and
formal part, is as follows : “ Mr. Schifiiiml
owes me on work dune on your dies, ctc..
$33. If you would consent to retain such
amount out ofany ninney due him from
yomlct me know by return nlall. lfS‘0\1 Wm
not consent to do so. I shall have to file a
mechanic's lien on the goods. Hcgot them
of me by lying, First he said he would
bring an order h-Om you, ’1‘hen, he would
my cash for them before he took them
away. He thcn watched his chances, and
took them when the furern an was not in,
and now TGIUHUQ avlnen 1;, ” It is also al-
leged that the f,’ ' euee wu's dismissed
from the service cgjfptlie corporation to
whom the lett r ' B addressed, and he
deinanded spa,-lg] :13] gen9l'al damages.
he language 0; the letter charges the
flflilrllee with | .| ubtained D"°i>9l‘l.V
bi’ ('0l‘rupt a, §mdim§ DIIUSIZ nieans. It is
not necessar ni sd ‘I’ tn constitute even
verbal mandy’ n or! e 1093 libel, that the
charge that er: muc .1; or criminal act was
committed sh u)lri-gp naade in direct terms.
eqnestion im ( I‘: cases is, what mean-
ing did the 1 n sue n1 r)]()\'el1 convey to
the mind ,,,“‘{§§“§§,-Heoli to. wvhoin it was
llfllll-ngsed -I smpr V jenkins, 97 Ind. 430.
put in writil1$’~' ‘Vin Often constitute
Rtitntp ‘vhichv ll SDUk(’1'l- ‘iv
- - r.
very deal: t iunable sin n de-
received
den-stooqand read the ‘at ta; h a rged the up-
ould not con-
th t the xv vi tel‘ .
pellee 1 *1 - 1 the propeity
by fr-av‘: th h‘“’m5 °bta‘aI_]r?:1_ thus under-
qulent means.
stood the languagewa
t e v. Brames.
.1?!‘ wasnot a D1’
he informal’-\:_’€_d
pose for - as vomntee- "eyed to the ap-
pe|]e0,s 9:‘) high it was cons
1' r the benefit
of the Wribl 93'9" ‘vas so‘e‘§‘:t0intcn.led to
benefit t
e1‘-fin“ “rag nflivlnil him. in
W0-"er t ui-pose. infor-
a nil 79" gig gs-otecticin against
(1 ubtedlylibel-
‘?3}‘,"‘ 3. l6l.
ivilegedcommunb
n 51-, professes to
and the pur-
The up '~I"l;\'l:!;Itl-trod u¢ed Siunueld Slips,
.n - . ne< n c 1 e ,
he had beeigfxfigga at [treat
I the redirect ex-
xuninatiunq Qt the ('l0:§e‘()] this question:
“State wh ’ on reported those
facts in this mutter to l\lr.
over.” , ' 'ecti0n being‘ made. the
1 aén oll1)i_|s “fa tpn']€IltZ We loffer
. th { e 12 ‘fitiie-1-18 communicated
()ver before the 15th
day of June, the day the letter was writ-
ten.” In our opinion the offer was too
general. for we do not believe it was the
duty of the trial court to examine the
mass of testimony to ' determine what
facts were competent. On the contrary,
we think it was counsel's duty to specific-
ally state the facts which they expected
to show that the witness communicated
to their client. There were some facts
stated in the testimony of the witness
that it would not have been proper to
communicate to the appellant, and the
court was not bound to analyze the testi-
n_lony.a-nd silt out the competent from
the incompetent. This should have been
done by the question and offer of the coun-
sci.
The appellee testified that he was direct-
ed by the appellant to his foreman, Mr.
Cox, and thereupon the court permitted
the appellee to testify what was said to
him by the foreman. In this there was no
error. Wherea party directs another to a.
third person for information or direc-
tions, he is bound by the statements of
such third person.
Our cases decide that, where the intent
with which an act is done becomes mate-
rial. it is proper to ask what it was. City
of Columbus v. Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Greer v.
State, 53 Ind. 420; White \'. State, 53 Ind.
595, (vlde page 596;) Shockey v. Mills, 71
Ind. 288; Parrish v. Thurston, 87 ind. 437,
(ride page 440.) We think that the ques-
tion asked the appelle-e,and objected to by
the appellant. is fairly within the princi-
pledccinrcd in these cases. It is compe-
tent in many cases, such as cases of fraud
and the like, to ask a party a direct q\1°'5'
tion, and we think this is an anaioguus
case. So, too. where a negative ll-1 W :f_
proved, it is often competent to 11$“ ‘tat
rect question. The reason for this ls ‘ '
. . ‘ \ B
by proving affirmative facts to est8\:.\:R:nil
negative conclusion, too much “me
would be gone over, and too ll‘l‘“'t (“ere
com-iumcd. Another reason is Th
are some cases where it is pructlcf’ e
possible to exclude every hypot
aconrse of aiilrmatlve question8¢c 6
the law is a practical science, l no
times permits a direct question 9,, ‘
swer upon a negative prupositl0',-I"?,
were conceded that the court ere ‘_.\\
permitting the appellee to iuqul ‘;f _ ’»
the aggregate amount in vahll? tiqj .
that had been made by the Encu\19_ ‘J r
(‘ompa.n_v, within a dcsigllatmi llmflpi ,
available error was cuinmittcd. Dig‘
reason that the grounds of 0“1i5_
were not specifically 3‘“‘_ted- 1,,-U1
think no error was c0\nnntted.tO pi ‘Q
reason that the testiinuny teniled gsa i
the amount of the Sl.JQ¢la\ da‘““’ 1
tallied by the nppell€1.*-
The court refused tn give t \\ 1
struction asked by the “ppe“B{\;§c11lt
reads thus: “The (l1.:fex1\1an\"»__i\1‘\e“1‘n.0t¢2 I ;
by his unswenadnnts than fihemus, ‘1
letter which is allei-2°“ tt-é°‘h§,. r ’ ‘
says that the statenic-n \
By this answer the “erenda‘“' on y
_ 3 110$
he wrote the i8tter‘.‘ tilO\‘£:\\_\:v“_' :
that plaintiff was lnplov oi the hull (7
that he was in the e t. “the burden ll‘ 11
tic Tile Compa 11>’!-lo :7“ th at he was 1" g
the pluintiti to B
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ADMISSIONS. [Case No. 3.'J 
OVER v. SCIIIFFLDiG. 
(26 N. E. 91, 102 Ind. 191.) 
Supreme Court of J:ndiana. April 24. 1R8!'>. 
Appeal 'from circuit court, Marlon coun-
ty. 
H. Dalley and G. "JV. 'Wlnpenn.r, for ap. 
peUant. S. Claypool. lV. A. Ketd1am,and 
B. F. Wa~ts. for appeUee. 
ELLIOTT, .T. The complaint of the ap-
peUee allegee that the a J>pellttnt malleloue-
ly published a libel; that t;bellheloa11 mllt-
ter watJ contained In a Jetter written by 
tbe latter to a corpora "tlon called the" En-
caosttc '.l'lle Company. " by whom the "P-
pl'llee was then eni1tloyed. The letter, 
omitting the date, addreH&, 1dp:nature, and 
formal port, Is as followa: 06 ~Jr. &hlftlln~ 
owes me on work done on your dlt'ff, etc.'., 
'33. If ;you would coneen t: to l"f'taln Ruch 
amount out of any DJ ouey d ne him from 
you, let me know by re1:urn nut II. II you will 
notcoD&t>ntto«1oso I shall havetofllPa 
mechanic's Jlt>non th~ goods. Hep:otthem 
of me by lying. FiMtt: Ile Maid he would 
bring an order from you. Then, he would 
ll&Y cash for them before he took them 
away. He then watched his chancefl, and 
took them whpn tile foreman was not In, 
anduowrefua..11 pavment;.'' .Itlsalitoal-
leged that the ap(>ellee W"llA dlsmlRHed 
from the serf'lce of the corporation to 
whom thp letter wae addreMMed, and be 
del!11lndt>d special and general damagea. 
'1 he language of the lfitt: ter charges the 
appl'llee " ' Ith having obtained property 
by corrupt and dlAlionest n1eonR. It ls 
not neceeeary In orde .. to constitute even 
verbal aJander much 1088 libel, that the ~harire that a l.~)rropt or crtmtnal at•t wtt11 
committed Fihooldbe made In dla"f'Ct termR. 
The QDPRtlon In such caset'I ts. what mean-
ing did the Ian e~ployed convey to 
the mind of tfoaKe rM<>D to -whom It was 
ad1ll'f'llsed? ie pe :Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430. 
Word11 Put lns~n~~l v.; .;,n1 orten constitute 
a libel Whl wr 0~ wut1ld not coo-
Rtltut; ch, H s1mken. We think It 
very de:~\1h=:~~~ :~~;~~~·te offll'ers who 
1'Ctllvf'd anc1 d tb \ett:er must have un-
derstool) ~h rea e rtter charged the op-
pellee With at thew tne•l the property 
by fraoa having obtn <l thus unrler-
stood, th:~ent means, a.~ndoubtedly llbel-
ouR. Hakeangua~ewa95 Jnd. 161. 
Theletter "V. Brames. r·l~Uegedcommonl· 
cation. Tb ~asnot a l\on \t i>roft'Mites to 
contain 'VW'" e lnforma ed end the pur-
JIOlle for~ Gs volunteer n ~eyed to the ap-
JJellec'a eru hleh It was colelY for tbe benetlt 
of the w,./~loyer waB s:;: not lnten.Jed to 
heneftt the- er, and web • Jith·lni;r him, In 
good faith ~mployer J~Bt pUl'JlOHf', lnfor-
matton n~~ .a ncl for a.btl! protection against 
a knavt11 h t-c .. ary for Theap1>:~•·V"ant. doced Sumuel Shue, 
and aftel' 111Q.nt tnt~~D cxamlnPd In chief, 
and ha<t b •e bad -e.s:iunlned at great 
lenarth, an<} ~n crosFt se of the redln..Ct ex-
!'mlnatton ~ t: the <-1~.iked this qut>stlon: 
State "IVb 9 ••e was t you reported thrRe 
!art.a In ~~"t:.her or f 0 tbls matter to i\lr. 
Over." tJ e.-enr.e 0 ton being: made, the 
connsel n:.l>o.~ obJect -ta tf"ment: "We offt>r 
to show l:h~Ql@t t:hl& ~tnt-MR cummunlcutPd 
au thewe .~"'t: t;blff .. ~r over before the 15th 
-~t;e to~ • 
day of JoOP., the day tbe letter was writ-
ten.,, In our opinion the offer was too 
genf'rnl. for we do not bellen It wa11 the 
duty of the triul court to examine the 
mass or testimony to . determine what 
facts we~ competent. On the contrary, 
we think it was counsel's duty to speclllc-
ally stat.- the facts which they expected 
to 8how that tJ1e wltn"88 communicated 
to their client. There were some facts 
stated tu the testimony of the wltnet48 
thnt It would not have been proper to 
communicate to the appellant, and the 
court was not bound to analyse the ttllltl· 
mony, and 11lft out the competent from 
the Incompetent. 'fhlM 11bould have been 
done by the question and offer of ~be coun-
sel. 
The appellee testlfled that he was direct. 
ed by tbe appelluut to his foreman, Mr. 
Cox, and thereupon the court permitted 
the apJ>ellee to testify what was said to 
him by tba foreman. Io this there was no 
error. Whe1-ea party dlrel'ts anuthPr to a 
third person for Information or direc-
tions, he ls hound by tile statements of 
such third person. 
Our caees decide that, where the Intent 
with which en act Is done hecomes mat&-
rlal, It ls proper to ask what It was. Clty 
of Columbus v. Dahn, 86 Ind. 330; Greer v. 
State, 58 Ind. 420; White v. State, 53 Ind. 
595, (vlde page 596;) ~hockey v. Mill11, 71 
Ind.~; Parrish v. Thurston, 87 Ind. 487, 
(vlde page 440.) We think that the ques-
tion uked the appellee, and objecte<l to by 
the appellant, Is fairly within the princi-
ple llt..oelurrd In thetie cases. It Is corupo-
tent In many cases, 11ucb as cases of fraud 
and the like, to ask a pRrty a dll'el.·t ques-
tion, ond we think this ls an analogous 
Cll&e. 80, too, where a negative \s tu be 
proved, It Is often competent to ask~ d~-
rect question. The rea11on for tblS ls t b a 
by proving ufflrmatlve facts to· esta\>~~'!in<l 
neirutl\'e conclusion, too much g;:i-t.\ll>e 
wonld be gone over, and too 111'.,c t owi~ 
conMumed. Another reason \s 1"ll ~\\S \tn.-
a1-e some c:aites Whl're It ls prnct\Ci',e8'"' '-l~,. 
possible to exclude every bypot ~~~\:e.­
a l'ourse or atttrmatlve questions. e 0 ll-"" 
the law ts a practical selenee, '!i>il \\ \'\. 
times permits a direct qm.'st\on ~ ~ \."n 
ewer upon a negative pro1>os\t\01}~,..f4 'C.~ 
were conceded thllt the court e e ''\\ , 
permitting the appellre to \uqult" .~~ _ .. ,.:-~ 
the aggregate amount In vn\ue -c:;l~j. \ 
that had been made by tbe Encuus.1 ,7' -C:: • l'ompan;v, within a deRlgnet••d {)C1f< 7 f"",,.. ._. J ... 
avalluble error was con11ll\tted. j~ -£. 
reaRon thllt the groun<lH of o~~ -C : 
were not spec:lftcally stated. v 0 ' ~ '-' 
think no error was co1n1u\tted, f fft ~ • 
reason that the testhnony ten<led toe~ • 
the umonnt of the special damn~ f;: • 
talned by the uppellee. orfJ ., . 
The t•oort refuse<l to gtve tbP. ~ J • r 
structlon asked by the R 1>pe\lant, c,. i.{- J 
reads thus: "'l'he delcn\lant In Utl~0te ? 11 by hie onswer, al11nlts that hew uH. l ._ 
letter whil'h Is alleJJ:<:>d to be U~ie\o re rt'~ 1 
soys that the 11tate111ents tbeieo~\ ll adtJ' • 
By this nnswer the clef'endan Yt nil rJ ~ · 
. be does no ·-he wrote the Jet t:er • 1 tt1ere\lY • ~ 
that plaintiff was clul~~;;e~t tbe 1~n1·1• 1:~ 
that he was In the e•Bl~ t th"' bur<len b• t:l.JI 
tlcTlleCompan)o"· ~ "tbatbew1111ID ~ 
the plulutUf to sbo 
Case No. 33]
RELEVANCY.
employ oi the Encaustic Tile Company;
and that he lost said employment by rea-
so'n of said letter, and that he has been
damaged.” It is settled by many cases
that, unless the instruction as prayed is
correct in terms, the court is not bound
to amend or modify it, but may rightfully
refuse it. Goodwin v. State, 96 ind. 550,
and authorities cited. This instruction
was not correct in terms, for the answer,
by not directly controverting the allega-
tion of the complaint, that the appellee
was employed by the Encaustic Tile Com- -
pany, admitted it, for the failure to deny
is an admission of the truth oi a. material
allegation. The general scope and tenor
of the answer filed by the appellant is
that of a pica of jnstificution, and it is by
it general scope and tenor that it must
be judged, and not by fragmentary state-
ments cast into it. Kimble v. Christie, 55
Ind. 140; Neideier v. Chastaln, 71 Ind. 363;
Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 96; Telegraph
Co. v. Reed. 96 Ind. 195, (vlde authorities
cited page 198:) Cottrell v. Insurance Co.,
97 Ind. 311; City of Logansport v. Uhl, 99
ind. 531. A plea of justiflcatlon proceeds,
and can only rightfully proceed. on the
theory that all the material averments of
the complaint are admitted, and this is
the theory of the answer before us, and it
would therefore have been error to in-
struct the jury that it controverted one of
the substantive and materlalaverments (Iii V
sai i
the complaint. What we have
proves that the court below did not err in
Instructing that the answer admitted
that the appellee was in the employment
of the Encaustic Tile Company, and that
he was discharged from it. It is true that
mere allegations oi value are not admit-
ted by afailure to controvert them. but
allegations of material facts are. and the
employment and discharge of the appellee
were material facts.
The third instruction given by the court
reads thus: "The answer. among other
things, charges and says that the plaintiff
went into the shop where the dies were
while the defendant’s iorcmun was absent
from the shop. and, without the knowl-
edge or consent of the defendant, or his
foreman, took and carried said dies away
from the shop and custody of the defend-
ant. On this point, I instruct you that
if the plaintiff called or sent for the dies,
and if he or the person whom he sent
found at the defendant's shop any one
there in charge of the shop who delivered
the goods or dies to the plaintiff. or to
any one sent by him for the dies. the law
will presume that, as between the public
and the defendant, the person so deliver-
iug
dies. whether as between him and the de-
fendant hc had authority or not; and if
the plaintiff simply went for or sent after
the dies, and got them from a person so in
charge of the defendant's shop, the plain-
tiff did not get the dies away without the
knowledge of the defendant, within the
meaning oi the law, evcn though both the
defendant and his regular foreman were
absent from the shop at the time the dies
were taken away. But if the plaintiff
watched his chances and availed himself of
an opportunity to go for or send after the
dies while the foreman was ubsent,for the
the dies had authority to deliver the -
purpose of getting possession without first
paying for the dies, then that portion nf
the letter is proved true. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff did not so watch his
chances to get the dies away, but took
the dies away with the consent of anyone
in charge of the shop, then in such casethe
defendant has failed to prove his letter
true in that particular, even though the
regular foreman was absent at the time
the dies were taken away.” We perceive
no substantial error in this instruction.
although it is not very well drawn.
If the principal holds out an agent or
servant as possessing authority to control
ashop or place of business, and a third
person acts upon the faith of the appear-
ances so crea ted, the principal may, in
such a case as this, be bound by the acts
of the apparent agent within the scope of
his ostensible authority, although. as be-
tween the agent and his employs-r,no such
authority in fact existed. It would, it is
. very clear, be unjust to impute sinister
motives toa third person who had ob-
tained an article from a person in charge
ofa shop without deceiving such person
by false statements. We think it was
proper to instruct the jury thatit could
not be inferred from the fact that appel-
lee got the dies from the agent in charge
of the appellant's shop that he “had
watched his chances,” in the sense con-
veyed by that phrase as used in appel-
lant’s letter. Counsel are in error in as-
serting that the instruction assumes to in-
form the jury who appeilant’s agent or
foreman was. lt does not assert that any
particular person was or was not his
agent or foreman. but simply asserts the
general principle that placing a person in
charge of a shop constituted such a per-
son, as to third persons. an agent for the
performance of such duties as pertained to
the authority of one who in fact was
rightfully in charge of the shop. It left it
to the jury to decide whether the person
from whom the dies were obtained was or
was not the pne in whose charge the shop
was at the time they were obtained. lf
the appellant had desired specific direc-
tions given to the jury upon the subject of
the effect oi knowledge of private instruc-
tions given by the principal to the agent,
he should have asked the court to specific-
ally instruct upon that subject. We think
the instruction before us is good as far
as it assumes to go, and, under long-set-
tied and often-declared rules, it must be
sustained. Insurance (To. v. Buchunail,
: 100 ind. 63. Counsel assume that the plea
of justiflca tion was, so far as that branch
of it is concerned. made out by evidence
thntappellee secured the-dies from one who
had no authority to deliver them, and
this we regard as an undue assumption.
The question is not whether the appellee
got the dies from a person having no au-
thority to deliver them, nor whether he
got them without paying for them, for
the language of the letter clearly imputes
to him a corrupt and dishonest purpose,
and it devolved upon the appellant to prove
that this was the appcllee’s purpose.
Odger. Sland. & L. 169. A written instru-
ment is to be construed by the court, and
not by thejury. it was for the court to
instruct the jury as to whether the letter
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C;1se No. 33] RELEVANCY. 
employ of the Encauatlc Tile Company; 
and that he lost said employment by rea-
sob or said letter, and that be has been 
damftged." It ls settled by many caHe& 
that, uole88 the Instruction as prayed ls 
correct in terms, the court is not l>ound 
to amend or modify it, but may rightfully 
refus~ it. Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 650, 
and authorities cited. Thie Instruction 
was not correct In terms, for the answer, 
by not directly controverting the allega-
tion or th~ complaint, thllt the appellee 
was employed by the Encaustlc Tile Com-
pany, admitted It, for the failure to deny 
Is an admission of the truth or a material 
allegation. 'l'he general scope und tenor 
of the answer fll(•d hy the appellant la 
that of n plea of J1111tiHcntlon, nnd It la by 
Its general scope aod tenor thllt It must 
be Ju<lged, and not by fragmentary litate-
ments cast Into it. Kimble v. Christle, 65 
Ind. 140; Neldefer v. Chastuln, 71 Ind. 363; 
.Me11call v. 'l'ully, 91 Ind. 96; Telegraph 
Co. v. Reed, 96 Ind. 195, ( vlde authorities 
cited pagt> 198;) Cottrell v. Insurance Co., 
97 Ind. an; City of Logansport V- Uhl, 90 
Ind. 531. A plea or justlftcatlon proceeds, 
and can only rightfully proceed, on the 
theory that all the mnterinl averments or 
the comphdnt are admitted, and this ls 
the theory of the answer before us, and It 
would therefore have been error to In-
struct the Jury that It contru\'erted ••ne of 
the eubstnnth·eand materlala,·ermenu of 
the complaint. What we lrnve &aid 
11rot'es that the rourt below did not era· In 
lnstrm·tlng that the answer admitted 
thnt the appellee was in the employment 
of the Encaustlc Tile Company, l\nd that 
he was discharged from It. It ls true that 
mere all~o.tlontt or value are not admit-
ted by a failure to controvert them, but 
allegations of material fnct11 are. and the 
employment.anrl discharge of the appellee 
were material fncbJ. 
The third lm1tructlon given by the court 
reads thus: "'The anHwer, a moug other 
things, charges antl says that the plain tin 
went into the shop where the dle11 were 
while the defendant's forcmun was absent 
from the shop, and, without the knowl-
edge ur con11ent of the defendant, or hie 
foreman, took and carried said dies away 
from the shop and custody of the delend-
ant. On this point, I Instruct you that 
If the plaintiff callt•d or sent for the dll'B, 
end If he or the person whom he eent 
found at the delendent'K Hhop any one 
there In charge of the shop who df'livered 
the ~oods or dies to the plalntlrr. or to 
an~· one sent by him for the dies, the law 
\Ylll presume that, aH between the public 
and the dcfendl\nt, the pPrson 110 clt>liver-
lng the c1lei,i harl authoai L.r to dell\'er the 
dieH. whether as between him and the de-
f(•ntlnnt he had uuthorlty or not; and If 
the plaintiff 11imply went for or Rent after 
the dies, noel got them from a pe~on so In 
rhurge Of the defen<laut'R !ihOp, the pJaln-
tlrf dhl not get the dies awa;\' without the 
knowlNlge of the defendant, within the 
menning of the lnw, en•n though both the 
defendant und his reicular foreman were 
al>Hent from the shop ut the time the <lies 
were taken 11 way. But If the t,lu lntlrr 
watehed his ('hance11 and availecl himself of 
an opportunity tu go for or senu uftt>r the 
dh'fl while the foreman was lll>sent, for thu 
9' 
purpose of irettlng poeseSRlon without fll'llt 
paying for the dies, then thnt portim• 11f 
the letter 11 pro\•ed true. On the other 
band, If the plaintiff did not so wat<'h his 
chances to get the dle11 away, but took. 
the dies a way with the consent of any one 
in chnrge of the shop, then In such case the 
defendant has failed to prove his letter 
true In that particular, even though the 
regular foreman was absent at the time 
the dies were taken away." We pcrcel\"e 
no substantial error in this Instruction, 
although It le not very well drawn. 
If the principal holds out an agent or 
servant aa possessing authority to control 
a shop or place of b11siness, and a third 
persou acts upon the faith or the appear-
ances eo created, the principal may, In 
1uch a case as this, be bound by the acts 
of the apparent agent within the ecope of 
his 011tPnslt>le authority, although. as he-
tweE>n tho} agent and his employer, no sncb 
authority In fact existed. It would, It la 
very clear, be unjust to Impute sinister 
motives to a third pen1on whu bad ob-
tained an article from a person in charge 
of a shop without deceiving such person 
by false 1ttateme11te. We think It waa 
proper to Instruct the jury that it could 
nut ba Inferred from the fact that appel-
lee gut the dies from the agent 111 chllrge 
of the appellant's shop that he "bad 
watched hie chances," ln the sense con-
veyed by that phrase ns ui;ed In appel-
Ja11t's letter. Counsel are 111 error in as-
sertlnJr that the instruction aRSumee to In-
form the jury who appellant's agent or 
foreman was. It does not assert that any 
particular person was or was not his 
agent or foreman, but 1dmply asserts the 
general prlnrlple that placing a pe1'8on In 
charge of a shop constituted Ruch a per-
son, as to third persons. un agent for the 
performance of Ruch duties &R pertained to 
the authority of one who In fact was 
rightfully In charge of the shop. It Mt it 
to the jury to decide wht>ther the person 
from whom the dll'B wen' obtained was or 
was not the pne In whose charge the shop 
w11s at the time they were obtained. If 
the appellant had desired SfX'Clfic direc-
tions gh·en to the jnry upon tht> subject of 
the effel't of knowledJl,•~ or private instruc-
tions given by the principal to the agent, 
he should have asked the rourt to epecltlc-
ally Instruct upon that subject. We think 
the Instruction before ns Is good as far 
ate It assumes to go, and, under long-eet-
tlt>d and oiten-declared rules, It mulit be 
Hnst11h1ed. Insurance Co. v. Buchauarl, 
lllO Ind. 63. Counsel astlume that the plea 
Of justlftca tlon WttS, SO far as thut hranch 
of It Is concerned, madt' out by e\•ldence 
thntappell~eseeured thedleti from one who 
hnrl no authority to deliver them, and 
this we regard e.s an undue assumption. 
The question le not whether the appellee 
got the dies from a pt>rson having no au-
~hmity to deliver them, nor whether he 
got them without pftying for them, for 
the lnnl(unge of the letter clearly lmputts 
to him a corr11)1t and diRhonest pur"lOlie, 
and it de\"OI \'ed upon the llppelhrnt to prove 
that this was the amwllee'ti purpose. 
Odger, Sland. & L. 169. A written Instru-
ment is to he construed by the cuurt, and 
not by the Jury. It wa11 for the court to 
Instruct the jury as tu whether the letter 
ADMISSION S.
[Case N0. 33
was or wasnot libelous. Gabe v. McGin-
U-,5’ 33 Ind. %; Young v. Clegg. 93 Ind.
9,71, authorities cited page 374. it would
mt-refure have been proper for the court
(0 have even more explicitly instructed
the jury than it did as to What was neces-
fiai-y for the appellant to prove in orderto
Q-0llSl3'lt\1t6 a justification.
The second instruction asked by appel-
iant is not correct, for it asks the court
to say to thejury that it was their ex-
elusive province to determine from the
evidence who, il any one. was authorized to
deliver the diesto the plaintiff. As we ha we
seen. the question of authority involreil
an element oi law,and it would have been
error to leave the whole question to tlm
jury. It is evident that to give such an
infltruction would mislead the jury, and
induce in their minds the belie! that they
were to decide the whole question. Judg-
ment atlirmed.
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ADMISSIONS. (Cue No. aa 
was or w-asnot libelous. Gabe""· McGln· 
uls, 68 J:nd. 588; Young v. CleJt"g, 93 Ind. 
:~71, autborltlee cited page 374. It would 
therefore have been p1-01>er fur the court 
to ba.ve even morP explicitly Instructed 
the jury "t:ben lt did as to what was nl'Ces-
M&.fY for the appellant to prove In order to 
constltut:e a Justlftca.t:lon. 
The second tnstructton asked by appel-
lant Is not correct, for it: uskH the court 
to say to tile jury tba t; it was their ex-
elusive province to determine from the 
evidence who, U any one, wns authorized to 
deliver the dies to the plttlntlfJ. As we ha vi, 
seen, the question of 1111thorlty ln\"ol;etl 
ttn element of law, and It would have h(!('n 
error to leave tbe whole question to th11 jury. It ls evident that to give such an 
lm1tl'11ctlo11 would mlslea.d the jury, and 
Induce In their mind!! the belief that they 
were to dcl"icle the whole question. Judg-
ment aftirmed. · 
Case No. 3-1]
RELE V AN CY.
S.\IlTH v. SATTERLEE et al.
(29 N. E. 225, 130 N. Y. 77.
Court of Appeals of New York. Second Divi-
sion. Dec. 23, 1891.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
third department.
Action by John H. Smith against Jolm
Satterlee and others to recover on an as-
signment of a claim for services rendered.
Judgment for plaiutii’i'. Defendants appeal.
Reversed. For former reports, see 43 Hun,
638, mem.; iii Hun, 681, inem.
'1‘. (J. Cronin, for appellants.
mesky, for respondent.
Frans Cu-
PAIKKER, J. The complaint alleged‘ an
indebtedness on the part of the defendant
to one Lutz for services rendered, and his
assignment of the demand to the plaintiff.
The answer denied any indebtedness to
Lutz, and averred that prior to the assign-
ment of Lutz's alleged claim to the plaintiff
he became indebted to the defendants in a
sum exceeding the amount for which tho
plaintiff demanded judgment. It was not
disputed on the trial that Lutz rendered the
services for which plaintiff sought to recov-
er, nor their value. But the defendant at-
tempted to prove that Lutz was intrusted
with a sum of money due one Minshull, then
an engineer on Lutz’s division; that Lutz
converted the money to his own use, and
thereafter the defendants were compelled to
pay Minshuil such amount. Whether Lutz
did or did not receive and retain the money
intended for .\Iinshull was the only question
in the case. The defendants’ evidence tend-
ed to show a request by Lutz of the pay-
master for Minshull‘s money; that it was
properly counted, put in an envelope, and
placed on the desk with the other pay envel-
opes, which were taken by Lutz to the em-
ployes on his division. Lutz denied having
96
received or asked for it. The defendant Sat-
terlee testified that Lutz admitted to him
that he had received the money. but had lost
it, as he supposed. out of his overcoat pock-
et. And in further support of defendants’
contention it was proven that Minshull did
not receive his money at the time the other
employes on the division received theirs, but
that it was paid to him by the defendants
about eight days later. and by check. The
plaintiff, against defendants‘ objection and
exception, put in evidence a letter written
over a year after this action was commen-
ced, of which the following is a copy: “B3
broadway, .\'ew York, April 16th, 188-i. .l.
H. Smith, Esq-~Dear Sir: Yours of the
1-ith inst. is at hand, and contents noted.
To save cost, and stop further litigation, we
are willing to send you our check for fifty
($51)) dollars in full liquidation of your
claim. Please let us hear from you. Yours,
etc., John Satteriee & C0.” The defendants
then moved that it be stricken out, but the
motion was denied, and the exceptions thus
taken are assigned for error on this review,
and must be sustained, because the letter
does not contain an admission of a fact, but
rather an offer of compromise, made for the
purpose of procuring a settlement of a pend-
ing controversy. Lawrence \'. Hopkins, 13
Johns. 288; Marvin v. Richmond, 3 Denio,
58; Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass. 53. We
cannot agree with the learned judge at gen-
eral term that the judgment should not be
reversed because the admission of the let-
ter could not have affected the result. It is
not seen how this court can determine what
effect it had on the mind of the referee, who
admitted it as evidence, and then refused to
strike it from the record. Presumably it
was considered in connection with the oth-
er evidence, which induced a finding favor-
able to the plaintiff. The judgment should
be reversed. All concur.
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Cue No. :J4] ILELEV ANCY. 
RlHTH v. 1UTTERLEE et al. 
(29 ~. E. 2"-5, 130 N. Y. 677.) 
Court of .Appeals of N<>w York. Second Divi-
sion. Dee. 23, 1891. 
.Appeal trom supreme court, general term, 
third department. 
Action by John H. Smith against John 
Satterlee and others to recoYer on an as-
tdgnment of a elalm for servl<'f's rendered. 
Judgment for 11lulntlft'. Defendants a11peal. 
Ren~reed. J.'or former reports, see 43 Hun, 
63.~. wem.; 41i Hun, 081, mem. 
T. C. l'ronin, for ap1lf'llants. l!'raDJ(. Cu-
mt-t1ky, for respondent. 
PAUKER, J. The complaint allPgt>d an 
indebtedneBB on the part of the defPndnnt 
to one Lutz for services renderl'd, and his 
aeslgnment of the demand to the lllalntur. 
The answer denied any indebtNlness to 
Lutz, and averred that prior to the assign-
ment of J,utz's allPged claim to the plaintiff 
he beeame lndPbtl'd to the defendants In a 
sum excet'dlng thP amount for whl<'h the 
plaintiff demanded judgment. It was not 
disputed on the trial that J,utz renderl'd the 
services for which plaintiff sought to rt>eoY-
er, nor their value. But tbe defendant at-
tempted to prove that Lutz was lntrusted 
with a sum of money due one Mlnshull, then 
an engineer on Lutz's division; that J,ntz 
converted the money to bis own use, and 
thereafter the defendants were compellt>d to 
pay l\llnshull such amount. WhPther J,ntz 
did or did not reeelve and retain the money 
Intended for lllnshull was the only qnPRtlon 
In the case. The defendants' evldenee tend-
ed to show a request by Lutz of the pay-
master for l\llnshull's money; that It was 
properly counted, put In an envelope, and 
placed on the desk with the other pa5' envel-
opes, which were taken by Lutz to the em-
ployee on his division. Lutz denied haYlng 
96 
received or asked for It. The defendant Sat-
terlee testified that Lutz admitted to him 
that be had reeelved the money, but had lost 
It, as he supposed, out of hla overcoat poek-
et. .And In further support of dPfendants' 
contentlon It was proven that Mlnehull did 
not l"\'('elve his money at the time the other 
employes on the division n-celved theirs, but 
that It was paid to him by the defendants 
about Plght daya later, and by c-he<'k. Tbt-
11IulntUr, against dPfendants' objection and 
exception, put ln evidence a letter written 
over a year after this action was commen-
eed, of whl<'h the following ls a copy: "63 
hroadway, XPw York, April 16th, 188-1. J. 
H. Smith, Esq.-Dear Sir: Yours of the-
Hth inst. ls at hand, and rontents noted. 
To save rost, and stop further litigation, we 
are willing to aend you our cheek for fifty 
($:-10) dollars in full llquldatlon of your-
elnlm. Pie.nae let us bear from you. Yours, 
etc., John Satterlee & Co." The defendants 
then ruovl'<l that it be stricken out, but the-
wotlon was tlenled, and the exceptions thus 
taken are aeslgned for error on this review, 
and must be sustained, because the letter 
does not contain an admleslon of a fact, but 
rather an offer of compromise, matte for the 
11urpose of procuring a aettlewent of a pend-
ing controYersy. Lawrence v. Hopkins, UJ. 
Johns. 288; Marvin v. Richmond, 3 Denio, 
riS; Draper v. Hatfield, l:.!4 MaBB. ria. We 
cannot agree with the learned Judge at gen-
e1"ai term that the judgment should not be 
reversed because the adml11Rlon of the let-
ter could not have atf('('ted the result. It 18 
not seen how this court can dt-termine what 
Plreet lt had on the mind of tl1t- referee, who 
admitted It as evidence, and then refWled to 
strike It from the reronl. Presumably ll 
was coneldered lo connection with the oth-
er evidence, whl<'h lndu<'ed a finding favor-
able to the plaintiff. The judgment should 
be reversed. .All concur. 
ADMISSIONS.
[Case No. 35
AKERS v. KIRK et Bl.
(18 s. 1-1. 366. 91 Ga. 590.)
Supreme Court of Georgia. April 24, 1893.
PBl.\'ClPAl_. AND Aer-;_\"r -— Scorn or Aozxcr—Ev1-
D1-:scE—Am-nssioxs—LIAR.1vn.r:ss Eauon.
1. It vyas competent for the plaiutid to tes-
flfy why 1t was that in the first instance he
charged the account sued upon to the defend-
ant's husband.
2- All 11891103‘ to borrow money for the pur-
pose of clearing off liens from defendant's prop-
crty does not comprehend an agency to confer
with the holder or claimant of one of the liens,
and make to him declarations touching the
aw‘-“QY. the payment of the debt, the agent's
hopes Or arrangements as to borrowing money,
01’_ll\‘-’_ Purpose for which it was wanted, no ap-
pl1cnt1on_for any loan being made to such hold-
er or claimant.
3. A conversation b0t\veen the parties short-
ly before the trial, in whiz-h the defendant made
¢?\'li1lI1 admissions, was not rendered inadmis-
Blble up evidence by being brought about by
the plaintiif through a proposition of settlement,
it Mt appearing that the defendant's admissions
were made With any view to a. compromise. nor
amt. ‘"15’ terms of settlement were mentioned
or d1scussed_
h 4-Th<‘I‘6 being evidence tending _t0 show
{lat the defcndanfs father had _auth0nty from
dell; W b0l'r0w money for the _d1schari:e _of the
9 li filled for in this action, his declarations to
persons to whom he applied for loans. as to the
P‘"'lZ°$9 for which the money xvas wanted, were
:g_ll1i8Il?le_lll evidence, the p1_1r-pose so declared
nymgowlfthm the scope and obJ_ect of the author-
concern? $1.!‘ as the debt now In con roversy is
. 5- There bel (-on test as to the owner-
")!!! of the pm,,,'§§_.,”,°} was irnnmterial who fur-
nished the money ta ay for them. _
th 5- Recovery may e had upon evidence that
9P1_1rt_v sought to be charged xvas the conceal-
ed Pflllcipal of 3 erqon who acted in his own
name without disc ogfng his agency, though this
“E be not alleged in the Dl°adi'."*’-'5' If lb“ °b'
ll was a good one t0 (he evidence, it should
“-"° “fa Presented and insitIs;¢€dt:???]:_']|:G‘_:t§gE
and the def was created.
...... he» in-‘“‘¢¥--.---= -:.**<;z:2a@‘*.'.¥..r:m
the case,“ alillatural equity 0:211 ‘egul evideuce to
“upper: it dhthere ‘.5 ‘Fun of some illegal evi-
deuce in breht e adnnssio evaifing arty Wm not
rend:-r a he 11lf_of _the_ Pr usable. 0th the trial
court anq court being satisfied,
th - _
e-verdmt lnust stand.
, Fulton county;
by Thomas 1-111-1‘ Y0} 1-"miulst
xfirs Tlmre was 3 \'|\1(ll(_t 01 pun.
a trial denied. Defendant
new
r01-_ Afl1ru)g\d-
u°"V'ing is thé Ofli"
\I1'S-
‘fixed ‘ close a licn as con-
anq also to.t0r:;en for \\‘u1'k done
on and ugh“ matorial Qd for the I‘(‘[)illi‘lIi‘.!
- - .311
uteri“! fut (“stain house in-longing
. i n alleged that the
lien was filirs‘ l?_r,(()fl¢ti:?ys after the work
inploq wit d the material furnishcil;
and that tllétedtizllas bl-ought within less than
$11‘ the work was douc
1 _ , tinle ‘
Grin! 0111 tlsizhpd’ and also within 1.’
months fr‘) 1 filrhle ' tune the debt became
w ‘*1
ial rm-port:
Akcrs upon an
Ilg of a, C01‘
due. The account attached to the declara-
tion run from July 23d to November 10th,
but the year was not stated. The lien was
recorded December 28, 1889. Defendant
pleaded “not indebted;” that she made no
contract with plaintiffs; that they did not
file their lien within the time allowed by
law and alleged in the declaration; and that
they took personal security for their debt.
Plaintiffs obtained a verdict, and defend-
ant's motion for a new trial was ovcrrulcd,
to which she excepts. Her motion contained
the general grounds that the verdict was
contrary to law, evidence, etc.; also that the
court refused to nonsuit plaintiifs on mo-
tion of defendant; that no case was made
out against her, but against her husband,
G. W. _Akers, for which she was not shown
to be responsible, which refusal to nonsuit
was error. Error in allowing plaintiff, over
defendant’ objection, to testify: “We
charged the account to G. W. Akcrs, because
we supposed he owned the house, and the
house was good for it." Defendant objected,
because the lot was not responsible for the
improvements, unless the owner procured
the improvements, or subsequently ratified
them. Because the court permitted plaintifl’
to testify: “I have had a conversation with
her (Mrs. Akcrs’) father since the work was
done, in reference to Mrs. Akers _ paying
the debt." Defendant objected on grounds
of irrclerancy, and that her father could
not bind her. Also because the court per-
mitted plaintiff to testify: “Her fatiur. 118
near as I can remember, came into my 5'0"
a month or two after the lien WM l“°d'
and he stated to me that he hoped l° s"“‘°'
this account in a very short time- He making arrangements, I think, “flm 3;‘;
Heaiy to borrow money; and he ha? short
would be all satisfactory. and in 9- v‘::m“d:\1\\
time he would pay the account." I)‘ ‘p\s'\n\“_‘
objected because the court pcrmiit"'£_f¢u U,
to ltkiilflfyi “He ['r. J. Shepherd. <3” us\““ 0“
futhcr] wanted it [the mmicy he W99 d°“e vgg
borrow] to pay us for the work cw
the house." Defendant objected ,;-31 j_
ground that the testimony was ll fl'p- C
and, further, that the prornlse, if @179 6‘
Mrs. Akei-s‘ part to pay G. W. Agfl *‘
should be in writing. Because 06
exxuninution of plaintiff he testlilc
morning Mrs. Akcrs and her fill t §
sitting togcthcr, and he went 091:9 /
wvnt in and took a sent by 1191" ‘£41’
‘could not this in S0lT\0 way be Se“ ,- , ;~
case be settled,-and then this 0*“ 1’
a 1’
vcrsation occurred.’
6‘-ff’:
ll1(‘:ll\lfl1'Z her 9 ‘yr
tcstificd to prcviuu.~'.l_v by lilfllntmsils I’
‘.\lr.~z. Akcrs said that her father W
ii
to borrmv the money ‘"3 Pay the dob f)‘
. - 1 1
‘Vixen plaintiff so fv.~\\‘1hvd. d05°“d‘l“dy 5
sation aired (G ,
to exclude the C"nv‘*" bow .
ficd to by plaintifl’. iltud 5°; of ‘Z
y ; vhu ever ‘- 0
the ground ill it \ ‘km mmd n 1
admitted in said c"nversa this (I55
received against def-endax“ on
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ADMISSIONS. [Case No. 8G 
AKERS v. KIRK et al. 
(18 S. E. 366, 91 Ga. 390.) 
Supreme Oourt of Georgia. .April 24, 1893. 
l"Bl~OIPA.L A.llD AOBNT - t:IC<>PB or AOll::SCT-EVI· 
J>B!!iOB-Al>111ss10~8-HA&MLE88 ERROR, 
L It W'&B competent for the plaintiff to tee-
ttff why it waa that In t:he first instancP. he 
chargf'!d the account sued upon to the defend· 
ant's husband. 
2. An agency to borro"W" 1noney for the pur-
:poee of clearing off liens froID defendant's prop-
ertY does not comprehend o.n ageDCJ to confer 
with the holder or claimant: of one of the liens, 
and make to him declara tiona touching the 
agency, the payment of the debt, the agent's 
hopes or arrangements as to borrowing money, 
or the purpose for which it 'W'O.B wanted, no ap-
plication for any loan being made to such hold-
er or claimant. 
a. A. conversation bet'W'een the parties short-
11 before the trial, in whi<>h the defendant made 
Certain admissioDB, was not rendered inadmis· 
Bible u evidence b7 being brought about by 
the plaiutitr through a proposi Uon of settlement, 
It not appearing that the defendant's admi11sions 
were made with any vie'W' to a comproml11e, nor 
that. any terms of nttlement were mentioned 
or d111Ctl88ed. 
4. There beinir evidence 'tending to show 
that the defendant's father had authority from 
her to borrow money for t:he diacharge of the 
debt IUed for In thia action. his declarations to 
pel'80na to Whom he applled for Joana, aa to the 
PUl'JIOle for which the .IDoney w-ne wanted, were ~ml•ible In evidence, the purpose so de<'lared 
. ag within the scope and object of the author-
ity, ao far aa the debt no"W' in controversy ia 
eoncernetf. 
5. There being no cont:est aa to the owner-~lp of the premises, it W'&& immaterial who fur-
lllahl'd the money to pa7 for them. • 6. Recovery ma be bad upon evidence that 
:e P'rt~ sought to ~ charged was the conceal-
Pnnc1pal of a person who acted In his own 
name Without diacloaing bis a.gen<'Y, though this 'fac~ be not alleged in the pleading&. I~ the ob-ectioa WIL8 a good to t:he evidence, 1t Rhould ave been one d Insisted upon whf'n the eriden- Pl't'sented an h t the dt'<'lnration 
uld ..... wa.a offered so t a cifi th 
""' be amended and made ape c as to • 
IDode In •hi h th tract between the plaln-U and h c e con ted 
7 ~ e defendant W'&.8 creadoubtedly repre-
aenta 'th here the verdict ~u aound justice of 
the caae_e natural eq.uity anh legal evldeuce to 
1npp0rt 1 &.nd there is ~noug £ some Illegal evi-
deul'e in l; hthe admission :iung ;i>ILl'tY will not 
re11d1•r a n e alf of ~he. prevsable. Both the trial 
court an() ew trial .md1spen court beiug satisfied, 
the verdiet the revaewing 
tSylJab lllust stand. 
· u.. b,y the Court.) 
Error tr-o 1 cour~ Fulton eonnty; M. J. Clar- Qi SUI•l"l" or 
Action bk.e, Judge. Kli-1~ & ('o. against 
Ella A!ier.-e 3'" ~homu:,.ns a ,·t>rdkt for plain· 
tiffs, au<1 • 'Ihere \• 1 denil•d. Defendant brlnga e a new tr u 
The to~:r. AtftrJ.Ded~fll<."1n1 rl'port: 
Kirk ~ "1\r!ng la t.be l\lrs. Akel'& upon nn 
account, a:r::a. <~o. sued ~or~close a lit' n as <'On· 
tractors a <I alsb to- 1 men tor wol'k done 
on and ll:l:<l mnt<>rl:lshNl for thl' rrpnlrln~ 
and buil(!t• t:erial :rur certnln boUIW lwlonglng 
to Mrs. ~ •g of a f.•dtion alleged thnt the 
lien waa fll~r-s. Tbe 1;o days attl.'r thl' work 
waa corul>l ~<I with~ tbe material turnh~hl'1I; 
and that 1:11. ~~ed an brought within less than 
12 month~ e Elult -was time the work was done 
IDd DllltQ.t"'l ~-l"'ou• tht bf.'d• and also within 12 
llooths :t.t"' at.1 {"UrD 8 uu.ie the debt became 
Q~ t;be 
lr'll:.Q "a. .-v .--Jl 
dul'. •rhl' account attnched to the declara-
tion ran trom July 23d to NOl·ember 10th, 
but the year was not stated. The Hen wu 
reeorded Decl.'mber 28, 1889. Defendant 
pleaded "not indebted;" tbat she made no 
contract with plalnturs; that they did not 
Ille their llen within the time allowed by 
law and alleged In the declaration; and thnt 
they took personal eecurlty for their debt. 
Plaintllrs obtained a verdict, and defend· 
ant's motion for a new trial was ovcn-ulC>d, 
to which she excepts. Her motion contained 
the general grounds that the verdict wns 
contrary to law, evldenee, etc.; also that the 
court refused to nonsuit plalntltrs on mo-
tion of defendant; that no case wu made 
out against her, but against her husbnnct, 
G. W. Akers, for which she was not shown 
to be responsible, whll'h refusal to noll8Ult 
was error. Error in allowing plaintiff, over 
defendnnt's objection, to testify: "We 
charged the ac<'ount to G. W. Akers, bccauae 
we supposed he owned the houae, and the 
house was good tor It." Defendant objected, 
because the lot was not responsible for the 
Improvement., unleu the owner prOCUl"ed 
the improvements, or snbsequently ratified 
them. Because the court permitted plaintiff 
to testify: ''I have bad a couversn.tlon with 
her (Mrll. Akers') father since the work was 
done, in reference to Mrs. Akers paying 
the debt." Defendant objected on itrounds 
of lrrelel"11ney, and tbat her father could 
not bind her. Also because the court per-
mitted plalntUr to testify: "Her tatbrr, u 
near u I can remember, come into my store 
a month or two after the lien was t\led, 
and he stated to me that he hoped to sl·ttll• 
this account In a very short ttme. Be ::_ 
making arrangements, I think, -with cd \t 
Healy to borrow money; nnd b~ ~ '6°no~ 
would be all sntlsfnctory. and in u. v~te"O.dn.'n't 
time he would puy the account." .a -p\i).\13.'t\'!' 
objected because the court perm\tt' · -renu&-n\::o 
to testify: "He [T. J. t:;bepberd, '1~ ~-y\-n~ Oll 
fath<>l'] wanted it [the mo1u•y he VII~ iJ.O~~e ~ 
borrow] to pay us for the wor1' D~e...,\\."t 
the house." Defendant olljl•cte6 ,...-.e~"3· 
ground that the testimony was l -- • < 
and, further, tbat the promise, lf e.:'~ c1 
Mrs. Akers' part to pay G. W. bo,1'-,,. #• 
should he In writing. Bel'nuse ~ ~ 
exnmlnntlon ot plaintiff he t.est\t\ ._e.-~1 
morning Mrs. Akers and her fat t ~ 
sitting togethrr, and be went o\J ; ~ .....-
w1•nt In and took n sPnt by bel', 1e.:I"' 
'could not this in some -way be sett 11 '-•°"I~ 
case be scttled,-e.nd then this ot cit~ 
VEirsatlon occurred.' tn<>an\njlt b<'r 11 i:C? ~ 
tl'Rtlfil'd to prevlomdy by \llnlntUl.'s;.s < 
')lrR. Akrrs snld tbnt brr rather :ebt "°"• 
to borrow the wonPY to \ll\Y the t ~ 
1\urn pl•tintur so tt•:-4t\l\4.•(\, defendnndY ~ 
to exdnde the con verHtl. tlon alre~bO'°#C' ~ 
fi<'d to by plnin tHT. n.nd. set 0~ o" 
the ground that ,vbu.tever occ l·ould nol:-
admltted In said conv~~lo:n tbls trl*':j 
received agnJnst de~e:o. 11 
Case No. 35]
RELEVAN CY.
_ recorded lien.
"testimony and that it was irrelevant.
it (the conversation) was looking to a com-
promise. Because the court admitted the
Defendant objected on the
grounds that the lien offered was recorded
about 60 days after the last item sued on,
and the petition set up that the lien claimed
was recorded within 30 days of the last
item, and that the aliegata and probata. did
not agree; that the substantial part of the
material sued for, to wit, the bills of August
13th and July 23d, was furnished over 90
days prior to the record of the lien offered;
and that no connection was shown between
the items of August 13th and July 23d, and
the remaining material or items. Because
the court permitted a. witness, J. A. Scott,
to testify: “I think he l'I‘. J. Shepherd]
wanted to pay certain debts with_it. He
wanted to borrow it for his daughter.” De-
fendant objected on the grounds that there
was nothing binding on Mrs. Akcrs in this
Be
cause the court permitted Scott to testify:
“Mr. Shepherd stated that he wanted to
remove the liens that were on the property;
that was what he wanted with the money."
Defendant objected on the grounds that no
connection was shown with Mrs. Akcrs. and
that it was irrelevant. Because the court
‘refused to permit defendant to show who
furnished the consideration for the lot
ought to be subjected to the lien of plain-
tii'fs. As piaintifls set up that Mrs. Akers
and Mr. Akcrs were concealing an agency,
this evidence was -proper. Because the court
permitted plaintiffs, in rebuttal, to prove by
a number of witnesses the length of time
Mrs. Akcrs was around the improvements,
and the extent to which she exercised super-
vision. The error alleged was that plaintiflfs
had gone into all this kind of evidence in
making out their case, and it was not legally
or properly in rebuttal. Because petitioner
alleged a contract and debt with Mrs. Akcrs,
but the evidence only tended to establish a
concealed principal, which was not alleged.
Because the allegations of the petition and
the evidence introduced thereunder do not
agree.
So far as material, the evidence for plain-
t;iff was: The materials mentioned in the
account went into the house. which belonged
to Mrs. Akcrs.
At the time piaintiifs were -
making the improvements they thought the §
house belonged to Akcrs. Akcrs came to
them, and got them to do the work, and they
charged the account to him, because they
supposed he owned the house, and the house
was good for it. They completed the job,
and have never been paid for it. Since the
work was done, plaintiff Kirk had a conver-
sation with Mrs. Akcrs’ father. Shepherd,
in rci'crcn':e to Mrs. Akcrs paying the debt.
This was a month or so after the lion was
tiled. lIer father came into the store, and
stated that he hoped to settle the account-
in a. very short time. He was making ar-
rangements, Kirk thought, with Mrs. Heaiy
i
to borrow money, and hoped it would be all
satisfactory. and in a very short time he
would pay the account. Kirk did not think
he stated whom he was trying to borrow the
money for, only that he wanted to pay oi!
the debt. Did not think he mentioned his
daughter's name. He said he wanted it to
pay pialntifis for the work done on the
house. Kirk had a conversation with Mrs.
Akcrs in reference to that conversation with
her father, and she said that her father was
trying to borrow the money for her to pay
off what she owed plaintiffs. When the
goods were sold, Akcrs belonged to a firm
which stood well, and plaintiffs were per-
fectly willing to sell goods to Akcrs, and
never asked Mrs. Akcrs whether he owned
the lot or not, nor inquired of any person
in whom was the title to the lot, supposing,
of course, that the house would be good
for the improvements. They gave the credit
to Akcrs and the lot and house combined.
supposing he owned the house, and that the
house was good for it. Did not see Mrs.
Akcrs at all in the transaction. There are
one or two articles in the account charged
to Mrs. Akers,—part of a gas fixture, one
or two of the small articles she might have
purchased. The goods were not sold on the
credit of Mrs. Akcrs, and she did not enter
into the computation at all. Plaintiffs after-
wards claimed the money from hcr, because
they found out she owned the lot and house.
The last item of the account went on the
house. The morning of the trial Mrs. Akers
and her father were sitting together, and
he went out, and Kirk took a seat by her,
and said in some way this case can be set-
tled, and then the conversation with her
occurred. Kirk thought if they could ar-
range it without going to a trial he preferred
to do so,—meant it should not go to trial if
she could pay up, and not have a trial. He
did not know. of course, whether she would
or not. Had no idea of compromise at all.
She told him that her father had been try-
ing to borrow the money to pay this debt.
but she did not know why he did not suc-
cecd. There was no written contract to fur-
nish the materlai, nor was there a contract
with anybody, except a verbal one of Akcrs.
Mr. Akcrs came and made the trade to get
a stove from plaintiflfs, and Mrs. Akcrs
paid for it the following June. Akers left
Georgia some time in December, 1889. or
January, 1890. Kirk thought he saw Mrs.
Akcrs down at the house, and that she might
have been down in the store, but was not
certain that she was in the store. Scott tes-
tiiicd that Shepherd wanted to borrow some
money on the property from Heaiy for
Shepherd's daughter to pay certain debts
with it, saying he wanted to remove the
liens that were on the property; and Shep-
herd put into Scott's hands deeds to the lot
in question for examination. Shepherd also
tried to borrow of Wellhouse money on the
property, to pay oi! the balance due on it,
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Case No. 85] RELEVANCY. 
It tthP <'on\·Pr811tlon) was looking to a com-
pro1111Kl'. Because the court admitted the 
r{'('()rded lien. Defendant objl'c·ted on the 
i,'l'ounds that the Uen otrered was r('('()l"ded 
about 00 days after the last ltl'ru su<>tl oo, 
and the petition set up that tlw I:en t·lnlmed 
was recorded within 30 days or the last 
item, and that the all<>gata and probata did 
not agree; that the substantial part of the 
material sul'd for, to wit, the bills of August 
13th and July !!3d, waa furnished over 90 
duys prior to the rl'<'Ord of the lien offered; 
and that no conn('('tlon was shown betwt•en 
the Items of Augmit t:lth and July 23d, and 
the remnlnlng material or Items. Bt.'<'lluse 
the court permitted a witness, J. A. Scott, 
to tt>stlfy: "I think be [T. J. Shepherd) 
wantl'd to pay certain d1~bts with. It. He 
wanted to borrow It for his daughter." De-
fendant objected on the grouncls that there 
was nothing binding on Mrs. Akers In this 
'testimony and that It was lrrt•levant. Be-
cnwie the court permitted Sl'ott to tl'Rtlfy: 
to borrow money, and hoped lt would be all 
aatlst'nctory, and In a very short time he 
would puy the account Kirk did not think 
be stated whom he was trying to borrow the 
money Cur, only that he wanted to pay off 
the debt. Dltl not think he mentioned his 
daughter's nnm«i>. He said he wanted It to 
pay plulntltrs for the work done on the 
house. Kirk had a conversation with Mrs. 
Akers in reference to that conversatton with 
her father, and she said that her father wae 
trying to borrow the money for her to pay 
otr wbnt she owl'd plaintUl's. When the 
goods were sold, Akers beloni;:-t.'<I to a firm 
which stood well, and plalnt1tr11 were per-
fectly willing to sell goods to Akt>ra, and 
never asked Mrs. Akers whether he owned 
the lot or not, nor Inquired of any person 
In whom was the title to the lot, suppo1dng, 
ot course, that the house would be good 
for the Improvements. They gave the credit 
to Akers and the lot and house comblnro. 
r.upposlng he owned the house, and that the 
house was good for It Did not st>e Mrs. 
Akers at 311 in the transaction. There are 
oue or two articles In the account charged 
to Mrs. A.k.?rs,-part of a gas fixture, one 
or two of the small articles she might have 
, 1>urchn11cct. The goods were not sold on the 
<'rt•dlt or 1\11'1'. Akers, and she did not enter 
l11to the com1mtntlon at all. Plaintiffs after-
wards clslmPd the mont-y from her, because 
they found out she owned the lot and hOU8e. 
"Mr. Shephl'rd stated that he wantl'd to 
remove the llt>ns that were on the pro11rrty; 
that was what be wanted with the money." 
Dl'fendant objl'ctro on tbe grounds that no 
<•onn<>c•tlon was shown with :\lrs. Akers, nnd 
that It was lrrcle\"ant. Bt>rnn.~<' th<' court 
l'<'fUsNI to permit def Pntlant to show who 
furnl!:!l11'<1 the consfd('l"ntloo for the lot 
sought to be subjected to the lien of plnln-
tltrs. As plalntUfs set up that Mrs. Akers 
and Mr. Akers were concealing an agency, 
this evidence was .proper. Because the court , 
permitted plafntltrs, In rebuttal, to prove by 
a number of witnesses the length of time 
Mrs. Akers was around the lmprovem1•nts, 
and the extent to which she exercised super-
vision. The error alleged was that plaintiffs 
bod gonl' Into all this kind of evidence In 
making out their case, and It was not lt>gnlly 
or propl.'l·ly In rebuttal. Because petitioner 
alleged a contract and debt with Mrs. Akers, 
but the evidence only tended to establish a 
coucealc>d principal, which was not allt•grd. 
Because the allegntlons of the petition nnd 
the evidence Introduced thereunder do not 
agree. 
Ro far as material, the evldt>nce tor plnln-
tttr was: The materials mentioned In the 
n<·count went Into the bou.~<'. whi<'h bt>longro 
to Mrs. Akers. At the time plnintlfl'11 were 
mnklng tbe Improvements thl'Y thouji';ht thf' 
house belonged to Akers. Akers cnme to 
them, nnd ~t them to do the work, and they 
charged the account to him, because they 
supposed he owned the house, and the house 
was good for it. They completed the job, 
nnd have uevao been paid for It. Since the 
work was done, plaintiff Kirk bad a. conver-
sn Uon with Mrs. Akt>r'J' fntht>r, ~hl'plwrd, 
In r,•flor,•nce to l\Jrs. Akl'rs p:t.\"luir thP tle!Jt. 
TniK w:tK a mouth or so afh•r thl• llPit wa11 
tilt•d. Iler father came Into the l!to1·e, and 
l!tatro thnt he hoped to settle the account> 
In a vcrry short time. He was making ar-
rnngl•rnents, Kirk thought, with Mrs. Healy 
98 
The lost Item of the ac<'ount Wl'Ut on the 
house. The morning of thl' trial }lrs. Akers 
nnd her father were sitting togPtber, and 
he went out, RDd Kirk took a seat by be1·, 
and said In some way this case can be st>t-
tled, and thl'u the conversation with her 
occurred. Kirk thought If they could ar-
range It without going to a trlnl he prt>ferred 
to do so,-meant It should not go to trial It 
she could pay up, and not have a trial. He 
did not know, of course, whether she would 
or not. Had no Idea of compromise at all 
She told him that hl'.r father had been try-
ing to borrow the money to pay this debt, 
but she did not know why he did not suc-
el'Pd. Thl're was no written contract to fur-
nish the material, nor was tbl're a contract 
with anybody, except a verbal one of Akers. 
Mr. Akers C'ame and made the trnde to 1tet 
a stove from 1>lalntltrs, and Mrs. Akers 
paid for It the following June. Akere left 
Geo1·1.rta some time In December, l&~. or 
January; 1800. Kirk thought be saw Mrs. 
Akers down at the house, and that she might 
have been down In tht! store, but was not 
ct>rtaln that she was In the store. Scott tl'S· 
tlll<'d that Shepherd wonted to borrow some 
monl'y on the property from Henly for 
Sh<'pberd's daughter to pay <'Crtaln dl'hts 
with It, saying he wantl.'d to rt•movl' the 
llm!! thnt wl'l·e on the propel'ty; nud Hlwp· 
hrrd put Into Scott's hands dt-l'lls to the lot 
In question for examination. Shepherd al!:!o 
tried to borrow of \Vellhouse money on the 
property, to pay off the balance due on It, 
• 
ADMISSIONS.
[Case No. 35
and left a. deed at VVellhouse’s. Shepherd
Stated to Wehhouse that he wanted to bor-
row the money for his daughter. The daugh-
ter herself never applied to l/Vellhouse for a.
loan. There was evidence also that Mrs.
Aka-rs was at the house during part of the '
time that the work was being done; saw it
done, and directed sorne changes to be made.
For the defendant there was testimony
that she was absent frorn Atlanta during the
time the improvements xvere being made,
and when she returned it wvas all complete,
and she directed no change; . She did not
agree with anybody to inake the improve-
ments. and knew notl1in',<.>: about them. She
did not make anybody 1101' agents to have
the l_mp1-ovements made. Iler husband was
not her agent. and she never had any con-
versation with him in xvhich he said he was
301111: to act as her agent, or anything of that '
kind. She had no notice of any purchases
to be made, knew nothing about build-
ing houses, did not eznploy any workmen
to assist in the work, and bought no mate-
rial. First saw Kirk the Inorning of the
llflfll. and did not rcrnenihr-r ever purchasing
anything from him. Did not buy the stove,
Pm did Pay for it; but nevvr gave any I"'°m'
189 to pay for anv other part of the debt.
In the COl1\»OI.satj(;n vvith Kirk the morning
Of the trial he asked her if there was any
W83’ the matter could be settled. She told
him she did not know, as she knew nothing
flfait in any way, having been absent from
c||;y_ She could not tell anything
about it. S1“; believed she
11 She "°1d him it, but did not
"<1 heard something Of
know anvthin
. ‘ . b t it, =1
111 flnyfhifiggmzrgu ghe did not say any-
thing about hm. father Ilis name was not
mentioned as never appoint-
Her father W apacity, and
transactions
has one or two
0 attend to the
ather looks after
\Vo1'k had just
she went away.
ere going to re-
ng could not tell
she
in Atlanta W11
Qt knovv they ‘V
house and it. She
husband. Some
t °""" with nelyvhllershe heard
be done.
improve the house.
nk-ed it before she
oiug to be
id not know Eiterwliilsslfandrin ref-
not talk toing to be done to the
at “'“s gotions as to what was
ed ”° quess nad her deed to the
done‘ Ha ng ti1ne,—longer than
handss uni: I-Qniember when she
e
hQ1P?ati1er. nor h0l§Iel'ml:g1’tl11terw:i:s-
it as bro“!-inf" -
olnezf that ‘b\1SlD(‘8S of borrowing
2 looking
he He was 1” Atllnm’
btLsl‘i-Bess for her. In this mat-
liard H (.0111 1119
done. Did
eronce to
house. As
1>'°|l18 to 5
land in he:
six month
ter, so1netl1nes,—I suppose so— As I was
not here, I don't know anything about it.
I don't remember whether I turned over
my deed to my father, and told him to do
the best he could with it. or not." Defend-
ant is using the property since the improve-
ments have been put upon it, and her hus-
band has nothing to do with it, having left
‘Georgia some time ago. “I don’t know
what I gave father the deed for. I guess
he- Nothing.” “Don’t know whether I let
him have it to come to Atlanta and negoti-
ate a loan to pay ofl this indebtedness on
my property or not. Father sorter over-
sees my property sometimes. Since my
husband left, some of the time father has
been in charge of my affairs, and I sup-
pose he is here now looking after this suit."
“There has been several thousand dollars of
improvements put upon the house, and I
have not paid one dollar for it." Shepherd
testifled that Akers, in a letter, told him
he (Akers) owed some parties for material
furnished and labor done in repairing or
remodeling the house, and would like to
hav'e Shepherd assist Mrs. Akcrs in trying to
get some money to pay 01'! the indebted-
ness, suggesting that he thought Shepherd
could get some money from Healy, Well-
house, or others; that he thought, with
Shepherd's assistance, he could borrow the
money. Shepherd came to Atlanta for that
purpose, and saw several parties with 11
view of getting the money, but was informed
that the claims against the property a1nou11t-
ed to so much that “we" abandoned the
idea. Mrs. Akers did not do anyrhiu$!- ‘Y3’
ness talked with her, advised with her. bu;
did not want to incumber the pr0P°_"w ‘Eve,
a mortgage, and no agreement “azflmega
reached from her to mortgage. that “H; the
ever knew of. They were consider el“
propriety of the thing when wiine
to try to get the money to relieve 9
Q1‘
of a debt which he believed A14 9, “max
Witness did not recognize that Fir :15
owed anything. The debts wefeit
I
Akcrs. Mrs. Akers never constlt‘
uess as her agent to negotiate. 0 0
vised together in reference to 9 47
this money, and witness attempted ii?
row it,—was attempting to borrow 6,;
her property; that ls what they “U6
sidering. The object was to take ‘
of! the property. “fitness does Bo
what facts constitute an ageI\Cy- *‘{"r;; 1,42
wanted the ‘parties paid tor the \\° 11
on the building, but is not herself; 7
do it. She owns the D1'°De1'tY' W‘
room house upon it, ei°- r0r_
kl“)-son & H111. fgr plninufl '1: 81‘
J. Albert, for defendants in 911° -
-4
1- {fa pl
»
, \ 1 ote ’ (Q
Bl.l<2Cl{LEY, G. J; 1 ‘the 1*’;-,
gether with the o'fl‘1(.-111 1‘ I 4/
_ _ d- '11 tlili
will render the ruhngs mu c 1
_ Th , can he
sufliciently inte11lgib1;*(': t oi age wry 1'0
doubt that the verd
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ADMISSIONS. [Case No. 33 
and left a deed at "W'ellhouse'a. Shepherd 
• stated to Wellhouse t:hnt he wanted to bor· 
row the JDODey for his dn ughter. The d1mgh-
·ter hersel.r never applied to Wellbouse tor a. 
toan. There was evidence also thnt Mrs. 
Akers 'W&S at the house during part ot the 
time that the work 'W'RS being done; anw It 
<lone, and directed eon1e cllnnges to~ made. 
ter, aomt>Umes,-1 suppos(' so- As I was 
not here, I don't know anything about lt. 
I don't remember whether I turned over 
my deed to my fatht>r, and told him to do 
the best he could with It, or not." Defend· 
ant la using the property since the Improve-
ments have been put upon It, and her hus-
band has nothing to do '\\1th lt, having left 
'Georgia some time ngo. "'I don't know 
what I ~ve father the deed for. I gnt'Ss 
he- Nothing." "Don't know whether I let 
For the defendant there was testimony 
that abe waa absent b-om Atlnnta during the 
time the lmprovemen ts ""·ere being made, 
and when she returned It 'W'ns all complete, 
and she directed no chunges. She did not 
agree with anybody to 111nke the lmprove-
mt>nts, and knew nothJng about them. She 
dld not make anybody h<>r agents to have 
the lm1>rovements ma.de. :I-Ier husband wns 
not her agent, and she ne,·er bnd nny <'OD· 
vcrs:1tlon with him Jn w-hlch be !'llllcl he wus 
going to act as her agent:. or anything of that 
kind. She had no notJce o~ any purchases 
to be made, knew nothing about build· 
Ing hous<>s, did not employ any workmen 
to asalat lo the work. and bought no mnte-
rlal. First saw Kirk the JDOrnlog of the 
trial, and did not remein bE-r ever purchllslng 
anything from him. DJd not buy the stove, 
but did pay for lt; but never gave any prom-
ise to pay for any other pa.rt ot the debt. 
In the conversation wi tb Kirk the morning 
Of the trial he asked her 1~ there was any 
way the matter could be settled. She tdld 
him she did not know as sbe knew nothing 
or.it In any way ha..;lng been absent ti·om 
the city. She 'cou1d not tt>ll anything 
nbout It. She told hllD she believed she ' 
bad heard something 0~ tt, but did not 
know anything about tt:. 0 :nd could not tell 
him anything ~he did not any any· 
1 him have It to come to Atlanta and negoti-
ate a loan to pcy off this Indebtedness on 
my property or not. Father sorter over-
sees my property sometimes. Since my 
husband Jett, some ot the time father baa 
been In charge ot my atratrs, and I sup-
pose he la here now looking after this suit." 
"There bas bet'o several thousand dollars ot 
Improvements put upon the house, and I 
hnve not paid one dollar tor It." Shepherd 
testified that Akers, In a letter, told him 
he (Akers) owed some parties for material 
turnlshed and labor done In repairing or 
remodeling the house, and would like to 
have Shepherd assist Mrs. Akers In trying to 
get some money to pay olf the ln:l<'bted-
ne88, suggesting that he thought Sh<'plwrd 
could get some mont>y from Healy, Well-
house, or others; that he thought, with 
Shepherd's assistance, he could borrow the 
money. Shepherd came to Atlanta for that 
purpose, and saw several parties with a 
view of getting the money, but was lntormed 
that the claims agnlnst the property amount· 
ed to so much that "we>" abandonro the 
Idea. Mrs. Akers did not do nnyth\nJC. ~~~ 
thl more. •- t 
ng nbout her father. III& nawe Wll8 no 
menttoned. Her father 'W'aJ!I never nppolnt· 
ed by her 118 h t ln anY capacity, and 
she liad no ~~.:l~ e o:f a.DY transnctlons 
he lllay ha h d g She bn& one or two 
gentlemen te A~ · ta vvho attend to the I 
rents or th n an H r :ra tber looks after.: 
the bll8f e place. ~ ...,,,V ork had just 1 h~- ne.ss sometimes. ' ~WI on the house be~ore she went away. I 
She did not tb y -were going to re- . 
build the know e ularge tt. She had 1 
not talkect house and t> 11er bu&band. Some I 
Ume after~t over wtt!od -wblle,-she henrd ' 
him 8Peak ll.t"ds,-a t g dld not know for cer-
tain It 'VV'a or_ lt. bu be done. Did not 
know they .:.. going to to improve the house. 
Knew th ere golng ed lt before she e~ 'L.- • mDJ.en.: left, but di .uu.d co it was going to be 
done, Dld cl not kno'W ber husband lo ref· 
ereoce to """"' ~<>t talk t:ol g to be done to the 
house. ~ bat was go ~0118 aa to what was 
going to be lc.~d. no quest bad her deed to the 
land In b.e~ c:J.one. :a:~:ng tlme,-longer than 
six months b.nnds a t remember when she 
imve ft to · noes no nor bow long It was 
:1fter the ~e~ :tather~:n,,gbt. Her father at-
tended to llo t ,.,vas brt bU.SlD('SS of borrowing 
money fo~ b. ~e o:t. tbn ._as lJ1 Atlnnta, looking 
after her 'L e;r-. :Ele her· "ID this mat· 
.. ~lness ~or 
nesa talked with her, ndvlaed with her. wl.th 
did not want to lncumber the propertJ ever 
a mortgage, and no agreement -w~\t-o.ee& 
n•n<:h!'d from her to mortgage, tbat iu.ii> the 
evt>r knew of. They were consider ss 'l'l~t. 
propriety of the thing when wi~e e ~o~ 
to try to get the money to relieve ~-- o~.,.e~ 
ot a debt which he believed AJ'C f!J· )';:. e.\1\'l>'-
Wltne88 did not recognize that ~..- :;J. -q4\'l.-
owed anything. The debts were .c;. e.~ 
Akers. Mrs. Akers never const\t~ve!~u 
nt'SS as 41er agent to negotiate. ---n,.:-0 'U' 
vised together In reference to v- ~ __,1 
this money, and witness a.ttem1>te6 J~ ' 
row lt,-was attempting to borro~ c~~ J. i 
her property; that ls what they ~tl•e ~ ._ 
slderlng. The object 'Waa to ta\te t; ~,. 
off the property. 'V\'ltnesa does n°'6• _,-~ 
what facts constitute an agency. ?til ~ ~ 
wanted the 'parties pnld 1'.or the wor ~ J.7 
on the building, but ls not herself tll ~ 
do It. She owns the property, w1 
room house upon lt, etc. , ... 
Mayson & Hill, 'for plalntift ln ert0 
1 • .Albert, tor defendants ln error. 
,........ benllnotetf• L.!. 
BLECK I EY C. .:J • ~ .... e h -ti"' 
' • iport of t e ,,.s,1 gethf'r with the oft\clu. re I. tb\S c 
ull gs lllade D will render the r n Tbere cun be :l 
autllclently lnteUlgi b1e. 1'. the jurf ref' 
doubt that the verdict 0 
Case N 0. 35]
ltELEVA‘.\'(‘.Y.
.-ents the natural equity and sound justice
01' the case. The le,-_'al ground on which the
verdict rests is that Mrs. Akcm was the
concealed principal of her husb:u1d; and
that, although the credit was originally given
to the latter by Kirk & Co.. this was done
in ignorance of the agency and of the true
ownership of the property. There was
enough legal evidence that such was the
real truth of the ease to uphold the verdict.
That some ille,-zal ('\'itll‘lii‘t‘ was zuimitted
docs not render :1 new trial indispensable.
To every lover of justice the verdict al-
ready tonntl is more .~‘:lil~‘f:lt'im‘_\‘ than would
be one oi’ an oppo.-ite nature. It is impos-
sible not to feel that, as Mrs. Akers, not
her husband, obtained the benefit, she or
her property ought to answer tor it, rather
100
than Kirk & Co. should lose their money.
Wliere all the consideration of a debt reaches
a wife as an accession to her separate estate.
and she retains and enjoys it, only slight evi-
dence of the. husband's agency in contracting
the debt is required to charge her. We have
examined many :1d_iudications upon some
what similar cases. but it is needless to cite
them; for. while some of them would make
for us, they are balanced by others of an op-
posite tendency. We prefer to rest the
case on principle and its own facts. Both
the trial court and the reviewing court are
content with the verdict. This being so,
we decline to order a new trial for sii,-.:ht
errors immaterial to the result on the actual
merits ot the controversy. Judgment at-
firmed.
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Cll8c No. 35] HELEVASCY. 
1<1•ntN the nntm·al equity nnd sound Justice 
of the case. The le1ml g1·onud on wbkb thl' 
verdict rests ls thut Mrs. Akers wu the 
concealt'<I principal of her busbnud; nnd 
that, although the crt'<lit was originally given 
to the latter by Kirk & Co., this was done 
In Ignorance o:f the agency and of the true 
ownership of the property. There was 
enough legal evldt•ncl' that such was the 
rE'nl troth of th<' <':t,.t• to uphold tlw V<'rdlct. 
That some lll<'gnl <'\"ltll'lll't' was 111lmltted 
do<'11 not r<'nd<'r u n1•w trial lndl"l't'nsnble. 
To every lo¥t•r of Jusli<'t' tht• wrdlct al· 
ready fouml b1 more "atl,f:11·tory thnn would 
be 00(' or llll 01>11011ltt• nntw·e. It la lmpos-
Rlhll' not to f<'el that, us Mrs. Akers, not 
ht>r husband, obtained the benefit, she or 
her property ought to answer tor It, rathel' 
100 
.. 
than lilrk & Co. should lo12e their money. 
Wb<'rt! all the con,.hl('ratlon of a debt reaches 
a wife as an acc~'41on to ht>r M.'J>IU'ate estate, 
and she retulllll and enjoy& lt, only slight evl· 
d<'Dl'e of the husband's agency In contracting 
the debt Is r('qulrt'<I to t•barge hPr. We have 
exnmlnro mnny adj111l11•atlons upon some-
what similar cast's, but It Is n('('dl<'l!B to cite 
them; for, whllP som<' of thl'm would mnke 
tor us, thf.'Y nre balanced by otht>rs of an op. 
poelte tenclPncy. Wt> prt>rl'r to r1"8t the 
casP on prlnl'lple and ltl'I own farts. Both 
tl1P trial rourt nnd thf.' rt>vlt>wlng rourt nre 
contt>nt with thf.' v1•r1llrt. Tbl11 bt>ln~ !10, 
we d!'rllnP to ordE'r a nf'w trial tor 11lhrht 
errors lmmlltPrlal to thP l't'11ult on the netwtl 
merit& al the controvers7. .Judgment af-
firmed. 
• 
• 
CONFESSIONS.
[Case No. 36
HOPT v-
PE()PIJE OF THE TERRITORY
OI“ UTAH.
(4 Sup. Ct. 202, 110 U. S. 574.)
supreme Court of the United States. March 3.
188-L
In error to the suprelne court of the terri-
tory oi.‘ Utah.
Thos. J. Marshall, for plaiutiii in error.
Asst. Atty. Gen. .\Ia1n- ', for defendant in er-
l'0l'-
HARLAN, J. The plaintiff in error and
one Emerson were jointly indicted in a court
of Utah for the murder, in the first degree.
of John F. Turner. Each (lofvmlant demand-
ed a separate trial, and pleaded not guilty.
lit-pt. being found guilty, “'21s sentenced to
suffer death. The judglnent was atilrmed by
the supreme court of the territory. But, upon
writ of error in this court, that judgment
was reversed, and the case remanded, with
instructions to order a nexv trial. 104 U. S.
Q1. Upon the next trial, the defendant be-
ing found I-ruilry’ was again sentenced to
suffer death. That judgznent was afilrmed
by the gum-,.me court of the territory. We
air now required to deterlnine whether the
court of originn] jurlsdk-tiOD in its conduct
of the last trial <_-omnlitted any error to the
Du-judit-e of the substantial rights of the de-
fendant_
l. The validity of the judgrnent is question-
ed upon the ground that 11 part of the pro-
ceedings in um "ml court xvere conducted in
The abs 1 nt.
(‘Ode otfmce of the defel“ :1 § 218, provides
that “it the indictment is for a felony the -
(lefen
"181; b
in the absence of the defendant; if,
however -essary for the
- hi _ is I1e¢ *
Purpose or ,§e§;“fi“f;§§n_ the court may, upon
application of fie >1-osecuting attorney, by
an order or walrmlut require the personal
attendance g ndant at the trial.”
The Sam of the de e that 9, juror may be
v for actual bias;
°1' u xistence .,
was fileaejust inference in referenu.
4 ith ti.
that he “flu not act W en re
lmpai-gin" _ 239_ 241. Such a
(_ha"eng0,t3i>_ ‘ ber-tioziss be denied, must be
tried bv 1' the rac triers. not on the
. three imvarflal D the court. Sec-
’ and “PP"mted Inenged “nmy be
he Juror 8° ch”
examln rove or disprove
the chaeligis 9, xvitlieissttgngwer every (Ines-
tion pertin gfi. and In inquiry." Section 2-19.
“Other ‘tent to thégv also be examined on
either S1 e messes In rules of evidence ap-
Dlicable t ’ and the of other issues govern
the adm the trial Jusion of evidence on
then-1a_| ‘Q11 01' exilge ” Section 250. "On
the hial ‘E119 chalggllenge for actual bias,
“hen the the c concluded, the court
The Criminal r
of a state of mind _.
to find the challenge true, if in their opinion
the evidence warrants the conclusion that the
juror has such a bias against the party chal-
lenging him as to render him not impartial,
and that if from the evidence they believe
him free from such bias they must find the
challenge not true; that a hypothetical opin-
ion on hearsay or information supposed to be
true is of itself no evidence of bias ufli-
cient to disqualify a juror. The court can
give no other instruction.” Section 252.
“The triers must thereupon find the challenge
either true or not true, and their decision is
final. If they find it true the juror must be
excluded." Section It appears that six jurors were separately
challenged by the defendant for actual bias.
The grounds of challenge in each case were
denied by the district attorney. For each ju-
ror triers were appointed, who, being duly
sworn, were, “before proceeding to try the
challenge," instructed as required by section
252 of the Criminal Code; after which, in
each case, the triers took the juror from the
court-room into a different room and tried
the grounds of challenge out of the presence
as well of the court as of the defendant and_
his counsel. Their findings were returned
into court, and the challenge, being found
not true, the jurors so challenged resumed
their seats among those summoned to try
the case. Of the six challenged for actual
bias, four were subsequently challenged by
the defendant peremptorily. The other tW0
were sworn as trial jurors, one of them. \1°w'
ever, after the defendant had exhausted all
his peremptory challenges. No objection was
made to the triers leaving the court-r0°m'
flufliifi
nor was any exception taken the1'Bi° exam-
the trial. The jurors proposed Wereony be-
ined by the triers, without any testflae Q‘-oee—
lng offered or produced, either DY t
cution or the defense. _‘egen6*>?\‘\‘e
It is insisted, in behalf .0! the ( 1tt,\fl¢- as
that the action of the court in pefiplefigii ‘me
u-nu in his absence of these <-halt‘, 1* ,,,.>.\\
jurors was so irregular as to vitifi t ‘Q95 xx“
subsequent proceedings. This poi“ ('10 /Q6 _
taken. The Criminal (‘ode of U\=\n_o
authorize the trial by triers of i5‘ ,6
challenges to be ma apart from ‘ ,_ , 1
and in the absence of the defend’ ‘111 {I7
specific provision made for the e.\'*‘c
of witnesses “on either side.” Bubie {£7 ¢F
rules of evidence applicable to We “111 t 4
other issues, shows that the D1‘°@ect1t1
torney and the defendant were 99111119 1
right to be present during the ex” C06;
by the triers. lt certainly W518 “Ox 56¢ 1
Plated that wltneflses should be
. the
brought before the triers W\th°“t 116
producing them hit
ving the prlvilegevoflé
the supervision of t 9
he coufi-. Oi Vwpo
such questions as “’°“‘
d elicit thet“e‘€1e,6
-t nity °
facts. or without an oppm “
posite side for
-rt’.
c1-05s-exnn\ination-
views find some $“PP0
rt in the f\l‘\']‘l}t‘efvv1
t 1 the co /
vision making it the du Y 0 )
11'
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CO~FESSIO~S. [Case No. 36 
HOPT v. PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY 
OF UTAH. 
(4 Sup. Ct. 202, 110 U. S. 57-1.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. March 3. 
1884. 
In error to the supreme court ot the teJTl· 
torr of Utah. 
Tbos. J. Marshall, 1'.or plalntll'l In error. 
.-\14-'lt. Atty. Gen. Mau1-y, for defendunt In er-
ror. 
HA.RLAN, J. The plnlntlt'I' In error and 
one l<~mf'rson were jointly lndleted In a court 
of l;tah for the murder. In tbe first degree, 
of John I<'. Turner. .E<Jach defl'ndunt demand· 
ec:l a lie1>nmte trial, and ple>tull>d not guilty. 
Hq1t. being found gnil ty, "•ns 11entenced to 
1mlfer (jeath. 'l'he judgn:ient wns alHrmed by 
the supreme <.'Ourt of the territory. But, upon 
writ of error lo this court, that judgment 
wus re'·ersoo, and the c•nse remnnrled, with 
lnstmctlons to order a ne~ t:rtal. 104 U. S. 
~1. U1>0n the next trial, t:he d<>t'encln.nt be-
ing found guilty, was ug.nln i:wntf'uced to 
imlfer death. '!'hat judgrnen t wus nfftrmed 
b~· the 111111rt-me court of t-he territory. We 
lll'l' now reqnlred to det:erini ue whether the 
l'OUrt of original jnrlsdlc-tfon in its couduct 
of the last trial conuu it te<l a uy error to the 
Jll"(•judl<·e of the substant:inl rights of the de-
fendant. 
1. 'l'he l"lllldlty ot the j Uflgn1e11t le question-
~ llPon tbe ground tlia t: n pnrt of thP pro-
~lnge In the trial c<>Urt -,.vere c-ond111·tl•1I ln 
t~e absen<>e of the det'en<lu.nt:. The Criminal 
{Ode Of p,..u I f U t~ b § 218, provldt>s 
ha .. ..,,.'el ure o ·~ • t t It the indictment ls ~or a felony the 
defenclunt must be persona llY present ut the 
trial; but If tor a m\edenien.uor the trial ~1ay 
be had In th b 0 - the defendant, If, ho ea eencc L Wever bl ls :necessary for the 
' s pre11ence purpose or Identification, the court may, upon 
applleat1on of the rosecutlng attorney, hy 
an Order 0 Pt require the personal 
attendanee r warnn:i~-reuc:lnnt at the trial." 
The same of the 8 tbn t a juror may be 
ehaUeng'ed Code pro'\"lde artY tor actual bins; 
that Is ··- by either P 6 a state ot mind 
' LOr tl \stence OA. Which lead~ . ie ex · t tu'ference In reference 
to the cuse· to a jus 111 not act with entire 
lmparttaUt tl1at he w 2:lU 2.U. Such a 
challeogf• ~ • ·' Sectlo~s ·be denied, must be 
tried b~· 'th r the facr:\nl triers, not on the 
Jury P11ne1 r~ lmJ>ll1 ted bY the court. Sec-
tion 246. :..rand app<> :0 cballenged "may be 
examlneq a he juror 9 to prove or dlt!pro\·e 
the chaUen 8 a wttnes st: answer every ques· 
tlon Jlertln ~e. and muln<.Iutry." Section 249. 
"Other '1P'lt:ent; to t:lle also be exnmlned 011 
either aide n~ffes ma~les of evidence ap-
plicable to> and the 0~ other Issues govern 
the admlaet t:h_e trtal ctuston of evidence on 
the trial 0 _ on or eJC e " 8ectlon 200 "011 
... 't:b bnueug . . 
tile trial o.r e c bauenge for actual bins, 
when the t:be c concluded, the court 
rnu11t lnst-.-:'\l"tdeDC~8rs t:bat lt la their ducy 
- ... ~t; t;be ..... ae 
to tlnd the challenge true, If In their opinion 
the e\'lden(.-e warrants the conclusion that the 
jnror has such a bias agnjnst the party chal-
lt>niclng him 88 to render him not impartial, 
uml that It from the evidence they belle'\'e 
him free from such bias they must find the 
challenge not tme; that a hypothetlcnl opln· 
loo on hearsay or information supposed to be 
true is ot Itself no evidence of bias sutli· 
clent to dlsquallty a juror. The court can 
gh·e no other lnstruetlon." Section 2:>2. 
"The trle1'8 must thereupon flnd the challenge 
either true or not true, and their decision Is 
final. If they find It tnte the juror must be 
excluded." Section 2a3. 
It ap(lears that six jurors were se1>arately 
challenged by the defendant for actual bias. 
The grounds of challenge In each case were 
denied by the district attorney. For each Ju· 
ror trll'rs were appointed, who, being duly 
sworn, were, "before proceeding to try the 
challenge," Instructed as required by section 
2:'i2 of the Crtmlnnl Code; after which, In 
each case, the triers took the juror from the 
court-room Into a dll'lerent room and tried 
the gronnde ot ehallenge out ot the presence 
as well of the court as of the defendant and 
hls coullllel. Their findings were returned · 
into court, and the challenge, being· found 
not true, the jurors so challenged resumed 
their seats among those summoned to try 
the case. Of the six challenged for actual 
hlae, four were sul1seq11ently challenged by 
the defendant peremptorily. The other two 
were sworn as trial jurors, one of them, how· 
ever, after the defl'odant had exhausted all 
his peremptory challenges. No objection was 
made to the triers leaving the court-r~:g 
nor wne auy exception taken thereto dU'ltlltn· 
the trial. The jurors proposed were ~'Y be-
lned by the triers, without auy tesd";:: -p't<>6e-
lng ol'len>d or prorluced, either bY 't. 
cutlon or the defense. e-cenG~~~ 
It le lnslt;1ted, In behalf J>f the <'l , ·tvuf. ~ 0 i, 
that the aetlon of the court \n pe1~1 le~g~~ \.'\\e 
trial In hl11 absence of theRe (•bfll te o. "i'le\\ 
jurors was eo lrrPgular as to 'V\t\~ t ~~es 1\<J 
!mbsequent proceedings. '.rl1\!~ \lo\ .. if O ~~& · 
taken. The Crlmtnnl {"o<\(' of Utall.0 .._• .,_ co~ 
author!?.!' the trl:1l h~· tril'l'~ of ~1 1,.e · challeng~ to be bnd upart from t .,.-I'.'.~~ 
and In the absem·e of the defeut\l\.~ J -c" 
spedfic pro¥1slon matte for the el>" ct; ,~ 
of wltne11ses "on either side," su\>le t;1f"" ~_r 
rules of e,·l<leuce uppl\cnble to t\1e \J t'J ~ 
other Issues, shows thnt the prosec tt-t:• p 
torney and the defendant -were ell tJJj~ 1 
right to be present dur\ng the exn ~o~ 
by the triers. It certuln\y was not se "" s 
pluted that witnesses should be tbe" i?",,:::i 
bronght before the t:rlers -wlthont e ~ A 
' 
the prtvncg • .... ~ prolluclng them bn v ng t ropo\JY- ff!?" 
the eu11en·lslon of 1:be conrt. 0 11 _,.of§ 
· \d e\\c\t the n""~ 
11uch questions nR 'vou "~rtunltY to tl:JCV 
facts, or without an <>~~xiun\nat\on. ~ '$:, 
poslte side for cros rt lu the furtbel° • 
vlewe find some supgo ty ot tbe court"~ .... 
vlslon making lt tbe u ~ 
Case No. 36]
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the evidence is concluded," and before the
triers make a finding, to instruct them as to
their duties. In the case before us the in-
structions to the triers were given before the
latter proceeded with the trial of the chal-
lenges. But all doubt upon the subject is re-
moved by the express requirement. not that
the defendant may, but, where the indict-
ment is for a felony, must be, “personally
present at the trial.” The argument in be-
half of the government is that the trial of
the indictment began after, and not before,
the jury was sworn; consequently that the
defendant's personal presence was not re-
quired at an earlier stage of the proceedings.
Some warrant, it is supposed by counsel. is
found for this position in decisions constru-
ing particular statutes in which the word
"trial" is used. Without stopping to distin-
guish those cases from the one before us, or
to examine the grounds upon which they are
_placed, it is sufficient to say that the pur-
pose of the foregoing provisions of the Utah
Criminal Code is, in prosecutions for felonies,
to prevent any steps being taken in the ab-
sence of the accused. and after the case is
called for trial, which involves his substan-
tial rights. The requirement is not that he
must be personally present at the trial by
the jury, but “at the trial." The Code, we
have seen, prescribes grounds for challenge
by either party of jurors proposed. And pro-
vision is expressly made for the “trial" of
such challenges, some by the court, others by
triers. The prisoner is entitled to an impar-
tial jury composed of persons not disqualified
by statute, and his life or liberty may depend
upon the aid which, by his personal presence,
he may give to counsel and to the court and
triers. in the selection of jurors. The neces-
sities of the defense may not be met by the
presence of his counsel only. For every pur-
pose. therefore, involved in the requirement
that the defendant shall be personally pres
ent at the trial, where the indictment is for
a felony, the trial commences at least from
the time when the work of impaneling the
jury begins.
But it is said that the right of the accused
to be present before the triers was waived
by his failure to object to their retirement
from the court-room, or to their trial of the
several challenges in his absence. We are
of opinion that -it was not within the power
of the accused or his counsel to dispense
with statutory requirements as to his per-
sonal presence at the trial. The argument to
the contrary necessarily proceeds upon the
ground that he alone is concerned as to the
mode by which he may be deprived of his life
or liberty, and that the chief object of the
prosecution is to punish him for the crime
charged. But this is a mistaken view as well of
the relations which the accused holds to the
public as of the end of human punishment.
The natural life, says Blackstone. “cannot
legally be disposed of or destroyed by any
-individual, neither by the person himself,
nor by any other of his fellow creatures mere-
ly upon their own authority.” 1 Bl. Comm.
133. The public has an interest in his life
and liberty. Nelther‘can be lawfully taken
except in the mode prescribed by law. That
which the law makes essential in proceedings
involving the deprivation of life or liberty
cannot be dispensed with, or affected by the
consent of the accused, much less by his
mere failure, when on trial and in custody,
to object to unauthorized methods. The great
end of punishment is not the expiation or
atonement of the offense committed, but the
prevention of future offenses of the same
kind. 4 Bl. Comm. 11. Such being the rela-
tion which the citizen holds to the public.
and the object of punishment for public
wrongs. the legislature has deemed it essen-
tial to the protection of one whose lite or lib-
erty is involved in a prosecution for felony
that he shall be personally present at the
trial; that is, at every stage of the trial when
his substantial rights may be aifected by the
proceedings against him. If he be deprived
of his life or liberty without being so present,
such deprivation would be without that due
process of law required by the constitution.
For these reasons we are of opinion that it
was error, which vitiated the verdict and
judgment, to permit the trial of the chal-
lenges to take place in the absence of the ac-
cused.
2. Another assignment of error relates to
the action of the court in permitting the sur-
geon~—who had made a post mortem exam-
ination of the body of a corpse which was
claimed by the prosecution to be that of John
F. Turner—-to state that one Fowler identi-
fied the body to him. The urgeon testified
that the body examined by him was on the
platform at the railroad depot in Salt Lake
City, in a wooden case and coflln. The father
of the deceased testiiied that he did not com-
municate personally with the surgeon, nor
see that his son's body was delivered to him:
that he left it at the railroad depot in Salt
Lake City, in a wooden coflin, inclosed in a
box; and the fact that the body of the de-
ceased was originally placed in such a cof-
flu was proved by a witness who put it in
the cotiln. And yet there was tetimony
showing that there was a body in the same
depot, at or about the time referred to by the
surgeon, which. having been placed in a me-
tallic case covered by a wooden box, had
been shipped from Echo, by rail to Salt Lake
City: also that it showed injuries “generally
similar" to those described by the surgeon.
Were there two bodies of deceased persons,
at the same depot, about the same time. one
“in a wood coiiin inclosed in a box," and the
other “in a metallic case covered by a wooden
box?" There would be some ground to so
contend did not the bill of exceptions, in its
reference to the body shipped from Echo in
a metallic case, imply that there was testi-
mony showing it to he the one that “had been
identified as the body of the deceased, John
102
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Case N'o. 36] RELEVANCY. 
the evidence Is concluded," and before the 
trlera make a finding, to Instruct them as to 
their dutll'.8. In the case before ns the ln-
stru<'tlons to the triers were given before the 
latter l>rO<'eeded with the trial of the chal-
lenges. But all doubt upon the subject hi re-
moved by the express requirement. not that 
the defendant may, but, where the Indict-
ment Is for a felony, must be, "peraonally 
present at the trial." The argument In be-
half of the government Is that the trial ot 
the Indictment began after, and not before, 
the jury was sworn; consequently that the 
defemlant's personal presence was not re-
quired at an earlier stage of the proceedings. 
Some warrant, it ls supposed by ('OUnsel, Is 
found tor this position in declslollll constru-
ing purtwular statutes In which the word 
"trial" Is used. Without stopping to distin-
guish those cases from the one before us, or 
to examine the grounds upon which they are 
,placed, it Is sufficient to say that the pur-
pose of the foregoing provisions of the Utah 
Crlmlnul Code ls, In prosecutions for felonies, 
to prevent any steps being taken In the ab-
Se11('e of the accused, and after the case ls 
<'ailed for trial, which Involves hll! substan-
tial rights. Tbe requirement Is not that he 
must be peraonally present at the trial by 
the Jury, but "at the trial." The Code, we 
have seen, prescribes grounds for challenge 
by either party of Jurors proposed. And pro-
vision ls exprellt!ly made for the "trial" of 
such challenges, some by the court, others by 
trlera. The prisoner is entitled to an Impar-
tial jury composed of persons not disqualified 
by statute, and his life or liberty may depend 
upon tb.e aid which, by his personal presence, 
he may give to counsel and to the court and 
triel'll, In the selection ot jurors. The neces-
sl tles of the defense may not be met by th1> 
presence of bis counsel only. For every pur· 
pose. therefore, Involved In the requirement 
that thl• defendant shall be personally prea 
ent at the trial, where the Indictment ls for 
a felony, the trial commences at least from 
the time when the work of Impaneling the 
jury begins. 
But It Is said that the right of the accused 
to be present before the triers was waived 
by his failure to object to their retirement 
from the court-room, or to their trial of the 
several challenges In his absence. We nre 
of opinion that .It was not within the power 
of the accused or his counsel to dispense 
with statutory requirements as to bis per-
sonal presence at the trial The argument to 
the contrary necessarily proceeds upon the 
&'round ibat he alone ls concerned as to the 
mode by which he may be deprived of hls Ute 
or Uberty, and thnt the chief objec>t of the 
prosecution Is to punish him for the crime 
charged. But this ls a mistaken view as well of 
the relations whlc·h the accused holds to the 
public as of the end of human punishment. 
The natural life, says Blackstone, "cannot 
legally be disposed of or destroyed by nny 
· Individual, neither by the person himself, 
102 
nor by any other of his fellow creatures mere-
ly upon their ow.n authority." 1 BL Comm. 
133. The public bas an Interest In his life 
and liberty. ~elther'can be lawfully taken 
eXC'eJ>t ID the mode prescribed by law. That 
which the law makes essential In proc-eedlngs 
Involving the deprivation of life or liberty 
cannot be dispensed with, or affected by the 
consent of the accused, much less by his 
mere failure, when on trial and In custody, 
to object to unauthorized met.bods. The great 
end of punishment ls not the expiation or 
atonement of the offense committed, but the 
prevention of future offenses of the same 
kind. 4 Bl. Comm. 11. Such being the rela-
tion which the citizen bolds to the publl<·. 
and the object of punishment tor publtc 
wrongs, the legislature has deemed lt essen-
tial to the protection of one whose ll!e or lib-
erty Is Involved In a proaecutlon tor felony 
that he shall be personally present at the 
trial; that ts, at every stage of the trial when 
his substantial rights may be affected by the 
proceedings against him. If he be deprived 
of his life or liberty without being so present, 
such deprivation would be without that due 
p1'0cess of law required by the constitution. 
l<'or these reasons we are of opinion that It 
was error, which vitiated the verdict and 
judgment, to permit the trial of the chal-
lenges to take place In the absence of the ac-
cused. 
2. Another assignment of error relates to 
the action of the court In permitting the sur-
geon-who bad made a post mortem exam-
lnstlon of the body ot a corpse whkh was 
claimed by the proBe<'utlon to be that of John 
F. Turner-to state that one Fowler Identi-
fied the body to him. The surgeon testified 
that the body examined by him was on the 
platform at the railroad depot In Salt Lake 
City, In a wooden case and coffin. The father 
of the deceased testllled that he did not com-
munl<'ate personaUy with the surgeon, oor 
see that his son's body was delivered to him: 
that be left It at the railroad depot In Salt 
Lake City, In a wooden coftln, lnclosed In a 
box; and the tact that the body of the de-
ceased was originally placed In such a cof-
fin was proved by a wltneu who put It In 
the coffin. And yet there was testimony 
shpwlng that there was n body In the same 
depot, at or about the time referred to by the 
surgeon, which, having been 11la<'ed In a me-
talllc case covered by a wooden box, bad 
been shipped from Echo, by rail to Salt Lake 
City; also that It showed Injuries "generally 
similar" to those described by the surgeon. 
Were there two boclles of deceased persons, 
at the same depot, about the same time, one 
"In a wood comn lnclosed In a box," and the 
other "lo a metalll<' <'ase covered by a wooden 
box?" There would be some ground to so 
contend did not the bill of ex<'eptlons, In Its 
referen<'e to the hodv 11blpped from Echo In 
a metallic casl', lmp01y that there was testi-
mony showing It to be tbe one that "had been 
ldentlfied as the body of the deceased, John 
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1)
F. Turner. The confusion upon the sub-
ject :u'i.=es from the failure. to statc that the
body winch the father of the deceased left at
the railroad depot W118 the same as that ship-
ed froin lcho to Salt Lake City. It was,
pei‘h8pS, to this part of the case the court re-
(erred xvhen, in the charge to the jury, it
said that the prosecution "has introduced a
vast amount of circunlstantial evidence.” Be
this as it may, it was a lnaterial question be-
fore the jury whether the body examined by
the surgeon was the saxne one that the father
of tho deceased had left at the depot, and
therefore the body of the person for whose
murder the defendant and Emerson were in-
dicted. It it was not, then all that he said
was immaterial. If it was, (U19 '~‘V!(1e!l¢‘9 Om-
erwise connecting defendant with the death
of John F. Turne-r,) the statements of that
Witness as to the condition of the corpse, the
nature of the injuries-—-whether necessarily
fatal or not—observabl-e upon the body ex-
amined by him, and how’ the blows, apparent
upon inspection oi.’ it, ‘Vere probably inflicted,
became of great consequence in their bearing
"DOD the guilt or inn,“-ence of the defendant
°t the (‘Tillie oi’ murder.
N0 Dmper foundation xvas laid for the ques-
tion propounded to the surgeon as to who
Pointed out and identified to him the body he
examined as that of John 1<‘_ ’,1‘urner. He had
Previously stated that he did not personally
know the deceased and did not recognize the
body to be his. he’ did not kl10\V that lt w:1B
the body wméh the father of deceased de-
sired him to exmn1ne- consequently his an-
swer could only place before the jury the
statement of some one not under oath, and
W110. being absent c0n1(l nOt be Sl1l)]€Cl’e(l (0
the ordeafot a ’s5_exa1ni11z1tion. The ques-
tion plainly C3-Fed for hearsay evldellce,
which, in its ie ai sense, “denotes that kind
‘S15! evidence whip does not derive its value
Ely fI‘()In
3:85 hhnsfilf, but restfi,
Bomnclty and competenc
n' Greenl. E‘v’- § 99;
eral rule, subject
in part, on the
y of some other per-
1 Phil. Ev. 169.
to certain well-es-
Old as the rule itself,
and therefore to be
be, “that hearsay
_ t ta establish any spe-
€‘_m‘°mtpcctte I-118 in its nature suscep-
mch a xvitnesses who speak
_ _ “qed-re.” “That this
°““ mlothe gm further said,
Justice Marshall, “sup-
esfin10ny which might be
“lay case is not the sole
20?». *0
tible of from th;
Species
speaklngt testimony,
posed so by (ilflef
adduced Q better t, _
ground the Pa"fl('
_ _ § n, Its intrinsic weak-
ness, ltsot its €_\(_\11-S ° 0 satisfy the mind of
‘C
the exist é1Q0mPete1t1§Z fact, and the frauds
which rniglnee of cticed under its cover, com-
bine to 3 It be pra 9 that hearsay evidence
is 1m1<1m?DD°"t tb€:,[_‘1h‘: specific fact to beestab-
iislied b ssible-" 1; some one else said
y Dr-oof Of wbn
to the surgeon as to the identity of the body
submitted to his examination was that it was
the body of John F. Tamer. What Fowler——
who was not even shown to have been placed
in charge of the body, nor commissioned to
deliver it to the surgeon, nor to be acquainted
with the deceased——said, in the absence of
the prisoner, as to the identity of the body.
was plainly hearsay evidence, within the rule
recognized in all the adjudged cases. As such
it should, upon the showing made, have been
excluded.
3. The next assignment oi.’ error relates to
that portion of the charge which represents
the court as saying: “That an atrocious and
dastardl_v murder has been committed by
some person is apparent, but in your delibera-
tions you should be careful not to be influ-
enced by any feeling.” By the statutes of
Utah, “murder perpetrated by poison, lying
in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliber-
ate, malicious, or premeditated killing, or
committed in the perpetration of or attempt
to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary, or
robbery, or perpetrated from a premeditated
desi:..'n unlawfully and maliciously to eflect
the death of any other human being other
than him who is killed, or perpetrated by any
act greatly dangerous to the lives of others
and evidencing a depraved mind regardless
of human life, is murrler in the first degree;
and any other homicide committed under
such circumstances as would have constitut-
ed murder at common law, is murder in the
second degree." Comp. Laws Utah 1373-_ P-
585. The punishment of murder in the first
degree is death, or, upon the recommeBda“°;
of the jury, imprisonment at hard 1flb°‘:'“‘_t’
the Denitentianv at the discretion 05 ‘hex; sec-
while the punishment for murdel‘ i“ {amt in
ond degree is imprisonment at hard five om?
the penitentiary for not less £119?“ new °E_
more than fifteen years. Id. 686- ‘ch the 2“
these statutory provisions, to Wn_ ¢\e$“
tention of the jury was called, it ii c0@-
the observation by the court, til” v6efl\w rs
cious and dastardly murdel‘ W15 (Of? ens“
mitted by some person,” was 1111,21 as \“
garded by them as an instruction v‘7_‘4oi’-i
fense, by whomsoever (!O11]!1\'\(i9d'if_ ‘O _
der in the first decree; whereas 4'/L.
the jury, having been informed 9 1;, ,1"
was murder by the laws of Uiflfla 1' 01
whether the facts made a case 05 4045/ I
the first degree or niurder in the ‘A :15, 1’
gree. It was competent for the We J1 ff
the statutes of Utah, to Btate t° tn“. 1%’
matters of law necessary 1°‘ the the ,¢
tion," and, conseqllenuy’ t° mfmm W it '
those statutes defined as rnurder-(ma 41,.
degree and murder in the iec(‘r. if 1,
Laws Utah 1878, D- C0(lc9Clili'(!l1 ,l
283, 284. But it is expressly ( - 1;
C d f C iminal P1‘°° ill
II1(:l_Ve gstatc: the testiInO1'1F ‘ma dec 1'6
1
lawn he ulnust not charge the jury n
. ” ~ '-ti n 257-
to matters of fact‘; C323 sy the Prev-10
committed was no
120 2
edure that ‘V ;¢
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CO:SFESSIONS. (Case No. 36 
F. Turner." The con:ruslon upon the aub-
jeet arlses from the :rallure to state that the 
bOdY 'Wblch the rather or the deceased left at 
the railroad depot w-as t:he ssme 1111 that shl1> 
ed 1'.ro111 Echo to SaU; Lake Ulty. It was, 
perhaps. to this part o:r the case the court re-
fened when, ln t:he charge to the jury, It 
said that the prosecution .. has introduced a 
vast amount of clrcumst:antlal evidence." Be 
this as tt may, It was a material question be-
fore the jury whether t:he body examined by 
the surgeon was the same one that the father 
of the de<"eased had le:rt at the depot, and 
therefore the bod$' or the person fo1· whose 
murder the defendant an.<l I~merson were In-
dicted. It it was not. then all that he said 
was immaterial. If It 'W'll&. (the evidence oth· 
erwlse connecting de:rendant with the death 
of John F. Turner,) tbe statements of that 
witness as to the condition of the corpse, the 
nature of the fnjurles-'W'hether necesaarlly 
fatal or not-observable upon the body ex-
amined by him, and ho"· the blows, ap11arent 
upon Inspection of It. were probably lnttl<-ted, 
became of great consequence in their bearing 
upon the guilt or fnncx•ence of the defendant 
of the crime of murder. 
No proper foundatlou "W'fl.B laid for the ques-
tion prop0unded to tile surgeon ae to who 
pointed out and ldeotUled to him the body he 
examfned as that of .Tobn It ... r.ru1·ner. He had 
PrevlouaJy stated tbat he <lid not personally 
know the deceased and did not recognize the 
bodr to be hie· h~ did not: kn.ow that It was 
the body wbl~b the 1'atber of deceased de-
Blred him to examine; consequently his an-
swer COUld only place be1'ore the Jury the 
statement of some one not under oath, and 
Who, being alllle t co-old not be subjected to 
the Ord.ea.I of a c~es-e.x.a in inn tlon. The ques-
Uon platnly 11 d 1'or beftr&aY evlOence, 
Wbleh. bi lte l:a~ sense. "'denotes that kind 
of etlden<!e which doe& not derive Its value 
aoleJy troin th redlt to be given to the wlt-
·neu hhn.aeir ~ \ ests al&O. ln part, on the 
veractty &.nd u ~ n~Y o1' some other per-
son." 1 Gr ~mE e 1 99; 1 Phil. Ev. 169. 
The gene een · v • ect: to certain well-es-
tabllshed l"al. rule, au!! old as the rule Itself, 
-applfca b~ceptlo~s ses and therefore to be 
rigidly enr: •o:vwbC:re tite or liberty are at 
Btake.-vv._ re ed In "MlID& Queen v. Hep-
burn, 7 ~ 8 stat 5 t:o be, "that hearBlly 
evidenc.-e 1 .-Unch, 29t;nt to establish any spe-
clftc fact 11 lncompe 1 ln its nature suscep-
tible or ~ 'Vhlch tact 8 witnesses who speak 
from th ln.g proved bY ledge " "That this 
et_. D kDOW . llpecles o:t ow ,, the court further said, 
•i>eaklng °t:~tlmony. ;rustlce Marshall, "sup-
)>Olled 8Qi:n b3T Chle~eetlniony which might be 
addnee<i ln.e better rticular case Is not the sole 
rround <>:t 1:he pa iuston- Its Intrinsic weak-
ness, lta l:t::t l ts ex.c ncY to satisfy the mind of 
the eXfet:e ~~Jinpete t:he -fact, and the frauds 
Whlchrnig~~e o~ ctlced under itscover,com-
blne to 11~1> 1: be pra rule t:bat hearaay evidence 
Is lnadzn.tea l>ort 1:b~be speclftc fact to be estab-
lished b~ i,1:::;;• 0~ w-bat some one else said 
• 
to the aorgeo.o ae to the Identity of the body 
submitted to hiB examination was that It was 
the body of John F. •.rumer. What lt'owler-
who was not even shown to have been placed 
In clwrge ot the body, nor commlBSloned to 
deliver it to the surgeon, nor to be acquainted 
with the deceased-said, in the abaence of 
the prisoner, as to the Identity of the body, 
was plainly hearaay et"ldence, within the rule 
recognized In all the adjudged cases. As such 
It should, upon the showlns made, have been 
excluded. 
3. The next asslgnmt-ut of error relates to 
that portion of the charge which represents 
the court as saying: "That an atrocloue and 
dastardly murder has been committed by 
eorue l>el"BOn ls apparent, but In your delibera-
tions you should be careful not to be ln1lu-
enced by any feeling." By the statute& of 
Utah, "murder perpetrated by poleon, lying 
ID wait, or any other kind o! willful, dellber· 
ate, mall<'lous. or premeditated killing, or 
committed In the perpetration of or attempt 
to perpetrate, any a1"B011, rape, burglary, or 
robbery, or perpetrated from a premeditated 
<lestgn unlawfully and maliciously to etreet 
the death ot any other human being other 
than hlm who ls kllled, or perpetrated by any 
act greatly dangerous to the lives of others 
and evidencing a depra,·ed mind regardleee 
ot human life, Is murdt-r In the first degree; 
and any other homlMde committed under 
such clrc•umstances as would ha¥e constitut-
ed murder at common law, Is murder ln the 
second degree." Comp. Lawe Utah 1873, P· 
58G. The punishment of murder ID tbe first 
degree Is death, or, upon the recommendaU0i:_ 
ot the jury, Imprisonment at bard l&~urt. 
the penitentiary at the discretion of tb:be sec· 
while tbe punb1hment for murder \: \abOr \11 
•.;. 
ond degree ls imprisonment at )lo.r i\..,e ~o-c 
the penitentiary tor not less tbS-1;~ -v\e,. of. 
more than fifteen years. Id. GSO· tcb ~e \.~~t. 
thf'Be statutory provisions, to '-"ta e c\e&.T ~o­
tentlon ot tile jury was called, \t l t:; ... .,..~ "'c<>~­
the observation by the court, tll9- .,ee..,:.\\-S r4'! 
clous and dastardly murder baS .-~ .._ \.~e ~ 
mltted by some person," was J:J9-l~~ ~~ ~ 
garded by them as an lnstruct\on t ~ ~~e 
tense, by whomsoever committee.\• t. i:- ~ • 
der In the first decree; whereas - -«:.<'. 
the jury, having been informed tl J•"' ~-~ 
was murder by the laws ot Uttl iP p~ 
whether the facts made a case of _.~ 
the first degree or n1 urd.er ln tbe d~~ ~ 
gree. It was competent tor the 3\l ~ ~~ 
the &ttltutes of Utah, to atate to tbe ,.,.--~ 
matters of law necessary tor tbell" lJe,,......." 
tton," and, coDBe<luently, to inform :U t;~ 4 
thOBe statutes defined aa murder d $• 
degree and murder tn t.be secoP 't' -.:-
Lawe Utah 1878. 1~· 120; ~od:ec~!~e<t , ; 
283, 284. But It is express Y bat w P. "' 
Code of Criminal. Proc~urea:d decl~1'"'"" 
may "state the t:est\mo Y ury \Jl .:' 
law" be "must not cbnrge the 1..... Tl:Je _..,. 
t,, sectton -·· ...... to matters of tac • ed b'f the pred0 
committed was Dot cur 
Case No. 36]
RELE VANGY.
servation of the judge, that by the laws of
Iftah the jury are “the sole judges of the
credibility of the witnesses and of the weight
of the evidence and of the facts." It is rath-
er more correct to say that the eifect of that
observation was destroyed by the statement
at the conclusion of the charge that the mur-
der, by whomsoever committed, was an atro-
cious and dastardly one, and therefore, as the
jury might infer, in view of the language of
the statute, was murder in the first degree.
The prisoner had the right to the judgment
of the jury upon the facts. unintiuenced by
au_v direction from the court as to the weight
of evidence. For the reasons stated the judg-
ment of the supreme court of tl1e territory
must be reversed, and the case remanded,
with directions that the verdict aml judg-
mcnt be set aside and a new trial ordered.
The assignments of error. however, present
other questions of importance which, as the_v
are likely to arise upon another trial, we
deem proper to examine.
-i. The first of these questions relates to the
action of the court in permitting Ga!-r—caiied
as a witness for the defensc—to give in evi-
dence a confession of the prisoner. T’hat con-
fession tended to implicate the accused in the
crime charged. The admissibility of such
evidence so largely depends upon the special
circuiiistances connected with the confession
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formu-
late a rule that will comprehend all cases.
As the question is necessarily addressed, in
the first instance, to the judge, and since his
discretion must be controlled by all the at-
tendant circumstances. the courts have wise-
ly forborne to mark with absolute precision
the limits of admission and exclusion. It is
un11cc1~ssa|-y in this case that we should lay
down any general rule on the subject; for
we are satisfied that the action of the trial
court can be sustained upon grounds which,
according to the weight of authority. are suf- '
flcient to admit confession made by the ac-
cused to o11e in authority. It appears that
the defendant was arrested at the railroad
depot in Cheyenne, Wyoming. by the witness
(‘at-r. who is a detective, on the charge made
in the indictment. The father of the (i\‘ceas-
ed. present at the time, was much excited,
and may have made a motion to draw a re-
volver on the defendant, but of that fact the
witiiess did not peak positively. The Wit-
ness 111ay have prevented him from drawing
a weapon. and thinks he told him to do noth-
iug rash. At the arrest a large crowd gath-
ered around the defendant; Carr hurried him
off to jail, sending with him a policeman,
wl1ile he remained behind. out of the hearing
of the policeman and the defendant. In two
or three minutes he joined them, and imme-
diately the accused commenced making a con-
fession. What conversation. if any, occurred
between the latter and the policeman during
the brief period of two or three minutes pre-
ceding the confession was not known to the
witness. So far as witness knew, the bill of
exceptions states “the confession was volun-
tary and uninfluenced by hopes of reward or
fear of punishment; he held out no induce-
ment, a11d did not know of any inducement
being held out to defendant to confess." This
was all the evidence showing or tending to
show that the confession was voluntary or
uninfiucnced by hope of reward or fear of
punishment.
\\'hilc some of the adjudged cases indicate
distrust of confessions which are not judicial.
it. is certain, as observed by Baron Parke in
Regina v. Baldry, 2 Dcnison, 430, 4-if». that
the rule against their 11d111issibility has been
sometimes carried too far. and in its applica-
tion justicc and common sense have too fre-
qucntly been sacrificed at the shrine of mer-
c_v. A confession, if freely and voluntarily
made. is evidence of the most satisfactory
character. Such a confcssio11. said l'}_vrc. (‘.
B.. in King v. \\'aricksl1all. 1 Leach, 263. “is
dc.~'c|-viug of the highest credit. bccaus'e it is
presumed to iio\v from the strongest sense of
guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof of
the crime to which it refers." Elementary
writers of authority concur in saying that,
while from the very nature of such evidence
it must be subjected to careful scrutiny and
received with great caution, a deliberate, vol-
untary confession of guilt is among the most
effectual proofs in the law. and constitutes
the strongest evidence against the party mak-
ing it that can be given of the facts stated
in such confession. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 215; 1
Archb. Cr. PL125; 1 Phil. Ev. 533, 534; Starkie.
Ev. 73. But the presumption upon which
weight is given to such evidence, namely, that
one who is i11noce11t will not imperil his safe-
ty or prejudice his interests by an untrue
statement, ceases when the confession ap-
pears’ to have been made either in conse-
quence of inducements of a temporal nature,
held out by one in authority, touching the
charge preferred or because of a threat or
promise by or in the presence of such person.
which, operating upon the fears or hopes of
the accused, in reference to the charge, de-
prive him of that freedom of will or se1f-con-
trol essential to make his confession volun-
tary within the meaning of the law. Test-
ed by these conditions, there seems to have
been no reason to exclude the confession of
the accused; for the existence of any such
inducements, threats, or promises seems to
have been negativcd by the statement of the
circumstances under which it was made.
But it is contended that the court erred in
not excluding this proof until the prosecu-
tion produced the policeman and proved that
nothing was said or done by him, in the
absence of Carr, which unduly influenced
the making of the confession. The argu-
ment is that, possibly, the policeman offered
such inducements, or made such threats or
promises, that the prisoner, when joined by
Carr, was not in a condition of mind to
make a confession which the law would
deem voluntary. This position, although
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11ervatlon of the judge, that by the laws of 
rtah the jury are "the sole judges of the 
<'redlblllty of the witnesses and of the weight 
of tht> eYhl('nce and of the facts." It ls rath-
er more correct to say that the effect of that 
ohlM'rt"atlon was destroyed by the statement 
at the <'On<'luslon of the charge that the mur-
der, by whomsoever committed, was an atro-
cious and dastardly one, and therefore, as the 
Jury might Infer, ln view of the language of 
the 111tatute, was murder In the 11.l'llt degree. 
'l'he prisoner bad the right to the judgment 
of the jury upon the facts. unlntluenc•ed by 
any direction from the court as to the weight 
of evidence. For the reasons stated the judg-
ment of the supreme court of the territory 
mllilt be reversed, and the case remanded, 
with directions that the vertlh·t and juclg-
uumt be set aslcle and a new trial ordered. 
The assignments of error. however, prt>Nent 
other questions of importnnc•c• whh·h, as tl1ey 
are likely to arise upon another trial, we 
deem prope1· to examine. 
4. The first of these questions relates to the 
actlon of the court ln permitting Carr-called 
:iR a witness for the defen!K'-to gf\"e In evl-
1lence a eonft>sslon of the prisoner. Tbat con-
fession tended to ln1pllcate the accused In the 
c-rlme eharged. The admlsslblllty of such 
evidence so largely depends upon the special 
t·lrc•uwstanct!S connected with the confession 
that It Is 11lffleu1t, If not Impossible, to formu-
late a rule that will comprehend all eases. 
As the qut>stlon Is necessarily addressed, In 
the firRt Instance, to the judge, and since his 
<llsC'retlon must be controlled by all the at-
tendant clreumstances, the courts have wise-
ly forborne to mark with absolute precision 
the limits of admhislon and exclusion. It ts 
unnet't•ssary In this case that we should lay 
down any general rule on the subject; for 
we are satisfied that the action of the trial 
rourt mn be sustained upon grounds which, 
a<-'t'Ordlug to the weight of authority, are suf-
ficient to admit confeM111lons made by the ae-
c·used to one In authority. It nppea!'ll that 
the defendant was arr('Nted at the rallroad 
depot In Cheyenne, Wyoming, by the witness 
<'arr. who Is a detective, on the charge made 
In tlw lndletment. The father of the dt•1·eas-
etl, present at the time, was much eiu·lted, 
nod may have made a motion to draw a re-
YolYer on the defendant, but of that fact the 
wltnf!!'a did not speak positively. The wlt-
11e1111 nmy have prevented him from drawing 
a weupon, and thinks be told him to do noth-
ing m11h. At the arrest a large <'rowd gath-
ered around the defendant; Carr hurried him 
otr to jail, sending with him a poll<'eman, 
while he remained IJt>hlnd. out of the hearing 
of tile pollceman and the defendant. In two 
or three minutes he joined them, and lmme-
dla tely the accused commenced making a con-
feBBlon. What conv;ersatlon, if any, OC'curred 
between the latter and the policeman during 
the brief llerlod of two or three minutes pre-
eecllng the confl!flslon was not known to the 
wltnesa. So far a1 wltnesa kllew, the bill of 
106 
exceptions states "the confet1Slon was volun-
tacy and unlnftuenced by hopes of rewarcl or 
fear of punishment; he held out no Induce-
ment, and did not know of any Inducement 
being held out to defendant to confess." This 
was all the evidence showing or tending to 
show that the confeBSlon was voluntary or 
uninfluenced by hope of reward or fear of 
punh1hment. 
While some of the adjudged cases Indicate 
distrust of confessions which are not judicial, 
It is certain, as observed by Baron Parke In 
Regina "'· Baldry, 2 Denleon, 430, 44:>, that 
the 1·ule against their admlsslblllty has been 
sometimes <'llrrled too far. nnd in Its appllca-
tlon justlt·e and eommon st•n11t' have too fre-
<1uently been sacrificed at tilt> shrine of mer-
c•y. A coufe11111lon, If freely nml voluntarily 
made. Is evidence of tbt> moMt HUtlRfnc·tory 
c•harn<'tt>r. S1wh a eonfe11slon. snl<l J<~yre, <'. 
B., In Klug v. WarlC'kshnll. 1 I.roeh, :wa. "ht 
d!'i>"t•rYlng of th(' blgheMt t•rt><llt. bt>caus'e It ls 
' 1>reMUme<I to flow from the strongest sense of 
guilt, and therefore It ls admitted ns proof of 
the crime to which It refers." Elementary 
writers of authority concur in !laying that, 
while from the very nature of such evidence 
It must be subjected to C'areful sC'rutlny and 
received with great caution, a dellberate, vol-
untary confession of guilt ls among the most 
elreC"tual proofs In the law, and constitutes 
the stronge11t evlden<'e agalnMt the party mak-
ing It that can be glYen of the facts stated 
In sut•b conft>sslon. 1 Greenl. Ev. f 215; 1 
Archb. Cr. Pl.12;;; 1 Phil. EY. r.aJ, 534; Sturkie, 
Ev. 73. But the presumption upon whleh 
weight ls given to such eYlden('(', namely, that 
one who ls lnno€'ent wl'l not Imperil his safe-
ty or prejudice his Interests by an untrue 
statement, ceases when the c'OnfeBSlon ap-
pears• to have been made Plther In conse-
quence of Inducements of a tPmporal nature, 
hehl out by one ln authority, touching the 
· cnarJre preferred or beC'au11e of a threat or 
proml11e by or In the preMe1we of such person, 
which, operating upon the fenrs or hopes of 
the acclliled, in reference to the charge, de-
prive him of that freedom of will or self-con-
trol essential to make his confession Yohm-
tary within the meaning of the law. Test-
ed by these C'ondltlons, there sePID8 to have 
been no reason to exclude the C'onfesslon of 
the aceused; for the existence of any such 
inducements, threats, or promises seems to 
have been negnth·ed by the statement of the 
circumstances under which It was made. 
But It Is contended that the court erred In 
not excluding this proof until the prosecu-
tion produced the policeman and proved that 
nothing was said or done by him, In the 
abSt>nce of Carr, whleb unduly lnftuenC'ed 
the making of the confession. The argu-
ment ls that, posl'llbly, the llOllcl'man offered 
such Inducements, or made such threats or 
11romlst!8, that the prisoner, when joined by 
Carr, was not In a condition of mind to 
make a 1•011ft>111slon which the law would 
deem voluntacy. '!'bis poeltlon, although 
• 
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plausible. is not sustained by authority. nor
consistent with sound reason. The circumstan-
ces narrated by the witness proved the con-
fession to be voluntary, so far as anything
was said or done by him on the immediate
occasion. There was nothing disclosed
which made it the duty of the court to re-
quire. as a condition precedent to the ad-
mission of the evidence, that the prosecution
should call the policeman and show that he
had not, when alone with the accused, un-
duly influenced him to make a confession.
In Rex v. Clewes, 4 Car. & I‘. 221; 3 Russ.
Cr. (Sharsw. Ed.) -131, 432, the prosecution
proposed to give in evidence a confession
made by the accused before the coroner. It
appearing that a magistrate had previously
an interview with the prisoner. it was sug-
gested that. as he may have been told by
that ofiicer that it was better to confess, the
prosecution should call him. But the court
said that while it would be fair in the pros-
ecutors to call the magistrate, it would not
compel them to do so; but if they did not,
the prisoner might do so if he chose.
In Rex v. “Fllllams, Roscoe. C-r. Ev. (Tth
Am. Ed.) 54, 3 Russ. Cr. (Sharsw. Ed.) 432,
it appeared that a prisoner, being l!l the cus-
tody of two constables on a charge of arson,
a third person went into the room. The
prisoner immediately asked him to go into
another room, as he wished to speak to him.
They went into that room, and the prisoner
made a statement to that person. It wa
contended that the constables ought to be
called to prove that they had done nothing
to induce the prisoner‘ to confess. But
Taunton, J.. after consulting with ilittiedaie,
.l., said: “We do not think, according to the
usual practice. that we ought to exclude the
evidence. because a constable may have in-
duced the prisoner to make the statement;
otherwise he must in all cases call the mag-
istrates or constables before whom or in
whose custody the prisoner has been.”
In Rex v. W'arner, 3 Russ. Cr. (Sharsw.
Ed.) +32, the prisoner, when before the com-
mittlng magistrate, having been duly cau-
tioned, made a confession, in which he al-
luded to one previously made to a constable.
It was remarked by the court that, although
it was not deemed necessary that a consta-
ble, in whose custody a prisoner had been,
should be called in every case. yet, in view
of the reference to him. he should be called.
The constable being called, proved that he
did not use any undue means to obtain a
confession, but he disclosed the fact that he
lmd received the prisoner from another con-
stable, to whom the prisoner had made some
statements. As it did not appear that any
confession was made to the latter. and only
appeared that a statement was made that
might either be a confession, a denial, or an
cxculpation, the court would not require him
to be called. S. C. Roscoe, Cr. Ev. (7th Am.
Ed.) 54. 55.
Roscoe (page 554) states the rule to be that
“in order to induce the court to call another
ofiicer. in whose custody the prisoner has
been, it must appear either that some in-
ducement has been used by, or some express
reference made to, such oiilcer.” Russell
says: “For the purpose of introducing a con-
fession in evidence. it is unnecessary, in gen-
eral. to do more than negative any promise
or inducement held out by the person to
whom the confession was made.” Vol. 3, p.
431.
While a confession made to one authority
should not go to the jiny unless it appears
to the court to have been voluntary, yet, as
the plaintiff in error chose to let its admis-
sibility rest upon the case made by the de-
tective, without any intimation that it would
be different if the policeman was examined,
and since there was nothing in the circum-
stances suggesting collusion between the of-
iicers, we do not think the court was bound
to exclude the confession upon the sole
ground that the policeman was not intro-
dnced.
5. The last question relates to the action
of the court in admitting, as a. witness in be-
half of the prosecution, Emerson, then serv-
ing out a sentence of confinement in the
penitentiary for the crime of murder, and
the judgment against whom had never been
reversed. His testimony tended to impli-
cate the defendant in the crime charged
against him. Objection was made to his
competency as a'witness. but the objection
was overruled. At the time the homicide
was committed, and when the indictment
was returned, it was provided by the crim-
inal procedure act of Utah of 1878 that “the
rules for determining the competency of
witnesses in civil actions are applicable also
to criminal actions and proceedings, except
as otherwise provided in this act." And the
civil practice act of that territory provided
(section 37-1) that “all persons, without ex-
ception, otherwise than as specifled in this
chapter, may be witnesses in any action or
proceeding. Facts which, by the common
law, would cause the exclusion of witnesses,
may still be shown for the purpose of af-
fecting their credibility.” Gomp. Laws Utah,
505. Further, (section 378,) that "persons
against whom judgment has been rendered
upon a conviction for felony, unless pardon-
ed by the governor, or uch judgment has
been reversed on appeal, shall not be wit-
nesses." On the ninth day of March, 1882,
after the date of the alleged homicide, but
prior to the trial of the case, an act was
passed which repealed the section of the
civil practice act last quoted. It is contend-
ed that such repeal, by which convicted fel-
ons were made competent witnesses in civil
cases, did not make them competent in crim-
inal cases; in other words, for such is the
eflfect of the argument, those who were ex-
cluded as witnesses, under the civil practice
act, at the time the criminal procedure act
of 1878 was adopted, remained incompetent
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plamllhlt-, le not sustained by authority, nor 
•("ODSlsteot with sound reason. The clreumstau-
<-t>S on rrn ted by the wltnt'!411 prm·l'<l tlw con-
reeeion to be voluntary, so fur as auytlllng 
was suld or done by him on the immediate 
occasion. There was nothing disclosed 
which mude It thl' duty ot the court to re-
-quire. as a condition }ll"eC{'dent to the ad-
mission ot the evlden<--e, that the proe•~cutlon 
shoulcl c·ull the policeman and show that he 
had not, when alone with the accused, un-
·duly lntlul'nced him to make n confession. 
Io ltl'x v. Clewes, 4 Car. & r. 221; 3 Russ. 
Cr. (Shnrsw. Ed.) -131, 432, the prosecution 
proposed to gh·e In e\·ldence a confes1don 
made by the accused b<>fore the coroner. It 
.. nppearlng that a magistrate hnd previously 
m1 inten·lew with tlle priROner. it was sng-
Jl<'Sted that, as he may hnve 1*eo told by 
that ottlcer that It was better to confess, the 
Jlrosecutlon should call him. But the court 
~:aid that while It would be fulr lo the proe-
t't·ntol"!! to call the magistrate, It would not 
rompel them to do so; but If they did not, 
the prlsonPr might do so If hp ('hosP. 
In lh•x "'· Williams, Hos<'oe. Cr. El'". (itll 
Am. Eel.) 54, 3 Russ. Cr. (Sharsw. Ed.} 432, 
it a11Jtt'tUW that n prisoner, h1•lni: l!l tht' eus-
tody of two constables on a <'hurge of arson, 
a third person went into the room. 'l'he 
11rh1011er Immediately n11k1>c.l him to go Into 
:mother room, as he wh1h1>tl to 1111Pnk to him. 
They went Into that room. nod till' llliMner 
mnde a statement to thnt 1>er11011. It was 
rontended that the coustnhlt>s oui:ht to be 
~lled to prove that thPy bad done nothing 
to Induce the prisoner· to confp11s. But 
Taunton, .T .. after consulting with Llttlec.lale, 
.J., sulll: "We do not think, according to the 
mmnl 1u1wtl1·P. thnt we ought to exc·lud<' the 
t•dd1>n<<t>. IK'Pnuse a constable may hun~ ln-
·dU«<'<l till' prlsone1· to mnke the statement; 
otl1Prwlse he m1111t In all cases call the mag-
istrntP11 or constahle11 before whom or In 
who11e <"n11tmly the prisoner has been." 
In H1•x l'". 'Varner, 3 Russ. Cr. (Hbarsw. 
1'~ct.) -ta:!, the prisoner, when before the com-
mitting magistrate, having been duly cau-
tioned, made a confession, In whil•h he al· 
htded to one previously made to a constable. 
It was remarked by the court that, although 
It was not clPPmed nece11snry thnt a consta-
ble, In whose custody a prisoner hnd been, 
should be called In every ca!IP, yet, In view 
of the refen>nce to him, be should he called. 
The constable being called, proY('(l that he 
-did not use any undue mean11 to obtain a 
confession. hut be dl11closPd the fnct that he 
hod recell'"ed the prisoner from anothPr con-
stable, to whom the pr1so11er had mucte some 
statements. As It did not np111•11r that any 
eonfeselou was made to the lattt>r. und only 
appear('(} thnt a stntement w11s mude thnt 
·might either be a confession, a denlnl, or an 
excutpntlon, the court would not 1·~1ulre him 
to be <-1llled. S. C. Roscoe, Cr. E,·. (7th Am. 
Ed.} 54, 55. 
Roscoe (page 554) states the rule to be that 
"In order to Induce the court to <~all another 
ofH<"er. In whosP <'UStocly th<> prisoner has 
IJe!n, lt must nppear elthPr thut some In· 
ducl•ment hus been used by, or some express 
reference made to, such omcer." Russell 
says: "l<'or the purpose ot introducing a con· 
tes11ion In evidence. It Is unnec•essary, In gen· 
eral. to do more than negative any promise 
or lndueement held out by the person to 
whom the confession was made." Vol. 3, p. 
431. 
'Vhlle a confession made to one authority 
should not go to the jury unless lt appears 
to the court to have bPen voluntary, yet, as 
the plalntlft' lo error chose to let lts admis-
sibility rest upon the case made by the de-
tective, without any Intimation that It would 
be dlft't>rent It the policeman was examined, 
and since there wnK noth.ng ln the clreum-
stances sugi;:-estlng c'Olluslon between the of-
ficers, we do not thlnlc the court was bound 
to exC"lude the c·onfesslon upon the sole 
ground that the pollceman was not Intro-
duced. 
5. Th<> last qnPstlon relates to the action 
of the court 111 ndmlttlug, as a witness In be-
half of the prospcutlon, Emerson, then serv-
ing out a sentence of confluement In the 
penitentiary for the crime of murder, and 
the judgment against whom had never been 
ren-•rsed. His testimony tended to Impli-
cate the defendant In the crime charged 
against him. Objection was made to his 
competency ns a 'witness, but the objection 
was overruled. At the time the homlc:lde 
was committed, and when the Indictment 
was returned, It was provided by the crim-
inal procedure net ot Utah of 18i8 thnt "the 
rules tor determining the competency ot 
witnesses In civil actions are applicable also 
to criminal actions and proceedings, except 
as otherwise provided In this act." And the 
civil pructlce act of thut territory provided 
(section 3i4) that "all persons, without ex-
ception, otherwise than as specllled In this 
chapter, may be witnesses In any action or 
proceeding. Facts which, by the common 
law, would cause the exclusion of witnesses, 
mny still be shown for tht> purpose of af-
fecting their credibility." Comp. Laws Utah, 
505. Further, (section 378,) that "persons 
against whom jnc.lgment has been rendt>red 
upon a conviction for felony, unless pardon-
ed by the go"ernor, or such judgment bas 
been reversed on appf'nl, shall not be wlt-
uessC's." Ou the ninth day of March, 188:.l, 
after the <Intl' of the alleged homicide, but 
p1ior to the trial of the <'Ilse, n.n net was 
pussed which repealed the section of tue 
cil'"ll practice net lust quoted. It ls contend-
ed that sucl1 rept>nl, by which convicted fel-
ons were made c•ompetent witnesses In civil 
casN1, dill not mnke them competent In crim-
inal c·asf's; In other words. for such is the 
effect of the argument, those who were ex-
clud1>d us wltnl•sses, under the civil practice 
act, at the time the criminal procedure act 
of 18i8 was adopted, remained Incompetent 
lOG 
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in criminal cases, unless their incompetency,
in such cases, was removed by some 1nodi-
tication of the civil practice act expressly de-
clared to have reference to criminal prosecu-
tions. in this view we do not concur. lt
was, we think, intended by the criminal pro-
cedure act of 1878 to make the competency
of witnesses in criminal actions and pro
ceedings depend upon the inquiry whether
they were, when called to testify, excluded
by the rules determining their competency
in civil actions. if competent in civil ac-
tions, when ealied, they were, for that rea-
son, competent in criminal proceedings.
The purpose was to have one rule on the
subject applicable alike in civil and criminal
proceedings.
But it is insisted that the act of 1882, so
construed, would, as to this case. be an ex
post facto law, within the meaning of the
constitution of the United States, in that it
permitted the crime charged to be estab-
lished by witnesses whom the law, at the
time the homicide was committed, made in-
competent to testify in any case whatever.
The provision of the constitution which pro-
hibits the states from passing ex post facto .
' for, and the quantity or the degree of proof
laws was examined in Kring v. Missouri,
107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 4-43. The whole
subject was there fully and carefully consid-
ered. The court, in view of the adjudged
cases, as well as upon principle, held that a
provision of the constitution of Missouri de-
nying to the prisoner charged with murder
in the first degree the benefit of the law as
it was at the commission of the otfene,—
under which a conviction of murder in the
second degree was an acquittal of mur-
der in the tirst degree, even though such
judgment of conviction was subsequently
reverscd,——was in contiict with the constitu-
tion of the United States. That decision pro-
ceeded upon the ground that the state con-
stitution deprived the accused of a substan-
tial right which the law gave him when the
offense was committed, and therefore. in its
application to that offense and its consc-
quences, altered the situation of the party to
his disadvantage. By the law as establish-
ed when the oifense was committed, Kring
could not have been punished with death
after his conviction of murder in the second
degree, whereas, by the abrogation of that
law by the constitutional provision subse-
quently adopted, he could thereafter be tried
106
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- unaffected by the subsequent statute.
and convicted of murder in the first degree,
and subjected to the punishment of death.
Thus the judgment of conviction of murder
in the second degree was deprived of all
force as evidence to establish his aosoiute
immunity thereafter from punishment for
murder in the first degree. This was held
to be the deprivation of a substantial right
which the accused had at the time the al-
leged offense was committed. But there are
no such features in the case before us.
Statutes which simply enlarge the class of
persons who may be competent to testify in
criminal cases are not ex post facto in their
application to prosecutions for crimes com-
mitted prior to their passage; for they do
not attach criminality to any act previously
done, and which was innocent when done,
nor aggravate any crime theretofore com-
mitted, nor.p1-ovide a greater punishment
therefor than was prescribed at the time of
its commission, nor do they alter the degree,
or lessen the amount or measure, of the
proof which was made necessary to convic-
tion when the crime was committed. The
crime for which the present defendant was
indicted, the punishment prescribed there-
necessary to establish his guilt, all remained
Any
statutory alteration of the legal rules of ev-
idence which would authorize conviction up-
on less proof, in amount or degree, than was
required when the offense was committed,
might. in respect of that offense, be obnox-
ious to the constitutional inhibition upon ex
post facto laws. But alterations which do
not increase the punishment, nor change the
ingredients of the offense or the ultimate
facts necessary to establish guilt, but-leav-
ing untouched the nature of the crime and
the amount or degree of proof essential to
c0nvlction—-only removes existing restric-
tious upon the competency of certain classes
of persons as witnesse, relate to modes of‘
procedure only, in which no one can be said
to have a vested right, and which the state,
upon grounds of public policy, may regulate
at pleasure. Such regulations of the mode
in which the facts constituting guilt may be
placed before the jury can be made applica-
ble to prosecutions or trials thereafter had,
without reference to the date of the com-
mission of the offense charged.
Judgment reversed.
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C&lie X o. :J6] RELEVANCY. 
In criminal cases, unlesa their Incompetency, , 
In sm·h <11se11, was remo"red by some modl-
ficntlou of the clvll pnwth!<' act expre88ly de-
clared to have referen<•l' to criminal prosecu-
tions. In this ylew we do not concur. It 
was, we think, Intended by the criminal pro-
ccdurt> n<·t of 1878 to makt• the competency 
of wltne8S<'s In criminal actions and pro- 1 
ceedlngs dt•pend upon the Inquiry whether 
they were, when called to testify, excluded 
by the rules d<>terminlng their competency 
In civil actions. lf eompetent In civil ac- 1 
tlons, when call<'d, they were, for that ren- I 
son, competent In criminal proceedings. 
The purpose wa11 to have one rule on the 1' 
subject applicable alike In civil and criminal 
proc-eedlng11. I 
and convicted of murder In the ftrst degree. 
and subjected to the punishment of death. 
'!bus the judgment of con,·lctlon of murder 
In tJu> 8e<'oud degree was dt-prived of all 
force as e"rldence to establish his aU80lute 
Immunity thereafter from punishment ror 
11mrd1•1· In the first degree. This was held 
to l><' the d<'111·irntlon of a substantlnl right 
whleh the 1wcused had at the time the al-
leged off<>nMe was committed. But there are 
no such fentures In the case before us. 
l'ltatutes which simply enlarge the class or 
111•rsons who ma:r be competent to testify in 
e1·imlnal cases are not ex post facto In their 
application to prosecutions for crimes com-
mitted prior to their passage; for they do 
not attach criminality to any act previously 
done. and which was Innocent when done, 
nor aggravate any crime theretofore com-
mitted, nor . provide a greater punishment 
th1•refor than was prescribed at the time or 
Its commission, nor do they alter the degree, 
or lessen th<> amount or measure, ot the 
proof which was made necessary to conTlc-
tlon when the crime was committed. The 
crime for whkh the present defendant was 
. lndl<•tf'd, the 1mul11hment pl.'f'scribed there-
i for, and thr quantity or the dPgree of proof' 
J 1w1·1'Mary to cstablb1h his guilt, all remained 
· uwiffected by the suhlwqueut statute. Any 
statutory alteration of the legal rules of ev-
idence which would authorize conviction Ul>-
on less proof, in amount or degree, than was. 
required wht>n the offense was committed, 
miiiht, In respect of that offense, be obnox-
But It Is lnslsh'd that the act of 1882, so 
construed, would, as to this call(>, be an ex 
post facto law, within the meaning of the 
constitution of the United States, In that It 
permitted the crime charged to be estab-
lished by witnesses whom the law, at the I 
time the homicide was committed, made In-
competent to testify In any case whatever. 
The provision of the constltutlon which pro-
hibits the states from pasaing ex post facto 
laws was examined In !\:ring v. :Missouri, 
107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 443. 'l'he whole 
subject was there fully and carefully consid-
ered. The court, In view of the adjudged 
cases, as well as upon principle, held that a 
provision of the constitution of Missouri de-
nying to the prisoner charged with murder 
In the ftrst degree the beneftt of the law as 
It was at the commls81on of the offeruie,-
undcr which a conviction of murder In the I 
second degree was an acquittal of mur-
der lo the first degree, even though such 
judgment of conviction was subsequently 
re'·ersed,-was In eoudlct with the constitu-
tion of the United States. That decision pro-
ceeded upon the ground that the state eon-
stltutlon deprived the accused of a substan-
tial right which the law gave him when the 
offense was committed, and tllerefore, In Its 
app11cation to that offense and its conse-
quences, altered the situation of the party to 
his disadvantage. By the law as establish-
ed when the offense was committed, Kring 
could not have been punished with death 
after bis conviction of murder In the second I 
dt-gree, whereas, by the abrogation of that I 
lnw by the constitutional provision aubse-
qu.-ntly adopted, he could thereafter be tried 
106 
ious to the eonstltutlonal Inhibition upon ex: 
po11t facto laws. .Hut alterations which do 
not increase the punishment, nor change the 
Ingredients of the ollense or the ultimate 
faets necessary to establish guilt, but-leav-
ing untouched the nature of the crime and. 
the amount or degree of proof essential t<> 
convlctlon-only removes existing restrlc--
tlous upon the competency of certain classes 
of persona aa witnesses, relate to modes or 
pl'O<'edure only, In which no one can be said 
to have a vested right, and which the state, 
upon grounds of public policy, may regulate 
at pleasure. Such regulations of the mode 
In which the facts constituting guilt may b& 
pla('(>d before the jury can be made appllca.-
ble to prosecutions or trials thereafter had. 
without reference to the date of the com-
mission of the offense charged. 
Judgment reversed. 
CONFESSIONS.
[Case No 37
BUBSTER v. STATE.
(50 .\'. ‘V. 953, 33 Neb. 663.)
Supreme Court of Nebraska. Jan. 4, 1892.
Error to district court, Douglas county;
Clarkson, Judge.
Prosecution against Herman Bubster for
larceny. Verdict of guilty, and judgment
thereon. Defendant brings error. Reversed.
John I’. Davis and Davis & Stevens, for
plaintiff in error. Geo. H. Hastings, Atty.
Gen., for the .Statc.
.\IAX\\'ELL, J. The plaintiff in error was
informed against in the district court of
Douglas county for the larceny of a bug!-U‘
of the value of $75, and on the trial found
guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment in the
penitentiary for one year. The sole question
in this court is the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the verdict. The buggy, it seems,
was found at a paint-shop in the city of
Omaha, and it is claimed the plaintiff in er-
ror took the buggy there to be painted, and
that it had been taken feloniously without
the owner's consent. There are two serious
objections to this verdict: First. The owner
of the buggy, although apparently within
reach of the process of the court, was not
called as a witness. Her son-in-law, who
resides with her, testiiies that he did not
give his consent, and very freely testifies
that his mother-in-law did not. She was
within reach of the process of the court, and
should have been called as a witness to
prove her non-consent. The rule is very
clearly stated in note 183, 1 Phil. Ev. (4th
Am. Ed.) A conviction of larceny ought not
to be permitted or sustained unless it ap-
pears that the property was taken without
the consent of the owner; and the owner
himself should be called, particularly in a
case like that under consideration, when the
acts complained of may be consistent with
the utmost good faith. There is a failure of
proof, therefore, on this point. Second. The
chief of police of the city of Omaha was
called as a witness, and on his direct exam-
ination he testiiies in substance that the
plaintiff in error confessed to him, and that
he offered no inducements to secure such
confession. On cross-examination, however,
he id effect admits that he did hold out such
inducements, and his testimony is clearly in-
admissible, as also that of .\Ir. Cusick, the
policeman. There is not suiiicient evidence
to support the verdict, and the judgment is
reversed, and :1 new trial awarded. Judg-
ment accordingly. The other judges concur.
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CONFESSIONS. [Casa No 3i' 
BuBSTER "'· STATE. 
(50 N. W. 953, 33 Neb. 663.) 
Su11remt> Conrt of Xebraska. Jan. 4, 1892. 
Error to district court, Douglas county; 
Clarkson, Judg1o. 
Pro11ecutlon against Herman Bubster tor 
larceny. Verdict ot guilty, and Judgment 
thereon. Defendant brings error. Ueversed. 
John P. Davis and Davis & Stevens, for 
plalutlff In error. Geo. H. Hastings, Atty. 
Gen., for the .State. 
called as a wltneBB. Her son-in-law, who 
resides with her, testllles that he did not 
i:Ive his consent, and very freely testifies 
that his mother-In-law did not. She was 
within reach of the process of the court, and 
should have been called as a witness to 
prove her non-consent. The rule Is very 
clearly stated 1n note 183, 1 Phll. Ev. (4th 
Am. Ed.) A conviction of larceny ought not 
to be permitted or sustained unless It ap-
pears that the property wu taken without 
the consent of the owner; and the owner 
himself should be called, particularly in u 
cnse like that under consideration, when the 
lIAXWELL, J. The plaintiff In el'ror wus acts complained of may be consistent with 
informt'<l against In the district com·t of the utmost good fulth. There Is a failure of 
Douglas rounty for the larceny of a buggy proof, therefore, on this point. ~ond. The 
of the ,·alue of $7ri, and on the trial found chief of police of the city of Omaha was 
guilty, und sentenced to Imprisonment In the called as a witness. nnd on bis direct exam-
penlteritlary for one yt>ar. The sole question lnatlon he testifies ln substance that the 
ln this court is the sutficlency of the evidence plaintiff In error confessed to hlw, and that 
to sustain the vel'dlct. The buggy, it seems, be offPred no inducements to secure such 
was fow1d at a pnlnt-shop In the city of confeS11lon. On <'l'oss-exarnlnntlon, however, 
Omaha, und It ls claimed the plaintiff in er- he hf effect 11dmlt11 that he did hold out such 
ror took the lmi:gy there to be painted, and Inducements, und his testimony ls clearly In-
that it bud l>eeu taken felonlom1I~· without admissible, as also that of lir. Cusick, the 
the owner·R com•ent. The1·e ore two serious I policeman. There ls not sufficient evidence 
objections to this verdkt: 1'"lnt. '.fhe owner to support the verdict, and tbe judgment ls 
of the buggy, although apparently within reversed, and a new trial awarded. Judg-
reach of the process of the court, was not ment accordingly. The other judges concur. 
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Case No. 38]
RELEVANCY.
I.O\VE v. STATE.
(7 South. 97, 88 Ala. 8.) U
Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 7, 1890.
Appeal from criminal court, Jefferson
county; S. E. Gm-:1-:NI~:, Judge.
Gilbert Lowe was indicted for the mur-
der of John W.Meadows, and found guilty,
and appeals.
S. M. & W. C. Meek, for appellant. W.
L. Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.
CLOPTON, J. The first matter com-
pluined of is the refusal of the court to ex-
clude the entire confession of defendant on
the ground that it was not shown to have
been freely and voluntarily made. The
necessities of the case do not call for a. de-
cision of the question whether or not the
confession was voluntary. In his confes- ,
sion defendant described the kind ofclothing
which the deceased wore when killed, and
the place when he was killed, and stated
that the body was left in a sink covered
with leaves. and also some keys, a. watch-
chain, a broken-handled knife, and a
hrown,soft hat. The court excluded all of
the confession, except the statements de-
scribing the dress of deceased, the place
where the killing occurred. and the man-
ner in which the body was left.
A modification of the rule which excludes
a confession not shown to be voluntary is,
if information derived therefrom leads to
the discovery of material facts, which go
to prove the commission of the crime, so
much of the confession as strictly relates
to the facts discovered. and the facts them-
selves. will be received in testimony, though
the confession may not be shown to have
been voluntar_v,for the reason that thedis-
covery of the facts corroborates the truth
of the confession to that extent. Banks v.
State, 84 Ala. 430, 4 South. Rep. 382; .\Iur-
phy v. State, 63 Ala. l. There is evidence.
showing that the bodyoi the deceased was
found at the place where accused stated it
was left, partially covered with leaves, as
were also a broken-handled knife. watch-
chain, keys, and a brown. soft hat, near
the body. The record does not affirma-
tively disclose whether the body and other
articles were discovered before the confes-
sion was made or afterwards, asa sequence
of the information derived from the ac-
cused. But the bill of exceptions does not
purport to set out all the evidence. In
this state of the record, we must presume,
if necessary to sustain the ruling of the
criminal court, that they were discovered
after the confession. It is true that the
clothing which the defendant stated de-
ceased Wore was not discovered. lie was
stripped of apparel, except the underwear.
The only identifying testimony as to the
clothing is that the deceased wore such the
last time he was seen before the killing. It
may be that the statement of defendant as
to the coat, vest. pantaloons and shoes of
deceased do not come within the ruleof ad-
missibility. This question we do not de-
cide. The motion was to exclude, and the I
108
exception goes to the refusal of the court
to exclude, theentireconfession. When gen-
eral exceptions are made to evidence part-
ly admissible and partly inadmissible, the
court is not bound to separate the legal
and illegal parts. The criminal court
could have properly overruled the entire
motion, a portion of the statements of de-
fondant being admissible. No objection
having been made separately and specially
to the portion of the statement describing
the dress of deceased, which may be of
doubtful admissibility, and as the court
could have properly, on the motion to ex-
clude the entire confession. retained the
whole of it in evidence, defendant cannot
complain that thecourt failed to nicely sep-
nrate the legal and illegal parts.
The court. having charged the jury. at
the instance of defendant, that before they
. can convict of murder they must be satis-
fied that he has been proven guilty of the
offense, “fully, clearly, conclusively, satis-
fartorily. and that to a moral certainty,
and beyond all reasonable doubt,” the
prosecuting solicitor requested the court
to instruct the jury that the terms used in
the foregoing charge meant the same as
that they must be convinced of his guilt
“beyond areasonable doubt. ” Thecharge
given at the instance of the defendant was
probably calculated. by the conjunctive
use of cumulative words and expressions,
to create upon the mind of the average
juror the erroneous impression thata high-
er degree of proof is essential to conviction
for murder than is meant by the phrase
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” The ex-
planatory charge was proper, to prevent
the jury from being misled. McKleroy v.
State, T7 Ala. 95.
There is no error in the refusal of the
court to charge the jury that if a witness
has willfully testified falsely to any materi-
al fact the jury should disregard his evi-
deuce altogether. Of the weight and cred-
ibility of all oral proof, whether given for
or against the accused, the jurors are the
sole judges. They may disregard alto-
gcther the evidence of a witness who has
willfully sworn falsely, or they may credit
portions of his testimony, especially if cor-
roborated by other witnesses, or by cir-
cumstances clearly proved. Thecourt can-
not. as matter of law, instruct them'to
disregard altogether the testimony of an_v
witness. The charge would have invaded
the province of the jury. Moore v. State.
68 Ala. 360; Jordan v. State, 81 Ala. 20, l
South. Rep. 577.
It cannot be said that the trite expres-
sion, “it is better that ninety-nine guilty
men should escape than that one innocent
mun should be punished, "is an established
maxim of the law. The law recognizes no
such comparison of numbers. Its sole ob-
ject is to punish the guilty, and that the
innocent be acquitted. The tendency of
such u charge, unexplained, is to mislead.
W'e have heretofore ruled in several cases
that itisnotcrrortorefusesiniilzu-charges.
\\’m-d v. State. T8 Ala.-H1; (‘a-rdcn v.Stat.e,
H-l Ala. 417. 4 South. Rep. 823.
Affirmed.
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-Cue No. 88] RELEVANCY. 
LOWE v. STATE. 
(7 South. 97, 88 Ala. 8.) 
~nprerue Court of Alabama. Jan. 7, lf!DO. 
Appeal from criminal court, Jeftt-rson 
eounty; S. E. GREENE, Judge. 
Oilbert Lowe was Indicted for the mur-
der of John W.Mea.dows,and foundgulltv 
and appeals. · ' 
S. M. & W. 0. Meek, for appellant. W. 
L. Martla, Atty. Gen., for the 8tnte. 
eX<'f.'ptton goee t.o the refoeal of the court 
to exclude, theenttreconfeeslon. When gen-
eral f'Xeeptlone are made to evidence part-
ly admlBHlbl~ and partly lnadml881ble, tht> 
court Is not bound to separate the l~a.l 
and Illegal parts. The <'rlmlnal court 
could have properly overruled the entire 
motion, a portion of the statements of de-
fendant being admlBSlble. No objection 
ha \·Ing been ma.de Reparately and 11prelally 
to the portion of the statement dl'llCrlblng 
the clreft8 of deceased, which may be of 
douhtful admlHSlblllty, and aB the court 
.couhl have properly, on the wotlon to ex-
CLOP'fON, J. The ftrt1t matter com- clmlt• the entire confession, retained the 
JJlulne•I of 111 the refusal of the court to PX· , whole of It In evidence, defendant cannot 
l'lude the .-ntlre ccmf Pt<slon of dPfendan t on : complain that the court failed to nicely sep-
the ground that ftwae not Rhown to have ' arate the legal and Illegal parts. 
been freely and voluntarily made. The ' Tht> <"ourt, bnvlnir charge<! the Jury. at 
neceBBities of the ca.He do not call for" ell'- the lnHtance of defendant, that before they 
cltllon of the question whether or uot the can con,·lct of murder they mu11t be satls-
confeHHion wa.H voluntary. In hh1 <'Onfes- flt'<I that he haR been proven guilty of the 
~Ion defendant described the kind of do thing often I!<', "fully, clearly, conclusl vely, sa tla-
whlch the deceaMed wore when killed, and fa<'torlly, and that to a moral certainty, 
the place whert he wa11 killed, and stat:A'<l and Iw~·ond all rea.Honable doubt," the 
that the body was left In a sink co\"ered proHf'f.'Utlnp; solfcltor requested the court 
with lea.n'R, and al110 11ome keys, a watch- to lm1truct the Jury that the terms ulled In 
chain, a broken-handled knife, and a the foregoing charge meant the same as 
hrown, Roft hat. The court excluded all of thut they must be eon vineed of bis guilt 
th<> confeHslon, except the statemf'nte de- "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thecharge 
Hcrlhlng the dl'l'H11 of decP8.8l'<l, thl• place gh·en at the instance of the defendant waa 
whf.'re the kllllng O<'curred, and the man- probttbly calculated. by the conjunctive 
ner In which the bodv was left. use of cumulative words and expressions, 
A modification of ti1e rule which excludes to create upon the mind of the average 
a confp1111lon not shown to be voluntary ts, Juror the erroneous Impression tbata bigh-
lf Information derived therefrom IP.ad11 to er dt>p;n>e of proof 111 e&Rtmtlal to conviction 
the diHCovery of material fact11, which go for murder than 111 meant by the phrase 
to J>ro\·e the comml881on of the crime, so "hP.vond a rt'nHonable doubt." The f'X· 
m0<·h of the confesHion as strictly relates planntory charge wa.s proper, to prevent 
to thP factsdlll<'overed, and the fact11 them- the Jury from being misled. McKleroy v. 
11elvt'M. will be received in te11tlmony, though 8tute, 77 Ala. 95. 
the conff'R8ion may not ht> shown to have There ls no error in the refusal of the 
been voluntary.for the reaMon thatthedi11- court to chargp the Jury that if a witness 
con~ry of the facts corroborates the truth ha11 wlllfully te11Ufted falsely to any materi-
of the confession to that t>xtent. Bank11 v. al fact the Jury should dlt1regard bis evl-
8tate, 84 Ala. 430, 4 South. Rl•p. ~2; ~lnr- dencp altogether. or the weight and cred-
phy v. State, 6a Ala. 1. There ls evidmce. lblllt.y of nil oral prouf, whether given for 
showlnJP; that tht> boil~· of the cle<'eaMed was or against the O.C<'USed, the jurors are the 
found at the place whPre a<'CUMPtl 11tatP<l lt sole Judites. Tht>;r may disregard alto-
was left, partially co\·ered with leaves, as gether the evidence of a witness who bu 
were also a broken.handled knife. watch- wlllfull~· sworn falMl'ly, or they may credit 
ehain, keys, and a brown, soft hat, near portions of hill testimony, etepeclally if cor-
the body. The rec:•ord does not aftlrma- roborated by other witlll'81!C8, or by elr-
tlvely disclose whether the body and otllf'r cumstances clearly proved. The court can· 
articles were cll~o,·er·('() bt•fore t11c confes- not, RR mntter of law, instruct them•to 
sionwBR madeorafterward11,8Jla llP<JUf.'nce dlMregard altogetht'r the tf.'stimony of an\· 
of the information derived from the ac- wltnf'MM. The charge would have invaded 
cueed. But the bill of exceptlon11 does not the 11rovlnre of the jury. Moore v. State. 
purport to set out all the e\·iclPnce. In SS Ala. 000; .Jordan v. State, 81 Ala. 20, 1 
this state of the record, we nm11t pn>11nme, South. Rep. 577. 
if neeeMeary to su11taln thf' ruling of tlw It cannot be said that the trite expreti-
crlmlnal court, that tht>y Wf.'t'l' dl11co\·Pred Rion, "It is hettl•r that ninety-nine guilty 
atter the confe11Mlon. It IM true thut the mf'n should rscape than that one innocent 
clothing which the clrft-ndant Htatt'<l dl'- man Mhould be punished, "lsan established 
ct>ruied wore was not dl11co,'ert.'<I. He was maxim of the law. The law recognises no 
stripped of apparel, except the undN"wear. su<'h comparison of numbers. ltR eole ob-
'l'he only identifying tl'fltlruon~· UH to the Ject Is to punish the guilty, and that the 
clothing is that thede<-eaHed worp Huch the hmo<'l•nt be &<'quitted. 'l'be tendency of 
la11t time hew8.ll Ml'l'll before the killing. It Rlll'h a chnrp;e, unexplained, ts to mislead. 
may be that the statement of dPft•nthmt tl.8 We hn.ve heretofore rulc!I in 11p,·ernl cl\FleH 
to the coat, vest, pantaloons and shoes of tlmt. ltl11noterrortorefuMe11lmilarrhargeo1. 
det·l'ased do not come within the rulP or acl- Wnrcl v. Stnte, i~ Ala. 4-U; Carden v. State, 
mlBBlbllity. This question we clo not de- 84 Alu. 417. 4 South. Rep. 823. 
eidE>. The motion was to exclllde, and the Affirmed. 
108 
CON FESSIONS.
[U-use N0. 39
STATE v. (‘LIFl<'ORD.
(53 N. \V._ 299, 86 Iowa. 55().i
"" 1892.
Appeal from district court, Shelby county;
Walter I. Smith, Judge.
Defendant was indicted for the crime of
larceny from a building in the nighttime,
Supreme Court of Iowa. Oct.
and was convicted of simple larceny. lie
appeals.
Byers & Lockwood, for appellant. John
Y. Stone, Atty. G-en., and Thus. A. Cheshire,
for the State.
KINNE, J. 1. The defendant and one Fill-
more were indicted for stealing from the
barn of Axline & Smith, in the nighttime,
26 bushels of clover seed, of the value of
$125. The court permitted a witness named
Cuppy to testify in rebuttal on part of the
state as to statements made by the defend-
ant in his examination before the grand jury.
lt appears that while the defendant was
under arrest and in the county jail, charged
with the commission of the very crime for
which he was afterwards indicted and tried,
the foreman of the grand jury, then in ses-
sion, had the sheriii? of the county bring de-
fendant before said body, where he was
examined under oath as to his supposed con-
nection with the alleged larceny. It does
not appear that the defendant was informed .
as to his rights, or of the effect of the an-
swers he might give, or as to the fact as
no whether or not such answers could aft-
erwards be used against him. No minutes of .
his testimony were taken by the grand jury.
We may properly assume that he testified
under oath, without being informed as to
his rights, or the effect of his testimony, or
the possibility of its use against him there-
after. It is contended that his statements
ac made before the grand jury were not
voluntary, and hence inadmissible against
him upon the trial. The course of procedure
pursued by the grand jury with reference
to the examination of this witness was un-
precedented, and, to our minds, wholly un-
justiflabie from any point of view. They
had no right to compel the defendant, then
in custody, and charged with the commission
of the crime inquired about, to give testi-
mony before them. To put him under oath,
under such circumstances, without advising
him of his rights, was attempting to take
an unfair advantage of his situation. to his
prejudice. A statement so procured could
in no proper sense be said to be voluntarily
made. A confession or statement. to have
been voluntarily made, must proceed “from
the spontaneous suggestion of the party's
own mind, free from the influence of any
e.vn-aneous disturbing cause." “if made un-
der oath by the party charged, upon a ju-
dicial inquiry as to the crime. it [the con-
fession] is rejected, as not being voluntary."
People v. Mc.\lahon, 15 N. Y. 3ii.'». The law
I
'
is well settled that when a person is com-
pelled to answer questions under oath, put
to him by a committing magistrate, touch-
ing his supposed connection with the crime
then being investigated, and of which he
stands accused. his statements are not ad-
missible against him. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law, p. 488; Wlmrt. Cr. Ev. §§ 668, 669;
State v. Mathews. (S6 N. C. 106; People v.
.\ic.\lahon, 15 .\'. Y. 384; People v. Mondon.
10.‘-5 N. Y. 211. 8 .\'. E. -196. And it is said
that. unless the defendant comprehended his
rights fully. and is informed by the court
or examining body that his refusal to an-
swer the questions propounded to him could
not prejudice his case, or be construed as an
evidence of his guilt, any responsive confes-
ions implicating him in the crime charged
must be regarded as involuntary, and hence-
inadmissible. Whart. Cr. Ev. §§ 668, 669;
' State v. Rorie, 74 N. C. 148; 1 Greenl. Ev..
§§ 225, 226, and notes. The same rule would
apply as to examinations had, as in this case.
before a grand jury. Some of the states by
, statute require magistrates conducting such
examinations to admonish the prisoner as to
the effect of his answer and his right to-
refuse to answer, but it is believed that the
general rule of law is as above stated. even
in the absence of such a statute.
Counsel for the state contend that the
evidence was admissible. and cite Code, §
4285; State v. Hayden, 45 Iowa, 11; State
v. Row, 81 Iowa, 138, 46 N. W. 872; and
some Indiana cases. The statute referred to-
provides that a member of the grand jury
may be compelled to disclose the testimony
of a witness examined before such jury, to
ascertain if it be consistent with that given
by him before the court. It cannot be said
that this statute had the effect of making
the testimony given before the grand jury,
under oath and involuntarily, by one at the
time charged with the very crime then be-
ing inquired about, and who. when so exam-
ined, was under arrest therefor. competent
on a trial of the party under indictment for
such crime. Counsel have cited no case so
holding, and we find none. We see no rea-
son for holding that the legislature, in enact-
ing the statute referred to, intended to ab-
rogate the universal rule of law that invol-
untary admissions in confession of a defend-
ant charged with a crime are inadmissible
against him on a trial for such crime. The
statute was. we think. not intended to cover
such a case. and thereby permit a grand ju-
ror to give evidence of such involuntary con-
fession, which no other person is permitted
to testify to. If the defendant, when ex-
amined before the grand jury, had been ad-
vised as to his rights. and then given evi-
dence. the rule might be different. In State
v. Bri;.-rgs, 68 Iowa, -i2-1, 27 N. W’. 358, it
was held that a plea of guilty, entered by a
defe1_idant to a preliminary information. in-
not being informed as to his legal rights,
was a voluntary adinission of his guilt, and
109
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CC)~FESSIONS. (C11se No. 8& 
STA.TE v. C'LIJ..'I•'ORD. ls well settled that when a person fa com-
(53 N ~ 299 pelled to answer 11uestlons under oath, put 
• · ' •. • 86 Iowa, a50.) to hlw by a committing magistrate, toucb-
Supreme Court of Iowa. Oct. 2'..?, 1892. Ing his supposed connection with the crime 
Appeal from district court, Shelby county; 1 then being llll"('Btlgated, and of which h,1.1 
Walter I. Smith, Judire. ! llhtnds a<'<'Used, bis statements are not ml-
Defendant w11.11 Indicted for the crime of I mlulble against him. 8 Am. & Eng. En<·. 
larceny from a building In the nighttime, , Law, p. 488; Wbort. Cr. Ev. ff 668, 600; 
and was convicted of simple larceny. lit> State v. !\la!he~s .. 66 N. C. 106; People v. 
appeals. ' lkllahon, 1., X. I. 384; People v. llondon, 
. 103 ~- Y. 211. 8 X. E. 496. And it Is said 
Byers & Lockwood, for appellant. John ' thut, unle88 the dPfendant comprehended bis 
Y. Stone, Atty. Gen., and Tbos. A. Cheshh-e, I rights fully. and Is Informed by the court 
tor the State. I or examlnlult' body that his rerusal to an-
swer the que11tlous propounded to him could 
KINNE, J. 1. The defendant and one J..'Ul- ' not preJmlk't' bis <·use, or be constmed as an 
more were Indicted for stealing from the I evidence of bis guilt, any responsive confes-
barn of Axline & Smith, in the nlgbttlme, 1 slon8 Implicating him In the crime charged 
26 buahela of clover seed, of tile value of I must be regarded as Involuntary, and hence· 
'125. The court permitted a witness named inadmissible. Whart. Cr. Ev. ff 668, 669; 
Cuppy to testify in rebuttal on part of the 1· State v. Rorie, 74 N. C. 148; 1 Greenl. E'·-
state 88 to statements made by tbe defend- It 225, 226, and notes. The same rule would 
ant in hla examination before the grand jury. apply 11.11 to examlnatloDB had, as In tbls case,. 
It appears that whlle the defendant waa 11 before a grand Jury. Some of the states by 
under arrest and In the county jail, charged , statute require mag111trate11 conducting such 
with the commlaalon of the very crime for I examinations to admonish the prisoner as to. 
which he was afterwards indicted and tried, the ed'ect of his answer and bis right to. 
the foreman of the grand jury, then in ses-
1
· refuse to answer, but it Is belle\"ed that the 
Blon, had the sherld' of the county bring de- general mle of law Is as above stated, even 
fendant before aald body, where be was in the absence of such a statute. 
examined under oath as to his supposed con- I Coun.ael for the state contend that the-
nectlon with the alleged larceny. It does evidence was admlBSlble. and cite Code, t 
not appear that the defendant was Informed 14285; State v. Hayden, 45 Iowa, 11; State> 
aa to his rights, or of the effect of the an- v. Row, 81 Iowa. 138, 46 N. W. 872; and 
swera be might give, or 88 to the fa<"t 11.11 somt- Indiana cases. The statute referred to-
to whether or not such aDBwers could aft- ; provides that a member of the grand jury 
erwards be uaed air;alnst him. No minutes of ' may be compelled to dls<"loee the testimony 
h18 testimony were taken by the grand jury. I of a witness examined before such jury, to 
We may properly &811Ume that he testified . IUK'Prtaln 1f It be consistent with that given 
under oath, without being informed as to ' by him before the court. It cannot be said 
Ills rights, or the effect of bis testimony, or that tbls statute had the effect of making 
the poeslblllty of its uee against blm there- the testimony given before tile immd jury, 
after. It Is contended that bis statements under ontb and Involuntarily, by one at the 
IQ made before the grand jury were not time charged with the very crime then be-
voluntary, and hence lnadmi88lble against Ing Inquired about, and who. when so exam-
him upon the trial. The course of procedure ined, was under arrest then-for, competent 
pursued by the in-and Jury with reference on a trial of the party umlPr Indictment for 
to the examination of this wltne88 was un- such crime. Counsel have <"l!ed no case so 
precedented, and, to our minds, wholly un- holding, and we find none. 'Ye see no rea-
just11lable from an7 point of view. They 1 llOD for holding that the legislature. In enact-
laad no right to compel the defendant, then Ing the statute referred to, Intended to ab-
In custody, and charged wltb the comml1118lon rogate the universal mle of law tbat lnvol-
of the crime Inquired about, to give testl- untary admlsslonB In confe881on of a defend-
mony before them. To put him under oath, ant charged with a <"rime are lnadmlsslbl<> 
under such circumstances, without advising against him on a trial for such crime. The 
him of bis rights, was attempting to take statute was, we think. not Intended to co\"er 
an notalr advantai;t> of his situation. to his sucb a <"Biie, aml the1·t•l>y J>ermlt a grand Ju-
pnaJudlce. A statement ao procured <'ould ror to give evidence of such Involuntary <.'On-
lu no proper BPnse be said to be Yoluntttrlly fPM1don. whkh no other JlPrson Is permitted 
made. A confession or statement, to bave to testify to. If tile dPf<>ndant, when ex· 
been voluntarily made, must proceed "from I nmlned before thP i:rnnd Jm-y, bad bPen ad-
tbe apontaneous suggestion of the pal'\,,t'B I vlst•d 11.11 to bis rlgbt11. and thPn given evt-
own mind, free from the lnftnPn<"I' of nny dPm"I'. the n1lt• mhd1t he dlft'erPnt. In State 
l'Xtraneous dlsturblulf <·aullt'." "It ma<ll' un- I v. Hrli:i:s, ti..~ Iowa, 424. 2i N. W. 358, It 
1lt'r oath by the party <"barged, upon a ju- wus held that a plea of guilty, entered by a 
dlelal Inquiry as to the <.>rim€', It [the con- d€'fe1~dant to a pr<'llmlnary lnfonn1\tlon. lw 
ft-sslon] Is rejected, as not bc>lni: \"oluntary." not '!wing Informed as to bis IPi:nl rights, 
P<'<i11le v. McMahon, 1;; N. Y. 3H:i. The law wus a voluntary odmh;slou of his guilt, and 
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admissible against him. No authorities are
cited in support of this holding. In the case
at bar the defendant was put under oath.
lie was taken before the grand jury. not of
his own volition, but by the direction of the
examining body, for the purpose of being in-
terrogated as to his supposed connection with
the crime with which he was accused. In
the Briggs Case the magistrate aflorded him
an opportunity to plead guilty or not guilty.
In the case at bar the proceedings as to de-
fendant's being sworn and examined were
of a compulsory character, no election being
afforded him. For these and other reasons
the holding in State v. Briggs does not apply.
See, also, State v. Carroll (Iowa) 51 N. W.
1159.
2. It is claimed that the evidence does not
warrant a verdict of guilty. In substance,
the evidence shows that Axline & Smith, in
January, 1892, had 13 sacks of clover seed
stored in their barn; that about January 20,
1892, said seed was stolen by some one; that
it was of the value of $125; that one Clouser
had worked for Axiine 8: Smith, and, among
others, knew where the seed was stored;
that he visited Fillmore (who was jointly in-
dicted with defendant) before the seed was
taken; that the sacks which had contained
the seed were found, after it had been stolen,
at llancock. Iowa; that about the time the
seed was taken 1-‘illmorc hauled to Council
Biufl's. and sold there. about 26 bushels of
4-lo\'t*i' seed; that (.‘lifl’ord went with him to
(‘ouncil Bluffs. and on the way he ascer-
tained from Fillmore that he had clover seed
in the sacks in the wagon, and saw him hide
the sacks under a culvert in the wagon road,
where they were afterwards found. it ap-
pears also that defendant accoinpanied Fill-
more hack from Council Bluffs to Avoea.
The reasons defendant gave for going to
Council Blui'l's with Fillmore were in part,
at least, unsatisfactory. But there was no
direct evidence in any way connecting de-
by means of which it was conveyed to Coun-
cil Bluifs. Defendant seems to have been a
passenger with Fillmore to Council Bluffs
under suspicious circumstances, which, how-
ever, are explainable consistent with his in-
nocence of the crime charged. The testimo-
ny does not point with reasonable certainty,
even, to defendant's guilt. Stated most
strongly against the defendant, it is a case of
suspicion, not oi’ guilt established. We are
at a loss to understand on what the jury
based a verdict of guilty, unless it was that
defendant, in a few of his answers, evinced
a disposition to be what is usually called a
“smart“ witness. The verdict is without
foundation to support it, and cannot stand.
3. It clearly appears from this rm-i;i'(l that
the trial court had grave doubts as to de-
fendant's guilt. When the court came to im-
pose sentence on the defendant he said to
him: “Mr. Clifford, it is contrary to my
usual practice to make any comments when
passing judgment in cases of this kind, but
in this case I am constrained to say to you
that you have been found guilty of the crime
of larceny upon very slight evidence. I firm-
ly believe that, if you had conducted your-
self upon the witness stand as you should
have done, no jury could have been found that
would have returned a verdict of guilty up-
on such slight and trivial evidence." The
conduct which the court speaks of was the
manner of defendant on the stand, especially
in his answers to certain questions relating
to his reasons for going to Council Blufls.
. These answers, which we need not set out
fendant with the crime charged. So far as '
appears. he received no part of the money
paid Fillmore for the seed. It does not ap-
pear that he was seen at or near the barn
where the seed was stored There is no
showing that he in any manner exercised any
control over the seed or the team and wagon
110
here, indicated a \vant of moral character
and rectitude in other directions. We think
this was clearly a case where the trial court
should have exercised its right to set aside
the verdict. If a man is to be committed to
the penitentiary for a crime, his guilt of
which is established, if at all, by circumstan-
tial evidence, such evidence should not only
point him out as guilty, but be inconsistent
with any reasonable theory as to his inno-
cence. This the testimony in this case fell
far short of doing. It will not do to let a
verdict stand which deprives a man of his
liberty, when it is based upon mere suspi-
cion. The judgment of the district court is
reversed.
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Cue No. 89] RELEVANCY. 
admlulble against him. No authorftlee are by means of which It was conveyed to Coun-
clted In support of this holding. In the caae ell Bld11. Defendant seems to have been a 
at bar the defendant waa put under oath. passenger with Fillmore to Council Blu1fa 
He was taken before the 1mLnd jury, not of under auspicious circumstances, wblch, how-
hla own volition. but by the direction of the ever, are explainable CODBIBtent with hl8 ln-
t>xamlnlng body, for the purpose of being In· nocence of the crime charge<L The teatlmo-
terrogated as to his supposed connection with ny does not point with reasonable certainty, 
the crime with which he was accused. In even, to defendant's guilt. Stated moat 
the Briggs Case the maglstmte nJrorded him strongly against the defendant, It la a cue of 
an opportunity to 1>lt-ad guilty or not guilty. ausplclon, not ot guilt established. We are 
In the case at but· the proceedings as to de- nt a 1088 to unclerstand on what the jury 
fendant"s betnir sworn and examined were based a verdict of guilty, unle88 It wu that 
of n compulsory character, no election being defendant, In a few of his answers, evinced 
afforded him. For theee and otht'l' reaeons a disposition to be what ls usually called a 
the holding lo State v. Briggs does not apply. "smart" wltneBB. The verdict la without 
See, also, State v. Carroll (Iowa) 51 N. w. foundation to support It, and cannot stand. 
llu9. 8. It clearly appears from this r<'< .. ;rll that 
2. It ls claimed that the evidence doetf not the trial court had grave doubts as to de-
warrant a verdict of guilty. In substance, fendant's guilt. When the court <.'lUDe to lm-
the eddence shows that Axline & Smith, 1n pose sentence on the defendant he Raid to 
January, 1892, had 13 sa<'kB of clover Beed blm: "Mr. Clifford, it ls contrary to my 
stored In their barn; that about January~ usual practice to make any comments when 
1892,. 11&ld seed was stolen by some one: that pa88lng Judgment In cases of this kind, but 
It was of the value of $125; that one Clouaer In this case I nm constrained to say to you 
had worked for Axline & Smith, and, among , that you havl' been found guilty of the crime 
other&, knew where the seed was stored; , ot larcen7 upon very alight evidence. I tlrm-
tbat he visited Fillmore (who was Jointly In- 1 ly believe that, If you had conducted your-
dlcted with defendant) before the 11eed was ; self upon the witness stand as you should 
taken; that the Backs whl<'h had contained ,. have done. 90 Jury could have been found that 
the IK!ed were found, after It had been stolen, would have returned a verdict of guUty up-
at Hancock, Iowa; that about the time the I on such alight and trivial evidence." The 
l!l>t'd was taken I•'lllmore hnuled to Council conduct which the court speaks of was the 
Bluffs. nnd sold thert-, about 26 bushels of manner of defendant on the stand, eapeelall7 
1•lowr seed; that Clltrord went with him to : 1-n hlR answer& to eertaln questions relating 
< ~oun<'ll Blulf11, and on the way be asc.-er- to bis reasons for going to Council Blu1f&. 
tulnE'd from J<'lllmore that he had cloV'er seed . These answer&, which we need not set out 
In the sa<'ks In the wagon, and saw him hide ' here, Indicated a want of moral character 
the sack8 under a culT'ert In the wagon road, and rectitude In other dlrecttoDB. We think 
where they were afterwards found. It ap- this wn11 clearly a case where the trial court 
pears also that defendant ac<'ompanled Fill- should have exercised Its right to set aside 
more back from Councll Bids to A Y0ca. the vE>rdlct. It a man la to be committed to 
The reasoDB defendant gave for going to the penitentiary tor a crime, his guilt of 
Council Bids with l<'lllmore were In part, which ls established, If at all, by clrcumstan-
at least, unsatisfactory. But there was no tlal e¥ldence, such evidence should not ont7 
direct evidence In any way connE>ctlng de- point him out as guilty, but be Inconsistent 
fendant with the crime charged. So far as with any reasonable theory as to his lnno-
a}l})('&rB, ht' re<•elYed no part of the money cenct>. Thls the testimony In this cue fell 
IJald Plllmore to1· the !l(>ecl. It dOl'B not ap- I far short of doing. It w111 not do to let a 
JK'ar that he was l!('('n at or nE>ar tlic barn verdict stand which deprives a mllD of hill 
where the seed was stored There ls no J uberty, when It la based upon mere auapl-
showlng that he In any manner exercised any I clon. The judgment of the district court ta 
<'Ontrol over thE> Meed or the team and wagon : reversed. 
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,of recognition.
teams, of which the defendant's led. Aft-
PEOPLE v. CIIAPLEAU.
(24 N. E. 469, 121 N. Y. 266.)
Court of Appeals of New York. April 29, 1890.
Appeal from court of oyer and terminer,
(‘linton county.
James A verill, for appellant. Samuel L.
Wheeler, Dist. Atty., for respondent.
GRAY, J. The defendant was indicted
for the crime of murder in the first degree
for the killing of Irwin E. Tabor, and he
was tried at a court of oyer and terminer
held in and for Clinton county. The jury
rendered a verdict in accordance with the
charge in the indictment. and sentence of
death was passed. From the judgment of
conviction the defendant has appealed to
this court, and his counsel assigns as
grounds for sustaining his appeal the ad-
_n1isslon of improper and incompetent evi-
dence, and the insufficiency of the evidence
to convict for murder in the first degree.
We have carefully read and considered the
proofs in this record relied on to establish
l the defendant’s guilt. We are satisfied that
no injustice has been committed against
him in the trial upon the indictment, and
that the verdictcould not have been other-
wise rendered by sensible men. The occur-
rence of the killing was in this wise, as it
is made to appear from the whole record:
The defendant lived near the village of
Plattshurgh, and was employed in the
hauling of wood. About 4 o'clock on Mon-
day afternoon, January 28, 1839, he and
two other teamsters were returning home
with their sleds, when, at a point in the
road, the_v met the deceased driving him-
self in a sleigh. He turned out with a nod
and passed the three
er passing, defendant attacked the de-
ceased, struck him upon the head with a
wooden stake, and knocked him out of his
sleigh upon the road, where he shortly aft-
er cxpired from his injuries. This attack
was testified to by one of the teamsters,
Nelson Brown; the other one having died
since the occurrence. Brown's attention
was attracted by hearing the defendant
address the deceased with loud and violent
language. He looked behind,and saw the
deceased stricken down from his seat. and
fall upon the road. Of other witnesses,
evidence was had of his loud and abusive
exciamations; of his hastening from the
rear of the teams where the body lay, with
a stake in his hand. to catch up with his
team. which had gone on ahead; and of
the finding of the body upon the road,
with the head battered almost beyond rec-
ognition, with t-he blanket and buffalo
robe still wrapped about his person, and
with a. piece of the driving reins tightly
grasped in his mittened hands. Evidence
was also adduced of the defendant's say-
ing to theofflcer who had arrested him the
same evening, and was conducting him to
Piatfsburgh, “I do not think that Mr. Ta-
bor will poisou any more cows.” This
remark hnd reference to the prisoncr’s pre-
vious statements, testified to by witnesses,
that the deceased had poisoned his cow.
The utterance of threats by the defendant
against the life of the deceased was also
proved. One neighbortcstitied that the de-
' monter;"
fendant had threatened to shoot Tabor,
remarking that he had injured his cow.
Another testified that the night before,
when the defendant was at his house, he
had narrated a. conversation had with
Tabor on the road. He told witness that
he had called Tabor “cow doctor. Ver-
and Tabor had told him to
“shut up his head ;” and he had answered
back, “I will not shut up my head, but I
am going to shut up your head for you,
and when I shut it up it will stay shut."
When the wile of the witness, hearing this,
said, “ If you was to do that to Mr. Tabor.
you would be apt to get a rope around
your neck, ”he replied: “ Mrs. Brown. peo-
ple will be so glad to get that long body
destroyed, people will not hurt me. much.
Any way, they do not hang any more. If
I was going to be killed, I would be killed
that new way.” The next day after the
occurrence, when the coroner held his in-
quest, the foreman of his jury, who was
also the sheriff, stated that Chapleau, the
prisoner, wanted to come before thejury
and make a statement. He was brought
in, and what he then said was reduced to
writing by the coroner. That official, be-
ing examined as a. witness upon the trial,
gave in evidence the statements of the de-
fendant as taken down by him at the time
of the inquest. He testified, from his min-
utes, that he informed the prisoner, before
the jury, as to his right to depose or not,
as he thought fit, and that the deposition
might be used against him thereafter; that
the prisoner elected of his own free will to
be sworn, and asked to be allowed to tes-
tify. The prisonei-'s story was then given
as thus stated, in which herepresented the
occurrence as provoked by deceased. He
stated that the deceased referred to his re-
marks about poisoning cows, and jumped
from his cutter upon the sled, with some-
thing in his hand; whereupon he(the pris-
oner) hit him with the stake. He also
stated that the deceased had threatened
to shoot him, and that they had had dis-
putes concerning this alleged poisoning
of his cows by the deceased. As against
the people’s evidence the prisoner adduced
some evidence of his good character._ The
charge of the trial judge was very fa.ir,and
was not excepted to; nor was it really
exccptionable in its instructions to the ju-
ry. But the appellant‘s counsel relies and
insists upon certain features of the case,
as it was developed upon the trial, as ex-
hibiting a lack of creditable evidence upon
which to convict; the inconipetency of the
coroner's evidence of the statements of the
accused; and the inadmfssibiiity of the evi-
dcnce of what the prisoner had said
while under arrest, immediately after the
occurrence. These points we will consider.
Three elements enter into the proof con-
victing the defendant of the crime charged
in the indictment. They are: The testi-
mony of an eye-witness of the occurrence;
the admissions and statements of thepris-
oner, and corroborating circumstances in
the evidence, of previous threats by the
prisoner; and of what transpired about
the time of the killing. according to the ev-
idence of persons who, while not seeing
the actual killing. saw the prisoner and
the deceased on the road. They had ob-
served his actions, and saw the condition
111
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CONFESSIONS. [Case No. 40 
PEOPLE T. CilAPLEAU. 
(24 N. E. 400, 121 N. Y. 266.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. April 29, 1800. 
· Appeal from court or oyer and termlner, {'llnton county. 
James .4 •·erlll, for appellant. Samuel L • 
JJ'beeler, Db1t. Atty., for respondent. 
GRAY, J. Tbe defE'ndaot was Indicted 
for the crime of murder lo the ftrst degree 
for the kllllng of Irwin E . Tabor, and be 
wtt,. tried at a court of oyer and termloer 
held In and for Clinton county. The jury 
rendered a \"erdlct In accorchrnce with the 
charge In the Indictment, ancl sentence of 
death was passed. From the Judgment or 
conviction the defendant bas appealed to 
this court, and his counsel ttsslgnR as 
grounds for sustalnlnll:' his appeal the ad-
·. mission of Improper and incompetent evi-
dence, and the Insufficiency or the evidence 
to convict for murder In the ttrst degree. 
We have carefully read and considered the 
. proofs in this record relied on to etctabllsb 
the defendant's guilt. Weo.resath1fted that 
no Injustice has been committed against 
him In the trial upon the Indictment, and 
thnt theverdlctcould not have been other-
wise rendered by sensible men. The occur-
rence of the killing was lo this wise, as It 
Is made to appear from the whole record: 
The defendant lh·ed near the village ol 
Plattsburgh, and was employed In the 
hauling of wood. About 4 o'clock on Mon-
day afternoon, January 28, 1889, he and 
two other teamsters were returning home 
with their sled11, when, at a point In the 
road, they met the deceased drl\•lng him-
self In a sleigh. He turned out with a nod 
,of recoftllltlon. and passed the three 
. teams, of which the defendant's led. Aft-
er passing, defendant attacked the de-
ceased, struck him upon the head with a 
woodPn stake, and knol'krd him ont of hie 
Sleigh UJIOn the road, Wht're he Shortly art-
er expired from his Injuries. This attack 
WM testified to by one or the teamsters, 
Nelson Brown; the other one ha\•lni;i; dlt.>d 
since the occurrence. Brown's attention 
was attracted by hearing the clefendant 
address the deceased with loud and violent 
languap;e. He looked behlnd,aud saw the 
d('(•eaiced 11trlcken down from bis seat, and 
fall upon the road. Of other witnesses, 
evldt'nce wae bad of his loud and abusive 
exclamatlom1; of bis hastening from the 
rear of the teams where the body lay, with 
a stake In his hand. to catch UJJ with his 
team, which had gone on ahead; and of 
the finding of the body upon the road, 
with the head battered almost beyond rec-
ognition, with the blanket and buffalo 
rube still wrapped about his person, and 
with a piece of the driving reins tightly 
grasped In his mlttened hands. Evidence 
was also adduced of the defendt•nt's Hay-
ing to theofflcerwbobatl arrl't!ted him the 
same evening, and was eonductlng him to 
Plattsburgh, "I do not think that l\ir. Ta-
bor wlll poison any more cows." This 
remark had refl'rence to the prlson<>r'11 prE"-
vlous etatements, testified to by witnesses, 
that the dece88ed had poisoned his t•ow. 
The utterance of threats hy the defendant 
agalmlt the life of the deceased wa11 alHo 
proved. One nelghbortestltled that tbede-
. 
fendant bad threatened to shoot Tabor, 
remarking that he bad Injured hie cow. 
Another testlfled that the nlgbt before, 
when the defendant was at bis house, be 
had narrated a convM'8atlon bad with 
Tabor on the road. He told witness that 
he had called Tabor "cow doctor. Ver-
. mooter;" and Tabor had told blm to 
"shut up bis head ; " and he had answered 
back, "I wlll not shut op my hPttd, but I 
am going to ebnt up your head for you, 
and when I ehut It up It wlll 11t.ay Abut." 
When the wife of the witness, hearing this, 
B&ld, "If you was to do that to Mr. 'l'abor, 
you would be apt to get a rope around 
your neck, "he replied: "Mrs. Brown, peo-
ple wlll be 110 Jtlad to get that long body 
destroyed, people will not hurt me much. 
Any way, they do not ban" any more. If 
I was going to be kllled, I would be kllled 
that new way." The next day aft.er the 
occurrence, when the coroner held bis In-
quest, the foreman of his jury, who was 
also the sheriff, Rtated that Chapleau, the 
prleoner, wanted to come before the jury 
and make a statement. He was brought 
In, and what be thPn ea.Id was reduced to 
writing by the coroner. That offlcalal, be-
ln11: examined as a witness UJ>OD the trial, 
gave In evidence the statements of the d6-
fendant as taken down by bhu at the time 
of the Inquest. Be t;efltltled, from bis min-
utes, that be Informed the prisoner, before 
the Jury, as to his right to depose or not, 
ae he thought flt, an'd that the deposition 
might he meed aga.lnst him thtoreafter; that 
the prisoner elected of his own fl"efl will to 
be sworn, and asked to be allowed to teR-
tlfy. The l"IRoner'11 story was then given 
as thus Rtatw, In which berepreicented the 
occurrence as provoked by deceased. He 
stated that the df'Ceased refPrred to bis re-
marks about poisoning cows, and jumped 
from his cutter upon the sled, with some-
thing In bis hand; wbereu1>on be(the prla-
oner) hit him wttb the stake. He also 
Rtsttt>d that the deceased harl threatened 
to shoot him, and that they had had dls-
pt1tes concerning thl11 alleJCed pob1onlna-
of hlH cowH by thP. deceased. As agalnat 
the people's evidence the prl11oner add11<'cd 
some evidence of his ,,:oor1 character. . 'l'he 
charge of the trial Judge was very fair, and 
was not excepted to; nor was It really 
exceptionable In Its lnstn1ctlons to the Ju-
ry. But the appellant's counsl•I relies Rnd 
lnsl11ts upon certain features of the case, 
as It was developed upon the trial, al! ex-
hlbl ting a lack or creditable evidence upon 
which to ron\·lct; the Incompetency of the 
coroner's evidence of the11tatument11 of the 
accused; and the lnadml111dblllty of the evl-
den<.'e of what the prisoner hfvl said 
whlle undE'r an'el!t, Immediately uftc•r the 
occurrence. These polnta,i we will consider. 
Three elements enter Into the proof con-
victing the defendunt of the crime cbnrged 
to the Indictment. They are: The teKtl-
mnny of an eye-wltneRi4 of the occurrence; 
the admissions and statements of the pris-
oner, and corroborating circumstances lo 
the e\'lclence, of previous thrents by the 
prh1oner; and of wlrnt tranHplred ahout 
the time of the kllllng. arl'ot'Cllng to the ev-
idence of per.mns who, while not sec•lng 
the actual killing, saw the prisoner anti 
the clc'Ceased on the road. They bud ob-
served his actions, and saw the condition 
111 
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in which the body of the deceased was
found. Before considering the points of
the appellant‘s counsel. we may here say
that the prisoner’s statements of what oc-
curred between him and the deceased are
absolutely negatived by the facts. The
position in which the body of the deceased
was found made it impossible that he
should have jumped from his cutter upon
the defendant’s sled to attack him, or that
any attack could have been made by the
deceased. 'l‘he body was found upon the
road, with the hands clenched in front,
and still holding the broken rein. The
blanket was nround his legs, and the buf-
falo robe partly under and up under his
right arm. Such circumstantial evidence
made itclear that the deceased was strick-
en down while on his seat in the sleigh,
and engaged in driving his horses. The
accused, after making this deposition be-
fore the coroner and jury, refused, upon
the subsequent day, to sign it, and denied
making it. This subsequent action of the
accused may have been predicated upon
one of two mental conditions: Either that
he was unwilling to sign afalse statement,
or else that subsequent reflection made
him regret having made any statement at
all. But the defendant's counsel argues
that the statement before the coroner was
inadmissible in evidence upon thetrial; and
he places the objection on the ground that
the prisoner was then confined in jail upon
the charge of murder, and that it was not
a voluntary statement. These were not
the grounds of the objection taken at the
trial. At that time they were that the
statements were not signed by the party.
But, overlooking the absence of other ob-
jections, we will consider if any injustice
was done, or any legal error committed in
the reception of the coroner's evidence.
The object of the law has always been
the accomplishment of justice by eliciting
the truth about an occurrence in such a.
mode as to minimize the chances of error
and mistake. and to charge the accused
with guilt by the most direct proofs; and
the aim of statutes of criminal procedure
is to secure the punishmentoi a person,in-
dicted for a crime. only by methods con-
sistent with the maintenance of every safe-
guard against error and sell’-crimination.
The design of the state is always to pre-
serve intact for the benefit of the accused
the presumption of his innocence, in the
proceedings for his conviction. and courts
should endeavor to scrupulously guard
his privileges in that respect, and rather
to err on the side of a tender regard for
his rights; for the penalty is death. Sec-
tion l9(i of the (‘ode of Criminal Procedure
provides that, where a party is examined
before a magistrate, he shall be informed
as to his rights and privileges with respect
to making any statements. Section 200
provides that the statement must be re-
duced to writing, and, if defendant refuses
to sign it, his reason therefor must be
stated, and it must be signed and certified
by the magistrate. These conditions were
met in the present case. Section 395 has
provided that the confession oi a defend-
ant, whether in the course of judicial pro-
ceedings or to a private person, can be
given in evidence against him, unless made
under the influence of fear produced by
threats, or upon a stipulation of the dis-
trict attorney that he shall not be prosc-
cuted therefor. The question, then, is,
was the statement of the prisoner made
before the coroner and jury admissible to
prove the homicide? (‘leurly it was. un-
der the provisions of section 395. It was
made at his own election and request, and
without the operation of the influences of
fear, produced by threats, or of hope. un-
der a stipulation that he would not be
prosecuted. It was admissible even before
the enactment of the Code provision; for
it was voluntary, because it was made at
the prlsonel-‘s own suggestion.
The case of People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y.
384, cited by the counsel for the appellant,
is not against the principle of its admissi-
bility. ln that case the prisoner was ar-
rested as the probable murderer; taken
before thecoroner, then holding an inquest
over the body of the deceased; and was
sworn and examined as a. witness. Upon
the trial his evidence so taken was read
against him. This was held to be an er-
ror; but the ground taken by the court
was that the testimony before the coroner
was in its nature unreliable evidence, and
that the reason of the rule of law which
demanded its exclusion was in that con-
sideration. It could not be said that the
statements proceeded from the internal
and spontaneous impulses of the prisoner
alone, or were uninfiuenced by any extra-
neous cause of sufficient force to prevent
free and voluntary mental action; and
thata judicial oath, administered when the
mind was agitated by a criminal charge,
might have that effect. Judge Si:|.ni-::\' de-
livered the opinion in that case, and he
discussed the meaning of the term “volun-
tary, " in reference to confessions. He
thought there was an obvious principle
underlying the rule which excluded the
statements of a prisoner, where not made
iree from outside influences of a nature dis-
turbing to the mind. He stated it to be
that “ we cannot safely judge of the rela-
tions between the motives and the declara-
tions of the accused, when to the natural
agitation consequent upon being charged
with crime is superadded the disturbance
produced by hopes or fears artificially ex-
cited ; ” and he defined a voiunta ry confes-
sion as one “proceeding from the spon-
taneous suggestion of the party’s own
mind, free from the influence of any ex-
traneous disturbing cause.” In the case of
Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7, the state-
ments of the prisoner before the coroner.
being voluntarily made, and after he hnd
been informed that he was under no obliga-
tion to testify, were held properly admitted
upon the trial. The People v. Mondon, 103
N. Y. 211,8 N. E. Rep. 496. was a recent
case, decided since the passage of the Code.
There the examination before the coroner
was excluded, not because of any principle
of inadmissibility inherent in the evidence
generally, but because it had not, and
could not have been in the nature oi
things. a voluntary confession. Therc,the
prisoner, upon being n|'reste(l, was brought
before the coroner as a witness and ex-
amined. He wns an ignorant man, was
unattended by counsel, and was not in-
formed of his rights or privileges as to
testifying. Judge RAPALLO reviewed this
112
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Case No. 40] RELEVANCY. 
In wht~b the body of the deceased wa11 
found. Ilefore conslderlnir the point.a of 
the appellant's counsel, we may here say 
that the prhmner's statement.a or what oc-
curred between him aud the deceased are 
abec>lutely negatived by the fact.a. The 
position tn which the body or the deceased 
was found made it lmpo881ble that be 
should have Jumped from his cutter upon 
the derendant's sled to attack him, or that 
any attack could have been made by the 
decea11ed. 'rhe body was found upon the 
road, with the hands clenched In front, 
and ettll holding the broken rein. The 
blanket was around hie legs, and the buf-
falo robe partly under and up under hie 
right arm. Such circumstantial evidence 
made ltl"lear that the dec:eaeed was strick-
en down while on his seat In the sleigh, 
and engaged In driving hie borsee. The 
accu11ed, after making tble de1>oeltlon be-
fore the coroner and Jury, refused, upon 
the subsequent day, to sign It, and denied 
making It. This subsequent action of the 
accused may have been predicated upon 
one of two mental conditions: Either that 
be was unwtlllng to sign a false statement, 
or else that subsequent reflection made 
him regret having made any statement at 
all. Bot tbe defendant's coun11el argues 
that the statement before the coroner was 
lnadml881bleln evldeuceupon thetrlal; aud 
be pl11ces the objection on the groun1l tl1at 
the prisoner was then confined In Jail upon 
the charge of murder, and that It was not 
a voluntary statement. These were not 
the grounds of the objection taken at the 
trial. At that time they were that the 
stntementit were not signed by the party. 
But, overlooking the absence of other ob-
JectlonH, we will· conitlder If auy Injustice 
was done-, or any legal error committed ln 
the rece1Jtlo11 of the coroner's evlc1ence. 
The object of the law ha.R a.I w aye been 
the accomplishment of justice by eliciting 
the truth about an occurrence In 1mch a 
mode as to minimize the chances of error 
aml mlHtake, and to l"harge the accused 
with guilt by the most direct pl'oofs; nod 
the aim of Htatutes of criminal procedure 
Is to secure the punlshmentof a peraon,ln-
dlcted for a crime. only by methods con-
ehrt.ent with the maintenance of en•ry safe-
guard against error a.nd eelf-crlmlnntlon. 
The design of the state le always to pre-
serve intact for the beuettt of the accused 
the preHumptlon of hlR Innocence, In the 
proceedlngit for hie conviction. and court.a 
shoulcl end .. a'l"or to HCrupulouely guord 
hlR prh·lleges In that re11pect, and rather 
to err on the side or a tender regard for 
his rights; for the penalty ls death. 1-lec-
tlon 1116 of the Cmle of Criminal Procedure 
provlde11 thnt, where a party ls examined 
before a magistrate, be shall be Informed 
as to hls rlgbt.H an<l prlvllegeH with respect 
to making any statements. St'ctlon :mo 
provides that the statement mm1t be re-
tluced to writing, and, if defpn1lant refuses 
to sl~n It, his reason tberl'for muRt be 
Htated, and It must be Hlgncd and ct>rtltted 
by the magistrate. '!'befit• conditions were 
met In the present caHl'. Section 39:> has 
pro,·itlrd that the confP~itlun of a defend-
unt, wlwt.her In the courHe of Jndlt·lal pro-
Cl!edlngs or to a private person, can be 
given In evidence against him, unless made 
under the induence or fear produced by 
112 
threats, 01· upon a stipulation of thf' dlH-
trlct attorney that he Khllll not he 1>roe<'-
cuted therefor. The queHtlou, then, Is, 
wu the statement of the prl1mner made 
before the coroner and Jury 11.dmlR1dble to 
prove the homicide? Clearly it was, un-
der the provisions of section 395. It was 
made at his own election and reque&t, and 
without the operation of the lnttue.ices of 
fear, produl'ed by threats, or of hoi>e, un-
der a stipulation that he would nut be 
prosecuted. It was adm!Aslble even before 
the enactment of the Colle provlHton; for 
It was voluntary, because It was made at 
the prisoner's own suggestion. 
·The case of People,, •. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 
384, cltt>d by the counHE!l for the a11pel111.nt, 
Is not agalnMt the principle of It.a a<lmll!Sl-
btllty. In that case the prisoner was ar-
rested as the probable murderer; takt•n 
beforethecoroner, then holding an lnt1uest 
over the body of the deceased; and wu 
sworn and examined as a witness. Upon 
the tiial bis evidence so taken was read 
against blm. This was held to be an er-
ror; but the ground taken by the court 
wa11 that the teHthuony before the coroner 
was In Its nature unreliable f!Vldence, and 
that the reason of the rule of law whicb 
demanded Its exclusion was In that con-
1dderation. It r.oultl not be said that the 
11ta.tewents proceeded from the lntt•rnal 
and spontaneous Impulses of the prlsont>r 
alone, or were nnlnftuenced by any extra-
neouH cause of sufficient force to [Jrevent 
free and voluntary mental action; and 
that a judicial oath, administered when the 
mind was agitated by a criminal charge. 
might have thatenect. Jutlge 81:1.oEs de-
livered the opinion In that case, and he 
dl!K'ueeed the meaning of the term "volun-
tary, " In reference to confeselone. He 
thought there was an ob,•loue principle 
underlying the rule which excluded the 
HtatP.ments of a prisoner, where not made 
free from outl!lde Influences of a nature dis-
turbing to the mind. He stated It to be 
that "we cannot safely Judge of the rela-
tions between themotivesand thetleclnra-
tlone of the accused, when to the natural 
agitation consequent upon being charged 
with crime Is superadded the disturbance 
produced by hopes or fears artiOcially ex-
cited;" and he defined a voluntary confes-
sion as one "proceeding from tht• spon-
taneou1J suggestion of the party's own 
mind, free from the intfuence of any ex-
traneous disturbing cause." In the caHeof 
Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7, the stat.e-
ments of the prisoner before the coroner. 
helng voluntarily made, and after he had 
been informed that he was under no obliga-
tion to testlfyi were held properly admlttl'<I 
upon the trla.. The Peoplev. ~fondon, 103 
N. Y. 211, 8 N. E. Rep. 496. WM a recent 
caer, dedlled since the passage of the>Co<lt'. 
There the examination before the coroner 
waH eiwlu1lt•d, not becau11e of any prlnt'iple 
or lnadrnlesilllltt,v Inherent In the evidence 
generally, but becausl' It had not, and 
could not ha 'l"e been In the naturP of 
thlngH, a 'l"oluntaryt·unfesslon. There, tho 
prlHoner, upon bPlng 11rre1:<ted, was brought 
before the coroner W4 a wl tne:-is anti ex-
amhll'd. He wus an ignor1111t mnn, WWI 
una ttf!ncled l>y counHel, and was not In-
formed of hlt1 rlghtH or privileges as to 
testifylnlf. JudKe RAPALLO reviewed tbli. 
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question of the admissibility of the exam-
ination of persons under oath before a
magistrate or coroner. He held that they
must be excluded upon the subsequent trial
for the offense, under circumstances where
the prisoner, having been arrested as a.
suspected murderer, was taken beiore the
coroner's inquest or examining magis-
trate, and there examined on oath as to
circumstances tending to connect him
with the crime. His opinion was given
with reference to the facts of the case be-
fore him, which showed that there was no
confession, but an examination before a.
magistrate. He expressly held that sec-
tion 395 of the Code was intended to apply
only to voluntary confessions, and not to
change the statutory rules relating to the
examination of prisoners charged with
crime. It is thus perfectly clear that both
before and since the enactment of the Code
provisions the test of admissibility of the
statements of a party accused of the com-
mission of a. crime. whether made in the
course oi judicial proceedings or not. is
whether they were voluntary: and that
can be determined by their nature, and the
circumstances under which made. If in
all respects, and however viewed, they
could only have been the voluntary and
uninfluenccd statements of the individual,
no principle of law warrants their exciti-
sion; and the Code expressly authorizes
tlhieilr being given in evidence upon the
t a .
The appellant's counsel argues that it
was error to admit the testimony of a
witness as to what the defendant said to
the officer shortly afterthe arrest. No ob-
jection was taken at the trial; and, as the
defendant's statements were voluntary
ones, no objection would be tenable. It
is no ground for the exclusion of ad-
missions that they were lnade while the
party was under arrest, if shown to ha-ve
been made voluntarily, and free from in-
fluences of promises or threats. Baibo v.
People, 80 N. Y. 484.
Another ground of error presented is
that thejury should not have been allowed
to consider the testimony of Nelson and
Peter Brown. The appeiiant‘scounsei ar-
gues that they were perjured Witnesses,
on their own showing. If this were true,
it would be no reason for any such in-
struction by the court to the jury. But it
is not a correct conclusion from the facts
respecting these witnesses. They were ev-
idently men of low intellectual order. and
dull of comprehension. and frightened at
being drawn into the case. Nelson Brown
was the eye-witness of the occurrence;
and Peter Brown was the person at whose
house, the evening before, the defendant
had repeated his threats made to the de-
ceased. Nelson Brown at first denied
knowledge of the facts to which he on a.
subsequent day of the holding of the in-
quest did testify. Peter Brown did not
state upon his examination before the
coroner the facts of the conversation. It
does not appear that they had any motives
for this conduct, or were influenced other-
wise than by fright or some kindred emo-
tion. That was most. probably the truth
of the matter as to both; and possibly, in
the case of Nelson Brown, there may have
been superadded the motive to shield a
WII.oUs,av.—8
friend. At any rate, upon the trial they
avowed their fright as the cause and ex-
planation. They were not otherwise im-
peached as witnesses, and the judge com-
mented in his charge upon the testimony
of these witnesses, and said it was open
to the criticism of counsel for the defend-
ant, and he instructed the jury that they
must be satisfied of its truthfulness. We
think that it was for the jury to pass up-
on the question of the credibility of these
witnesses. It was formerly held to be the
rule that where a witness was shown to
have willfully sworn falsely in u former
proceeding in the case. or upon the trial,
or, as in the case of People v. Evans, 40 N.
Y. 1, where the false swearing was insti-
gated by the prisoner, and the witness
had been promised a. reward for so swear-
ing, that the jury should be instructed to
disregard the testimony of such witness.
Dunlop V. Patterson, 5 Cow. 243. is an ear-
ly and leading case on that subject. The
doctrine as to the treatment of testimony
which is affected bycontradlctions and in-
consistencies: or by evidence making its
falsity n anifest, and establishing a con-
sciousness in the witness of its falsity. has
been much considered in the books. Opin-
ions have not always been in accord; but
the weight of authority was in favor of
the general ruic that the question of credi-
bility of a. witness was one for the jury,
and that the only exception to the rule
was in cases where the discrepanciesin the
testimony were the result of deliberate
falsehood. The Sautissima Trinidad. 7
Wheat. 339; Conrad v. Williams, 6 llill,
446; People v. Evans, supra; Wilkins v.
Earle. 44 N. Y. 172: Pease v. Smith, 61 N.
Y. 477; Place v. Minster, 65 N. Y. 89; Peo-
ple v. Petmecky, 99 N. Y. 415, 2 N. E. Rep.
l-45. But since the enactment of section 7 4
of the Penal Code. and section S32 of the
Code oiCivil Procedure. we must hold that
a new rule obtains. and that the rule and
policy of the law are to allow all testimo-
ny to go to. and be weighed by. the jury.
By those sections a. person convicted of
any crime is, notwithstanding, a compe-
tent witness in any cause or proceeding,
civil or criminal: but proof of his con-
viction is allowed for the purpose of af-
fecting the weight» of his testimony. In
People v. O'Neil. 109 N. Y. 266, lti N. E.
Rep. 68, the court had refused to charge
that if the jury should find that certain
witnesses had, in their previous testimony
in respect to the same matters,commltted
willful perjury, the jury should wholly
disregard their testimony given on the
trial. This was held not to be error; and
ANDREWS, J.. said, in reference to the force
of section 714 of the Penal Code: “ it
would be manifestly absurd. in the light
of this statute, now to hold that an un-
convicted perjurer was an incompetent
witness, whose evidence could not be con-
sidered by the jury, when, under the stat-
ute, if he had been convicted his evidence
must be received and weighed by the
jury.” Here the witnesses, in testifying
to facts of which upon the preliminary
examination they had denied knowledge,
or which they had suppressed, may have
been moved and dctcrrod, as they swore
they were, by motives of fright; and they
appear to have been perfectly free from
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CONFESSIONS. [Case No. 40 
question or the admissibility or the exam-
ination or persons unller oath before a 
magistrate or coroner. He held that they 
JDU11t be excluded upon theRubsequent trial 
tor the offense, under circumstances where 
the prisoner, having bren arreRted as " 
suspected murderer, was tuken before the 
corom~r·s inquest or examining m agls-
trate, and there examined on oath as to 
clrt'umstances tending to connect him 
with the crime. His opinion was glveu 
with referenct• to the far.ts of the case be-
fore him, which showed that tberewus no 
confeHslon, but an examination before u. 
rnttgistrate. J;Ie expressly held that sec-
tion 395 of the Code was Intended to apply 
only to voluntary confessions, and not to 
change the statutory rules relating to the 
examination of prisoners charged with 
crime. It Is thus perfectly clear that both 
before and since the enactment of the Code 
provisions the teMt of ad mlBKlblllty of the 
statements of a party accused of the com-
mission of a crime, whether made In the 
course or judicial proceedings or not. Is 
whether they were voluntary: and that 
can be determined by their nature, and the 
elrcumstances under which made. If In 
all reHpects. and howe\"er viewed, they 
could only have been the voluntur~· and 
uninfluenced Rtacements of the lwllvlrlua.J, 
no principle of law warrants their exclu-
sion; and the Code expretisly authorl:o:es 
their being given In evidence upon the 
trial. 
The appellant's counsel argues that It 
war.1 errol" to admit the testimony of a 
witness as to what the defendant 1u1ld to 
the omcel." Rhortly afterthe arrest. No ob-
jection was taken at the trial: and, aR the 
defendant's statements were voluntary 
ones, 110 objection would be tenable. It 
Is no ground for the exclusion of ad-
mlRSlons that they were made while the 
party w&R under 1urPst, If Mhown to have 
been made voltmtarlly, and fl't'e from In-
fluences of promfMes or threatl!. Ba.Ibo v. 
People, RO N. Y. 484. 
Another ground of erl."or presented Is 
that the Jury should not have bePn allowed 
to consider the testimony of NelRon and 
Peter Brown. The a.ppelitmt'scounsel ar-
gues that they were perjured wltnes11es, 
on their own showing. If thl11 werl' true, 
it would be no reason for any such ln-
11truct10n by the court to the Jury. But It 
Is not a correct conclusion from the facts 
resµeetlng these wtt1lCHses. They were ev-
idently men of low Intellectual order. and 
dull of comprehension. and frightened at 
being drawn Into the ca11e. Nelson Brown 
W88 the eye-witness or the OCCUl."rence; 
and Peter Brown w11s the person at whose 
house, the evening before, the 1lefPn<lant 
had repeated bis ·threats made to the de-
ceased. Nelson Brown at firHt denied 
knowledge of the facts to which he on a 
subsequent day of the holding of the In-
quest <lid testify. Peter Brown did not 
state upon his examination before the 
coroner the fact:R of the couverstttlon. It 
doesnotappearthat tbeyhad any motives 
for this t>ondoct, or were influenced other-
wfRe than by fright or Mome kindred emo-
tion. 'l'hnt w1u1 moMt probably the truth 
of the matter rui to both; and possibly, In 
the case of Nelson Brown, there may ha Ye 
been euperadded the motive to shield a 
•n.nno R.V _q 
friend. At auy rate, upotJ. the trtnt they 
avowed their frigl•t as the ctrnHe and ex-
planation. 'l'hey were not otherwise Im-
peached as witnesses, and the judge com-
mented In his charge upon the te8tlmony 
of thPse witnesses, and sal cl It was open 
to the criticism of counsel for the defend-
ant, and he Instructed the jury that they 
must be satlsflcd of its truthfulness. We 
think that It was for the jury to pass up-
on the question of the rrediblllty of these 
witnesl!es. It wns fomwrly held to be the 
1·ule that where a wltul'HH was shown to 
have willfully sworn fnlsl'iy In u former 
proceeding In the cnse, or upon the trial, 
or, as In tile case uf People v. Evans, 40 N. 
Y. 1, where the false swearing was i~1stl­
gatecl by the prisoner, and the wltne11s 
had been promised a rewar1l for so swear-
lnl{, that the Jury should be lnstrm·ted to 
rllsregard the testimony or such witness. 
Dunlop v. Patterson, fl Cow. 24:J, le an ear-
ly and leading case Qn that subject. The 
doctrine as to the treutment or testimony 
whleh is affected by contradictions and ln-
consistencie~: or by evidence making Its 
falsity 11 nnlfest, and eetabllsbtng a con-
sclousneRs In the witness of lb! Jnlslty, hae 
been much consltlercd In the books. Opin-
ions have not always bPen In accord; I.mt 
the weight of authority was In favor of 
the general rule that. the question of credi-
bility of a wltneHs wus one for the jury, 
and that the onl;v exl'eptlon to the rule 
Wll.R In cases where the discrepancleR In the 
testimony wero the result of deliberate 
fab1ehood. The Santlsslma Trinldart, 7 
Wheat. :139; Conrad v. Williams, 6 Hill, 
446; People v. Evuns, suprn; Wilkins v. 
Earle. 44 N. Y. 172: Pease v. Rmlth, 61 N. 
Y. 477; Place v. Minster, 65 N. Y. 89; Peo-
ple v. Petmecky, 00 N. Y. 415, 2 N. E. Rep. 
145. But since the enactment of section 714 
of the Penni Code. and section S32 of the 
Code of Civil P1·ocedure, we must hold that 
a new r11le ohtulnR, and that the rule and 
policy of the law are to allow all testimo-
ny to go to. and be weighed by. the jury. 
By those sectlonH a flerl!on convicted of 
any crime ls, notwithstanding, a compe-
tent witness in any cause or proceeding, 
ch·ll or criminal: but proof of his con-
viction Is allowed for the purpose of af-
fedlng the wel~ht of his testimony. In 
Pl•ople v. O'Neil. 1011 N. Y. 266, ltl N. E. 
Rep. GR, the court had refu11e1l to charge 
that if the jury should flnd that certain 
l'l'ltnesses had, In their previous testimony 
In l'\'flpect to the same matters.committed 
willful perjury, the jury should wholly 
ilil'regard their testimony gl ven on tile 
trial. This was held not to be error: and 
AN01rnws, J ., said, In reference to the force 
of Hection 714 of the Penal Coile: "It 
woulc.l be mnnlfestly o.b1mrd. In the light 
of this statute, now to hold that un un-
convlcted perjurer was an lncompetl~n t 
witness, whose e\•ldence could not be con-
sidered by the jury, when, under the sta.t-
ute. tr he had been convicted his evidence 
must be received and weighed by the 
jury." Here the witnesseR, in teRtlfylng 
to facts of which upon the preliminary 
examination they had dPnied knowled~e, 
or which thc>y hnd suppressed, may have 
been mo\·e«l uncl rleterrl'd, as they swore 
they were, by moth·eR of fright; and they 
appear to ha.ve been perfectly free from 
Case No. 40] RELEVANCY.
improper lnsthxntluns or motives to swear defendant as the pen-petru’t01' of the crhne,
falsely. At any rate,itwas ior the jury to and which the jury could consider in (ggn-
decide whether they were to he believed nectlun with the evidence assailed. The
or not. There was other evidence of aclr- judgment ulconvictlonshould be aflirmed.
cumstantlal nature clearly pointlug to the All concur.
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<Jase No. 40] UELEVANCY. 
iPlproper Instigations or motives to swear 
fal11ely. At any rate,ltwa11 for the Jury to 
decide whether they were to be belle\·ed 
or not. There was other evidence of a cir-
cumstantial natu1-e clearly pointing to the 
114 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, 
and which the Jury could consider In con-
nection with the evidence assailed. The 
Judgment ufconvlctlonehould be afDrmed. 
All concur. 
RECITALS IN
STATUTES. [Case N0. 41
DOW'NING et al. v. DIAZ et al.
(16 S. W. 49, 80_ Tex. 436.)
Supreme Court of Texas. March 27, 1891.
Appeal from district court. Webb county.
ii‘ Shmvalter and J. O. Nicholson, for
appellants. McCampbells& li'eIcb,forap-
pelices.
S'l‘AYTON,C. J. 'l‘his is an action of
trespass to try title, bi-ouglit by appel-
lees, who are shown to be entitled to take
by inheritance from Joaquin Cueliar.
They allege that the land in controversy,
known as “Porcion No. 36, ” was granted
to Jacinto Cueilar by the Spanish gov-
ernment in the year i767. and that he
gave it in exchange to Joaquin Cucllar
for
land in controversy was granted to Ja-
cinto. Jacinto and Joaquin Cuellar were
brothers, and both died leaving descend-
ants. Appellants claim through patents
dated 9th and 20th of August, 1884, cover-
' tions.
porclon No. 35, which was originally \
granted to the latter at the same time the ~
ing the same land embraced in poncion No.
36, and located by virtue of land certifi-
cates that issued since the adoption of the
present constitution of this state. The
cause was tried without a. jury, and thu
court found the following facts: “(1)
Plaintiffs, and those whoseestate they suc-
ceed to,havebeen in actual,continuouspos-
session, with improvements, of the porcion
of land described in the petition; and
within the knowledge of living and credi-
ble witnesses. who have testitied herein,
for at least 75 years prior to the institu-
tion of this suit. and claiming and hold-
ing under well-defined boundaries. (2)
Said plaintiffs have so claimed and pos-
sessed the said poncion of land by virtue
of and under what is termed ‘An Act of
General Visit of 1767,’ archived Under the
Spanish government in that year, and
recognized by it for over 50 years. and re-
spected and acquiesced in by the Mexi-
can government for 22 years, copy of
which act was filed in the general land-
oflice of Texas about 1871 by virtue of an
act of the legislature of Texas, entitled:
‘ An act to provide for the obtaining and
transcribing of the several acts or char-
ters iounding the towns of Reynosa,
Camsrgo, Mier, and Guerrero,in the repub-
iic of Mexico, and of Laredo in Texas, and
making an appropriation for that pur-
pose. Approved April 24. 1871, and same
constitutes now an archive of said gener-
al land-office under title 7, art. 57, subd. 5,
Rev. St. Tex. (3) Under said act ponciou
35 was originally adjudicated to Joaquin
Cueliar and port-ion 36 was originally ad-
judicated to Jacinto Cuellarz but i find
from a preponderance of evidence that for
at least 75 years the heirs and lineal de-
scendants of Joaquin Cuellar ha ve been in
pea:-eabie, adverse. and undisturbed pos-
session of porcion 36. and the heirs anti
assignees of Jacinto Cueiiar have been in
adverse, peaceabie, and undisturbed pos-
session of pmclou 35, and these porcions
are contiguous. (4) Plaintiffs are the
lineal descendants of Joaquin tlueiiar, and
if1h‘.'l'it all his right, title. and interest in
and tosuid port-ion No. 36. (5) Ifind that
at the time of theiocation, surveys, and
patenting of the i&li(1F"Citllill0(i by defend-
ants herein, porcion ho. 36, upon which
their said locations were made, an-l put-
ents subsequently obtained, was equitably
owned by plaintiffs under color of title
from the sovereignty of the state, and the
evidence of said appropriation was in tne
general land-office. and also evidenced by
the occupation of the owners of said por-
cion, who were and are the plaintiffs here-
in. Ifiud that the deiendantJaines Down-
ing had actual notice of same, as a tenant
of plaintiffs at the time he made his loca-
i6) The lands claimed by defend-
ants are within and upon porcion num-
bered 36, owned and possessed by plain-
tiffs as shown by the survey in evidence.
(7) ifind that the defendants herein. re-
pectively. are the patentecs of the land de;
scribed in the answer and numbered, re-
spectively, 9i and 92, in the name of James
Downing, and 410 in the name of W. Von
Rosenberg, and same from the certificates
recited therein were patented and the lo-
cn tions thereunder made since the consti-
tution of 1876 wentinto effect." As con-
clusions of law the court found: “ (1) Un-
der the first, second, and fourth conclu-
sions of fact I find that plaintiffs have a
good and perfect title to porcion of land
numbered 36, and they are entitled to de-
cree quicting them in their title and pos-
session, and defendants must be enjoined
from claiming any part of the same, or
further asserting title by virtue of their
patents, which are null and voicl,and must
be delivered up for canceilation. (2) Un-
der the third conclusion of fact an ex-
change of porcions 35 and 36, between .J oa-
quin Cucliar and Jacinto Cuellar, is pre-
sumed. (3) Under the fifth conclusion of
fact defendants cannot recovcr herein in
the nature of plea reconvcntion possession
of the lands described in their pa tents, as
said patents are null and void.” On these
findings a judgment was rendered for the
plaintiffs. The questions raised relate to
the admission and rejection of evidence
and to the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the presumptions indulged by the
court.
The land in controversy was formerly
within the jurisdiction of the town ofGuer-
rero, once known as "Revilla." A paper
was offered in evidence which was a certi-
fied copy from the general laud-ofiice of a.
paper therein filed by J. L. Haynes in pur-
suance of the act of April 24, 1871, (Pnsch.
Dig. art. 5826.) That paper was by Haynes,
in pursuance of the act referred to. obtained
from the archives of thetown of Guerrero,
and purports to be a copy of the proceed-
ings of a. sub de legatlon composed of the
same persons, acting under the same au-
thority and for the same purpose. as
shown in the case of Railway Co. v. Jar-
vis, 69 Tex. 527, 7 S. W. Rep. '.’.‘i0. In that
case the law under which Haynes was
acting when he obtained and filed in the
general land-office the paper from which
the copy used in this was taken. as well
a statement of the ofiicialcharacter of the
persons whose acts it purports to evi-
dence. and the purpose of the visit of the
sub delegation will be found. as well as
a statement of the general course oi pro-
cedure. The paper offered in evidence in
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U.ECI'f.ALS IN STATUTES. [Case No. 41 
DOW?-."ING et al. v. DIAZ et al 
(16 S. W. 49, 80, Tex. 436.) 
Supreme Court of Texaa. March 27, 1891. 
Appeal from district court. Wehh county. 
W Showalter and J. 0. Nlcho/so11, for 
uppellants. Mcl'ampbe/ls .t H'e/ch,forap-
pelll!el!. 
STAYTON, C. J. 'rhte 1B on action or 
tl"ellpa88 to try title, brou~ht by appel· 
lees, who nre shown to be entitled to take 
by Inheritance from Joaquin Cuellar. 
'.fhey alleg;e that the lanc1 In controvel'8y, 
known as" Pore/on No. :16," was granted 
to Jacinto Cuellar by the Spanish gov-
ernment In the year 1767. and that. be 
gave It In exrhange to Joaquin Cuellar 
for pore/on No. 35, which was originally 
grauted to the hitter at thl" same time the 
land In controvel'By was ,;ranted to Ja-
cinto. Jacinto and Joaquin Cuellar were 
brothers, and both died lea vlng deecend-
an ts. AppPllants claim through patents 
dated 9th and 20th of Augo11t, 1884, cover-
lnsr: the same land embraced lo porcloa No. 
oo; and located by virtue or land certifi-
cates that leeoed since the adoption of the 
present constitution of this state. Tha 
cause was hied wlthou t a Jury, and th~ 
court found the following facts: "(1) 
Plalotlns, and those whose estate thl"y suc-
ceed tn,bave been In actoal,contlnuooti pos-
8e881on, with Improvements, of the porcioa 
of land described in the petition: and 
within the knowlf'd~e of living and credi-
ble witnetl8es, who have te11tltied herein, 
for at leaBt 75 years prior to the lnstltu-
iton uf this suit. and claiming ttnd huld-
ing under well-defined boundaries. 12) 
Naid plalntlns have so claimed aud pos-
sessed the said porelon of land by virtue 
of and under what le termed 'An Act of 
General Visit of 1767,' archl\·ed under the 
Sp11nl8h government lo that year, and 
recognized by It for over 50 years, and re-
spected and acqulescl"d In by the Mexi-
~an atoven1ment for 22 years, co11y of 
which act was filed In the general lund-
omce or Texas about 1871 hy virtue of an 
act of the legislature of 1.'exas, entitled: 
•An act to provide for the obtaining and 
transcribing of the eev.eral aets or char-
ters foon•llng the towns of Reynosa, 
Camaiiro. Mier, and Guerrt'ro, In the repuh-
Jlc of Mexico, and of L11.redo In Texas, and 
making an appropriation for that pur-
pose. Appro\'ed April 24, 1871, and same 
constitutes now an nrclJlv" of said gener-
al le.nd-omce under title 7, art. 57, sulld. 5, 
Rev. St. Tex. (8) Under said act poz-cioa 
35 was originally adJudlicated to Joaquin 
Cuellar and pore/on 36 waR orlglm\lly 11d-
Jmllcated to Jacinto Cuellar: but I ftnd 
from 11 preponderance of evillence th11.t for 
at least 75 years the heirs and lineal de-
seenrlaota of J oaquln Cuellar have been In 
peareable, advertie. and undlstur!Jed pos-
BP.Rslon of pore/on 36, and tht" heirs anrl 
auignees of Jacinto l'uellar have beE'n in 
adverse, peaceabl!!, and undisturbed pos-
BeHHloo of porctou 85, and tht!He porclnns 
are contlguoo11, (4) Plaintiffs are the 
lineal dl'fleeodante of Joaquin Cuellar, a111t 
lnh·!rlt all his right, title, and llJtt>t"eRt In 
and tu eald porcion No. 36. lli) ltlod that 
at the time or the location, surveyR, and 
patenting of the lttnd~clalmed by defend-
ants herein, pore/on .No. 36, npon which 
their said locations were made, an.I 11ttt-
e11te 1mheequently obcaloed, waseqnflably 
owued by }llntntlfts un<ler color of title 
from the sovereignty of the stntt-, tt1ul the 
evidence of said approµriutlon was in tne 
general land-office, and also evidenced by 
the occupation of the owners of HR Id fJOl°-
cloa, who were ttncl are the plnlntlffM ht>re-
ln. Hind that thederendantJaml'11 Down-
ing had actual notice of same, as a tenant 
of plaintiffs at the ttme be made bis loca · 
tlons. (6) The lends clalme•l by dl"fend-
ante ore within and opuo porclon nnm-
brred 36, owned and possessed 11.v plulo-
tlns as shown by the survey in evidem·e. 
(7) I find that the defendnotR herein, re-
pel·tl vely, are the pa teotee11 of the land de; 
Elcrlhed In the answer and numbered, re-
RIJeCtlvely, 91 und 92, lo the name of James 
Downing, and 410 In the nRme of W. Von 
Rosenberg, au<! same from the certlftcatee 
recited therein were patented anc1 the lo-
cn tlone therenndl"r madl" since the consti-
tution of 1876 WPDt Into effec:~t. n AH con-
clnelone or law the court fonnd: "11) Un-
der the tint, t1econd, and fourth eondu-
slons of fact I Ond that }llalntlft11 bu v~ a 
good antl perfect title to porclon of land 
numbered ll6, and they are entitled to de-
cree quieting them In their title ao•l pos-
session, and defendHnte must be enjoined 
from clalmlnic any part of the ett111e, or 
farther asHerting title by virtue of thl'ir 
patents, which are null aur1 void, and nrnst 
be clellvered up for canr.eilntlon. (21 Un-
der the third conclusion of fart on ex-
chno~e of pore/om~ :l."i and 36, between Joa-
quln Cuellar Rml Jacinto Cuellar. ls pre-
sumed. (:J) Under the fifth conclusion of 
fact defendants cannot recovl•r ht>reln in 
the nature of plea l'PConvi:ntion pm11<e1Bloo 
of the lands deteerlbed ln their pa tt>n t.R, as 
Raid patents ti.re null and vol11." On tbe11e 
flndlnJrS a Ju1lgmeot was renderttd for the 
plalntUJs. The quest!ons r11.lsed rt>late to 
the adml11slon and rejection or e\'ldence 
anrl to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain the pre1:1umpt!ons lndulgt'd by the 
court. 
Tbe land In controversy was formerly 
within the jurisdiction of the town ofGuer. 
rero, once known as" Re\•llla." A paper 
was offered in evidence which waR a certl-
fle•l copy from the gt>nerul land-ofttce of a 
paper thl•reln ftle1l by .J. L. Haynes In 11ur-
Rt1ance of tht> act of Aprll 24. 1M71, ( P111~ch. 
DIF,. art. 5~26.) '!'bat paper was by Haynes, 
In pursuenre of the ad referred to. obtained 
from the archives of thetownof Guerrero, 
and purpurts to be a copy of the proreed-
lngs of a sub de legation composed of the 
11a.::ie persons, acting under the same au-
thority and for the 11ame p11rpo11e, as 
shown In the ~a11e of Railway Co. v. Jar-
vis, 69 Tex. 527, 7 H. W. Rep. :!10. In that 
case tba law under which Huynf's was 
t1ctlng when he olltalned and Hied In the 
general la1111.omce the pnper from which 
the copy used In this waH taken, us well 
a statement of the otflclalcharucter of the 
persons whose acbl It purports to evi-
dence, and the purpo11e fJf the visit of the 
sub de Jegatlon will lie found, es Wt>ll as 
a lltatem-ent of tile p;rneral coul'1'1e of pro-
cedure. 1.'be paper offered In evidence In 
115 . 
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this case bears the same relation to the
town of Guerrero, its inhabitants and
property rights, as did the paper offered
in evidence in the case before referred to,
to the town of Laredo, its inhabitants
and property rights. It is in effect the
charter of the town, and at the same
time the evidence of the right of the town
to lands set apart for public use, as well
as the evidence of the right of each settler
to the land then designated and granted
to him. Both towns embraced lands on
each side of the Rio Grande. The locality
of the severa.i porcions granted to individ-
uals may be detiniteiy ascertained from
the instrument as well as the relation of
land granted to one to that. granted to
another. The recitals in reference to por-
cions 35, 36, and 37 are as follows: “ (35)
On the same course and river bank they
measured thirty-four cords, which make
seventeen hundred Mexican varas, which.
with as many more on the opposite head
and twenty thousand on the sides, ad-
just a ponclon. They identified it, and,
being applied for by Don Joaquin Cuellar.
it was left to him. (36l They measured
an equal number of cords on the same
course. which makes seventeen hundred
Mexican varas, and with as many more
on the opposite head and twenty thous-
and on the sides. a purclon which they
marked out complete, and, being applied
for by Don Jacinto de Cueilar, it was ieit
to himilke the preceding one. (37) On the
same course and river hank they meas-
ured the same cords. which complete sev-
enteen hundred Mexican varas, with as
many more on the opposite head and
twenty thousand on the sides. a poncion
which they marked out. and, being ap-
pllcd for by Bartolimi Cuellar, it was left
to hiu|.”—and in this manner proceeded
the designation of porcions until all the
settlers received lands. There is evidence
of much detail in the whole transaction
from its inception to the close,with strict
conformity with the laws then in force.
After the several allotments were made,
the sub de legates made the following dec-
laration: “We hold, as adjudicated, the
sixty-nine porcions of land partitioned to
the residents and settlers of this town
and its jurisdiction, as the surveyors de-
clare they havc done with the assistance
at the time of surveying them of some in-
terested parties. “ ° ' For the fuiiexe-
cution of their contents a ‘test1mom'0‘
thereof shall he left to the captain or lus-
tice to be archived for the protection of
the parties so soon as he shall effect the
taking of possession, when he shall estab-
lish conspicuous and lasting monuments
in every porcion and sitio assigned in or-
der that the possession thereof may pre-
vent all damage and injury to third par-
ties." Chrlstibai Benz ilenavides, "cap-
tain or justice,” was required to place
persons to whom lands had been allotted
in possession, and after having done so to
attach fhe original evidencing his acts to
the tcstimouio ieit by the sub 11¢:-Ielg.-ate,
and the same to archive for his protec-
tion oi ail persons interested, and also to
forward to the sub de Iegates a testimonio
of his proceedings. In pursuance with the
irder Benavides placed the settlers in pos-
session oi the lands that had been allotted
to them, but possession seems not to have
been given in the order in which allot-
nents were made; and in some instances
exchanges made between persons after al-
lotment, but before judicial possession
was given were recognized as valid in the
wet of possession. In the proceedings by
him the following appears: “(29) Next
they proceeded to the place called ‘Las
Animas,’ under which patronage three
ion-ions of land are contained. The first
belongs to Don Jacinto de Cueliar: (30)
the second to Don Joaquin (fueilar: (iii)
and the third to Don liartoiomi dc Cue!-
lar. When making the proper demonstra-
lions, as before the said Jacinto appeared.
personally representing the persons of his
father and brother, adjoining his own
tract, possession was delivered to him in
the name of ail, and he received it in prop-
er conformity as the former ones upon the
stated conditions, the said witnesses being
present." Possession preceding and fol-
lowing this was given to the same per-
sons to whom the allotments preceding
and following were made. He also gave
possession of lands to the mission and
lots in the town to settlers, as provided
in the orders of the sub delegates. and
closed the record of his acts by a declara-
tion that. the instrument then executed
was such a record made for their perpetu-
ation of which he ordered n festimonio
“he made itcm by item. literally, which.
being done, shall be forwarded to his
Lordship Brigadier Don J. Fernando Pala-
cin, governor and vice captain general of
this colony, in obedience of orders. and
that his original be attached to the tes-
timonio of partition."
To give a. full statement of the contents
of the paper offered in evidence as a copy
of that known as the “General Visit"
would consume more time and space than
can now be given to that purpose. but we
may say that it throughout. from day to
dn_v, was executed with all the formalities
required at that time, and bears evidence
that the protocol from which taken was a
true and faithful record of what occurred
at the time the town of Guerrero was es-
tablished as a Spanish municipality. The
proceedings thus evidenced began early
in July. 176?, and ended on August 20th of
that year. Following the papers before
referred to in the transcript filed in the
general land-office by Haynes. from which
all the copies offered in evidence were
taken, are many papers, some of which
appear to have been taken from protocols,
executed in all respects as the laws then in
force required during the latter part of the
last century, and early in the present,
which refer to the paper known as the
“General Visit,“ and recognize particular
appropriations of land as thereby made.
One of thcse was an application made by
Jose Miguel de Cueiiar, of date February
20, l.\‘Ol. directed to the governor oi the
province. in which he made known to the
governor that he had succeeded to the
right of his father, Bartolomi Uuellar. to
the [)OI(‘iOll of land set apart in the “Gen-
eral Visit, ” which was porcion No. 37,and
complaining that his brother Joaquin
Cueliar had shut him off from the view on
the south by an inclosure, and thereby
prevented his stock from getting, water,
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Case No. 41] HELEVANCY. 
this case beani the same !"elation to the 
town or Gue1"1-e1"0, its Inhabitants anll 
pl"Opel"ty l"lghtM, as dhl the pupPI" ottel'ed 
In evidence In the case befol"e referred to, 
to the town of Lnredo, its lnh11bltants 
und property l"lghtK. It Is In effect the 
chnrcer of the town, and at the same 
thm• the evidence of the l"lght or the town 
to lands sC't apart fol" public use, as well 
a~ the evidence of the rfgh t of eRch settle!" 
to the land then d~l~natecl ttnd ~ranted 
to him. Both towns emoracl'd lauds on 
each 11lde of the Rio Urande. The locality 
of the 11evPral por('fom~ gl"untl'll to lndlvid-
ualt1 may be definitely asce1"t11lned from 
the ln11trnment as well as the relation of 
land granted to one to that gl"anted to 
anothel". The recitals In refel"ence to pnr-
cions 35, 36, and 37 are as follows: "(35) 
On the same r,onl'tle and rl vel" hank they 
rueitsured thirty-four col"d'l, which mBke 
11eventren hundnid Mexican va!"as, which, 
wt th as many mol"e on the op111111ite bead 
and twenty thousRnd on the sides, ad-
just a pure/on. Tht>y Identified It, and, 
being applied for by Don Joaqnln Cuellu. 
It was left to him. (86) They mea1rnred 
an equal number of r.ol"dll on the aamP 
coul'Se, which makt"t!I seventeen bund!"ed 
Mexican v11ras. and with as muny more 
on the opposite belld Rnd twenty thout1-
and on the 11ldt>s, a purdon which they 
mal"ked out complete, and, being nppllt>d 
for by Don Jacinto de Cuellar, it wa11 left 
to him like the pl'eCedlng one. (37) Oo the 
11ame counie and river h1tnk th11y meRs-
ured tba same cordt1, whkh complllte sev-
en teen hundred Mexican varnH, with ns 
maoy more on the opµmdte head nod 
twenty tho1111and on the sldt>s, a porcina 
which they marked out, and, being ttp-
pll<>d fol" by Bartollml Cuellar, It was left 
to him. "-and to this mannel" pl"oceeded 
the de11lgnatlon or pon•lons until all the 
M'ttlel'll received lanil11. 'l'here is evidence 
of much detail In the whole transa<.'tlon 
from lt11 Inception to the close, with strict 
confol"mlty with the lnw11 then In fol"ce. 
After the several allotments were made, 
the 1111b de legates made the followlngdec-
lal"ntion: "We hold, a11 alljurllcated, the 
sixty-nine porclnns of land pRrtlt!oned to 
the residents and settlel"s of thlB town 
and Its jurls<llctlon, as · the sul"veyors de-
cla re thev bani done with tlui a11sh1tance 
at the time of surveying them of some ln-
ter .. tited partlPB. • • • For the full exe-
cution of their ('ODtl!OtH II 'test/mon/O' 
thereof shall be left to the captain Ol" Jus-
tice to be arcbh·ed for the protection of 
the parties so soon &R he shall effect the 
tu king of poH11ession, when he shall e11tab-
lh1h conspicuous and laHtlng monuments 
In evel"y voreiun and sltio aHHigned In Ol"· 
•ler tb1tt the pos11est1lon thel'eof may pri>-
1·ent all damage anrl lnjul"y to thll"d Pill"· 
ties." Chrlstibal Ilenz Benavides, "cup-
taln or justice," watt required to pluce 
persons to whom lan1ls ball been allotted 
lo po11se11sion. and after ha vlug clone su to 
uttnch the ol"lglnnl rvldencing hlH acts to 
the ttwti111011io lert by the :rn/1 1Je /1•1.m te, 
encl the l'ame to al"chlve fol" hlH protec-
tion or nil pel'eons intcresterl, and ahm to 
fol"war(] to the .~11b <le leJ(11tP.~ a testimonio 
of his procerdlngH. In pu11mance with the 
Jl"der llennvh..lt>lil pl111:ed the lilettlel"e In pos-
session of the lam.ls that had been allotted 
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to them, but poeeee11lon seems not to have 
ht>en given in the ol"der In which allot-
nents weni made; and In Flume lnetanr.ea 
flxchaoares made het,veen pel"SonK aftel" al· 
lotment, but before judicial poHBessloo 
was given were recognlzetl as valid In the 
·1rt of pos11e1111loo. In the pl"o~eedln~~ hy 
him the following appeal'H: "(211) Next 
thl•y pro•~l'f'detJ tu the place called 'LaH 
Animas,' nnrtel" which petl"onage three 
w1dom1 of hrnd are cnntalnefl. 'l'he ftrRI 
111>longs to Don Jacinto de Cuellnr: FJllJ 
the 11ecoml to Don Jouquln Cuellal"; (311 
und the third to Don Bartoloml de Cuel-
lar. When making the pl"oper 1le111011etra-
tlo11R, as befol"e the said J aclnto a;1pea re1I. 
pt>1·sonally repreKentinic the person11 of hiR 
father and brother, arlJoinlng his own 
tract, possee"lon wae delh•el"t>d to bhn In 
the name of 1111. aud he receh·ed It In prop-
l•r conformity aH thtt fo!"mer ones npoo th~ 
Htated condltlonM, the 1mld wltnesseM being 
11re11ent." PosseeKlon preceding anrl fol-
lowing tblR was gh·en to the same per-
11ons to whom the allotments pre<'edlng 
nnd following were madt>. He also Jtave 
possPselon of lands to the mlRslon ond 
lotR lo the town to settlel'll, as pl"ovlcled 
In the ordel'8 of the sub de lega.tes. and 
clo11ed the recol"d of hh1 acts by a declara-
tion t11at thA lnstl"ument then executed 
was such a l'ecorrl made for their pt'rpetu-
atluo of which be ordered n t.estimonlo 
"he made ltt•m hy Item. literally, whl<'h. 
being done, shall be fo1"war1led to his 
Lo1"d11hl1> BrlgRdlel" Don J. Fel"nando Pala-
cla, govel"nor and vice captain general of 
this colony, In obedience of orden. and 
that hl11 original he attbched to the tes-
tlmunlo of partition." 
To give a full stntP.rueot of the contents 
of the papel" offered In f'\"ldt>nce as a copy 
of that known as the "Genernl Visit .. 
would consume more time and space than 
can now be ~lven to thnt pu1"po11e, but w& 
may HBY that It throughout. from day to 
clay, waH executed with all the formalltleK 
required at that time, aud beam e\•locnce 
that the pl"otocol rrom whkh taken was a 
tl"ue and folthful l'C<'Ord of what occurred 
at the time the town of GuPrrero waR el'-
tabll11hed a'I a SpanlHh munklpality. 'fhe 
proceedings thuR e\'ldenced bep;an early 
In Jnly, 17117, and ended on August 20th of 
that year. Following the papers befnm 
l't'ferl"ed to In the tl"anecl"lpt flied In the 
gf>nerttl land-ottke by Hayne11. fl"om which 
all the copies offt>red tn evhlence wem 
taken, ttre muny Jlllflers, some of which 
ap1>ea1" to have been taken fl"<>m pl"otocol11, 
:ixecuted In nil l"C'spectH as the IAws then In 
force required during the latte!" pal"t of the 
lnet century, 11n<I f'Urly In the pl"t'llent, 
which l't'fer to tho paper known &H the 
"Gent•l"ul Vlt1lt," and rerognlze paa•tlcular 
n11proprlatlun11 of land as thereby mu<le. 
One of tht:'11e Wllll an 1111pllcatlon made by 
.J ur1e ~lig-uel I.le Cuellnr, of d11 te Feb rua I'.'' 
20, lSOl, directP<l to the governor of thtt 
province. In which he made known to tht+ 
J(overnor tlrn t he h11d su<.'ceede1l to the 
rh:ht of hlR father, Bartoloml <:nelhu, to 
the porl'io11 or Jund set a 11art In the" Gen-
Prnl Visit," which was 1wrcion No. 37, 11ntl 
<.'OlllJ>lainlng that hlH bruthPr .Jou11uin 
Cuellal" had 11hut him off fl"om the view on 
the south by an lnclosure, itnd thereby 
prevented ·hie stock from gettln& water. 
RECITALS IN STATUTES.
[Case No. 41
and praying that the governor appoint
some comp:-tent person “ who shall, in ac-
cordance witn the said acts of the ‘Gen-
eral Visit,’ run the line. as it appears that
said porcion was given and bounded, and
that it be surveyed and run in accordance
with the tenor of said act, fronting on the
river, and with its depth on the estab-
lished courses as they appear in the pro-
ceedings of partition of lands, in order
that with surety l may obtain a watering
place on my property.“ In reply to this
petition the governor made the following
order. “I confer commission upon Don
Fraco. Corduite," who will. as is asked by
this party, conform himself to the ‘Gen-
era Visit,‘ with citation of adjoining own-
ers, and declare the boundaries of the por-
cions of laud referred to,and cause mortar
and stone monuments to be erected tiiere-
on. " On March 9th of same year (‘orduite
caused the order to be sent to the cus-
todian of the writings known as the“ Gen-
era] Visit," requiring them to be sent to
him, in order that he mightduly discharge
his commission, which embraced other
land matters besides that already referred
to. and in pursuance of this order it ap-
pears that they were sent, and that (for-
dnite then re-established the lines and cor-
ners oi these purcions as were they at first,
in which all interested parties concurred;
and on the 14th of the same month the
papers were remitted to the governor,
who, on November 18, 1801, finding the
work correct, approved it; but it does not
appear when the papers known as the
“ General Visit. ” properly archived in Guer-
rero, but delivered to (‘ordnite were re-
turned to their proper archive. The act
preceding the paper which purports to be a
record oi the proceeding of the sub de le-
gates and of Benavides, who was empow-
ered to establish lines aml corners of por-
clons and to give possession in 1767, is as
follows: “In the city of Guerrero, in the
free state oi Tamaulipas, on the third day
of the month of March, eighteen hundred
and thirty-one, I,Santiago Vela, constitu-
tional alcalde, acting with assisting wit-
nesses in default of a notary, there being
none in terms oi law. In view of the reso-
lution of his excellency the governor of the
state, agreeably to his counsel, dated the
15th oi October. in the year oi 1830, last
past. upon the restoration oi the proceed-
ings or acts of visit of this city, I order
thutit takes effect in all its parts. copy-
ing in the form oi testimouio the said doc-
uments, in order that, being protocoled,
they may perpetuate the evidence oi pos-
session of the first settlers oi this city.
This I have determined by this decree.
Signed by me. with my assisting witnesses
in the prescribed form, which I certify.
[Signed] SAN'l"i.\U() VELA. Assisting wit-
nesses: Jose Ms FLORES. FLfilii'2.\‘(,‘l0
Vii.1.1lin~:.u.." Then follow the entire pro-
ceedings of the sub de iegation and other
papers referred to. which were properly
authenticated and delivered to the state's
agent on September 9. 1871, by wiiom they
were filed in the general land-office, and
certified copies thereiroin were used on the
trial of this cause. Haynes, with the
papers before referred to, and embraced in
the transcript certified by the proper au-
thorities at Guerrero, also liled a. statement
which purported to have been made on
February 4, 1831, but by what authority
is not shown, showing to whom lands
were granted by the "General Visit," who
owned them at time statement was made.
what lands were granted in 1784, and
what lands were denounced in the year
I810, or under the colonization law, and
on this it appeared that porcion 35 was
granted to Jacinto (‘ueilar, 36 to Joaquin
Cucliar, and 37 to Burtolomi Cuellar, which
were stated to be owned by the heirs of
these persons, except No. 35, which was
held by a person named as a purchaser
The paper last named was objected to on
the ground that it did not appear that it
was an archive at Guerrero or in thegencral
land-office, and it was inrtherclaimed that
the original would not be admissible iipro-
duced. It sutiiciently appears from the cer-
titicate authenticating the transcript liled
by Haynes that the paper was an archive
at Guerrero; and if it appeared thatit was
such a paper as Haynes was authorized,
by the act under which he was appointed,
to preserve a copy of them, the copy filed
by hiin in the general land-oiiice would be
an archive of that office; hut as presented
we are of opinion that it should have been
excluded on proper objection. We are of
opinion that the act under which Haynes
was appointed did not authorize him to
procure and flle it in the general land-
oiiice; for the original was neither an
“act, charter, or grant affecting the lands
on the east side of the Rio Grande,” but
merely a. statement, it may be, of some
ofliciai oi the town oi Guerrero as to his
opinion as to the matters of which the
paperspeaks. in this case, ii it was not
properly an archive in the general lumi-
oflice, the certified copy offered was not
admissible.
The (injection to papers before referred
to, other than those which are termed the
“General Visit," made on the trial, was
as follows. "Because all that portion of
said document beginning on page 64, at
the said words, ‘ In the town of Revilia.,'
and all thecontinuing portions tiiereof, ap-
pear to be made up of recitals of persons
regardingmatlers and things not relevant
to the issues of this cause, and not admis-
sible in the form offered, and instruments
and documents which do not purport to‘
be archives in any ofliee in Mexico. and
none of which are en itled to he archived
in the general land-oliice of 'l‘exa.s.” The
papers here referred to are not mere recit-
als, not relevant to the issues in this case,
but evidence the acts of the officers of the
Spanish government in making grants of
land, in the adjustment of boundaries of
land granted, ascertainment of unappro-
priated lands, and like matters. Some of
them had bearing on the question of right
of Joaquin Cueiiar to the land in contro-
versy, and as to its boundaries, and all in
some manner affected lands on the east
side of the Rio Grande, and threw more
or less light on the very matters in refer-
ence to which information was sought:
through the act of April 2-l, 1871. Such
being their cliaracter. and it being clear
that they were properly archived at Guer
rero, the copies filed by the state’s agent
in the general land-oiilce became archives
of that otfice, as held in Railway Co. v.
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RECITALS JN STATUTES. (Case No. 41 
and praying that the governor appoint 
some competent person" who shall, lu ac-
cordance with the amid acte of the •Gen-
eral Vlaslt.' run the line, es It a11pears that 
said pore/on was given and bounded, aud 
that it be surveyed and ran in accordunce 
with the tenor of said act, fronting on the 
river, and with its depth on the PStab-
l111hed coul'l!es as they appear in the pro-
ceedlnlCll of partition of lands, In order 
that with surety I may obtain a watering 
plat'e on my pru11erty." In reply to this 
petition the g•>Vernor made the following 
order. "I eonfer commission u1mn Don 
Fraco. Cordulte, who will. as le a11ked by 
this party, conform himself to the' Gen-
era~ Vlldt,' with clttl tlon of adjoining own-
ers, end declare the boundaries of the pur-
clona of land referred to, antl cauRP mortar 
and stone monuments to be erectPCI there· 
on." On March 9th of 11nme year l'01·dulte 
cauRed the order to be 11ent to the t'U8· 
todlan of the writings known as the" Gen-
eral Visit," requiring thPm to be sent to 
him, In order that ht> mlghtdulydlBl'harge 
hl11 commission. which embraced other 
land matters besides that nlrendy referred 
to, end in porsuenee of this order It ap· 
pears that thPy were sent, end thn t Cor-
dnlte then re-establlshell the lloeA aocl cor-
ners of these porcions a11 were they llt first, 
In which nil Interested parties concurred; 
and on the 14th of the 11ame D1onth the 
paptirs were remitted to the governor, 
who. on November 18, 1801, finding the 
work correct,apJ1roved It; but ltdoes not 
appear when the paper11 known as the 
"General Visit," properly archived In Guer-
rero, but dellveretl to Cordnite were re-
turned to their proper archive. The act 
precf'dlntcthepaper which purports to he a 
record of the proceedlnJt of the sub de le-
RRtf'll aD1l of Bennvldes, who wus empow-
ered to estahl111h lines and corners of por-
clons and to give possee11ion In 1767, Is as 
follows: .. In the city of Guerrero, lu the 
free state or Tamaullpas, on the third day 
of the month of March, eighteen hundred 
and thirty-one, I, Snotiago Vela, conetltu-
tlonal alcalde, acting with assisting wit· 
nenes lo default or a notary, there belnit 
none In terms of law. In view uf the re110-
latlon of bis excellency the governor of the 
trtate, airreeably to his counsel, dated the 
15th of October, In the year of 1830, last 
past, upon the restoration of the proceed-
ings or acts of vl11lt or this city, I orclt>r 
that tt takes ett1't't In nil Its parts, eopy-
lng In the form or testlmoulo the said doc-
uments, In order that, being protocoled, 
they may perpetuate the evidence of pos-
•t'llldon of the ftrst 11ettlers of this city. 
This I have determlne<l by this decree. 
Signed by me. with my &lli\lstlng witnesses 
In the prescribed form, which I certlly, 
[81gned] SANTIAOO V&J.A. Assisting wlt-
Dl'lll!(lff: J osB: MA 1''1.om;;s. 1''1,01u::>c10 
VJLLAUEAL." Then follow the entire 1>ro-
eeedlnga of the s11b de legation and other 
papers referred to. whlcl1 were properly 
anthentlcatPd and dellver.-d to the Htate'11 
agent on 8eptember 9, 1871, by whom they 
were filed In the general land-utflce, and 
certified copies thererrom were used on the 
trlel or thlR cause. Haynes, with tile 
papera before referred to, end embraced in 
the transcript certified by the proper eu-
tborltleeat (:inerrero. also lile<l a statement 
whleh purportPd to have been made on 
February 4, 1831, but by what authority 
ls not Rhown, showing to whom lends 
were grnnted by the" Ot•oeral Visit," who 
owned them at time statement Wllll made. 
what landM were granted In 1784, and 
what lands were denounced In the year 
ll'tlO, or under the colonization law. end 
on this It appeued that porclun 85 was 
granted to Jacinto <'ueller, 36 to Joeqofo 
Cuellar, and 37 to Burtoloml CueJlasr, which 
were stated to be owned by the helni of 
these persons, except No. 85, which was 
held by a 1-1el'lilon named aa a purchaser 
The paper last named wa11 objected to on 
the ground that it did not appear that It 
wa11an arcblveatOuerreroorin thegenPral 
lend-office, and It was furtherclalmed that 
the original would notbeadmlMslble if pro-
duced. It sutflclently appears from thecer-
tltlf'ate authenticating the transcript Hied 
by Heynee that the paper waa an archive 
at GuerrPro; and tr it appearedtbatltwas 
such a paper as Haynes was authorized, 
by the act under which he was appointed, 
to preserve a copy of tbem, the copy filed 
by him In the gl'neral land-ofHce would be 
an archive of that office; hut llM prellentt>d 
we are of opinion that It should have been 
~xclmled on proper objection. We are of 
opinion th11t tbe ar.t under which Haynes 
was appointed did not authol'lze him to 
procure and fl.le It In thi' general lancl-
ofHce; for the original wns neither an 
"act, l'harter, or grant affecting the luncls 
on the enst 11lcle of the Rio Grande," but 
merely a statement, It may be, of aome 
ofHclal of the town uf Guerrero as to his 
opinion as to th" ma ttens of whkh the 
paper.11peak1t. Jn this cu11e, If It was not 
proi1erly an archive Ira the general land-
oftll·e, the certified copy ottered was not 
admlBBlble. 
The otlJPCtlon to papers before refel'red 
to, other than those which are termed the 
"Gt>neral Visit," made on the trial, ·was 
. es follows ... Beca11se all that portion of 
said document bl.'glnntn11: on page 64, at 
the said words,' lo the town of Revilla.' 
and all the continuing portions thereof, ap-
pear to be made up of recitals of persons 
regarding ma ttel'I! and things not rehwant 
to the Issues of this cause, and not admis-
~lble lo the form ottt>red, and Instruments 
and clocum<'nte which do not rrnrport to1 
be archives In any olflet> In l\f Pxlco, and 
none of whh·h nre 1·11 · itled to he archh·l'd 
In the general hrncl·ullice of Texas." The 
papers here referred to are not mere ret'lt-
als, not rPlevant to the l11sue11 In this case, 
but evidence the nets of the offtcers of the 
Spanl11h government IQ malclnic grants of 
land, In the adjustment of boundaries of 
lund grunted, ascertainment of UllBl'l>ro-
prlated hrnds, and like matters. Some of 
them had bearing on the q uestlon of right 
of Joaquin Cuellar to the land In contro-
vel'Ky, end es tn lt11 bounclsrles. end all In 
11orue manner anected lands on the east 
side of the Rio Grande, and threw more 
or lees llgh t 011 the \"ery ma ttt>r& 10 reler-
cuce to which lnformutlon was sought 
through the aet of April 24, 1!l71. Such 
bt>lnir their cbllrHl"tl'r, and It being clear 
that they were properly brchlved at Guer 
rero, the copies flied by the state'11 agent 
In the genPral land-oftlce bPCame archives 
of that omce, as held in Railway Co. v. 
U7 
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RELEVANCY.
Jarvis, 69 Tex. 527. 7 S. W. Rep. 210. There
were many objections made to the intro-
duction of the certified copy of the paper
known as the “General Visit, " which con-
sists solely of the writings evidencing the
acts of the sub delegates Palacio and Os-
erio. and of persons acting under their in-
structions, which were authenticated by
themselves with the necessary witnesses,
and by Bcnavides. \vho was authorized by
them to place inhabitants in possession
of lands allotted at time surveys were
made. The paper takes its designation
from the fact that it evidences the acts of
the sub de Ic,'_r.-ztes who came to the Rio
Grande frontier, at time named, to or-
ganize the frontier towns, ami to desig-
nate the lands that should pertain to
each for several public purposes, as well
as to allot lands to the settlers of such
towns, and to give evidence of the rights
conferred. The many objections urged to
the admission of the certified copy from
the land-otiice may and will be grouped.
1. it was claimed that the paper
offered in evidence was neither a copy of
an archive in the land-oflice, nor of a
paper that could legally become an ar-
chive. As held in Railway Co. v.Jarvis. 69
Tex. 527, 7 S. W. Rep. 210, it rests with the
lcgislatureto determine whatshall become
an archive; and under the statutes re-
ferred to in that case it must be held that
the paper in the general land-oliice from
which the cop_v offered in evidence was
taken was an archive. but its eflect as evi-
deuce is a matter for consideration here-
after.
2. It was objected that the loss of the
Original was not proved, nor its absence
accounted for: and this objection em-
braces both the protocol and original tes-
fimonlo evidencing the proceedings known
as the “General Visit.” From the record
before us it appears that both the papers
referred to, properly become archives in
two places in a foreign country; and from
the nature of the proceedings evidenced by
them. did it not so appear in the record,
this court would takejudicial knowledge
that they should so have become, and
could not be legally withdrawn for pro-
duction here. The record of the proceed-
ings was, in effect,the charter of the town
of Revilla, now known as “Guerrero,”
as well as evidence of the town's right to
all lands set apart for public use, and, at
the same time, the evidence of individuals‘
rights to the tracts of land allotted to
persons in whose favor no separate evi-
dence of right was given. The protocol.
unless otherwise directed by competent
authority, was required to be placed in
the proper archive of the government,
while the original remained with the in-
tercsted parties as the evidence of their
right; and affecting, as it did, the town
in its municipal character and ownership,
the archive of the town was the proper
place of deposit. 'l‘he paper evidences the
fact that neither the protocol nor original
could be legally surrendered by their cus-
todians to individuals to be taken to an-
other country. or for any other purpose;
and the olijrctions now considered were
properly overruled.
3. It was urged that the paper from
which that filed in the general land-ofiice
was copied was not an archive in the
town of Guerrero, and that this appears
from the instrument itself. So far as the
contents of the paper show, it was one
not only such as it was proper to make
an archive of that town, but one which by
competent authority was required to be
so made. In reference to such a matter it
is peculiarly proper to presume that was
done which ought to have been done, and
especially so after the lapse of so many
years. lf the original, authenticated by
the sub delegates with necessary wit-
ncsscs. and evidencing their acts, and
the protocol, properly authenticated, evi-
dencing the acts of Benavidcs under their
orders, were found archived at Guerrero.
they would beheld to make full prodf of
the facts testified to b_v them, in the
courts of all countries where the laws of
Spain are in force, and in all courts gov-
erned by the rules of the common law
wherein should arise a question as to the
faith to be given to such instruments, ex-
ecu ted when the Spanish laws were in
force, and affecting property subject to the
dominion of that sovereignty. It is not
clear from the record. except as before
stated, how the papers from which those
in the general laud-oflice were copied were
authenticated; but it is evident that the
copy in that office was not made from
the original left by the sub de Iegates, and
the protocol executed by Benavides with
proper witnesses. which was directed to
be attached to that original and both to
be archived in Guerrero. We have seen
not only that the papers last named were
directed to be archived at that place, but
that this was done; and we havealso seen
that, under the order of the governor of
the province, these papers were directed
to be delivered to Corduite, and that they
were received by him. These facts appear
through papers properly authenticated,
and the record clearly manifests that the
labors of Corduite were governed by these
papers, to which frequent reference is
made. Whether the papers archived in
Revilla in 1767, and removed by order of
the governor in 1s01, were ever returned,
cannot be clearly ascertained from the rec-
ord before us; but it is evident that they.
or copies of them, were returned with a
resolution of the governor of the state of
date October 15,1830. 'l‘he resolution is
not found in the record; but the inference
from what does appearis that it accom-
panied the papers removed in 180i. or cop-
ies of such papers, and contained an or-
der that they should be copied, and placed
in such enduring form as would perpetuate
the evidence of the rights of the first set-
tlers, as well as oi the town. From the
decree of March 3. 1831, it is evident that
what was then done was in obedience to
the order or resolution of the governor of
October 15. 1830. and that this required
whatever papers were restored to be
copied “ in the form of testimonio, the
said documents, in order that, being pro-
tocoled, they may perpetuate the evidence
of possession of the first settlers of this
city. " What was directed to be done was
to perpetuate evidence of rights, which
would be impossible if the record to be
made would not import verity. The
meaning of the language above quoted is
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Case No. 41) RELEVANCY. 
Jarvis, 69 Tex. 527. 7 S. W. Rep. 210. There 
were many obj('('tlons made to the Intro-
duction of the certlfled cory of the paper 
known as the "General Visit," which con· 
slsts solPly of the writlnitH evhlenclng the 
acte of the .Yub de legates Palacio and Os-
erlo, and of penJone actlnK' under their In· 
etrnctlon1t, wLlch were authentlcatt•d by 
themselves with the necessnry witnesses, 
and hy Benavides. who wns authorized by 
them to place Inhabitants In po88e88loo 
of Jtrnd11 allotted at time eurvey11 were 
made. Tile paper takes Its dt.'fllgnatlon 
from the foct that It evidences the acts of 
the s11b de IPJrlltes who ca 11111 to the Rio 
Grnnde frontier, at time named, to or-
ganize the frontlPr towns, and to de11lg-
note the lands that should pertain to 
each for several public purposes, as well 
as to Rllot lands to the settlel'8 of sueb 
towns, and to give evidence of the rights 
conferred. The many objections urged to 
the admission of the certllled copy from 
the land-office may and will be grouped. 
1. It was claimed that the paper 
offered In evidence was neither a copy or 
an archive tn the land.office, nor of a 
paper that could le2ally hecome an ar-
chive. As held lo Railway Co. v.Jarvl1t, 6U 
Tex. 527, 7 8. W. Uep. 210, It rests with the 
ll•glslature to determine whats ball become 
an archh·e; and under the statute& re-
ferred to In that ease It must be held that 
the paper In the general land-office from 
which the co(ly offered lo evlllence was 
taken wwi an archive. but Its erfer.t as evl-
deuce ls a matter for consideration here-
after. 
2. It wae objt>Cted that the IOBR of the 
original WOB not proved, nor lt11 absence 
accunnted for; and this objection em-
braces both the protoeol and orlglna.I tes-
tlmonlo evl'1enclng the proceedlngM known 
as the "Genf'ral Visit." l<~rom the rec.-ord 
before us It appears that both the papers 
reff"rrerl to, properly become archives lo 
two places In a foreign country; aud from 
the nature of the proceedlnJ(sevhJP.11ced by 
them, did It not so appf'nr In the record, 
this court would take judlelal knowled~e 
that they should MO have become, and 
~:ould not be legally withdrawn for pro-
duC'tlon here. The record of the proceed-
ings was, In effect, the charfor of the town 
of Re\•llla, now known nil "Guerrero," 
as well as evidence of the town's right to 
all la.ode set apart fur public use, aud, at 
the SRme time, the evidence or lndlvlduRIK' 
rights to tho tracts of lund allotted to 
1w111oos lo whose favor no separate e\·l-
dence of right was Jl;lvPn. The protocol, 
u•1 let1s otherwise dlrt>cted by c11m11E>tent 
authority, was required to be plt1ced In 
the proper archive of the JP;overumeot, 
while the orlglual remained with the ln-
terf'eted partleK as the e\"lclence or their 
right; and affecting, as It did, the town 
In its municipal cha1·acter end ownerHhlp, 
the ar\.'111\·e of the town was the proper 
place of deposit. Tlw pa11er evldenct·M the 
fact that neither the protocol nor urlitlnal 
could tie lei.tully tmrrendered by their cus-
to.tlans to indh·ltluals to be taken to an-
other country. or for any othPr purpose; 
and the ohJr<·tlons now con11ldered were 
properly O\'erruled. 
3. It was urged that the paper from 
"·hlch that filed In the Keneral land-uftlce 
ll8 
I was copied was not an archive In the 
1 town of Guerrero, and that th111 n1>pe1trs 
I froDl the Instrument Itself. So far as the 
! contents of the paper Rhow, It wat1 one 
1 not only 11uch as It was proper to maKe 
an archive of that town, bot one which by 
competent authority w11B required to ~e 
so made. In refereuce to 11urh a matter It 
la pt>cullarly proper to pl't'Kume that was 
done which ought to hu ve been done, and 
especially RO ufter the lapse of so many 
yea!'ll. Jf the orlKlnal, authPntlea.t<!d by 
the 8ub de lt.-glltes with oecet1sary wlt-
neHMl'ff, and evidencing their acts, and 
the Jlrotocol, properly authenticated, evi-
dencing the acts of Henu vld('8 under their 
orders, were found arw·hlved Rt Ouerrero. 
thPy would he held to muke full prodf of 
the facts testified to by them, In the 
courts of all countries where the laws of 
Sp•dn are In force, and In Rll courts gov-
erned by the rules or the common law 
wherein should arise a question as to the 
fRlth to be Klven to such lostrumt>nts, ex-
ecuted when the Spanish laws were lo 
forct>, and aftectln,,; property subject to the 
d'>mlnlon of that sovtlrelgnt:y. It Is not 
clear from the reimrd, except as bt'fore 
stated, bow the papers from which thoee 
In the general land-office were copied were 
authenticated; but It Is evident that thtt 
copy In that office waR not made from 
the original left by the sub de le/fates, and 
the protocol executed by Benavides with 
pro1>er witnesses. which wu directed to 
be attacht'd to that original and both to 
be archived In Huern;ro. We have aeen 
not only that the papers last named were 
directed to be ar~blved at that place, but 
that tbls was done; and we have also seen 
that, under tbP order of the governor of 
the provlure, the11e paperR were directed 
to be dellvert'd to Cordulte, and thnt they 
were received by him. These facts appear 
through papers properly authenticated, 
and the record clearly rua.nlfeste that tbP. 
labol'll of Cordulte were governed by these 
paperB, to which frequent referenr.e Is 
made. Whether the paperM orchlved lri 
Revilla. In li117, and removed by ordt>r of 
the gu,•ernor In JSCll, were ever returned, 
cannot be clearly ascertained from the rec-
ord before us; but It Is e\·ldent that they, 
or co11les of them, were returned with a 
resolution of the governor of the 11tnte of 
date October 15, 1830. The reKolutlon Is 
not fonnd In the record; but the lnferenre 
from what does appear 111 that It accum-
11anled the pupers removed In 1801, or l'op. 
lea of 11uch pa11ere, Rnd con talned an or-
der that they Kbould be copied, and placed 
in such enduring form aa would 11er1>etuate 
the et'lclence or the rights of the tlrst set-
tlers, as well as of the town. From tbe 
df'l•ree of Mttrrb 3, 1831, It Is evldP.nt that 
what wus then done was In ohecllenl'P to 
the or1ler or reimlutlon of tbt' governor of 
October 15, 1~-lO. and thut this reqnlre<I 
whatever ptt.pcr11 were restored to be 
copied .. In the form of testluwnlo, the 
said documents, In order that, belnit pro. 
tocoled, they n1ay perpetuate the evldenr.e 
of po11seMlon of the first Mettlel'B of this 
city." What wa11 directed to he done was 
to perpetuate evldeuce of rll(hte, which 
would be tmpoMelble If the rec--rd to ne 
made would not Import verity. The 
meanlug of the language above quoted le 
RECITALS IN STATUTES.
[Cass No. 41
not clear; but, in view of theiact that one ' that TOP This P088011 it 81101110 have been
of the papers constituting the “General
Visit” was a testimonio, and the other a
matrix or protocol, a copy to be made
from them would be. not only in form,
but in fact. a testimonio, and the direction
that they should be protocoled for perpet-
uation carries with it the idea that they
should be copied into a book. The Span-
ish word “protocolo, " when applied to a
single paper, means the first draft of an
instrument duly executed beiore a notary,
—the matrix.——because it is the source
from which must be taken copies to be
delivered to interested parties as their evi-
dence of right; and it also means a bound
book in which the notary places and keeps
in their order instruments executed beiore
him. from which copies are taken for use
oi parties interested. It is evident that in
neither oi these senses, strictly, was the
Spanish word translated “protocoled.”
used in the order of March 3, 1831; but
the inference is that by resolution of the
governor of date October 15, 1-K30, the per-
son who made the order of later date. and
made the record from which the transcript
in the general land-oiiice was taken, was
directed to place in a book ior preserva-
tion, as are matrices when said to consti-
tute a protocol. The copies which the
governorintended should be preserved are
evidence oi rights, public and private,con-
ferred by the acts of the sub de legates,
and persons acting under their orders;
and we may be permitted hereto say that,
after so great a lapse oi time, with our re-
stricted means of acquiring correct inior-
mation,it would not be just to assume
that what was deemed suiiicient evidence
of right by t.hc otiicers of the former gov-
ernment, who must be presumed to have
been familiar, not only with the general
laws then in force. but with the special
laws and usages oi the time. as well as the
facts attending a. particular transaction,
is now entitled to no consideration. We
cannot hold, under the facts presented.
that the papers irom which the transcript
filed in the general land-ofiice was made
were not archives in the town oi Guerrero.
4. it was urged that the introduction oi_
thecertiflcd copy from the general land-of-
fice was forbidden by section 4. art. 13, oi
theconstitution: but it iscvident that the
section oi the constitution has no applica-
tion to it. Railway Co. v. Jarvis. 69 Tex.
5-ii», T S. W. Rep. 2l0. It was claimed that
the paper should have been excluded be-
cause it does not show that porcion No.
36 was granted to Joaquin Cuellar, and
because it does not suificiently describe the
land. It is true that the paper does not
show that the pomiou was originally
granted to Joaquin ijueliar. through whom
plaintiffs claim; hut one step in their de-
railzmnent oi title was to show that the
land was granted to Jacinto Cuellar by
the Spanish government. and through him
they seek to show title in their ancestor;
and. if the paper tended to prove that-
iuct, it was admissible, unless subject to
some other objection. Looking to the
whole paper, there can he no doubt that
the land can be identified by the descrip-
tion therein given.
5. It was urged that the paper did not
show more than an inchoate grant, and
excluded, unless proof of confirmation
was made. The paper, upon itsface, does
not purport to evidencean inchoate right;
hut, if it did, this would not inrnish suffi-
cient reason for excluding it as evidence-
of some right and description of the land;
and confirmation ought to be presu|ned,if
necessary, from the long and continuous
possession shown under claim based on
the proceedings evidenced by the paper.
6. It was several times urged, in effect,
that the record from which thecop_v tiled in
thegeneral land-office was taken wou-Id not
have been admissible to prove the facts
stated in it. or ior any other purpose. If
that be true. the paper offered should have
been cxcludcd: butif that be not true. then
the transcript flied in the general land-
ofiice, or a certified copy taken from that,
ought to have been received as evidence
oi the facts which the paper states to be
true; ior. the transcript in the land-oflice
having become by law an archive. certi-
fled copies from it may be used in evidence
in cases in which the record now found in
Guerrero could be. The objections now
underconsirieration are based on the prop-
osition that the record found in Guerrero
is but a copy. and too remote irmn the
protocols to be received in evidence. It
must be conceded that the record in Guer-
rero now found in the archives of that
town was made in the year 1831; and itis
proper to hold, from what appears, that
it was copied from the papers there filed
in 1767, subsequently removed, and not re-
turned until some time after October 15,
1830. That record, in so far as it contains
the proceedings of the sub de 1»-gu tes,
would be what is termed in the Spanish
law a “trasl.'|d0." which is a copy taken
by a notary from the original, or a subse-
quent copy taken from the protocol, and
not a copy taken directly from the matrix
or protocol: but, in so far as it contains
the proceedings by Benavides. it would be,
so far as the record shows. what is the
original, because theflrst copy taken from
the protocol, or at mostasubsequent copy
taken from that paper. It may be con-
ceded that to entitle a. paper of the class
last described to entire faith under the
Spanish law. it should be given by the
officer before whom the protocol was ex-
ecuted, or if by another notary on inquiry
after citation to parties adversely inter-
ested; and,iurther, that under the laws
in force here the execution of the copy
would have to be proren even when the
protocol is an archive of the governlnent,
unless by reason of its age it was entitled
to be introduced as an ancient instru-
ment. A paper of the class first named,—
a copy taken from an ori;:inai,—under the
Spanish law, was only en titled to full faith
against the party producing it. unless
given after citation to the person adverse-
iy interested under judicial sanction; but
it seems to be held, when such a copy is
given by the notary beiore whom the pro-
tocol was executed, and by whom the
ori,'_:innl was extended, that even such
copies areentitled to full faith. But, un-
der that law. even a truslmlo, if it be an-
cieut, is entitled to full faith, although
given by a notary other than the one be-
fore whom the protocoi or original were
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RECLTALS IN STATUT~. [Case No. 41 
not clear; bot, lo -view of thefact that one 
uf the papeni constituting the .. General 
Visit,. was a testimonlo, a ml the other a 
matrix or JJrotocol, a copy to be nuule 
f1'0m them woultl be, not only In form, 
but In fact, a te11timonlo, and the direction 
that they Hhould be protocolt>d for pt>rpet-
oatlon carries with It the idea thot they 
should be copied Into a book. The Span-
ish word ~ protocolo," when applied to a 
single paper, means the first draft of an 
Instrument duly executed berore a notary, 
-the matrix,-becaulM' It Is the source 
from wblch must be b1ke11 copieH to be 
dellvert>d to Interested porllf's as their t-vl-
denee or rlicht; and it nlsu mP.ans a bound 
buuk in which the notary ()laces and kct•pH 
In their order lnstrumen t .. executed before 
him. from whirh copit>R are taken for use 
or parties interested. It is e\•ident that In 
neither of tl1ese Rf!nfl~, strictly, wtts the 
8paolsh word translated "protocoled." 
used In the order or March 3, l&'Jl; but 
the Inference le that by resolution of the 
governor of date October 15, IS30, the per-
son who made the order of later date, and 
made the rt>cord from which the tra nHt•rl1>t 
In the general land-office was taken, was 
directed to place lo a book for prel'erva-
tlon, as ure matrices when 11ald to consti-
tute a protocol. 'rhe co1>lee which the 
go,·eroorlnteuded should be preRen·ed are 
evh.lence or rights, public and prlvute,con-
ferred hy the octe of the Rllb de lt>gate11, 
an<l persons acting under their or<lerR; 
ancl we may be permitted ht>re to 11ay that, 
after so great a la1,ee of time, with our re-
stricted means of acquiring correct Infor-
mation, It would not be just to aseume 
that what wa11 deemed Rntttcleut evidence 
of right by the officers of the former gov-
ernment, who must be presumed to have 
he1m familiar, not only with the general 
laws then In force, but with the special 
laws and llil&gl'ti of the time. ae well as the 
faets attenillng a particul11r transaction , 
lit now entitled to no conMh.le:ratlon. We 
cannot hold, under thtt facts preeentoo. 
that the papers from which the transcript 
filed lo the gene1·al land-ofHce was made 
were not archives In the town of Guerrero. 
4. It was urgi>d that the Introduction of 
thPcertlftl"fl copy from the generul land-of-' 
flee was forbidden by section 4. art. 13, of 
theconelltutlon; bot It ls evident that the 
llPCtlun of thu l'lllllltl tu tlon has DO ll l)pJlca-
tlo11 to lt. Railway Co. v. Jar,•lis. 6!1 Tex. 
fH<1, 7 S. W. Rep. 210. It was claimed that 
the paper should have bel•n excluded be-
cause It does nut show thut pnrelon No. 
36 was granted to Joaquin Cuellar, and 
becauire It dues not MU tftclen tly describe the 
land. It Is true that the paper does not 
ehow that the pore/on wu't originally 
aranted toJoaqulnt'uellur, through whom 
plain tins claim; but ono step In their de-
ralgnment or title wee to show that the 
l11nd wus grante<l to Jacinto Cuellar hy 
tht>8ponlsh government.and through him 
they eeek to show title In their ancestor; 
amJ, If the paper tt>nded to prove thut 
fact, It was 111lmiHslble, unless suhject to 
sorue other ohjectlon. Looking to the 
whole paper, there cau be no donht thut 
the lund can he Identified IJy the descrlp-
tl•>u therein glf'en. 
5. It wae ur~ed that tile paper did not 
show mom than an Inchoate grant, and 
• that for this reason it should have been 
excluded, unleBB proof of l!Onflrma tlon 
\\'as made. The paper, upon its face, does 
not purport to evidence an Inchoate right; 
hut, If It did, this would not furnish sutft-
cl1>nt reason for excluding It as evldeuce· 
of som1> rl~ht and description of the land; 
and confirmation ou~bt to be prestimecl, If 
nf"!essary, f1·om the long and continuous 
poeseH11lun shown under clRlm based on 
the proceedings 1ivldenced by the pa1,er, 
6. It wee Aeveral times urged, In effect, 
that the record from which thecu1>Y Hied In 
thegenerol lund-ofHce was taken wolrid not 
have been llllllll'tslble to prove the facts 
stated In it, or for any other purpose. If 
thnt be true. the paper offe1·ed should hnve 
been exrlu<lt•d: but If that bP. not true, then 
the transcript filed In the general lend-
office, or a certlHed copy taken from that, 
ought to have been received ae evldP.nce 
of the fact11 which the paper states to bti 
trne: for. the transcript lo the land-office 
ha.\·lng become by law an archive, certi-
fied eo11le" from It mas be need lo evidence 
in cusf'M In which tile ra·ord now found In 
Guerrero coulfl be. The objections now 
undercon11ldMatlon are based on the prop-
osition that the record found In Guerrero 
IA bot a copy, and too remote from the 
protocols to be received ln evldenee. It 
must be conceded that the record In Guer-
rero now found In the archives of that 
town was mnde In the yenr 1831; and It le 
proper to bold, from what appears, that 
It was copied from the papers tht!re filed 
In Ji67, 11ubsequt>utly removed, and not re. 
turned until some time after October Iii, 
1830. That record, In so far as It contHin11 
the proreedlngs of the s11b de /,,gutes, 
would be what Is terme<I In the Spanish 
law a "tra!l/11do," which 111 a copy taken 
by a notary from the orlii:lnal, or a eubse-
quent copy taken from the protocol, and 
not a eopy ta.ken dlrACtl,r from the matrix 
or protocol; bot, In so far as It conb1lns 
the proe!'ecllngs by Benavides, It would be, 
110 fttr ae the rec•Jrd 11howe, what Is the 
orlglnRI, because theflt"llt copy taken from 
the protocol,orat mostasubscquent copy 
taken from thut paper. It moy be con-
ceded that to entitle a papPr of the class 
last deHcrlbed to entlrl> faith under the 
Spanish law, it 11houhl be gh•en by the 
officer before whom the protocol was ex-
ecuted, or if by another notary on lnc1ulry 
after citation to parties ad verKely Inter-
ested; aml, further, that under the laws 
In force here the execution of the copy 
would have to be pro,·en even when the 
protocol ls an archh·e of th0 goVt!l'lltnf'nt, 
unlet:is by reueon of its age It was entitled 
to be lntrodui~ed as an ancient Instru-
ment. A paper of the rinse ftret named.-
a copy tnken from an orlglnal,-nnder the 
Spanish htw, was onlyentltled to full faith 
agulnst the party producing It, 1111le11s 
given ufter citation to the person ad verHe-
ly lntere11ted uuder judicial sanction; but 
It seems to be held, when such a copy ls 
gh·en by tbe notnry before whom the pro-
torol wa't executed, and by whom the 
original was extended, tlrnt even such 
coph•s are.entitled to full faith. Dut, un-
der that law, even a trm;/m/o, if It be an-
clt>nt, le entitled to full faith, althouAh 
given by a notary other than the une l>e-
fore whom the protocol or original were 
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authenticated. and without citation and
judicial sanction. in cases in which .the
property passed by it is possessed under
the right conferred by it for the period of
80 years. These rules of the Spanish law.
however, have no force here. further than
that we maylook to -them to ascertain the
character oi evidence one claiminga grant
ofiand from the Spanish government ought
toproduce. Assumiug,then, that thecopy
offered in evidence is an archive in the gen-
eral land-oiiice, and that its remoteness
from the protocols is as stated. then, in
view of the facts shown by other instru-
ments. to which the objection now under
.-onsideration does not appl_v,and of thefur-
therfact that plaintlffs,anrl those through
whom they claim. have had continuous
possession of theland described in thosein-
strumen ts. and claiming through them, for
a period of 75 years, can it beheld that the
certified copy was not admissible under
the rules of the common law to show the
boundaries of their clnim. and thcgrounds
on which this has been so long asserted, if
for no other purpose?
it is unnecessary for us now to determine
whether it would be admissible and euth-
zicnt to show title if uncorroborated by
other facts. In State v. Cueilar, 47 Tex.
295, extracts from the papers we have re-
ferred to were considered. and properly
held not to be admissible in an action for
zonfirmation of title; but the transcript
before us shows all the matters which the
court was then unable to understand
from the brief extracts used in that case:
and, besides, since thatcase was decided the
zopy now in the land-office has been made
by law an archive. Many of the ques-
tions relating to the admission of the pa.-
pers in question were considered in Rail-
way Co. v. Jarvis, 69 Tex. 530,7 S. W. Rep.
210. which involved a similar question,
which may be looked to, on matters now
not fully discussed, for the reasons on
which some rulings are made. It is urged
that the court erred in flnding that plain-
tiffs. and those through whom they claim,
before the institution of this action had
possessed the land continuously for at
least 75 years. claiming it under well-de-
fined boundaries: but the evidcncc fully
sustains the findings, and there isevidence
tending to show that their ancestor was
in actual possession of the land at the be-
ginning of this century, when the bound-
ary between it and porciou No. 37 wasfnr
the second time established by the govern-
ment. The same facts tend to show the
exchange between Jacinto and Joaquin
Cuellar, and justified the court’s flnding
in this respect; and the recognition of the
right of plaintiffs and theirancestors to
the land by former governments and by
this, until the patents relied on by the dc-
fcndants issued, is to be inferred from the
fact that their claim was asserted by pos-
session. recognized by the vicinage as well
as by papers in the archives of the former
government. and their right was never
questioned by any government or individ-
ual until appellants concluded that the
land was vacant. -
It is urged that the court erred in find-
ing that the land was equitably owned by
plaintiffs under color oi title from the sov-
ereignty oi the soil at the time appellants
We think not. and
made their locations; but, if we disregard
uli the evidence contained in the certified
copy of the “General Visit” issued from
the general land-otiice, no other concili-
sion ought to have been reached from the
other evidence in the case, looking to the
laws of which the court should have tak-
en judicial notice. At the opening of this
century the father of Joaquin Cuellar, to
whom was granted porcion No. 37, made
known to the authorities that his son
was in possession of the land in contro-
versy, which was contiguous to his. and
that by inclosure made by the son on the
south he was excluded from water. By
the act of February l0, 1852. porcion No.
37 was confirmed to the father, and por-
cion No.35 to Joaquin Cueliar, and be-
tween those is porcion 36. the land in
controversy, of which plaintiffs and au-
cestors had continuous possession for 75
years before the trial of this cause; claim-
ing the land as their own. These facts
alone would have justified a finding that
plaintiffs were not only theequitableown-
crs, but that they held it under title from
the sovereignty of the soil. The findings
of fact required the findings of law; and,
while it is not necessary to rely upon the
certified copy of the“ General Visit ” to sho w
the title of the plaintiffs, we desire to note
the fact that by the act of February 10,
1852, (Pasch.Dig. art. 446i.) noless than 20
porcions of land within the jurisdiction of
Guerrero were continued by numbers, as
given in that instrument, to the persons
to whom that showed these several por-
cions were granted in 1767; and, had appli-
cation been made for confirmation of por-
cion No. 36. it doubtless would have been
made at the same time as was done in re
gard to those above and below and con»
tiguous to it.
This action was brought by 16 persons
all of whom claim by inheritance from Oi
through Joaquin Cuellar, except omt
who were husbands of persons thus claim-
ing, and joined pro form.-1, and among
those so claiming is Francisco Cuellar. In
bar of this action. defendants pleaded a
judgment of the district court for Travis
county in favor of the state. rendered
against Francisco Cuellar, in an action
brought by him as an heir of Jacinto
Cuellar, in which he assumed to sue for
himself and co-heirs. who werenot named.
for confirmation of title to the porcion 0!
land in controversy. That action was
brought early in the year 1871. On th!
trial of this cause defendants offered to
read in evidence copies of the pleadings.
judgments. and statement of facts in that
case; but the court excluded the state-
ment of facts on objection, and admitted
the pleadings and judgments. It is urged
that the court erred in excluding thestate-
ment oi facts, but this ruling was evident-
ly correct. It is also urged that the court
erred in excluding what is termed the
“Judgment Voli.” but this is not sus-
tained by the record, for it was admitted
under defendants’ plea of not guilty, as
shown in the statement of facts.
It is claimed that the court erred in not
rendering judgment in favor of appellants
on their plea of ms adiudicata-, but there
was no error in this ruling for several
reasons. That action was by Francisco
120
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authenticated. and without citation and 
Ju<llclu.I M1111ctlon, In cases In which .the 
property 111111 ... ed by It le poM11e>u11ed under 
the right conferred by It for thl' period of 
30 yf'ars. ThesR rules or the Spanish law, 
however, have no force here, rurthPr thau 
that we may look to ·them to a8l'ertaln the 
cho rocter or evidence one claiming a grant 
of land from the Spanish gO\·ern ruent ought 
toprodnce. ABRumlng, then, that thecopy 
offert'fl In evidence Is an archive In the gen-
erHI land-offke, and thut Its remoteness 
from the protocols Is as stated, thl'n, In 
view of the facts Hhowu by other ln11tru-
m1>nte, to which tbe objection now under 
!Omllderatlon doeit not apply ,nnd ofthefur-
therfact that plaintiff-,, and those through 
whom they claim, have had contlnuo1111 
po11Hes11lon of the land deRcrlbed In thol'Pin-
11truments, sod claiming throuJrh thPm, for 
a 11erlod of 75 yean, can It beheld that the 
eertlfted copy was not admlBBlble unclPr 
the rules of the common law to show the 
noumlarlf's or their clnlm, and the grounds 
on which this has heen so long ast1erted, If 
lor no other purpose? We think not, and . 
It Is unnecessary for us now to determ!ne 
whether It would he admb11dble and soffi. 
~lent to show title If uncorroborated by 
other fact11. Jn State v. Cuellar, 47 Te-x. 
29:>, ntracbJ from the papers we havl' re-
ferred to were comlidrred, and properly 
held not to be admh11dble In an action for 
:!onftrma tlun of title; but the tran~rlpt 
before us shows all the matters which the 
t>oort was then unable to understand 
from the brief extracts use<l In that caAe: 
and. beRldes, slncetha tease was dt>eided the 
!op,v now In the land-omce bee bPen made 
by law an arehh·e. Many of the ques-
tions rel a ting to the admission or the pa-
per11 In qneetlon were corielllered tu Rail-
way Co. v. Jarvis, 69 TH. 530, 7 S. W. Rep. 
210, whlt>h tnvolvt'd ll similar question, 
which may ht> looked to, on matten now 
not folly dl11eussed, for the reaRone on 
whl<'h some rullngR are made. It le ur11:ed 
that the court erred In finding that plaln· 
tlffR. and those through whom th1>yclalm, 
before the lnRtltutlon of this action had 
poSl!t'RMed the land continuously for at 
least 75 yeal"I!, claiming It under well-de-
fined boundarlt'8; but the e\'ldencc fully 
ttoetalns the findings, and there lsevhlence 
teudlnit tu show that thl'lr anct>stur was 
In actual possession of the land at the be-
&1nnlnK of till .. cPntury, when the bound-
ary betWePU It and porcfon No. a1 '\\'aHtnr 
the second time established by the go\'ern-
ment. The same facts teurl to show the 
exchange between Jacinto and .Joaquin 
Cuellar, and Justified the court's finding 
In this respect; and the recognition or thl-' 
right of plaintiffs and their ancestors to 
the land by former governments And by 
thlH, until the patentR relied on by the dt'-
rendante Issued, IR to be Inferred from the 
faet that tlwlr claim was aKserted by pos-
set111ion, recognlzi::d by the vlcinage a11 well 
as by papera In the archh·eH of the former 
government, and their right was never 
questioned by any government or Individ-
ual ontil appellants concluded that the 
land was vttcnnt. 
It Is nrged that the court erred In find-
ing that the land was equitably owned by 
plaiotlfte lllldCr COior O( title from the BOV• 
erf:lgnty or the soil at the time appellants 
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made their locattona; but, tf we dlel't'gard 
all the eridence contained In the certlfted 
copy of the "Oeneral VIRlt" Issued from 
the general land-otHce, no other eonclu-
Hlon oujl'bt to have been reached from the 
other evloence to the case, looking to the 
laws of which the court should have tall:-
l'n Judicial notice. At the opening of this 
<'entury the father of Joaquin Cuellar, co 
whom was granted pore/on No. 37, made 
known to the aotborltletf that his son 
was In posAesslon of the land In contro-
versy, whkh was conthruons to his, and 
that h.v tncloRure made by the son on the 
south he w11e excludf'd from water. By 
the act of February 10, l81i2, pore/on No. 
3i was conftrmed to the father, and por-
rlo11 No. 33 to Joaqnln Cuellar, and be. 
tween thoHe Is pore/on 36, the hrnd in 
t•ontruverey, or which plaintiffs and an-
ceHton had continuous possession for 75 
.real'M before the trial of thi11 cause; claim-
ing the land Rll their own. These far.ts 
a lnne would have Jnstlftt'd a ftnding thi&t 
plalotiffH were not only tbeequltableown-
t•rs, bot that they heltl It under title from 
the sovereignty of the Holl. The Hndlngs 
or fact required i:he findings of law; and, 
while It ts not nece11eary to rely upon the 
certifted copy of the .. Heneral Visit" to abo w 
the title or the plttlntlffH, we dewlre to note 
the fact that by the al't of February 10, 
1H52, (Pasch. Dig. art. 4461,) nolese than 20 
porefons of land within the J01·l11dlctlon of 
Guf'rrero were conftrmed by numbers, as 
given in that t11st1·ument, to the persons 
to who an that ehow~d these several por-
clons were grRnted in li67; and,had applf. 
cation been made for confirmation of pol'-
c/011 No. 36, It doubtless would have beeo 
made at the same time as was done In r& 
gard to those abo\·e and below and con• 
tlguoue to It. 
'.l'hle action was brou~ht by 16 persons 
all of whom claim by luheritauce from 01 
through Joaquin Cuellar, except eomtt 
who were huitbends of pcnone thus claim-
ing, and joined pro formx, and among · 
tho11e so claiming le Francisco Coellar. In 
bar of this artton. defe11dHnt11 pleaded .,. judgment of the dlRtrlct court for Travlt. 
county In favor or the stnte, renr1eree 
against Francisco Cuellar, In ail action 
brootcht by him as an heir of Jarinto 
Cuellar, In which he aes1rn1ed to sue for 
himself and co-heirs. who were not named. 
for conHrmatlon of ttt.le to the pore/on ~ 
land In controversy. That action wa" 
brought early In the year tsn. On tin 
trial of thi11 cause defendants offPl"t'd tft 
reall In evidence co11les of the pleadings. judgmente,Hnd statement of facts in that 
cm1e; bot the court excluded the state-
ment of facts on objection, and admitted 
the pleadings nod judgments. It ts urged 
that the <·ourterred In excluding the state-
ment of facts, but this ruling wa11 evident-
ly <"orrect. It le also uri:l•d that the court 
erred In excluding what 111 termed the 
"Judgment Voll," bot this ls not 11us-
tained by the record, for it was admitted 
oncler dl'fPndnntR' plea of not guilty, as 
shown In the statement of fa<"ts. 
It is claimed that the court erred In not 
rendering Judgment In favor or app1>llanta 
on their plea of res adjudieata, lmt there 
was no error In this rulloi;i; for 1:1e\•eral 
reasons. That action was by Francisco 
RECITALS IN STATUTES.
[Case No. 41
Cuellar alone, and a judgment therein
could not bar the right of the other plain-
tlffsln this case. even il it would bar an
action by him; but that action was pros-
ecuted by him as an heir of Jacluto (Inel-
lur, and it would be no bar to this. even
as to him, for he now sues in a different
right. Thompson v. Cragg. 24 Tex. 582,"
(Iaruth v. Grigshy. 57 Tex. 266. I1, how-
ever, that judgment could operate as a.
har to him, this would not better the con-
dition oi appellants; for, the land being
equitably owned, titled, and occupied by
plaintifls at the time deic-n(lants’locations
were made, under the provisions of the
constitution they could acquire no inter-
est in it, (Const. art. 14, § 2.) and the oth-
er plaintifls would be entitled to recover.
Although the court below erred in the
matter noticed, that furnishes no reason
for reversing the judgment; for, on the
evidence, no otherjudgment than the one
entered could have been rendered, and it
will therefore be uflirmed. It is so ordered.
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RECITALS lN STATUTES. [Case No. 41 
~oellar alone, and a Judgment therein 
eould not bar the right of the other plain-
tltf11 ln tblR case. even if It would bar u.n 
action hy him; but thRt action was pros-
ecuted by him as an heir or Jacinto Cuel-
h1r, and It would be no be.r to this. even 
as to him, for be now eue11 in a differt>nt 
right. Thompson v. Cragg, 24 •rex. 5S2; 
Caruth v. Grigsby, 67 Tex. 266. If, how-
~ver, that Judgment coulf1 operate a11 a 
bar to him, this would not better the con-
dition or appellants; for, the land being 
equitably owned, titlecl, and occupied by 
plaint1ffli at the time defendants' loce.tions 
were made, untlt>r the provisions of the 
constitution they could acquire no inter-
eMt In It, (Const. art. 14, § 2,) e.nd the oth-
t-r plaintlHs would be entitlt>d to rPCover. 
Although the court below erred in the 
matter noticed, that furni11het1 no reason 
for reversing the judgment; for, on the 
""idence, no other judgment than the one 
entered could have been rendered, E1n1l It 
will therefore be aftirmecl. It Is so ordered. 
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STEINBRUNNER v. PITTSBURG & W. R.
CO.
(23 At]. 239, 1-lb‘ Pa. St. 504.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan 4, 1892.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Alle-
gheny county.
Action by Barbara Steinbrunner against
the Pittsburg & Western Railroad Company
tor damages for the death of plaintit‘t"s
husband, alleged to have been caused by de- ‘
tendant’s negligence. Judgment for plain-
tifl, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
Woodward, for appellee.
PAXSON, C. J. Upon the trial in the court
below, it became a vital question ot fact
whether the deceased, Xavier Steinbrunner,
stopped, looked, and listened just before he
crossed the railroad track. One witness for l
the plaintifl, Miss Margaret Martin, testitied
distinctly that he did stop on the sidewalk
crossing of Cherry street.
tive evidence, however, the other way.
Charles Rentz, a witness for the defense,
testifled that the deceased did not stop. “He
didn't look either way; never looked either
way; just came straight through.” Wil-
liam Cernuska testified that he saw the de-
ceased from the time he started down the
hill until he was struck by the train; that
he did not stop, nor look either way; that he L
had a bag in his hand, and was looking at it.
Yvilliam F. Crooks, another witness, says:
“l noticed Mr. Sieiubrunner just coming out
of the foot of Cherry street, and he come on
down, and when he got along-side of the side
track, about three feet this side of the first
track, the wheel kind oi‘ scotched. He stop-
ped just about a second, and then he went
ahead, and when the horse was about halt-
way over the main track the train struck
him. " " " He made no other stop.
" ‘ ' Didn't see him look up or down. He
had his head down, kind oi.’ this way, [illus-
trating.] It seems to me he was counting
some money or something. I know that he
didn’t look up or down. When his wagon
checked tor that short time, I thought he
was going to wait till the train passed on."
Under these circumstances we think it was
error for the learned judge below to say to
the jury: “The fact is uncontradicted that
he did stop at the crossing on Cherry street
just as he crossed over and came on River
avenue, but did he stop for the purpose of
looking out for trains?" It may be the
learned judge used this language inadvert-
ently. This is probable from the fact that
it is inconsistent with the portion of his
charge which immediately preceded it. But
as it stands it appears to be an erroneous
statement of the evidence upon the pivotal
fact in the case. We cannot say what in-
fluence it had with the jury. Where a judge
states the evidence in two ways, one in favor
'corpo1-ations, especially railroad
There was posi- -
of a corporation and the other against it, a
jury may be depended upon to adopt the
latter.
The sixth specification alleges that the
court erred in answer to the plaintiff's sec-
ond point. The point involved the measure
of damages, and in most respects was cor-
rectly answered. But when the learned
judge told the jury that they should look at
this question "from a broad and sensible
point of view, and liberal, because it is not
a case to cut oi! corners too closely," we
, think the expression was unwise, to say the
John McClea\'e, for appellant. Marcus A. 1
least. Juries do not need encouragement
from the court to give large verdicts against
corpora-
tions. Courts and juries should be just to
both corporations and individuals, but no
one has a right to be “liberal" with the mon-
ey ot' other persons. While we are not pre-
pared to say we would reverse for this rea-
son alone, we have considered the matter of
suflicient importance to call attention to it.
The only remaining specification of error
which we think it necessary to refer to is
the ninth, which alleges that the court erred
in admitting certain evidence ot the de-
ceased‘s expectation of life, based upon the
Carlisle tables. The question asked the wit-
ness was, “Will you state to the jury what
the expectation of life is of a man in good
health, 46 years of age?" and the answer
was: “The Carlisle table would make it
23.81 years; the American table, 23.8 years."
Neither of the tables appears to have been
oifered in evidence, but, as the answer of the
witness was based upon evidence obtained
from them, their eflect may well be consid-
ered in connection with this specification;
and, as the American table depends upon the
same principle as the Carlisle table, we will
discuss the question more particularly in ref-
erence to the latter. In estimating the dam-
ages for the death oi.‘ the deceased, his ex-
pectation of life became an element of im-
portance. His earning power being fixed by
the evidence, the next question to be settled
by the jury would naturally be, how many
years will he probably live to exercise this
power? This can never be decided accurate-
ly in single cases. The most a jury or any
one else can do is to approximate it. A
man may die in a day, or he may live to earn
wages tor 20 years. It follows that there
must always be an element of uncertainty in
every such case. But there are some rules
to be observed which aid to some extent in
such investigations. Thus, it a man is in
poor health, especially if he is sufiering from
some organic disease which necessarily tends
to shorten life, his expectancy is much less
than that of a man in robust health. Again,
the age of the person and his habits are
among the important matters for considera-
tion. It needs no argument to show that
the expectation of life is much greater at 21
years of age than at 50. The value oi.’ the
122
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
06
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Case No. 42] H.ELEV ANCY. 
STEINBHUN'NER v. PITTSBURG & W. R. 
co. 
(23 Atl. 239, 146 Pa. St. 504.) 
Supreme Court oi Pennsylvania. Jan 4, 1892. 
Appeal from court of common pleas, Alle-
gheny county. 
Action by Barbara. Stelnbrunner against 
the Pittsburg & Western Railroad Company 
tor dnmnges for the death of plaintiff's 
husband, alleged to have been caused by de-
fendant's negllgl•nce. Judgment for plain-
tiff, and defendunt appeals. Reversed. 
John McCleaw, for appellant. Marcus A. 
Woodward, for nptlellee. 
PAXSON', C.J. Upon the trial In the court 
below, It becnwe a vital question of fact 
whPther the dt•<'<'ltlled, Xa'l"'ler Stelnbrunner, 
stopped, looked, and listened just before he 
crossed the railroad track. One witness for 
the 1>lalutltr, lllss llnrgaret Martin, testified 
distinctly that he did stop on the sidewalk 
crossing of Cherry street. There was posi-
tive evidence, however, the other way. 
Charles Rentz, a witness for the defense, 
testified that the deceased did not stop. "He 
didn't look either way; never looked either 
wny; just came straight through." Wil-
liam Cernuska testified that he saw the de-
ceased from the time he started down the 
hill until he was struck by the train; that 
he did not stop, nor look either way; that be 
had a bag In his hand, and was looking at It. 
Vi'llllam ~'. Crooks, another wltnell8, says: 
"l noticed Mr. Stelnbrunner just coming out 
of the foot of Cherry street, and he come on 
down, and when he got along-side of the side 
track, about three feet this side of the first 
track, the wheel kind of sC'otched. He stop-
ped Just about a second, and then he went 
ahead, and when the horse was about half-
way over the main track the train struck 
him. • • • He made no other stop. 
• • • Didn't see him look up or down. He 
had his head down, kind of this way, [Illus-
trating.) It seems to me he was counting 
some money or something. I know that he 
didn't look up or down. When his wagon 
cheC'kell for that short time, I thought he 
wns ~olng to wait till the train passed on." 
Umh•r these circumstances we think It was 
error for the learned judge below to say to 
the Jury: ''The fact Is uncontradlcted that 
he did stop at the crossing on Cherry street 
just as he crossed over and came on River 
avenue, but did he stop for the purpose of 
looking out for trains'!" It may be the 
learned Judge used this language lnadve11:-
ently. This Is probable from the fact that 
It Is Inconsistent with the portion of his 
charge which Immediately preceded It. But 
as It stands It appears to be an erroneous 
statement of the evidence upon the pivotal 
fact In the <'nsc. We cannot say what In-
fluence It hnd with the jury. Where a judge 
states the evidence lo two ways, one ln favor 
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of a corporation and the other against it, a 
jury may be depended upon to adopt the-
Iatter. 
The sixth specification alleges that the-
conrt erred In answer to the plaintiff's sec-
ond point. The point Involved the measure-
of damages, and lo most respects was cor-
rectly answered. But when the learned 
judge told the jury that they should look at 
this question "(rom a broad and sensible 
point of view, and liberal, because It 18 not 
a case to cut off corners too closely," we-
think the expression was unwise, to say the 
least. Juries do not need encouragement 
from the court to give large verdicts against 
corporations, especially rallroad corpora-
tions. Courts and juries should be Just t<> 
both corporations and Individuals, but D<> 
one has a right to be "liberal" with the mon-
ey of other persons. While we are not pre-
pared to say we would reverse for this rea-
son alone, we have considered the matter of 
sutHclent Importance to call attention to It. 
The only remaining specification of error 
which we think It necessary to refer to Is. 
the ninth, which alleges that the court erred 
In admitting certain evidence of the de-
censed's expectation of Ute, based upon the 
Ca1·llsle tables. The question asked the wit-
ness was, "Will you state to the jury what 
the expectation of life Is of a man in good 
health, 46 years of age?" and the answer 
was: "The Carlisle table would make It 
23.81 years; the American table, 23.8 years." 
Neither of the tables appears to have been 
offered In evidence, but, as the answer of the 
witness was based upon evidence obtained 
from them, their effect may well be consid-
ered In connection with this specification;. 
and, as the American table de1>ends upon the-
sa.me principle as the Carlisle table, we will 
discuss the question more particularly In ref-
erence to the latter. In estimating the dam-
ages for the death of the deceased, his ex-
pectation of ll!e became an element of Im-
portance. His earning power being fixed by 
the evidence, the next question to be settled 
by the jury would naturally be, how many 
years wlll he probably live to exercise this. 
power? Thls can never be decided accurate-
ly In single cases. The most a jury or any 
one else can do ls to approximate It. A 
man may die In a day, or he may live to earn 
wages for 20 years. It follows that there 
must always be an element of uncertainty In 
every such case. But there are some rules 
to be observed which aid to some extent In 
such Investigations. Thus, If a man ls In 
poor health, es1>eclally If lie Is suffering from 
some organic disense which necPssarily tr111ls 
to shorten life, his expectancy Is much le~s 
than that of a man In robust health. Again, 
the age of the person and his habits are 
among the Important matters for considera-
tion. It needs no argument to show that 
the expectation ot life Is much greater at 21 
years of age than at 00. The value of the 
MATTERS or H‘5T0RY- MAPS, LIFE TABLES, mo. [Case No. 42
Qariiflle tables as bearing upon this question
“pends in a measure upon the manner in
which they xvere made up.
If be-<P‘1 upon
gaiected lives, that is to say, only 119011 lives
which are insurable, they would be of value
only for life-insurance purposes, and utterly
useless to apply to unselected lives or lives
generally. The evidence in this case is not
very clear as to the mode in which these ta-
bles were composed. I have therefore con-
sulted the Encycloptcdia Britannica, a very
high authority, (volume 18, p. 169,) from
which l extract the following: "The Carlisle
table was constructed by Mr. Joshua Milne
from materials furnished by the labors of
Doctor John Heyr.-ham. These materials
comprised two enumerations of the popula-
tion of the parishes of St. Mary and St.
Cuthbert, Carlislc, (England,) in 1780 and
1787, (the number of the former year having
been 7,677, and in the latter 8,677.) and the
abridged bills of mortality of those two par-
ishes for the nine years, 1779 to 1787, during
which period the total number of deaths was
1,810. Thcse were very limited data upon
which to found a mortality table, but they
were manipulated with great care and fidel-
ity. The close agreement of the Carlisle ta-
ble with other observations, especially its
agreement, in a general sense, with the expe-
rience of assurance companies, won for it a
large degree of favor. No other mortality
table has been so extensively employed in
the construction of auxiliary tables of all
kinds for computing the value of benefits de-
pending upon human life. Besides those fur-
nished by Mr. Milne, elaborate and useful
tables based upon the Carlisle data have
been constructed by David Jones, W. T.
Thomson, Christopher Sang, and others.
The graduation of the Carlisle table is, how-
ever, very faulty. and anomalous results ap-
pear in the death rate at certain ages.” It
appears, therefore, that the Carlisle table is
based upon general population, and not upon
selected or insurable lives. In Shlppen’s
Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 391, it was held that the
Carlisle table was not authoritative in deter-
mining the value of a life-estate. and the
common-law rule of one-third the capital
sum was adopted as the measure of the life-
interest. It was said in the opinion of the
court: “As to the measure of the lite estate
of Slayton T. Platt, we may add that the
Carlisle tables are not authoritative. They
answer well their proper purpose. to ascer-
tain the average duration of life, so as to
protect life insurers against ultimate loss
upon a large number of policies, and thereby
to make a profit to the shareholders. But an
individual case depends on its own circum-
stances, and the relative rights of the life
tenant and the remainder-man are to be as-
certained accordingly. A consumptive or
diseased man does not stand on the same
plane as one of thc same age in vigorous
hcalih. Their expectations of life differ in
point of fact." We can understand that in
a contest between a lifetenant and the re-
mainder-man the Carlisle tables would not
serve as an authoritative guide. In such
instance the question must be decided upon
its o\vn facts. But in a case like the one in
hand, where the expectation of life of the
deceased was a. quetion of fact for the jury,
we are unable to see why the tables referred
to were not competent evidence. Being in-
tended for general use, and based upon aver-
age results, they cannot be cont-lu.~1ive in a
given case. That is not the question here.
It is whether they are not some evidence,
competent to be considered by a jury. Their
value, where applied to a particular case.
will depend very much upon other matters,
such as the state of health of the person, his
habits of life, his social surroundings, and
other circumstances which might be men-
tioned. While we are unable to see how
such evidence is to be excluded, I must be
allowed to express the fear that it may
prove a dangerous element in this class of
cases, unless the attention of juries is point-
edly called to the other questions which af-
fect it. Upon the whole, we are of opinion
the evidence referred to was properly receiv-
ed, and this specification is not sustained.
The judgment is reversed, and a venirc
facias de novo awarded.
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M~TTERS OF gJSTOH."Y, MAPS, LTFE TABLES, ETC. [Case No. 42 
car\\11\e tables as bearing upon tblS questton 
ue\lends ln a measure upon the wanner in 
wn\c\l they were made up. If based Upon 
~elected lives, that is to say, only upon lives 
whlch al'e insurable, they would be of value 
only for life-insurance purposes, and utterly 
useless to apply to unselected llves or lives 
generally. The evidence In this case is not 
very clear ae to the mode 1n which these ta· 
bles were composed. I have therefore con-
sulted the Encyclopredia Britannica, a very 
high authority, (volume 18, p. 169,) from 
which 1 extract the following: "The Cartlsle 
table was constructed by Mr. Joshua Milne 
from materials furnished by the labors of 
Doctor John Heycham. These materials 
comprised two enumerations of the popula-
tion of the parishes of St. Mary and St. 
Cuthbert, Carlisle, (England,) In 1780 and 
1787, (the nuruber of the former year having 
been 7,677, and 1n the latter 8,677,) and the 
abridged bills of mortality of those two par-
ishes for the nine years, 1779 to 1787, during 
which period the total number of deaths was 
1,840. These were very llmltecl data upon 
which to found a mortality table, but they 
were manipulated with great care and fidel-
ity. The close agreement of the Carlisle ta-
ble with other observations, especially Its 
agreement, In a general sense, with the expe-
rience of assurance companies, won for it a 
large degree of favor. No other mortality 
table bas been so exteneh·ely employed In 
the construction of auxiliary tables of all 
kinds for computing the value of benefits de-
pending upon human life. Besides those fur-
nished by Mr. Milne, elaborate and useful 
tables based upon the Carlisle data have 
been constructed by David .funes, W. T. 
Thomson, Christopher Sang, and others. 
The graduation of the Carlisle table ls, how-
ever, very faulty, and anomalous results ap-
pear In the death rate at certain ages." It 
appears, therefore, that the Carlisle table ls 
based upon general population, and not upon 
selected or insurable lives. In Shlppen's 
Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 391, it was held that the 
Carlisle table was not authoritative In deter-
mining the value ot a life-estate, and the 
common-law rule of one-third the capital 
sum was adopted as the measure of the llfe-
fnterest. It was said lo the opinion of the 
court: "As to the measure of the life estate 
of Slayton T. Platt, we may add that the 
Carlisle tables are not authoritative. They 
answer well their proper purpose, to ascer-
tain the average duration of life, so as to 
protect life Insurers against ultimate loss 
upon a large number of policies, and thereby 
to make a profit to the shareholders. But a1• 
Individual case depends on Its own clrcuru· 
stances, and the relative rights of the life 
tenant and the remainder-man are to be as-
certained accordingly. A consumptive or 
diseased man does not stand on the same 
plane as one of the same age In vlgoroul! 
health. Their expectations of life dllfer In 
point of fact." We can understand that In 
a contest between a lite-tenant and the re-
mainder-man the Carlisle tables would not 
serve as an authoritative guide. In such 
Instance the question must be decided upon 
Its own tacts. But In a case like the one In 
hand, where the expectation of life of the 
deceased was a question of fact for the jury, 
we are unable to see why the tables referred 
to were not competent evidence. Being In-
tended for general use, and based upon aver-
age results, they cannot be crindusive In a 
given case. That ls not the question here. 
It ls whether they are not some evidence, 
competent to be considered by a jury. Their 
value, where applled to a particular case, 
wlll depend very much upon other matters, 
such as the state of health of the person, his 
habits of life, his social surroundings, and 
other circumstances which might be men-
tioned. While we are unable to see bow 
such evidence ls to be excluded, I must be 
allowed to express the fear that It may 
prove a dangerous element In this class of 
cases, unless the attention of juries ls point-
edly called to the other questions which af-
fect It. Upon the whole, we are of opinion 
the evidence referred to was properly receiv-
ed, and this specification ls not sustained. 
The judgment le reversed, and a venlre 
faclas de novo awarded. 
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Case No. 43]
RELE VANCY.
KANSAS crrr, M. & B. R. co. v. SMITH.
(s South. 43, 90 Ala. 25.) '
June 11, 1890.
Appeal from city court of Birmingham;
H. A. Sharpe, Judge.
This action was brought to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained
by plaintiff on account of a wreck alleged
to have been caused by the negligence of
defendant. The complaint contained two
counts, on which issue was joined, viz..
the first and third In the first of these.
the plaintiff sought to recover for the al-
leged negligence of the defendant in using
in the train and transportation an old,
weak. and defective car, which by being
overloaded, gave way on a trestle and
caused the wreck. whereby the plaintiff
was injured; and in the third count the
plaintiff based his recovery upon the ai-
leged negligence of the defendant by rea-
son of defects in the condition of the
ways, works, and machinery used by the
defendant, whereby the accident occurred.
Issue was joined on these counts by the
defendant pleading the general issue, and
contributory negligence. Upon the trial,
as shown by the bill of exceptions. the
plaintiff introduced evidence tending to
show that the car which gave way, and
thereby caused the accident, was an old
car. and the timbers thereof were rotten,
and insecure; that it was loaded with
some kind of fertilizer or guano, and was
overloaded; and that, while on a trestle.
this car by reason of being old. rotten,
and insecure, and because of being over-
loaded, gave way, and fell through the
trestle, thereby causing the wreck wherein
the plaintiff was injured. The evidence
intro-luced by the defendant was in direct
conflict with the evidence of the plaintiff,
and tended to show that the cars used in
said train,itsmachinery,and its road-way
were in good condition. and that the said
car was not overloaded, and that the ac-
cident did not occur from any negligence
on its part. During the trial, after the
examination of Mary A. Hughes. a wit-
ness for the plaintiff, who testified that
she took a photograph ofthe wreck about
two hours after it occurred. and on being
shown the photograph testified that that
was the one, and that it was a correct
picture of the wreck and its surroundings,
the plaintiff offered to introduce the pho-
tograph in evidence. The defendant ob-
jected, but the court overruled its objec-
tion. allowed the photograph to be intro-
duced in evidence, and the defendant
thereupon duly excepted. During the ex-
amination of one Slaton, as a witness for
the plaintiff, he was asked, “How long,
how wide, and how thick is a sack of gua-
no that weighs from 167 to 200 pounds?”
The defendant objected to this question,
but the court overruled its objection, and
allowed the wiimss to answer against
the exception of the defendant as follows:
“A 200-pound sack is about 24 inches long,
about 18 inches wide, and, when it is
down, it is about 9 inches thick,l_ving
down as it lays in a car. " Before the trial
was entered into, the defendant demanded
a struck jury for the trial of this cause.
.\t the time this demand was made, there
Supreme Court of Alabama.
. facts to the
were only 23 regular jurors in attendance
upon the court. The court thereupon in-
structed the sheriff to “summon one R.
E. Seelye as such juror, and be was sworn
as such and placed upon the jury. ” Upon
being furnished with this list of jurors, as
thus completed, the defendant objected to
the list of jurors; but the court overruled
its objection, and the defendant duly ex-
cepted. There was judgment for plaintiff,
and defendant appeals.
Hewitt, ll’alker& Porter, for appellant.
Bowman & Harsh, for appellee.
sbm~:nv|LLa,.1. 1. Thephotograph of
the trcstle and of the wrecked train of
cars was shown to have been taken about
two hours after the accident occurred,and
was verified by the testimony of the pho-
tographer as being a correct representa-
tion of the locality and scene. It was
clearly admissible in evidence to aid the
jury in properly understanding the case.
It is a well-understood rule. applied in
every-day practice in the courts. that dia-
grams and maps illustrating the scene of
a transaction, and the relative location of
objects, if proved to be correct, are admis-
sible in evidence in order to enable the
jury to understand and apply the proved
particular case. 3 Brick. Dig.
p. 43l.§ 366. A plan, picture, or other repre-
sentation produced by the art of photog-
raphy. is admissible on like principles. if
verified as a true and accurate represen-
tation. lt is, in fact. but a scientific re-
production of a fac simile of the original
object in nature, by a mechanical art
which is every day advancing towards
perfection. 'l‘he competency of such evi-
dence was settled in Luke v. Calhoun
Co.. 52 Ala. 115, approving alike ruling
in the case of Udderzook v. Com., 76 Pa.
St. 340, where a photograph of a per-
son in~life. shown to be a correct picture,
was admitted in evidence for the purpose
of aiding in the identification of a de-
ceased person alleged to have been mur-
dered. The case of Ruloff v. People. 45 N.
Y. 213, supports the same principle. In
the case of Blair v. Pelham. 118 Mass. 420,
which was an action against a town to
recover damages for injuries caused by a
defect in a highway, the defendant was
permitted to put in evidence a photograph
of the place of the accident, on its verifica-
tion by the photographer as a true repre-
sentation. So in (‘hurch v. City of Mil-
waukee, 31 Wis. 512, an action for dam-
ages resulting to a lot-owner from a
change in the grade oi a street, a photo-
graph of the premises shown to be correct
was admitted “to aid the jury in arriving
at a clear and accurate idea of the situa-
tion of the premises, and enable them _to
better understand how they were affected
by the change in the grade." And Cozzcns
v. Higgins. 33 How. Pr. 436. decided by
the New York court of appeals, is to tho
same effect. In an action of trespass
against an adjoining proprietor, for tho
wrongful act of opening holes in the walla
of the plaintiff's cellar, so as to render it
untenable, by projecting into it heavy
beams. a “photographic view ” of theceliar
was admitted in evidence as “an appro-
priate aid to the jury in applying the evi-
dencc. ” The case of Dyson v. Railroad Co.,
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Case No. 43] RELEVANCY. 
KA'SSAS CITY, M. & B. R. CO. T. SMITH. 
(8 South. 43, 90 Ala. 25.) 
Supreme Court of Alabama. lune 11, 1890. 
Appenl from city court of Birmingham; 
H. A. Sharpe, Judge. 
ThlK action waA brought to recover 
damages for personal Injuries sustained 
by plalntlft on a<·connt of a wre<·k alleged 
to have been caused by the neKllareuce of 
defendant. The complaint contained two 
counts, on which l88ue was joined, vl1., 
the ftl"l!t and third In the ftl'Mt of tbe11e, 
the plaintiff sought to recover for the al-
Je~ed nPgllgence of the defendant In using 
In the train and tran11portatlon an old, 
weak, and defective car, which by being 
overlnuded, gave way on a tret1tle and 
caused the wreck, wherelJy the plaintiff 
wu Injured; and in the third count the 
plaintiff baRed hie recovery upon the al-
leged negligence of the defendant by rea-
son of def<>CtR In the condition of the 
ways, workH, and machinery used by the 
defendant, whereby the accident occurred. 
l88ue was joined on these counts by the 
defendant pleading the general lesue, and 
contributory negligence. Upon the trial, 
as shown by the blll of exceptions. the 
plaintiff Introduced evidence ten<llnK to 
Khow that the car which gave .vay, 11n1l 
thereby cnused the at.•cldent, was an old 
car. amt the tlmbt>ra thereof were rotten, 
and lnHecure; that It was loaded wltla 
1mme kind of ft!rtlllzer or guano, and was 
overlundl•d; and th11t, while on a trestle, 
this cur by reason of being old. rotte11, 
and lm1ecure, and bet•ttuee of being over-
loaded, ga\"e way, and fell through the 
tl"l'Stle, thereby causing the wreck whel'f'ln 
the plaintiff was Injured. The evidence 
lntro.luced by the defc>ndant was In direct 
conftkt with the evidence of the plaintiff, 
and tendetl to show that the cars URt>d In 
11ald trnln, Its machinery, and ltR road-way 
were in good condition. and thRt the Httld 
car W&R not overloaded, and that the ac-
cident did not occur from any nep:llgc>nce 
on its part. During the trial, niter the 
examlnutlon of Mary A. Hughes. a wlt-
neAS for the plalntlft, who testified that 
ijhe took a photograph orthewreck about 
two hours after It occurred. and on being 
shown the photograph teiJtlfted that that 
was the one, and that It was a correct 
picture of the wre<'k and ltH surroundings, 
the plaintiff offered to Introduce the pho-
tograph In evidence. The defenclllnt oh-jeeted, but the court overruled ltH objec-
tion, allowed the photograph to bl' Intro-
duced In e\"ldence, and the defendant 
thereupon duly excepted. During the ex-
amination of one Slaton, as a witness for 
the plaintiff, he was asked," How long, I 
how wide. and how thick le a Rack of gua-
no that welghR from 167 to 200 pounds?" 
The 1lefendant obje<-ted to this question, 
but the court o\•erruled Us obJeetlon, and 
allowed the wlt1101H to anRwer ngnlnst 
the e:i:ceptlon of the defentlant as follows: 
"A 2011-pound Huck 111 Hbout 24 lnchl'l1 long, 
about 18 lnl'bes wide, and, wh~n It le 
down, It le Rbout 9 lncheA thick, lying 
down as It lny11 In a car. " Bt'lore the trli1l 
was entered Into, the defendant dPmanded 
8 Strock jury for the trial Of thlH C8\11~e. 
. \t the time this demand was mude, there 
124 
were only 23 reeular Jurors In attendanre 
upon the court. The court thereupon In-
structed the eherlft to "summon one R 
E. ~eelye D8 such Juror, aml he was eworu 
as such and placed u11on the Jury." (Tpon 
being furnh1hed with thlR llRt of jurortc, as 
thus completed, the defcnduut objt'Cted to 
the lb.;t or Jurors; bot the court overruled 
Its objection, and the dP.fcndant duly ex-
cepted. 'l'here was Judgment for plalnttn, 
and defenaant appeals. 
HP.w/tt, Wnlkerct Porter, for appellant. 
Rn wmHu & llarsb, for apvellee. 
FlbMERVILLE,J. l. Tbephotogra1>bof 
the tr<'Mtle and or the wrecked train or 
carR was shown to have been taken ubout 
two hours 11fter the act'lde11t occurred, and 
was \'erlfted by the testimony of the 1>ho-
togro(1her &8 IJelng a correct representa-
tion of the localltJ and 11ctme. It wa1 
clearly admle11lble In evldt!nre to aid the jury In properly undenrtamllng the case. 
It la a well-understood rule, applied In 
every-day practice In the courts, thllt dia-
grams and maps Illustrating the scene of 
a tranRactlon, and the relative location of 
objet•ts, If proved to be correct, are admls-
11lhle In e\•ldence In ordP.r to enable the 
Jury to understand and llpply the proved 
. f1ll'tH to the particular case. 3 Hrlck. Dig. 
p. 431, § 366. A plan, picture. or other repre-
sentu tlon prodm·ed by the art of photog-
raphy, le admlsellJle on like principles. If 
verified as a true and arcurate represen-
tation. It Is, In fact, but a itelentlflc re-
production of a fac simile of the original 
object In nature, by ft mechanical nrt 
which Is every day advancing towor1la 
perfection. 'l'be competency of such evi-
dence was settled In Luke v. Calhoun 
Co., 62 Ala. 115, npprovlng a like ruling 
In the case of Uddersook v. Com., 76 Pa. 
St. 1\40. w)\t!re a photograph of a per-
son ln·ltfe. shown to be a corr.iet picture, 
was admitted In evidence for the purpose 
of al<llng In the ldentltkatlon of a de-
ceased person alleged to have been mur· 
dered. The caMe of Roloff v. People. 40 N. 
Y. 213, eu)lport.8 the same frlnclple. In 
the case of Blair v. Pelham. 18 :Maes. 4:.JO, 
which was an action against a town to 
recover damages for Injuries caused by a 
dtfect In a highway, the defendant waa 
p<>rmltted to put In evidence a photop:r1tpb 
of the place of the accident, on I°' verifica-
tion by the photographer as a true repl't'-
eenta tlon. So In Church v. City of Mii-
waukee, 81 WIR. 1>12, an action for dam-
agf'B resulting to a lot-owner from a 
clmnge In tbe grade or a 11treet, a photo-
gruph of the prPmlees shown to be correct 
w&11 admitted "to aid the jury In 11rrlvlng 
at a clear 11nd accurate Idea of the situa-
tion of the premises, and enable them ,to 
better understand how they were affcctecl 
by the chan11:e In the grade." And Cozz1>11e 
v. Hlg~lnR. 33 How. Pr. 436. decided l1y 
the :Sew York court of appeals, le to tlio 
same effect. In an action of trespaHS 
agnlnRt an adjoining proprietor, for tho 
wrongful act of opening holes In the wttlli 
of the plaintiff's cellar, so as to render at 
untPnllhle, by projecting Into It hetl\'.f' 
beams, a" photographic view" ofther.ellur 
was admitted In evidence aa "nn appro-
priate aid to the Jury In applying the evl• 
deuce." The case of Dy1ion v. Uallroad Co .. 
-Hr
NIATTERS or HI” ORY. burs, LIFE TABLES, E'l‘C. [Case No. 43
5,1Co!\“- 10- 17 Atl. Rep. 13?. is arlQfl'e" ‘111-
thoriw directly in point, wlicrc. in an 30-
mm ior dainagos agailist a railrfltl ¢("'_l-
pamy, a photographic view of tho I00"-\'_1n
qua oi the accident was held to be adn_ng.
sihie in evidence. The same ruling [)l‘€1.‘l:'~t¥-
- ly was made in the case oi Archer v. Rail-
road 00.. 13 N. E. Rep. 318, (decided in
133'l,by the New York court of appeals.)
We entertain no doubt as to the sound-
ness oi these rulings, and they iully sup-
port the action oi the court in admitting
in evidence the photograph oi the wrecked
train and surroundinglocaiity in this case.
1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed.) §676; Eborn v. Zim-_
pelman, 26 Amcr. Rep. 319-321. note; Mar-
cy v. Barnes, 16 Gray, 161; Locke v Rail-
road (,‘0., 46 Iowa. 109.
2, 3. The question propounded to the
witness Slaton, and his answer to it,
tended to throw some light on the plain-
tiffs contention that the car containing
the fertilizer was too heavily loaded;
which was one oi the grounds 0! negli-
gence imputed to the defendant as the
proximate cause oi’ the injury suffered by
the plaintiff. This evidence was therefore
relevant. and its admission iree from er-
ror. The objection interposed. moreover,
was general and undefined. failing to par-
ticuiarize any specified ground, and for
this reason there was no error in dime
garding it. Dryer v. Lewis, 57 Ala. 551;
3 Brick. Dig. p. 443, § 567.
4. The evidence tended to sustain the
allegations of each oi the counts in the
complaint (the first and the third) upon
which the merits oi the case were tried be-
iore the jury. And, under the circumstan-
ces, we are oi opinion that the questions
oi negligence by the defendant, and oi’
contrilmtory negligence by the plaintifl,
were both properly left to the jury Rail-
road C0. v. Perry, S7 Ala. 392, 6 South.
Rep. 40. The objection take to the panel
oi jurors was clearly without merit. We
discover no error in the record, and the
judgment must be aifirmed.
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MATTERS 01!' urSTOay, MAPS, UFE TABLES, ETC. [Case No. 48 
~1conn.10. 17 Atl. Rep.13i, IB anotlier nu. 
tMrltY directly tu point, whcr('. In an ac. 
t\on tor da1nagt•B a11:alnst a railroad cum. 
11any. a pbotop:raphic view of thA Jocux 1a 
11uo ot the &C"chlent was held to he admis-
11\b\e In eviueqcu. 'l'he sume rullug preciioo-
ly was made In the case of Archer v. RalJ-
road Co., 13 N. E. Hep. 318, (decided In 
1887, by the New York court of appeals.) 
We entertain no doubt as to the sound· 
nees ol tbetie rulluge, and they fully sup-
port the action or the court In admitting 
tn evidence the photograph of the wrecked 
train and surrounding localt ty In this caee. 
1 Wbart. Ev. (8<1 Ed.)§ ll76; }<;born v. Zhn-. 
pelman, 26 Amer. Rep. 819-321, note; Mar-
cy v. Barnes, 16 Gray, 161 ; Locke v Rail-
road Co., 46 Iowa, 109. 
2, 8. The question propounded to the 
wltn('SR Slaton, and hie answer to It, 
t~mle<I to throw some Ugbt on the plaln-
tltf's contention that the car contulnlug 
the fertilizer was too bea vlJy loaded; 
which waB one of the crounds of n~ll-
genre Imputed to the defendant as the 
pro.1m1ate cause of the Injury suffered by 
the J1lulntln. This evldenc~e was therefore 
relevunt, and Its admlHslon free from er-
ror. The objection Interposed, moreol"er, 
was p;eneru.l and undetioed, falling to Jlar-
tlcularlze any specified ground, and for 
this ret1eon there was no error In dl~re­
gardlng It. Dryer v. Lewie, 57 Ala.. 551; 
8 Brick. Dig. p. 448, § 567. 
4. The evidence tended to sustain th9 
allearatlons of each of the counts tn the 
complaint (the ftntt and the third) upon 
which the merltB of the case ware tried be-
fore the Jory. And, under the circumstan-
ces, we am of opinion that the questlous 
of negligence by the defendant, and of 
contributory negligence by the plaintiff, 
were both properly left to the jury Rail-
road Co. v. Perry, 87 Ala. 892, 6 South. 
Rep. 40. The objection take to the panel 
of Jurors was clearly without merit. We 
dlsrover no error In the record, and the 
Judgment must be amrmed. 
l2r> 
Case No. 44]
RELEVAN CY.
GLENN v. ORR.
(2 S. E. 538, 96 N. O. 413.)
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
1887.
Appeal from superior court, Mecklenburgh
county.
Action by John Glenn, trustee of the Na-
tional Express & Transportation Company,
against M. M. Orr, alleged to be shareholder
of said company, to recover the sum of $300,
being the amount of a call or assessment
upon the stock held by the defendant. The
court having refused to admit the evidence
referred to in the opinion, the plaintiff suffer-
ed a nonsuit and appealed.
D. G. Fowle, A. Jones, and W. Fleming,
for plaintifl. W. P. Bynum, for defendant.
May 27,
MERRIMON, J. It became material on
the trial to prove the organization of the
National Express & Transportation Compa-
ny, and the appellant offered in evidence,
for this and other purposes, “the records,
books, and minutes" of that company, em-
bracing what purported to be the proceed-
ings in the organization of it under and in
pursuance of its charter. The appellee ob-
jecting, the court held that these records
were not evidence for such purpose. and the
appellant assigns this ruling as error. It
likewise became material to prove that the
appellee was a subscriber for 10 shares of
the capital stock of the company named,
charged and credited to his account as a
stockholder thereof, and the appellant oi.’-
fered in evidence for this purpose the same
records, which purported to show that the
nppellee did subscribe and was a subscriber
for the number of shares of stock mentioned;
that he had paid $50 on account of the same,
and the balance of the money due therefor
had not been paid; and that he was a stock-
holder of the company. The appellee ob-
jecting, the court declined to allow the rec-
ords so offered to be put in evidence for such
purpose, and the appellant assigns this re-
jection of the records as error. In view of
these adverse rulings, the appellant suffered
a judgment of nonsuit, and appealed to this
court.
It was admitted on the trial that the books
and records offered in evidence were those
of the National Express & Transportation
Company, and it must be taken, from such
admission, as there is no suggestion to the
contrary, that the proceedings entered in
them, and the orders and statements therein
made, are regular, and made by the proper
clerk, secretary, or agent of the company,
or some person autliorized to make them.
It must so appear bei’ore such records and
books can be received as evidence for any
purpose. The records and books, thus iden-
tltied, were evidence—certainly prima facie
evidence—of the organization and existence
of the company. They purport to set forth
the proceedings of the organization, a list
of the names of the stockholders, the num-
ber of shares of stock owned by each, when
he subscribed for the same, the sum of mon-
ey paid by each for his stock, and the sums
due therefor remaining unpaid, and an ac-
count of its business transactions.
In Turnpike C0. v. McCarson, 1 Dev. &
B. 306. Chief Justice Ruflin said: “The
case does not state the contents of the sub-
scription and corporation books that were
produced, and therefore we cannot say pos-
itively of what they were evidence. We
suppose them to be entries of such acts as
the charter prescribes, as no deviation is
specified. If so, these documents. when iden-
tified, were not only evidence, but complete
evidence, of the organization and existence
of the corporation." The rule is so stated
in Angeli & Ames on Corporations, §§ 513,
514, 679; and so, also, Turnpike Co. v. Mc-
Kean, 10 Johns. 154; Grays v. Turnpike C-0.,
4 Rand. (Va.) 578; Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat.
420.
The books of the corporation offered in evi-
dence. including the stock book, purported
to contain, as we have seen. a list of all its
stockholders, the number of shares of stock
owned by each, the sum of money paid. and
the balance still due from each on account
of his stock; and the name of the appellee
appears as a stockholder, and his account is
stated showing a balance due from him for
his stock. These books were competent evi-
dence to prove that the appellee was a stock-
holder, and the state of his account as such
in respect to his stock. It was so decided in
the very similar case of Turnbull v. Payson,
95 U. S. 418, in which the court say: “Where
thenameof an lndividualappears in the stock
book of a corporation as a stockholder, the
prima facie presumption is that he isthe own-
er of the stock in a case where thereis nothing
to rebut that presumption; and, in an action
against him as stockholder, the burden of
proving that he is not a stockholder, or of
rebutting that presumption, is cast upon the
defendant." Hamilton Plank-Road Co. v.
Rice, 7 Barb. 157; Coflin v. Collins, 17 Me.
440; Whitman v. Granite Church, 24 Me.
236; Wood v. Railroad, 32 Ga. 273; Hoag-
land v. Bell, 36 Barb. 57; Mor. Corp. 5 270.
The rule of evidence underlying this and sim-
ilar decisions seems to he founded in con-
venience, and to rest upon the further ground
that corporations in this country are the
creatures of statute, with prescribed rights
and powers, subject, to an important extent,
to public control and supervision, and are
therefore to exercise their powers as allow-
ed and required by law, and to keep their
records accordingly and truly. Such pre-
sumption may, of course, be rebutted by any
competent evidence. This rule might, in pos-
sible cases, work injury to :1 party, but this
is not probable, and, thus objected to, it has
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Cue No. 44] BXLEVANCY. 
GLENN T. ORR. 
(2 S. E. 538, 96 N. 0. 413.) 
Supreme Oourt of North Carolina. May 27, 
1887. 
Appeal from superior court, Mecklenburgh 
('OUDty. 
Action by John Glenn, trustee ot the Na-
tional Express & Transportation Company, 
against M. M. Orr, alleged to be shareholder 
of said company, to recover the sum of '30(), 
being the amount of a call or assessment 
upon the stock held by the defendant. The 
court having refused to admit the evidence 
referred to In the opinion, the plaintiff suffer-
ed a nonsuit and appealed. 
D. G. Fowle, A. Jones, and W. Fleming, 
tor plalntur. W. P. Bynum, for defendant. 
MERRIMON, J. It became material on 
the trial to prove the organization of the 
National Expre88 & Transportation Compa-
ny, and the appellant offered In evidence, 
for this and other purposes, "the records, 
books, and minutes·• of that company, em-
bracing what purported to be the proceed-
ings lD the organization of It under and In 
pursuance of Its charter. The appellee ob-
jecting, the court held that these records 
were not evidence tor such purpose, and the 
a11pellant assigns this ruling as error. It 
likewise became material to prove that the 
11.11pellee was a subscriber for 10 shares of 
tbe <'t1pltal stock of the company named, 
charged and credited to hie account as a 
stockholder thereof, and the appellant of-
fered In evidence for this purpose the same 
records, which purported to show that the 
appt>llee did subscribe and was a 1mbscrlber 
for the number of shares of stock mentioned; 
that be had paid $50 on account of the same, 
and the balance of the money due therefor 
had not been paid; and that he was a stock-
holder of the company. The appellee ob-
jecting, the court de<'llned to allow the rec-
ords so ofT'ered to be put In evidence for such 
purpose, and the appellant assigns this re-
jection of the records as error. In view of 
these adverse ndlngs, the appellant suffered 
a judgment of nonsuit, and appealed to this 
court. 
It was admitted on the trial that the books 
and records offered In evidence were those 
of the National Express & Transportation 
Company, and It must be taken, from such 
admission, as there Is no suggestion to the 
contrary, that the proceedings entered In 
them, and the orders and statements therein 
made, are regular, and made by the proper 
clerk, secretary, or agent of the company, 
or some per1mn authorlzt>d to make them. 
It mm1t so 111111ear before such records and 
books can be received as evidence for any 
purpose. The records and books, thus Iden-
tified, were evldence-<'ertalnly prlma facle 
evldenc~f the organization and existence 
126 
of the company. They purport to set forth 
the proceedings of the organization, a list 
of the names of the stockholders, the num-
ber of shares of stock owned by each, when 
be subscribed for the same, the sum of mon-
ey paid by each for hie stock, and the BUIDB 
due therefor remaining unpaid, and an ac-
count of Its business transactions. 
In Turnpike Co. v. Mccarson, 1 Dev. & 
B. 806, Chief Justice Rutftn eald: ''The 
case does not state the contents of the sub-
scription and corporation books that were 
produced, and therefore we cannot say pos-
itively ot what they were evidence. We 
suppose them to be entries of such acts as 
the charter prescribes, as no deviation ls 
specified. If so, these documents, when Iden-
tified, were not only evidence, but complete 
evidence, of the organization and existence 
of the corporation." The rule le so stated 
In Angell & A.mes on Corporations, ff 513, 
514, 679; and so, also, Turnpike Co. v. :Me-
l Kean, 10 Johns. 154; Grays v. Turnpike Oo., 4 Rand. (Va.) 578; Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 
1
420. 
The books of the corporation offered lD evi-
dence, lndudlng the stock book, purported 
to contain, as we have seen, a list of all Its 
stockholders, the number of shares of stock 
owned by each, the enm of money paid, and 
the balance still due from each on account 
of his stock; and the name of the appellee 
appears as a stockholder, and his account ls 
stated showing a balance due from him for 
hie stock. These books were competent evi-
dence to prove that the appellee was a stock-
holder, and the state of his account as such 
In respect to hie stock. It was so decided In 
the very elmllar case of Turnbull v. Payson, 
95 U. S. 418, In which the court say: "Where 
the name of an lndlvldualappears In the stock 
book of a corporation as a stockholder, the 
prlma facle presumption le that he le the own-
er of the stock In a ell.Se where there Is nothing 
to rebut that presumption; and, In an action 
against him as stockholder, the burden of 
proving that he Is not a stockholder, or of 
rebutting that presumption, Is cast upon the 
defendant." Hamilton Plank-Road Co. v. 
Rice, 7 Barb. 157; Cotftn v. Collins, 17 Me. 
44-0; Whitman v. Granite Church, 24 Me. 
236; Wood v. Rallroad, 32 Ga. 273; Hoag-
land v. Bell, 36 Barb. 57; Mor. Corp. § 270. 
The rule of evidence underlying this and sim-
ilar decisions seems to be founded In con-
venience, and to rest upon the further ground 
that corporations In this country are the 
creatures of statute, with prescribed rights 
and powers, subject, to an Important extent, 
to public control and supervision, and are 
therefore to exercise their powers as allow-
ed and required by law, and to keep their 
records accorcllngly and truly. Such pre-
sumption may, of course, be rebutted by any 
competent evidence. This rule might, In pos-
sible cases, work Injury to a party, but thli;i 
Is not probable, and, thus objected to, lt has 
c0BP°RA'r10N BOOKS. [Case No. 44
me i695 We\8ht. as generally ever? lmgllllt There is error, and the appellant is enti-
mg the light to testify in his owll behalf. tled to have a new trial. To that end let this
Tumpme C0. v. McKean, supra; OW11188 V. opinion be certified to the superior court ac-
Speed, 9\1Pra.. cording to law. It is so ordered.
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coB11°a..a.T10N BOOKS. [C11se No. 44 
t\\t \e88 weight. as generally everY litigant 
\la.a the Tight to testify 1n bis own behalf. 
-rurnp\k.e Co. v. McKean, supra; Owings v. 
s-peed, aupra. 
There Is error, and the appellant is enti-
tled to have a new trial. To that end let this 
opinion be certified to the superior court ac-
cording to law. It ls so ordered. 
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Case No. 4-5]
RELEVAN CY.
HOVVARD v. GLENN.
(11 S. E. 610.)
Supreme Court of Georgia. April 21, 1890.
Error from superior court, Richmond
county; Ro.\'Ev, Judge.
F. H. Miller, for plaintiff in error. Cal-
houn. King 4': Spulrllng, and C‘. H. Cohen,
for defendant in error.
BLANl)F()BD,J. Attheappearanceterm
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the plaintiffs declaration on the ground
that he failed to annex a copy of the writ-
ten terms of subscription, and copies of
the proceedings referred to in his declara-
tion, with a copy oi the call for the en-
forcement of which this action was
brought. Subject to this motion, defend-
ant pleaded: (1) That the National Ex-
press & Transportation Company was not
on the 14th day of l)ecember, L880, a body
politic and corporate, as alleged in the
plaintiffs declaration; (2) that the plain-
tiff is not a legally appointed trustee, and
authorized to institute this action by vir-
tue oi his appointment; (3) that, if the de-
fendant ever subscribed to stock, it was
to the National Express Company, whose
charter was amended without the knowl-
edge or sanction oi this defendant, (4. 5,
6) the statute oi limitations. When this
case came on to be tried, the court ordered
these pleas stricken, and overruled the
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs declara-
tlon.
1. In our opinion. the plaintiffs declara-
tion set iorth a. cause of action against the
defendant. The declaration substantially
alleged that Howard was a subscriber to
the National Express & Transportation
Company for ‘l5 shares of its capital stock,
amounting to the sum of $1,500; that this
company, having become insolvent, made
an assignment to certain persons as trus-
tees: that certain creditors of this com-
pany fllcd a bill in the city court of Rich-
mond, upon which there was a decree ren-
dered, praying that the defendant in error,
Glenn, should be appointed a trustee with
authority to sue and collect from the cor-
porators oi the National Express&Trans-
portation Company a certain assessment
and call made upon them by the decree of
that court. The. officers or persons r;\pre-
scnting the National Express & Transpor-
tation Company were made parties defend-
ant to that bill. We think,so far as How-
ard had anyinterest in thiscompany, that
he was represented by the corporation in
that case, and that he was bound by the
decree rendered in the same. (it being ren-
dered by a court oi competent jurisdic-
tion.) notwithstanding that Howard may
at the time have been a citizen of Georgia,
and may not have been served with any
process in that case. So we think the
court did right to overrule the demurrer
of defendant to the plaintiffs declaration.
We think, also, that the pleas first. sec-
ond, and third and fourth, fifth, and sixth
were properly dismissed on demurrer by
the court. We think that Glenn was duly
appointed a trustee, and as such had a
right to bring this suit; and that ii the
defendant subscribed to stock in the Na-
tional Express Company, although the
charter may have been amended without
his knowledge or auction, so as to make
it the National Express & 'i‘rausport.ation
Company. this did not relieve the defend-
ant from any liability to pay up his un-
paid stock, this not being such a material
alteration oi the charter as would relieve
the defendant, Howard; and this court
held in 81 Ga. 393, 8 S. E. Rep. 636. in this
same case, that the statute of limitations
did not apply to the same.
_ 2. We think there was no error of the
court in holding that the first plea of the
defendant in this case was insufficient, in
that it alleged that the action brought by
the plaintiff did notset forth the outstand-
ing creditors for whose benefit the same
was instituted, the decree of the court in
Virginia having set forth such creditors;
and we hold that that decree was binding
on the defendant, Howard, as to all mat-
ters therein con tained. if he was a cor-
porator in the National Express & Trans-
portation Company.
3. it is alleged as error that the court
erred in striking the second plea of de-
fendant: that the decree of the chancery
court of the city of Richmond of December
14, 1880, set forth in the petition, was not
such a. contract of record as was binding
upon him personally for any purpose, in
that the court was without jurisdiction
over him as a. resident citizen of the estate
of Georgia, who was never served with
process therein, who never appeared, or
had notice thereof, until the institution of
this suit. We think that when the corpora-
tion was sued at the instance of creditors,
and was duly served. Howard was bound
as acorporator by any proceedings in that
case, and there was no error in striking
the second plea.
4. We think thethird plea was also prop-
erly stricken by the court, inasmuch as we
think that whatever fraud may have been
committed by the corporation would not
operate to defeat an action by the cred-
itorspf the corporutiomhowever it might
be as between the corporation and a cor-
porator. Persons who gave credit to this
zorporation would not be bound by any
fraud between the corporation and the
corporators. As between the corporation
and a corporator, such defense may or
may not have been good; but, as between
a trust-ee appointed by a court to bring
suit and collect the unpaid subscriptions
of a. corporator, no such defense could be
made.
5. We think the fourth plea was prop-
erly stricken on demurrer. in this: that
while it alleged the decree of the court in
this case in Virginia, to the effect that if
the stockholders should pay a certain per
cent. upon their subscriptions within a
certain time, this would be sufficient to
pay off the indebtedness of the company.
the pica did not allege that there was any
tender or offer on the part of defendant to
pay under that decree, within the time
therein prescribed, the amount prescribed
to be paid. To avail himself of that de-
cree, the defendant shouid have paid, or
have offered to pay, the amount specified
in the decree. No such allegation appears
in this plea, and therefore it was properly
stricken.
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Case No. !5] RELEVANCY. 
HOW ARD v. GLENN. 
(11 S. E. 610.) 
Supreme Court of Georgia. April 21, 1890. 
Error from euperior court, Richmond 
county; RoxEY, .Judge. 
F. H. Miller, for plalntlft In error. Ca.1-
houn. K/111( & SJ1aldlng, and C. B. Goben, 
for defendant in error. 
BLANDFORD,J. Attheappearanceterm 
the defendRn l ftled n motion to cllsmlss 
the plalntlff't1 declaration on the ground 
that he failed to annex a copy of the writ-
ten t.erms of subscription, and copies of 
the proceedings referred to In bis declara-
tion, with a copy of the call for the en-
forcement of which this action was 
brought. Subject to this motion, dP.fend-
ant pll'aded: (1) Tbttt the National Ex-
iJree8 & Transportation Company wtts not 
on the 14th day of December, l~O. a body 
politic and corporate, as alleged In the 
platntlft'at declaration; (2) that the plaln-
tlft Is not a legally appointed trustee, and 
authorized to tm1tltute this action by vir-
tue of bis Appointment; (8) that, If the de-
fendant ever subscribed to stock, it was 
to the National Express Company, whose 
charter was amended without the kuowl-
edge or sanction of this defendant, ( 4. 5, 
6) the statute of limitations. When this 
case came on to be tried, the court ordered 
these pleas stricken, and overruled the 
motion to dismiss the plaintiff's declu.ra-
tlon. 
1. In our opinion. the plaintiff's declara-
tion set forth a cause of action agatnstthe 
defendant. The declaration substirntla.lly 
ulleged tl\at Howard was a subscriber to 
the National Expl't'88 & Trans1Jortatlon 
Company for 15 shares of Its capital stot'k, 
amonutlug to the sum of fl,500; that this 
company, having be<.'ome tut1olvent, ma.de 
an assignment to certain persons as trus-
tees: that certain creditors of this com-
pany ftk-d a btll In the city court of Rich-
mond, upon which there waR a. decree ren-
dered, praying that the defendant In error, 
Glenn, Mhould be appointed a tru11tee with 
authority to sue and collect from the cor-
pora tol'll of the Na.ttona.l Express& Trans-
portation Company a certain asHe11sment 
and call made upon them by the lle<.'ree of 
that court. 'fhe olftcers or perHone r.r'pre-
sentlng the National ExprPss & Transpor-
tation Com1Jnny were 1111:1rle parties defend-
ant to that blll. We think, so far as How-
ard had anyloterest In this company, that 
he was represented by the corporation In 
that case, and that be WM bound by the 
decree rendered In the same, (It being ren-
dered by a court of competent jurlatdlc-
tlon,) notwithstanding that Howard mfty 
at the time have been a citizen of Geora-la, 
and may not ba.\"e buen served with RllY 
procesR In that case. So we think the 
<.'ourt did right to overrule the demurrer 
of defendant to the plaintiff's declnratlou. 
We think, also, thut the pleas ft~t. sec-
ond, and third and fourth, fifth, and sixth 
were JJroperly dismissed on demurrer by 
the court. We think that Glenn was duly 
appointed a trustee, and as such bad a 
right to briI1g this Rutt; and that 1f the 
defendant eub11ertbed to stock in the Na-
tional Express Company, although the 
128 
charter may bu·e been amended without 
his knowledge or sanction, so as to mak& 
It the National Express 4: 'fransportatlon. 
Company, this did not relieve the defend-
ant from any ltabutty to pay up bis un-
paid stock, this not being such a material 
alteration of the charter as would relle\"& 
the defendant, Howard; and this court 
held In 81 Ga. SM, 8 S. E. Rep. 636. In this 
same case, that the statute of Umltattoua 
did not apply to the same. 
2. We think there was no error of th& 
court In holding that the ftrst plea of the 
defendant In this case was lnsufftctent, In 
that it alleged that the action brought by 
the J.llalntlft did notset forth the outstand-
ing creditors for whose benefit the earn& 
was Instituted, the decree of the court In 
Vlrglnlft having set forth such cMltnrs; 
and we bold that that decree was binding 
on the defendant, Howard, a.a to all mat-
ters therein contained. If be was a cor-
porator In the National Express 4: Trantf-
portution Company. 
8. lt Is allt-ged as error that the court 
erred In strtklng the second plea of de-
fendant; that the decree of the chancery 
court of the city of Rlcbmnn1l of De<.-ember 
14, 18k0, set forth lo the petition, was not 
such a contract of record as was binding 
upon him personally for any purpl•Se, In 
that the court was without jurisdiction 
over him as a resident citizen of the estate 
of Georgia, who was never served with 
process thereto, who never a11peared, or 
bad notice thereof, until the Institution of 
this suit. We think that w heu the corpora-
tion was sued at the Instance of creditors, 
and was duly served. Howard was bound 
as acorporutor by any procl'C()lngs to that 
case, and there was no error in strlkln1t 
the second plea. 
4. We think tbethtrd plea was also prop-
erly stricken by the court, hrnsmncb as we 
think that whatever fraud way have been 
committed by the corporation wonld not 
operate to defeat an action by the cred-
ltors4>f the corporutlon, however It might 
be as between the corporation and a cor-
pora.tor. Persons who gave credit to this 
::iorpora tlon would not be bound by any 
fraud between the corporation and the 
corpora tors. As between the corporation 
and a corporator, such defense may or 
may not have been good ; but, SM between 
a trustee appointed by a court to bring 
snit and collect the uupalll subscrtptlom1 
of a corpora tor, n<> su<.'b defem1e could be 
made. 
5. We think the fourth plea was prop-
erly stricken on demurre.r, In this: that 
while It alleged the decree of the court In 
thl!l calil9 In Virginia, to the effect that If 
the stockholders should pfty a certain per 
cent. upon their subscriptions within a 
certain time, tbts would be sufftctent to 
pay off the tndehtednff!R of the c<>mpany, 
the plea did not allege that there wae any 
tender or offer on the part of dPlendant to 
pay under that decree, within the tlml' 
therein prescribed, the amount pn>Scrtbed 
to be paid. To a vatl himself or that de-
cree, the defendant should have paid, or 
have offered to pay, the amount specified 
In the decree. No such allegation appearat 
In this plea, and therefore it waa properly 
stricken. 
CORPORATION BOOKS.
[Case No. 45
s. it ‘F1 <=Om Dlained um the coil‘; tiifred
in striking the fifth plea,or s_o muc V Ere-
cl as alleged that the subscription ‘I 3-5 in-
duced by fraud, and is void for false and
iraudulent representations made, and for
the fraudulent suppression of material
facts concerning said company. the court
allowing the words to stand in said plea;
that defendant at no time became a
subscriber to the National Express &
Transportation Company; that he did
sign a paper subscribing to the National
Express Company for 15 shares of the cap-
ital stock. Whether Howard became a
stockholder in this company by subscrip-
tion which was induced byfraud practiced
upon him or not, if he did become a stock-
holder in said company, he is liable to the
creditors of the company for so much of
his unpaid stock as might be necessary to
pay the company’s debts.taken in connec-
tion with the other corporators of the
company; and whether fraud was prac-
ticed upon him or not would make no dif-
ference as to the creditors. It would be a.
question between him and the corporation.
with which the creditors had nothing
to do. So we think the court committed
no error in striking that portion of the
fifth plea complained of. We think the
sixth plea was properly stricken. for the
reasons stated in justification of the court
in striking a portion of the fifth plea.
7. In the seventh plea, which was also
stricken by the court, it is alleged that the
plaintiff had settled with and released
frpm liability several stockholders under
said decree, and defendant contends that
this is equivalent to a release of himself.
We think the court properly struck this
plea. The defendant ls bound to the cred-
itors upon his subscription to the capital
stock of this company. and whether other
stockholders were released or not is a
matter with which he has no concern. un-
less this action on the part of the creditors
or their agent increased his liability.
8. For the same reason we think the
court was right in striking the eighth plea,
which is complained of, and also the ninth
plea. When the plaintiff below showed
that he had been duly appointed a trustee
by a court having competent jurisdic-
tion. to recover of the stockholders of this
company their unpaid subscriptions, for
the purpose of paying off the credit-ors of
the corporation. and when the plaintiff
showed that defendant was u stockholder
and had subscribed so many shares to the
capital stock of this company. and that
the court had made an asscssinent upon
the stockholders for a certain per cent. up-
on the stock subscribed. and authorized
him to sue and collect the same, we think
he made out a case which entitled him to
recover, notwithstanding any fraud which
might havebeen practiced upon the stock-
holder to procure his subscription to the
capital stock of this company by the cor-
poration or its agents. Fraud thus prac-
ticed upon the subscriber was a matter
which did not affect the creditors of the
corporation. The great question in this
case is whether the defendant, Howard,
\\'ho is now the plaintiff in error, was a
corporator and a subscriber to the capital
stock of this company. He admits by his
wn.ous,r.v.—-9
plea that he did subscribe to 15 shares of
the capital stock of the National Express
Company; and it was shown by the evi-
dence introduced by the plaintiff in the
court below that the National Express
Company and the National Express &
Transportation Company were ono and
the same. A mere change in the name of
a corporation we do not think makes any
material difference; clearly not such a dif-
ference as would relieve a subscriber from
liability to pay for stock subscribed by
him.
9. It is insisted that the court erred in
allowing the books of the corporation to
be put in evidence for the purpose of show-
ing that the defendant did subscribe to 15
shares of stock, and to show, also. certain
other things therein contained. When it
was shown that the defendant was a
stockholder in the company. then the
books of the company were admissible in
evidence against him. But, when this fact
is not shown, we are of the opinion that
the books of the company would not be
admissible in evidence against him. In
this case, however, it was admitted by
the plaintiff in error that he did sub-
scribe to so many shares of stock in the Na-
tional Express Company; so, when it was
proven that the National Express Company
and the National Express & Transporta-
tion Company were one and the same cor-
poration, we think the books were ad-
missible in evidence, not only to show
that Howard was a. stockholder, the num-
ber of shares and the value thereof he sub-
scribed for, but to show any other trans-
action that had taken place between him
and this company. We are aware that it
has been held that the books of a corpora.-
tion are admissible to show prima facie
that the defendant was a subscriber to
the stock of the company, and was a
stockholder therein; but while we do not
think this ruling is correct, upon any rea-
son or principle known to us, yet, under
the facts of this case. we think the books
were properly admitted in evidence. We
know of no decision, however, which
shows upon principle that such books are
anlmissible without some special circum-
stance. We do not think that the case of
Turnbull v. Payson. 95 U. S. ~'ll8,—a decis-
ion by Ju(lg,e_C1.11-‘Fonn to the effect that
the books of a corporation are admissible
in evidence to show that a person is a
stockbolder,—is correct. No reason is as-
signeml in that decision, and none has been
a:-signed in any decision which we have
been able to find in either North Carolina
or Alabama. But we think, under the
facts of this case. where the defendant ad-
mitted that he was a subscriber to the
stock of the National Express (iompuny,
and where it was shown that the Nntiozal
Express Company and the Nntioxial Ex-
press & Transportation Company were
one and the same thing, that the books
were properly admitted. We think, fur-
ti1ermore,thnt when the subscription list
was tendered, and admitted in evidence
by the court below, the plaintiff in error
luul a right to show that he did not
subscribe to this list. and therefore think
the court committed error in refusing to
allow him to make such proof; yet we
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C()llPOB.4TlON BOOKS. [Case No. '5 
g lt ll!I complained that the court erl'ed 
\n ~tr\ldng the ttfth plea, orso m ucb there-
ot aa alleged that the eubeerlptlon wa.e in-
duced by Ira ud. and is void for f pleed and 
ttaudu\ent l"epresentatlone made, an for 
the fraudulent suppression of material 
facts concerniug said company, the court 
allowing the words to stand In said plea; 
that defendant at no time became o. 
subl!crlber to the National Express & 
Transportation Company; that be dtd 
sign a paper eubeeriblnit tu the National 
·Expl'el!s Company for 15 ehareM of the cap-
ital stock. Whether Howard became a 
stockholder In thle company by 11ubecrlp-
tlon whlcb was Induced by fraud practiced 
upon blm or not, If he did become a stock-
holder ln said company, he le ltable to the 
cmlitore of the company for so much of 
bis unpaid stock as might be nPCeSBary to 
pay the company's debts. taken In connec-
tion with the other corporatore of the 
company; and whether fraud was prac-
ticed upon him or not would make no dif-
ference as to the credltorB. It would be a 
quPBtlon between him and the corporation, 
with which the credltol'B had nothing 
to do. So we think the court committed 
no error In striking that portion of t.be 
tilth plea complained of. We think thA 
Rlxtll plea was properly stricken. for the 
l'e88ons stilted In justlftcatton of the court 
lo etrlklug a portion of the fttth plea. 
7. In the seventh plea, which was also 
stricken by the court, It le alleged that the 
plalntlft had settled with and relewiell 
trvm liablllty several Btockholllere under 
said decree, and defendant contends that 
this ts equivalent to a release of himself. 
We think the court properly struck this 
plea. The defendant le hound to tlle Cl'fld· 
!tore upon his subscription to the capital 
stock of this company. and whether other 
etockbolderB were released or not Is a 
matter with which he has no concern, un-
leee this aettonon the part of thecredlton 
or their agent lncreued his liability. 
8. For the same reason we think the 
court \Vas right In striking the eighth plea, 
which ls complained of, and also the ninth 
plea. When the platntlft below showed 
that he had been duly appointed a trustee 
by a court having competent jurisdic-
tion. to recover of the stockholders of this 
company their unpaid suhHcrlptlons, for 
the purpose of paying oft the credltol'B of 
the cor1mratloo, and when the plalntlft 
showed that deft>nclant was n Htockllolder 
and had eubsrrlhed so many shRreH to the 
capital stock of tills company. and thut 
the court had made an l\SKl'KHmeot upon 
the etockholdel'B for a certain per cent. up-
on the stock subscribed, and authorized 
him to sue and cullect the same, we think 
be made out a case which t:>ntltled him to 
rerover,notwlthetandlng any fraud which 
might have been practiced upon the stock-
h~der to procure hie subscription to the 
capital stock of this company by the cor-
poration or Its agents. Fraud thu11 pr11.c-
tlced upon the subscriber was a matter 
which did not affect the cre<lltora of the 
corporation. The great qul•stlon in this 
case le wht>ther the defl!ndant, Howard, 
who 18 now the plaintiff lo error, was a 
corporator and a subscriber to the capital 
•tock of this company. He admits by hie 
WlLGUB,BV.-1 
plea that he did subscribe to 15 shares of 
the capital stock of the National Exprese 
Company: and lt was shown by the evi-
dence Introduced by the plalnttn lo tile 
court below that the National Express 
Company and the National Express &: 
Transportation Company were ono and 
the same. A mere change lo the name of 
a corporation we du not think makes any 
material dlfterence; clearly not such a dif-
ference as would relieve a subHCrlber from 
llabtllty to pay for stock subscribed by 
him. 
9. It le Insisted that the court erred In 
allowing the books of the corponttlon to 
be put In evidence for the purpose of show-
ing that the defendant did Hubscrlbe to 15 
shares of fltock, and to show, a.1110, certain 
other things therein contained. When it 
was shown that the defendant wu a 
11tockholder to the company, then the 
books of the company were admissible in 
evidence against him. But, when this fact 
le not shown, WI.' aft' of the opinion that 
the hooks of the com11any would not be 
admissible In evidence against him. In 
this rase, however, It was admitted by 
the plaintiff In error tha.t he did eub-
ecribetoeomanyeharee of atock In the Na-
tional ExpresR Company: so, when It was 
proven that the Na.tlonnl Expn!88Company 
and the National ExprP.81t &: Trans11orta-
tton Company were one and the 11ame cor-
pora tlon, we think the books were ad-
missible lo evidence, not only to show 
that Howard was a stockholder, the num-
ber of eharet1 and the value thereof he eub-
scrlbt>d for, but to show any other trans-
action that had ta.ken place be~ween him 
and this company. We are aware that It 
has b<.>en held that the books of a corpora-
tion are admissible to show prima facie 
that the defendant was a subscriber to 
tile stock of the com11a11y, and was a 
et.ockholder therein: but while we do not 
think thlR rnllng le correct, upon any rea-
son or principle known t11 us, yet, under 
the facts of thlK cnHe, we think the books 
wer~ properly admitted In evidence. We 
know of no dech1lon, however, which 
shows upon principle that such books are 
aelmlHHlble without some Hpeclal ch'CUDl· 
stunre. We <lo not think that the ca11e of 
Tumhull v . Puy1mn, 9:; U.S. 41~,-a decle-
lon by Judge.C1.WFORD to the t•ffect that 
the books of a corporation are u.dmls11lble 
In <>vldcnce to show that a person Is a 
stockholder,-ls correct. No reaKon Is as-
ei~m·cl In that decb1lon, nnd none has been 
ai-;Hignerl In any <lecbdon which we havA 
bt.'en able to find In either North Carolina 
or Alabama. But we think, under the 
facts or this case, where the defendant ad-
111ltted that he was a subscriber to the 
stock of the Nntlonnl Expl'l'IJ8 Comr,any, 
and wher<> It was Rhown thutthe Nutlo·•al 
I~xpreHs Company and the National Ex-
press & Transportation Company were 
one and the Hame thing, that the books 
were properly admitted. We think, fur-
thermore, that when the suhecrlptlon list 
was tendered, and admitted In evidence 
by the court below, the plalotlft In error 
hn.d n right to show that he £lid uot 
eul>11crlbe to this li11t, and therefore think 
the court committed error In rf!fuelng to 
allow him to wake such proof; yet we 
l29 
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RELEVANCY.
do not think this is reversible error. inas-
much as it appears from the record, with-
out more, that the plaintiff had a right to
recover in this case. So, upon consider-
ing this case, we are of the opinion that
therewas no material error committed by
the court below, and that the finding of
tl1e jury was right, under the facts in
proof.
10. It is contended by the plaintiff in er-
ror that the admission in the fifth plea, to
the effect that he had never subscribed to
the National Express & '1'l'anspo|'tation
Company, but that he did subscribe 15
shares to the Na tionai Express Company,
could not be used us an admission against
him upon the trial of any other plea than
that; and the case of Glenn v. Sumner, 132
U. 156,10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4l,is cited as au-
thority to sustain this position. ln the
present case the main issue was whether
the plaintiff in error was a subscriber to
the stock of theNational Express&Trans-
portation Company. It was affirmatively
alleged in the declaration that he was;
and, if he was such subscriber, his liability
under the facts of the case was clear and
unmistakable. We think this allegation in
the plaintiffs declaration that be was
such subscriber called forth from him a
clear and explicit denial of the same by a
plea of non est factum, as was strongly
hinted at by the supreme court of this
state in the case of Thornton v. Lane, 11
130
Ga. 489. This was the main issue in the
case. and, without a determination of the
same against the plaintiff. the plaintitf
was entitled to judgment. So we think
that a plea which denies that the defend-
antwas a subscriber to this company, but
which at the same time admits that he
was u. subscriber to another company,
(which two companies were one and the
same.) was evidence against the defend-
ant. (now plaintiff in error.) and might he
so used as an admission. While we admit
that, under the laws of this state. ade-
fendant may file as many contradictory
pleas as he thinks proper, yet, if one of
those pleas bears on the main issue in the
case, and there be an admission in the
same by the defendant which is calculated
to damage his cause, that admission may
be used in evidence against him. In fact,
the only issue to be determined by the
jury in this case was whether Howard be-
came a subscriber and stockholder in this
company, and any plea which bore upon
that issue, and which contained admis-
sions by the defendant, could be used
against him. S0 we think that in the case
of Glenn v. Sumner. supra, what was
said by the judge in delivering the opinion
therein,to the effect thatstatemenis made
for the purpose of presenting the issue to
which they relate are not evidence upon
any other issue in the same record, does
not apply to this case. Judgment afiirmed.
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c.&e No. 45] RELEVANCY. 
do not think this Is revendble error. lnns-
rnuch as It appN1rs from the record, with-
out more, that the plulntlft ha<l a rlg;ht to 
n'<:O\"er tn this ca.se. So, upon consider-
ing this case, we are of the opinion that 
there was no material error commlttt-d by 
the court below, anti that the finding of 
the Jury was right, under the facts In 
proor. 
10. It Is rontenrled hy the plaintiff In er-
ror that the admh;slon In the filth plen, to 
the erfPct thut he find ne\·er snbHcrlhe1l to 
the Natlonnl J<;xpr~H & '1'1·an1o1portnt lon 
Company, but that he did sulii;crlbe 15 
shares to the National Expre;o~ Company, 
could not be used UH an admission agah1st 
him upon the trial or any other plea than 
that; and the case of Olenn v. Sumner, 132 
U.S. 156, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41,is cited aa au-
thority to sustain this position. In the 
preHent case the main Issue was whtither 
the plelutlff in error was a subscriber to 
the stock of the Na tlonal Exprt'ss & Trane-
porta tlon Company. It was aftlrmatlrnly 
alleged In the declaration that be was; 
and, if he wae such subscriber, bis liability 
under the fact.a of the case was clea.r and 
unmistakable. We think this allegation In 
the plaintiff's declaration that be was 
such subscriber callecl forth from him a 
clear and explicit denial of the same b.v a 
plea or non est factum, as was strongly 
hinted at by the supreme court or thl11 
11tate in the case of Thornton v. Lane, 11 
130 
Ga. 489. This wne the main issue 1n the 
case. and, without a dt>t.ermlnatlnn of the 
same against th"' plalntlrr. the plalntlft 
was entitlerl to judgment. So we think 
that a plea which t.lenlea that the defl'nd-
a.ntwas a subRcrlber to this company, but 
which at the same time admits that he 
was a subscriber to another company. 
(which two companies were one and the 
same,) wns evldenre against the defend-
ant, (now plaintiff in error.) and might be 
so used as an admission. While we admit 
that, under tho laws of this state, a de- · 
fenuant may file as many contradictory 
pleas as he thinks proper, ,\·et, if one of 
those pleas bears on the main Issue In the 
case, and there be un admi11sion to the 
same by the defenuant which is calculated 
to damage bis cause, that admiSHion may 
be used in evidence against him. In fact, 
the only IHsue to be determined by the 
jury In this C"l\8e was whether Howard be-
en me a subscriber and stockholder In this 
company, nncl any plea which bore upon 
that Issue, and which contained admis-
sions by the defendant, could be UKed 
against him. So we think that In tbe CN!e 
of Glenn v. Sumner, supra, what was 
said by tbe Judge In delivering tbe opinion 
therein, to the effect tha.tstatl"ments made 
for the purpo11e of presenting the Issue to 
which they relate are not evidence upon 
any other issue In the same record, doee 
not apply to thl11 case. Judatment affirmed. 
JUDG.\IEN'1‘S.
[Case No. 46
Ggimonwmnixrn v. O'BRIEN (two
cases).
(23 N. E. 834, 152 Mass. 495.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Es-
sex. Nov. 25, 1890.
Exceptions from superior court, Essex
county; EDGAR J. SHERMAN, Judge.
These were complaints against defend-
ant, Richard O’Brien, for the illegal keep-
ing oi intoxicating liquors on the 2d day
oi June. 1890. Appealed from the police
court oi Haverhill. A motion to dismiss
was filed in the superiorcourt beiore a jury
was sworn to try the case, on the ground
that the complaint and warrant were not
sworn to or certified or issued according
to law. At the trial, defendant not hav-
ing waived his said motion, or the objec-
tions therein set iorth, offered, in support
of said motion and objections, the testi-
mony of Edward B. George, clerk of the
police court oi Haverhiil, to explain the
record, to rebut the presumption that the
receiving of the complaint, swearing to
the same, and issuing of the warrant,
were done in court, or when the court
was in session, and to show that when
the complaint was received and sworn to
and the warrant issued the court was not
in session. The court refused to admit
the evidence and overruled the motion,
and defendant excepted. After trial on
the merits, the jury returned a. verdict of
guilty.
A. J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., for the
Commonwealth. Horace I. Ba-1-tIett;,ior
defendant.
KNOWLTON, J. In each oi these cases,
the complaint purported to have been
properly received and sworn to before the
police court oi I-iavcrhili, and the war-
rant to have been properly issued by the
court. The motion to dismiss was right-
ly overruled. The oral evidence offered to
impeach the record was incompetent.
Com. v. Intoxicating Liquors, 135 Mass.
519; Kelley v. Dresser, 11 Allen, 31. Ex-
ceptions overruled.
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JUDGMENTS. (Case No. 46 
coY:MONWEALTH "'· O'BRI~N' (two 
cues). 
(25 N. JD. &14, 152 Mass. 495.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of MaBBachuRrtts. Ea-
aex. Nov. 25, 1890. 
E:r.eeptlons from superior court, Essex 
county; EDGAR J. SHERMAN, Judge. 
Th~ were complo.luts against defend-
ant, Richard O'Brien, for the Illegal keep-
ing of Intoxicating liquors on the 2d day 
of June, 1890. Appealed from the police 
court of Haverhill. A motion to dlsml88 
was filed In thesuperlorcourt before a Jury 
was sworn to try the case, on the ground 
that the complaint and warrant were not 
sworn to or certlfted or IBSued according 
to law. At the trial, defendant not ha v-
lng waived bis said motion, or the obJec-
tlons therein set forth, offered, In support 
of said motion and obJectlons, the testi-
mony of Edward B. George, clerk of the 
pollcP court of H!iverhlll, to explain the 
~ord, to rebut the presumption that the 
receiving of the complaint, swearing to 
the same, nnd le11ulug of the wurrant, 
were done In court, or when the court 
was In f!eRBlon, and to show th1:1 t when 
the complaint w1:1s receh·ed and sworn to 
and the warrant Issued the court wus not 
In StlRHlon. The court refu1<ed to admit 
the evidence and overruled the motion, 
o.nr1 defendant excepted. After t1·lal on 
the merits, the jury returned a vMdkt of 
guilty. 
A. J. Wxterma11, Atty. Gen., for the 
Commonwealth. Boruce I. Bartlett, for 
defendant. 
KNOWL1'0~, J, In Pach of these casefl, 
thf' complaint purported to have been 
properly received and sworn to berore the 
police court of Haverhill, and the war-
rant to have been properly IB11ued by the 
court. The motion to dlsmlM woe right-
ly overruled. The oral evidence offert-d to 
impeach the record was Incompetent. 
Com. v. Intoxlca ting Ltq uors, 13."> Mass. 
519; Kelley ,. . Dresser, 11 Allen, 31. Ex· 
ceptions overruled, 
131 
Case No. 47]
RELE VANCY.
NESBIT v. INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF
RIVERSIDE.
(12 Sup. Ct. 746, 144 U. S. 610.)
Supreme Court of the United States. April 18,
1892.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the Northern district of Iowa.
Action by Eleanor Nesbit against the inde-
pendent district of Riverside to recover on
certain bonds issued by the district. Judg-
ment for defendant. l’laintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
Statement by Mr. Justise BREWER:
This was an action on five bonds purport-
ing to have been issued by the school dis-
trict defendant. The case was tried by the
court without a jury. Special findings of
facts were made, of which the following are
the only ones material to the questions pre-
sented:
"(2 The value of the taxable property
within the boundaries of the independent
district, as shown by the state and county
tax lists, wa for the year 1872 forty-one
thousand four hundred and twenty-six dol-
lars, and for the year 1873 sixty-eight thou-
sand three hundred and seven dollars.
"(3) That on the 26th and 27th days of
March, 1373, the indebtedness of said inde-
pendent district, exclusive of the bonds de-
clared on in this action, exceeded the sum of
thirty-five hundred dollars.
‘-(4) That the bonds sued on in this action
bear date March 27, 1873, maturing ten years
thereafter, are five in number, for five hun-
dred dollars each, or $2,500.00 in the aggre-
gate, exciusive of interest, are numbered 14,
15, 16. 17, and 18, and that the signatures
thereon are the genuine signatures of the of-
ficers of the district purporting to sign the
same, and that said bonds, with the accrued
interest. BOW amount to the sum of five thou-
sand six hundred and ninety-five dollars,
which bonds and interest coupons were pro-
duced in evidence by piaiutifi. The said
bonds and interest coupons are in all respects
alike except as to number, and each coupon
refers to the number of the bond to which it
belongs and to said act under which it was
|s5ued_ All of said bonds contain the follow-
mg provision in the body thereof: This bond
is issued by the board of directors of said in-
dependent school district under the provisions
of chapter 93 01' the Acts of the Twelfth Gen-
eral Assembly of the state of Iowa, and in
conformity with a resolution of said boa1'd
dated the 26th day of March, 1873. A copy
of the 110$ referred to is printed on the back
of the bonds. The exhibits attached to plain-
tilT'$ I14‘-tilloll are correct copies of said bonds
and coupons-
“(4%) Th“ all of said five bonds and the
coupons attlwhed belong to the same series,
and were issued at the same time, undel‘ the
same circumstances, and part of the same
transaction.
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“(5) That the plaintifl, who is a citizen of
Great Britain, bought these bonds, and all
the interest coupons belonging thereto, as an_
investment from one Henry Hutchinson on
the 20th day of December, 1877, paying him
therefor the sum of two thousand dollars;
that said plaintiff, when she made such pur-
chase, had no other knowledge concernhig
the b01165. or of the facts connected with
their issuance, than she was chargeable with
from the bonds themselves, and from the pro-
visions of the constitution and laws of the
state of Iowa.
"(6) That said bonds were issued without
consideration.
“('i') That plaintiff brought suit in the Unit-
ed States circuit court at ])es Moines, lows,
llgfiiinst the said independent district of Riv-
e1‘s1d9_11Don certain of the interest coupons
belonging to the bonds Nos. 14 and 15, be-
1!18_ two of the bonds included in the present
1161011, and in the petition in that cause filed
the plaintiff averred that she was the owner
Of the two bonds Nos. 14 and 15, and the cou-
POBE thereto attached, and asked judgment
"Don the six coupons then due and impaid.
T0 this Petition the defendant answered that
at the time the bonds were issued the indebt-
edness of the district exceeded five per cent.
Of the taxable property of the district, as
5h°“'11 by the state and county tax lists, and
that the bonds were therefore void, under the
Provision of the constitution of the state of
TOWHZ that no legal or proper election upon
the question of issuing the bonds was held;
that the bonds were issued under the pre-
tense of building a schoolhouse with the pro-
ceeds thereof, but the same has not been
built. nor was it intended that it should be
built; that the district received no considera-
tion for the bonds. and that the same are
fraudulent and void; that piaintiti‘ is not a
bone. fide holder of said bonds.
‘The case was tried to the court, and judg-
ment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for
the full amount of the six coupons declared
°I1 in that cause. It is shown by evidence
aliunde that the five bonds bought by plain-
tiff were in possession of plaintiff's counsel
at the trial of the action at Des Moines, and
that bonds Nos. 1~i and 15 were actually pro-
duced and exhibited to the court at such trial.
and offered in evidence. It is not shown that
at such trial the mt-t that plaintiff had
bought and was the owner of bonds Nos. 16,
17. and 18 was made known to the court-
The judgment entry in said cause shows that
on that trial it appeared from the evidence
that when said bonds Nos. 1-i and 15 were is-
sued the indebtedness of the district. exclu-
sive Qg these bonds exceeded the constitu-
tional limitation Of vfive per cent.; that the
judllefi trying mid cause were divided in
Oilinion upon the question whether the re-
citals in the bond estopped the defendant
fl~()Il1 showing this fact against plaintiff, and
certified 3 division of opinion on this quefi‘
tion, judgment being rendered in favor of
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Case No. 47] RELEVANCY. 
:NESBIT v. INDEPENDE~"T DISTRICT OF 
RIVEH.SIDE. 
(12 Sup. Ct. 746, 144 U. 8. 610.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. April 18, 
1892. 
In error to the clrcult court ot the United 
States for the Northern dlstrlct of Iowa. 
Action by Eleanor !'Jesblt against the inde-
pendent district of Riverside to recover on 
<.>ertaln bonds IBSued by the district. Judg-
ment for defendant. l'lnintllT brings error. 
AtJlrmed. 
Statement by Mr. Justlse BUEWER: 
This was an action on fi.ve bonds purport-
ing to have been lssued by the school dis-
trict defendant. The case was tried by the 
court without a jury. Special fi.ndings of 
facts were made, of which the following are 
the only ones material to the questions pre-
sented: 
"(2) The value ot the taxable property 
wlthln the boundaries ot tbe Independent 
district, aa shown by the state and county 
tax lists, was for the year 1872 forty-one 
thousand four hundred and twenty-six dol-
lars. and for the year 1873 sixty-eight thou-
sand three hundred and seven dollars. 
"(3) That on the 26th and 27th days of 
March, 1873, the Indebtedness of said Inde-
pendent district, exclusive of the bonds de-
clared on lo this action, exceeded the sum of 
thirty-five hundred dollars. 
"(4) 'l'hat the bonds sued on lo this action 
bear date !\larch 27, 1873, maturing ten years 
thereafter, are five In number, for five hun-
dred dollars each, or f2,500.00 in the ag~re­
gate, exclusive of Interest. are numbered 14, 
15, 16. 17, and 18, and that the signatures 
thereon are the genuine signatures of the of-
ficers of the district purporting to sign the 
same, and that said bonds, with the accrued 
Interest. now amount to the sum of five thou-
sand slx hundred and ninety-five dollars, 
which bonds and Interest coupons were pro-
duced In evidence by plnlntllT. The said 
bonds and Interest coupons are in all respects 
alike except as to number, anq each coupon 
refers to the nutnber of the bond to which It 
belongs and to said act under which it wss 
Issued- All of said bonds contain the follow-
ing provision to the body thereof: This bond 
Is Issued by the board of directors of said ln-
depenctent school district under the provisions 
ot chapter 98 of the Actt1 of the Twelfth Gen-
eral Assembly of the state of Iowa, and In 
conformity with a resolution of said board 
dated the 26th day of March, 1873. A co1>Y 
of the act referred to Is printed on the baek 
of the bonds. The exhibits attached to plain-
tiff's petition are correct copies of said bonds 
nod coupons. 
"(5) That the plalntltr. who Is a citizen ot 
Great Britain, bought these bonds, and all 
the Interest coupons belonging therefo, as an . 
investment from one Henry Hutchinson 011 
the 20th day ot December, 1877, paying h\m 
therefor tbe sum of two thousand dollars; 
that said plalntltr, when she made such pur-
chase, bad no other knowledge co11cemlug 
the bonds, or ot the tacts connected with 
their Issuance, than she was chargeable w\th 
trom the bonds themselves, and from the pro-
visions of the constitution and laws ot the 
state of Iowa. 
"(6) That said bonds were Issued without 
consideration. 
"(7> That plalntlft' brought suit lo the Unit-
ed States circuit court at Des Moines, Iow4, 
against the said Independent district of Riv-
erside upon certain of t-ie Interest coupom 
belonging to the bonds Noe. 14 and 15, be-
ing two of the bonds Included in the present 
action, and ln the petition In that cause filed 
the plaintU! averred that she was the owner 
ot the two bonds Nos. 14 and 15, and the cou-
pons thereto attached, and asked Judgment 
upon the slx coupons theo due and unpaid. 
To thls petition the defendant answered that 
at the time the bonds were Issued the indebt-
edness ot the distrl<'t exceeded five per cent. 
of the taxable propen:y of the district, as 
shown by the state and county tax l\sts, and 
that the bonds were therefore void, under the 
provision ot the constitution of the state of 
Iowa; that no legal or proper election upon 
the question ot Issuing the bonds was held; 
that the bonds were issued under the pre-
tense of building a schoolhouse with the pro-
ceeds thereof, but the same has not been 
bullt, nor was tt Intended that it should be 
built; that the district received no <'onsidera-
tlon tor the bonds. anct that the same are 
fraudulent and void; that plaintiff Is not & 
bona tide holder of said bonds. 
"(41h} That all of said five bonds and the 
coupons atta<'he<l belong to the same seri,~s. 
and were il!sued at the sam<> time, under the 
same circumstances, and pa1t of tbe same 
transaction. 
"The case was tried to the <."Ourt, and ju<lg-
ment was rendered in favor of plalntUf tor 
the full amount of the slx coupons declared 
on In that cause. It is shown by evidence 
allunde that the five bonds bought by plain-
tiff were In possession of plafntlfl'.'s counsel 
at the trial of the action at Des Moines, and 
that bonds Nos. 1-l and rn were actually pro-
duced and exhibited to the court at such trial, 
and ottered tn evlden<'e. It 111 not shown that 
at such trial the fact that plaintltr bad 
bought and was the owner of bonds ~os. 16, 
17 • and 18 was made known to the court. 
The judgment entry In said cause shows that 
on that trial It appeared from the evidence 
that when said bonds Nos. 14 and 15 were Is-
sued the indebtedness of the district. exclu-
sive of these bonds exceeded the constitu-
tional limitation of 'five per cent.; that the 
judges trying se.ld cause were divided ID 
opinion upon the questton whether the r~ 
cltals in the bond esto11ped the defendand 
from .showing this fact against pJnlntUf, a~ 
certified a division of opinion on this qu t 
ti j . ....A in favor o 
on, Udgment being rendei""" 
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iliaintiil. It docs not appear thflt the cause
property in the county is not stated; but, cx
was taken to the supreme court “P0” the
vi termini, it was usccrtainable in one way
q\\eS\'.\0I1 certified.
~-(3) Under the statutes of Iowa, ill f°1'Q9 in
1872 and 1873, regulating the assessment of
property for the purpose of state and county
taxation, the lists thereof could not be com-
puted before the month of August, and in
March, 1873, when these bonds were issued,
the last computed tax list was for the year
1872.”
Upon these facts judgment was ciitcreil in
favor of the defendant, (25 Fed. 637),) to re-
verse which judgment this writ of error was
sued out. "
W. Wiiloughby, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the
facts in the foregoing language, delivered the
opinion of the court.
Article 11, 5 3, of the constitution of Iowa
of 1857, ordains that “no county, or other
political or municipal corporation, shall be
allowed to become indebted in any manner,
or for any purpose, to an amount in the ag-
gregate excccding five per centum on the
value of the taxable property within such
county or corporation, to be ascertained by
the last state and county tax lists previous to
the incurring of such indebtedness." Under
that section, the limit of indebtedness which
the district could incur at the date of the
issue of these bonds was $2,071.30. It was
already indebted in a sum exceeding $3,500,
and the five bonds of themselves aggregated
$2.500, or nearly $500 more than the amount
of debt the district could lawfully create.
Aside, therefore, from the fact that they were
issued without consideration. they were in-
valid by reason of the constitutional pro-
vision, and created no obligation against the
district. They were issued at the same time,
and as one transaction, and were purchased
by plaintiff together and in one purchase. If
not charged with knowledge of the prior in-
debtedness, she was with the fact that, in-
dependent of such indebtedness, these bonds
alone were an overissue, and beyond the pow-
er of the district; for she was bound to take
notice of the value of taxable property with-
in the district, as shown by the tax list.
Buchanan v. Litchflcld, 102 U. S. 278; Bank
' v. Porter Tp., 110 U. S. 608, 4 Sup. Ct. 354;
Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, -i Sup. Ct.
315. In the first of those cases, on page 23!).
it is said that “the purchaser of the bonds
was certainly bound to take notice, not only
of the constitutional limitation upon munici-
pal indebtedness, but of such facts as the au-
thorized official assessments disclosed con-
cerning the valuation of taxable propcrt_v
within the city for the year 1873;" and in the
last, on page 95, that “the amount of the
bonds issued was known. It is stated in the
recital itself. It was $87,000. The holder of
each bond was apprised of that fact. The
amount of the assessed value of the taxable
only, and that was by reference to the as-
sessment itself, n public record equally ac-
cessible to all intending purchasers of bonds,
as well as to the county ofiicers.” So when
the plaintiff purchased these bonds she knew,
or at least was chargeable with knowledge of
the fact, that they were unlawfully issued,
and created no obligation against the dis-
trict. She could not, therefore, claim to be a
bona fide purchaser, no matter what recitals
appeared on the face of the instrument.
But the question which is most earnestly
pressed upon our attention is the estoppcl
which is alleged to have been created by the
judgment against the district in the United
States circuit court at Des Moines, upon cou-
pons detached from the two bonds numbered
14 and 15. Is this a case of estoppel by judg-
ment? The law in respect to such estoppel
was fully considered and determined by this
court in the case of Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U. S. 351. It was there decided that
when the second suit is upon the same cause
of action, and between the same parties as
the first, the judgment in the former is con-
clusive in the latter as to every question
which was or might have been presented and
determined in the first action; but when the
second suit is upon a different cause of ac-
tion, though between the same parties, the
judgment in the former action operates as an
estoppel only as to the point or question ac-
tually litigated and determined, and not as to
other matters which might have been litigat-
ed and determined.
Now, the present suit is on causes of ac-
tion diiferent from those presented in the
suit at Des Moines. Bonds 16, 17,- and 18
were not presented or known in that suit;
and while bonds 14 and 15 were presented,
alleged to be the property of plaintiff, and
judgment asked upon six coupons attached
thereto, yet the cause of action on the six
coupons is distinct and separate from that
upon the bonds or the other coupons. Each
matured coupon is a separable promise, and
gives rise to a separate cause of action. It
may be detached from the bond and sold by
itself. indeed, the title to several matured
coupons of the same bond may be in as many
different persons, and u'pon each a distinct
and separate action be maintained. So, \vhiie
the promises of the bond and of the coupons
in the first instance are upon the same pa-
per, and the coupons are for interest due up-
on the bond, yet the promise to pay the cou-
pon is as distinct from that to pay the bond
as though the two promises were placed in
diiferent instruments, upon different paper.
By the rule laid down in Cromwell v. Coun-
ty of Sac, the Judgment in the suit at Des
Moines is conclusive in this case only as to
the matters actually litigated and determin-
ed. What were they? The defense pleaded
was this: That at the time the bonds were
issued the indebtedness exceeded 5 per cent.,
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JlJJ>GMENTS. [Case No. 47 
\\'19.\nt\ll. It does not appear that the cause 
'flaB taken to the supreme court upon the 
l\uest\on certlft ed. 
"{8) Under the statutes of Iowa, In force In 
1S'i2 and 1873, regulating the assessment of 
property for the purpose of state and county 
tuaUon. the lists thereof could not be com-
puted before the month of August, and Jn 
Mareh, 1813, when these bonds were Issued, 
the last computed tax list was for the yeur 
1872." 
Upon th<>se facts judgment was t-ntered In 
favor of the defendant, (25 Fed. 6a:i,) to re-
verse which judgment this writ of error was 
sued ouL 
W. WWoughby, for plalntln: In error. 
Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the 
facts ln the foregoing language, delivered the 
opinion of the court. 
Article 11, I 3, of the constitution of Iowa 
of 1857, ordains that "no county, or other 
political or municipal corporation, shall be 
allowed to become Indebted In any manner, 
or for any purpose, to an amount In the ag-
«regate exceeding five per centum on the 
value of the taxable pro11erty within such 
county or corporation, to be ascertained by 
the last state and county tax lists previous to 
the Incurring of such Indebtedness:• Undt>r 
that section, the limit of Indebtedness which 
the district could Incur at the date of the 
Issue ot these bonds was $2,071.:lo. It was 
already Jndebted ln a sum exceeding $3,000, 
and the ftve bonds of themselves aggregated 
'2,500, or nearly $500 more than the amount 
of debt the district coulil lawfully create. 
Aside, therefore, from the fact that they were 
IBSued without consideration, they were In-
valid by reason of the constitutional pro-
vision, and created no obllgutlon against the 
district. They were Issued at the same time, 
and ae one tmnsactlon, and were purchased 
by plalntltr together and In one purchase. If 
ilot charged with knowledge of the prior ln-
debtedneBB, she was with the fact that, In-
dependent of such lndebtef.lness, these bonds 
alone were an overlssue, and beyond the pow-
er of the district; fer she was bound to take 
notice of the value of taxable pro11erty with-
in the district, as shown by the tax list. 
Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278; Bank 
• v. Porter Tp., 110 U. S. 608, 4 Sup. Ct. 254; 
Dixon Co. v. lt'leld, 111 U. S. 83, 4 Sup. Ct. 
31:>. In the ftrst of those cases, on page 28!), 
It Is said that "the purchaser of the bouds 
was certainly bound to take 1:10tlce, not only 
of the constltutlonnl limitation upon munici-
pal Indebtedness, but of such facts as the au-
thorized oftlclal asseBSments dls<'losed con-
cerning the valuation of taxable property 
within the city tor the year 1873;" and In the 
last, on page 95, that "the amount of the 
bonds Issued was known. tt ls stated In the 
recital ltaelt. It was '87,000. The holder of 
filch bond was apprised of that tact. The 
.amount of the aBBessed value of the taxable 
property In the county 18 not stated; but, ex 
vi termini, It was ascertainable In one way 
only, and that was by reference to the as-
sessment Itself, a public record equally ac-
<"esslble to all Intending purchasers of bonds, 
as well as to the county oftlcers." So when 
the plalntltf purchased these bonds she knew, 
or at least was chargeable with knowledge of 
the tact, that they were unlawfully Issued, 
and created DO obligation against the dis-
trict. She could not, therefore, claim to be a 
bona ftde purchaser, no matter what recitals 
a111ieared oD the face of the Instrument. 
But the question which ls most earnestly 
pressed upon our attention ts the estoppel 
which ls alleged to have been created by the 
judgment against the district In the United 
States circuit court at Des .Moines, upon cou-
pons detached from the two bonds numbered 
14 and 15. Is this a case ot estoppel by judg-
ment? The law In respect to such estoppel 
was fully considered and determined by this 
court In the case of Cromwell v. County of 
Sac, 94 U. S. 351. It was there decided that 
when the second suit ls upon the same cause 
ot action, and between the same parties as 
the first, the judgment in the f1>rmer ls con-
clusive In the latter as to every question 
which was or might have been presented and 
determined in the first action; but when the 
second suit Is upon a dtn:erent cause of ac-
tion, though between the same parties, the 
Judgment In the former action operates as an 
estoppel only as to the point or question ac-
tually lltlgated and determined, and not qs to 
other matters whl<.>h might have been litigat-
ed and determined. 
Now, the present suit Is on causes of ac-
tion different from those presented In the 
suit at Dee Moln~s. Bonds 16, 17,· and 18 
were not presented or known In that suit; 
and while bonds 14 and 15 were presented, 
alleged to be the property of plalntltf, and 
judgment asked upon six coupons attached 
thereto, yet the cause of action on the six 
coupons ls distinct and separate from that 
upon the bonds or the other coupons. Each 
matured coupon Is a separable promise, and 
gives rise to a separate <'II.use of action. It 
may be detached from the bond and sold by 
itself. Indeed, the title to several matured 
coupons of the same bond IDllY be in as many 
different persons, and upon each a distinct 
and separate action be maintained. So, while 
the promises of tile bond and of the coupons 
In the first Instance are upon the same 11a-
per, and the coupons are for Interest due up-
on the bond, yet the promise to pay the cou-
pon ls as distinct trow that to pay the bond 
as though the two promises were placed in 
different Instruments, upon dllTerent paper. 
By the rule laid down In Cromwell v. Coun-
ty of · Sac, the judgment in the suit at Des 
Moines Is conclusive In this case only as to 
the matters actually litigated and determin-
ed. What were they? The defense pleade\l 
was this: That at the time the bonds were 
Issued the Indebtedness exceeded r> per cent., 
1H..'t 
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and the bonds were therefore void; that the
district received no consideration; and that
the plaintiff was not a bona flde holder. "he
judgment entry shows that it appeared from
the evidence that the indebtedness at the
time the bonds were issued exceeded the con-
stitutional limitation of 5 per cent.; but that
it was adjudged that the recitals in the
bonds estopped the defendant from showing
this fact against the plaintlif. In other
words, that which was determined was the
effect of the recitals. But this case does not
turn upon that question at all, and nothing
was determined here antagonistic to the ad-
jndication there. An additional tact, that of
notice from the amount of the bonds pur-
chased, was proved.
The effect of recitals in municipal bonds is
like that given to words of negotiability in
a promissory note. They simply relieve the
paper in the hands of a bona iide holder from
the burden of defenses other than the lack
of power, growing out of the original issue of
the paper, and available as against the im-
mediate payee. Snppose two negotiable
promissory notes. issued at the same time,
and as a part of the same transaction. In a
suit on the first, brought by a purchaser be-
fore m11tl11'1tY, the maker proves facts con-
stituting a defense as against the payee, but
mils t° brlllt-‘.' home notice of these facts to
the holder before his purchase. The judg-
ment must go in favor of the holder, for the
words of negotiability in the note preclude
the maker from such a defense as against
him: In a suit on the second of such notes,
may not the maker couple proof of notice to
the holder with that Qf the original invalid-
ity of U19 BOW, and thus establish a complete
defense against the holder? Is he precluded
by the first judgment, and his failure in that
to prove notice to the holder? That is pre-
cisely this case. In the suit at Des Molnes
no‘ notice to the holder was shown. The re-
citals cut off the defense pleaded of original
invalidity. In this action notice is proved,
and an additional fact is put into the case.
which makes a new question. The effect of
recital is one thing; that of recitals coupled
with notice is another. The one question was
litigated and determined in the Des Moines
134
suit; the other is presented here. Sureiyan
adjudication as to the effect of one fact alone
does not preclude in the second suit an in-
quiry and determination as to the effect of
that fact in conjunction with others. In-
fancy is pleaded in an action on a contract,
and an adjudication is made establishing it
as a defense. In a. second suit between the
same parties on a dilferent cause of action,
tllollilh created at the same time, may not
the lllllillliff Drove ratification after majority‘!
Many reasons may induce or prevent the in-
¥t'°<1l_1('U0I1 into the first case of all the facts.
SacW(fiS Well_ said in Cromwell v. County of
Page -5-'6) that: "Various considerations,
other than the actual merits, may govern a
Part-Y in bringing forward grounds of recov-
91'? 01‘ defense in one action, which may not
f;§;:ltd1l'.\su8.lt1]Othel‘ action upon a ¢1|rge;-em de.
or thé Vail flsfthe smallness of the amount,
the di'mcult°_ of the I_)l‘PDerty in controversy,
deuce the Zxo ilhmllllll,‘-' the necessary evi-
owu git t Dense Of the litigation, and his
ua ion at the time. A party acting
upon considerations like these ought not to
be precluded from contesting, in a subsequent
!t1l:3]<>SIIl‘,c;>lt(l1l;2.r' demands arising out of the same
Tl'f(i1i(s1e@f1l8:Ql.I1&i\7 be looked at in another light.
was that a~t* tfi eaded in the Dos Moines suit
bonds then dl e time of the issue of the two
eduess of th sciosed there was a prior indebt-
tufional “I _te district exceeding the consti-
one adjud mdatloll» and that defense was the
Here an :§mt_<> be Drecluded by the_recitais.
bonds in S ittiOli8.i defense is that the five
sue Th 11 themselves created an ovens-
‘ at question was not presented in the
filedsioliitoines suit. and could not have been ad-
a ed. It is presented for the first time
ilrlmtills case. 1: is of itself a valid defense.
h -ll§_‘('l1\'e of prior indebtedness. So we
ave in this case a new question not pre-
sented in the Des Moines suit, the existence
Of facts never called to the attention of the
court in that case, which of themselves create
8- perfect defense.
\Ve see no error in the judgment, and it is
affirmed.
Mr. Justice HARLAN dissents.
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Case No. 47) RELEVANCY. 
and the bonds were therefore void; that the 
district received no consideration; and that 
the plaintiff. was not a bona fide holder. 'l'be 
judgment entry shows that It appeared tr«>J,D 
the evidence that the lndebtedneee at the 
time the bonds were Issued exceeded the con-
11titutlonal limitation of 5 per cent.; but that 
It was adjudged that the recitals In the 
honds estopped the deteudant from showing 
this tact against the plnlntllT. In otlw1· 
words, that which was deteru1ined was the 
effect ot the recitals. But this case doe11 11ot 
turn upon that question at all, and nothing 
was determined here antagunlstic to the ad-
judication there. A.n addltionnl tact. that ot 
notice from the amount of the bonds pur-
chased, was proved. 
The effect of recitals In municipal bouds le 
Uke that given to words of negotlablllty In 
a promlsBOry note. They simply relieve the 
papet· In the hands of a bona fide holder fr«>m 
the burden of defenses other than the lack 
of power, growing out of the original Issue of 
the paper, and available as against the Im-
mediate payee. Suppose two negotiable 
promissory notes. Issued at the same time, 
and as a part of the same transaction. In a 
suit on the first, brought by a purchaser be-
fore maturity, the maker proves facts con-
stituting a defense as against the payee, but 
falls to bring home notice of these facts to 
the holder before his pul'('hase. The judg-
ment must g«> In favor of the holder, for the 
words of negotlablllty In the note preclude 
the maker fl'om such a defense as against 
him: In a suit on the second of such notes, 
may not the maker couple proof of notice t«> 
the holder with that of the original Invalid-
ity of the note, and thus establish a complete 
defense against the holder? Is he precluded 
by the first judgment, and bis failure In that 
to prove notice to the holder? That ls pre-
cisely this case. In the suit at Des .Moines 
no· notice to the holder was shown. The re-
citals cut off the defense pleaded «>f original 
Invalidity. In this action notice Is proved, 
and an additional fact Is put into the case, 
which makes a new question. The etrect of 
recital Is one thing; that of recitals coupled 
with notice ls another. The one question was 
litigated and determined In the Des Moines 
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suit; the other Is presented here. Surely an 
adjudication as to the etrect ot one fact alone 
does not preclude In the second suit an In· 
qulry and determination as to the etrect ot 
that fact In conjunction with others. In· 
fancy ls pleaded In an action on a coutmct, 
and an adjudication Is made establishing It 
as a defense. In a second suit between the 
same parties on a dlfl'erent cause or action, 
though created at the same time, may not 
the plalntlt? prove ru tltlca ti on after majorlty1 
Many reasons may Induce or prevent the In-
troduction Into the first <'Dse of all the facts. 
It was well said iu Crom well v. County ot 
Sac (page 3:iG) that: ··various conslderatlODS, 
other tllnu the actual merits, may govern a 
party In bringing forward grounds of recov-
ery or def Pnse In one action, which mo.y not 
exist In another action upon a ullferent de-
mand, such as the smallness of the amount, 
or the value of the property In controversy, 
the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evi-
dence, the expense of the litigation, and his 
own situation at the time. A party acting 
upon considerations like these ought not to 
be precluded from contesting, In a subaequ~nt 
action, other demands arising out of the same 
transaction." 
This case may be looked at In another light. 
The defense pleaded In the Des Moines suit 
was that at the time of the Issue of the two 
bonds then disclosed there wu a prior Indebt-
edness of the district ex<>eedlng the consti-
tutional Umltatlon, and that defense was the 
one adjudged to be precluded by the rec•ltnls. 
Here an additional defense Is that 0 the ftve 
bonds In suit themst>lves created an overls-
sue. That queRtlon was not presented In the 
Des Moines eult, and could not have been ad-
judicated. It Is presented for the first time 
In this case, It ls of Itself a valid defense, 
lrrespeetlve of prior lmlebtedness. So we 
have In this case a new question not pre-. 
sented in the Des Moines suit, the existence 
of facts never called to the attention of the 
court In that case, which of themselves create 
a I>erfect defense. 
"
7 e see no error In the judgment, and It la 
amrmed. 
M:r. Justice HARI,AN dissents. 
JUDGMENTS.
[Case No. 48
rn.x.\'KL11~: COUNTY v. GERMA-\' 8-\\'.
BANK. -
(12 Sup. cc 141, 142 U. s. 93-)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 14,
1891.
ln error to the ci_rcuit court of the United
States for the Southern district of Illinois.
Action by the German Savings Bank
against the county of Franklin, lll., on the
coupons of certain railroad aid bonds. Jury
waived, and trial by the court. Judgment
for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Af-
iirmed.
The facts of the case fully appear in the
following statement by Air. Justice BROWN:
This was an action by the German Sav-
.ings Bank of Davenport, Iowa, upon 128
coupons cut from bonds issued by the coun- '
ty of Franklin in payment of its subscrip-
tion to the capital stock of the Belleville &
Eldorado Railroad Company. The allega-
tion of the declaration was that such bonds
had been issued on the 10th day of Novem-
ber, 18T'|', by the said defendant, “being
therennto duly authorized by an afiirmative
vote of the legal voters of said county, as
required by law.” There was a further
averment that plaintiff became the owner of
20 of these bonds, whose numbers were
given, from which the coupons in suit had
been cut. To this declaration a plea of non
assumpsit, and a replication thereto, were
tiled. A jury being waived, the cause was
tried by the court, which found in favor of
the plaintiff, and a judgment was rendered
on February 4, 1891, in its favor, for the
sum of $5,120, damages and costs. ’1‘he
bonds purported on their face to have been
"issued under the provisions of an act of the
general assembly of the state of Illinois en-
titled, ‘An act to incorporate the Belleville
and Eldorado Railroad Company,’ approved
February 22nd, 1861, authorizing subscrip-
tions to the capital stock of said railroad,
and in accordance with the majority of
votes cast at an election held in said coun-
ty on the 11th day of September, 1869, in
conformity with the provisions of said act."
Upon the trial of the case, the plaintifi
hank, after presenting the bonds and cou-
pons set forth in the declaration, put in evi-
dence the record of a suit in equity. begun
in the same court, and carried to a final de-
cree on July 3, 1883. The bill was originally
flied by the county of Franklin in the cir-
cult court of Franklin county, Iii., on the
4th day of August, 1880, against the Belle-
ville & Eldorado Railroad Company, the
clerk, sheriif, and collector of said county,
the auditor of public accounts of the state
of Illinois, the state treasurer of Illinois,
several private individuals, and the un-
known holders of bonds issued by the said
Franklin county in aid of the said railroad
company. The bill alleged the issuing by
the county of $150,000 of its bonds, dated
November 13, 1877, to the Belleville & Eldo-
. the same;
rado Railroad Company; $100,000 of which
were subscribed and issued under the act
of the general assembly of Illinois entitled,
"An act to incorporate the Bellevilie and
Eldorado Railroad Company," approved
February 22, 1861, authorizing a subscrip-
tion to the capital stock of said company,
and $50,000 of which were subscribed and
issued under an act of the general assembly
entitled, “An act to authorize cities and
counties to subscribe stock to railroads."
approved November 6, 18-l9. The bill al-
leged that both classes of bonds were sub-
scribed and issued in pursuance of the vote
of the people of the county at an election
held the 11th day of September, 1869. and
that the order of the county court submit-
ting the proposal to the voters named cer-
tain conditions to be complied with before
the bonds should be issued, one of which
was that the railroad should be commenced
in the county of Franklin within nine
months from the date of the election, and
completed through the county by the 1st
day of June, 1872. The bill further alleged
that the orders submitting the question to
the voters were never complied with, and
particularly that the road was not completed
within the time provided; that all of the
orders and resolutions of the county court
and the board of supervisors subscribing
and attempting to subscribe, stock to said
railroad company, were in conflict with the
constitution of the state, and were void;
that the state auditor had no right to levy
taxes for the purpose of paying the princi-
pal or interest of said bonds; that the state
treasurer had no right to receive or pay out
and that the act to provide for
paying railroad debts by counties, approved
April 16, 1869, was unconstitutional, con-
trary to public policy, and void. The bill
prayed an injunction restraining the oflicers
of the state from collecting or paying out
taxes in liquidation of said bonds, and that
the individual defendants and unknown
holders of the bonds be enjoined from suing
the county upon any of the coupons attach-
ed to such bonds.
A temporary writ of injunction was is-
sued as prayed. Service by publication was
made upon the unknown holders of the
bonds. Upon the 27th day of October, 1880,
a decree was taken by default. At the Oc-
tober term, 1881, the German Savings Bank
appeared in the cause, had the decree open-
ed, and removed the case to the circuit court
of the United States for the Southern dis-
trict of Illinois, to which it was submitted
upon proofs taken, and upon a stipulation
that the defendant was the bona tide holder
of the bonds set up in its answer, and pur-
chased the same, for value, without notice
of any defense. The answer of the bank,
which was also adopted by other defend-
ants intervening for their own interests, put
in issue every material averment of the bill,
and prayed that, as to the bonds and cou-
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JlJDGME~TS. (Case No. 48 
YR~'SKLIN CO"C"NTY v. GEU.:\IAN SA. V. 
BANK.· 
(12 Sup. Ct. 147, 142 U. S. 93.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 14, 
1891. 
In error to the circuit court of the United 
States tor the Southern district of Illinois. 
Action by the German Savings Bank 
against the eounty of J..'rnnklln, Ill., on the 
l'Oupons of certain railroad aid bonds. Jury 
waived, and trial by the L'OUt1:. Judgment 
for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Af· 
firmed. 
The tacts of the case fully u1,penr In the 
following stntement by :\Ir. Jmsth·e BROWN: 
This wns an action by the Uerman Sav· 1 
Jngs Bank of Davenport, Iowa, upon 128 I 
coupons cut from bonds ls1med by the coun- j 
ty of Franklin In payment of its subscrlp- I 
tlon to the capital stock of the Belleville & 
Eldorado Railroad Company. The allega-
tion of the declaration was that such bonds 
had been lSBued on the 10th day of ~ovem· 
ber, 18ii, by the said defendant, "being 
thereunto duly authorized by an affirmative 
vote of the legal voterB of said county, as 
required by law." There was a further 
averment that plaintiff became the owner of I 
20 of these bonds, whose numbers were 
given, from which the coupons ln suit had 1 
been cut. To this declaration a plea of non 
assumpait, and a replication thereto, were 
tlled. A Jory being waived, the cause was 
tried by the court, which found ln favor of 
the plalntUr, and a Judgment was rendered 
on February 4, 1891, ln its favor, for the 
sum of $5,120, damages and costs. The 
bonda purported on their face to have been 
"luued under the provisions of an act ol. the 
general 8.88embly of the state of llltnols en-
Utled, 'Ao act to Incorporate the Bellevllle 
and Eldorado Railroad Company,' approved 
February 22nd, 1861, authorizing subscrlp· 
tlons to the capital stock of said railroad, 
and In accordance with the majority of 
votes cast at an election held 'In said coun-
ty on the 11th day of September, 1869, In 
conformity with the provisions of said act." 
Upon the trial of the case, the plaintiff 
bank, after presenting the bonds and cou-
pons set forth In the declaration, put ln evl· 
dence the record of a suit In equity, begun 
In the same court, and carried to a final de-
cree on July 3, 1883. The blll was originally 
filed by the county ot Franklin in the cir· 
<.'Ult court of Franklin county, Ill., on the 
4th day of August, 1880, against the Belle-
ville & Eldorado Railroad Company, the 
elerk, sherllr, and collector ot said county, 
the auditor of public accounts of the state 
ot Illinois, the state treasurer of Illinois, 
several private Individuals, and the un-
known holders of bonda lHued by the said 
Franklin county In aid of the sald railroad 
company. The bill alleged the lSBuing by 
the county ot $150,000 of Its bonds, dated 
November 13, 1877, to the Belleville & Eldo-
mdo Railroad Company; $100,000 of which 
were subscribed and Issued under the act 
of the general assembly of Illinois entitled, 
"An act to Incorporate the Belleville and 
Eldorado Railroad Company;" approved 
February 22, 1861, authorizing a subscrip-
tion to the capital stock of said company, 
and $50,000 of which were subscribed and 
Issued under an act of the general 1188embly 
entitled, "An act to authorize cities and 
counties to subscribe stock to railroads," 
approved November 6, 1849. The bill al· 
leged that both classes of bonds were sub-
scribed and Issued In pursuance of the vote 
of the people of the county at an election 
held the 11th day of September, 1869, and 
thnt the order ot the county court submit· 
ting the proposal to the voters named cer· 
taln conditions to be complied with before 
the bonds should be issued, one of which 
was that the rallroad should be commenced 
In the county of ~·ranklln within nine 
months from the date of the election, and 
completed through the county by the 1st 
day of June, 1872. '.l'he bill further alleged 
that the orders submitting the question to 
the voters were never complied with, and 
particularly that the road was not completed 
within the time provided; that all of the 
orders and resolutions of the county court 
and the board of supervisors subscribing 
and attempting to subscribe, stoek to said 
ralll'Oad company, were In conflict with the 
constitution of the state, and were void; 
that the state auditor bad no right to levy 
taxes for the purpose of paying the princi· 
pal or Interest of said bonds; that the state 
treasurer had no right to receive or pay out 
the same; and that the act to provide for 
paying railroad debts by counties, approved 
April 16, 1809, was unconstitutional, con-
trary to public policy, and void. The blll 
praye1l an Injunction restraining the ofllcer8 
of the state from collecting or paying out 
taxes In liquidation of said bonds, and that 
the Individual defendants and unknown 
holders of the bonds be enjoined from suing 
the county upon any of the coupons attach· 
ed to such bonda. 
A temporary writ of Injunction was la· 
sued as prayed. Service by publication was 
made upon the unknown holders of the 
bonds. Upon the 27th day of October, 1880, 
a decree was taken by default. At the Oc· 
tober term, 1881, the German Savings Bank 
appeared in the cause, had· the decree open-
ed, and removed the case to the circuit court 
of the United States for the Southern dis-
trict of llllnols, to which It was submitted 
upon proofs taken, and upon a stipulation 
that the defendant was the bona fide holder 
of the bonds set up in its answer, and pur-
chased the same, for value, without notice 
of any defense. The answer of the bank, 
which was also adopted by other defend-
ants Intervening for their own interests, put 
In Issue every material averment of the bill, 
and prayed that, as to the bonds and cou· 
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pons held by it, the bill might be dismissed
for want of equity, and the injunction dis-
solved. On July 3, 1883, a decree was en-
tered, declaring that all bonds involved in
the case, and purporting on their face to
have been issued under the provisions of
the railroad act of November 6, 1849, were
issued without authority of law, and were
therefore void, and decreeing that as to the
holders of such bonds the injunction be
made perpetual. The decree further pro-
vided that, as to the specific bonds desig-
nated by their numbers, and among others
the bonds belonging to the German Savings
Bank, “purporting on their face to be of the
series isued under the charter of the said
Belleville & Eldorado Railroad Company,
approved February 22, 1861, the court doth
decree in favor of said defendants, the said
several respective holders thereof, and that
the said several bonds, and the coupons
thereof, are valid and legal Oiillilfltifllls
against the county oi.‘ Franklin; and as to
said last-mentioned series of said bonds and
coupons thereunto attached, as held as afore-
said, the court doth decree that the injunc-
tion 188116-d in this cause be dissolved, and
the complainant's bill be dismissed for want
of equity."
The German Savings Bank in June, 1885,
appealed from so much of this decree as ad-
Jlldi-’ed that nine bonds, which had been is-
SUH1 11111191‘ the act of 1849, and were held
by the bank. were void, and upon such ap-
l><‘il1 this court affirmed the decree of the cir-
cuit <'0l1l't. German Sav. Bank v. Franklin
Co., 128 U. S. 526, 9 Sup. Ct. 1-">9. The coun-
ty of Franklin, however, did not appeal from
the decree establishing the validity of the
bonds issued under the act of 1861.
After the plaintiff had put in the said rec-
ord, decree, and mandate of this court in
the equity case, it introduced in evidence
the eighteen bonds whit-11, with the coupons
thereof. had been decreed to be valid and
legal oblhzntions ilizainst the county, and also
put in evidence coupons cut from two other
bonds which had also been adjudized to be
va,11d_ The defendant introduced no evi-
dence. but claimed that the evidence con-
tained in the record introduced by the plain-
tiff showed that the bonds and coupons
therefrom, upon which this action was
brought, were invalid. The plaintiff con-
tended that the validity of said bonds and
coupons had been established in the said
equity case, and that the question was res
adjudicate; and the court so decided To
reverse the Jiidglnent of the circuit court in
this behalf, this writ of error was sued out.
D. M. Browning, for plaintiff in error. E.
E. Cook and 3- P. Wheeler, for defendant in
error.
Mr. Justice Baows, arm stating the
facts 9-3 9-b°Ve» delivered the opinion of the
court.
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As both parties claim an estoppel by vir-
tue of the decree in the equity suit between
"19 barties to this suit, it only becomes nec-
essary to consider the eflect of this decree.
It contains two separate and distinct timi-
illgsz First. S0 far as the nine bonds held
by the German Savings Bunk, and issued
under the act of November 6, 1849, were con-
cerned, the decree pronounced them to be
void; and as to them the injunction was
made Perpetual. From this part of the decree
the bank filipflaled to this court, by which
the decree was aflirmed. 128 U. S. 526, 9'
SUD. Ct. 159. Second. As to the eighteen
bonds issued under the act of 13131, and the
¢°11D0ns cut from two other bonds issued
under the same act, also held by the Ger-
man Savings Bank. and purporting on their
face to be of the series issued under the
charter of said Belleville & Eldorado Rail-
"Wi Collloany. approved February 22, 1201,
thi‘ ‘i*‘i"'°<’- =1liJl1<i.'-ted in favor of the defend-
ant bank. and that the said several bonds,
and the (‘01iDons thereof. were legal and
Valid Obligations against the county of
Frrflnkiilli and as to this series the injunc-
tloll was dissolved ‘and the complainant's
M1,] d1sm'“S“‘i- N0 i1DDPal was taken from
iills Daft of the decree by the county of
Iiriiliklin. but it now insists that these bonds
fife Void for the same reasons that the
bonds issued under the act of November 6,
1349. were adjudged to be void. namely, be-
‘-'fl1i$*‘- both series were issued pursuant to
the same vote, and subject to the same con-
ditions.
The record of the equity suit does not
311°“ "l(’11i‘i.\' the i-‘round upon which the
Court based its distinction between the two
classes of bonds; nor is it necessary to be
ascertained here. It is sufficient for the
I"1I'Doses of this suit to know that the valid-
ity of these bonds was directly put in issue
by the Dleadings, and determined adversely
to the county. The plaintiff alleged in its
bill that these bonds were invalid b_v reason
01' the non-compliance of the road with cer-
min conditions precedent upon which they
“'9-re issued, setting up with great particu-
larity all the proceedings prior to the issue
01' the bonds; reciting the laws under which
they were claimed to have been authorized;
and demanding their cancellation and sur-
render “Don the ground that the acts of the
comlty Oiiivers were unauthorized and void-
illld the laws under which they were isfllled
unconstitutional. The entire question of
their validity was presented and tried 11110"
the merits, and the court could not have dis-
missed the bill as to these bonds without
holding that thev were valid, and the fur-
ther finding that‘ the several bonds and cou-
P°n8 thereof “are valid and legal obliga-
golls" added nothing to the force of the
ecreg d _ L
The t:,1:s1l¢)1iln in this C0111!
tion is that as UK, (mflro record. taken to-
Eether, shows that these bonds were void.
QC‘
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Case No. 48] RELE\• ANCY. 
pons beld by It, the bill might be dlsmlBBed 
for want of equity, and the Injunction dis-
solved. On July 3, 1&~. a decree was en-
tered, declaring that all bonds Involved In 
the case, and purporting on their face to 
have been Issued under the provisions of 
the rallroa<l act of "Sovember 6, 184\J, were 
issued without authority of law, and were 
therefore void, and decreeing that as to the 
holders of such bonds the Injunction be 
made perpetual. The decrpe turther pro-
vided that, as to the specltlc bonds desig-
nated by their numbers, and among othel'IJ 
the bonds belonging to the German Sa-rings 
Bank, "purporting on their face to be of the 
series Issued under the charter of the said 
Belleville & Eldorado Railroad Com11any, 
approved February 22, 1861, the court doth 
d('(.·ree In favor of said defendants, the said 
several respective holders thereof, and that 
the said several bonds, and the cou11ons 
thereof, are valid and le1rnl obligations 
against the county of Fmnklln; and as to 
said last-mentioned series of sahl bonds ancl 
coupons thereunto attached, as hE'ld as afore-
said, the court doth decree that the Injunc-
tion luued In this cause be dlssolvE'd, and 
the eomplalnant's bill be dismissed for want 
of equity." 
The German Savings Bank In June, lss:i, 
a1>poaled from so mueh of this decree as ad-
judged that nine bonds, which had beE'n Is-
sued under the act of 1849, and were held 
by the bank, were void, and upon such ap-
peal this court amrmed the de<'ree of the cir-
cuit rourt. German Sav. Bank v. I•'mnklln 
Co., 128 U.S. 526, 9 Sup. Ct. 159. The coun-
ty of Franklln, however, did not appeal from 
the decree establishing the validity of the 
bonds Issued under the aet of 18tll. 
After the plalntttr bad put In the said rec-
ord, decree, and mandate of this court In 
the equity case, It Introduced In evldE'nCt' 
the eighteen bonds wbll-h, with the <•ouponK 
thereof, had been decl't'ed to be valid and 
legal obligations against the count~·. and ulHo 
put In evldencE' <'ou11ons cut from two otlwr 
bonds which had also h1>en adjudgt'd to be 
valid. The defendant Introduced no evi-
dence. but claimed that the evid('nce <·on-
talned In the record introduced by the plaln-
tl« showed that the bonds and coupons 
therefrom. upon which this action was 
brou~ht, were Invalid. The plalntltr con-
tended that the validity of said bonds and 
coupons bad been established In the said 
E>qulty case, and that the question was res 
adjmllcata; and the court so dt'<'lde<l. To 
rm·erse the judgment of the clrc•ult court In 
this behalf, this writ of ('rror was Mue<l out. 
D. M. Browning, for plalntlrr In error. E. 
E. cook and S. P. Wheeler, for defendant In 
error. 
:Mr. .Justice BROWN, after stating the 
facts as above, delivered the opinion of the 
f'OUrt. 
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As both parties claim an estoppel by vir-
tue of the decree ln the equity suit between 
the 11artles to this suit, It only becomes nec-
essary to consider the etl'ect ot this decree. 
It contains two separate and distinct find-
ings: First. So far as the nine bonds held 
by the German Savings Bank, and Issued 
under the net of November 6, 1849, were con-
cerned, the decree !)J'Onounced them to be 
void; and as to them the Injunction waa 
made perpetual. l<'rom this part o! the decree 
the bank appealed to tide court, by which 
the decree was affirmed. 128 U. S. 526, 9· 
Sup. Ct. 159. Second. As to the eighteen 
bonds Issued under the act o! 1861, and tile 
coupons cut from two other bonds Issued 
under the same act, also held by the Ger-
man Savings Bank, and purporting on the\r 
faee to be of the series Issued under the 
eharter of said Belleville & Eldorado Rall-
ro1ul Company, approved February 22, 181ll, 
tlw det•rt>e utlJutlged In favor of the defend-
ant hunk. nod that the said several bonds, 
and the eoupons thereof, were legal and 
valid obligations against th(' county of 
Franklin; nn1l as to this series the injunc-
tion was dissolved ·and the complainant's 
bill dlsmlMsed. No appeal was tnkt•n from 
this part of the decree by the county of 
Franklin, but It now Insists that th('Re bonds 
are void for the same reasons that tbe 
bonds Issued under tht> act of November 6, 
1849, were adjmlge<l to be void, namely, be--
cause both series wen" h1sued pursuant to 
the same vote, and subjeet to the same con-
dltlon11. 
The reeord of the equity suit does not 
show clearly the ground upon which the 
court based Its dlstlnc·tlon Ix>twt>en the two 
elm~~" of bonds; nor Is It ne<·essary to 1* 
ast·t>rtalned here. It ls sufflelent for the 
purposes of this suit to know that the valid-
ity of these bonds was directly put In IMue 
by the pleadings, and determined adversely 
to the county. The plaintiff alleged lo Its 
bill that thee~ bonds were Invalid by n>ason 
of the non-compliance of the road with cer-
tain eondltlons precedent upon which they 
were Issued, setting up with great particu-
larity all the proceedings prior to the Issue 
of the bonds; reciting the laws under which 
they were claimed to have been authorized; 
and demanding their cancellation and sur-
render upon the ground that the acts of the 
county oftll'<"rs were unauthorized and void. 
and the laws under which they were Issued 
unconstitutional. The entire question of 
their validity was presented and tried upon 
the mertts, and the court could not have dls-
mh1sed the bill as to these bonds without 
holding that they were valid, and the fur-
ther finding that the several bonds and eou-
pons therrof "are valid and Jegal obliga-
tions'' added nothing to the force of the 
dC<'ree dismissing the blll. nnec· 
Tht> defendant's position In this co 
tlon Is that as the entire l'('('(lrd. taken !r 
gether, shows that tbese bOnds were vo , 
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this Court ought not to treat the dscme _of bonds which this court had held to be in-
me court below, adjlldging them t0 9 Valid, valid. ‘The court denied the application of
as W5 ilfljudicata. It is true that were are the relator upon the ground that, in his
certain authorities to the effect that in the pleadings, he did not rely exclusively upon
case of deeds, if the truth plainly fiDllPI1I'8
on the face of the deed, there is, i;€nerall_v
speaking, no estoppel. meaning simply. as
stated by ltlr. Bigelow (Bigelow, Estop. 351,)
"that all parts of the deed are to he con-
strued togcther, and that if an allegation in
the deed which alone would work an es-
toppel upon the parties is explained in an-
other part of the deed, or perhaps another
deed to which reference is made for the pur-
pose, there is ordinarily no estoppel." Lord
Coke also states certain exceptions to the
conclusive effect of records. one of these
being, “where the truth appears in the same
record, as where the defendant is sued by
the wrong name, and enters into a hail-
bond prout the writ, as he must, and then
put in hail by his right name, he who was
arrested is not estopped from pleading in
abatement: or where the record shows that
the judgment relied on as an estoppel has
been reversed in error.” But we know of
no case which goes to the extent of holding
that. where a court having complete juris-
diction of the case has pronounced a decree
upon a certain issue, such issue may be re-
tried in a collateral action, even although
the evidence upon which the case is heard is
sent up with the record. If this were possible,
then in every such case where a judgment
or decree is pleaded by way of estoppel, and
the record shows the evidence upon which
it was rendered, the court in which the es-
toppel was pleaded would have the power to
retry the case, and determine whether a dif-
ferent judgment ought not to have been reu-
dered. The case of Brownsville v. Loague,
129 U. S. 493, 9 Sup. Ct. 327, has perhaps
gone as far in the direction indicated by the
defendant as any case reported in the books;
but it is far from being an authority for the
position assumed here. That was a petition
for a mandamus to enforce the collection of
Judgments of a. circuit court upon certain
the judgments. but opened the facts which
attended the judgments for the purpose of
counting upon a certain act of the legisla-
ture as furnishing the remedy which he
sought, and that by so doing he, in effect,
asked the court to order the levy of a tax to
pay the coupons, and relied upon the judg-
ments principally as creating an estoppel of
a denial of the power to do so. “Thus in-
viter," said the’ chief justice, “to look
through the judgments to the alleged con-
tracts on which they are founded, and find-
ing them invalid for want of power, must
we nevertheless concede to the judgments
themselves such effect, by way of estoppel,
as to entitle the plaintifl‘ ex debito justitize,
_to a writ commanding the levy of taxes un-
der a. statute which was not in existence
when these bonds were issued? * * *
But where application is made to collect
judgments by process not contained in them-
selves, and requiring, to be sustained, refer-
ence to the alleged cause of action upon
which they are founded, the aid of the court
should not be granted when upon the face
of the record it appears, not that mere error
supervened in the rendition of such judg-
ments, but that they rest upon no cause of
action whatever." This. however, does not
touch the question of the binding effect of
judgments when offered in evidence in a
distinct and collateral action. We know of
no case holding their probative effect to be
anything else than conclusive. Had the
plaintiif county desired further to test the
validity of these bonds, it was its duty to
have appealed from this decree, as did the
bank with respect to the bonds which that
court held to be invalid, when the question
of the validity of both issues could have
been heard and determined by this court.
There was no error in the finding of the
court below, and its judgment must be af-
firmed.
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JUDGMENTS. (Cuse No. 48 
tll\S court ought not to treat the decree of 
t\\e court below, adjudging tbem to be Valid, 
as res adjudlcata. It Is true that there are 
(!ertv.\n authorities to the errect tbnt ln the 
ro11e of deeds, It' the truth 11hl.lnly appenrs 
on the face of the deed, there ls, generally 
speak\ng, no estoppel. meaning simply, ns 
stated by Mr. Bigelow (Bigelow, Estop. &11,) 
"that all parts of the deed nre to be con-
strued togl!ther, and that If an allegation In 
the deed \Vhlch alone would work an es-
toppel upon the parties Is explained lu an-
other part of the deed, or perhaps another 
deed to wbkh referenc•e Is made for the pur-
pose, there Is ordinarily no e11toppel." Lor<l 
Coke also states certain exl'eptlons to the 
~on<'luslve effect of records. one of these 
being, "where the truth appears In the same 
record, as where the defendnnt Is sued by 
the wrong name, and entl'rs Into a ball-
bond prout the writ, as he must, and then 
put In bail by his right name, he who was 
arrested Is not estop1>ed from plentlin:: In 
abatement; or where the record shows that 
the Judgment relied on as an estoppel has 
been reversed in error." But we know of 
no eMe wbh·h goes to the extent of hol1llng I 
that, where a court having complete Juris- i 
diction of the case has pronounced a decree I 
upon a certain issue, such issue may be re-
t11ed In a collateral action, even although 
the evldenC"e upon which the case le heard Is 
11eut up with the n-<.'Ord. If this were possible, ' 
then In e\"i!l'Y such cnee where a Judgment 
or decree le pleaded by way of eetoppel, an(J. 
thP. record shows the eYillence UJIOU which 
It was rendered, the court In which the es-
toppel was pleaded would have the power to 
retry the case, and determine whether a dif-
ferent judgment ought not to have been ren-
dered. The case of Brownsville v. Loague, 1 
129 U. s. 493, 9 Sup. Ct. 32i, has perhaps 1 
gone as far In the direction Indicated by tile 
defendant as any case reported In the books; 
but It is far from being au authority for the 
position assumed here. That was a petition 
for a mandamus to enforce the collection of 
Judgments of a circuit court upon certain 
bonds which this court had held to be In-
valid. The court denied the application of 
the relator upon the ground that, In llle 
pleadings, he did not rely exclusively upon 
the Judgments. but opened the facts which 
attended the judgments for the purpose of 
counting upon a certain net of the leg-isla-
ture as furnishing the remedy which be 
sought, and that by so doing he, In errect, 
asked the court to order the le\"y of a tax to 
pay the coupons, and relied upon the judg-
ments principally as creating an estoppel of 
a denial of the power to do so. "Thus In-
vited," said the' chief justice, "to look 
through the judgments to the alleged con-
tracts on which they are founded, and find-
ing them Invalid for want of power, must 
we nevertheless concede to the judgments 
themselves such effect. by way ot' estoppel, 
as to entitle the plalntltT ex debito justltire, 
to a writ commanding the levy of taxes un-
der a statute which was not In existence 
when these bonds were issued? • • • 
But where application Is made to collect 
judgments by process not contained In them-
selves, and requiring, to be sustained, refer-
ence to the alleged cause of action upon 
which they are founded, the aid ot' the court 
should not be granted when upon the face 
of the record It appears, not that mere error 
supervened In the rendition of such Judg-
ments, but that they rest upon no cause of 
action whatever." This. however, does not 
touch the question of the binding eft'ect of 
judgments when olTered In evidence in a 
distinct and collateral action. W~ know of 
no case holding their probative en'.ect to be 
anything else than conclusive. Had the 
plaintiff county desired further to test the 
validity ot these bonds, It was Its duty to 
bn\"e appealed from this decree, as dlcl the 
bank with respect to the bonds which that 
court held to be Invalid, when the question 
of the validity of both Issues could have 
been heard and determined by this court. 
There was no error In the ftncllng of the 
court below, and Its judgment must be af-
firmed. 
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Case X0. 49]
RELEVANCY.
(IILMER v. MORRIS et ai.
(-16 Fed. 333.)
Circuit Court, M. D. Alabama.
In equity.
W. A. Gunter, H. C. Semple, and R. C.
Brickell, for complainant. Tompkins &
Troy, for respondents.
May, 1891.
BRUCE, J. 'l‘he facts appear in the opin-
ion of the court. There was a previous bill
between the same parties, which was dis-
missed by the supreme court of the United
States upon a question of jurisdiction, as
will be seen in case of Morris v. Gilmer,
129 U. S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 289. A new bill
was tiled, and we have for consideration the
sutliciency of the plea of res adjudicata,
which was considered and determined in
the former case, reported in 30 Fed. 476.
The bill in this case and the plea are the
same as in the former case, and the ques-
tion has been again heard upon argument
and brief of counsel on both sides. It is
conceded that the original suit in the state
court was brought to recover the same
shares of stock for which this suit was
brought; that it was by the same complain-
ant against the same defendants; and, as
the bill was dismissed absolutely and the
de01'e6 affirmed on appeal, the defendants
insist that the cause of action set up in the
suit was adjudicated between the parties in
the suit in the state court, and that the
facts set up in the plea constitute a. bar
to the present suit. It will be observed
from the'record in the state court set up
in the plea that the original bill after amend-
ment, and a it stood when the trial was
had, stated a pledge of 120 shares of stock
in 1871 for $6,000, the original cost of the
same, and that this sum on the 30th day of
March, 1871, was paid by a sale of one-half
of the stock, and the remainder, 60 share,
was left to secure the balance of interest
due to Morris. The bill did not allege M15
of recognition on the part of Morris from
that time to the filing of the bill in the state
court, on the 7th day of July, 1884. The
answer of the defendants admitted certain
facts, but denied, by way of conclusion, the
ownership of the stock by the complainant,
and coupled with the answer as a part there-
of, under the state practice, five different
grounds of demurrer, viz.: (1) The facts
alleged show that the demand is stale; (2)
that it is barred by the statute of limita-
tions; (3) the claimant has. an adequate
remedy at law; (4) the bill as amended
makes an entirely diiferent case from that
made by the original bill; (5) there is no
tender alleged lI1 the bill oi.’ the amount ad-
111111911 1° be 11119, and said amount is not
brought int" ¢0urt. Testimony was taken,
and the case was submitted upon the plead-
illgs and evidence Without a previous ruling
1-119011 the demllrrers, and the chancellor, in
vacation, rendered a decree dismissing the
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bill absolutely, which decree was on appeal
aiflrined by the supi-cine court of the state.
80 Ala. 78. The present bill states the
original transaction of 1871 by way ot iii-
d11¢911l911i1. and goes on to state a new and
<lll1'°1‘911t Pledge in 1875 of the same stock
for other debts and for future advances
which were from time to time made", and
the 11119511011 1, can the res adjudicata in
1119 $11119 C‘0\1l't be held to apply to the case
HOW made by the bill in this court?
If 11 11°“? Pledge of the same stock was
1 made in 1875, and if by that it (the stock)
was to be held as security for advances to
be 11111119, and which were afterwards made,
Li1l€lt1h\vil/llt is there in the record of the suit
to fin: stiilttge court that operates as a bar
in the _s;t I119 0Pinion of the chancellor
th t I b e court in the former suit shows
9-_ ie rested his decision on the statute
of limitations. His language is: “The amt
iiitehtost’ lignitatlons is tliei-eforc a bar to the
I 3 '0 themomplaiiiaiit in this cause."
mmt “*1 9- D0131 in the deniurrer, and clear-
ly 1119 Point decided was that the case made
lfiy ltthel bill was barred by the statute of
thin‘ at ons. The issue was not whether
eie were acknowledgments that took the
case °“t °f the °I191‘nti0n of the statute, or
whether a"Ytl1l118 of that sort was proved
or n°t' but °11lb' th-is: whether a case with-
out_such acknowledgment was made by the
' and the question of a new and differ-
gnt Pledge in 1875 was not before the court
Y ally averment in the bill, and the judg-
ment of the court was not invoked upon the-
case as it is now made in this court. The
91151111111118 of the demurrer to the bill in
the state court put the complainant out of
court, and the suggestion of the counsel for
the defendants is that he could have sought
leave to amend hi bill, and state the matter
Which he now claims took the case out of
the °Derat.ion of the statute of limitations.
00399111118 llow that he might have done so.
Yet was he obliged to do so, and did he
110$ have the option to confess the demurrer.
and state new matter by way of amendment,
°r b1'l11S 11 new suit, and state new matter
which would avoid the demurrer? 'l‘he al-
l l0\\‘<‘\ucc of auiendniciits in pleadin.‘-2 “'39
Qertainly not intended to prevent a party
from filing a new suit, if he deems that the
better course. Wells, Res. Adi 5 4403
Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 144; Marsh v.
Masterton, 101 N. Y. 406, 5 N. E. 59-
The V913’ idea of amendment has in it
that of other and new matter, and the es-
1°DDel of the judgment of a court can 01191"
ate only 11D0n the case made and D1‘@$1*11ted
1'01‘ the judgment of the court. If a part?
fails to state e case in his bill of complaint-
and goes out of court on demurrer, the rule
of res adludicata operates as to the case
'““‘1° by his bill and only as 1° 11111‘ case"
Gould v_ Ra“l_0a(i C0 91 U_ S_ 533; Bigelow.
15-_>__155_ "The question, thenfi
defendant W110 has been detea
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Case X o. 49] RELEVANCY. 
mr.lrnH v. MORRIS et al. 
(46 Fed. 333.) 
Circuit Court, M. D. Alabama. May, 1891. 
In equity. 
W. A. Gunter, H. O. Semple, and R. C. 
Brickell, for complainant. Tompkins & 
Troy, for respondents. 
BRUCE, J. 'l'he facts appear In the opin-
ion of the court. There was a p1·e,·Ious bill 
between the same parties, which was dis-
missed by the su11reme court of the United 
States upon a question of jurisdiction, as 
will be seen In case of Morris v. Gilmer, 
129 U. S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 289. A new blll 
was tiled, and we haYe for consideration the 
sutHclency of the plea of res adjudlcata, 
which was considered and determined In 
the former case, reported In 30 .!!'ed. 476. 
The blll In this case and the plea are the 
sawe as In the former case, and the ques-
tion has been again heard upon argument 
and brief of counsel on both sides. It ls 
conceded that the original suit In the state 
court was brought to recover the ume 
shares of stock for which this suit was , 
brought; that it was by the same complain-
ant against the same defendants; and, as 
the bill was dlsm188ed absolutely and the 
decree affirmed on appeal, the defendants 
Insist that the cause of action set up In the 
suit was adjudicated between the parties In 
the suit In the state court, and that the 
factB set up In the plea constitute a bar 
to the present suit. It wlll be observed 
from tire · i-ecord In the state court set up 
In the plea that the original blll after amend-
ment, and as lt stood when the trial was 
had, stated a pledge of 120 shares of stock 
In 1871 for $6,000, the original cost of the 
same, and that this sum on the :lOth day of 
March, 1871, was paid by a sale of one-half 
of tbe stock, and the remainder, 60 shares, 
was left to secm-e the balance of interest 
due to Morris. The bill did not allege acts 
of recognltlon on the part of Morris from 
that time to the filing of the bill In the state 
court, on the 7th day of July, 188!. The 
answer of the defendants admitted certain 
facts, but denied, by way of conclusion, the 
ownership of the stock by the complainant, 
an<l coupled with the answer as a part there-
of, under the state practice, five different 
grounds of demurrer, viz.: (1) The facts 
alleged show that the demand ls stale; (2) 
that it ls barred by the statute of llmlta-
tlons; (3) the claimant has_ an adequate 
remedy at law; (4) the blll as amended 
makes an entirely dUl'.erent case from that 
made by the original bill; (5) there is no 
tender alleged in the bill of the amount ad-
mitted to be due, and said amount is not 
brought Into court. Testimony was taken, 
and the case Was submitted upon the plead-
ings and evidence without a previous ruling 
upon the demurrers, and the <'lmncellor, In 
vacation, ren<lered. a dec1·ee dismissing the 
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bill absolutely, which decree was on appeal 
atD.rmed by the supre1nc court ot the gtate. 
80 Ala. 78. The present bill 11tates th~ 
original transaction of 1871 by way ot in-
ducement, and goes on to state a new and 
dllrerent pledge in 1875 of the same stock 
for other debts and for future ndYances 
which were from time to time made; and 
the question ls, can the res adjudlcata In 
the state court be held to apply to the case 
now made by the b111 in this court? 
It a new pledge of the same stock was 
made lo 1875, and U by that It (the stock~ 
was to be held as security for adYances to 
be ma<le, and which were afterwards made, 
then what is there In the record of the suit 
In the state court that operates as a bar 
to this suit? Tbe opinion of the clJancellor 
In the state court in tbe fOI'Wer sult shows 
that he rested his decision on the statut.e 
of llmltatlone. Hie language ls: "The stat-
ute of llmltatlons le therefo1-e a bar to the 
rights of the complainant In this cause." 
'.rhat was a point in the demurrer, and clear-
ly the point decided was that the case made 
by the bill was barred by the statute of 
lhnltatlons. Tbe Issue wu not wheth'1r 
there were acknowledgments that took the 
case out of the operation of the statute, or 
whether anything of that sort was proved 
or not, but only this: whether a cnse with· 
out such acknowledgment waa made by the 
blll; and the question of a new and dlJrer-
ent pledge in 1875 was not before the court 
by any a verment in the blll, and the judg-
ment of the court was not Invoked upon the 
case as it Is now made In this court. The 
sustaining of the demurrer to the bill In 
the state court put tbe complainant out of 
court, and the suggestion of the counsel for 
the defendants is that be could have sought 
leave to amend bis blll, and state the matter 
Which be now claims took the case out or 
the operation of the statute of limitations. 
Conceding now that he might have done so. 
Yet was he obliged to do so, and did he 
not have the 011tlon to confess the demurrer. 
and state new matter by way of amendmen~ 
or bring a new suit, and state new matter 
Which would avoid the demurrer? The al-
lownnce of amendments In pleading was 
certainly not Intended to prevent a partY 
frolll fl.ling a new suit, If he deems that the 
better course. Wells, Res. Adj. § 440; 
Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 144; l\larsh v. 
Maste11on, 101 N. Y. 406, 5 N. E. 59. 
The very idea of amendment has In ft 
that of other and new matter, and the es-
toppel of the judgment ot a court can oper-
ate only upon the case made and presented 
for the judgment of the court. If a party 
falls to state a case in his bill of complaint, 
and goes out of court on demurrer, the rule 
of res adjudlcata operates as to the case 
made by his bill and only as to that case. 
Gould v. Rnlh·oad Co., 91 U.S. 533; Blgelo":'; 
Estop, PP. 152- 155 The question, then, 
whether a d~fenda~t who h8.S been defeated 
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on demurrer, because he has 110t made 0.
case by the allegations in his bill, can. bring
it new suit to recover the same P101“-ITY
time, and with different conditions, not only
for indebtedness then existing, but to ex-
ist,—that is, a continuing pledge, which in
{mm the salne party, upon supplying the
detects in his first bill.
'i‘he statement of the proposition would
seem to carry its own answer, for how can
the merits of a difierent cause, as set up in
a bill in a second suit, be heard and decided
on a different bill in a former suit, even
when it is between the same parties and for
the same property, or how, in such case, can
the estoppel of a judgment in a former case
operate as an estoppel in the second case?
'l‘he judgment rendered in a cause must be
held to the issues made by the pleadings,
and the estoppel will operate only as to the
issue, and whatever was necessarily involved
in that issue. Presumption will never be in-
dulged in favor of an estoppel beyond what
is necessary to sustain the judgment ren-
dered. Russell v. Place, 9-i U. S. 606; Bige-
low, Estop. pp. 152-155; Barnes v. Rail-
road Co., 122 U. S. 14, 7 Sup. Ct. l0l3;
Black, J udgm. § 242. In Aurora City v.
West, 7 Wall. 82, it is said: The essential
conditions under which the exception of res
adjudicata becomes applicable are "the iden-
tity ot the thing demanded, the identity of
the cause oi‘ the demand, and of the parties
in the character in which they are litigants.”
Can it be maintained that the cause of the
demand in the case in this court is the iden-
tical cause of demand in the state court in
the former suit? The theory of the bill in
the state court seems to be a claim to the
property upon an acknowledged pledge and
trust relation subsisting between the parties
in 1871. The theory of the bill in this case
is that of another pledge at a subsequent
its nature was inconsistent with the run-
ning of the statute of limitations; and that
in fact there was no act of repudiation of
the pledge on the part of Morris prior to
June, 1884. It is claimed, however, that
the question is not simply what point was
decided in the former suit, but what was
necessarily involved in the issue in the for-
mer suit, and that, as the right to the stock
in question wa in issue, the matter now
sought to be litigated is res adjudicata in
the former suit. True, the same property
is claimed here that was claimed in the
former suit, but on a diiferent ground, as
we have seen; and as the judgment in the
former suit was on demurrer to the bill and
did not necessarily involve the question of
property except as there stated, and as an
estoppei must be certain to every intent,
and cannot be extended, in the case of judg-
ments, by implication, beyond matters es-
sential to uphold them, the former judgment
in this case cannot be held to conclude the
right of property to the stock in question,
which is involved alike in both cases. Bige-
low, Estop. pp. SO, 81, 152, 154; Moss v.
Anglo-Egyptian, etc., C0., L. R. 1 Ch. 113-
116.
The questions in this case have already
been considered, and although upon a re-
argument some views have been 1)l'(‘St‘ll\t‘(l
and some authorities cited in addition to
what was presented in the former case, yet
the conclusions reached do not differ from
those expressed in former opinion, reported
30 Fed. 476, and it is not deemed necessary
to go over the same ground again.
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JU llGMENTS. 
_(Case :No. 49 
an demurrer, because he bas not made a 
t-ase by the nllegatlons in hls blll, can bring 
1. new suit to recover the same Pl'Ol>erty 
trom the Ba.llle party, upon supplying the 
defects ln his flrst bill. · 
'fhe statement of the proposition would 
seem to carry its own answer, for bow can 
the merits of a different cause, as set up in 
a bill in a second suit, be heard and decided 
on a ditterent blll in a former suit, even 
when It is between the same parties and for 
the same property, or how, in such case, can 
the estoppel of a judgment in a former C88e 
opel'ate as an estoppel In the second case? 
'fhe judgment rendered In a cause must be 
held to the lssues made by the pleadings, 
and the estoppel will operate only as to the 
isllne, and whatever was necessarily involved 
in that lssue. Presumption wlll never be In-
dulged In favor of an estoppel beyond what 
18 necessary to sustain the judgment ren-
dered. Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606; Bige-
low, Estop. pp. 152-155; Barnes v. Rail-
road Co., 122 U. S. 14, 7 Sup. Ct. 10:13; 
Black, Judgm. I 242. In Aurora City v. 
West, 7 Wall. 82, It ls said: Tbe essential 
conditions under which the exception of res 
adjudlcata becomes applicable are "the Iden-
tity of the thing demanded, the Identity of 
the cause of the demand, and of the parties 
in the character in which they are litigants." 
Can it be maintained that the cause of the 
demand In the case in this court ls the Iden-
tical cause of demand In the state court In 
the former suit? The theory of the bill In 
the state court seems to be a claim to the 
property upon an acknowledged pledge and 
trust relation subsisting between the parties 
In 1sn. The theory of the blll In this case 
Is that of another pledge at a subsequent 
time, and with ditl'erent conditions, not only 
for indebtedness then existing, but to ex-
lst,-that Is, a continuing pledge, which In 
Its nature was Inconsistent with the run-
ning of the statute of lhnltatlons; and that 
In fact there was no act of repudiation of 
the pledge on the l'art of Morris prior to 
June, 1884. It ls claimed, however, that 
the question ls not simply what point wa11 
decided In the former suit, but what was 
necessarily Involved In the Issue In the for-
mer suit, and that, as the right to the stock 
In question was In Issue, the matter now 
sought to be litigated Is res adjudlcata In 
the former suit. True, the same property 
ls claimed here that was claimed In the 
former suit, but on a ditrerent ground, ll!I 
we have seen; and as tile judgment In the 
former suit was on demurrer to the bill and 
did not necessarily Involve the question of 
property except as there stated, and as an 
estoppel must be certain to every Intent, 
and cannot be extended, in the case of judg-
ments, by Implication, beyond matters es-
sential to uphold them, the former judgment 
in this case cannot be held to conclude the 
right of property to the stock In question, 
which Is involved alike In both cases. Bige-
low, Estop. pp. 80, 81, 152, 154; l\:loss v. 
Anglo-Egyptian, etc., Co., L. R. 1 Ch. 113-
116. 
The questions Jn this case have already 
been considered. and although upon a re-
arguwent some views have l>N•n preseult'U 
and some authorities cited in addition to 
what was presented In the former case, yet 
the conclusions reached do not dltler from 
those expressed In former opinion, reported 
30 Fed. 476, and It ls not deemed necessary 
to go over the same ground again. 
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Case No. .30]
RELIC YA N CY.
FREEU.-\.\' et al. v. ALDERSOX ct al.
(7 Sup. Ct. 165. 119 U. S. 185.)
Supreme (fourt of the United States. Nov. 29,
1886.
Error to the circuit court of the United
States for the Northern district of Texas.
This was an action of trespass to try the
title to certain land in Texas. It is the
form in use to recover possession of real
property in that state.
The plaintiffs claimed the land under a
deed to their grantor, executed by the sher-
iff of )IcLennan county, in that state, upon
a sale under an execution issued on a judg-
ment in a state court for costs, rendered
against one Henry Alderson, then owner of
the property, but now deceased. The de-
fendants asserted title to the land as heirs
of Alderson, contending that the judgment
under which the alleged sale was made, was
vo.d, because it was rendered against him
without personal service of citation, or his
appearance in the action.
The material facts of the case, as disclos-
ed by the record, are, briefly, these: On the
sixteenth of July, 1835, a tract of land com-
prising one-third of a league was patented
by Texas to Alderson, who had been a sol-
dicr in its army. One undivided half of
this tract was claimed by D. C. Freeman
and G. R. Freeman, and they brought an ac-
tion against him for their interest. The
pleadings in that action are not set forth in
the transcript, but from the record of the
judgment therein, which was produced, we
are informed that the defendant was a non-
resident of the state, and that the citation to
him was made by publication. There was
no personal service upon him, nor did he ap-
pear in the action. The. judgment, which
was rendered on the first of October, 1858,
was of a threefold character. It first ad-
judged that the plaintiifs recover one undi-
vided half of the described tract. It then
appointed commissioners to partition and di-
vide the tract, and set apart, by motes and
bounds, one-half thereof, according to quan-
tity and quality, to the plaintiffs; and to
make their report at the following term of
the court. And, finally, it ordered that the
plaintiffs have judgment against the defend-
ant for all costs in the case, but stayed ex-
ecution until the report of the commission-
ers should be returned and adopted, and a
filial decree entered.
At the following term the commissioners
made a report showing that they had divid-
ed the tmct into two equal parcels. The re-
port was confirmed. and on the thirty-first of
March, 1859, the court adjudged that the
title to one of.these parcels was divested
i'rom Alderson, and vested in the plaintiffs,
the two l~‘rec-mans. and that they recover all
costs in that behalf against him, which were
$61.45, and that execution issue therefor.
Execution therefor was issued to the sher-
iff of McLennan county on the thirtieth of
.\ia_v directing him to make the amount out
of “the goods, chattels, lands, and tene-
ments" of the defendant. It was levied on
the other half of the divided tract, which re-
mained the defendant's property. On the
fifth of July, 1859, this half was soid by the
sheriff to one James E. Head for $66.79, be-
ing the costs mentioned, and his fees for the
levy and for his deed, which was executed
to the purchaser. In September following.
Head conveyed the premises to D. C. Free-
man for the alleged consideration of $178.
Two of the defendants disclaimed having
any interest. The other defendants, includ-
ing Freeman, so far as their title is disclos-
ed by the transcript, claimed under the sher-
if!'s deed. '
On the trial. the defendants, to show title
out of the plaintiffs, oflered in evidence the
judgment for the costs, the execution issued
thereon, and the sheriff's deed; to the in-
troduction of which the plaintiffs objected,
on the ground that the judgment for costs
was a judgment in personam, and not in
rem, and was rendered against the defend-
ant. who was a non-resident of the state,
without his appearance in the action, or per-
sonal service of citation upon him, but upon
a citation by publication only, and therefore
constituted no basis of title in the purchas-
er under the execution. The court sustained
the objection, and excluded the documents
from the jury; and the defendants except-
ed to the ruling. I\'o other evidence of title
being produced by the defendants, a verdict
was found for the plaintiffs, and judgment
in their favor was entered thereon; to re-
view which the case is brought to this court
on a writ of error.
M. F. Morris. for plaintiffs in error. E. H.
Graham and L. W. Goodrich, for defendants
in error.
Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the case,
delivered the opinion of the court as fol-
lows:
Actions in rem, strictly considered, are
proceedings against property alone treated
as responsible for the claims asserted by the
libclants or plaintiffs. The property itself
is in such actions the defendant. and, ex-
cept in cases arising during war for its hos-
tile character, its forfeiture or sale is sought
for the wrong, in the commission of which
it has been the instrument, or for debts or
obligations for which by operation of law
it is liable. The court acquires jurisdiction
over the property in such cases by its sei-
zure, and of the subsequent proceedings by
public citation to the world, of which the
owner is at liberty to avail himself by ap-
pearing as a claimant in the case.
There is, however, a large class of cases
which are not strictlyactions in rem, but
are frequently spoken of as actions quasi in
rem, because, though brought against per-
sons, they only seek to subject certain prop-
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Case No. :io] UELlff ANCY. 
FRl<~ElIA:S et al. v. ALDEHSO:S <'t al. 
(7 Sup. Ct. 165, 119 U. S. 18aJ 
Supreme Court of the United States. Nov. 29, 
1886. 
May directing him to make the amount out 
of "the goods, chattels, lands, and tene-
ments" of the defendant. It was leYled on 
the other half of the divided tract, which re-
mained the defendant's property. On the 
Error to the circuit court of the United fifth of July, 1859, this half wne sold by the 
Statf'B for the Northt>ra district of Texas. Sherif[ to one Jamt'8 E. Head for $66.79, be-
'.rhls was an action of tres{lllBB to try the Ing the costs mentioned, and hlB Cet>s for the 
title to <oertaln land In Texas. It 18 the levy and for his deed, which was executed 
form In UAC to recover poe8t's.~lon of real to the purchaser. In Seoptt>mber following, 
property In that state. Head conveyed the premlBes to D. C. Free· 
The plulntltrs claimed the land under a man for the alleged consideration of $178. 
de<'d to their grnntor, executed by the sher- Two of the defendants dleclalmed having 
11r of lkLennan county, In that state, upon any lnten>et. The other defendants, lnclud-
a sale under an execution Issued on a judg- Ing Freeman, BO far as their title le cllscloe-
ment In a state court for costs, rendered ed by the trnruwrlpt, claimed under the sher-
agalm1t one Henry Alderson, then owner of Hr'e deed. 
the property, but now deceased. The de- On the trial, the defendants, to show title 
fendants aBSerted title to the land as heirs out of the plaintiffs, olrered ln evidence the 
of AlderROn, contending that the judgment judgment for the costs, the execution IBBUed 
und«>r which the alleged Bale was made, was thereon, and the eherllT'e deed; to the ln-
Yo.d, because It was rendered agalWlt him troductlon of which the plaintiffs objected, 
without personal service of citation, or hie on th~ ground that the judgment for costs 
appearance In the action. was 11. judgment In personam, and not In 
The material facts of the case, as dlscloe- rem, nnd was rendered against the defend-
ed by the record, are, briefly, these: On the ant, who was a non-resident of the state, 
slxt«>entb of July, lS.->5, a tract of 111.nd com- without his appearance In the action, or per-
prlslng one·thlrd of a league was pat«>nted sonal service of citation upon him, but upon 
hy TexaR to Alderson, who bad bet>n a sol- a citation by publl<'fltlon only, and therefore 
<lll'r In Its army. One undlYlded half of constituted no basis of title In the purchas-
thls tract was claimed by D. C. Frt>eman er under the execution. The court sustained 
and G. R. Freeman, and they brought an ac- the objection, and excluded the documents 
tlon ngalnet him for their Interest. The from the jury; and the defendnuts except~ 
pl<•ncllnge In that action are not set forth In ed to the ruling. No other evidence ot title 
tht> tranR<.'rlpt, but from the record of the IM'ln1r produced by the defendants, a verdict 
judgment therein, which wu produced, we I was found for the plaintiffs, and judgment 
are Informed that the defendant wns a non- In their ra,·or was entered thereon; to re-
l'Nli<lPnt of the state, and that the citation to view which thP case le brought to this court 
him was mode by publication. There was on a writ of error. 
no personal service upon him, nor did be ap-
pear In the action. '£he judgwt>nt, whleh 
was rendered on the ftrMt of OctolK'r, 18.">H, 
was of a thret>fold character. It firRt ad-
judgl'd that the plalntllTR recO\·er one undi-
vided holf of the described tract. It then 
appolnfrd commissioners to partition and di-
vide the tract, and set apart, by metes and 
bounds, one·balf thereof, ncrordlng to quan-
tity and quality, to the plalntllrs; and to 
make their report at the following term of 
the court. And. finally, lt ordered that the 
plalntltre have judgment 8Jmlnst the dPf Pnd-
ant for all costs In the <·aHl', hut Rtayt'd t'X-
ecutlon until the report of the commission-
ers should be returned and adopted, and a 
flnnl decree entered. 
At the following term the commissioners 
made a report showing that they had divid-
ed the tract Into two equal pareele. The re-
port was confirmed, and on the thirty-first of 
!'.Iar<'h, 1850, the court adjudged that the 
title to one of. these parcels was divested 
from Alderson, and vested In the plnlntllTs, 
the two Jo'reemans, and that they J'N'O'l"f'r all 
rosts ln thnt IM'half against him, whl<·h wt>re 
$61.46, and that execution IBSUe therefor. 
J<]xecutlon therefor was Issued to the sher-
iff of McLennan county on the thirtieth of 
140 
M. 1''. l\forrls. for pl,alntlffs In error. E. H. 
Graham and L. w. Goodrich, for defenaants 
In error. 
l\lr. Justice FIELD, after stntlng the case, 
dellvered the opinion of the court as fol-
lows: 
ActloDR In rem, strictly confJldered, are 
proceedings against property alone treated 
as responsible for the claims aeeerted by the 
lliM'lnnts or plalntllrs. The property Itself 
ls In such actions the defendant, and, ex-
<>ept In cases arising during war for Its hos-
tile character, Its forfeiture or sale ls sought 
for the wrong, In the commission of which 
It has bM>n the Instrument, or for debts or 
obligations for which by operation of law 
It ls liable. The court acquires jurltldlctlon 
oYer the property In such cases by lte sei-
zure, and of the subsequent proceedings by 
publlc <>ltntlon to the world, of which the 
owner Is at liberty to avail himself by ap-
pearing as a claimant In the case. 
There 18, howevt>r, a large class of cases 
which are not strictly · actions In rem, but 
are frequently spoken of as actions quasi In 
rem, because, though brought agnlnet per-
sons, they onl;y seek to subject certain prop-
GME -
JUD N ‘rs’ [Case No. 50
089 l)9\'5°“3 to the discharge of the
llsllel '
Such are actions in which 1 against the defendant by the tinai
til
judgment of the court. But it there is no
as °f ,,aeri@d-
Qniifls oi non-residents is attached and f1Dpearance 01' the . _
P\'°pert:tl19 discharge of debts due by them me 01' process on bi(l]]I€l‘fet|ill?£a:;,S6aIl1)gC(I)]I(;lesSell:l
1ie14_ file“; of the Hale, and actions for the ii“-8 essential nature, a proceeding in 1-om
wgéice efli °£ irtsgfsggliiriafld 0ther'liei1B- the only eifect of which is to subject the
°“ eed, all i>"°°°‘* 2, _ “=1 1’ or tiieir sole Dl‘0perty attached to the payment of the de-
lild ct the gale 01‘ ° 1191' d1SD0sition of the lnand which the court may flnd to be due to
‘Me fly or the (3.9-f9_m ant to satisfy the de- the plaintiff. That such is the nature of
i>"°K§S 0; the lllfillmfi are in a. general way this proceeding in this latter class of cases
‘$18 designated. But: they fli tfer, among is clearly evinced by two well-established
other things, from no ioéls wliicii are strict- propositions: First. The judgment of the-
iv in rein. in that the rgerest of the defend- court, though in form a personal judgment
int alone soiight tod e‘ afl‘e(¢tvd, that cita- against the defendant, has no effect beyond
2-mu to him is requiie { Yand that Judgment the property attached in that suit. No gen-
tlierein is only c0n¢l\1S \ 0 b£'t\veen the par- eral execution can be issued for any balance
um _ unpaid after the attached _property is ex-
The smte nan jurisdiction over property liausted. 1\o suit can be maintained on such
within its limits owned by non-residents, a Judgment in the same court, or in any oth-
and may therefore subioct. it to the payment er; nor can it be used as evidence in any
of demands against thein of its own citi- other proceeding not affecting the attached
mm 11-_is only in virtue of . its jurisdiction property; nor could the costs in that pro-
ovet me property, as we said on a _foriner cceding be collected of defendant out of any
occasion, that its tribunais can inquire into other property than that attached in the-
the non-residcnfs obligations to its own cit- suit. Second. The court, in such a suit, can-
1-,,@n_<-, and the inquiry can then proceed only not proceed unless the otficer finds some
so far as may be necessary for the disposi-
tion oi the D1'°Pe"ty'
possesses n
It the non-resident
0 property in the state, there is
nothing upon which its tribunals can act.
Pennoyer V.
Nefl, 95 U. S. 723. They can-
not determine the validity of any demand
beyond that Whlfll
is satisfied by the prop-
ex-Q-_ F01‘ any further adjudication the de-
fendant must be personally served with cita-
tion, or voluntarily allpeflr in the 9°35“-
The laws of the state have no operation out-
side oi its territory, except so far as may be
allowed by comity; its tribunals cannot send
their citation beyond its limits, and require
parties there domiciled to respond '10 PTO-
ceedings against them; and publication of
citation within the state cannot create any
greater obligation upon them to 11PP9fl1'-
Pennoyer v. Neil, 95 U. S. 727. So, neces-
sarily, such tribunals can have no jurisdic-
tion to pass upon the obligations of non-resi-
dents. except to the extent and for the pur-
pose mentioned.
This doctrine is clearly stated in Cooper v.
Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, where it became nec-
essary to declare the eifect of a Personal 11°-
tion against an absent party without the
jurisdiction of the court, and not served with
process or voluntarily flllllefmllg 111 the ac"
tion, and whose property was attached, and
sought to be subjected to the payment of the
demand of the resident plaintiff. After stat-
ing the general purpose ot the action, and
the inability to serve process upon the de-
fendant, and the provision of law for attach-
ing his pi-gperty in such cases, the court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, said: “If the
defendant appeatfl, the cause becomes main-
\'_¢ a suit in per-sonam, with the added inci-
dent that the property attached remains
liable, under the control of the court» '10 1111-
swer to any demand which may be estab-
property of defendant on which to levy the
writ of attachment. A return that none can
be found is the end of the case, and deprives
the court of further jurisdiction, though the
publication may have been duly made and
proven in court.” 10 Wall. 318.
To this statement of the law it may be
added what, indeed, is a conclusion from the
doctrine, that while the costs of an action
may properly be satisfied out of the proper-
ty attached, or otherwise brought under the
control of the court, no personal liability for
them can be created against the absent or
non-‘resident defendant; the power of the
court being limited, as we have already said,
to the disposition of the property, which is
alone within its jurisdiction.
The pleadings in the case in which judg-
ment was rendered for costs against Alder-
son are not before us. We have only the
formal judgment, from which it should seem
that the action was to recover an undivided
interest in the property, and then to obtain
a. partition of it, and have that interest set
apart in severalty to the pi!iintiffs,—a sort
of mixed action to try the title of the plain-
tiffs to the undivided half of the property,
and to obtain a. partition of that halt. Such
action, though dealing entirely with the real-
ty, is iiot an action in rem in the strict sense
of the term. It is an action against the par-
ties named, and though the recovery and
partition of real estate are sought, that docs
not change its character as a personal ac-
tion. The jlld,‘.'l1l6‘Ilt therein binds only the
parties in their relation to the property.
The service of citation by publication may
suiiice for the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the court over the property so far as to try
the right to its possession, and to decree its
partition; but it could not authorize the cre-
ation of any personal demand against de-
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tJloSE' persona to the dlRc.•hn.rge ot the 
ert1 of saerted· such are ac'tlona ln wblcll 
"'!Jlls 11 of non-residents ls a tt:ached and 
propert1 we dlacllarge or debts due by theDJ 
11eld for 08 of the state, and n.c.·tlons for the 
to cit11£111eot of mortgages and other liens. 
enforce all proceedings having ror their sole 
indeedttbe sale or other dleposltlon ot the 
object rt1 of the defendant; to sn.t:tety the de-
prope of the ptalntU'l are ln a general way 
1111\Ddlldelllgnated. But t.hey dift'er, among 
tn118 things, from actlollB ~hlcb are strlct-
otber relllt ln that the interest or the defend-
Jy ~ls alone sought to be aft'ected, that clta-
an to him la required, nnd that judgment 
tlon 1 la only conclusive bet-ween the par-there n 
ue;-he state ha& jur\ad\ctlon over property 
wlthln lta Umlta owned by non-residents, 
and maY therefore aublect It to the payment 
of demands against thelll o:f its own cltl-
zena. lt ts onlY ln virtue o:f. lts jurisdiction 
over the property, as we aald on a former 
occasion, that its tribunals can inquire into 
the non-resident's obllgatlons to its own clt-
lzeDB; and the lnquley can then proceed only 
80 far as may be neee888.ry for the disposi-
tion of the property. 1:f the non-resident 
po88K(!e8 no property ln the state, there ls 
nothing upon which \ta tribunals cun act. 
Pennoyer v. Netr, 95 U. S. 723. They can-
not determine the validity of any demand 
beyond that which ls satisfied by the prop-
erty. For any further adjudication the de-
fendant must be personally served with clt.a-
tton, or voluntarily appear in the action. 
The laws of the state have no operation out-
Blde of Its territory, except so far as may be 
allowed by comity; its tribunals cannot send 
their dtatlon beyond lta llmlts, and require 
parties there domiciled to respond to pro-
ceedings against them; and publication of 
cltatlon wlthln tbe atate cannot create any 
greater obligation upon them to appear. 
Pennoyer v. Neft, 95 U. S. 727. So, neces-
sarily, such trtbunala can have no jurisdic-
tion to pa88 upon the obligations of non-resi-
dents, except to the extent and for the pur-
pose mentioned. 
ThlB doctrine le clearly stated In Cooper v. 
Beynolds, 10 Wall. 308, where It became nec-
euary to declare the effect of a personal ac-
tion against an absent party without the 
jurlsdlctlon of the court, and not served with 
proeeu or voluntarily appearing In the ac-
tion, and whose property was attached, and 
11ought to be 111ubjected to the payment of the 
demand of the resident plal11t1ll'. After stat-
lng the general purpose of the action, and 
the tnablllty to serve proceBB upon the de-
fendant, and the provision of law for attach-
\ng bla property In such cases, the court, 
speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, said: ''If the 
defendant appears, the cause becomes main-
ly a BUlt tn personam, with the added Inci-
dent that the property attached remnins 
liable, under the control of the court, to an-
BWer to aB7 demand which may be estab-
[Case No. 5& 
llab~·• J ~ IJ&'B/nst the defendant by the 4nal 
Udgment ol the <:ourt. But It there fs no. 
~Pi>earance ol the defendant, and no serv-
l ce ot process on hfm, the case becomes, in 
ts eBBentJal nature, a proceeding in rem, 
the only effect ol which fs to subject the-
Property attached to the payment o! the de-
mand which the court may find to be due to 
the pJalntl11'. That su<>h fs the nature of 
this procet>dlng in this latter class of cases 
ls clearly evinced by two well-established 
propositions: First. The judgment of th& 
court, though In form a personal judgment 
against the defendant, bas no etfe<:t beyond 
the property attached In that suit. No gen-
eral execution can be issued for any balance-
unpaid after the attached property la ex-
hausted. No suit can be maintained on such 
a judgment in the aame court, or In any oth-
er; nor can It be used as evidence In any 
other proceeding not atrectlng the attached 
property; nor could the cost& In that pro-
ceeding be collected of defendant out of any 
other property than that attached In the· 
suit. Second. '.rbe court, in such a suit, can-
not proceed unless the officer flnds some 
property of defendant on which to levy the-
writ of attachment. A return that none can 
be found Is the end of the l'llBe, and deprives 
the court of further jurisdiction, though th& 
publication may have been duly made and 
proven in court." 10 Wall. 318. 
To this statement of the law It may be-
added what, Indeed, Is a conclusion from the 
doctrine, that while the cost& of an action 
may properly be satisfied out of the proper-
ty att.ached, or otherwise brought under the 
control of the court, no personal liability for 
them can be created against the absent or 
non:resldent defendant; the power of the 
court being limited, as we have already said, 
to the disposition of the property, which 18 
alone within Its jurisdiction. 
The pleadings In the case In which judg-
ment was rendered for costs against Alder-
son are not before us. \Ve have only th& 
formal judgment, from whl<'h It should seem 
that the action was to recover an undivided 
Interest In the property, and then to olltaln 
a partition of It, and have that Interest set 
apart In severalty to the pll'l.lntl!Ts,-a sort 
of mixed action to try the title of the plain-
tiffs to the undivided half of the property, 
and to obtain a partition of that half. Such 
action, though dealing entirely with the real-
ty, Is not an action In rem In the strict sense 
of the term. It ls an action against the par-
ties named, and though the recovery and 
partition of real estate are sought, that does 
not change Its character as a personal ac-
tion. The judirment therein binds only the 
parties In their relation to the property. 
The service of citation by publication may 
sumce for the exercise of the jurisdiction of 
the court over the property so far as to try 
the right to Its possession, and to decree Its 
partition; but It could not authorize the cre-
ation of an7 personal demand against de-
141 
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fendant, even for costs, which could be sat-
isfied OUL of his other property.
The judgment is for all the costs in the
case, and no order is made that they be sat-
isfied out of the property partitioned. Had
satisfaction been thus ordered, no execution
would have been necessary. The execution,
also, is general in its direction, commanding
the sheritf to make the costs out oi’ any
property of the defendant.
The judgment, as far as we costs are con-
cerned, must therefore be treated as a judg-
ment in personam, and, for the reason stat-
142
ed, it was without any binding obligation
upon the defendant; and the execution is-
sued upon it did not authorize the sale made,
and, of course, not the deed of the sheriff.
Were the conclusion otherwise, it would foi-
low, as indeed it is claimed here, that a joint
owner of real property might sue a non-resi-
dent co-tenant for partition, and, having had
his own interest set apart to himself, pro-
ceed to sell out on execution the interest of
his co-tenant for all the costs.
The judgment of the court below must be
afiirmed; and it is so ordered.
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fendant, even for coats, whleh could be aat-
lstled ou~ ot his other property. 
'l'be judgment 111 tor all the costs In the 
case, and no order la made that they be eat-
letled out of the property partitioned. Had 
satisfaction been thus ordered, no execution 
would have been nece88Bry. 1."lle execution, 
also, is general In Its direction, commanding 
the sherltf to make the costs out of any 
property of the defendant. 
The judgment, ae far ae Ule costs are con-
cerned, must therefore be treated ae a judg-
ment In personam, and, for the reason stat-
142 
ed, It was without any binding obligation 
upon the defendant; and the execution Is-
sued upon It did not authorize the sale made, 
and, of course, not tbe deed of the eberUJ. 
\Vere the conclusion otherwise, It would fol-
low, as Indeed It le claimed here, that a joint 
owner of real property might sue a non-resi-
dent co-tenant for partition, and, having had 
bis own Interest set apart to himself, pro-
ceed to sell out on execution the interest of 
hie co-tenant for all the costs. 
The judgment of the rourt below must be 
affirmed; and It le so ordered. 
J UDGMENTS.
[Case No. 51
¢B°S$ v. ARMSTRONG.
(10 14- E- 160. 44 Ohio St. 613.»
Supmme CW11 of Ohio. Jan. 13, 1:537,
mm to district court, Tuscarawas coun-
tyiyhc actioll bl‘-10W was commenced by the
filing in the fllilrt of common pleas of a
petition which, in substance, alleges that the
pm-mm: is the aduiinistrator of William
Mmswong; that the assets are insutficient
,0 pay the debts; and that the defendant is
the widow of the deceased. The intestate,
Apr“ 26, 1870, effected an insurance upon
msiifc, for the sum of $10,000, in the Provi-
dent Life & Trust Company of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, then doing business in Ohio
as an insurance company, and caused the
policy to be made payable on its face to his
wife, Polly Armstrong, the defendant. By
the terms of the policy, the assured, William
Armstrong, agreed to pay, and did annually
D35‘. the sum of $339-1, yearly premium for
such insurance, from the date 01' the policy
until the time of his death, which occurred
March, 1879. The intestate, at the time of
his death, held the policy in his possession.
at his domicile in Ohio. The deceased, the
plaintiff, and the defendant were always cit-
izens of, and domiciled in, this state. After
the death of the assured. the defendant ob-
tained possession of the DOHCY, 00l1€':t9d of
the company the entire amount secured
thereby, and surrendered it to the company;
and she now holds the sum of $7,475-75 Of
the $10,000 received by her, for the use of
the plaintifl, as the representative of the
deceased. To this an answer was tiled, Whlf-'11
alleges in substance-—First. That the Provi-
dent Life & Trust company is 11 <r0rnornt10n
organized under the laws of I‘ennS.vlVflI1i8;
that the insurance contract mentioned in the
petition was effected in that state, to be per-
formed, and was performed, in that state;
and that, by the laws of Pennsylvania, and
by virtue of the contract, the Tight Vested
in the defendant to receive the whole of the
insurance money secured by the D0110!’ T01‘
her sole use and benefit. Se00nd- That -Tilly
25, 1879, the defendant instituted a suit in a
common pleas court, of the city of Philadel-
phia, upon that pclicy. against the insur-
auce company, to recover the $10,000 named
therein; that before plea pleaded the com-
pany came into court, and suggested that
the administrator of William Armstrong
claimed to have some interest in the insur-
ance fund, and prayed for leave to bring
the money into court, and for an interpleader
between the said Polly Armstrong and the
administrator of her husband, touching their
rights, respectively, t0 the D1'°¢‘@ed5 Of Such
insurance; that such leave was granted, and
a rule entered requiring the administrator to
show cause why an interplefldcr should not
be awarded between him and Polly A;-m.
strong to determine their respective Ilghtg
and ownership in the fund agreeably to the
laws of Pennsylvania, a copy of which rule,
under the seal of the court, was, pursuant
to the laws of Pennsylvania and the practice
in said court, delivered to said administrator,
at the county of Tuscarawas and state of
Ohio, together with a letter from the attor-
ney of the company, notifying him that, un-
der the laws of that state, it was necessary
for him to appear. Afterwards, the rule be-
ing made absolute, and the money having
been paid into court, :1 citation was duly
issued under seal, requiring and summoning
the administrator to appear in court and in-
terplead, and notifying him that, in case of
default, the moneys would be awarded to
said Polly, and he declared estopped and
debarred from any further right or claim
therein; which citation, pursuant to the laws
of Pennsylvania, was duly served on the
administrator, by delivering the same to him
at said county of Tuscarawas. The admin-
istrator not appearing, the court adjudged
and decreed that the entire fund be paid to
Polly. and that the administrator be estopped
and debarred from all claims to any part of
aid fund or in the policy of insurance. To
this answer the plaintiff interposed a general
demurrer. The court of common pleas over-
ruled the demurrer, and rendered judgment
for defendant; which judgment was affirm-
ed by the district court. To obtain a reversal
of these judgments the petition in error is
filed in this court.
H. T. Stockwell, for plaintiff in error. J.
T. O’Donnell and Alexis Cope, for defendant
in error.
SPEAR, J. The questions arising in the
case are presented by the demurrer to the
answer. It will be observed that there is
no denial of the allegations that, at the time
of the effecting of the insurance upon the
life of William Armstrong, he and the de-
fendant were residents of and domiciled in
Ohio, and that they continued to so reside
until his death, and sne has ever since re-
sided within the state; that the premiums,
$594 each year, were wholly paid by the
husband; that the debts of the estate are
over $3,000, while the assets are not more
than $700; and that the defendant has re-
ceived from the insurance company the en-
tire amount of the insurance money covered
by the policy, $10,000. The claim of the
plaintiff is based upon the statute of Ohio,
section 3268, while the defendant's claim is
that the rights of the parties are measured
by the laws of Pennsylvania. the place where
the contract was made, and was to be en-
forced, and that those rights have been ad-
judicated upon and determined by the de-
cree and Judgment of the court of common
pleas of Philadelphia, set up in the second
defense of the ans“ er. It is urged that, by
the common law, the contract of insurance is
to be construed by the law of the place where
14-3
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JU UGME~'fS. (Case No. 51 
cttOSS T. AIUISTRONG. 
(1.0 ~. E. 160, 44 Ohio St. 613.) 
Suprell1e Court of Ohio. ;Jan. 18, 1887. 
Error to district court, Tuscarawas coun-
ty 
Tile action below was commenced by the 
tlllng in tbe court of' common pleas of a 
petition wbich, in substance, alleges tbnt the 
plalntlft ls the administrator of William 
A.rmstrong; that the assets are insutncient 
to pay the debts; and that the defendant ls 
the w\doW of the deceased. The intestate, 
April 26, 1870, effected an Insurance upon 
hla Ufe, for tbe sum of' $10,000, In the Provi-
dent Lite & Trust Company of Phllndelphla, 
Peunsylvnn\a, then doing business ln Ohio 
88 an insurance company, and caused the 
policy to be made pa.ya blr on Its face to his 
wlfe, Polly Armstrong, the defendant. By 
the terms of the pollcy, the assured, William 
Armstrong, agreed to pay, and dld annually 
pay, the sum of $594, yearly premium for 
such insurance, from thP. date of the policy 
until the tlme of hie death, which occurred 
Mareh, 1879. The Intestate, at the time of 
his death, held the poUcy In hls possession, 
at hlB domicile In Ohlo. The deceased, the 
plalntUr, and the def'endant were always clt-
lsens of, and domlclled ln, this state. After 
the death of the aseured, the defendant ob-
tained po881!sslon of' the. policy, collected of 
the company the entire amount secured 
thereby, and surrendered It to the company; 
and abe now holds the sum of $7,475.75 of 
the $10,000 received by ber, for the use of 
the plalntlft, as the representative of the 
deceased. To thls an answer wae fl.led, which 
alleges In substance--Flrst. That the Provi-
dent .Life & Trust Company ls a corporation 
organized under the la we of Pennsylvania; 
that the Insurance contract mentioned in the 
petition was effected In that state, to be per-
formed, and was performed, In that state; 
and that, . by the laws of Pennsylvania, and 
by virtue of the contract, the right vested 
1n the defendant to receive the whole of the 
lnlurance money secured by the policy for 
her llOle uee and benefit. Second. That July 
25, 1879, the defendant Instituted a suit In a 
eommon pleas court, of the city of Philadel-
phia, upon that p<'llcy. against the Insur-
ance company, to ret.-over the •10,000 named 
therein; that before plea pleaded the com-
pen1 came Into court. and suggested that 
tbe administrator of William Armstrong 
claimed to have B<'me Interest ID the Insur-
ance fund, and prayed for leave to bring 
the money Into court. and for an lnterpleader 
between the said Polly Armstrong and the 
admlnletrator of ber husband, touching their 
rights, respectively, to the proceeds of such 
Insurance; that such leave was granted, and 
a rule entered requiring the administrator to 
abow cause why an lnterpleader should not 
be awarded between him and Polly Arm-
ltroll( to determine their respective rights 
and ownership In the fund agreeably to the 
laws of Pennsylvania, a copy of which rule, 
under the seal of the court, was, pursuant 
to the laws of Pennsylynnla and the practice 
In said court, dellvered to said administrator, 
at the county of Tuscarawas and state of 
Ohio, together with a letter from the attor-
ney of the company, notlfylng him that, un-
der the lnws of that state, It was necessary 
for him to nppear. Afterwards, the rule be-
ing made absolute, and the money bnvlng 
been pald Into court, a citation was duly 
Issued under seal, requiring and summoning 
the admlnlstrator to appear In court and ln-
terplead, and notifying him that, ln case of 
default, the moneys would be awarded to 
sald Polly. and he declared estopped and 
debarred from nny further right or claim 
therein; which citation, pursuant to the lawa 
of Pennsylvania, was duly served on the 
administrator, by dellverlng the same to him 
at sald county of Tuscarawas. The ndmln-
lBtrator not appearing, the court adjudged 
and decreed thnt the entire fund be pald to 
Polly, and that the admlnlstrator be estopped 
and debarred from all claims to any part of 
said fund or In the pollcy of Insurance. To 
this answer the plalntlfr interposed a general 
demurrer. The court of common pleas over-
ruled the demurrer, and rendered judgment 
for defendant; which judgment wae affirm-
ed by the district court. To obtain a reversal 
ot these judgments the petition ln error ts 
fl.led In this court. 
H. T. Stockwell, for plalntltr ln error. J'. 
T. O'Donnell and Alexis Cope, for defendant 
In error. 
SPEAR, J'. The questions arlslng In the 
case are presented by the demurrer to the 
answer. It wlll be observed that there le 
no denial of the allegations that, at the time 
of the etrectlng of the Insurance upon the 
llfe of Wllllam Armstrong, he and the de-
fendant were residents of and domiciled In 
Ohio, and that they continued to so reside 
until bis death, and sne bas ever since re-
sided within the state; that the premiums, 
'594 each year, were wholly paid by the 
husband; that the debts of the estate are 
over $3,000, while the aSBetB are not more 
than $700; and that the defendant has re-
ceived from the Insurance company the en-
tire amount of the Insurance money covered 
by the policy, $10,000. The claim of the 
plalntl.1r Is based upon the statute of Ohlo, 
section 3268, while the defendant's claim ts 
that the rights of the parties are measured 
by the laws of Pennsylvania, the place where 
the contract was made, and was to be en-
forced, and that those rights have been ad-
judicated upon and determined by the de-
cree and judgment of the court of common 
pleas of Philadelphia, set up In the second 
defense of the ans"\\er. It ls urged that, by 
the common law, the contract of insurance ls 
to be construed by the law of the place where 
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made; that the law of that place governs as
to the nature, obligation, and interpretation
of the contract: that, where the plaintii!
would have no right of action by the law of
the state where the contract was made and
to be performed, he can have none here; and
that, by the laws of Pennsylvania and by
virtue of the contract, the right rested in
the defendant to receive for her own ex-
clusive use the whole of the money secured
by the policy.
Assuming. without holding. that the law
of Pennsylvania is surliciently pleaded in
the answer. and that. unless the question is
determined by the statute referred to, the
claim made by the defendant as to the effect
of the law of Pennsylvania upon the rights
of the parties here is conclusive, how, if at
all, are those rights affected by section 3628
of the Revised Statutes? That section reads
as follows: “Any person may effect an in-
surance on his life, for any definite period
of time, or for the term of his natural life,
to inure to the sole benefit of his widow
and children, or of either, as he may cause to
be appointed and provided in the policy; and
the sum or net amount of insurance becom-
ing due and payable by the terms of insur-
ance shall be payable to his widow or to his
children. for their own use, as provided in
the policy, exempt from all claims by the
representatives and creditors of such per-
sou; but the amount of premium annually
paid on such policy shall not exceed the sum
of one hundred and fifty dollars, and, in case
of such excess, there shall be paid to the
beneficiaries named in the policy such por-
tion of the insurance as the sum of one hun-
dred and fifty dollars will bear to the whole
annual premium, and the residue to the rep-
resentatives of the deceased.”
In obtaining an insurance of this kind, the
manifest intent of the husband is to make
provision for those dependent upon him. a
purpose every way rightful and laudable.
It is to be done by applying, from year to
year, the money of the husband, obtained
from proceeds of his own labor or otherwise,
to the future use and benefit of those who
stand in such relation to him as to give them
a natural claim to his effects, forethought,
and bounty. And, up to a certain point as
to expenditure, such provision may legally be
made. In the same spirit our laws allow to
the widowdowerinlands,use of the mansion
house one year, a homestead right, a year's
support out of the personalty, a given propor-
tion of the residuum after debts are paid. and
certain specific articles of personal property,
if such the deceased possessed. But the
same laws recognize others as having rights
as regards the property of the deceased.
The creditors are not to be wholly ignored.
even though there be a needy widow and
needy children. As to the section referred
to, while it recognizes the right of the hus-
band to make provision for those of the fam-
ily who may survive, to the extent of $150
yearly thus invested, it also provides that,
as to insurance effected by payments over
that sum, it shall inure to the legal represent-
ative. No question is made that, as to con-
tracts with Ohio companies, the statute would
apply. Should it receive such construction
as to confine its operation to that class of
contracts? It is not doubted that it is com-
petent for the general assembly to enact laws
which in effect forbid citizens of the state
from resorting to the courts of sister states
for the purpose of defeating the operation
of laws of Ohio as to questions which affect
the rights of other citizens of Ohio. The law
which gives to a debtor, the head of a family,
and not the owner of a homestead, an exemp-
tion as against a claim of a creditor in at-
tachment, where the sum due the debtor is
shown to be necessary for the support of the
family, is a. law of that kind, inasmuch as it
is held that such creditor may be enjoined
from bringing action in courts out of Ohio
where such exemption could be permitted.
And the law in question, if it applies to
policies issued by companies other than those
organized in Ohio. is an inhibition against
citizens of Ohio placing moneys beyond the
reach of creditors, by entering into contracts
with insurance companies organized out of
this state. It will be noticed that the words
of the statute do not limit its application.
The language is comprehensive, and in terms
it applies to all contracts of insurance obtain-
ed by citizens of the state. Why should we
assume that the legislature intended that, if
the company happens to be a home company,
the statute applies, while,if one located in an-
other state, it does not apply? Why not as-
sume, rather, that that body intended to cor-
rect the mischief which the very enactment
of the statute raises the implication then ex-
isted? It is but the ordinary rule to give
such construction to statutes as will advance
the remedy and correct the mischief. Apply-
ing the law only to home companies would.
in great measure, defeat the very purpose
apparent in this legislation. The general as-
sembly must be assumed to have at least
such general and common knowledge upon
subjects of legislation as is possessed by citi-
zens at large; and it is matter of common
information that the great proportion of pol-
icies written upon the lives of citizens of
Ohio are issued by companies organized out-
side the state, and there is little doubt that
this was true in a larger sense even at the
time this statute was enacted (1847) than it
is now. Statistics, believed to be reliable.
show that, in the year 188-1, out of about 15.-
000 policies and certificates written upon the
lives of citizens of this state. more than 10.-
000 were written by foreign companies. and
out of $33,000,000 gross amount covered by
those policies and certificates nearly $25,000,-
000 were in policies issued by foreign com-
panies. It is probable that. prior to the or-
ganization of the various relief and aid asso-
ciations now so common, the disproportion
144
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Cruse No. 51] U.KLK \'AN CY. 
made; that the law of that plare governs as 
to the nature, obligation, and Interpretation 
of the contract; that, where the plalntur 
would have no right of action by the law of 
the state where the contract was made and 
to be performed, he can have none here; and 
that, by the la we of Pennsylvania and by 
Ylrtue of the contract, the right rested In 
the defendant to receive for her own ex-
<·luslve use the whole of the money secured 
by the policy. 
Assuming, without bohUng, that the law 
of PennsylYania le sutticlently pleaded In 
the answer, and that, unless the question ls 
determined by the statute referred to, the 
claim made by the defendant as to the efl'ect 
of the law of Pennsylvania upon the rights 
of the parties here Is conclusive, bow, If at 
all, are those rights affected by section 3628 
of the Revised Statutes? That section reads 
as follows: "Any person may etfect an in-
surance on hie life, for any definite period 
of time, or for the term of bis natural life, 
to Inure to the sole benefit of hie widow 
and children, or of either, as be may cause to 
be appointed and provided in the policy; and 
the 11um or net amount of Insurance becom-
ing due and payable by the terms of insur-
ance shall be payable to his widow or to bis 
chlldren. for their own use, as provided in 
the policy, exempt from all claims by the 
t't>presentatlves and creditor& of such per-
son; but the amount of premium annually 
paid on such policy shall not exceed the sum 
of one hundred and fifty dollars, and, In case 
of such excess, there shall be paid to the 
beneficiaries named In the policy such por-
tion of the Insurance as the sum of one hun-
dred and fifty dollars will bear to the whole 
annWll premium, and the residue to the rep-
resentatives of the dec•ensed." 
In obtaining an tnsumuce of this kind, the 
manifest Intent of the husband Is to make 
provision for those depencleut upon him, a 
1mrpose every way rl11:htful and laudn ble. 
It 18 to be done by applying, from year to 
year, the money of the husband, obtained 
from proce<>cl11 of his own labor or otherwise, 
to the future use and benefit of those who 
stand In such relation to him as to give them 
a natural claim to his elTe<•ts, forethought, 
and bounty. And, up to a et•rtaln point as 
to expenditure, such provision may leg-ally be 
made. In the same spirit our laws allow to 
the wlclowdowerlnlands, use of the mansion 
hon~ one year, a homestead right, a yenr'<J 
l'npport out of the personalty, a given propor-
tion of the residuum after debts are paid. and 
<0ertaln speclll.c articles of personal pro1wrty. 
If such the de<'eased possessed. But tht> 
same laws recognize others as having rlithts 
as regarcls the property of the decea~l'll. 
The creditors are not to be wholly Ignored, 
eTen though there be a needy widow and 
needy children. As to the section referred 
to, while It recognl7..es the right of the hus-
band to make provision for those of the fam-
ily who may survive, to tbe extent of fl50 
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yeal'ly thu Invested, It also provides that.. 
aa to insurance etreeted by payments over 
that sum, it shall inure to the legal represent-
a tlve. No question ls made that, as to con-
tracts with Ohio companies, the statute would 
apply. Should it receive such constnu·tlon 
as to ron11.ne Its operation to that class o! 
contmcts? It ls not doubted that lt Is com· 
petent for the general assembly to enact laws 
which In efl'ect forbid citizens of the state 
from resorting to the courts of sister states 
for the purpose of clt>featlng the operation 
of laws of Ohio as to questions which affect 
the rights of other citizens of Ohio, The law 
which gives to a debtor, the head of a famlly, 
and not the owner of a homestead, an exemp-
tion as against a claim of a creditor in at-
tachment, where the sum due the debtor la 
shown to be neceseary for the support of the 
family, 18 a law of that kl.nd, inasmuch as It 
ls held that such creditor may be enjoined 
from bringing action In courts out of Ohio 
where such exemption could be permitted. 
And the law In question, If It applies to 
poli<'les Issued by companies other than those 
organized in Ohio, le an Inhibition against 
citizens of Ohio placing moneys beyond the 
reach of creditors, by entering Into contracts 
with insurance companies organized out of 
this state. It wtll be noticed that the words 
of the statute do not ltmtt Its appll<'lltlon. 
The language Is comprehem;Ive, and in terms 
It applies to all contracts of Insurance obtain-
ed by citizens of the state. \\'hy should we 
assume that the legislature intended that, If 
tbe company happens to be a home company, 
the statute applies, while, If one lo<'Rted in an-
other state, It does not apply? Why not as-
sume, rather, that that body Intended to cor· 
rel't the mischief which the very enactment 
of the statute raises the lmpll<'atlon then ex-
isted? It Is but the ordinary rule to gtye 
such construction to statutes as will advan<'f' 
the remedy and correct the mls<'hlef. Apply-
ing the law only to home companies wonld. 
In gl'eat mettsure, defeat the very purpose 
apparent in this legislation. The general as· 
sembly must be aSBumed to have at least 
BU<'h general and ccmmon knowledge upon 
subjects of legislation as ls possessed by citi-
zens at large; and It ls matter of common 
Information that the great proportion of pol· 
leles written upon the lives of citizens of 
Ohio are Issued by companies organized out-
side the state, and there ls ltttle doubt that 
this was true In a larger sense even at the 
time this statute was enacted (1847) than It 
ls now. Statlstl<'S, believed to be rellablP. 
show that, ln the year 1884, out of about t:l.-
000 policies and certificates wrlttl'n upon th<' 
lives of citizens of this state. more than 10 .. 
000 were written by foreign companies. amt 
out of '33,000,000 gross amount coTered by 
those policies and certificates nearly $2fi.OOO.· 
000 were in poli<'les iMned by foreign C'Om-
pantes. It Is probable that. prior to thE' or· 
ganlzatlon of the various reliPf and aid asso-
ciations now so common, the disproportion 
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' was s\*‘“.e5 to this litigufl
tel‘ than thé abo
one essentially in rem, and the court, having
011 are citizens of then obtained jurisdiction of the res, and
. -n
K? gate of Om“, and were when rights un- having given notice according to the laws ot
Q; ms policy accrued. Those rights are be- Pennsylvania, had ample power to hear and
mg m3“¢\i('1\i‘3‘3 in the courts of Ohio. Why
determine, and having so heard and ‘deter-
fihmm ‘pose °°“1't3 1gfl01‘e our own law. or
mined, the parties are bound by the judg-
make “ subordinate to the law of another
State? we think they should not. To do so
Wm“ permit a citizen, largely indebted, to
invest his capital and earnings to an unlimit-
ed amomit tor the benefit or members of his
tamily in insurance contracts in distant states,
thus making a fraud upon deserving cred-
itors, by placing such sums beyond their
reach, notwithstanding such investments
would be in spirit a plain violation of the
spective rights of debtor and creditor. Very
much more might be said in elaboration of
this view, but we deem it unnecessary to
take further space, as we feel confident that
enough has been indicated to make it clear
that the demurrer as to the first defense of
the answer was well taken, and should have
been sustained.
Does the second defense set up in the an-
swer stand in the way of a recovery? The
contention on part ot defendant is that, by
the judgment of the Philadelphia court, the
matter in issue here is res adjudieata, and
this is so, it that court had jurisdiction of
the subject-matter and of the person of the
plaintiff. The record shows that the service
on the plaintiff was by delivering to him in
Ohio a copy of the rule of court requiring
him to show cause why the court should not
give direction to the company to bring the
$10,000, owing by it on the policy, into court,
and why he should not interplead with Mr.
Armstrong as to conflicting rights to suc.h
money, together with a letter from the com-
pany's attorney, advising him to appear. and
by like service afterwards ot a copy oi.’ a
rule absolute, and of citation to appear and
interpiead. Is such notice sutiieient to re-
quire an Ohio administrator to go to another
state to litigate. in the courts of that state,
with a citizen of Ohio, questions arising un-
der the laws of Ohio affecting toe estate
which he represents, or refuse at his peril?
It is probable that no injustice would in this
case be done if the question were put in this
way: Can a resident of Ohio resort to the
courts of another state, and there compel an
administrator, raident of Ohio, and deriving
his authority from the courts of this state. to
litigate a dispute existing between them,
wherein the rights of the administrator de-
pends upon the law of Ohio, tor the express
purpose of evading the effect of our statute,
and of obtaining a judgment which would
be contrary to the law of the domicile of
both?
It is urged that when the company asked
that an interpleader be awarded, and brought
the money owing by it into court, the court
then obtained jurisdiction of the fund. and,
from that time forward, the proceeding was
wn.ous,sv.—-10
inent. That such proceeding could be in rem
seems a. novel doctrine. “In rem” is under-
stood to be a. technical term, taken from the
Roman law, and there used to distinguish
an action against the thing from one against
the person, the terms in rem and in person-
am always being the opposite one of the
other; an act in personani being one done or
V, directed against a specific person, while an
V act in rem was one done with reference t'o
whole policy of our laws regulating the re- ‘
no specific person. but against, or with rel’-
erence to, a specific thing, and so against
whom it might concern, or “all the world."
A proceeding brought to determine the sta-
tus of the thing itself,—the particular thing,
-and which is confined to the subject-mac
ter in specie, is in rem, the judgment being
intended to determine the state or condition,
and. pro facto, to render the thing what the
judgment declares it to be, while a pro-
ceeding which seeks the recovery of a per-
sonal judgment, is in personam. In the for-
mer, process may be scrved on the thing
itself, and by such service, and making proc-
lamation, the court is authorized to decide
upon it without other notice to persons, all
the world being parties, while, in the latter,
in order to give the court power to adjudge,
there must be service upon those whose
rights are sought to be affected. As regards
rights, the terms signify the antithesis of
“available against a particular person,” and
“available against the world at large.” Thus,
“jura in personam" are rights primarily
available “against specific persons; jura in
rem. rights only available against the world
at large." Beyond this, a judgment or de-
cree is in rem, or in the nature of a judg-
ment in rem, while it binds third persons,
such as the sentence of a court of admiral-
ty on a question of prize; or a decree of
other courts upon the personal status or re-
lation of the party, such as dissolution ot
marriage contract, bastardy, etc.; a decree
in probate court admitting a will to probate
and record, granting administrators, etc.; or
a decree of a court of a. foreign country as
to the status of a person domiciled there.
We quote from Freem. Judgm. the defini-
tion of “judgment in rem" given by that
author: “An adjudication against some per-
son or thing, or upon the status oi‘ some sub-
ject-matter, which. whenever and wherever
binding upon any person. is equally binding
upon all persons." In contract. a judgment
in personam is. “in form, as well as sub-
stance. between the parties claiming the
right; and that it is so inter partes appears
by the record itself.” Woodrufl v. Taylor,
20 Vt. 65. From all which it appears that a
judgment in rem. at least when against any-
thing, may bind the res in the absence oi.’
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9-ter than the above figures show. one essentially In rem, and the court, having 
'n\ p-e t\etl to th\s UU.gation are citizens of then obtained jurisdiction of che l'es, and 
'tilt -pat of Ohlo, and Were when rights un- having given notice according to the Jn.ws of 
the ~te •'CY &""'ru d ' \ll.~ p01> '"'" e • 'l:hose rights are be- Pennsyl¥anla. had ample power to hear and ~~ 11.~ud\eated ln the courts of Ohio. Why determine, and having so heard and ·deter-
llllou\O. tbose courts ignore our own law, or mined, the parties are bound by the Judg-
ma.'i.e \t subordinate to the law of another I ment. That such proceeding could be in rem 
state1 we think tbey should not. To do so seems a novel doctrine. "In rem" Is under-
wau\d pet"lll\t a cltlzen, largely Indebted, to stood to be a technical term, taken from the 
ln-vest n\s capital and earnings to an unllmlt- I Roman law, and there ui~ed to <llstlngulsh 
ed amount for the benetlt of memberll of his ! an action agulnst the thing from one against 
fam. Uy\n lnsurance contractslndlstant stat&!, I the person, the terms In rem and In pereon-
thus ma'i.\ng a fraud upon deserving cred- am always being the opposite one of the 
ltoni, by lllaclng such sums beyond their other; an act in personam being one done or 
rench, notw\thstandlng such Investments ! directed agalnart a spe<"llic person, whlle an 
would be In spirit a plain violation of the · act in rem was one done with reference fo 
whole policy of our laws regulating the re- no specific peraon. but against, or with 1-er-
spectlve rights of debtor and c1·e<lltor. Very erence to, a specific thing, and so agalnHt 
much more might be said In elalJoration of whom It might concern, or "all the world." 
this view, but we deem It unnecessary to A proceeding brought to determine the sta-
take further space, as we feel confident that tus of the thing ltself,-the particular thing, 
enough has been indicated to make It clear 1-ilnd which Is confined to the subject-mat-
that the demurrer as to the first defense of ter ln specie, ls in rem, the judgment being 
the answer was well taken, and should have Intended to determine the state or condition, 
been sustained. and. pro facto, to render the thing what the 
Does the second defense set up In the Rn- Judgment deelares It to be, while a pro-
swer stand In the way of 11 reeo¥ery? The C'CNling which seeks the recovery of a per-
contentlon on part of defendant Is that, by sonal judgment, is In personam. In the for-
the Judgment of the Philadelphia court, the mer, process may be serve.d on the thing 
matter In issue here is res adjudlcata, and Itself, and by s1wh service, and making proc-
thls ls so, If that court had jurisdiction of lamution, the court Is authorized to decide 
the subject-matter and of the person of the upon It without other notice to persons, all 
pla\utlfl'. The record shows that the service the world being parties, while, In the latter, 
on the plnlntltr was by delivering to him In In order to give the court power to adjudge, 
Ohio a copy of the rule of court requiring there must be service upon those whose 
him to show cau11e why the court should not rights are sought to be affected. As regards 
give direction to the company to bring the rights, the terms signify the antithesis of 
$10,000, owing by It on the policy, Into (•ourt, "available against a particular person," and 
and why he should not lnterplead with l\Ir. "avallable against tbe world at large." Thus, 
Armstrong as to conflicting rights to such "Jura in personam" are rights primarily 
money, together with a letter from the com- avallal>le "against specific persons; jura In 
pany's attorney, advlsln.ic him to appear, and i rem. rh:hts only a\"allable against the world 
by like service afterwards of a copy of a at lurj!'e." Be~·ond this, a judgment or de-
rule absolute, and of citation to appear and cree Is in rem, or in thE> nature of a judg-
lnterplead. Is such notice sufficient to re- ment In rem, while It binds third persons, 
quire an Ohio admlnh1trator to go to another such as the sentenee of a court of admiral-
state to litigate, In the courts of that state, ty on a question of prize; or a decree of 
'ITlth a citizen of Ohio, questions arl!dug un- other courts upon the })E'rsonal status or re-
der the laws of Ohio affecting hie estate latlon of the party, such as dissolution of 
which he represents, or refuse at his peril? munlnge contract, bastardy, etc.; a decree 
It ls probable that no Injustice would lu this In prolmte court admitting u will to probate 
ease be done lf the question were pUL In this and re<"ord, granting administrators, etc.; or 
way: Can a resident of Ohio resort to the a decree or a court of a foreign country as 
courts of another state, and there compel an to the status of n person domiciled there. 
administrator, resident of Ohio, and deriving We quote from I<'reem. ,Judgm. the deflnl-
hle authority from the courts of this 11t11te. to tlon of "judgment In r<>m" glvE>n by th:it 
litigate a dispute exlstlng between them, author: "An adjudication against some per-
wbereln the rights of the administrator de- Hon or thing, or upon the stutm~ of some sub-
pends upon the law of Ohio, for the express ject-matter, whlc-11. whf'nt>ver and wherever 
purpose of evading the effect of our statute, binding upon uny 11e1·Ron, is PfJlllllly binding 
and of obtaining a jud~Iment which would upon all pPr801111.'' In contmct, a Judgment 
be contrary to the Jaw of the domicile of In personam Is. "In form, as well as sub-
both? stance, between the parties claiming the 
It Is urged that when the company askE>d right; and that It ls so Inter partes appears 
that an lnterpleader be awarded, and brought by the record iti<clf." Woodruff v. Taylor, 
the money owing by It Into court, the court 20 Vt. 6.'i. From nil which It appears that a 
then obtained Jurisdiction of the fund, and, judgnwnt In rem, nt least when against any-
from that time forward, the proceeding was thing, may bind the res in the absence of 
wn.nm• llv_-10 145 
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any personal notice to the parties interested;
but a judgment in personam, as we have
seen, can have no validity except upon serv-
ice on the interested parties, or what is
equivalent to it. Why was the Philadelphia.
action, in its nature, not a proceeding be-
tween parties claiming right to money due
under the policy, rather than u proceeding to
determine the status of such money‘: If it
was the former, then the etiicncy of the judg-
ment depended upon having the parties be-
fore the court so that these conflicting claims
could be adjudicated; if the latter, then it
would appear to be one wherein the court's
judgment would have been effectual and con- i
elusive without reference to whether the
parties were before the court or not;
the rights of both of them could have been
as well settled by the tiling of a bill by the
insurance company, and the bringing of the
money into court, and without the presence,
by service or appearance, of either of the
parties claiming to be interested in the fund.
It was not the status of any particular mon-
and -
ey that was to be determined; for any mon- ~
ey which was a legal tender would have ef-
fectually satisfied the claim of the party
receiving it; nor was there any clahn prima-
rily, by even the widow, much less the ad-
ministrator, to any money in specie;
did either the company or the widow, at any
time, claim or admit that the administra-
tor had any money or property within the i
jurisdiction of the court, or valid claim to
any subject-matter sought to be aflected by
the decree to be rendered. The proceeding
was clearly one of interplender, and that
only. We do not understand that an action
in personam, simply because a debtor brings
money, the right to recover which is in conten-
tion, and gives to the custody of the court a.
sum sufficient to discharge his debt, change
into an action in rem, or that an interpleader
suit is, in its nature, a proceeding in rem.
In the Philadelphia case the company could
have begun the action by original bill, and
obtained a. complete standing in court, if,
with other proper averments, the pleader
had alleged a willingness to bring the mon-
ey into court. Manifestly, the action thus
begun would not have been in rem. Then,
does the mere fact that the company, (the
debtor,) being sued, voluntarily delivers mon-
ey to the clerk of the court, rather than
keep it in its own safe, or to its credit in
bank, or loaned upon call, change the action
from one in personam to one in rem? We
think not.
It will be borne in mind that the Phila-
dephin suit was essentially unlike an at-
tempt to reach, by process of attachment,
the prtperty of an absent party. it was
rather an attempt to estop the administrator
from claiming any recovery against the com-
pany, to draw the estate of William Arm-
strong to a distant state for settlement, and
an attempt to compel the iuiministrator to
litigate, against his will, in a Pennsylvania.
I101‘ ‘
court, a controversy affecting the estate, and
with another resident of Ohio; hence the
class of eases which treat proceedings in
attachment as substantially proceedings in
rem have no application to the case at bar.
If the case made in the answer cannot be
treated as a suit in rem. it appears clear
that the judgment rendered is void, as
against the administrator, for want of ju-
risdiction, at least, of his person. No sup-
port is given that judgment by the consti-
tutional provision, and the act of congress
of 1790 passed pursuant to it, which gives in
all states the same faith and credit to a
judgment of a state as it has by law or
usage in the courts of the state where ren-
dered; for, whatsoever strict construction
was given that provision by the earlier de-
cisions, it is now well B€tll9d that parties
sought to be affected by a judgment ren-
dered in another state are not precluded
from showing that the court wherein the
action was pending had no jurisdiction, ei-
ther of subject-matter or of the person; for,
in order to entitle a judgment rendered to
such full faith and credit. the court must
have had jurisdiction as well of parties as of
subject-matter. The law on this point is well
stated by Johnson, J., in Pennywit v. Foote,
27 Ohio St. 618, as follows: “From a care-
ful review of numerous cases, we find the
rule now well settled that neither the con-
stitutional provision that full faith and cred-
it shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of ev-
ery other state, nor the act of congress pass-
ed in pursuance thereof, prevents an inquiry
into the jurisdiction of the court in which the
judgment oifered in evidence was rendered,
apd such a judgment may be contradicted
as to the facts necessary to give the court
jurisdiction; and, if it be shown that such
facts did not exist, record will be a nullity,
notwithstanding it may recite that they did
exist, and this is true either as to the sub-
ject-matter or the person, or in proceedings
in rem as to the thing." The state of Penn-
sylvania could not extend its sovereignty in-
to the state of Ohio. It could not. in an ac-
tion in personam, compel a citizen of this
state to respond to the process of its courts
served in this state. “No sovereignty can
extend its process beyond its own territorial
limits, to subject either person or property
to its judicial decisions. Every exertion of
authority of this sort beyond this limit is a
mere nullity, and incapable of hindering such
person or property in any other tribunals."
Story, Confl. Laws, § 539. “The jurisdiction
of state courts is limited by state lines, and
upon principle it is diflicult to see how an
order of court, served upon a party out of
the state in which it is issued, can have any
greater effect than knowledge brought home
to the party in any other way. Mere knowl-
edge of the pendency of a suit in the courts
of another state, without service of the pro-
ccss, or an appearance, is not sutiicient, of
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any 1wrMow1l notice to the parties Interested; court, a controvel'IJY aft'.ectlng the estate, and 
I.mt u Jmlg111Pnt In personam, u we have with another resident of Ohio; hence the 
llt'en, can have no validity except upon aerv- claaa of cases which treat proceedings lD 
lee on the Interested parties, f>r what Ill attachment as substantially proceedings In 
equlvall•nt to It. Why was the l'hlladelphla rem have no application to the case at bar. 
action, lu Its nature, not a proceeding be- If the case made In the answer cannot be 
tween parties clalmlna right to money due treated as a suit In rem, It appears clear 
under the policy, rather than 11 procl'('<llng to that the judgment rendered la void, as 
determine the status of such money1 If It against the administrator, for want of ;Ju-
was the forD1er. then the emcacy of the judg- I risdlctlon, at least, of bis penon. No sup-
ment depended upon having the parties be- port ls given tbat judgment by the constl-
fore the court so that these eontllctlng claims 1 tutlonal provlMlon, and the act of congresa 
could be adjudicated; If the latter, then It I of 1700 111u111ed pursuant to It, which gives In 
would appear to be one wherein the court's all states the same faith and credit to a 
judgment would have been effectual and con- · judgment of a state as It bas by law or 
elusive without reference to whether the ! usage In the courts of the state where ren-
partles were before the court or not; and · dered; for, whatsoever strict coDBtructlon 
the rights of both of them could have been ; was given that provh!lon by the earlier d& 
as well settled by the tiling of a bill by the ' clslona, It Is now well seti.Jed that parties 
lnt:urance company, and the bringing of the I sought to be affected by a judgment ren-
money Into court, and without the presence, ' dered In another state are not precluded 
by service or appearance, of either of the from showing that the court wherein the 
parties claiming to be Interested In the fund. action was 11endlng had no jurisdiction, el-
It was not the status of any particular mon- : ther of subject-matter or of the person; for, 
ey that was to be determined; for any mon- · In order to entitle a Judgment rendered to 
ey which was a legal tender would have et- SU<'h full faith and credit, the court must 
tectually satisfied the claim of the party I have had jurisdiction as well of parties as of 
re<'t"lvlng It; nor was the1·e any claim pl'lma- 1 subjt'<'t-matter. The law on this point Is well 
rlly, by even the widow, much less the ad- stated by Johnson, J., In Pennywlt v. Foote. 
mlnlstrator, to any money In specie; nor · 2i Ohio St. 618, as follows: "From a care-
dlcl either the company or the widow, at any : ful review of numerous cases, we ftnd the 
time, claim or admit that the admlDlstra,. 1 rule now well settled that neither the con-
tor had any money or property within the : stitutlonal provision that full faith and cred-
jurlsdlctlon of the court, or valid claim to I It shall be given In each state to tbe public 
any subject-matter sought to be affected by acts, records, and judicial proceedings of H'• 
the decree to be rendered. The proceeding ery other state, nor th£ act of congre88 p&BB-
was clearly one of lnterpleader, and that 1 ed In pul'8uance thereof, prevents an Inquiry 
only. "'e do not understand that an action Into the jurisdiction of the rourt In which the 
lo personam, simply because a debtor brings 1 Judgment offered in evlden<!e was rendered, 
money, the right to recover which ls In conten- · al"d such a judgment may be contradicted 
tlon, and glyes to the custody of the court a as to the facts neceBSary to give the court 
sum sufficient to dls<'harge bis debt, changes jurisdiction; and, If It be shown that such 
into an action In rem, or that an lnterpleader facts did not exist, record · •. 1n be a nullity, 
suit ls, In Its nature, a proceeding In rem. I notwithstanding It may recite that they did 
In the Philadelphia case the company could exist, and this Is true either as to the sub-
have begun the action by original bill, and Ject-matter or the person, or In proceedings 
obtained a complete standing In court, If, In rem as to the thing." The l!ltate of l'enn-
with other proper averments, the pleader sylvanla could not extend Its sovereignty In· 
had alleged a willlngness to bring the mon- to the state of Ohio. It could not, In an ac-
ey Into court. Manifestly, the a<·tlon thus tlon In personam, compel a citizen of this 
begun would not have been In rem. Then, ' state to respond to the process of Its court.a 
does the mere fact that the company, (the sprved In this state. "No sovereignty can 
debtor,) being sued, voluntarily delivers mon- extend Its proceBS beyond Its own territorial 
ey to the clerk of the court. rather than limits, to subjeet either person or property 
keep It In Its own safe, or to Its credit In to Its judicial de<'lslons. Every exertion of 
bank, or loaned upon call, change the action authority of this sort beyond this limit Is a 
from one In personam to one in rem? We mere nulllty, and Incapable of hindering such 
think not. person or property In any other tribunals." 
It wlll be borne In mind that the Phlla- Story, Conti. Laws, § 539. "The jurisdiction 
dephla suit was essentially unlike an at- of state courts ls limited by state lines, and 
tempt to reach, by process of attachment, upon principle It Is difficult to see how an 
the pr< perty of an absent party. It was order of court, set'ved upon a party out of 
mtht>r au attl'lnpt to estop the n<lmlnlstrator the state In which It ls IBSued, can have any 
from claiming any recovery against the com- greatt>r elf Pct than knowledgl brought homP 
pany, to draw the estate of William Arm· to the party In any other way. llere knowl· 
strong to a distant state for settl<>ment, and edsce of the pendency of a suit In the courts 
an attempt to <'OntJl(•l the ndmlnh1tmtor to ot another state, without service of the pro-
lltiiratc, 11.guinst his will, In a l'l•nu11yl\·unla cpi,is, or an appearance, ls not suftlclent, of 
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\e\1.w ° ¢<-1'
The cf!“
me“ “Y a c°“smeYat\°!1 of the policy and
. mus 0‘ °“" Statute, which directs in
fifmcounty 311 administrator may be sued.
gecmm 5031 °§ the Revised Statutes pro-
vmes that 11@'“°“5 against an cxecutor,'ad-
mmistrator, guardian. or trustee may be
\,..(,“g\\\ in the Cmlnty wherein he was ap-
pomted or resides, in which case summons
may issue to any county. When so careful
0. provision is made as to the situs of suits
against administrators in this state, and
while, under the section referred to. this
widow would have been confined to the lim-
it above indicated in the bringing of an ac-
tion in Ohio, to settle the rights of the par-
ties to the amount due on the policy, it would
seem strange. indeed, it she could, by choo-
ing a court in another state, compel the ad-
ministrutor to tollow her there to defend the
claims of the estate he represented. _
We are of opinion that the demurrer to the
answer should have been sustained. Judg-
ments reversed.
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JUDGMENTS. [Case ~o. ~1 
c0in~rom\se the rlgbte of the party 
\\It\!., to ~at~· Ewer v · Cotn.n, 1 Cush. 23. 
'
11 ~: c0nc1¢on we have reached is streogth-
a consideration of the policy u.od ~:\:!DB ot our statute, which directs lo 
what couiiU' an adm\n\strn.tor may be sued. 
Section :)()31 of the Revised Statutes pro-
vldea ttiat actions against an executor,· ad· 
mlnlstmtor, guardian, or trustee may be 
\irought \n tbe county wherein be was ap-
pointed or rer.ldea, ln which case summons 
may mue to any county. When so careful 
a ;>rovlslon la made aa to the situs of suits 
against administrators In this state, and 
while, under the section referred to, thl11 
widow would have been cootlned to the lim-
it above Indicated In the bringing of an ac-
tion In Ohio, to settle the rights of the par-
ties to the amount due on the policy, It would 
seem strange. Indeed, If she could, by choos-
ing a court In another state, compel the ad· 
mlnlstrator to follow her there to defend the 
claims of the estate be represented. • 
We are of opinion that the demurrer to the 
answer should have been 8U8talDed. ludg-
ments reversed. 
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Case No. 52]
RELEVANCY.
CARLISLE v. KILLEBltE\V.
(6 South. 756, 89 Ala. 329.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Nov. 26, 1889.
Appeal from circuit court, Dale county; J.
M. Carmichael, Judge.
This was an action of detinue,and was brought
by the ap llant, R. K. Carlisle, against the ap-
pellee. Jo n G. Killebrew, and sought to recov-
er certain crops taken from the premises by de-
fendant. On the defendant being examined as
a witness in his own behalf, he was asked by
his counsel to “state whether he was put in pos-
session by the sheriff of the lands upon which
the crops were raised." The plaintiff objected
to this question, the court overruled his objec-
tion, allowed the defendant to answer that he
was so put in possession, and the plaintiff ex-
cepted. The bill of exceptions recites: “The
defendant then ofiered in evidence, for the pur-
pose of identifying fraction 12, [the tract of
land on which the crops were alleged to have
been raised, and which are in controvery in this
suit,] a patent, regular on its face, from the
governor of Alabama to Thomas L. Smith, con-
veying said fraction 12. ' ‘ " Defendant
then introduced the deed from T. L. Smith to
M. N.Killebrew,conveying fraction 12 as afore-
said. Said deed was acknowledged and record-
ed as required by law." The plaintiff objected
to the introduction of both the patent and the
deed, and reserved an exception to each of the
court‘s rulings in admitting them. “The de-
fendant then introduced a certified plat of said
section 16 [in ‘which said fraction 12 is sit-
uated] from the oflice of the secretary of state,
to locate said fraction 12 as aforesaid. ” The plain-
tif! objected to the introduction of this certified
plat, the court overruled his ob'ection, and the
plaintiff dulv excepted. “Defen ant then intro-
uced Prof. McCartha. who swore he was a prac-
tical surveyor, and that he had in his hands an en-
larged plat, and which was an exact copy of lat
from secretary of state, and witness propo to
use said enlarged plat in locating fraction 12 forthe
juiz.” Whcreupon the plnintifl objected to the
sai witness using the said enlarged plat. which
objection the court overruled, and the plaintifl ex-
cepted.
After the eneral charge by the court, the plain-
tifl reques the court to give the followingcharge,
which was in writing: “If plaintiff was in the act-
ual and peaceable possession, at the time theplain-
tifl brought this suit, of the lands upon which the
crops were raised, and that defendant had entered
on said land and removed said crops without per-
mission of plaintiff, then the plaintiff must recover
in this action.” The court refused to give this
charge, and the plaintiff duly excepted. The de-
fendant then requested the court to give the fol-
lowing charge, in writing, to the jury: “When
Carlisle, in the defense of the suit brought by Kil-
lebrew for fraction 12, disclnimed being in posses-
sion of fraction 12, this disclaimer devolved upon
the jury the duty of ascertaining whether or not
he was in ossession of fraction 12, and if thejudg-
ment ren cred was against Carlisle on the dis-
claimer, and in favor of Killebrew for rent, Car-
lisle is estopped by the judgment from saying that
he was not in possession of fraction 12, or that he
was not in possession of the articular piece of
land sued for as fraction 12, if it was embraced in
his disclaimer. " The court gave this charge, and
the plaintiffreserved an exception to such giving by
the court. There was judgment for the defendant.
The plaintifl now prosecutes this appeal, and as
signs the various rulings of the court below aserror.
A. L. Millegan, M. E‘. Millegan, and H.
L. Martin, for appellant. H. H. Blackman,
for appellee.
SOMERVILLE. J. The defendant, Kille-
brew, the appellee in t-his case, had, prior to
the present suit, recovered certain premises
from the plaintiff, Carllsle, in a real action in
the nature of ejectment. He was formally put
in possession by the sheriff under a writ of
possession, and under such claim of right
gathered and appropriated the crops of cot-
ton, corn, and fodder growing on the land.
Carlisle afterwards took possession of the
land without resort to the courts, and brought
the present action in detinue to recover the
crops taken away by Killebrew.
1. The general rule of the common law is
that one who recovers land in ejectment is
entitled to the crops then growing on the prem-
ises. they being regarded as part and parcel
of the realty. Mclgean v. Bovee. 24 Wis.
295: Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412; Thweat v.
Stamps, 67 Ala. 96. In other words, “as be-
tween the successful plaintiflf in an action of
ejectment and the evicted defendant, growing
crops are a part of the realty." Van Alen
v. Rogers, 1 Amer. Dec. 113, note, 116.
The statutes of Alabama modify this prin-
ciple only by providing that, if the defend-
ant in ejectment has a crop planted or grow-
ing on the premises recovered from him by
the plaintiff, he may stay the writ of posses-
sion until the expiration of the year, by giv-
ing bond and sureties to the plaintiff to se-
cure the rent to him, which is declared to
have the force and efiect of a judgment up-
on the defendant’s failure to pay the rent at
the expiration of the year. Code 1886. $§
i2712, 2713. No such bond having been giv-
en in this case, this statute can have no bear-
ing on the rights of the parties litigant.
2. The main question in the present suit is
whether the defendant, Killebrew, cain be per-
mitted to introduce in evidence, in this action
for the crops severed from the freehold. the
jwlgment of recovery in ejectment, and, if
so, what force as evidence this judgment will
exert. It is insisted by the appellant that
the court below erred in admitting thisjudg-
meut, and the writ of possession issued on
it, because the question of title to the land
cannot be litigated in a personal action. and
for the further reason that, at common law,
a prior judgment in ejectment was not ad-
missible in a subsequent suit between the
same parties. The former principle, applied
to this case, operates to preclude the plain-
tiff, Carlisle, from challenging the defend-
ant’s right. of possession and title acquired
under his judgment in ejeetment. Beatty v.
Brown, 76 Ala. 267; Striugfellow v. Curry,
Id. 394. The latter rule is so stated bysome-
of the old writeis, and is based upon the use
of fictitious names in the action of ejectuient
proper. which is still tolerated in our form of
practice. But this is not a second action of
ejectmeut in which it is sought to use as ev-
idence a judgment recovered in a former ac-
tion. The present is a personal action, and
the rule applies. as against the plaintiff him-
self. that he cannot collaterally raise the ques-
tion of title to the land by way of showing
iiicidentally his right to the crops severed
from the freehold. Martin v. Thompson, 120
U. S. 376, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586.
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Cll8e No. 52] UELEVANCY. 
CARLISLE v. IULLEBHEW. 
(6 South. 756, 89 Ala. 329.) 
Supreme Court of Alabama. Nov. 26, 1889. 
Appeal from circuit. court, Dale county; J. 
M. Carmichael, Judge. 
This was an action of detinue, and was brought 
by the appellant, R. K. Ce.rlisle, against the ap-
pellee, John C. Killebrew, and sought to recov-
er certain crops taken from the premises by de-
fcnda nt. On the defrn1lnnt bl'iug examined 88 
a witness in his own behalf, he was asked b;y 
his counsel to "11tate whether he was put In po11-
11e1111ion by the sheriff of the lands upon which 
the crops were raised." The plaintiff objected 
to this question, the court overruled hie objec-
tion, allowed the deff'ndnnt to answer that he 
Wll8 so put in possession, and the plaintiff ex· 
cepted. The bill of exceptions recites: "The 
defendant then offered In evidence, for the pur-
p08e of identifying fraction 12, [the tract of 
land on which the crops were alleged to have 
been raised, and which are in controYery in this 
suit,] a patent, regular on its face, from the 
governor of Alabama to Thomas L. !'mith, con-
veying said fraction 12. • • • Defendant 
then introduced the deed from T. L. Smith to 
M. N.Killebrew,conveylng fraction 12 as afore-
said. Said deed was acknowledged and record-
ed 88 required by law." The plaintiff objected 
to the introduction of both the patent and the 
deed, and reserved an exci>ptlon to each of the 
court's rulings in admitting them. "Thi> de-
fendant then introduced a certified plat of said 
section 16 [in "Which said fraction 12 i11 11it-
unted] from the office of the sPcretary of state, 
to locate 11airl fraction 12 n11 aforesaid." The plain-
tiff objected to the introduction of this certified 
plat, the court overrl)led hl11 objection, and the 
plaintiff dulv excepted. "Defendant then intro-
duced Prof. Mccartha, who 11wore he was a prao-
tical surveyor, and thnt he had in his hands an en-
larged plat, and which was an exact copy of plat 
from secretary of state, and witness proposed to 
use said enlarged plat in locating fraction 12 for the jury." Whereupon the plaintiff objected to the 
said wttness using the aald enlarged plat, which 
objection the court overruled, and the plaintiff ex-
cepted. 
After the general charge by the court, the plain-
tiff requested the court to give the following charge, 
which was In writing: "If plaintiff was in the act-
ual and peaceable po1111ession, at the time the plain-
t.Ur brought this 11uit, of the lands upon w)Jich the 
orops were raised, and that defendant had entered 
on said land and removed said crops without per-
mission of plaintiff, then the plaintiff must recover 
in this action." The court refused to give this 
charge, and the plaintiff duly excepted. The de-
fendant then requested the court to give the fol· 
lowing charge, In writing, to the jury: "When 
Carlisle in the defense of the suit brought by Kil-
lebrew for fraction 12, disclaimed being In posses-
sion of fraotion 12, this disclaimer devolved upon 
the jury the duty of ascertaining whether or not 
he was In possession of fraction 12,and if thejudg-
ment rendered was against Carlisle on the dis-
claimer, and in favor of Killebrew for rent, Car-
lisle is estopped by the judgment from saying that 
he was not in possession of fraction 12, or that he 
was not in possession of the particular piece of 
land sued for as fraction 12, if It was embraced In 
his disclaimer." The court gave this charge, and 
the plaintiff reserved an ex<'eptlon to such giving by 
the court. There was judgment for the defendant. 
The plalntlft now prosecutes this appeal, and as 
sign11 the various rulings of the court below as error. 
A. L. Jlillegan, JI. E. Mlllegan, and H. 
L. Martin, for appeilant. H. H. Blackman, 
for appellee. 
SOMERVJI,LE, J. The defendant, Kille-
tirew, the Kpprllee in this C'l\Se, had, prior to 
the present suit, recovered certain premisea 
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from the plaintiff, Carlisle, in a real action lo 
the nature of ejectment. He was formally put 
in possession by the sberitt under a writ or 
pos.<Jession, and under such claim of righ~ 
gathered and appropriated the crops of cot-
ton, corn, and fodder growing on the land. 
Carlisle afterwards took possession ot the 
land without resort to the courts, and brought 
the present action in deti n ue to recover the 
crops taken away by Killeurew. 
1. The general rule of the common law is 
that one who recovers land in ejectment is 
entitled to the crops then growing on the prem-
ises, they being rPg1mled as pa1·t and p11rcel 
of the realty. McLean v. Bovee, 24 Wis. 
295; Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412; Thweat v. 
:Stamps, 67 Ala. 96. In other words, "as be-
tween the successful plaintiff In Kn action of 
ejectment and the e\'icted defen<lant, growing 
crops are a part of the realty." Van Alen 
v. Rogers, 1 Amer. Dec. ll3, note, 116. 
The statutes of Alabam:l modify this prin-
ciple only tiy providing that, if the defend-
ant in ejectment has a crop planted or grow-
ing on the premises recovered from him by 
&he plaintiff, he may stay the writ of posses-
sion until the expiration of the year, by giv-
ing bond Rnd sureties to the plaintiff to se-
cure the rent to him, which is dech1red to-
have the force and effect of a judgment up-
on the defendant's failure to pay the rent at 
the ex pi mtion or the year. Code 1886, §~ 
fu712, 2713. No such bond ha\'ing been gi\·-
en in this case, this statute can h1tve no bear-
Jn~ on the rights of the parties litigant. 
2. The main qnPslion ln the present suit is. 
whether the defendant, Killelmiw, c:in tie per-
mitted to introduce in evidence, in lbisactlon 
for the crops severed from the freehold, the 
ju1lgment of recovery in ejectment, and, It 
so, what force as evidence this judgment will 
exert. It is insisted by the appellant that 
the court below erred in admitting this judg-
ment, and the writ of possession issued on 
it, because the question or title to the land 
cannot be litigated in a personal action, and 
tor the furthi.>r 1·eason that, at common law, 
a prior judgment in ejectment was not ad-
missihle in a s11use•]11tmt suit between the 
same parties. The former principle, applied 
to this case, operates to preclude the plain-
tiff, Carlisle, from challenging the defend-
ant's right of possession and title acquired 
under bis judgment in ejectment. Beatty v. 
Brown, 76 Ala. 2t:i7; StringCellow v. Curry. 
lei. 394. The latter rule is so stated by some 
of the old write1 s, and is ba~Pd upon the use 
of lictitious narne11 in the action of ejectment 
proper, which is still tolerated in our form of 
practice. llut this is not a second action of 
ejectment in which it is sought to use as ev-
idence a jmtgment recovered in a former ac-
tion. 'fhe present is a personal action, and 
the rule applies, as against the plaintiff him-
self, that he cannot collaterally raise the qnes-
tion of title to the land by way of showing 
lnddentally his right to the crops se\'E'l"ed 
from the freehold. .Martin v. Thowpson, 12() 
U. S. 376, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586. 
JUDGMENTS.
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. '0
‘O bar‘ further
in eject“!
P‘“°\_‘°.°' “me! the statute. it re-
w“hct's and judgments for the
suit by the plaintiff
pt, °Y‘“\% V681 action in the nature
of e-1w,“en$- Q-$19 13815. § 2714. But where
the qusflofl ° 1\3\e arises collaterally, as in
M ad‘-,0“ ioi‘ mt‘-9l\e profits, or otherwise, the
record 05 3 r6¢°V_9T§' In ejectrnent is not only
adm-,S._,-Me in evidence in favor of the party
put in po5S€SSl0ll under it, but is conclusive
bewme“ the same parties. and their privies,
on the same title. RS to the question of pos-
session and title. Shumake v. Nelms, 25 Ala.
126; Howard V. Kennedy, 4 Ala. 592; Van
Alen v. Rogers. 1 Amer. Dec. 113, note, 116;
2 Greenl. Ev. § 333; Camp v. Forrest. 13 Ala.
114; 6 Amer. &. Eng. Cyciop. Law. 245q;
Chime v. R»-inecker, 2‘. Pet. 613, 622: Equa-
tor Co. v. Hall. 106 U. S. 86, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep.
128; Caperton v. Schmidt, 85 Amer. Dec. 187,
note, 208. The judgment recovered in the
ejectment suit involved the title and right
of possession of the parties to the present suit
to the same lands, upon which the crops in
dispute were at the time growing, and was
conclusive on collateral attack as lo the title
of the lands, and therefore of the growing
crops which were a part of the freehold at
the time of recovery.
3. The plat of fraction 12 in dispute, pro-
in KN‘
posed to be introduced by the plaintifit‘, was .
ruled out by the court as inadmissible. This ,
was alleged to be the “original plat” of this
land given to the plaintiff as such by the sec-
retary of state. No legal proof was made on
this point, however, and the paper is not be-
fore us for inspection. We cannot say that the
trial court erred in excluding it from the jury.
4. We do not judicially know that thejudg-
ment of ejectment for the recovery of "frac-
tion 12, a part of the S. E. 1 and [of] N. E.
1 sec. 16, T. 4, R. 4, containing 34 75-100
acres,” was void for uncertainty. on the
ground that no such land exists. The record
shows that it was surveyed by the county
surveyor, and was found primu facie correct.
Moreover. the objection taken to the admis-
sion of this judgment, and other parts of the
record accompanying it, was so general and
undefined in its character that it was compe-
tent for the court to ignore it; no ground
of objection whatever being particularized.
Dryer v. Lewis, 57 Ala. 551; March v. Eng-
land, 65 Ala. 275; Steele v. Tutwiler, 57 Ala.
113.
5. The other evidence to which objection
was taken by appellant was admissible to ex-
plain the extent of defendant’s possession,
and to identify the lands on which the crops
in dispute were grown.
6. The court did not err in refusing to admit
in evidence the verdict and judgment in the
criminal prosecution instituted by Killehrew
against the plaintiff, Carlisle, for removing
the crops, in which the latter was acquitted
by the presiding magistrate. A verdict and
judgment in a criminal case is not generally
evidence of the fact upon which the judg-
ment was founded in a civil proceeding. 1
Starkie, Ev. (Sharswood) *36Ii--365.
7. S0 the judgment of the magistrate show-
ing a recovery oi.’ damages by Carlisle against
Killehrew in the action of malicious prosecu-
tion, based on the prosecution last referred
to, is not shown to involve the d8t€l'lll1lliltiOIl
of any fact relevant to the present issues.
The judgment of acquittal, moreover, in the
criminal case, upon which the case of mali-
cious prosecution was based, being inadmis-
, sible as above stated, the latter proceeding
must also be excluded. We find no error in
the record, and the judgment is allirmed.
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JUDGMENTS. [Cll8e No. 52 
ut l'rac\.ic.e. under the statute. it re-\~ 0 1l(O '11lrdicts and judgments for the 1\1\\t~ t. t to bal further suit by the plaintiff 
d11t11n\\.\\n t or tn · l ' 
. . ..... en • e tea action in the nature 
1U e1ec~...- C d 188. 6 
t · t'""ent· 0 e • R 2714 But where o e1ee ,.. t t"tl i li . . the uest.\on O 1 e ar ses collaterally, as m 
an ii:ul)n tor mesne J?l'C\fl_ts. 01' otherwise, the 
record ot a recovery in e1ootment is not only 
admissible \n l'V\dence in favor of the party 
put \n po88ession under it, but is conclusive 
betwet!n tbe same parti1·s. and their privies. 
on the same title, as to the question of pos-
session and title. Shumake v. Nelms, 25 Ala. 
126: Howard v. KenneJy. 4: Ala. 592; Van 
Alen v. Rogers. 1 Amer. Dec.113, note, 116; 
2 Greenl. Ev.§ 333; Camp v. Forrest, 13 Aha. 
114; 6 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 245q; 
Chirac v. R .. ineckl'r, ~ Pet. 613, 622; Equa-
tor Co. v. Hall. 106 U.S. 86, 1 Sup. Ct. Hep. 
128; Caperton v. Schmidt, 85 Amer. Dec.187. 
note, 208. 'fhe judgment recovered In the 
ejectment suit involved the title and right 
of possession of the parties to the present suit 
to the same lands, upon which the crops in 
dispute were at the time growing, and was 
conclusive on collateral attal'k as to the title 
of the lands, and therefore of the growing 
crops which were a part of the freehold at , 
the time of recovery. I 
3. The plat of fraction 12 In dispute, pro- \ 
posed to be introduced by the plainLiff, was '. 
ruled out by the court as inadmissiule. This ! 
was alleged to be the "original plat" of thiis 
land given to the plalntitr as such by the sec-
retary of state. No legal proof wits m11de on 
this point, however, and the paper is not ht--
fore us for inspection. We cannot say that the 
trial court erred in excluding it from the jury. 
4. We do not judicially know that the judg-
ment of ejectment for the recovery of "frac-
tion 12, a part ot the S. E. i and [of] N. E. 
i sec. 16, T. 4, R. 4. containing 34 75-100 
acres," was void for unct1rtainty, on the 
ground that no such land exists. The record 
shows that it was surveyed by the county 
sur\•eyor, and was found primafacie correct. 
.M01·eover, the objection taken to the admis-
sion of this judgment, and other pal'ts of the 
record accomp1mying it, was so general 11nd 
undt>tlned in its character that it was compe-
tent for the court to ignore it; no ground 
of objection whatever being particulnrized. 
Dryer v. Lewis, 57 Ala. 551; March v. Eng-
land, 65 Ala. 275; Steele v. Tutwiler, 57 .Ala. 
113. 
5. The other evidence to which objection 
was taken by appellant was a•lruissible to ex-
plain the extent of defendant's possession, 
and to ldt!ntify the lands on which the crops 
in dispute were grown. 
6. The court did not err in refusing to admit 
in evidence the verdict and judgment in the 
criminal prosecutiQSI instituted by Killebrew 
against the plaintilY, Carlisle, for removing 
the crops, in which the latter was acquitted 
by the presiding magistrate. .A verdict and 
jurlgment in ll criminal case is not generally 
evidence of the fact upon which the judg-
ment was founded in a civil proceeding. 1 
Starkie, Ev. (Sharswoorl) •36:J-365. 
7. So the judgment of the m11gistrate show-
ing a recovery of damages by Carlisle against 
Killebrew in the action of malicious prosecu-
tion, based on the prosecution last referred 
to, i11 not shown to involve the determinat•on 
of any fact relevant to the present issues. 
The judgment of acquittal, moreover, in the 
Cl"iminal case. upon which the case of mali-
cious prosecution was based, being inadmis-
sible as above stated, the latter proceeding 
must. also be excluded. We find no error in 
the record, and the judgment is affirmed. 
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RELE VANCY.
NEEDIIAM v. THAYER.
(18 N. E. 429, 147 Mass. 536.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Hampshire. Oct. 22, 1888.
Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire
county; Dunbar, Judge.
Action upon a judgment obtained by plain-
tiff in the superior court in 1874. The an-
swer alleged, that at the time of the service
of the writ in the suit in which the judgment
was recovered defendant was an inhabitant
of the state of Connecticut, and had no no-
tice of the commencement of the action, or its
pB1l(i0ll('_\'; and that he was not indebted to
plaintiff in the amount for which judgment
was rendered. The court admitted, against
defendant's objection, the record of the for-
mer suit, and excluded evidence in support of
the allegations of the answer. The court
found for plaintiff, and defendant excepted.
D. W. Bond, for defeifdant.
Spellman, for plaintiff.
MORTON. C. J . The question of the validi-
ty of a judgment rendered by a court of this
state against a defendant, who was not a
resident of the state, and who was not served
personally with process within the state, was
considered in Eliot v. McCormick, 144 Mass.
10, 10 N. E. 705. In that case this court, foi-
lowing the decisions in the supreme court of
the United States, held that such judgment
contravened the fourteenth article of the
amendments of the constitution of the Unit-
ed States, and was invalid, and would be re-
versed upon a writ of error. The case at bar
presents the question whether, in a suit in
this state upon such a judgment, the defend-
ant nniy show, by plea and proof, that it is
invalid. The recent cases in the supreme
court of the United States go upon the ground
that a judgment in personam against a per-
son who is not a resident of the state, who
150
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has not been personally served with process,
and who has not appeared, is wholly void,
and that no suit can be nmintained on it,
either in the same or in any other court. Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. T14, T32; Freeman v.
Ald9l‘S0l1, 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Ct. 165. The
court has no jurisdiction, and its judgment
has no force, either in the state in which it
was rendered, or in any other state. This
being so, the judgment cannot be enforced
by a suit upon it; and the non-resident de-
fendant cannot be deprived of his right to
show by plea and proof, if such suit is
brought. that the judgment is void, without
an abridgement of his privileges and immuni-
ties, to protect which was the object of the
fourteenth article of amendment. To com-
pel him to resort to our courts by a writ of
error, in which he must file a bond if he
would obtain a stay of the execution, is to
impose a burden upon him, and thus to
abridge his privileges and immunities. It has
been held in many cases that a domestic judg-
ment cannot be impeached by plea and proof
in a suit brought upon it, because the proper
remedy is a writ of error. Hendrick v.
Whittemore, 105 Mass. 26, and cases cited.
But’ while a state may make laws binding its
own citizens, requiring them to resort to a
writ of error, it cannot so bind citizens of
other states. The case of McCormick v.
Fiske, 138 Mass. 379, seems opposed to our
views. But in that case the question of the
effect of the fourteenth article of amendment
was not raised or suggested to the court, and
therefore is not considered. In the case at
bar the eflect of that amendment is involved.
The defendant’s answer sets up that, at the
time when the original suit was brought
against him, he was a non-resident, and that
no service was made upon him. We are of
the opinion that he had the right to impeach
the judgment by proof of these facts, and
that the ruling rejecting such evidence was
erroneous. Exceptions sustained.
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NEgDHAM v. THAYER. 
(18 N. E. 4:.!9, 147 Ma1111. 036.) 
has not been personally aerved with process. 
and who bas not appeared, ls wholly void, 
and that no suit can be mhlntalned on It, 
Supreme Judicial Court of :MassachUBetta. eltht>r In the same or In any other court. Pen-
Hamr1t1bire. Oct. 22, 1888. noyer v. ~etr, 95 U. S. 714, 732; ~·reeman v. 
Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire J Alderson, 119 U. S. 18.i, 7 Sup. Ct. 165. The 
rounty; Dunbar, Judge. : court has no jurisdiction, and Its judgment 
Action upon a judgment obtained by plain- I has no force, either In the state In which It 
tUr in the superior court In 1874. The an-1 was rendered, or In any other state. This 
swer alleged, that at the time of the service being so, the Judgment cannot be enforced 
of the writ In the 11ult In wblch the Judgment I by a suit upon It; and the non-resident de-
\V&S recovered defendant was an Inhabitant I fendant <'llnnot be deprived of his right to 
ot the state of Connecticut, and had no no- , llbow by 11lt-a and proof, If 11uch suit Is 
Uce of the <."Ommencement of the action. or lt11 brought, that the jt11l!l"mt>nt Is void, without 
peocleu(·y; and that he was not Indebted to an abridgement of his prl vllrges and lmmunl-
plulntll'C In the amount for which judgment ! ties, to protect whl<'h was the object of the 
was rendered. The court admitted, against I fourteenth article of amendment. To com-
defendant'R objection. the record of the for- pel him to resort to our rourts by a writ of 
mer suit, and excluded evidence In support of l error, In which be must ftle a bond If he 
the allegations of the am1wer. The eourt ' would obtain a stay of the execution! Is to 
found for plalntltr, and defendant enepted. I Impose a burden upon him, and thus to 
• I abrld!l"e his prl\"lleges and Immunities. It bas 
D. W. Bond, for defendant. Maynard & J been hehl In man:\· <·ases that a domestic Judg· 
Spellman, for plalntltr. ment (•unnot be impea<•be<l by plea and proof I In a suit brought upon it, because the proper 
MORTON, C. J. The question of the valldl- 1 remedy Is a writ of error. Hendrick v. 
ty of a judgment rendered by a court of this Whittemore, 105 Ma88. 26, and cases cited. 
state against a defendant, who was not a But' while a state may make laws binding Its 
resident of the state, and who was not served own citizens, requiring them to rellOrt to a 
pel'80nally wltb process within the state, was writ of error, It cannot so bind C'ltlzens of 
(•onsldered lo Eliot v. :McCormick, 144 Ma88. other states. The case of McCormick v. 
10, 10 ~. E. 1o;;. In that case this court, fol- Fiske, 138 MasR. 379, seems opposed to our 
lowing the dedslons In the supreme court of views. But In that case the question of the 
the l'nlted States, held that such judgment etrect of the fourteenth article of amendment 
contravened the fourteenth article of the was not raised or suggt>.sted to the court, aml 
amendments of the constitution of the Unit- therefore Is not considered. In the <'ase at 
ed States, and was Invalid, and would be re- bar the effect of that amendment Is Involved. 
versed upon a writ of error. The case at bar The defendant's answer sets up that, at the 
presents the question whether, In a suit In time when the original suit was brought 
this Rtate upon such a judgment, the defend- J against him, be was a non-reshlent, and that 
ant way show, by plea and proof, that It ls no service was made upon him. We are of 
Invalid. The recent cases In the supreme the opinion that be bad the right to Impeach 
court of the United States go upon the ground the judgment by proof of these facts, and 
that a judgment In personam against a per- that the ruling rejecting such evidence was 
aon who Is not a resident of the state, who erroneous. Exceptions sustained. 
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Snore
O‘BRmN "- FRAsn-:R.
(1 Pm" “¥°"'5- 4'? N- J. Law, 349.)
me C°‘“'t °£ New Jersey. Nov. 5, 1885.
of °fl°r'
‘git suit was {OT B malicious prosecution.
The ¢ec\ara'ii°!1 Set forth, in the usual form,
the $005 ch111‘9-Qter of the plaintiff, and that
the Qgfeflflfluti intending to injure her in her
fame and cl-‘edlii without any reasonable
cause, made a charge of perjury against her,
and so caused her arrest and imprisonment
in the county jail until she was discharged
on account of no indictment having been
found against her by the grand jury; that
by means of these facts she was greatly in-
jured in her said credit and reputation, and
brought into public scandal, infamy, and dis-
grace, etc. The plea was the general issue.
Stevenson & Ryle, for plaintifif in error.
A. M. Ward, for defendant in error.
Bl'JASi.EY, C. J. The bills of exceptions
sent up with the writ in this case present
three points for adjudication. These several
propositions will be considered in the order
in which they stand in the brief of the coun-
sel of this plaintiff in error. The basis of
the suit was the arrest and imprisonment of
the plaintiff on an affidavit made by the de-
fendant containing a charge oi‘ perjury, and
which charge, it was asserted, had been
made falsely, maliciously, and without prob-
able cause. The false swearing thus imput-
ed to the plaintiff consisted in a statement
made by her under oath, in a suit between
herself and the defendant, that a certain
bank-book which she had turned over to the
defendant contained a credit of a certain
sum due from the bank to her. Upon the
strength of this aflidavit a justice issued a
warrant, and the plaintiif had been arrested
and imprisoned until she was discharged in
consequence of the grand jury failing to find
an indictment against her. At the trial of
the cause it was admitted by the counsel of
the defendant that the statements of this
aflidavit were altogether untrue, and that
there had been no probable cause for the
arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff on
that particular charge; and the defense was
that, although he signed the aflidavlt upon
which the warrant issued, he did uch act by
mistake; that the charge which he intended
to make was of a dilferent character;
what he meant to dcpose was that the plain-
tiif, on the trial referred to, had sworn false-
ly with respect to a certain amount of cah
she had given him, and not, as it stood in his
affidavit, that she had falsified touching the
contents of the bank-book which she had
transferred to him. In this aspect the de-
fendant was permitted at the trial, when he
was on the witness stand, to testify that he
(lid not intend to charge in his aflidavit that
the plaintiff swore falsely as to the amount
that_
of money placed to her credit in her bank-
book, but that she swore falsely with respect
to the amount of cash she had paid to him,
and that the magistrate before whom he had
laid his complaint, from a misconception of
his statement, inserted the former instead of
the latter accusation, and that he had igno-
rantly taken the oath in that form. This of-
fer of proof was rejected by the court, and,
in eifect, the defendant was not allowed to
prove that he believed that the plaintiff had
perjured herself in her a.ii<\,gation of the
amount of cash she had paid to him, and
that his purpose had been to charge her with
that oifense.
The circumstances of the case are peculiar;
but, upon reflection, I am satisfied that the
testimony thus shut out was admissible. It
is not regarded as legal, on the ground stated
in the brief of counsel, which was that it
helped to support the defendant's statement
that he had not meant to make the particu-
lar accusations contained in his aflidavit;
for such a collateral issue could not be inter-
polated merely by way of confirmation. But
it is conceived that it was legitimate evi-
dence, as it was an essential part of the de-
fense interposed. The case was in this situ-
ation: The defendant‘s aflidavit had been
produced. and it had been proved that its
crimination was without foundation, and
without color of foundation. This the de-
fendant admitted, and he thereby confessed
that he had made a false charge of crime
against the plaintiff, resting on no probable
cause, and that by reason of such improper
action on his part she had been arrested and
imprisoned. If the case had been closed at
this point, the jury would have been con-
strained in right reason to find, not only that
the prosecution had been founded in false-
hood to the knowledge of the defendant, but
that it was consequently malicious, and thus
his liability would have ensued. In this pos-
ture of affairs the defendant could not con-
trovert the fact that the charge that he had
in point of fact sworn to was false and with-
out foundation, but it was still open for him
to disprove the inference that would have
necessarily resulted from the admitted facts
that he had put the law in motion against
the plaintiff from a malicious motive.
The existence of an illegal intention in
this action was as esential to its support
as were the falsity of the crimination and
the absence of reasonable ground for a be-
lief in its truth. In order to manifest a
legal motive for his conduct, the offer was
made to the effect that the charge that he
had meant to make was one touching a
diiferent matter, and that such latter in-
culpation was true according to his belief.
It will be observed that if this had been the
true attitude of the defendant, that is, rea-
sonably believing that the plaintiif had com-
mitted the crime of perjury in the particular
sought to be shown, and he had taken steps
in behalf of public Justice to call her to
151
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
06
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
GENERAL REPUTATION. [Case No. 54 
O'BRIEN v. FR.A.::o;IER. 
(\ ~t\. ~~. 47 N. J. Law, 349.) 
Su~-retne court of New Jersey. Nov. 5, 188r.. 
Wr\t of enor. 
Tb.e suit was for a mnJ.tclous prosecution. 
The declaration set forth, in the usual form, 
the good cb1lracter of the plnlntHr, and that 
the defendant, intending to injure her In her 
fame and credit without any reasonable 
eause, made a charge of perjury against her, 
and l!O caused her arrest and imprisonment 
ln the county jail until she was dl11charged 
on account of no indictment having been 
found against her by the grand jury; that 
by means of these facts she was greatly in-
jured in her said credit and reputation, and 
brought Into public scandal, Infamy, and dis-
grace, etc. The plea was the general Issue. 
Stevenson & Ryle, for plaintiff in error. 
A. M. Ward, for defendant in error. 
BEASLEY, C. J. Tbe bills of exceptions 
sent up with the writ In this case present 
three points for adjudication. These several 
propol!litions will be considered in the order 
In which they stand In the brief ot the coun-
sel of this plalntUf In error. The basis ot 
the suit was the arrest and Imprisonment of 
the plaintiff on an aftldavlt mulle by tbe de-
fendant containing a charge of perjury, and 
which charge, it was asserted, had been 
made falsely, maliciously, and without prob-
able cause. Tl1e false swearing thus !Input-
ed to the plaintlft' consisted in a statement 
made by her under oath, in a suit between 
herself and the defendant, that a certain 
bank-book which she had turned over to the 
defendant contained a credit of a certain 
sum due from the bank to her. Upon the 
strength of this aftldavlt a justice issued a 
warrant, and the plalntUI had been arrested 
a.nd imprisoned untll she was discharged In 
consequence of the grand jury tailing to find 
an indictment against her. At tbe trial of 
the eause It was admitted by the cotm11el of 
the defendant that the statement11 of tbl11 
affidavit were altogether untrue, and thn t 
there had been no probable cause tor the 
arrest and Imprisonment of the plalntlft' on 
that particular charge; and the defense was 
that, although he signed the atfidavlt upon 
which the warrant issued, he did such act by 
mistake; that tbe charge which he intended 
to make was ot a dllferent character; that 
what he meant to depose was that tbe plain-· 
Ulf, on the trial referred to, had sworn false-
ly with respect to a certain amount of cash 
she had given him, and not, as it stood In his 
n1ftdavlt, that she had falsified touching the 
contents of the bank-book which she had 
transferred to him. In this aspect the de-
fendant was permitted at the trial, when he 
was on the witness stand, to testify that he 
did not Intend to charge In hie aftldavlt that 
the plaintiff swore falsely as to the amount 
ot money placed to her credit in her bank-
book, but that she swore falsely with respect 
to the amount of cash she had paid to him, 
and that the magistrate before whom he had 
laid bis complaint, from a misconception of 
his statement, inserted the former Instead of 
the lattet accusation, and that he had igno-
rantly taken the oath in that form. This of-
fer ot proof was rejected by the court, and, 
in effect, the defendant was not allowed to 
prove that be believed that the plaintlft' bad 
perjured herself In her allegation of the 
amount of cash she bad paid to him, and 
that his purpose had been to charge her with 
that olTense. 
Tbe circumstances ot the case are peculiar; 
but, upon reflection, I am satisfied that the 
testimony thus shut out was admissible. It 
ls not rcganled as legal, on the ground stated 
in tbe brier of counsel, which was that it 
helped to support the defendant's statement 
that 11e had not meant to make the particu-
lar accusations contained In his aflidavit; 
for such a collateral issue could not be inter-
polated merely by way of contlrmatlon. But 
It Is conceived that lt was legitimate evi-
dence, as it was an essential part ot the de-
fense interposed. The case was In this situ-
ation: The defendant's aftldavlt bad been 
produced. and It bad been proved that Its 
crlminatlon was without foundation, and 
without color of foundation. This the de-
fendant admitted, and he thereby confessed 
that he had made a faille charge of crime 
against the plalntlft', resting on no probable 
cause, and that by reason ot such Improper 
action on bis part she had been an-ested and 
Imprisoned. It the case had been closed at 
this point, the jury would have been con-
strained in right reason to find, not only that 
the prosel:utlon had been founded in false-
hood to the knowledge of the defendant, but 
that it was consequently malicious, and thus 
hie llablllty would have ensued. In this pos-
ture of a.ft'alrs the defendant could not con-
trovert the fact that the charge that he had 
In point of tact sworn to was false and with-
out foundation, but It was still open for him 
to dlsp1-ove the Inference that would have 
necessarily resulted from the admitted facts 
that he had put the law In motion against 
the plalutlf! from a malicious motive. 
The exlstt>uce ot an llleJ."81 Intention In 
this action was as essential to Its support 
as we1·e the fabiity of the crlmlnatlon and 
the absence of reasonable ground for a be-
lief In Its truth. In order to manifest a 
legal motive tor his conduct, the oft'er was 
made to tbe elTect that the charge that he 
had meaut to make was one touching a 
di!Terent matter, and that such latter ln· 
culpation was true according to his belief. 
It will be observed that If this had been tbe 
true attitude of the defendant, that ls, rea-
sonnhly belle\"lng that the plaintlft' had com-
mitted the crime ot perjury In the particular 
sought to be shown, and he had taken steps 
in behalf of public justice to call her to 
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account, and in that course of law a mis-
take in the atiidavit had supervened, it is
clear that, no matter how negligent he had
been, his motive had not been illegal. Proof
of the naked fact that one charge had been
substituted for another would not of itself
have been a defense to the action, because
it would not have exhibited a legal motive
for the defendant's conduct. It would have
been consistent with such a state oi’ proof
that he had been actuated in the aifair either
by a legal or illegal inducement to the course
taken. In order to test the principle, sup-
pose the defendant had proved that he had
intended to charge a crime upon the plain-
tiff which he knew she had not committed.
but that by mistake he had charged a difl’er-
ent offense, and had caused her imprison-
ment for it, would such proof have been a
defense to this action? Such a contention
very plainly would not have availed. The
defendant could not escape responsibility by :
the subterfuge that the unintended and not '
the intended falsehood had worked the
plaintiff injury. On this side of the case
the question is whether the defendant's
motive was illegal with respect to the course
of law leading to the arrest of the plaintiff,
rather than to the particular mode of pro-
cedure that was adopted. No reason sug-
gests itself why the doctrine should be
made a part of the legal system that when
a person has been subjected to the sulfering
and ignominy to which the plaintiff was
subjected. such person is to be without re-
dress if, through the inadvertence or negli-
gence of the prosecutor, a mistake has been
fallen into with respect to the particular
charge which it was intended to make, no
matter how improper or vicious the purpose
of such prosecutor may have been. As the
case stood before the court below, it had
appeared that the charge made was false;
that there had been no reasonable cause for
beiieving it to be true‘; and the conclusion
is that unless the defendant could show that
his motive for putting the prosecution on
foot was not malicious, that is, was not
such a motive as the law prohibited, the
action was sustained. There was error,
therefore, in rejecting the testimony in ques-
tion.
The second objection urged against the
proceedings at the trial also arises from the
exclusion of proofs offered by the defend-
ant. The defendant. desirous, apparently,
to disparage the general reputation of the
plaintiff in point of morals, asked of a wit-
ness the following question: “Do you know
the reputation of Mrs. Frasier in the city of
Paterson?" This interrogatory, in the form
stated, was overruled; the court directing
the counsel to make the inquiry more spe-
ciflc. The following interrogatories were
then propounded, and were successively
overruled, to-wit: “Are you acquainted with
the general reputation, among her neigh-
bors and acquaintances, of the plaintiff?
Do you know whether the plaintilf has been
charged with crime prior to the complaint
which Mr. O’Brien made against her? Are
you acquainted with the general reputation
which the piaintitfhadamong her friends and
neighbors prior to the time that Mr. O’Brien
made his charge against her? Do you know
whether, prior to the charge that Mr. O’Brien
made against her, the defendant had ob-
tained and acquired the good opinion and
credit of her neighbors? Are you acquaint-
ed with the reputation which Mrs. Frasier
had, prior to Mr. O'Brien‘s charge against
her, for virtue?"
With respect to these inquiries, two topics
are discussed in the briefs of counsel: First,
whether the general character of the plain-
tilf in that action was open to attack; and,
second, this being answered in the affirm-
ative, whether the interrogatories. or any of
them, which were addressed to the witness
were in due form.
Touching the first subject, it is conceiv-
ed that when a plaintiff in a suit for mali-
cious prosecution founds his action in part
on an injury done to his character by such
prosecution. that the legal rule is quite
settled that he thereby puts his general
character in isue. As long ago as the case
of Saviie v. Roberts, reported in 1 Ld. Raym.
37-i, Lord Holt, in defining the damages
which will support a suit of this character,
states, as his first class. those instances
where the only injury consists in the "dam-
age to a man’s fame, as if the matter where-
of he is accused be scandalous.” It would
seem to follow, therefore. that whenever the
action is used as a means of reparation for
an injury in whole or in part done to his
character, the plaintiff in such procedure
must stand in precisely the same attitude
that the actor in an action for libel or slan-
der assumes, and in the latter class of cases
it has been adjudged in th-is court that the
general bad character of the plaintifl at the
time of the alleged grievance is admissible
on the part of the defense in mitigation of
damages. The case indicated is that of
Sayre v. Sayre, 25 N. J’. Law, 235, in which
Chief Justice Green reviews the English
and American decisions on this subject, and
finally declares the class of evidence in ques-
tion is admissible in mitigation oi! damages,
on the broad ground “that it cannot be just
that a man of infamous character should,
for the same libelous matter, be entitled to
equal damages with the man of unblemished
reputation." It is also to be noted in this
connection that in his discussion of this
subject the accurate jurist just mentioned
evidently considered the action for malicious
prosecution based on an injury to character
as in parl materia with the action for libel
or slander, and refers to both procedures
throughout his opinion as resting on the
same general principle. And, indeed, it does
not seem to be deniable that a malicious
prosecution for an indictable and odious
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account, and In that course of law a mts-
take ln the attldavlt bad supervened, It 18 
clear that, no matter how negligent be had 
been, his motive had not been Illegal. Proof 
ot the naked tact that one charge had been 
substituted tor another would not ot Itself 
have been a defense to the action, because 
it would not have exhibited a legal motive 
tor the defendant's conduct. It would have 
been consistent with such a state ot proof 
that he had been actuated In the alralr either 
by a legal or Illegal Inducement to the com°l!e 
taken. In order to test the principle, sup-
pose the defendant had proved that he had 
Intended to charge a crime upon the plaln-
tta which he knew she had not committed. 
hut that by mistake he had <•barged a dlfl'er-
ent offense, and had caused her Imprison-
ment tor It, would such proof have been a 
defense to this action? Such a contention 
very plainly would not ha,·e availed. The 
defendant could not escape reeponslblllty by 
the subterfuge that the unintended and not 
the Intended falsehood had workPd the 
plalntUf Injury. On this side of tilt" <·ase 
the question ls whether the defendant's 
motive was Illegal with respect to the course 
ot law leading to the arrest of the plalntltf, 
rather than to the particular mode ot pro-
cedu1-e that was adopted. ~o reason sug-
gests itself why the doctrine should be 
made a part of the legal system that when 
a person has been subjected to the 1mtrerlng 
and Ignominy to which the plalntltr was 
subjected, such person ls to be without re-
dreSB It, through the Inadvertence or negli-
gence of the prosecutor, a mistake has been 
fallen Into with respect to the particular 
charge which It was intended to make, no 
matter how Improper or vicious the purpose 
of such prosecutor may have been. As the 
case stood before the court below, It had 
appeared that the charge made was false; 
that there had been no reasonable cause tor 
believing It to be true; and the conclusion 
le that unless the defendant could show that 
his motive tor putting the prosecution on 
toot was not malicious, that le, was not 
11ucb a motive as thi! law prohibited, the 
action was sustained. There was error, 
therefore, In rejecting the testimony In ques-
tion. 
The second objection urged against the 
proceedings at the trial also arises from the 
exclusion of proofs offered by the defend-
ant. The defendant. desirous, apparently, 
to disparage the general reputation of the 
plalntllf In point of morals, asked ot a wlt-
uess the following question: "Do you know 
the reputation ot l\lrs. Frasier In the city of 
Patersop?" This lute1Togatory, in the form 
stated, was overruled; the court directing 
the counsel to make the Inquiry more spe-
cific. The following Interrogatories were 
then propounded, and were successively 
overruled, to-wit: "Are you acquainted with 
the geueral reputation, among her neigh-
bors &nd acquaintances, of the plaintiff? . 
iu2 
Do you know whether the plalntta h8.8 been 
charged with crime prior to the complalnt 
wWch Yr. O'Brien made agalDSt her? Are 
you acquainted with the general reputation 
which the plalntttrhadamongher friends and 
neighbors prior to the time that Yr. O'Brien 
made his charge against her? Do you know 
whether, prior to the charge that Mr. O'Brien 
made against her, the defendant had olr 
talned and acquired the good opinion and 
credit of her neighbors? Are you acquaint-
ed with the reputation which .Mrs. Frasier 
had, prior to Mr. O'Brlen·s charge against 
her, for virtue?" 
vnth respect to these Inquiries, two topics 
are discussed ln the briefs ot counsel: 1''1rst, 
whether the general character of the plaln-
tllf In that action was open to attack; and, 
second, this being answered In the aftlrm-
atlve, whether the Interrogatories, or any of 
them, which were addressed to the witness 
were In due form. 
Touching the ftrst subject, It ls conceiv-
ed that when a plalnttfl' In a suit for mali-
cious p1"0secution founds his action In part 
on an Injury done to his character by such 
prosecution, that the legal rule is quite 
settled that he thereby puts Ws general 
charal'ter In Issue. As long ago as the case 
ot Sa¥11e v. Roberts, reported In 1 Ld. Raym. 
374, J..ord Holt, In deftnlng the damages 
which wlll support a suit of this charncter, 
states, as his first <'lass, those lnstanet>S 
where the only Injury conMlsts In the ··dam-
age to a man's fame, as It the matter where-
of he ls accused be scandalous." It wou~d 
seem to follow, thl'retore. that whenever tht" 
action ls used as a ml"ans of reparation for 
an Injury In whole or In part done to his 
chara<'ter, the plaintiff In such procedure 
must stand in precisely the same attitude-
that the actor In an action tor libel or slan-
der assumes, and ln the latter class of cases 
It has been adjudged In this court that the 
general bad character of the plaintiff at the 
time of the alleged grievance ls admissible 
on the part of the defense in mitigation of 
damages. The case Indicated ls that of 
Sayre v. Sayre, ~ N. J. Law, 235, In whl<'h 
Chief Justice Green reviews the English 
and American decisions on this subject, and 
finally deel.a.n>s the claSB of evidence In ques-
tion Is admh~1dble In mitigation of damages, 
on the broad ground ''that It cannot be just 
that a man ot infamous cllftracter should, 
for the same libelous matter, be entitled to 
equal damages with the man of unblemished 
reputation." It is al8o to be noted In this 
connection that In bis dlM<.'uS11lon of thla 
subject the accurate jurist just mentioned 
evidently considered the action tor mallcloUB 
prosecution based on an Injury to charal"ter 
as In part mnterla with the action for libel 
or slander, and refers to both procedures 
throughout hla opinion as resting on the 
same general principle. And, Indeed, It does 
not seem to be deniable that a mallclous 
prosecution for an lndlctable and odloU& 
GENERAL REPUTATION. [Case No. 54
mm" to which is, in some cases,
6 illegal im
Prlsonment and the loss
\
‘:)\t“\“t:“e\-ti’ so that it would be quite ab-
““€ma\ got me Sam? court to declare that
m me actwns ml‘ hh‘~‘-\ the plaintiifs char-
acm -,5 la isms‘, but in actions for malici-
thus framed embraces other than moral
traits of character. It would not be easy
to put the inquiry in a shape at once suc-
cinct and yet comprehensive, so as not to
be open to such a subtle objection, for the
line that separates what is immoral from
oh-nsfl ‘B
0“ “Net-\\tl0ns it is not in issue. And the
dec1S1,,,, 3ust referred to appears to accord
Wm, me great weight of autiiorities, as
will plainly flDiJ9fl1' bl‘ reference to any of
the leading text-books treating of the sub-
jeep 1 Whart. Ev. § 54; Bacon v. Towne,
4 Cusll. 211'; Fitzgibbon v. Brown, 43 .\ie.
169. Evidence as to the bad moral char-
acter of the plaintiff was, it is considered,
plainly admissible in mitigation of damages.
Whether such testimony would have been
proper, if such issue had been presented on
the facts, as a circumstance going to make
up a reasonable cause for the conduct of the
defendant is a question not now sub judice.
With regard to the other branch of thi-
suhject, it seems to me that the form of
some of the questions put to the witness
were unobjectionable. It was not merely
the bad character of the plaintiff on the
point in which it had been viliiied that was
subject to discussion, but her character gen-
erally with respect to morals. That the in-
quiry has .this scope was fully considered and
declared in the case just referred to of
Sayre v. Sayre. Consequently the interrog-
atory thus phrased, “Are you acquainted
‘with the general reputation which the plain-
tiff had among her friends and neighbors
prior to the time that Mr. 0’Brien made his
charge against her?" would seem to have
been all that the rules of practice require.
According to common usage the phrase re-
fers to the general moral character oi‘ the
person referred to, and it seems to savor ‘
of hypercritlcism to suggest that a question
What is indecorous is oftentimes exceedingly
indefinite and indistinct. it will be found,
by referring to the language of the judges
as found in the reports, that the expressions
“bad character" and “general reputation"
are constantly used to signify character and
reputation with regard to morals. And if
this matter were in doubt. the other ques-
tion which was propounderi and overruled,
in the words, “Are you acquainted with the
reputation which Mrs. Frasier had, prior to
Mr. 0'Brien's charge against her, for vir-
tue?” was sufiiciently specific; for the in-
quiry necessarily tested the knowledge of
the witness with reference to the general
moral standing of the plaintiif in public esti-
mation. The result is that these two ques-
tions were improperly overruled.
The third and last exception relates to the
rejection at the trial of the following ques-
tions put by the counsel of the defendant
to one of the witnesses, to-wit: “Do you
know whether, prior to Mr. O'Brien’s charge
against this woman, [the plaintiff,] she was
living in adultery with Mr. '2" It is
plain that the judicial course on this sub-
ject was correct. Particular criminal acts,
as a general rulc, cannot be set up either
against a party or a witness. If the rule
were otherwise, innumerable issues, incapa-
ble of all reasonable trial, would be raised
in the progress of the ordinary suits. It is
not known that any case warrants the
introduction of suclr a species of testimony.
Let the judgment be reversed on the
grounds above defined.
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GENERAL UEl'UT.A.TION'. (Case No. !i4 
\S tJ. l\bel, to 'Wb\eh ta. In some eases, <ll~ dde<l 11\ega.\ imprisonment and the 1088 
~t9' ~1 • BO that lt would be quite ab-
-0t \lta\)(' the ......... • 
a\ fot' -.&Ue court to declare that ~\\e actions tor Ubel the plalntllf's char-
actet \e \ll \11Sue, but in actions for malici-
ous \lrose<·ut\ona lt is not ln Issue. And the 
decl.11\an )USt referred to appears to ae<..'Ord 
with tbe great weight or a.utb011tles, as 
w\U p\alnlY appear by reference to any of 
the \ea.diJlg text-books treating of the sub-
ject. 1 Wbart. Ev. I M; Ba<.'OD v. Towne, 
4 Cush. 217; Fltzglbbon v. Brown, 43 )le. 
169. Evidence as to the bad moral chllr· 
actet of the plalntltr was, it ls considered, 
11lainly admissible ln mitigation of damages. 
Whether such testimony would have been 
proper, if such issue bad been presented on 
the facts, as a circumstance going to iqake 
up a reasonable cauiw for the <.-onduct of the 
defendant ls a question not now sub judlce. 
With regard to the other branch of tbl• 
subject, It seems to me that the form of 
some of the questions put to the wltnese 
were unobjectionable. It was not meri>ly 
the bad character of the plalntur on the 
point In which It had been vllllled that Wll8 
eubJ~t to discussion, but her character gen-
erally with respect to morals. That the In-
quiry lu111 .this scope was fully considered and 
declared ln the case just referred to of 
Sayre v. Sayre. Consequently the interrog-
atory thus phrased, "Are you acquainted 
"with the general reputation which the plain-
tllf bad among her friends and neighbors 
prior to the time that llr. O'Brien made bis 
~barge against her?" would seem to ba,·e 
been all that the rules of practice require. 
According to common usage the phrase re-
fers to the general moral character of the 
person referred to, and It seems to ea vor 
.i hypettrltlclam to suggest that a question 
thus framed embraces other than moral 
traits of character. It would not be easy 
to put the Inquiry In a shape at once suc-
cinct and yet comprehensive, so as not to 
be open to such a subtle objection, for the 
line that separates what le immoral from 
what ls indecorous ls oftentimes exl'eedingly 
Indefinite and Indistinct. It will be found, 
by referring to the language of the judges 
as found In the reports, that the expreeslone 
"bad character" and "general reputation" 
are constantly used to signify character and 
reputation with regard to morals. And If 
this matter were In doubt. the other ques-
tion which was propounded and oYerruled, 
In the words, "Are you acquainted with the 
reputation whlt>h lfrs. Frasier hsd, prior to 
Mr. O'Brien's cberge against her, for vir-
tue?" W118 sufilclently specific; for the In-
quiry nect>118Rrily tested the knowledge of 
the wltne8fl with referenC'e to the general 
moral standing of the plaintUl' in public esti- , 
matlon. The result le that these two ques-
tions were Improperly overruled. 
The third and last exception relates to the 
rejection at the trial of the following ques-
tions put by the counsel of the defendant 
to one of the witnesses, to-wit: "Do you 
know whether, prior to Mr. O'Brien's charge 
I against this woman, [the plaintllf,] she was living In adultery with Mr. --?" It ls 
I plain that the judicial course on this sub-
ject was correct. Pai·ticular criminal acts, 
as a general rule, cannot be set up either 
against a party or a witness. If the rule 
were otherwise, Innumerable Issues, Incapa-
ble of all reasonable t11al, would be raised 
In the progress of the ordinary suits. It ls 
not known that any case warrants the 
Introduction of suclr a species of testimony. 
Let the judgment be reversed on the 
grounds aboTe defined • 
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RELEVANCY.
BACKDAHL et al. V. GRAND LODGE AN-
CIENT ORDER OF UNITED
VVORKMEN.
(48 N. W. 454. -16 Minn. 61)
Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 8. 1891.
Appeal from district court, Uennepin
county: Ran, Judge.
Merrick & Illerrlck, for appellants. W.
H. Adams and E. Southwoi-tll. (Joseph
A. Ecksteiu. of counsel.) for respondent.
COLLINS, J. Plaintiffs, as the heirs of
Alfred Backdahl,deceased,brought this ac-
, tion to recover the amount ol"$2.000 upon
0. beneficiary certificate issued by defend-
ant to him. '1‘he answer denied that
plaintiffs were the heirs, and alleged two
defenses.-—the first, that Backdahl had
been suspended for non-payment of an as-
sessment; second. that he had been sus-
pended for non-payment of dues. When
the trial commenced, plaintiffs moved that
defendant be required to elect between
these two defenses relating to non-pay-
ment. on the ground that they werein-
consistent. The test of consistency in two
defenses is, can the facts pleaded in both
be true? if so. then. although either be-
ing proved, proof of the other may be un-
necessary, they are not inconsistent. As
the two suspensions alleged in the answer
were at different times, fordifferent causes.
effected in different ways, and having dif-
ferent consequences, the last in point of
time being more comprehensive than the
other, and as, notwithstanding theearller,
the defendant might have made the later
suspension. they were not inconsistent.
The verdict was for defendant. Each par-
ty clalms, in effect, to have been entitled
to a direction from the court for a. verdict.
As it is necessary to reverse the order de-
nying a new trial. we will not consider in
detail the 24 assignments of error, many
of them unfounded. but will refer only to
some general questions. which,in all prob-
ability, will arise on a second trial.
l. '1‘o prove that plaintiffs were sole
heirs of Backdahl. they offered in evidence
the decree of the probate court distribut-
ing his estate. This was properly exclud-
ed.for while binding, as to the matters
adjudicated. upon the parties to the ad-
ministration proceedings, it was no evi-
dence of the facts on which it was based
against a stranger to such proceedings, as
was this defendant. To prove they were
such heirs, plaintiffs further offered, and
the court admitted. the testimony of a
witness whose only knowledge in refer-
ence to the subject had been derived from
his acquaintance with the family and with
Backdahi, the witness and the latter re-
siding in this country, the plaintiffs in
Sweden. Although that sortof evidence
is in the nature of hearsay. is based on
hearsay, it is admissible from necessity, be-
cause many times in no other way could
relationship be shown but by proof that
relationship in and to a particular family
was recognized b_v the members of the
family. 1Greenl.Ev.§l06. When such tes-
timony is introduced. it is for the jury to
determine. from the extent of the wit-
ness‘ acquaintanceship with the family
l
l
' as a member. what weight to give it.
and his opportunities forknowingthat its
members recognized the particular persclm
n
this instance, at least, the testimony of
the witnc.-s made a prima tilcie case for
the plaintiffs on the question of kinship.
2. 'l‘hcre was n contest on the evidence
= as to the making and notice to Backdahl
of the assessment for non-payment of
which the suspension set out as a first de-
fense was alleged. It appears from the
constitution of defendant that, when a.
memberentitled to participate in the bene-
ficiary fund dies, the subordinate lodge to
which he belonged is to notify, by a pre-
scrihcd form of death notice, the grand re-
corder of defendant lodge, who, on the
first day of the following month, is to no-
tify each suizordinate lodge. it is then the
duty of the latter to forward to the grand
recorder thebeneficiary fund on hand in
such lodge, (the sum being one dollar for
each certificate. and such sums as may
have been received for certificates re-
newed,') and then to make an assessment
of one dollar upon each member holding a
certificate. An officer of the subordinate
lodge, called a “financier, "is to send writ-
ten or printed notice of the assessment to
each member assessed, and, upon the fail-
ure of any member within the specified
time to pay his assessment, he forfeits all
rights under his certificate. The financier
is required to keep a book wherein all as-
sessments for the beneficiary fun'd shall be
entered against each member holding a
valid certificate. He is also required to
furnish the recorder ofthe lodge the names
of members in arrears upon assessments,‘
and the recorder is to place these names
on the minutes of the lodge, and to mark
the certificates of such members as sus-
pended on the certificate registry book.
So far as the return in this case shows. no
form or mode of making an assessment is
prescribed, and no record thereof required
to be made. except by the financier in the
book kept by him. To tix a member's
duty to pay an assessment, these are the
essential things: A death by reason of
which an assessment may be made; notice
of the death to the grand recorder; the
notice before mentioned to the subordinate
lodge: an assessment in fact: and notice
thereof by the financier to the member.
As the duty to make the assessment is im-
perative, and no form or mode of making
it is prescribed. and no record of it is. re-
quired to be kept. except in the financiei-‘s
book, it is not necessary that such assess-
mcnt be formally made by the lodge, or
that it be entered in the lodge minutes,
though that would doubtless be the bet-
ter way of preserving evidence of the fact.
Hence such assessment may be proven by
parol. and the evidence of it produced up-
gm this trial was sufficient to go to the
ur_v.
3. And so was the testimony as to the
sending of notice to Backdahl. The finan-
cier. whose duty it is to forward no-
tices, could not and would not testify.
positively and specifically, that he mailed
a notice to Backdahl. but he swore to
sending notices of this particular assess-
ment to all of the members of the lodge. as
he supposed, and as he evidently intended
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C111e No. 55] RELEVANCY. 
BACKDAHL et al. v. GRAND J,ODGE AN-
CIE~T ORDER OF UNITED 
WORIOfE~. 
(48 N. W. 454, -16 ::Uinn. fll.) 
Supr«>mP Court of Minnesota. April 8, 1891. 
Appeal from dletrlct court, Hennepin 
count.v: llFa, Judgl'. 
Mn·rit•k & Merrick, for apprllants. W. 
H. Arlmns and E. ,<;;;n11t11wortl1. (Joseph 
A. F,ck . ,teill. of cou1111el,) for re~vondent. 
COJ.LINR, J. Plalntlrfe, ae the helr1t of 
Alfieri H111"k1lahl, decea11e1l, brought tbh1 ac-
tion to rPCO\'er thr amount of$:!.OllO upon 
o. bPnt>fklary certificate h1:med by defend· 
ant to him. 'l'he anewer denied that 
plalntiffe were the heirs, amt alle~ed two 
defenReH.-the tlrst, that Backduhl had 
bet-n su11pemlcd for non-payment of an us-
ses.•nnen t; sel'und. that he bad b~n BUB· 
peuded for non-1myment of due1t. When 
the trlalco111mem·e1I, plnlntlffs moved that 
defendaut be re4ulred to elect bt>tween 
the!IP two defensee relating to non-pay-
ment, on the ground that they Wl'l'e ln-
cousll'tent. The test of consl11tency In two 
deff'n~l!M b1, can the facts pleaded In both 
be true? If so, then, ulthough either be-
ing proved, ,,roof of the other may be un-
ne<~eo11i'ary, they are not lnronfllHtent. AM 
the two Puspeoslooe Alleged In the amnver 
were at dlfft>l'l'nt thnes, fordtrrerentcauRes, 
enected In different ways, and having dif-
ferent consequem·es, the last In polot of 
time being more comprehenHive than the 
other, and as, notwltlu~tundlug the earlier, 
the defendant might have made the later 
l!llNJ>enslon. they were nut Inconsistent. 
The verdict wa11 for defendant. Each par-
ty claims, In effect, to have been entitled 
to a dlrt>ctlon from the court for a \'erdlct. 
As It Is neceli'l'Bry to reverse the order de-
nying a new trial, we will not con111hler In 
detail the 24 asRli;i:nments of error, mnny 
of them unfounded, bnt will refer only to 
sorm~ general que11tlonA. which, In all prob-
ability, wlll arise on a 11eco11CI trial. 
1. '1'1> provf' that plain tins were sole 
heirs of BaC'kdahl, they offered In evhleuce 
the decree of the probate court dl11trllrnt-
lnK his estate. This was properly exclud-
ed. for whiJP bln•llng, ns to the matters 
ac1j111Jlcated, upon the parttee to the ad-
ministration Ilroceedlngs, It was no evi-
dence of thl' facts on which It w1111 ba11ed 
against a stransz:er to such proceedln1i1:A, as 
waH this dPfen!lant. To pro\'e they were 
1mch hell'll, plain tlffH further orrere<l, and 
the court acJmittf'd, the testimony of a 
wlhlPRB whose only knowledge In refer-
ence to the subject ha cl been derived from 
hiH lll'Qt111intance with the family and with 
Bnck<tnhl, the wltnt>s"' and the lotter re-
sldin1t In thiR country, the pluintlffs In 
8we!lt'n. Althou11:h that sort of evidence 
IR In th~ nature of hearsay, Is lJ1111ed on 
hE>ursay, It Is aclmh•elble from neee11Hity, be-
coui.e many times 111 no other way conld 
relatloni<hip be shown hut by proof thnt 
relationship In and to a partlcula1· family 
waH recognized hy the mt>mbers or the 
family. l Green I. E\'. § 106. \\"hen such tes-
timony Is lntroducell. It IR for the Jury to 
detl'rmlne, from the extent of th«-' wlt-
ue11H' acl)ualnt11ocet1hlp with the ramll,y 
15-l 
rmd hla opportunities for knowing that Its 
members ret'ognlzed the partlculRr peraon 
as a member, what wt>lght to ll1\'e tt. In 
this Instance, at least, the tet1tlmony of 
the wltm•;.11 IDA.de a pr/ma facie ca1<e for 
thP plRlntlffs on the quPt1tlon of kinship. 
2. Tlwrc wus 11 l'ontea;t on the e\·irJ1•nce 
ae to the making and notice to Backdahl 
or the HBRcsHment for nun-payment of 
which the suspension set out as a fil'llt de-
ft>nse wa11 allel(ed. It appPnrs from the 
coo11tltutlon ot dpfendaut that, when a 
member entitled to participate In the hene-
ftclnry fund dle8, the suhordlnR te lodge t() 
which he belou11:ed Is to notify, by a pre-
scrlhi_'<i form or death notll'e, the K'l'nnd re-
cor1le1· of defPndanT lo1lge, who, on the 
fil'Ht day of the following month, Is to no-
tify each sul:ordlnate lodge. It 111 then the 
duty or the latter to forward to the grand 
recorder the· beneficiary funll on hand In 
such lodge, (the sum being one dollar for 
each certlHcate, and such eums al! may 
Ila ve been received for certlftca tes re-
newed,) and then to make an aBHessment 
of one dolbtr upon each member holding a 
certltlc11te. An 0Hlce1· of the subordinate 
lodge, railed a "financier." Is to send writ-
ten or printed notice of the assessment tu 
each member assessed, and, upon the fail-
ure of any memher within the specified 
time to pay his &"8CS!llllent, he forfeltll all 
rl~ht11 under his certificate. Till' financier 
Is required to keep a book whel'l'ln all l\K-
11~smenh1 for the beneficiary fun'd shall be 
entere!I airalnst eat•h member holding a 
valid certltlcate. He IA al~o required to 
furnish the recorderofthe lo~ge the names 
of members h1 arreal'll upon aReessmenta; 
and the recorder Is to plncfl theee names 
un the minutes of the lodgP, and to mark 
the certlftcntes of such members as su11-
pended on the certificate rt>glstry book. 
So far as the return In th le caHt' shows, no 
form or mode of making an ttl'.'Hl."RHment ill 
prescrlbP.<1, and no record thereof required 
to bti made. except by the finaneler In the 
book kept hy him. To fix a member's 
duty to p11;1· an ns1:1~sment, the11e are the 
eRHl•ntlal thlngo: A death by ren1:1011 of 
which an uset.'llsment maybemade; notice 
of the death to the grand recurdt>r; tlitt 
nntll'e before mentioned to the1:1ubordinot1t 
lort~e: an &Sl:lf!SHment In fact; nnd nutktt 
thereof by the financier to the member. 
As the lluty to make the ae11P11sment Is lm-
perath'e, and no form or mode or maklmc 
It IH prl'f!crlbed. and no record of It 1~. r&-
qulred to be kept, except In the financier's 
book, It Is not nec.·essary that Much a88eaa-
ment be formally made by the lodge, or 
that It be t-ntered In the lodge mlnute1:1, 
thou11:h that would doul>tlese be the bet-
ter way of preser\·lng evidence of the fact. 
HenC'e snch 1tHRes1m1ent may be proven by 
Jlarol. and the evidence of It producf'd UP-
on this trlnl was 11utflclent to go to the 
Jur;1-. 
3. Ancl so wae the te11timony as to tho 
se1111lngof notice to Bat•kduhl. The ftnuu-
cler, whose. duty It IH to forward no-
tices. could not and would not tePtif.r. 
positively and speclflcelly, that he malled 
a notice to Backdahl, but he swore to 
sending notices of this particular 0>1ses11-
ment to all of the membf'rs of the lodt(c, a11 
be suppo~ed, and as he evidently Intended 
GEN E ii AL REPUTATION.
[Case No. 55
mo.“‘ are-vi
\xasn0t 3 that notice .
n “ as sent to Ba wk-
‘A‘\‘§\‘t a5\d\b°°k "- G9-Pbeck. 7 Q. B. sits;
“ ' V‘““°“‘°">\u:t1. 12 c. B. 252; 1
1 q, _
‘(‘.)§§§“_ \r,v- §4\i. 2 Wllzirt. Ev. §13a0.
g, tile“! was not sufficient evidence
,,‘,"g§‘{<, t\le1\1\'y as to the suspension for
,,0,,.paymefli °i dues. alleged in the sec-
unq Qeiense. and the court erred in refus-
ing B“ insl\‘\l¢“0I\ requested by the plain-
tms “mt the second defense had not been
made out. in hcheufier v. This Defendant,
(Minn) 47 N. W. Rep. 799, we had for con-
sideration those provisions of defendant's
constitution which provide for suspen-
sion ior non-payment of assessments and
suspension ior non-payment of dues. It
was held that the former operate ipso fac-
to upon default of the member, and with-
out any action on the part of the lodge, or
of any oiiicer thereof, while the latter re-
quire the action and determination of the
lodge or an officer thereof. In other
words, that a failure to pay an assess-
ment- of itself, and without further cere-
mony, suspends the member. while a. fail-
ure to pay dues gave cause for suspension
only, and, as suspension for non-payment
of dues is in the nature of a forfeiture, the
lodge cannot. under its constitution, de-
clare it without notice to the member.giv-
ing him an opportunity to be heard in op-
position. There was no testimony tend-
ing to show such notice or opportunity.
5. It was claimed upon the trial of the
case, as well as upon the argument of this
appeal, that Backdahl had voluntarily
withdrawn, had discontinued his connec-
tion with the subordinate lodge. 'l‘lu-.evl-
dence produced in support of this claim was
abundant, but such a defense was not al-
leged in the answer, and there is nothing
in the settled case indicating that plaintiffs
consented to try such defense, although
not pleaded. However,alloithetestimony
which was received nearing: upon the
question was admissible and pertinent
upon the defense omuspenslon fnr non-pay-
ment of the assessment. alleged in the first
defense. Order reversed.
VANDERBURGH, J.,absent on account
of sickness, took no part. MITCHELL.
J., not being present when this decision
was made and filed, did not participate.
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GENEHAL REPUTATION. (Case No. 55 
c\oi'\\n~ notlce to 'B .. ~ ~o \1\ '°er\ooked .. F ackdabl, tr be ~a%~ot. 03 that not\ce ~om tblfl the jury 
m\f(\\t t\1' \\beek v ,.... hw as sent to BHck-
' S~ · uar eek, 7 Q. B. S4fl; 
ds\\1. ~ t.oni\~hurongh 12 C B 252· 1 ~:~~\. Y,\' . § 40; 2 Whan: Ev. §'1s3o. • 
<\ But tbe\-e was not sutt1clent evidence 
to 'go to tbe lul'y as to th"' suspension for 
non-payment ot duefl, alleged In the sec-
ond deteose. and the court erred In rerus-
\ni;i: an. \nstruct\on requested by the pluln-
t\Tle tbot the 11eeond dcfonse hall not lleen 
made out. ln Scheufier v. Thh4 Delt-ndaut, 
(Minn.) 47 N. W. Rep. 700, we had for con-
sideration those provhdons of defendant's 
constltut\on wblch prO"ltlde for suspen-
sion for non-payment of assessments and 
suspenidon for non-payment of dues. It 
was held that the former operate ipso fac-
to upon <Mault of the member, und with-
out any action on the part of the lodge, or 
of any o!Hcer thereof, while the latter re-
quire the action end determination of the 
lodge or an offirer thereof. In other 
worcls, that a failure to pa.'· an assess-
ment of ttself, and without further cere-
mony, suspends the member. while a fail-
ure to pay dues gave cause for &Ul!penslon 
only, encl, as suspension for non-payment 
of dues ls In the nature of a forfeiture, the 
lodge cannot, under 1te constitution, de-
clare It without notice to the mPmber,glv-
lng him an opportunity to be heard In op-
position. There wae no testlmouy tend-
ing to show euch notice or oppo1·tunlty. 
o. It was cloimed upon the trial of the 
case, as \'l"ell as upon t11e arainment of this 
appeal, that Backdahl had voluntarily 
wltbdr11wn, had db1contlnued hie connec-
tion with the 1mbordlnatl'! lodge. 'flwevl-
denceproducell In support of thlR claim was 
abundant, but such a dPfem~e was not al-
leged In the answer, and there h1 nothing 
In the settled case lncllcatlnittha t plalntlffH 
com;en terl to try such defenRe, although 
not pleaded. However, all oftbe testimony 
which was recPlved tJeurln.a: upon the 
question was ndml11slhle and pertinent 
upon the defense of 13uspenslon for non-pay-
men t of the assessment, alleged In the first 
defense. Order re'l"ersed. 
VANDERBURGH, J ., absent on account 
of sickness, took no part. MITCHELL, 
J ., not being prefilent when this decision 
was made au cl ft led, did not partlctpa tc. 
1~ 
Case No.56]
RELE \'A N CY.
SULLIVAN v. STATE.
(6 Tex. App. 319.)
Court of Appeals of Texas. June, 1879.
Appeal from district court, Gonzales coun-
ty; E. Lewis, Judge.
Harwood & VVinston and Fly & Davidson,
for appellant. Thomas Ball, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
for the State.
WINKLER, J’. This is an appeal from a
judgment of conviction of nmrder in the first
degree, imposing the death penalty. The
most important and interesting inquiry here
presented for consideration may be stated
to be substantially as foll0ws:—
The appellant having been accused of the
murder of a woman, described in the indict-
ment as one “Harriet (a freedwoman, whose
name other than Harriet is to these grand
jurors unknown)," soon after the homicide
was arrested and taken before the county
judge of Gonzales county for examination,
on which examination a witness called Owen
E. Dean testified; and on the trial at which
the conviction was had, the witness Dean
not being in attendance, counsel for the
state proposed to reproduce his testimony
taken before the county judge on the pre-
liminary examination, and for this purpose
placed on the stand as a witness one Ed
Titcombe. who qualified himself to testify
in the following manner, as set out in the
statement of facts: “He was deputy clerk
of the county court, and was present at an
examining trial held by John S. Conway,
county judge of Gonzales county. on the 11th
day of July, 1877. The examination was
held for the purpose of ascertaining whether
or not defendant, Thomas Sullivan, should
be committed to jail, he being charged with
the killing of the woman Harriet, and the
examination being had to ascertain the facts
in that case. The defendant, Thomas Sul-
livan, was present, and had an opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses. He was ask-
ed by Judge Conway if he desired to cross-
exaniine the witnesses, and was so asked in
relation to each witness. Owen Dean was
sworn as a witness in said examining court
by me. and testified in the case, after being
threatened with punishment by the court for
refusing to testify.- I took down his testi-
mony. It was reduced to writing. and he
signed his statement ‘Owen E. liean.’ I
can state substantially all that said Owen E.
Dean testified to on said examination. He
(Titcombe) was then presented with the writ-
ten statement at said trial, and was going
on to stale Dean's testimony, when counsel
for defendant suggested that he had better
read the evidence from the record, which
was done. and the witness stated as follows."
Here follows what purports to be the state-
ment of Dean. as given by him on the ex-
amination before the county judge.
This testimony was admitted over ob-
1
I
i
I
i
i
1
1
jection by defendant’s counsel, on the fol-
lowing grounds, as set forth in a bill of ex-
ceptions, to wit: "(1) Said witness had not
been put under the rule with other witnesses
for the state. but had been in the court room
during the trial. (2) Because it had not been
proven that Owen E. Dean was dead. (3)
Because it was not shown that Owen E.
Dean was beyond the jurisdiction of the
court. or was even residing permanently out
of the state. (4) Because it was not provcn
that the pretended statement of Owen E.
Dean was made in any court having any
manner of jurisdiction over the cause or over
the defendant. (5) Because it was not prov-
en that the said purported statement of
Owen E. Dean was made by said Dean un-
der oath, and it was not shown that the pre-
tended confessions made by said defendant
to said Dean were voluntarily made.” All
of which objections, the bill of exceptions
recites. were overruled by the court.
It is further shown by the statement of
facts and by a bill of exceptions that certain
testimony of a witness named Smced was
admitted over objection by defendant. The
testimony of the witness Smecd was sub-
stantially as follows: The witness knows
Owen Dean. Don't know his middle name,
or that he had any. He was here for sev-
eral months, to set. after his brother, who
was in jail. charged with murder. Ile was
here from January until August of last year.
He went away out of this state. I wrote a
letter to the postmaster at Marion, Vassa-
chusetts, inquiring for Owen Dean. I got
a reply, he savs. saying that Dean was at
Boston, Massachusetts. Among his friends
a.nd acquaintances it is generally understood
that he is at Boston, Massachusetts. He said
that Dean came here from Boston, Massa-
chuscits.
The grounds of objection to this testimo-
ny, as set out in the bill of exceptions. were:
I-‘irst. The testimony does not show that the
man Owen E. Dean wa beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court. or that he was even living
beyond the jurisdiction of the state. Sec-
ond. That said evidence was hearsay. Third.
That the letter of which witness spoke was
better evidence ti an witness's statement as
to the contents of said letter. Fourth. The
letter referred to by witness was in regard
to Owen Dean, and not Owen E. Dean; and
because the man known here as Owen E.
Dean was not known in Massachusetts by
that name.
Another bill of exceptions recites that the
defendant offered a witness to prove that
the man called Owen E. Dean was under
an assumed name, and not Dean; and also
to prove that the man called Owen E. Dean
stated to the witness that when the defend-
ant made the pretended confession of guilt
to him, said Dean, about which witness Tit-
comhe had testified, that he (defendant) was
laboring under delirium tremens, caused by
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Case No.'56] RELEVANCY. 
SULLIVAN T. STATE. 
(6 Tex. App. 819J 
Court of Appeals of Texas. June, 1879. 
Appeal from district court, Gonzales coun-
ty; E. IA'wls, Judge. 
Harwood & Winston and Fly & Davidson, 
for appellant. Thomas Ball. Asst. Atty. Gen., 
for the State. 
WINKLER, J. This Is an appeal trom a 
judgment of conviction of murder In the ftrst 
degree, Imposing the death penalty. The 
most Important and Interesting Inquiry here 
presented for consideration may be stated 
to be substantially as follows:-
jectlon by defendant's counsel, on the fol-
lowing grounds, as set forth In a blll of ex-
ceptlon11, to wit: ''(1) Said witness bad not 
been put under the rule with other wltnel'Bf'B 
for the state. but had been lD the court room 
during the trial. (2) Because It had not bef'n 
proven that Owen E. DP.an was dead. (:l) 
Bemuse It was not shown that Owen E. 
Dean was beyona the jurisdiction of the 
court. or was even resi<Ung permanently out 
of the state. (4) Because It was not proven 
that the pretended statement of Owen E. 
Dean was made In any court having any 
manner of jurisdiction over the l'ause or ovf'r 
the <lefendant. (5) Because lt was not 11ro,·-
en that the said purported 11tatement of 
Owen E. Dt>on was made by Mid Dean un-
der oath, and It was not shown that the pre-
tended confessions made by snld defendant 
to said Dean were voluntarily made." All 
of which objections, the bill of exceptions 
recltt>s, were overruled by the court. 
It t11 further shown by the statement of 
fa<'ts and by a bill of exceptions that certain 
testimony of a witness named Smeed WllR 
admitted over objection by defendant. The 
testimony of the witness Smeed was sub-
stantially 88 follows: The witness knows 
Owen Dean. Don't know his middle name, 
or that he had any. He was here for sev-
eral months, to Ret- after his brother, who 
was In jail, <'barged with mnrder. He was 
here from Jammry until Augu!lt of last year. 
He went away out of this state. I wrote a 
letter to the po11tmaster at Mnrlon, )la888-
chusetts, Inquiring for Owen Dean. I got 
a reply, he 111tv11. sr.ylng that Denn waH at 
Boston, Massa<'hnsetts. Among hhl friend11 
and acquatntan<"'H It 111 generally un<lerstoocl 
that he 111 at Bo11ton, lfas!IB<'husetts. He aid 
that D1•an <'ame here from Boston, Ma11&a-
chns(•ttR. · 
The grounds of objec•tlon to this teBtlmo-
ny, as set out In tile bill of exceptton11, were: 
F'lrst. The testlmuny does not show that the 
man Owen E. Dean was beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court, or that he was PVen living 
beyond the jurisdiction of the state. Sec-
ond. That said evidence was hearsay. Third. 
That the letter of whl<'h witness spoke was 
ht•tter evidence U an witness's statement as 
The appellant having been accused of the 
murder of a woman, described In the Indict-
ment as one "Harriet (a freedwoman, whose 
name other than Harriet ls to these grnnd 
jurol'B unknown)," soon after the homicide 
was arrested and taken before the county 
judge of Gonzales county for examination, 
on which examination a wltne88 called Owen 
E. Dean testified; and on the trial at which 
the conviction was bad, the witness Dean 
not being In attendance, counsel for the 
state proposed to reproduce his te11tlmony 
taken before the county judge on the pre-
liminary examination, and for this purpose 
placed on the stand as a witness one Ed 
Tltcombe, who qualified himself to testify ' 
In tht> following manner, as set out In the 
statf'meut of facts: "HP was deputy clerk 
of the rounty court, and was pre11ent at an 
examining trial held by John S. Conway, 
county judge of Gonzales county, on the 11th 
day of July, 1877. The examination was 
held for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
or not defendant, Thomas Sullivan, should 
he committed to jail, he being charged with 
the kllllng of the woman Harriet, and the 
examination being had to ascertain the fuct11 
In that case. The defendant, Thomas Sul-
livan, was present, ancl had an opportunity I 
to cros..'4-examlne the wltnes11es. He wns ask-
ed by Judge Conway If he desired to <·ross-
examlne the witnesses, and was so a"ke<l In 
relation to each witness. Owen DP1111 was 
sworn a11 a wltne88 In said examining court 
by nw, and testlfie<l In the ('a11e, ·artn being 
threatt>ned with punishment by the rourt for 
refusing to testify. · I took down 11111· testi-
mony. It waR rednced to writing. and he 
signed his statement 'Owen E. Denn.' I 
<'an state sub11tantlally all that said Owen E . 
Dean testified to on said examination. He 
(Titcomhe) was then preMented with the writ-
ten statement at said trial, and was going 
on to state Dean's testimony, whc>n couns(•I 
for defendant suggested that he had bettl'r 
rend the evidence from the record, which 
was done. and the witness stated as follows." 
Here follows what purports to be the state-
ment of Dt>an, as given by him on the ex-
amination before the county judge. 
, to the contents of said letter. lt'ourth. ThP 
This testimony was admitted over ob-
156 
I lettf'r referretl to by witness was In rei,"llrd to Owen Dean, aud not Owen E. Denn; and 
because the man known here as Owen E. 
I DPan was not known In Massachusetts hy that name. 
I Another bill of ex<'eptlons recites that the 
I defendant offered a witness to prove tlmt 
I the man called 0\\ en E. Dean was und1•1· an assumed name, and not Dean; and :tl!IO 
to prove that the man called Owen E. Dl':tll I stated to the witness that when the deft>nd-
ant made the pretended conf Psslon of guilt 
1
1 to him, said Dean, about whl<'h witness '.rtt-
combe had testified, that he (dt>tendant) was 
laboring under delirium tremens, caused b7 
EWDENCE owns IN FORMER rnocsnnmcs.
[Case No. 56
we d\'-mki which ‘V
mess vy counsel for t
' -no“ _
bmagg saved by of Qkceptionsl
Wemve Stated some of the questions pre-
these bills of em; . - .- _
W‘ by - (.[)i.lOl1 uith, per
Se“ e¢95i‘-111‘? particularity, for the rea-
as ruled out, on
the county court; and hence we find, fur-
he state, and the
ther, that when the legislature, in enacting a
statute, refers to the presiding officer of the
county court, the appellation in use at the
time is the one employed in speaking of him.
Now, when our Codes were enacted, where
ii ,ui\n
sfigsmag t0 state them plainly is to show
mm‘ mggniflcance with reference to all that
is mm conceffliflg the name of the man call-
?“ Beam We have no concern as to wheth-
9,. he was passing under an assumed name or
mt, Q; whether he had a middle initial let-
ter in his name or not. The only concern
the court and jury could have had was, not
with the name, but with the identity of the
witness who testified in that name before
the examining trial before the county judge,
and as to his identity there seems no room
for controversy. As a general rule of law,
a middle name is treated as of no conse-
quence whatever.
The first question here presented is this:
Was the county judge lawfully authorized
and empowered to hold what the law de-
nominates an examining court? We do not
propose to discuss the question further than
it relates to conserving the public peace and
the subject of commitment, and release on
habeas corpus after arrest, without inquiring
into the general subject of jurisdiction, this
not being deemed of controlling influence in
the present inquiry.
It will be remembered that from the time
Texas first threw off the Mexican yoke and
organized civil government under Anglo-
American ideas and auspices, a part of the
machinery of government was the organiza-
tion of counties. and placing at the head of
the judicial authority of each county a ju-
dicial oflicer. It was provided in the con-
stitution of the republic of Texas that “the
republic shall be divided into convenient
counties,” and “there shall be in each coun- i
ty a county court." Const. Rep. art. 4, §§ |
10, 11. And by act of December 20, 1836, the
oiilce of chief justice was created, and it was
declared that the county courts should con-
sist of one chief justice. Pasch. Dig. note
454.
Starting from this standpoint, we find, by
noticing the several provisions of the several
constitutions and legislative enactments, that
from that early day, through the various
changes, down to the present time, there has
ever been, as a part of the judiciary, the dis-
tinct feature of a county court, presided over
by a magistrate, and which feature has been
maintained notwithstanding that the scope
and extent of the jurisdiction has not in many
respects been uniform, nor the presiding of-
ficer called by the same name; and whether
the officer has been called by one name or
by another, the court has been the same, and
has maintained characteristics peculiarly its
own. We will also constantly see that when
the appellation of “county judge," “chief jus-
tice," or of “presiding justice” is used. it in-
variably applies to the presiding oflicer of
reference is made to this official, the appella-
tion of “chief justice" is usually employed.
because that was the name by which he was
at the time known; not to indicate any par-
ticular functions, for these are otherwise pre-
scribed, but simply the presiding oiiicer, the
chief of the county court. Bearing these
things in mind, we need not be misled by the
terms employed by the Code when speaking
of this ofllclal in connection with oflicers,
peace oflicers, magistrates, and examining
courts, and their authority over the subjects
of crime, bail, and the like, and by which ef-
fect can be given to the various provisions
on these subjects, in harmony with the manl-
fest intention of the legislature and with es-
tablished rules of applying such legislative
enactments.
Some of the provisions of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure will he noticed:
“Art. 2'5. The provisions of this (‘ode shall
be liberally construed, so as to attain the ob-
jects intended by the le,'.:islature,—the prose-
cution, suppression, and punishment of
crime.”
“Art. 32. It is the duty of every oflflcer
known to this Code as a ‘magistrate’ to pre-
serve the peace within his jurisdiction, by the
use of all lawful means; to issue all process
intended to aid in preventing and suppressing
crime; to cause the arrest of offenders by
the use of lawful means, in order that they
may be brought to punishment.
“Art. 33. A chief justice of a county who,
when legally applied to, refuses to issue pro-
cess, or who knowingly and corruptiy refuses
to discharge a duty imposed upon him by the
provisions of this Code, is guilty of an of-
fence for which he is subject to removal, up-
on trial and conviction."
“Art. 52. Either of the following oflicers
is a ‘magistrate’ within the meaning of this
Code: The judges of the supreme court, the
judges of the district courts, the chief jus-
tice of the county,” etc.
“Art. 55. When a magistrate sits for the
purpose of inquiring into a criminal accusa-
tion against any person, this is called an ‘ex-
amining court.’ "
“Art. 2-l8. Upon examination of a person
accused of a capital offence, no magistrate.
other than a judge of the supreme or district
court, or chief justice of a county, shall have
power to discharge the defendant,” etc.
“Art. 249. When it is made to appear, by
complaint on oath, to a judge of the supreme
or district court. or chief justice of a county.
that the bail taken in any case is insuflicient
in amount, such judge or chief justice shall
issue a warrant of arrest, and require of the
defendant additional security, according to
the nature of the case.”
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EVlDE~CE GIVEN IN FOHMER PUOCEEDINGS. [Case No. 00 
\"e dr\nk.; Which was ruled out, on 
t\tt\\S t>Y COUllSl'\ tor the tat d th ~\)\~\\oil :'ied by bl\\ ()f excep:oos.e, an e 
ru\\ug sa tat d 
..q-e s e some of the questions pre-ae'!~~,. tbese bl\\s ()f exception with, per-
ha\)S un11ecessary I>artlculartty, for the rea-
son 'Uiat to state them plainly is to show 
the\r \ns\gnl.t\cance with reference to all that 
\s sa\d conceru\ng the name of the man call-
ed Dean. We have no eoncem as to wheth-
er he was pass\ng under an assumed name or 
not, or wbetber he had a middle lnltlal let-
ter ln bi• name or not. The only concern 
the court and jury could have had was, not 
with the name, but wtth the Identity of the 
witneas who testified ln that name before 
the examlnlng trial befo1e the county judge, 
and as to hlB identity there seems no room 
for controversy. As a general rule of law, 
a middle name ls treated as of no conse-
quence whatever. 
The first question here presented ls this: 
Was the county judge lawfully authorized 
and empowered to bold what the law de-
nominates an examining court? We do not 
propose to discuss the question further than 
It relates to conserving the public peace and 
the subject of commitment, and release on 
habeas corpus after arrest, without Inquiring 
into the general subject of Jurisdiction, this 
not being deemed of controlling ln1luence in 
the present Inquiry. 
It will be remembered that from the time 
Texas ftrst threw off the Mexican yoke and 
organized civil government under Anglo-
Amerlean Ideas and auspices, a part of the 
machinery of government was the organiza-
tion of counties, and placing at the head of 
the judMal authority of each county a ju-
dicial oftlcer. It was provided in the con-
stitution of the republic of Texas that "the 
republtc shall be divided Into convenient 
counties," and "there shall be In each coun-
ty a county court." Const. Rep. art. 4, I§ 
10, 11. And by act of December 20, 1836, the 
office of chief justice was created, and It was 
declared that the county courts should con-
sist of one chief justice. Pasch. Dig. note 
454. 
Starting from this standpoint, we fl.nd, by 
notMng the several provisions of the several 
constitutions and legislative enactments, that 
from that early day, through the various 
changes, down to the present time, there bas 
ever been, as a part of the judiciary, the dis-
tinct feature of a county court, presided over 
by a magistrate, and which feature has been 
maintained notwithstanding that the scope 
and extent of the jurisdiction bas not In many 
respects been uniform, nor the preHldlog of-
ficer called by the same name; and Whl>tber 
the otllcer bas been <'alled by one name or 
by another, the court bas been the same, and 
baa maintained characterlstlce peculiarly Its 
own. We wlll also constantly see that when 
the appellation of "county judge," "chief jus-
tice," or ot ''presiding Justice" Is used, it ln-
Varlabq applies to the presiding ofllcer ot 
the rounty court; and hence we fl.nd, fur-
ther, that when the leglslature, in enacting a 
statute, refers to the presiding otllcer of the 
county court, the appellation In use at the 
time ls the one employed In speaking of bhn. 
Now, when our Codes were enacted, where 
reference le made to this ofllclal, the appella-
tion of "<'hlef justice" Is usually employed. 
because that was the name by which he waR 
at the time known; not to Indicate any par-
ticular functions, for these are otherwise pre-
scribed, but simply the p1·esldlng oftlcer, the 
<'hlef of the county court. Bearing these 
things in mind, we need not be misled by the 
terms employed by the Code when 11peaklng 
of this oftlclal In connection with oftlcers, 
peace oftlcers, magistrates, and examining 
courts, and their authority over the subjects 
of crime, ball, and the like, and by which ef-
fect can be given to the various provisions 
on these subjects, In harmony with the mani-
fest intention of tbe legl8lature and with es-
tabllehed rules of applying eucb legislative 
enactments. 
Some of the provisions of the Oode of Crimi-
nal Proeedure will be noticed: 
"Art. 25. The provlsloJJs of this Code shall 
be liberally construed, so ae to attain the ob-
Jeets intended by the legislature,-the prose-
cution, suppression, and punishment ot 
crime." 
"Art. 32. It Is the duty ot every oftlcer 
known to thls Code as a 'magletrate' to pre-
serve the peace within bis jurisdiction, by the 
use of all lawful means; to lssue all procell8 
Intended to ald In preventing and suppressing 
crime; to cause the ID'rest of ot!enders by 
the use of lawful means, in order that they 
may be brought to punishment. 
"Art. 33. A chief justlee of a county who, 
when legally applied to, refuses to IBSue pro-
cess, or who knowinirly and corruptly refuses 
to discharge a duty imposed upon him by the 
provisions of this Code, ls guilty of an of-
fence for which he ls subject to removal, up-
on trial and conviction." 
"Art. 52. Either of the following oftlcers 
ls a 'magistrate' within the meaning of this 
Code: The judges of the supreme court, the 
judges of the district courts, the chief jus-
tice of the county," etc. 
"Art. 55. When a magistrate sits for the 
purpose of Inquiring Into a criminal accusa-
tion against any person, thl11 Is called an 'ex-
amining <'OUrt.'" 
"Art. 248. Upon examination of a person 
accused of a capital offence, no magistrate. 
other than a judge of the supreme or district 
court, or chief justice of a county, shall have 
power to discharge the defendant," etc. 
"Art. 249. When It ls made to appear, by 
com1>lnlnt on oath, to a judge of the supreme 
or district court, or <'hlef justice of a county. 
that the ball taken In any case Is insuftlcient 
In amount, such judge or chief justice shall 
issue a warrant of arrest, and require of the 
defendant additional security, according to 
th.:i nature ot the case." 
• 
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Many other articles might be cited where
the term "magistrate" is used. when the
term would apply as well to the chief ju-
dicial county ofiicer as to a judge of the dis-
trict court; but these will be sutiicient, not
only to show the importance of this magis-
trate in a proper enforcement of the provi-
sions of the Code, but also the trouble and
confusion which would ensue by any other
interpretation of these several articles of the
Code than the one here intimated, and would
render nugatory many of the provisions of
the Code, so far as any county oflicer is con-
cerned.
In support of this application of the term
“chief justice,” and strengthening our con-
clusions that the appellation was intended to
apply to the chief judicial ofllcer of the coun-
ty, we find, on an examination of the Revised
Code adopted at the recent sesion of the leg-
islature, that-the term "county judge" is in- v
serted in the revision wherever the term
“chief justice” is employed in the original in
corresponding articles. So that, when the
Revised Code goes into effect, the confusion I
will disappear, until some future legislature ‘
shall change the name of the county judge
to some thing else by unguarded enactment.
It is further worthy of note that, so far as
the articles of the Code which relate to the
prevention and suppression of crime are con-
cerned, and the definition of the terms “mag-
istrate” and “peace oflicer,” we know of no
material changes until the revision mention-
ed. which has not as yet gone into effect.
Our conclusions, therefore, are that, in so
far as the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure relating to the subjects above set
out are concerned, and which speak of the
principal county judicial ofllcer as chief jus-
tice, they are intended to apply to the judge
who by law presides over the county court,
and that it is altogether unimportant what
particular name or appellation may be given
him;
Code. that county ofiicial, whether called
“county judge," “chief justice,” or “presiding 1
judge” or “justice,” or by whatever name he
may be called, to distinguish him from other
magistrates, was and is authorized and em-
powered to hold an examining court.
In the present case we are of opinion that
the county judge had authority to inquire
into the accusation against the appellant, and
to either swear the witnesses himself or cause
it to be done by the clerk or deputy clerk,
and cause the same to be taken down in writ-
ing, and subscribed and sworn to by the wit-
ness Dean; and that, so far as the question
of jurisdiction is concerned, the court did
not err in admitting the testimony.
The next important inquiry is, was it com-
petent for the state to prove, under the cir-
cumstances disclosed by the record, what the
witness Dean had testified to before the ex-
amining court?
'l‘i|e constitution (article 1, § 10, Bill of
lti_~_-ins» declares that “in all criminal prose-
and that, under the provisions of the V
cations" the accused “shall be confronted
with the witness against him.” The Code of
' Criminal Procedure (article 2-i) provides that
“the defendant upon a trial shall be confront-
ed with the witnesses, except in certain cases,
provided for in this Code, when depositions
have been taken." In treating of constitu-
tional provisions similar to the one above set
out. and found in all the constitutions of the
several states and in that of the United States,
Mr. Cooley lays down as the correct rule, de-
ducible from the authorities, and which we
adopt as correct. the following:
“The testimony for the people in criminal
cases can only, as a general rule, be given
by witnesses who are present in court. The
defendant is entitled to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; and if any of
them be absent from the commonwealth. so
that their attendance cannot be compelled,
or if they be dead, or have become incapac-
itated to give evidence, there is no mode by
which their statements against the prisoner
can be used for his conviction. The excep-
tions to this rule are of cases which are ex-
cluded from its reasons by their peculiar
circumstances; but they are far from nu-
merous. If the witness was sworn before
an examining magistrate, or before a coro-
ner, and the accused had an opportunity
then to examine him; or if there were a
formal trial, on which he was sworn, it
seems allowable to make use of his deposi-
tion. or of the minutes of his examination,
if the witness has since deceased, or is in-
sane, or sick and unable to testify, or has
been summoned, but appears to have been
kept away by the opposite party." Cooley.
Const. Lim. pp. 363, 364.
Agreeably to Mr. Greenleaf, “upon the
question whether this kind of evidence is
admissible in any other contingency except
the dcath of the witness, there is some dis-
crepancy among American authorities.” 1
Greenl. Ev. § 163, note. The rule in the text
appears to be that: "When the testimony was
given under oath, in a judicial proceeding in
which the adverse litigant was a party, and
where he had the power to cross-examine,
and was legally called "upon so to do, the
‘ great and ordinary test of truth being no
longer wanting, the testimony so given is ad-
mitted. after the decease of the witness. in
any suit between the same parties. It is
also received if the witness, though not dead,
is out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be found
after diligent search, or is insane, or sick
and unable to testify, or has been summoned,
but appears to have been kept away by the
adverse party. But testimony thus oflered is
open to all the objection which might be
taken if the witness were personally pres-
ent.”
There has also been controversy as to
whether these rules apply to other than civil
causes. and the position that they do not
apply to criminal cases has been strenuously
and ably maintained; but it seems now to
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!\lany other articles might be cited where cutlons" the accused "shall be confronted 
the term "magistrate" ls used. when the with the witness against him." The Code of 
term would apply as well to the chief Ju· Criminal Procedure (article 24) provides that 
dlclal county ofllcer aa to a judge of the dis- ''the defendant upon a trial shall be contront-
trlct court; but these wlll be sufllclent, not ed with the witnesses, except In certain cases, 
only to show the lmporta~ce of this magi&- provided for In this Code, when deposltlons 
trate In a proper enforcement of the provl· have been taken." In treating of constltu-
stons of the Code, but also the trouble and tlonal provisions slmllar to the one above set 
confusion which would ensue by any other out, and found In all the constitutions of the 
Interpretation of these se\·eral articles of the several states and In that of the United States, 
Code than the one here Intimated, and would Mr. Cooley lays down as the correct rule, de-
render nugatory many of the provisions ot duclble from the authorities, and which we 
the Code, so far as any county ofllcer ls con- adopt as correct, the following: 
cerned. ''The testimony for the people In criminal 
In support of this application of the term cases can only, as a general rule, be given 
"chief justice," and strengthening our con- by wltneues who are present In court. The 
cluslons that the appellation was Intended to I defendant la entltled to be confronted with 
apply to the chief judicial ofllcer of the coun- ' the wltneR&efl against him; and If any of 
ty, we tlnd, on an examination of the Revised : them be ab11ent from the commonwealth, so 
Code adopted at the recent session of the leg· : that their attendance cannot be compelled, 
lslature, that.the term "county judge" ls In· · or If they be dead, or have become lncapac-
serted In the revision wherever the term ; ltated to give evidence, there ls no mode by 
"chief justice" ls employed In the original In 1 which their statements against the prisoner 
con-espondlng articles. So that, when the ; can be used for his conviction. The eX'-"P-
Revlsed Code goes Into effect, the confusion : ttons to this rule are of cases which are ex-
wlll disappear, until some fnture legislature · eluded from Its reasons by their peculiar 
shall change the nBJDe of the county judge c>lrcumstances; but they are far from nu-
to some thing else by unguarded enactment. : merous. If the witness was sworn before 
It Is further worthy of note that, so far as l an examining magistrate, or before a coro-
the articles of the Code which relate to the ~ ner, and the accu&M had an opportunity 
p1·eventlon and su1>presslon of crime are con- ,~ then to examine him; or If there were & 
cerned, and the definition of the terms "mag- formal trial, on which he was sworn, It 
lstrate" and "peace ofllcer," we know of no seems allowable to make use of his deposl-
materlal changes until the revision mention- tlon. or of the minutes of his examination, 
ed, which has not as yet gone Into effect. It the witness has since deceased, or ls ln-
Our conclusions, therefore, are that, In so sane, or sick and unable to testify, or has 
far as the provisions of the Code of Criminal been summoned, but appears to have been 
Procedure relating to the subjects above set kept away by the opposite party." Cooley, 
out are concerned, and which speak of the Const. Lim. pp. 363, 364. 
principal county judicial oflleer as chief jus- Agreeably to Mr. Greenleaf, "upon the 
tlce, they are Intended to apply to the judge question whether this kind of evidence Is 
who by law presides over the county court, admls1dble In any other contingency except 
and that It ls altogether unimportant what the death of the witness, there ls some dla-
partlcular name or appellation may be given crepanc>y among American authorities." 1 
him; and that, under the provisions of the Green!. Ev. f 163, note. The rule In the text 
Code, that county ofllclal, whether called appears to be that: "When the testimony was 
"county judge," "chief justice," or "presiding : given under oath, In a judicial proceeding In 
judge" or "justice," or by whatever name be : which the adverse litigant was a party, and. 
may be called, to distinguish him from other ! where he had the power to cross-examine, 
magb1trates, was and is authorized and em- i and was legally called ·upon so to do, the 
powered to bold an examining court. j great and ordinary test of truth being no 
In the preRent case we are of opinion that longer wantlnl?, the testlmoLr so given ls ad-
the county judge had authority to Inquire I mltted, after the decease of the witness. In 
Into the aceu!latlon against the appellant, and 
1 
any suit between the same parties. It ls 
to either swear the witnesses himself or cause also re1•elved If the witness, though not dead. 
It to be done by the clerk or deputy clerk, , Is out of the jurisdiction, or cunnot be found 
and c>ause the same to be taken down In writ- after dlllgent search, or ls Htsane, or sick 
Ing, and subscribed and sworn to by the wit- and unable to testify, or has been summoned. 
ness Dean; and that, so far as the question but appears to have been kept away by the 
of jmlsdlctlon is concemed, the court did adverse party. But testimony thus otrered ts 
not err In admitting the testimony. open to all the objections which might be 
The next Important Inquiry ls, was It com- taken if the witness were personally pres-
petent for tht• 1itate to prove, under the ctr- ent." 
cumstances diliclosed by the record, what the There has also been controversy as to 
witness Dean had testified to before the ex- whether these rules apply to other than civil 
amlnlng court? c>aus~·s. and the position tbnt they do not 
Tht> ronstltutlon (article 1, f 10, Blll of J apply to criminal cases has been strenuously 
Hl;.:;llh<I llcl"lures that "In all criminal prose- and ably maintained; but It seems now to 
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be settled that these rules apply to civil common lea-~~ ~.b/H&, £C118t 
and crtrolnal cases alike, so far as reprodu- [ slble tbe "¥'~~~0 ~ePt.e 
cl.Dg the testimony of a deceased witness Is can be hacI- 1 '4.flJ tJJem when It Is fl 
ed Wh rt. C I • Pl ~/. Preseoee of tbe wit. concern · a r. I..aw, § 007, note c, 1 however, P• 11, ~IJ. Or. Proe. I 1(Jf)(J. It 
and u. uthorltles there cited. ..The testimony I son, that tl:ai H 1-1 1~ matter of J11dlcfal re 
ot a deceased witness given at a former trial J tlon J..'TOWB Ollt lrht to Jotrod11ce the depoBJ 
or ex..umiuatlon may be pro' . .ld at 11. su!Jse- \I cessity. • • • °J.nthe grent tloctrlue oL ne· 
quent: trhtl by a person who beard him tes- er known th.at the!!: p;a~tlce ::1 was ~ev­
tlfy. •• Id. § 60'7. To this extent the question mentioned wei-e recelvedo w::::S tli~usUvl::: 
11:1 uot: an open one in thls court. In Black I presence of tbe witness could be had. Id. 
, .. .State. 1 Tex. App. 368, it was held that, \ §§ 1098, 1099. 
at a second or subsequent trial of a criminal ; The principle applies, not only to these 
charge, it ls competent: :tor the prosecution \ formal depositions, but llkewlse to evidence 
to put in evidence testimony given at a pre- I of what a witness testified orally at a pre-
,·Jous trlal by a witness "Who has since died; vious trial. It, moreover, prevails not only in 
and such testimony may be proved by a wit· 1 civil causes, but in criminal; and, in gen-
ness ·"'rho heard it given ln, and who can i eral, in tbe United States a.. well as in Eng-
qua.Ufy himself to state tbe substance of it. I land. There are with us, perhaps, some ju-
ln Johnson v. State, 1 Tex. App. 333, lt was, ; dlcial localities ln which this doctrine is not 
after mature consideration, held that the : received. • • • But the admission of the 
rules and prnctk'e of the common law have ' evidence ls limited, or nearly so to the case 
been substantially adopted by our Code in : in which the witness ls decea~ed; and in 
res\lect to admitting as evidence for the pros- i this case it ls the general Americim tloctrine 
t-cutlou the deposition of a deceased witness, j to receive equally the depositions taken aa 
duly taken on a former trial of tbe accused ! before mentioned, and evidence of the for-
by a L-ourt or an exaxnlnlng magistrate, and I mer, or oral, testimony. It the witness ls 
that the act of 1866 (Pasch. Dig. art. 6005), ! absent by the procurement of the defend-
whkh 1>xpre~sly secures to the accused the I ant, It ls, perhaps, the American doctrine, 
right to use such e'\·fdence, does not abrogate ~ the same as it ls the English, that the deP-
or Impair that of the st:a te to use such tes- I: osition, or eYidence of his tonner testlJllO~~~ 
tlmony. . . may be recelYed against him. But wb~~Y \n 
But the question }Jere is, not as to the ! witness ls without this elelllent. ~~e p0~­
rlght to reproduce tlle testimony of a de- i another state, or otherwise be5~!n~· 1- ~\sb· 
l'l!llsed witness taken at a :former hiul, but I t•r of the court, this ls not sutP-c tbe'S' 
the right here clatmed and exercised lly the . Cr. Proc. f 1098. vced· ~!s 9.1'& 
state ls to prove the :torwer testimony of ; These and similar rules-de6 e-r stl.' on• 9.~!-
a llYiug witness· or at Jenst:. one who Is not I are, trom adjudications ln oi:P ed. "'~ -cef,"' O\· 
shown or claim~ t~ be dead. but who, it ls : countries-are of necessity b.t:I-~ -t:~'t.o..: & col'~\1' 
<!lal111ed, Is not within tbe jurisdiction of the : influenced more or less by, st:.~ iJ- ~~e ~'!~· \t 
l'OUrt or Its J>roeess. It is not perceived that : tlons, and liable to be mod\t\.e ~-«:. &""""Ce ~9.-i:t 
the reason of the rule which admits proof ~ led thereby, and with us lJlvc~'-7~0 ~~'\es ~f.­
of what a deeeased witness bad on some : subordination to whatever 10 ~*~Ve 0 t ~~\).~ 
former occasion between tbe same parties, 1 any, we have on the s'\1b3ect. # .. ~ ~ -eeS• .._~\" 
on an exatninntion into tbe sume criminal I a statute which prov\de s tb"t _. ~ ~ y'6 \~ ~\~.._.. 
eliarge, on a form t tal testltled to, as ad- l evidence known to the comtn° ,._'J .,_ ~ .P.'"c "~"""' 
lll\gg\b\e on. a ber r nt trial of the same i land, both lu cl'v\l and cr\111\U .,.~~~~d~e'('l.o ~e ~.does not : 11 sequ~th eaunl force to one \ govern ln the tr\a\ of cr\ro\nt'-1 u C: tJ!ff!" ~ ~i \~.\'\. ~o, though notpXly dwls beyond the reach ot \state, except 'When they are\ 0~ ~ ~ •i:-'t!> .,-o:~l'\).'\ 
e \\Tll<!e11a ot th ea ' rt- The testimony of the prov\s\ons of t.h\s Code 'f!'~d ~ ~ · c;~'(S)- '91!Y" ~e \\~aaeu 'Wit e colus adJ.Dltted on the l11ea 1\ ute of th\s st.at.e." \dCode ~~~sc~-\ V' .,,~ -t:;.Ve00Ge:' . 
.... at the\\ neBB ted \•" "Tl \es ot ev ence .. \\ e1> ~ ~1!8.Red had been c.-onfron w "'' ie ru tn\s state \n cW , _,_ &-~ . \'I. 
t W\tueeaon.theformer trfaJ,-had met h\m I statute la.W o;\cn.b\e, gove"tn n\s:,\-C~~ ~~ "J?e ~e ~to tal!e,-and th t the witness bad \.~'8- ~tar as a.PP not. \n. cou~\ct 't'~1l'.11'-,,._ ~ ~'\"~ . :~ betote a compe~ent tribunal, under the act\ons, w~~~s C<>de oT ot \\\:\)et"'".___ ..C' ~~ ~ fo:~ ot an oath, and an opportun\ty at- ~to~ 0~9. ••1n l:'roce~::!, ot ~:>- ~..,, ~ • ~e 
1\-i \\r ctoss-exam\untlon · n 0 u.r\:. the tes d to 'llt\t ~ii"""--- -;111--- ::;;.--- 1 ~·~~~eee~sibl~ w\tuess b~s been sobleet- am\n\n~ ~o.U. be redu':,('~es ot ~n:r ~~ ..... ......-_.i;:~:.v 
"'we sam ce ~ · u esses s h tue\-C n~ \\ "Ue ..___ ~ ~ 
mi \\Jat ~ e ordeal, the only d\fteren t \)'Y them -v.·\t :nus t.a~eu snl.' ~- ~ , .; #---~t ttaeh ~one \~ dead and the ot:ner o'\ld \\le \est\Tnon-Y :-cu:t.e.'' '\d. n'-°'\\ \)e \~ p ~ .r ~. ~~ aeh has conf.ron-ced the e.ccu~\; '\:l"S fue Tn&:g~s -w\tnes~~s ~:~ 9.~· ~~; ~ :::::--::;. · al\'11\J\i~~ the sanction. of. an oat~• "n\t.'"$ \lJl\\uat\oU. ~ accuse d. c\t\Wt tot ~~-ir .c:;. ~ • fottt~ .and as to each, nn O\)pcil"'t.1.: ~c.- euce ot tb \. n.'\.~-pen.r '("Oni;\"'t\'.n'-'? I\ ~n.~ ~ ..,_, 
l'lltl\i11g\()laln\nat\on has been aft.orued- 'l'-\c~ uo counse dtl.ut. tb~ t'\"'e u.cc''"'c ~ \\~I\~ 'M.t.B\shop, the pl.·\uc\p\e on. "'~ 1.\.\~e \\\e ~et'-~'~t'>se~"' ~u~4"1. "'"""'- ~'\>.e: ~ ,~\Ions a\"e - uu.der statutc9 P '-o \.\\e -w;~n ~3.- n.-rt· :\. ~rosec~ '~nt ell \lrl!'Vll\lel\ \n. En.g\anll dO~ ~n~ 't\v,.'ri.\.. :\. ci:\.~ ~~ ~t\od-adm\ss\bl.e \s that. uc t,ne "\D.~\: 
l \aieu under .,. .. ~-a -· - --" ---
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timony of a witness has been reduced to
writing, signed. and sworn to before an ex- ‘
amining magistrate, or before any court, and
the witness has died since giving his testi-
mony, the testimony so taken and reduced
to writing may be read in evidence by such
defendant, as proof of the facts therein stat-
ed, upon any subsequent trial for the same
offence: provided, however. that in all other
respects the testimony of such deceased wit-
ness shall be subject to the established rules
of evidence in criminal cases. In every case,
the death of the witness must be established
to the satisfaction of the court." Pasch.
Dig. art. 6605. Whilst this seems to be a
privilege granted to the accused, yet, as we
have seen in Johnson v. State, 1 Tex. App.
333, by the rules of practice the prosecution
virtually has the same privilege. And whilst
the provisions of this article, as well as the
ruling in Johnson’s Case, have reference to
the testimony of a deceased witness, as we
have already seen, the reason for the rule
applies as well to a witness whose personal
presence cannot be had, and that the testi-
mony of a witness who had been spirited
away after having testifled ought to be re-
ceived.
Yet, inasmuch as this species of testimony
is admitted as a sort of judicial necessity,
the proof of the facts which constitute the
necessity for the departure from general
rules ought to be clearly established before
the testimony is admitted; as that the wit-
ness is dead, that diligent inquiry has been
made for him where it is most likely he
would be found, or that the defendant had
caused his absence. The proof on this sub-
ject should be complete and satisfactory, as
the question of the sufliciency of this proof
would necessarily be comlded largely to the
discretion of the judge, and not be revisable
on appeal when properly exercised.
On the whole, we are of opinion the au-
thorities warrant the following conclusions:
First. That a county judge is a magistrate 1
authorized to hold an examining court. Sec-
ond. That whcn a witness has testified be-
fore an examining court on the investiga- -
tion of a criminal charge against any pe1'son,
the testimony taken before such examining ‘
court, in the manner prescribed by law, may
be used as testimony on the trial, upon satis-
factory proof being first made that the wit-
ness whose testimony is offered has either
died since testifying, or been prevented from ‘
attending by the opposite party, or that he
cannot, after diligent inquiry, be found, or
his whereabouts ascertained; and that the
testimony so taken and reduced to writing
before an examining magistrate may be used
either by the prosecution or by the accused.
Third. That when a witness has testifled on
a former trial of the case, it is competent for
either party to prove what the witness, if he
has since died, tcstitied on the former trial.
And, fourth, that, in either case the bare
fact that the witness wa out of the state at 1
the time of the second trial would not. of it-
self, be sutiicient ground for admitting proof
oi‘ his former testimony in a criminal prose-
. cution, unless admitted by consent.
Applying these rules to the case at bar, we
are of opinion the prosecution had a right to
read as evidence on the trial the testimony
oi‘ the witness Dean. given in the examining
court before the county judge, and that the
better evidence as to what he testifled would
have been the production of the written tes-
timony so taken; and on this account we see
no error, as it appears that the witness Tit-
combe read from the written statement of
the witness Dean, taken on the preliminary
examination before the county judge.
Yet we are of opinion that the absence of
the witness Dean was not sutiiciently ac-
counted for at the trial to allow the intro-
duction of his testimony taken before the
examining court. The evidence upon which
, Dean's testimony was admitted was that of
the witness Smeed, hereinbefore, set out,
which need not be repeated, and which is
mentioned in the second bill of exceptions
taken to the admission of Smeed‘s testimony.
To our mind, the tangible defect in this tes-
timony is the want of any showing of prop-
er effort to ascertain the fact as to whether
the witness Dean could be produced on the
trial, or not: whereas it should have been
shown that it was not in the power of the
state to produce the witness in person, be-
fore admitting his former testimony. One
main ground oi‘ the statement of the wit~
ness Smced appears to have been based part-
ly upon a letter. which was not even pro-
duced on the trial. We are of opinion the
showing, taken as a whole, did not show ei-
' ther that any proper effort had been made to
= learn the whereabouts of the witness Dean,
or to show the inability of the prosecution to
produce him in person on the trial. This
was a matter of great moment to the accus-
ed. Iie did not stand by in silence and per-
mit the error to be committed without objec-
tion; on the contrary, he objected to the pro-
ceeding at the time, and also followed it up
by bill of exceptions, and in his motion for
a new trial, and in his assignment of errors.
substantially; and for this error, which is
the turning-point in the case, the judgment
must be reversed.
It is shown by bill of exceptions that the
defendant offered to prove by a witness
(Parker) that the witness Dean was passing
under an assumed name. There was no er-
ror in excluding this testimony; it was but
hearsay. .
We are of opinion the objections to the
charge of the court are not well taken. In
the main, the charge correctly informed the
jury on the law of the case as made by the
. evidence, and there was no important omis-
' sion.
\Vhethcr this would be a proper
ciiarge on another trial or not depends upon
the case and the testimony as the same shall
be developed. If the charge should need
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Case No. 55] UELEV AXCY. 
tlmony of a wltneBS has been reduced to 
writing, signed, and sworn to before an ex-
amining magistrate, or before any court. and 
the wltneBS has died since giving his testi-
mony, the testimony so taken and reduced 
to writing may be read 1n evidence by such 
defendant, as proof of the facts therein stat-
ed, upon any subsequent trial for the same 
otren1'l•: (>rovlded, however, thnt In all other 
respects the testimony of such deceased wit-
ness shall be subject to the established rules 
of evidence In criminal cases. In every case, 
the deuth of the witness must be established 
to the satisfaction of the court." Pasch. 
Dig. art. 6003. Whilst tWs seems to be a 
privilege granted to tile &<'<'Used, yet, as we 
have seen In Johnson v. State, 1 Tex. App. 
aaa, by the roles of pra<'tlce the prosecution 
virtually has the same prtvUege. And whilst 
the provisions of this article, as well as the 
ruling In Johlll!on's Case, have reference to 
the testimony of a deceased wltneBS, as we 
have already seen, the renson for tht> ruh• 
applies as well to a witness whose personal 
presence cannot be bad, and that the testi-
mony of a witness who had been spirited 
away after haying testified ought to be re-
ceived. 
Yet, Inasmuch as this species of testimony 
ls admitted as a sort of judicial necessity, 
the proof of the facts which constitute the 
necessity for the departure from general 
rules ought to be clearly established before 
the testimony ls admitted; as that the wit-
ness le dead, that diligent Inquiry has been 
made for him where It Is most likely he 
would be found, or that the defendant had 
caused hie absence. The proof on this sub-
ject should be complt>te and eat111f1U'tory, as 
the question of the su1H<•lency of this proof 
would nece&Mrlly be contlded largely to the 
dltK'retlon of tht> judge, and not be revisable 
on appeal when properly exer<'lsed. 
On the whole, we are of 01>lnlon the au-
thorities wan11nt the following <'on<'luslons: 
First. That a county judge Is a mnglstratP 
authorized to hold an examining rourt. Se<·-
ond. That whPn a wltn('Sll bas tt>11tlftet1 ht--
fore an examining court on the investiga-
tion of a criminal charge against any person, 
the testimony taken before SUl'h examining 
court, In the manner pres<·rtbed by lnw. may 
be used as testimony on the trial, upon satis-
factory proof helng ftn1t made that the wlt-
nesR whOBt' t<•Rthuony 111 otrered lin11 either 
died since tl•sttfrlng, or bt>en prevented from 
attending by the opposite party, or that he 
cannot, after diligent Inquiry, be found, or 
his wht>reabouts aS<'ertalned; and that the 
te11t1mony so taken and redu<'Pd to writing 
before an examining magistrate may be used 
either by the prose<"utlon or by the accused. 
Third. That when a witness has testified on 
a former trial of the case, It Is competent for 
either party to prove what the wltne11B, If he 
has since died. testified on the former trial 
And, fourth, that, In either case the bare 
fact that the wltneu was out of the state at 
100 
1 the time of the second trial would not. of lt-
1 self, be sutftclent ground for admitting proof 
or his former testimony In a criminal prose-
! cutlon, unlesa admitted by consent. 
Ap11tylng these rules to the case at bar, w• 
are of opinion the prosecution had a right to 
read as evidence on the trial the testlmon;r 
of the witness DMn, given In the examining 
court before the county judge, and thut tbP 
l better evidence as to what be testlfted would 
: have been the production of the written tes-
Umony so taken; and on this account we see 
no error, as It appears that the witness Tlt-
combe read from the written statement of 
the witness Dean, taken on the preliminary 
1 examlnktlon before the county judge. 
Yet we are of opinion that the absence of 
the wltnesa Dean was not suftlclently ac-
counted for at the trial to allow the Intro-
duction of bis testimony taken before the 
examining court. The evidence upon which 
. Dean's testimony was admitted was that of 
the wltneM Smeed, herelnbefore, set out, 
which need not be repeated, and whleh ls 
mentioned In the second bill of exceptions 
taken to the admlBBlon of Smeed's testimony. 
To our mind, the tangible defect In this tes-
timony ls the want of any showing of prop-
1 er e1Tort to ascertain the fact as to whetht>r 
11 the witness Dean could be produced on the 
trial, or not; whereas It ehou!d have been 
shown that It was not In thP 1iower of the 
' stah! to 11roduce the witness In person, be-
fore admitting his former testimony. One 
main ground of tht> statf'ment of the wit-
ness Smeed ap11ear11 to have been based part-
ly upon a letter. which wa11 not even pro-
/ duee<l on the trial. We are of opinion the showing, taken ns a whole. <lid not show el-
. ther that any proper e1Tort bad been made to 
learn th~ whereabouts of the witness Dean, 
or to show the lnablllty of the prosecution to 
produce him In person on the trial. This 
was a matter of grffit moment to the accus-
ed. He did not stand by In slll•nce and per-
mit the error to be committed without obje<•-
tlon; on the contrary, be objected to the pn1-
rt>edlng nt the tlmt>. and also followed It up 
by blll of exceptl<mK, and In hl11 motion for 
, a new trial. and In his amtlttnm<•nt of error11. 
· substantially; and for thlK l'rror, whlrb ls 
the turning-point In the l'alll', the judgment 
1 must bt• rt>verse1l. I It 111 11hown by blll of exceptions that the defendant otrert>d to prove by a wltneBS 
1 (Parker) that th<! wltne~H l>E>nn was passing 
under an assum!'d name. There was no er-
ror In <•xdudlng this tt'Htimony; It was but 
hearsay. 
We nre of 011lnlon the objections to the 
charge of the <•ourt are not well tnken. In 
the main, the l'hargl' cort·t>etly Informed the 
jury on the law of the c•aee as made by the 
. evlden<'e, and there wrui no Important omls-
i slon. Whether thl11 would be a proper 
1 cliarge on another trial or not depends upon 
· the case and the testimony as the same shall 
1 be developed. U the charge should need 
i \
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Case No. 57]
RELEVANCY.
STATE v. REED. '
(37 Pac. 174, 53 Kan. 767.)
Supreme Court of Kansas. July 6. 1894.
Appeal from district court, Cowley county;
A. M. Jackson, Judge.
Isaac G. Reed was convicted of murder in
the second degree, and appeals. Reversed.
Chas. E. Elliott, C. J. Peckham, and Isaac
Reed, for appellant. John T. Little, Atty.
Gen., C. J. Garver, and W. W. Schwinn, for
the State.
JOHNSTON, J. Isaac G. Reed was char-
ged in an information filed in the district
court of Sumner county with shooting and
killing Isaac Hopper, in Sumner county, in
such a manner and with such an intent as
to constitute murder in the first degree. The
information was filed on August 31, 1892,
and on October 10, 1892, upon application
of the defendant, a. change of venue was
granted, and the cause transferred to the
district court of Cowley county for trial.
The trial was begun in the latter court on
January 10, 1803, and, after the impaneling
of the jury, the production of the evidence
for the state and for the defendant, the
charmng of the jury, after the opening argu-
ment in behalf of the state and the argument
in favor of the defendant, and before the
closing argument for the state had been
completed, on January 20th, one of the jur-
ors became sick, and was unable to attend
at the trial. The cause was continued from
time to time for five days, and on January
26th, after an examination, and without the
consent of the defendant, the court deter-
mined that it was impossible for that jury
to conclude the trial, and thereupon it dis-
charged the jury. At the next term of the
court the plea of former jeopardy was inter-
posed, and attached to it was the evidence
taken by the court when the first jury was
discharged; but the court sust:1ined a dc-
murrcr, and ruled that, the discharge of the
jury having been made necessary by the sick-
ness of a juror, it did not operate as a bar
to a further trial. The trial then proceeded,
and the defendant was convicted of murder
in the second degree, from which conviction
he appeals to this court, alleging numerous
grounds of error. We will only notice those
which seem to be material or require atten-
tion at this time. ‘
The first contention is that the discharge
of the jury first impaneled is equivalent to a
verdict of acquittal. It is true that the
jeopardy of the defendant began when the
jury were impaneied and sworn and the re-
ception of evidence was commenced; and it
is also true that the discharge of the jury
without the consent of the defendant, and
without sufiicient reason, will ordinarily bar
a further trial. The statute prescribes the
grounds which will warrant the court in
discharging a jury before the completion of
a trial. It reads as follows: “The jury
may be discharged by the court on account
of the sickness of a juror, or other accident
or calamity requiring their discharge, or by
consent of both parties, or after they have
been kept together until it satisfactorily ap-
pears that there is no probability of their
agreeing." Civ. Code, § 281; Cr. Code, § 208.
In this case the sickness of a juror was the
cause for discharge, and whether that sick-
ness was of such a character as to make a.
discharge absolutely necessary was the sub-
ject of inquiry and decision by the court. A
court cannot arbitrarily determine such a
question, but the incapacity of the juror,
and the necessity for discharge, are to be
heard and determined by judicial methods.
State v. Smith, 44 Kan. 75, 2-1 Pac. 84. That
course was pursued in the present ease, and
the finding made by the court that such a.
necessity existed was based on the testimony
of a physician and other evidence, some of
which is not preserved. In the absence of that
evidence, we cannot say that there was not
good cause for the discharge. From what
appears, we think that the court did not act
capriciousiy, nor without a. due regard for the
rights of the defendant. After the illness of
the juror was reported, the court postponed
the trial from day to day in the expectation
that the juror would recover sufficiently to
complete the trial. Several inquiries were
made as to his condition, and the prospect
of recovery. At the end of five days he was
still seriously sick, and his recovery was a
matter of great uncertainty. It is said that
the near approach of the end of the term
influenced the court to some extent in reach-
ing the conclusion which it did. Of itself,
this might not be suflicient to justify a dis-
charge, but, as the real inquiry was whether
the sickness of the juror required the jury
to be discharged, the finding of the court
made upon this inquiry is necessarily binding
upon us. As the testimony taken at the
time of the discharge was made a part of the
plea, and a demurrer thereto sustained, the
question raised upon the reply to the plea.
is not deemed material.
Upon leave of the court, obtained without
notice to the defendant, the state was per-
mitted, at the time of the trial, to indorse
upon the information the names of eight
witnesses who gave material testimony in the
case. This indorsement was made just be-
fore the trial, on April 5th, and it is contend-
ed that, as the testimony given by these
witnesses was important, the aetion of the
court in permitting the indorsement was an
abuse of discretion, which resulted in prej-
udicing the rights of the defendant. It ap-
pears that on the 3d day of February a mo-
tion was made to indorse the names of the
new witnesses, which motion was sustained
by the court. Afterwards the names of these
witnesses so indorsed were stricken from the
information, and it was said that it was
done upon the ground that the order for in-
dorsing the names of witnesses was made in
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Case No. 5i] RELEVANCY. 
STATE v. REED. 
(37 Pac. 174, GS Kan. 761.) 
Flupreme Court of KaD8&8. July 6, 1894. 
Appeal from district court, Cowley county; 
A. M. Jackson, Judge. 
Isaac G. Reed was convicted of murder In 
the second degree, and appeals. Reversed. 
Chas. E. Elliott, O. J. Peckham, and Isaac 
Reed, for appellant. John T. Little, Atty. 
Gen., 0. J. Garver, and W. W. Schwinn, for 
the State. 
JOHNSTON, J. lsaac G. Reed was char-
ged in an Information filed In the district 
court of Sumner county with shooting and 
killing Isaac Hopper, In Sumner county, In 
such a manner and with euch an Intent as 
to constitute murder In the tlrst degree. The 
Information was fl.led on August 31, 1802, 
and on October 10, 1892, upon application 
of the defendant. a change of venue was 
granted, and the cause transferred to tht> 
district court of Cowley county for trial 
The trial was begun In the latter court on 
January 10, 1893, and, after the Impaneling 
of the jury, the production of the evidence 
tor the state and for the defendant. the 
cllarglng of the Jury, after the opening argu-
ment In behalf of the state nnd the argument 
In favor of the defendant, and before the 
closing argument for the state had been 
completed, on January 20th, one of the jur-
ors became sick, and was unable to attend 
at the trial. The cause was continued from 
time to time for fl.ve days, and on January 
26th, after an examination, and without the 
consent of the defendant. the court deter-
mined that It was Impossible for that jury 
to conclude the trial, and thereupon tt dis-
charged the jury. At the next term of the 
court the plea of former Jeopardy was Inter-
posed, and attached to It was the evidence 
taken by the court when the first jury was 
discharged; but the court sustained a de-
murrer, and ruled that. the discharge of the 
jury having been made necessary by the sick-
ness of a juror, lt did not operate as a bar 
to a further trial The trial then proceeded, 
and the defendant was convicted of murder 
In the second degree, from which conviction 
he appeals to this ·court. alleging numerous 
grounds of error. We will only notice those 
which seem to be material or require atten-
tion at this time. • 
The tlrst contention ls that the discharge 
of the jury tlrst Impaneled Is equivalent to a 
verdict of acquittal. It ls true that the 
jeopardy of the defendant began when the 
jury were Impaneled and sworn and the re-
ception of evidence was commenced; and It 
la also true that the discharge ot the Jury 
without the consent of the dl'ft>ndant, and 
without sutnclent reason, will ordinarily bar 
a further trial. The statute prescribes the 
grounds which will warrant the court In 
dlschnrglng a jury before the completion of 
a trial. It reads as follows: "The jucy 
}IJ'l 
may be dlscharged by the court on account 
of the sickness of a juror, or other accldent 
or calamity requiring their dlst'harge, or by 
consent of both parties, or after they have 
been kept together until lt satisfactorily ap-
pears that there ls no probability of their 
agreeing." Clv. Code, I 281; Cr. Code, I 208. 
In this case the sickness of a juror was the 
cause for discharge, and whether that slck· 
neas was of such a character as to make a 
dlscharge absolutely necessary was the sub-
ject of Inquiry and decision by the court. A 
court cannot arbitrarily determine such a 
question, but the Incapacity of the juror, 
and the necessity for discharge, are to be 
beard and determined by judicial methods. 
State v. Smith, 44 Kan. 75, 24 Psc. 84. That 
course was pursued In the present case, and 
the finding made by the court that such a 
necessity existed was based on the testimony 
of a physlclan and other evidence, some of 
which ls not preserved. In the absence of that 
evidence, we cannot say that there was not 
good cause for the dlscharge. From what 
appears, we think that the court did not act 
caprlclously, nor without a. due regard for the 
rights of the defendant After the Illness of 
the Juror was reported, the court postponed 
the trial from day to day In the expectation 
that the juror would recover suftlclently to 
complete the trial. Several Inquiries were 
made as to his condition, and the prospect 
of recovery. At the end of fl.ve days he was 
still seriously sick, and his recovery was a 
matter of great uncertainty. It ls said that 
the near approach of the end of the term 
lntl.uenced the court to some extent In reach-
ing the conclusion which It did. Of Itself, 
this might not be suftlclent to jutltlfy a dis-
charge, but. as the real Inquiry was whether 
the elcknees of the juror required the jury 
to be discharged, the finding of the court 
made upon this Inquiry ls necessarily binding 
upon us. As the testimony taken at the 
time of the discharge was made a part of the 
plea, and a demurrer thereto sustained, the 
question raised upon the reply to the plea 
is not deemed material. 
Upon leave of the court. obtained without 
notice to the defendilnt, the state was per-
mitted, at the time of the trial, to lndorse 
upon the Information the names of eight 
witnesses who gave material testimony In the 
case. This lndorsement was made Just be-
fore the trial, on April 5th. and It ls contend-
ed that. as the testimony given by these 
witnesses was Important, the action of the 
court In permitting the lndorsement was a.n 
abuse of discretion, which resulted in prej-
udicing the rights of the defendant. It ap-
pears that on the 3d day of February a mo-
tion was made to lndorse the names of the 
new witnesses, which motion was sustalnE'd 
by the court. A ftt>rwards the names of thl'Se 
witnesses so lndorsed were stricken from the 
Information, and It was said that It was 
j done upon the ground that the order for ln-
1 dorslng the names of witnesses was made LD. 
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. l..>YJNG DECL.ARATIO~~ 
.the absence ot the defendant. It thus ap-
pears that the attention ot t.he defundant 
and bis attorneys was called to these wit-
nesses; and, further, that inquiry had been 
mnde of them as to What their testimony 
would be. Under the circumstances it can-
not be said that the court exercised its dlscre-
tJon without due regard for the rights ot the 
defendant, or that he was prejudiced by the 
ruling. · 
his Injury- .;:"ft fCJue 
that, If h~ ~H -'°oi?"'" . 
a. -tt "' 8 ..,_o.dJ. and admoolabed 
required ~llt1. -v /Juatoesa matters wb 
them, as b~ e!o111. 0 o, ./Je should atteDd 
edly expl."eSB(ICI <I Dot Jive long. He repea; 
about to dJe. 4 tbe opinion that he was 
called In. Ere .lDfolster or the gospel was 
as guardian ro .r-equested a neighbor to act ~ bis children, gave tnrorma-
tlon about Jnslll"a11ce on his lire, and direct-
Three Jurors were challenged on the 
ground that they did not posseBB the requi-
Blte qualUlcatlons of Jurors. The objection 
urged Js that their names did not appear on 
the tax rolls of the county. and hence that 
they should have been excluded from the 
panel upon the objection. of'. the defendant. 
The showing made upon. this point ls not 
Blltlsfactory. While ft appeared that these 
jurors did not pay any personal taxes for 
the precedJng year, It -wva.s not shown that 
they did not pay taxes on real estate, nor 
that their names did not appeer on the as-
IK'ssment rolls of their respective townships. 
It appears that two of them were listed for 
personal taxes, but that the value or the 
personal property which each had tor tsxa-
Uon did not equal the exemption allowed to 
him; and, In the case of the third, he stated 
that he had made a return for a stock com. 
pany as Its manager and agent, but that he 
had not been assessed for persona] taxPM. 
Whether he was upon the tax roll is uvt 
shown. No Inquiry was made as to whether 
they had reai estate listed fn their names In 
the respectJve townships In which they lived, 
lllld nothing to show that tbey did not pay 
taxes on rea1 estate for tbe preceding year. 
The statute Pro-vldes for listing both person-
a\ an11 r1>a1 est.at In the name of the owner. 
Gen. l!ll 1889 ~ 6889 6911. It Is further 
Pl'llvided that ltl ~In~ a list of persons to 
l!l!n·e as llll'or8 th jur comnlissloners shall Ill!~ from thoae e ~d on the asseRsment ~~s of the Se"era~:wnf\hlps &nd cities or 
ed how It and his property should be ap. 
piled. He sulfcred intense pain, and at times 
cried out, "I am dying now." A stenogra-
pber was Ment for, and a dying statement 
as to the shooting, and the cause of It, was 
tnken down; which was aftcr,vards Intro-
duced In evidence. Some time after the 
1.1tatement was given he rallied some, and 
used language which Indicated thnt he 
was then not without hope of recovery; but 
soon afterwards he expired. It Is claimed 
that under the circumstances the state-
ment should not have been received in evi-
dence. It Is clear that the statement was 
made In the belief ot Impending death, and 
the fact that there was an Interval of sev-
eral hours between the time the. statement 
was made and his death does not make tt 
Inadmissible. Nor will the tact that at times 
after the statement was made he enterlalnedll 
t we or expressed a hope that he might ge The 
render his declarations fncoropeten~eclara­
controlllng question Is whetber th~ \tnpcndd. 
tlons were uttered under a sense ~ deatn d\ e-
lng dissolution; and the fact -tl~:. nope ot .;\\\ 
not Immediately ensue, or tbfl. t; ~u~\11ed&. ~11tr;· 
covery was subsequently eIJ. -te ~Tl'· 
not atfect their admlssibtllty. 6 ~11f. t-n.:t 
Enc. Law, 117. ,el:>0aete"lli\.:w.-n 
The admission of testlmoIJ.:f"° e; 1>-a ~.qqee"ll 
r-elatlons existing between t.:; _.,;J --oe ~i\a"ll"-
P~lng l' . Id pars. 3567, 3601. ~e ev\l\~t l)\tr e1U. Is t~ obtain the service ·~ llltllra '1Vho aP<>Be bstantlal citizens and 
.... e <1wn .. - re BU 
?11\\a ~0 Of l>ro t and the assessment 
'1 th~ferr~ to 1.0~[jury law are evldent-
and the wife of the decease ~ P' c oeteu~';e 
tended to show a crlm\nn\ tntt.!!;..e- :J. ~~ ot ~cei 
them, Is assigned as error ...... ~~j. e-s\s"-0 ~ 
admits that proof of a crltnl ~1>- ~ -o1 
between the defendant and tbe -tV '!! ~ ~ ~b-e 'l."'0"'"-1 
deceased Is admlss\ble to sbo.q9' ie~v:j:._.~~11e 0 9). 
ot a motive for the kU\\ng, at ttJI- ~ ~ ~ ~e"llet. e-
, wbere the killing bas to be es 1~ ~ _ l-~ ct. i\S 
circumstantial evidence; and b:11e ~~ ..> ~W\"'O.e 
lll.d 11\l lllade In the listing of both real \hat~llalproPerty. As It does not appear ~ '1 Were not UPon the personal prop-
as the klll\ng "W'RB adni\tted, tJJ. ~ ~ ot ~o"ll 
the defendant could be snow!'\l'~ ~--~ ~C.~a "'01 
way, but that a. d~t.~~"':~ ~!~\~ei.-t 0~ ~ --t:~\:\\c~. 
, ate new issues, a.n the eons\de-rat.~_-.£'.?:;.. ~ ~fl).ee; ~( 
Q\'I\\ ~lllent rolls, nor that they dld not \~\\Q11. Pay t111.es on real estate, tbls ob-1t~'lgg~llat be overruled. State ex re\. ?~. ll:i\i • C<illllll\ssloners, 44 Kan. 528. 2A ~ltte11.~ ~ther <1blectlons ""Were made w\th ~\Q~\ha the lury, but an exam11u1.tlon 
'?lie 11.elt t they are not ma.ter\al. t 
of the jury 1'r~~e tbeoTY ot tbeou:i~  ~ ., e: "'~ 
prln.c\pa\ \ssu.e. bo-m\c\de was ~ss'-~~~ ~():e~ 
be\ng t.hat tbe because ot tne tne ~ ~~ ~ e 
tb.e detenda:n~ -tor tb.e -w\te ~110w\e ~ -~ - ..._.. ~ 
\J.e entertn\nc deceased nad. a'.9' ot 6~~ ~ ~ ~ l 
ot wb\ch tbe tood \n tne :i\ \)\lT\lo ~ ~ :JJ. .._ ~ 
tb.nt. as be t.s b.\S des\-re,:.~cb e~st~~~~ _.:;. ~--
\\\ttl)ll?t:lllp\a\nt re\u.tes 1:0 the ruun.g () '~~1111 .. 11 ll\ru\tt\ng What -was rece\~ed :-; earr-y\ng o:e re\a.t\on~ ,,\)on tue\l.-S tb- :t.-.... ~ :is::> mou1 ot t con-il:>et"-'" t.ne states s\uce> .c7~  
\lt! '1iaa\h ~larn.t\on or t.he decens~d. ~ "t be ~1~11111g 0 otby lleed about 5 o'clodt. o-P te-r-lui~w~ lda~ 21, 1892, n.nd soon tJ.i'.' e"1-'~llat~11 l!ar!~ed to h\s hon.-ie, where 1).1.>- "l'-"Y-'~lll. ~t Ins wound wn.~ i.nu.de b1 V J.J.O.t. 
\\\e\\\ wa~ ·on~e\ t".or cou<!i!ded., \Pe ('.'. ~ ~-;:-... _.:;. 
\\"\.Q\\'<e. o ·crsn.\\Y e U-r\an \ll -set.~~ 
,,fi, n "'-"\\'\..., •Set "Y d -re\\Te •e • 
llrugeona, Who h:i.formed hill). t:. 
""e lo'-"b. t.\e. s.n d. d:• • 
-in:o\e to ~t \>St. ~,\t.ten 9." t.t.C= s~ ()t \\\~ uo e.$ b0 
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man who coveted his neighbor's wife had a
motive for desiring the death of his neighbor."
The evidence is not only competent as tending
to show the motive which induced the crime,
but it is important also in determining the
degree or grade of the crime that has been
committed. As a general rule, testimony
tending to show the commission of another
uiTense is not admissible, but, where such
offense is intimately connected with the one
charged, important proof to establish the lat-
ter cannot be excluded because it may tend
to prove that the defendant is guilty of an-
other offense. State v. Folwell, 14 Kan. 105.
There may be some cause for complaint at
the very extended inquiry that was made as
to the relations between the defendant and
Mrs. Hopper. A detailed inquiry was made.
and a large volume of testimony was taken.
It may he said, however, that this was due
to a large extent to the fact that an undue
intimacy between these parties was denied
by the defendant. The testimony of the illic-
it relation, however, if it existed, was re-
ceivable in evidence as tending to show the
motive of the defendant in killing the de
ceased. Johnson v. State (Fia.) 4 South. 535;
Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 424; Com. v.
Merriam, 14 Pick. 518; State v. La\vlor, B
Minn. 216, 9 N. W. 698; State v. Hinkle, 6
Iowa, 380; 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 714; 15
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 936.
A more serious objection is made to in-
terviews and conversations held with the
deceased some time prior to the shooting,
when the defendant was not present, and
of which he had no knowledge. A witness
was permitted to detail at length a. meeting
between himself and Hopper on the day be-
fore the shooting; the taking of a long drive
with the deceased, during which he related
to the witness his troubles at Wellington,
and his plans for leaving that place and go-
lug to Missouri. He was allowed to testify
what the mood and manner of the deceased
were on that day, and to relate the reason
given by the deceased for leaving Welling-
ton. The reason stated was the interfer-
ence in his family, and the trouble made by
the defendant. Another witness, over objec-
tion, related that he had met the deceased
on the next day, and had a conversation with
him, in the absence of the defendant, in
which the deceased informed him, among
other things, that he had determined to
go to Missouri, and the reason given was
“that if he could get his wife away from
where Judge Reed was, they could get along
all right together.” The acts and conduct
of the deceased previous to the fatal en-
counter which formed a part of the res
gcstae, or which tended to throw light upon
the question of motive or malice, might be
admitted in evidence; but the acts or con-
dnct of the deceased which are not a part
of the res gestae, and which could not have
influenced the defendant in the commission
of the homicide, cannot be shown. The
manner and conduct of the deceased on the
day previous to the killing was not known
to the defendant, and was not connected
with the homicide, and therefore the de-
fendant could not be aflected thereby. Any-
thing that would throw light on the homi-
cide, and everything that would operate on
the mind of the defendant, can be shown;
but evidence of the acts or manner of the
deceased which never came to the knowl-
edge of the defendant, could not be proved.
There was introduced in evidence a paper,
identified by Mrs. Hopper, in which the de-
ceased declared that he belleved his wife to
be a woman of honor, integrity, and high
moral character, and that any accusations
to the contrary were false. To meet the
introduction of this evidence by the defend-
ant the state was permitted to ofler a wit-
ness who related an occurrence between him-
self and the deceased on May 1st,—t.he day
upon which the other paper was executed,
—in which the deceased presented to him a
paper which he said was prepared by Mrs.
Hopper. He then gives a conversation be-
tween the deceased and himself with ref-
erence to the paper and its contents. After
reading it over, the witness told the deceased
that he would be a fool to sign it; that the
paper was not prepared by l\Irs. Hopper,
but was prepared for the purpose of getting
a divorce from him. A long conversation
ensued, in which it was intimated or would
bear the construction that a trap was being
laid by the defendant and the wife of the
deceased, so that, if trouble occurred, or a
divorce was asked for, the mouth of the de-
ceased would be closed; and much of the
contents of the paper was disclosed in the
conversation. This testimony was wholly in-
competent, and the objection of the defend-
ant should have been sustained, and the mo-
tion to strike it out should have been ai-
lowed. If the testimony had been compe-
tent as an explanation of why the paper
signed by the deceased came to be executed
and delivered to his wife, it was still see-
ondary evidence, and, if competent at all,
the letter itself should have been produced.
or its nouproduction accounted for. The pa-
per itseif, however, if in existence, was not
competent proof, and the introduction of it
contents was prejudicial error.
There i just ground for the complaint
made by the defendant in permitting the
state to cross-examine the defendant in re-
gard to his early life. A great part of the
testimony in the case was devoted to the
question of whether the defendant sustained
adulterous relations with the wife of the
deceased, and on cross-examination he was
required to relate the marital relations be
[\\t‘\‘ll him and his first wife, having been
married in 1868; that he was divorced from
her in the spring of 1877; and to state the
grounds upon which the divorce was grant-
ed. The inquiry was pressed so far that he
was required to state that cruelty and adul-
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man who coveted hl11 nelghbor'11 wife had a 
motive for desiring the death of his neighbor." 
The evidence is not only competent as tending 
to show the motive which Induced the crime, 
but It ls Important also In determining the 
degree or grade of the crime that has been 
committed. As a general rule, testimony 
tending to show the commission of another 
offense ls not admissible, but, where such 
olfense ls Intimately connected with the one 
charged, Important proof to establish the lat-
ter cannot be excluded because It IDtlY tend 
to prove that the defendant Is guilty of an-
other olfense. State v. Folwell, 14 Kan. 100. 
There mny be some cause for complaint at 
the very extended Inquiry that was made a8 
to the relations between the defendant and 
l!rs. Hopper. A detailed Inquiry was made. 
and a large volume of testimony was taken. 
It may be said, however, that this was due 
to a large extent to the fact that an undue 
Intimacy between these parties was denied 
by the defendant. The testimony of the llllc-
lt relation, however, If It existed, was re-
ceivable In evidence as tending to show the 
motive of the defendant In kllllng the de 
ceased. Johnson v. State (Fla.) 4 South. 535; 
Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. ~4; Com. Y. 
Merriam, 14 Pick. 1518; State v. Lawlor, 28 
Minn. 216, 9 N. W. 698; State v. HJnkle, 6 
Iowa, 380; 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 714; 15 
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 936. 
A more serious objection ls made to In-
terviews and conversatlon11 held with the 
deceased some time prior to the shooting, 
when the defendant was not present, and 
of which be had no knowledge. A witness 
was permitted to detail at length a meeting 
between himself and Hopper on the day be-
fore the shooting; the taking of a long drive 
with the deceased, during which he related 
to the witness his troubles at Welllngt.on, 
and his plans for leaving that place and go-
ing to :Missouri. He was allowed to teetlfy 
what the mood and manner of the deceased 
were on that day, and to relate the reason 
given by the deceased for leaving Welling-
ton. The reason stated was the Interfer-
ence In his family, and the trouble made by 
the defendant. Another witness, over objec-
tion, related that he had met the deceased 
on the next day, and had a conYersation with 
him, In the absence of the defendant, In 
which the deceased Informed him, among 
other things, that he had determined to 
go to Missouri, and the reason given was 
"that If he could get his wife away from 
where Judge Reed was, they could get along 
all right together." The acts and conduct 
of the deceased previous to the fatal en-
counter which formed a part of the res 
gestae, or which tended to throw light upon 
the question of motive or malice, might be 
admitted In evidence; but the nets or L'On-
duct of the deceased which are not a part 
of the res gestae, and which could not have 
Influenced the defendant In the commission 
of the homicide, cannot be shown. The 
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manner and conduct of the deceased on the 
day previous to the killing was not known 
to the defendant, and was not connected 
with the homicide, and therefore the de-
fendant could not be alfected thereby. Any-
thing that would throw light on the homi-
cide, and everything that would operate on 
the mind of the defendant, can be shown; 
but evidence of the acts or manner of the 
deceased which never came to the knowl-
edge of the defendant, could not be pro'f'ed. 
There was Introduced in evidence a paper. 
ldentlfted by Mrs. Hopper, In which the de-
ceased declared that he believed his wife to 
be a woman of honor, Integrity, and high 
moral character, and that any aceusattons 
to the contrary were false. To meet the 
Introduction of this evidence by the defend-
ant the state was permitted to otrer a wit-
ness who related an occurrence between him-
self and the deceased on May lst,-the day 
upon which the other paper was executed. 
-In which the deceased presented to him a 
paper which he said was prepared by Mrs. 
Hopper. He then gives a conversation be-
tween the deceased and himself with ref-
erence to the paper and Its contents. After 
reading It over, the witness told the deceased 
that he would be a fool t.o sign It; that the 
paper was not prepared by Mrs. Hopper. 
but was prepared for the purpose of gettlnc 
a divorce from him. A long conversation 
ensued, In which It was Intimated or would 
bear the construction that a. trap was belnc 
le.Id by the defendant and the wife of the 
deceased, so that, If trouble occurred, or a 
divorce was asked for, the mouth of the de-
ceased would be closed; and much of the-
contents of the paper was disclosed In the-
conversation. This testimony was wholly In-
competent, and the objection of the defend-
ant should have been sustained, and the mo-
tion to strike It out should have been al-
lowed. It the testimony had been compe-
tent as an explanation of why the paper-
slgned by the deceased came to be executed 
and ilellve11"d to his wife, It was still sec-
ondary evidence, and, If competent at all, 
the letter Itself should have been produced, 
or Its nonproductlon accounted for. The pa.-
per Itself, however, If In existence, wns not 
competent proof, and the Introduction of Its 
contents wns prejudicial error. 
There Is just ground for the complnlnt 
made by the defendant In permitting the 
state to cross-examine the defendant in re-
gard to bis early life. A great part of the 
testimony In the cnse was devoted to the 
qu('Stlon of whether the defendnnt sustained 
adulterous relations with the wife of the 
deceased, and on crOSIH!xamlnatlon he wns 
required to relate the marital relations be-
t\\ el•n hiw nnd bis lirst wife, ba\·ing beeu 
married In 1868; thut hl' wus divorced from 
her In the sp1·lng of 1877; and to state the 
grounds upon which the divorce was grant-
ed. The Inquiry was pressed so far that he 
was required to state that cruelty and adul-
they 1111,21) t tll/174‘/,<
5 100. “'11 ile file cbdcsob [C-as
that they ;l11i_g'1Jt L74. Q11‘ '£eQ_ ., 8 1
circlnnsta I1 ces 1/11/10,. Into s
tell were charged against blfllv ft-Sena“ er.
101‘! was made to show that his P ivor t wife
was the co-respondent in that (3 “nee Hit
with whom adultery was char:-‘J-’ "
110 W115 engaged to his Pl‘?-sent “ e prim‘ was made, in 11110 "'12 fe .
to thc gfllllfillg of the divorce from his first the qucsti ()1: of n'11ett1‘i1Or Job e:Z°’<1e:1¢u"’ J1
wife. Some of these direct questions were the statelzacnt undo‘. Q1‘ tiff 0 8 G5-01;)” h
not 1-eq|_11l‘0(1 to be answered, but the in- speedy (lea ti, Was, in the Q G t the egafla
qu“-y was pushed sufficiently far to leave their consi (18l‘zl(I0l1, I Olfe } Qppicflaaed mar?‘
the inference with the jury that the (19. credibility ()_f the stat Ii Dag ex ehension ade
iendant had been guilty of another adu1- titled to consider whementasslngcluded wit
wry with 9, person other than the wife ot fact, the (1(:('e¢1ged 11 ether the J "Don the
the deceased 15 years before the 0C(!l11'rence ad > "IZY are em
covcry. and tn 1 lo
modified in :cc':_f;;‘:t1ohst
Starkey v- People, 17 c
ple,139 111. 102 28 N
eron. 2 Pin. 49¢’). v_ '
1s1; State v. B,,',,,s§“"‘°
gaunbetli v_ State ‘)c;- “(SI O 14 S
tate,13 smed ’_ -' -ns ' r_ . E. 678;
1 Parker’ Cr. 9;&1l;{_ 506;S.P3.1-2:,‘ Nelms v.
Tex. 366; Jones v S; “’a11<e§°'§1e 7' Gm‘-‘I1.
v- Nash, 7 Iowa 347 sflfe. 71 Ind’ §;f"§- 37
Another com ' ' 84- ' ' mm
ot the homicide with which he was Charged,
A tull cross-examination should be allowed
upon anything connected with the homicide,
or which would affect the credibility of the
defendant as a witness; but it ls not compo
tent to prove previous acts of udultcr_v,
which have no connection with the offense
chargcd; nor can evidence of improper con-
duct with other parties than those charged
in the information, which happened in his
early lite, he given in evidence to sustain
the present charge. “'9 think there was an
abuse of discretion in this extended cross-
exnminniiou oi’ the defendant.
Another ground 0! complaint is the in-
stmction given by the court with 1-ctercnco
to the effect ot the dying declaration which
was admitted in evidence. The court char-
ged that: “Such declaration, when made in
the hellet that death was imminent, and the
deceased had abandoned all hope or recov-
ery, is admissible; and in this case, it you
should flnd from the evidence that the do
ceased made a declaration as to the encoun-
ter with defendant before his death, then
the court instructs you as a matter of law
that such declaration was made when the
deceased thought death was imminent, and
he had abandoned all hope of recovery."
The court further advised the Jill‘? that the
weight to be given to the declaration and
the credibility of the witness making it.
0l1.'.:ht to be governed by the ordinary rules
of evidence, and to determine the Weight
and credit to be given to the same the jury
can consider all the circumstances under
which the declaration was made. The ob-
jection is that the court withdrew from tin-
jury all considerations as to whether tho
declaration was made when the deccascd
thought death was imminent, and after lu-
had abandoned all hope of rec0very- T111‘
court must decide, as a preliminary ques-
tion, whethcr the declaration was made un-
dcr a sense of impending dissolution, and
the admissibility of the same is exclusively
tor the consideration of the 001111; "bill-
aitcr the evidence is admitted, its credibili-
ty is entirely within the province of the jury,
Who. or course, are at liberty to weigh all
the circumstances under which the declara-
tions were made, including those alro:ul_v
Proved to the judge, and to give the testi-
“‘°l1i' only such credit. as, upon the whole,
state, :75 Ga_
*0 repel the
The '
leave;-'l'tl;'l;3l?L1;l'yi:otil!)18t.E‘rt€1l(: instruction given
at the flppearunccs
were to be Judged by then: and not b tn
d°fe“da“t- “A party assaned 15 Justifizd 'e
acting “P011 the facts as they appear to hig
filgnls ggftto be judged by the facts as they
the l!1SU'l1Ctel0:l.lI:(:l‘g€Ilr8(.iS, ::pIl{l:i1::.a1s‘ Qlihlirillg
have been, it is evident from other portions
or the chafge that the court meant that he
might use such force “as at the time reason-
ably l1DD0ared to hirn to be necessary.” A1
though the instruction is defective, we woulé
hardly think that the error of itsoif “-
itillfiifllfllt to require a reversal. In any fails
I11‘ . - . “
corfieggl. Of the cause this OlI1lSSl0ll can be
There is
court failed ato z‘1:|.hmil1)1lSaf-il'I:ltctlt)h3t thQ
manslaughter in the .-<1-cond (ii-<-,.(_(_ IR }1D0Il
instruction complained of related ‘t ‘ 5 the
gree of crime inferior to that of -if a (lg
defendant is convicted this ob_1“t'1ch the
comes immaterial. State v_ D,cks§,'§ 1%“ ba
‘-")9; State v. Potter, 15 Kan 300. émK‘*n-
B11011» 2-3 Kan. 576; State v i’a1-lior te V‘
K“n- 533» 18 PEG 474- Ftirtlier though, 39
however we think the tcstiy . 0'? that»
Such I-1S’t0 giustify the court xilglzugxgisttixot
an "151-l‘11ctio11 11$ 1° “mt grade of ofiengi
other criticisms are made upon the charge
Of the court, but in them we find no err-O13
nor anything which reqéilrcsiturthiar jcouq_
uncut. F0 _ ,0 or-rors re L‘i‘l‘0( to, tie ur ;=_
me-nt will! reversed, and tho cause re‘
lll{lIldPd for another \-\‘\i1\- All the iustifle-s
concur:-iug_
165
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
07
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
·----- -
--5r~Q. 
'!) l) 'E:CL.1.RA.TI<> 
tJ1ld lt 
l@oJ were charged against b\lll• ,·eSe11 t 11 er-
fort wu made to show that biS 1:i1vorce "•ft'e 
was the co-respondent ln tbat an 8Uft 
with whom adultery was cbu.rged~if <l that 
Ile was engaged to his present e l>rior 
to the granting of the dlvorce frolll his first 
wile Some of these dlrect questions Were 
not 0requlrt'il to be answered, but the In-
quiry was pushed suft\ciently far to leave 
the Inference with the JW'Y tbllt the de-
fendant bad been guilty of another adul-
M'Y with a person other than the Wife of 
the deceased 15 years before the occwTence 
of the bomiclde with which he was charged. 
A full cross-examination should be allowed 
upon anything connected with the homicide, 
or which would affect the credibility of the 
defendant as a witness; but lt Is not compe-
tent to prove previous acts of adultery, 
which hnve no connection with the otfemw 
charged; nor can evidence of Improper con-
duct with other parties than those charged 
In the lnformutlon, which happened In his 
early lite, be given In evidence to sustain 
the present charl(e. "\Ve think there was an 
abuse of discretion In this extended cross-
examlnntlon of the defendant. 
Another ground of complaint ls the in-
struction given by the court with referenc1• 
to the e!Yect of the dying declaration wbid1 
WllB admitted in evidence. The court char-
ged that: "Such declaration, when made In 
the bellef that death was imminent, and the 
deceased bad abandoned all hope of recov-
ery, 18 admissible; and in this case, it you 
should tlnd from the evidence that the de-
ceased made a declaration as to the encoun-
ter with defendant betore his death, then 
the court ln11tructs you as a matter of law 
that such declaration was made when the 
deceased thought death was Imminent, and 
he had abandoned all hope of recovery." 
The court further advised the jury that the 
weight to be given to the declaration and 
the credibility of the witness making It, 
ought to be govern!'d by the ordinary rult>t1 
or evidence, and to determine the weight 
and credit to be given to the same the jury 
can consider all the circumstances undt>t 
which the declarntlon was made. Tbe ob-
jection ls that the court wlthdrE'W rrom till' 
jury nil considerations as to whether th1· 
declaration was made when the decen&•li 
thought death was imminent, and after b1• 
had abandoned all hope of recovery. Th<' 
court uinst decide, as a preliminary ques· 
tlon, whether the declaration was made un-
der a sense of Impending dissolution, anti 
the admlsslblllty of the same ls exclusively 
tor the consideration of the court; "but, 
nftl'l' tbe evldenL'e Is admitted, its crediblli-
ty is entirely within the province of the JW'1, 
who. or t•ourse, are at llb<.>rty to weigh nil 
the circumstances under whkh the deelnrn-
tlolll! were made, Including those alre:uly 
proved to the judge, and to give the testi-
mony only such credit BB, upon the whole, 
they mlgl-:a «=:: -L-.b/P.f It 
I wo. -\.v-~ I.ie rbe co!~£>~ f01186 .2 
that the-y ~Jcbr kike ~c ~ ~. •• 
clrcumsta. :r:.Jt. ~es UIJ<f<!'t- 1~t0 &l:l-ll :f Gl'ee 
was mad~... ID BIJOtJ:i ll-4/c- Oo~&ct~ tJi 'llJ. 
the quest:I c:>.ll3 of whet/J ~ .ll.Q~ tile 1del'lltJo~ Jl 
the stat:em€?nt under ei- 't'2 t 0~ d%l'at:1. t.i 
speedy d~-.. "th was. Jn t.l!e e cJec tJie cbar. 0 · 
their con~ideratton. l.n.e~~et~.ll])l'e~d llJal: 
crediblllt:T <>1 the Batte l>1t • e:icciu~118loa o:t 
titled t<> ~DSfder Wb lllellt ~lllg ed rrollJ 
fact, the d~ease<J .I! etbel" 'tbe J llpoa the 
covery, and the lnsU::cJ. Jo8t l!s au:: :re ea-
moditled In. accorda Ctfoll liJli a11 hoPea t;r or 
Starkey v. People 17 !lee ~l OUJd haveob re-
ple, 139 Ill_ 102, 28 N .lJJ. l. 7 . tli_ this vie'!n 
erou, 2 Pin 400· v: · ID. nn_• l\orth v .,.,~· 
• ' Ul'lJ --vu· S . .. -.._~ 
181; State v. Banfste e<f0e v' "'Ui.te v. Cam-
Lambeth v_ Stat~ 9 .,r (S. C). State, 75 Ga. 
S ~. -•> 1'1 • 1.4 S E 6"'o tate, 13 Sn1edes & ~I ;F.1.lss. 3.'l5· . . oo; 
1 Parker Cr R. . ·.>O(J. P , Nelms v. 
T ' · 11; \\~ ' eople v. Green 
ex. 366; .Too(>S v. State llllc.er v. State ai 
v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347, .38:1,' 71 Ind. 66; s'tate 
.Another complaint fs • 
Instruction given upon ~~tb reference to an 
defense, In Which the e Sllbject ot' selt-
thut, It one ts uninw.ru~urt told the Jucy 
other, he may stand bl Y attacked b.v nn. 
such force as reasonablys ground, and use 
to 1 appears necessary 
• repe the attack and protect himselr 
rhe criticism ls that the instruction give~ 
leu ves the Jury to Inter that the nppearnncC's 
were to be judged by them, and not by the 
defendant. "A party assailed ts Justified In 
ncttng upon the facts as they appear to him, 
and Is not to be Judged by the facts as they 
are." State v. Howard, 14 Kan. 175. While 
the Instruction ls not as explicit as it should 
have been, It ls evident :trom other portions 
of the charge that the court meant that he 
might use such force "as at the time reason-
ably appeared to him to be necessary." Al-
though the Instruction ts defective, we would 
hardly think that the error of Itself wna 
suffl.cll•nt to require a reversal. In any f'u-
ture trial of the cause this omission can be 
corrected. 
There ls a further complaint that the 
court failed to submit an in.st.ruction upon 
man!llaught<>r In the s (•<'ond cll'l-{rt'I\ As th 
hu1U·uction complained of related to a d e 
gree of crime interior to that ot' which t:.he-
defendant ls convicted, this objection b e 
comes lm111aterlnl. State v. Dickson, 6 Ka. e-
'..!09; State v. Potter, 15 Kan. 302; State xi. 
l~hm, ~ l~an. a7G; State v. Yarborough, :a 
l\.nn. o~. 18 Pac. 47-1:. Further tbnn that: 
hoWP'l"cr, we th\nk the testimony was not 
such as to jn~tify the court ln submltth.l.g 
an instru'-•t1on as to that grade ot on'.ense_ 
Other cri tic\!'!IDS are made upon the charge 
ot the collrt. but \n them we find no erro~. 
nor anytb.tug wbl.ch requires further c<>xn.-
lll<'Ht. l•'oi· tllC t•rrors referred to, the jutlµ;-
llll'llt Will be revt>tsed, and the cau.o;;e _ re-
nutndf>d for o,uotller tr\ul. All the justi.c"-"8 
1-'0ncw·1·Iug. 
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At the October term, 1889, of the court
oi common pleas oi Brown county, George
W. Kindle was tried upon an indictment
charging him with the murder of one
Thomas Butt. On the trial, to maintain
the issue on the part oi the state, the pros-
ecuting attorney offered in evidence a
written sta tcment purporting to be signed
by Thomas Butt, purporting to contain
a dying declaration by him of the circum-
stances immediately attending the crime,
and relating to the identity of the per-
petrator. Iieiore offering the paper_ the
state called witnesses who testitied to the
satisfaction oi the court that the said
Butt. at the time the paper was written,
and when it was signed by him, was un-
der a sense of impending death, and had
no hope of recovery, and that the paper
was read over to him before he signed it.
The statement was then, against the ob-
jection and exception oi the dciendant, ad-
mitted in evidence, and read to the jury.
A verdict finding the defendant guilty oi
manslaughter having been rendered, the -
defendant filed a. motion for a new trial on
the ground, among others, that the court
erred in admitting in evidence the written
statement of Butt. On this ground alone
the court sustained the motion. To this
ruling the prosecuting attorney duly took
a bill oi exceptions. which upon leave was
flied in this court “for its decision upon
the points presented."
D.V. Pearson, Pros. Att_v., ior the State.
C. A. White and W. W. Young, contra.
SPEAR, J., (after stating the iacts as
above.) The question presented by the
bill of eitccptions is, did the court err in
'the admission as evidence of the written
statement purporting to be a dying decla-
ration? While some oi the statements oi
the bill respecting the preliminary prooi
are not couched in the clearest and most
positive language, yet it is fairly to be un-
derstood that the testimony of the wit-
nesses satisfied the judge that the state- t
ment was prepared by one of the witness-
es called.under the direction oi the de-
ceased; that it was by one of the wit-
nesses read over to him, and was actual-
ly signed by him; and that at the time he
was under a sense oi impending death, and
had no hope of recovery. The paperitseli
shows that itis a recital of the circum-
stances immediately attending the assault
which resulted in Butt's death. It is not
questioned that the words used by the de-
fendant, or the substance oi them. might
have been testifled to orally by those who
heard them. if they were able to recall
them; hut it is insisted by counsel that
to admit the written statement of the de-
ceased is to make him a witness in the
case, and is a violation of ti-a‘. clause oi’
theconstitution oi theUnited States which
provides that every person on trinl,charg-
ed with crime, shall have the right “to
be confronted with the witnesses against
him," and of the like clause in our own
constitution which provides that in any
such trial the party accused shall be al-
lowed “to meet the witnesses face to face."
It being conceded that what the deceased
said is the substantive matter to be given
to the jury, the only question is as to the
proper mode of communicating from the
declarant to the jury.
Dying declarations have been received
in evidence on the ground of necessity,
there often being no other evidence of the
facts attainable. and sometimes on the
further ground that the solemn circum-
stances surrounding the wounded person,
in view of impending death, will create an
obligation to utter the truth equal, in its
influence, to the obligation of an oath,
though it is difficult to see why, if the lat-
ter is a. substantive ground, the declara-
tions should be limited to the facts im-
mediately connected with the killing. Mr.
Roscoe, in his work on Criminal Evidence,
observes that the concurrence of both
these reasons led to the admission of this
species oi evidence. Page Such decla-
rations are in the nature of hearsay, and
their admissionis an exception to the gen-
eral rule oi evidence. It follows from this
that the person making them is not, but
the person by whom they are proven is,
the witness. Hence the witness by whom
the_accused has theright to beconfronted,
is the one called to lay the foundation for
proof of the declaration, and by whom
the making of the declaration is estab-
lished. The object is to give the accused
the opportunity to see and hear the wit-
ness, and for cross-examination. li these
objects are secured, the guaranty of the
constitution is maintained. Applying these
conclusions to the case at bar, how can it
be said that the accused was deprived of
any right? In order to intelligently pre-
pare the paper signed by the declarant, it
was necessary for the witness to first talk
with him,or at least hear his verbal state-
ment. Then, having reduced the state»
ment to writing, he read it to the declarant,
and it was then signed by him. All this
must have been shown by the witness be-
fore the court could have been satisfied of
the necessary facts preliminary to the ad-
mission oi the paper. Being thus testifled
to, the whole transaction. and every de-
tail, was the subject of cross-examination.
The accused could inquire as to just what
the declarant actually said,just how much
care was taken in writing out the state-
ment, how carefully and distinctly the pa-
per was read to the declarant, and, in
short, as to all that was said and done,
the order of it, and the manner of it.
Whether the accused availed himself of
this opportunity or not, the opportunity
was present. it is clear that in this case
the constitutional requirement was com-
plied with, and every constitutional right
was preserved to the accused. Where tl:is
appears, the only question is, which is
the preferable evidence of the actual decla-
rations,—the memory of witnesses, and
their ability to reproduce the words used,
or the substance of them, or the paper. re-
duced to writing at the time, and signed
by the party making the statement? Or,
to present the exact question in this case,
____.l
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<'onstltutlon which provldee that tn any 
such trial the party accuHed •hall be al-
lowed "to meet the wlt11et1eM faee to face.~ 
It bPlng eonceded that what the deceased 
said Is the subHtllntlve matter to be given 
to the Jory, the only que.it1011 ls as to the 
proper mode of communlcatlug from the 
declaran t to the Jury. 
Dying declarations have beon l'flCelved 
In evidence on the ground or necessity, 
there often being no other evidence of the 
facts attainable. and sometimes on the 
At the October term, 1889, of the court 
or common pleas or Brown county, George 
W. Kindle was tried upon an Indictment 
cbal"1:1ng him wtth the murder of one 
Thomaa Butt. Oo the trial, to motntatn 
the l88ue on the part of the state, the pros- , 
ecutlng attorney onered lu e\•ldence a 
written statement purporting to be l!hrned 
by ThomM Hntt, purporting to contain 
a dying declare tlon by him of the ch-cum-
stam•l'f4 lmmt-'11ately attending thP crime, 
and relating to the Identity of the per-
petrutor. Ht>fore offering the pa11er. tba 
l!tate called wltnl'tl&es who testltied to the 
satlsfttctlon or the court that the said 
Butt, at the time the paper was written, 
u.nd when It was signed by him, was un-
der a sen11d of Impending death, and had 
no hope of recovery, and that the paper 
was read O\"er to him before be signed It. 
The statement WWI then, against the ob-jection and exception of the defendant, ad-
ml tted In e-vldeul'e, and read to the Jury. 
A verdict finding the defendant guilty of 
manslaughter bu.Ying been ren<lered, the 
defen!lan t Hied a motion for a new trial on 
the ground, among others, that the coua·t 
erred In admitting In e\•ldence the written 
11tatement of Butt. On this ground alone 
the <'OU rt sutttalned the motion. To this 
rullng the prosecuting attorney duly took 
fnrthl:'r ground that the solemn ch-cum-
stances surrounding the wounded perBon, 
In view of Impending death, will Ct"Pate an 
obligation to utter the truth equal, In Its 
Influence, to the obligation ol an oath, 
though lt ls dltHcult to see why, If the lat-
tea· Is a substantive ground, the declara.-
tions itbould be limited to the facts Im-
mediately connected with tlw killing. Mr. 
Roscoe, In bb1 work ou Criminal Evidence, 
obsea·vel!I that the t·oncurrence of both 
thee,, reasonB led to the admission of thte 
species of evidence. Page 38. 8uch decla.-
rn.tlontt !lre In the nature of hearsuy, and 
their admieslon 111 an exception to the gen-
el'al rule ol evidence. It follows from thle 
thut the person making them ls not, but 
the person by whom they are proven ls, 
the witness. Hence the witness hy whom 
: the accused has the right to bet'onfronted, l fit tbe one c111leJ to lay the foundation for ('roof of the declaration, and by whom 
' the making of the tleclaratlou le est'Lb-
llshed. '£he object Is to gl ve the accused 
the opportunity to see and bear the wit-
ness, and for croHB-examlnatlon. If these 
objects are secured, the guaranty of the 
const.ltutlon Is maintained. Applying these 
conclu1tlo11s to the caso at bar, how can It 
be said tbat the accused was deprived of 
any right? In order to lntelllgently pre-
pare the paper signed by the deelal'ant, It 
was neceuary for the witness to first talk 
with him, or at least bear biK verbal state-
ment. Then, ba\•lug reduced the state-
ment to writing, heread It tothedt-clurant, 
and It was then 1dgned by him. All this 
must have been sh1•wn by the wltnetis be-
fore the court could have been entlsHPd of 
the neceMary facts prellmln11.ry to the ad-
mission of the paper. Being tbas testified 
to, the whole trnnttactlon, and every de· 
tall, was the subject of l'ross-examluutlon. 
The accm1ed could Inquire wt to Juttt what 
the declarant actuallyeald,Just bow much 
care was taken In wrltlug out tbe state-
ment, bow carefully and distinctly the pa-
per was read to the declarant, and, In 
short, as to all that wHs said and done, 
the order of It, and the manner of It. 
Whether the accused availed hlmseU of 
this opportunity or not, the opportunity 
was present. Jt ls cl~ur that In this case 
the constltutl.onal requirement wue com-
piled with, and every constitutional right 
was preserved to the accused. Whel'etl•h1 
appears; the only 11uestlon Is, which Is 
the preferable evidence of the actual dl:'Cla-
ratlone,-the memory of wltne88es, and 
their ability to reproduce the words UKed, 
or the 1mb1ttance of them, or the pnper, re-
duced to writing at the time, and signed 
by the party m11klng the statement? Or, 
to present the exact question in thls caee, 
a bill of exceptions, which upon leave was 
Hied In this court "for lta declttlon upou 
the points pl"f'sented." 
D. V. PParaon, l'rOll. Atty., for the Stale. 
C. A. White and W.W. Young, contra. 
SPEAR, J., (after stating the facts as 
ahove. I The que11tlon presented by the 
.bill of e11:ceptlo11s Is, did the court err lo 
the adml111don as evidence or the written 
statement purporting to be a dying decla-
rn tlou? While Ho rue of the statements of 
the bill respecting the prelimln11.ry proof 
are not couched In the dearest and most 
positive language, yet It Is fairly to be nn-
derstood that the teiitlmony or the wlt-
ne&Aes satisfied the judge that the state-
Wl:'nt was prepared by one of the witness-
es called, under the direction of the de-
cease<l; that It was by one or the wlt-
nes11es read over to him, and was actual-
ly Hli&ned by him; and that at the time be 
WllB under a sem1eof Impending death, and 
had no hope or recovery. The paper Itself 
shows that It ls a recital or the clreum-
stnnces Immediately attending the assault 
which resulted In Butt's (}ea th. It Is not 
queHtloned that the words used by the de-
fendant, or the substance of them, might 
have been testlHPd to orally IJy thm1e who 
heard them. If they were able to ~all 
them; hut It le Insisted by counRel that 
to actmlt the written statement of the llA-
ceased 1'4 to make him a witness In the 
cosP, aud lR a violation of ti.a! claosl:' of 
thecnnHtitutlon of the United 8t11 tes which 
11rovldes that evPry pertton •ID trlal,charg-
ed with crime, 11hall have the rbrht "to 
be confronted with the wltneitHe11 ag11tnst 
him," and of the like clause Ju our own 
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preference to lat th an
l0l'mer|mctl_iod as to render Q02?!‘ ime ..dIef"§I€;:., (3 ;' _'I‘f‘i,-_g;,-(£251)
proper? We th1nk_ not. . Td upmlmon time of L'l("j1-S 11;“,/10,5608 [Case
judginent oi mankind, ioime at U 1 oh_ _; “.,.,-t,-"2-_ (‘Dd 1.06’) mg jibe at
sei-ration and experience, is h '9 a,1;_ 11- as — ,. - 1”}; Pea ‘t Q ate;
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may not have fuilty understood the decla1-
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ant. He may no recollect accurately the p 1m.at,0nS_ ,9 The ails evidlg-, ifytbe re ,.e_
words or their substance; or, having an. E tent 41¢-¢1a_|.,mO ‘ 11,,-8 one ine lslierson
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these objections. _
the paper so prepared and verified has not
a legitimate tendency to prove the facts
sought to be pruven; that is.to show
what the dying man said.
But, ii we had doubts as to this conclu-
sion, on principle, we would be impelled
to the same result upon authority. The
admissibility of dying declarations in cases
oi homicide has been recognized by the
courts for more than a century, and the
question oi the iorm in which such decla-
rations shall be given to the jury has oft-
en been under consideration. ln King v.
Ely, tried beiore Chief J ustice KING at Old
Bailey, in 1720, (12 Vin. Abr. 118,) it was
held that,“ in the case of murder, what the
deceased declared, alter the wound given,
may he given in evidence; ” and in Tr0w-
ter‘s Case, Id. 119, “ the court would not
admit the declaration of the deceased.
which had been reduced into writing, to
be given in evidence without producing
the writing. " 'l‘o like effect is Rex v.
Woodcock, 1 Leach, 500, (decided in 1789.)
In Rex v. Gay, 7 Car. & P. 2‘-30. it was de-
clared that ii a declaration in arniculo
mortis be taken down in writing, and
signed by the party making it. the judge
will neither receive a copy of the paper in
evidence, nor will he receive paroi evi-
dence of the“ declaration ; " a nd COLERIDGE,
J ., refused to receive the parol evidence of-
fered. Under the head oi‘ “ Form oi Decla-
ration.” lilr. Phillips, in his W0I‘li "I1 Evi-
dence, (volume 1. p. 240,) uses the follow-
inglunguage: “ With regard to the man-
ner in which a dying declaration may be-
come the subject of legal evidence, it may
be observed that an examination taken on
oath by a. magistrate, and signed by the
deceased and by the magistrate, has been
received in evidence as oi the same effect in
point oi admissibility as declarations not
madewith the same solemnity. ” And in a
note to page 241 occurs this: “ Where the
statement oi the deceased is taken down
in writing, it is oi course more reliable,
more accurate, than the memory of most
men: but it is oi no higher grade than un-
written testimony.” Prof. Greenleai in
his work on Evidence (section 161) gives
the rule that, “if the statement Of the de-
ceased was committed to writing, and
signed by him, at the time it was made, it
has been held essential that the writing
should be produced. if existing. ” Mr,
Wharton, in his work on Criminal Evi-
V. State, . J) I
gt?“ (‘ll-I 1"ePgl:11s'3g11 ’-3 in
1‘ ‘Y, ockab ’
Indlnna,(Binnsee "- Q, » 919,-) in Ken:
in w- - "- Sta 11-. nx - -
21_ isconsln, (State te 46 Ind .§-1680;) m
Petr,-') Andlillferentially lflrtin .‘g(l;)Vli'lId
son , ' ,i F1 - s.
B£l(.'hugg‘t7ts§tat9: 5 Lea, 293 .1enneS‘?ee, (Ep.
455.) ’ a,;,', “‘“". "1 MM-
3t!lYtei111Z7 Muss’
several tilneg hefds gseposi ents are
Biflpi, M '
amai en-IU
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01 d.ving d -l - y u"‘]‘“' the IJPIIPPBJ mud
- BL motions. our attention has
t
no been called to them,
found _
th0,.it_i:g_ch ill an entended
nor have we
search of an-
doubt, a n-‘1il:5r1li;lldeve11_ts. there is, beyond
tliIeg1i:i(in1iS8lbiliety_ ilgleernent in favor of
W-as 8 dnsisted that the written statemen\;
been nofiposlt-ion. and that. as there has
our c statutory provision, and under
such onstitution could not luwllllly be
fim Provision, for the taking Oldepugi-
‘P '5 T01‘ the state, the paper, on that
iéfilllld. was inadmissible. But is it a
aflhuvsvition? In a cez-tain_ general sense,
Bog c(:'1?e_l1 sta.temen_t, Blglled by 8' Der-
treétedn uming assertions of fact, may be
bepn B as l_1isdeposit_10n, and the term has
-_ omctimes used in this sense by 1u,“,_
wnters and llldges In law, however ‘
acct-‘iited meaning is limited to the writ’: Its
testimony Of B witness reduced to W1-liyten
in due mrmv by vii-tu’eLof a commissio lug
other a"th°1'lty of a. competent tribun or
upon notice, or according to the pronfili
ions 0! some statute law. Besides,
5¢°I1e and sub - _ _
and B dying de<l;l3h:l:'s1ll2liz<,‘j1i':|t€1:1Ila(_;" w:ig§l)03it'°“
A Duper competent to be ,.e,.eive‘dYl lffer.
deuce as a. deposition ma, be n evi-
any case in which it is t‘Z,kH,r€:°:1"e(1 in
contain statements as to an ' in ay
which the witness,“ on the stanyd igcts 13°
could have testiiied. A ,,,,,,e, ,.,,m°°\11-t,
’°° be 1'i‘0eive<1 as B dying cc¢1uratio1I1"ite“t
ceivable Qnlv in a. case where the dent]? re‘
the deceased is the Bilhiect oi the char Q!
and is limited in its statements to dec-ia§e‘
tions respecting the immediate cause of 1:1?"
death. Again, a deposition, duly take‘?
proves itsen; apaper containing a dying
declaration must be ‘identified and es1;;1\_,_
lished by oral prooi. This paper (1093 not
purport to be a deposition. it vv as 1\Q_,\-_
offered as a d9pOBitlOn. it has nowhere in
these proceedings been treated as a. (1Q[)(_)_
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REL l~I VAN CY.
sition. We think it cannot be now regard-
ed as such. _
Again, it is urged against the admissibil-
ity oi this statement that, “as our expe-
rience teaches, there are many men who in
the hour of death do not have the fear of
God before their eyes, are filled with mal-
ice, hatred, and anger, which go out only
with their lives. and are buried with them
in their graves, and with whom a con-
sciousness oi impending death moves to a.
desire for revenge; and that such declara-
tions,in a majority of cases, are prompted
by such desire.” But against his objection
may be quoted the observation oi Chief
Baron EYRE, in Woodcock's Case, supra,
to the effect that these “declarations are
made in extremity, when the party is at
the point of death, and when every hope
of this world is gone; when every motive
to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is in-
duced, by the most powerful consideration,
to speak the truth. A situation so solemn
and so awful is considered by the law as
the objection, it goes to the weight oi the
testin|ony,and not to its competency, and
would be lust as forcible, if not more so,
against the admission of declarations
proven by Word of mouth. We are oi
opinion that in cases of homicide a state-
ment of the injured person, made in ex-
tmmis, while conscious of his condition,
and under a sense of impending dissolu-
tion, reduced to writing by a competent
person, at the instance of tne tieclarant,
or with his consent, approved and signed
by him, containing statements of the cir-
cumstances oi the unlawful act which re-
stilts in death, after proper preliminary
proof has been introduced, is admissible in
evidence. Whether or not such paperis
primary evidence in the sense that parol
evidence of the declarations will not he re-
ceived until the absence of the paper is ac-
counted for, we are not called upon to de-
termine. It follows that thecourt of com-
mon pleas did not err in admitting the
written statement of Thomas Butt in evi-
creating an obligation equal to that which I deuce, and that that court did crr in sus-
is imposed bya positive oath administered I taining the motion for a new trial by rea-
in a. court of justice. ” However, it is man-
ifest that, whatever force there may be in
168
son of the introduction of the written
statement. Exceptions sustained.
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Case No. 58] RELEVANCY. 
eition. We think it cannot be now regard-
ed as such. 
Again, it is urged a1:ainetthe admlesibll-
tty of this statement that," as our expe-
rience teaches, there are many men who In 
the hour of den th do not have the fear of 
God before their eyes, are filled with mal-
ice, hatred, and anger, which go out only 
with their lives, and a.re burled with them 
iu their graves, and with whom a con-
sclo mmesH of lmpl"ndlng death moves to & 
desire for revenge; and that such declara.-
tlons, in a majority of cases, are prompt~11 
by such desire. " Buta11:ainst Ills olljt•cthm 
may be Quoted the observation of Chief 
Baron EYRE, In Woodcock's Case, supra., 
to the effect that theMe "declarationH are 
made In extremity, when the pa1·ty is at 
the point of death, and when e\·ery hope 
of this world it1 gone; when P-very motl\·e 
to falsehood is eUenced, and the mind Is In-
duced, by the most powerful consldera tlon, 
to speak the truth. A situation so solemn 
and so awful Is considered by the law IU! 
creating an obligation equal to that which 
Is imposed bya positive oathad111luh1tered 
in & court of Justice." HoweYer, It Is man-
ifest that, whatever force there may be 1D 
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the obJec.-tton, It goes to the weight or tile 
testhuony,and not to Its competency, and 
would be Just as forcible, If not more so, 
against the admtsi:lion of declaratton11 
proven by word of mouth. We a.re of 
opinion that in cases of homicide a state-
ment of the Injured person, made Jn e.r-
tremls, while conscious of hie condition, 
and under a sense of impending diHHolu-
tlon, redul'e1l to writing by a competent 
pers<,u, at the Instance of tne oeclarant, 
or with his consent, approved and signed 
by him, con talnlng statements of tbe clr-
1"11 mstances of the unlawful act which ~ 
"'ults in death, after proper preliminary 
p1·oof has been Introduced, is admissible In 
evidence. Whether or not such paptr 111 
primary evidence in the sense that parol 
e\•ldence of the declarations will not he ~ 
celved until the absence of the paper is ac-
counted for, we are not called upon to d&-
termine. It follows that tbecourt of com-
mon pleM did not err In admittlnir the 
written statement of ThomM Butt in evl-
llPnl'e, an!l that that court did err In sus-
taining the motion for a new trinl by rea-
son of the tntrnduction of th ·.~ written 
statement. Exceptions eustaJned. 
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MAYOR‘ ETC" OF CITY OF 50- YORK materials. 1:-11140/4!’, 638'
v. SECOND Avg, R. 2) SUV “mo I1 in tr B0trr1,,l,d [O
(7 N- E- 905, 102 N. Y- 5'7 ' "9"" .d°“e ‘”'11rfi*° "$3 Rio‘ ex we
- e 22 llgeflfles tzsua .!'e I-1,. 0
C0011 of APPBMB °f 1\eW York Jun ' 1386- Drosecuti<:>1:n ot’ sbegpioy 9?; Q1111:-Dlfjféigil
Appeal from a judgment or me general term learned cc) lxnsel 101- tbeenal by 1', and
supreme court, First department, affirming in the pI"<)1)0s1't1'0-17 that qe _ I _ qty
verdict for plaintiff at circuit. M-rest fol‘ t 11¢? breach or ttbet@11QaD7;e tbllufflti
, , n v~'a;- t . _ .
Austen (1. I<ox. for appellant, Second Ave. $1119 ¢\v‘_5(_Og;d "e']:”l1a1,1:@ dlgefisure 001-re,
R. C0. D. J. D0311, f()1' l‘e*spuil(l€!-XI, Mayor, eXu.a_va_g.:11J t m no DI‘()(_0 (*ostr9I)(]_,1nt,ot (I811;
etc., of the City of Ne\v York. ant for 'e_{I)ens*e1l"1el‘, Q Pq In 01- tbes“;;'ov@_
-. _ 0
_ ably iucu 11-e(1_ Stgltnlmces (1121;-gs " less ANDREWS, J. The construction of the Rutland v, Dayton 968’. Insalil orflle defs=n.1-
covenant Of flit! defendant, the SECOIIG Ave- covenant , 2 1. ’ $7111 "Hreag _
eh “S made I11. 58 117- 5 Ired.
nue Railroad Company, contained in the in-
strument of December 15, 1852, to pave the
streets “in and about the rails," in a perma-
nent manner, and to “keep the same in re-
pair to the satisfaction of the street com-
missioners,” was considered in the Case of
Xiciliuilon, 75 N. Y. 235, and it was held that
the covenant bound the company to pave and
keep ill repair so much of the space between
the tracks as was disturbed in the original
conslrm-tion of the road. Upon this construc-
tion ot the covenant the defendant was bound
to keep in repair the whole space between
the tracks of its road on Second avenue, be-
tween Houston and Forty-second streets, as
it was shown that, while the laying of the
road originally would only require the actual
displacement of the pavement for a distance
of about 18 inches on the side of each rail,
nevertheless it would so disturb the belt of
intermediate pavement as to require it to be
relaid. The trial judge therefore correctly
ruled that the covenant extended to the en-
tire space between the tracks.
It is insisted, however, that, conceding this
to be the true construction of the'covenant,
the court erred in directing a verdict for the
sum expended by the city, and for the value
of the new materials used, as pl‘0\'9d by the
account kept by the city. The 0b1Q0ti0I1 15
twofold: First, that the rule of damages T01‘
a breach of a. covenant to repair» Where the
covenantor has neglected to P91'1'°1'm his
covenant, and the repairs have been made
by the covenantee, is the reasonable Cost of
the repairs, and not the sum expended by
the covenantee in making them, and that the
question of reasonable expense should, lllldfll‘
the evidence, have been submitted to the
jury; and, second, that improper evidence
was admitted to prove the amount of labor
and materials used in the work.
In reference to the first‘ ground, it W118
shown, on the part of the city, without con-
tradiction, that the street was out of repair,
and that the defendant, having ncglectcd,
after due notice, to put it in repair. as re-
quired by its covenant, the city proceeded to
make the repairs at a cost, for labor and
materials, of $1,971.72. it employed labor-
crs at the usual wages paid by the City. and
purchased materials for the work. It does
not allinnutively appear that the labor and
nantor “was boun d
make, and ha ' but wm 1,
and no fraud 188 gzzfiseded ‘Ea 0 fife cove-
11, th ’
peach the reasonablen 9 Usual Way
e ,
1101-
811111 actually e s an-Y 1'fl<.‘ts to im-
xpended or the flccounf, the
think prinm. 1' In
fined‘ to remvgcle 151119 sum 'l’:1v(idV;1*]0l'k is, we
neither fraud. reékl the absen c he ls en-
will be presumed essness no °° °1' moor.
_ ' and t ' rextravfigance
1.?1(1§le]ly<?ms"""’t1l'elygiveshfim measure °f re‘
11 Plllnlty only. 6 Covvnantor ac.
But it is insisted th
have been therefore, should
Submitted to the jury. We think
there wa
Point. Tfienzigfisdgil g),€,::‘; 1:1? iltlllon this
master, that the cost to the CdIn11Slr1l1ys0ftrack-
313 with cobble-stone was, in respect topillie
em Of labo - 1 - -, ,
sum ment in question. But the pavement l:1idp\v:s
Belgian Dfivement, and it was proved on the
Dart of the citv, and the proof was uncontrq.
dkted, that the laying of Belgian pavernc-1‘:
involved much more labor and expense thqln
paving with cobble-stones. There was ‘
evidence showing that the charge for labor no
the account of the city was excessive 01- thin
more laborers or materials were provided th-at
were 1'eas°m1b1Y required. We are of opin an
meref°1‘°, that the direction of the v ion’
for the sum actually expénded by th ierdict
mlgiiflg the repairs was not error. e c ty in
mor
tions to ei!ths<aer:()i1rl1§1;is(s1i1<frf tigneivrsicllgzfizd lzy ext.
book kept by one John B_ W-m Kandfina tinne-
ten mexnorandum or account ‘made bf ‘V1-it-
offered to prove the number of days, w05kl1im,
f-°"m°d' and me llwmtity or materials? De“
“rill: was a foreman in the employ of thgse '
partmem; of public works, and had gen d_e'
clulrge of the repairs in question. Ix §m
him were two gang foreinen, or head 1){;v;?r
Patrick 1\1adden and Charles Qoughlnn, eats-"1
having Qllafge of a separate gang of about 10
men ernhloyed on the work. Wilt kept a
tllH&—b0Qk in winch was entered the nnlne
Of each Ifian employed. lie visited the \\-Qrk
twice a Ga ‘/11; the morning and afternu<)x\,__
.01“ g few minuies to a halt an
l‘(¥llllllDlI1g- f1
hour each tune; and he testified that \vhl1e
Pp-
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there he checked on the time-book the time
of each man as reported to him by the gang
foreman. He also testified that he marked
the men's names as he saw them, and that
he knew their faces. The gang foreman did
not see the entries made by Wilt, but they
testified that they correctly reported to him
each day the names of the men who worked,
and, it any did not Work full time, they re-
ported that fact also. Upon this proof the
trial judge admitted the time-book in evidence,
against the objection of the defendant.
The trial judge also admitted in evidence,
under like objection, a written memorandum
or account, in the handwriting of Wilt, of
materials used. Wilt testified that the en-
tries in the account were made from daily in-
formation presented by the gang foremen
on the occasions of his visiting the work, and
that he correctly entered the amounts as re-
ported. It does not appear that he had any
personal knowledge of the matters to which
the entries related. The gang foremen were
called as witnesses in support of the account.
Neither of them saw the entries, and on the
trial neither claimed to have any present
recollection of the specific quantities so re-
ported by them. .\Iaddcn testified that he re-
ported the correct amounts to Wilt, and it is
inferable from his evidence that, when the
reports were made, he had personal knowl-
edge of the factsreported. (Joughlan alsotes-
titied. in general terms, that he reported the
items correctly. But on further examination
it appeared that his reports to Wilt, of the
stone delivered at the work, were made upon
information derived by him from the carmen
who drew the stone, and who counted them,
and who reported the count to Coughlan, who
in turn reported to Wilt. Cc-ughlan saw the
carmen dump the stone, but he did not verify
the count, but appears to have assumed its
correctness. The carmen who delivered the
stone were not called as witnesses.
The exception to the admission of the
time-hook presents a. question of considera-
ble practical importance. The ultimate fact
sought to be proved on this branch of the
case was the number of days‘ labor per-
formed in making the repairs. The time-
book was not admissible as a memorandum
of facts known to \Vilt and veriiied by him.
His observation of the men at work was cas-
ual, and it cannot be inferred that he had
pc1's.on{il knowledge of the amount of labor
performed. His knowledge from personal
observation was manifestly incomplete, and
the time-book was made up, mainly at least,
from the reports of the gang foremcn. The
time-book was clearly not admissible upon
the testimony either of the gang forcmen or
of Wilt, separately considcrcd. The gang
forcmcn knew the facts they reported to
Wilt to be true, but they did not see the en-
tries made, and could not verify their cor-
rectness. Wilt did not make the entries up-
on his own knowledge of the facts, but
from the reports of the gang foremen.
Standing upon his testimony alone, the en-
tries were mere hearsay. But, combining
the testimony of Wilt and the gang foremen,
there was-First, original evidence that ia-
borers were employed, and that their time
was correctly reported, by persons who had
personal knowledge of the facts, and that
their reports were made in the ordinary
course of business, and in accordance with
the duty of the persons making them, and
in point of time were contemporaneous with
the transactions to which the reports relat-
ed; and, second, evidence by the person who
received the reports that he correctly enter-
ed them, as reported, in the time-book,—the
usual course of his business and duty. it
is objected that this evidence, taken togeth-
er, is incompetent to prove the ultimate fact.
and amounts to nothing more than hearsay.
If the witnesses are believed, there can be
but little moral doubt that the book is a true
record of the actual fact. There could be
no doubt whatever, except one arising from
infirmity of memory, or mistake or fraud.
The gang foremen may, by mistake or fraud,
have misreported to Wilt, and Wilt may, ei-
ther intentionally or unintentionally, have
made entries not in accordance with the re-
ports of the gang foremen. But the possi-
bility of mistake or fraud on the part of wit-
nesscs exists in all cases, and in respect to
any kind of oral evidence.
The question arises, must a material ulti-
mate fact be proved by the evidence of a
witness who knew the fact, and can recall
it, or who, having no personal recollection
of the fact at the time of his examination as
a. witness, testifies that he made, or saw
made, an entry of the fact at the time, or re-
cently thereafter, which, on being produced,
he can verify as the entry he made or saw.
and that he knew the entry to be true when
made; or may such ultimate fact be proved
by showing, by a witness, that he knew the-
facts in relation to the matter which is the
subject of investigation, and communicated
thcm to another at the time, but had forgot-
ten them, and supplementing this testimony
by that of the person receiving the commun-
lcation to the effect that he entered, at the
time, the facts communicated, and by the
production of the book or memorandum in
which the entries were made?
The admissibility of memoranda of the
first class is well settled. They are aumit-
ted in connection with and as auxiliary to
the oral evidence of the witness; and this.
whether the witness, on seeing the entries,
recalls the facts, or can only verify those en-
tries as a true record made or seen by him
at or soon after the transaction to which it
relates. Halsey v. Sinsebaugh, 15 N. Y. 485;
Guy v. Mead. 22 N. Y. 462.
The other branch of the inquiry has not
been very distinctly adjudicated in this
state. although the admissibility of entries
made under circumstances like those in this
case was apparently proved in Payne V.
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there he clwdted on the time-book the time 
of each man as reported to him by the nng 
foreman. He also tE'Stifled that be marked 
the men's names as he eaw them, and that 
be knew their faces. The gang foreman did 
not see the entries made by Wilt, but they 
testified that they correctly reported to him 
each day the names of the men who worked, 
and, It any did not work full time, they re-
ported that fact also. Upon this proof the 
trial judge admitted the time-book In evidence, 
against the obje<'tioo of the defendant. 
The trial judge also admitted In evidence, 
nnder like objection, a written memorandum 
or account, In the handwriting of Wilt, of 
materials used. Wilt testlflecI that the en-
tries In the account were made from dally In-
formation presented by the gang foremen 
on the occasions of hJs visiting the work, and 
that be correctly entered the amounts as re-
ported. It does not appear that be had any 
pel'llOnal knowledge of the matters to which 
the entries related. The nng foremen were 
called as wltnes&e8 in 11upport of the a<'COunt. 
Neither of them saw the entries, and on the 
trial neither claimed to have any present 
recollection of the l!}>e<'lftc quantities 80 re-
ported by them. lladdt>n testified that he Te-
ported the correct amounts to Wilt, and It ls 
inferable from bis evidence that, when the 
reports were made, he had pel'80nal knowl-
edge of the facts rPported. Coughlan also tes-
tltled, in gt>neral terms, that he reported the 
Items correctly. But on further examination 
it appeared that his reports to Wilt, of the 
stone delivered at the work, were made upon 
information derived by him from the carmeo 
who drew the stone, and who rounted them, 
and who reported the count to Coughlan, who 
in turn reported to Wilt. Coughlan saw the 
carmen dump the stone, but he did not verify 
the count, but a11pears to have aaumed its 
correctneSB. The <'armen who delivered the 
stone were not called as witnesses. 
The t>xceptlon to the admission of the 
tlm<>-book presents a question of considera-
ble practical lmportanct>. The ultimate fact 
aought to be proved on this branch of the 
case was the nurul)('r of days' labor per-
formed in making the repairs. The time-
book wns not admlBSlble as a mE'morandum 
of facts known to Wilt and verU\ed by him. 
His obse1-vatlon of the men at work was cas-
ual, and It cannot be lnft>rred that he had 
personal knowledge of the amount of labor 
pPrformed. His knowledge from personal 
observation was manifestly Incomplete, and 
the time-book was made up, mainly at least, 
from the reports of the gang foremen. The 
time-book was clearly not admissible upon 
the testimony either of the gang foremen or 
of Wilt, sepnrntcly consldc>rE>d. The gang 
forE'mE'n knew the tacts they reported to 
Wilt to be true, but they did not see the en-
tries made, and could not verify their cor-
rectness. Wilt did not make the entries up-
on his own knowledge of the facts, but 
from the reports of the gang foremen. 
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Standing upon bis testimony alone, the en-
tries were mere hearsay. But, comblnlng 
the testimony of Wilt and the gang foremen, 
there was-First, original evidence that la-
borers were employed, and that their tlme-
was correctly reported, by pE>rsons who had 
personal knowledge of the facts, and that 
their reports were made In the ordlnarr 
course of business, and in accordance with 
the duty of the persons making them, and 
In point of time were contemporaneous with 
the transactions to which the reports relat-
ed; and, second, evidence by the person who 
received the reports that he correctly enter-
ed them, as reported, in the tlme-book,-the 
usual course of his business and duty. It 
la objected that this evidence. taken togeth-
er, ts incompetent to prove tbe ultimate fact. 
and amounts to nothing more than hearsay. 
If the wltneBBee are believed, there can be 
bot little moral doubt that the book Is a true 
record of the actual fact. There could be 
no doubt whatever, except one arising from 
lnfl.nntty ot. memory, or mistake or fraud. 
The gang foremen may, by mistake or fraud, 
have misreported to Wllt, and Wilt may, ei-
ther Intentionally or unintentionally, have 
made entries not In accordance with the re-
ports of the gang foremen. But the poaal-
blllty of mistake or fraud on the part of wit-
nesses exists in all cases, and In respect t& 
any kind of oral evidence. 
The question arises, must a material ulti-
mate tact be proved by the evidence of a 
witneBS who knew the fact, and can reeall 
It, or who, having no personal recollection. 
of the fact at the time of bis examination as 
a wltneSB, testifies that he made, or saw 
made, an entry of the fact at the time, or re-
eently thereafter, which, on being produced.. 
he <'an verify as the entry he made or Raw, 
and that he knew the entry to be true when 
made; or may such ultimate fact be proved 
by showing, by a wltne88, that he knew the· 
faets in relation to the matter which is the 
subJN!t of investigation, and communicated 
them to another at the time, but had forgot-
ten them, and supplementing this testimony 
by that of the person receiving the commun-
katlon to the effect that he entered, at the 
time, the tacts communicated, and IJy the 
production of the book or memorandum In 
which the entries were made? 
Tht> adml881blllty o~ memoranda of the-
first class Is well settled. They are aumlt-
ted In connection with and as auxiliary t.0-
the oral evidence of the witness; and this. 
whether the witness, on seeing the entries, 
recalls the facts, or can only verify those en-
tries as a true record made or seen by him 
at or soon after the transaction to which It 
relates. Halsey v. Slnsebaugh, 15 N. Y. 48";. 
Guy v. l\lead. 22 N. Y. 462. 
The other branch of toe Inquiry has not 
been very distinctly adju1llcated In thls 
state, although the admlsslblllty of entries 
made under circumstances like those In this 
case was apparently proved in Payne v. 
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Hodge, 71 N. Y. sos. We flreofandqpifilon In Peck ,,_ 15/ 679.
that the admissibility ot meulembrarc may mem0,am(3 1,1,, 138,601/O [
properly be extended so as t0 an ac :1‘ the 0,-lg,-D411 1:11 €>I11oI‘/1/10 9 age’ 91 Ofise
case before 118- The case is Of usi Count, vatell19lI1@1':I11(/llm U1", bnlitt A’. Y
kept in the 0rdiI1&I'y course Of D (“$988. of the plain ti tf for 1z18'l""€Ie ht :0 we‘ 56$
laborers employed in the i>1'°Se i°11 of in the c0I_1 rse of bisdown bJ> qO°1v> in-"°1
11 a
ork, based upon daily reports 0f f0rem of 1) _ lit D
w en course uslness. 1, J>, 111.008 employé.
who had Charge °f the I119-I1, and who’ in ac- dum was delivered e or es
cordance with Ulflil‘ duty, reported the time to the pla izlntitf, whé $15’ tllgoliggn he ozgd
to another subordinate of the same Common the paper produced a °s¢ ‘ti one 11 emollaz;
muster, but of a higher grade, who, in time, was a C013,},-_ The pe Dd 9 - but 11 made"‘"1-
also in accordance with his duty, entered inal memorandum rs Q°ivedt"“' fled tb it
the time as reported. Xve think entries so copy. The court hwas "rho In In evidence
made, with the evidence of the foreman that impmperlsr admltt acid thilble tglde the on-g
they made true reports, and of the person Sign in Peck V ve "J ev at the Verity the
who made the entries that he correctly en- dim“-ent‘ fa cts 819111,-n Idenca ‘1'?P.V was
tered them, are admissible. It is subs\nn- In respect to tzllorn those‘! rests upolllle deal.
tiaily by this method of accounts that the of material, we tzizimisfiiin this case quite
that £1‘) of the flccount
D0 ‘"1 of the 11¢-_
rts of Dléldden
transactions of business in numerous cases A
count bas d
are authenticated, and business could not e upon the
was admissible on th
e
which we ha _ sa
cases, without great inconvenience, unless the tIme_bookveLflUStlfiGd me grounds upon
this method of keeping and proving ac- fled that he klgew tzildden in seuli1dtHll.<Si0l.'l or
counts is sanctioned. In a business where e fac S ance ms"-
many laborers are employed, the accounts
must, in most cases, of necessity, be kept by
a person not cognizant of the facts, and
from reports made by others. The person
in charge of the laborers knows the fact, but
he may not have the skill, or for other rea-
sons it may be inconvenient that he should
keep the account. It may be assumed that
a system of accounts based upon substan-
tially the same methods as the accounts in
this case, is in accordance with the usages
of business. In admitting an account veri-
fied as was the account here, thcrc is little
danger of mistake, and the atlmission of
such an account as legal evidence is often
necessary to prevent a failure of justice.
We are of opinion, however, that it is a
proper qualification of the rule admitting
such evidence that the account must have
been made in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, and that it should not be extended so
as to admit a mere private memorandum.
not made in pursuance of any duty 0WiI1g
by the person making it, or when made 111!-
on information derived from afl0the1' W110
made the communication casually and vol-
untarily, and not under the sanction of duty
or other obligation. The case bef0l‘e HS 18
within the qualification suggested.
i
!
1
be carried on and accounts kept, in many t‘
ported them, and Wilt t
1261-ed them as reported. estifled that he en_
. _ urn‘
was not strictly admissiblleahed by Courrhlan
not appear t
of the quanti<t)Vl1011fv:t(l)1ad personal knowledge
of the work but to gelivered on his part
men, and his: re 0 t 0 t e count of the car.
on we I_Ppm_N D I‘ s to Wilt were based up-
- Of the carmen to him. Tim
car
\\rifiZ1efll1 dvere not called» and the evidence of
n Collghlan was mere hearsay. If
lt)1;efl?‘ft§ntEi°l1 01’ the court had been called
and oi) e endant to this part of the account,
the it Jection had been specifically tasen to
Ian ems entered upon the reports of COllgh..
1 the objection would. we think, have
v
Coughlan does
been valid. But the objection was a gen-
3"e‘L_‘l>bJection to the whole account. It ‘vim
b admissible as to the ltems mpg;-ted
tiinillllé. and we think the general objec.
t exception is not available to raise
he question as to the admissibility Qf
items entered on the report of Couglilan t-he
dependently of the others. The ’ In-
amollllt Of materials embraced in the whole
ery was small, and we think no l1]jf1esQt(.)v-
l(.'e
Wm be done by aflirmin
, g th.
The Jlldgnient is therefore am:m'j€:1‘?8ment.
All concur. -
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nOdge, 71 N. Y. 598.. We f1.r:;,(6lld:);)fru_on 
that the admlsslbtllty of JJlestJ ettthra.~ !nay 
properly be extended so as to tJ,Jl a~ the 
case before us. The case ts of bUSln count. 
.tept ID the ordinary course of u ees. of 
laborers employed. in the prose; ttlon of 
work bafled upon dally reports o 0 renien 
who had cbal'ge of the men, and who. In ac-
eordance wtth their duty. reported the time 
to another subordinate o'f the same common 
master, but of a higher grade, who, in ti.me, 
also ln accordance with hls duty, entered 
the time as reported. We think entries so 
made, with the evidence of the foremen that 
they made true reports, and of the person 
who made the entries that he correctly en· 
tered them, are admissible. It 11 subst.an-
Ually by thls method of accounts that the 
tranaactlons of business ln numerous cases 
are authenticated, and buelneBB could not 
be carried on and accounts kept, ln many 
'88eB, without great inconvenience, unleBB 
tblB methOd of keeping and proving ac· 
counts ls sanctioned. In a business where 
many laborers are employed, the accounts 
must, ln most cases, of neceeslty, be kept by 
a person not cognlzant of the facts, and 
from reports made by others. The person 
lo charge of the laborers knows the fact, but 
he may not have the skill, or tor other rea-
aona It may be Inconvenient that be should 
keep the account. It may be &88Umed that 
a system of accounts based upon substan· 
tlally tbe same methods as the accounts ln 
tbl8 cue, is In accordance with the usages 
of bualneBB. In admitting an account veri· 
lied as was the account here, there ls little 
danger of mistake, and the admlBBlon of 
soch an account as legal evidence ls often 
necell8al'J to prevent a tallure of Justice. 
We are of oplnlon, however, that it ls a 
proper quallflcatlon of the rule admitting 
nch evidence that the account must have 
been made In the ordinary course of busi-
ness, and that lt should not be extended so 
as to admit a mere private memorandum, 
not made ln pursuance of any duty owing 
by the person making it, or when made up-
on Information derived from another who 
made the communication casually and vol· 
11J1tarlly, and not under the sanction of duty 
or other obligation. The case before us l8 
within the qualiflcatlon sugg.-sted. 
7>! ~~ 
IZJ Pee~ '11"""", ~i ~// memom.i..~ -..z ZZZ ""lt>Jt> 1'"e fOttat, 
orlgfnal m ~ivon//<111. "ct~ ~ 
vate me~<:>:ra.DDOLlJ '.lll, b .ft:tE>ct ~ .r.: 
the plal.11tI1r for .bJa ~Cle ~ .fl ~a; 66t 
fn the co-.i ..-ae oL' .b/11 <l::liJ,.~ :.)>- ~l>J? Of' 1:1 
course or Z>us/ness. ".I:'~· 0~.,_% 9ltlpJoni 
dum was <Iellvered, h.J> e 0~ Ill t;e" IUld ll 
to the phLI~ ti.tr, who lo ~~ 0 f:'l~111 e 01YJJ11a; 
the paper I>roduced an et It. lle ..,.h0lllellloran'. 
was a copy-- The pel'e: l"~~llt test111lllade It, 
inal meJD.<>randum lp-48 !l ""°.b "~In l'd that 
copy. Tb~ court .Ile 'ttt:ia o llJade ev/dezice 
lmproperiy fidmftted f! t11a!>le to ve~;,,o~g­
slon in ~ec.k v. Valen el>'ldeJJ the eop;y wa: 
different :f'acts tro.ro tb ff.Ile l'es Ce. The decl-
In respect: to the a(f 0 &e IJJ th t.B UJ>On quite 
ot material. we thfJJJc lrlle8 to11 ls CllBe. 
count based upon t that or the account 
-was admissible on tbbe l"eJ>o~rt0;1'~ ac-
-wblcb we have Justf; Raine Pounds 0 ;!,e; 
t:he time-book. .Madde~ the admJsslon ot 
tied that he knew tlJe 1'ac fn substance testi-
P<>rted them, and WUt 1: t.s and properJy re-
t:ered them as reported eetJ11ed that he . en-
The Part ot the acco· 
Items of which were f unt ot materials, the 
was not strictly admle~lahed by Coughlan, 
not appear to ha h e. Coughlan does 
of! th ve ad i>ersonaI knowledge 
1! e quantity ot atone delivered on his part 
o die work, but took the count ot the car. 
men, and bis reports to Wllt were based up-
on ~!le reports ot the carmen to him. 'l' bt> 
carmen Wet'& not called, and the evidence of 
Wilt and Coughlan was mere hearsay. ll 
the attention ot the court had been called 
by the detendant to this part of the account, 
and objection had been speclft('fllly t&Aen to 
the items entered upon the reports of Cough-
lan, the objection would, we think, have 
been valid. But the objection was a gen-
eral objection to the whole account. It was 
clearly admlBBlble as to tbe Items reported 
by Wilt, and we think the general obJec· 
tton and exception Is not available to ra.lee 
the question as to the admlsslblllty of 1:he 
Items entered on the report ot Coughlan, In-
dependently of the others. The Whole 
amount of materials embraced ln the recov-
ery was small, and we think no flljnati 
will be done by afUrmfng the judgi:ne ce 
The judgment Is therefore atflrmed. n t. 
All concur. · 
' 
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SMITH v. RENTZ.
(30 N. E. 54, 131 N. Y. 169.)
(‘ourt of Appeals of New York. Feb. 12, 1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
First department.
Action by Eugene Smith, executor of Rich-
ard Patrick, deceased, against Frederlcka
Rentz, for moneys paid out and expended by
plaintifl"s testator at defendant‘s request.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the
general term aflirming a judgment for plain-
tifl! entered upon the report of a referee.
Reversed.
Leopold Leo, for appellant.
for respondent.
ANDREWS, J . The action was brought to
recover moneys advanced and paid out by
the plaintiffs testator for the defendant.
The complaint alleges that from 1882 to 1887
the testator was the banker and general
H. B. Glosson,
business agent for the defendant, and that I
during aid years the defendant from time
to time deposited moneys with the testator;
and the latter, as requested by the defend-
ant, from her funds in his hands, and when
was liable; and that there was a balance
due the testator on account of such payment
of $3,744.75, which the plaintil claimed to
recover. The answer contained a general
denial and interposed special defenses. On
the trial before a referee the plaintiff offered
in evidence the ledger kept by the testator
containing the items of the alleged account.
It was admitted against the objection of the
defendant. Evidence was given on the part
of the plaintiff independently of the ledger,
tending to establish many of the items of
the account, but a considerable number of »
the items for which a recovery was had are
supported by the ledger alone. If the ledger
was improperly admitted in evidence the
judgment must be reversed. It was admit-
ted not only to establish the items, of which
there was no other proof, but its admission
may have influenced the referee in passing '
upon the items of the account, of which it 1
was not the sole evidence. The referee ad-
mitted the ledger on the ground that the de-
fendant had under the Code examined the
plaintiff })efore trial, and in that proceeding
had given notice to the plaintifi to produce
the books oi.’ the tcstator, and that upon
such notice the plaintiff produced certain
books of the decedent. among which was the
ledger containing his account with the de-
fendant, which was inspected by the de-
fendant's counsel. The referee held that
the ledger was thereby made evidence for
the plaintiff. The ledger was not used on
the examination, nor were any questions
asked founded upon the entries therein. A
similar question was before the second divi-
sion of this court in Carradine v. Hotchkiss,
120 N. Y. 608, 2-1 N. E. 1020. There the
plaintiff, on the request of the defendant's
counsel, made on the trial, produced a let-
ter, and delivered it to the latter, who read
it, but did not offer it in evidence. There-
upon, on demand of the plaintiff’ counsel,
the court directed,the defendant's counsel to
put it in evidence, and in obedience to such
direction, to which the defendant's counsel
excepted, the letter was read to the jury.
When the case came to this court on ap-
peal by the defendant this ruling was chal-
lenged as erroneous. The court so decided,
Haight. J., saying: “Whatever may have
been the ancient rule in England upon the
subject, we do not understand that the rul-
ing of the court can be sustained under any
rule now existing in England or in this
state.” But the court, being of opinion that
the letter did not prejudice the defendant,
aflirmed the judgment. It is claimed that
the decision upon the point of the admissi-
bilit_v of the letter was unnecessary, and
therefore is not binding. The quetion was
properly raised, and was decided. Its deci-
; sion naturally preceded the decision of the
these were insuiiicient from his own, paid '
her diflerent sums in cash, and also paid ?
taxes and tradesmen’s bills for which she 3
subsequent question, and the declaration of
the court was not oblter. We think, more-
over, that the decision in the case accords
with the view which has prevailed in the
A courts of this state and the practice of the
profession. In Lawrence v. Van Horne, 1
Gaines, 276, the defendant gave notice to the
plaintiff to produce on the trial a certain let-
ter, which the plaintiff refused to do unless
the defendant would engage to read it in
evidence. The defendant claimed the right
to inspect the letter before deciding wheth-
er he would read it in evidence. The judge
ruled that inspection could not be demanded
except on the terms which the plaintiff im-
posed. On appeal one of the judges was of
the opinion that the ruling was right, and
that the court could not compel a production
of a paper for inspection only. But the
point was not decided. In Kenny v. Clark-
on, 1 Johns. 385, Spencer, J., said: "I must
not be understood as sanctioning the course
adopted at the trial in admitting the paper
to be read without proof, because notice
had been given to produce it, and it had
been called for and perused. The case of
Lawrence v. Van Horne, 1 Caines, 276, set-
tles nothing, the then chief justice express-
ing no decided opinion on the question, and
the rest of the court were equally divided.
It appears to me that the notice to pro-
duce a paper, and calling for its inspection.
ought to be considered as analogous to a
bill for discovery, where most certainly the
answer is not evidence but for the adverse
party. I think it is our duty to adopt such a
course as will not needlessly drive parties
into equity for discovery.”
The doctrine announced by Judge Spencer
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similar question was before the second dlvl· 
slon of thlB court In Carradine v. Hotchkiss, 
120 N. Y. 608, 24 N. E. 1020. There the 
C'ourt of Appeals of New York. Feb. 12, 1892. plalntur, on the request of the defendant's 
Appeal from supreme court, general term, counsel, made on the trial, produced a let· 
First department. ter, and dellvered It to the latter, who read 
Action by Eugene Smith, executor of Rich- It, but did not offer It In evidence. Tbere-
ard Patrick deceased against Fredericka upon, on demand of the plaintiff's counsel, 
Rentz, for n:oney8 patd' out and expended by ! the court directed.the defendant's counsel to 
plaintiff's testator at defendant's request. put It In evidence, and In obt'dlenre to such 
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the dll't'CUon, to which the defendant's counsel 
general term aftlrmlng a judgment for plain- j excepted, the letter was read to the jury. 
tiff entered upon the report of a referee. 1 When the case came to this court on ap-
Reversed. : peal by the defendant this ruling was chal· 
1 l~nged as erroneous. The court so decided, 
Leopold Leo, for ap1>ellant. H. B. Clo880D, : Haight. J., saying: "Whatever may have 
for retlll<>ndent. i been the ancient rule In England upon the 
! subject, we do not understand that the rul· 
ANDREWS, J, The action was brought to ' Ing of the court can be sustained under any 
recover moneys advanced and paid out by I rule now existing In England or In this 
the plalntUf's te11tator for the defendant. state." But the court, being of opinion that 
The complaint allPges that from 1882 to 1887 the letter did not prejudice the defendant, 
the testator was the banker and general aftlrmed the judgment. It la claimed that 
business agent for the defendant, and that the decision upon the point of the admlssl-
durlng said years the defendant from time ; blllty of the letter was unnecessary, and 
to time dPposlted moneys with the testator; ! therefore ls not binding. The question was 
and the latter, as requested by the defend- properly raised, and was decided. Its decl-
ant, from her funds In his hands, and whPn slon naturally preceded the decision of the 
these were ln1mftlclent from his own, paid subsequent question, and the declaration of 
her different sums In cash, and also paid the court was not obiter. We think, more-
taxes and tradesmen's bills for which she over, that the deelslon In the case accords 
was liable; and that there was a balance with the view which has prevailed In the 
due the tPHtator on account of such payment , courts of this state and the practice of the 
of $3,744.75, which the plalntUr claimed to . profe881on. In Lawrence v. Van Home, 1 
recover. The answer contained a general [ Caines, 276, the defendant gave notice to the 
denial and Interposed special defenses. On : plalntitr to produce on the trial a certain let-
the trial before a referee the plalntllf offerl'd : ter, which the plaintiff refused to do unless 
In evidence the ledger kept by the testator ; the defendant would engage to read It In 
containing the Items of the alleged account. ! evidence. The defendant claimed the right 
It was admitted against the objection of the l to Inspect the letter before decldinll wheth· 
defendant. Evidence was given on the part er he wo\Jld read It In evidence. The Judge 
of the plaintiff Independently of the ledger, I ruled that Inspection could not be demanded 
tending to establish man~· of thf' Items of except on the terms which the plaintiff Im-
the account, but a con11lderablt> numlK'r ot . posed. On appeal one of the judges was of 
the Items for whl<'h a recovery was had are the opinion that the ruling was right, and 
supported by the ledger alone. If the ledger ' that the court could not compel a production 
was Improperly admitted In evidence the of a paper for Inspection only. But the 
judgment must be reversed. It was admit· point was not decided. In Kenny v. Clark-
ted not only to establish the Items, of which son, 1 Johns. 385, Spencer, J., said: "I must 
there was no other proof, but Its admission not be understood as sanctioning the course 
may have Influenced the referee In pa11Slng · adopted at the trial In admitting the paper 
upon the ltPms of the account, of whh'h It , to be read without proof, because notice 
was not the sole evidence. The rt>feree ad· i :bad been given to produce It, and It had 
mltted the ledger on the ground that the de· j been called for and perused. The case of 
ft-ndant bad under the Code examined the I Lawrence v. Van Horne, 1 calnes, 276, set-
plalntUf jlefore trial, and In that proceeding 1 ties nothing, the then chief justice -e.xpress-
had given notice to the plaintiff .to produce Ing no decided opinion on the question, and 
the book11 of the testator, and that upon the rest of the court were equally divided. 
11ucb noth'P the plalntllf produ<'ed certain It appears to me that the notice to pro-
hook11 of thP dP<'Pdent, among whl<•h was the duce a paper, and <•ailing for Its Inspection, 
ledger c.'Ontalnlng his account with the de- ought to be considered as analogous to a 
fendant, whl<'h was ln11pected by the de- bill for discover~·. where most certainly the 
f Pndant's counsel. The referee hPld that answer ls not evidence but for the adverst• 
the ledger was thereby made evhlt>n<'e for party. I think It ls our <luty to adopt such a. 
the plaintiff. The ledger was not u11t>d on course as will not DN'dlPssly drive parties 
the examination, nor were any que11tions 'I Into equity for discovery." 
asked founded upon the entries tberelu. A The doctrine announced by Judge Spencer 
li2 
/‘ or ~ \
“The reasons drawn from analogy render
the argument almost insuperabie.” The
New Hampshire case was decided upon an
elaborate examination 01' the English and
American authorities, and contains the most
thorough opinion on the question to be
found in the books. The courts of Massa-
chusetts, Maine, and Delaware seem to have
followed the supposed English rule on the
subject. It was said in the earliest case in
Massachusetts on the subject (Com. v. Da- .
vidson, 1 Cush. 33) that it was a mooted
point whether calling for the books of the
opposite party and inspecting them, and‘
doing nothing more, makes the books evi-
dence; but in Clark v. Fletcher, 1 Allen, 53,
the point was decided. In Maine (Blake v.
Russ, 33 Me. 360)‘ the question was decided
without assigning any reasons; and the rul-
ing in the Delaware case (Randel v. Chesa-
peake Co., 1 Har. [Del.] 284) was made on
the trial, and, so far as appeal“, Wiflwllt
any examination. The authorities on the
question are divided. But we perceive 11°
reason for departing from the rule as un-
derstood in this state. The claim that it
gives the party calling for a paper M1 Unfair
advantage, if he may inspect it» find $11611
decline to put it in evidence, $991118 t0 HS
rather specious than sound. The same ob-
jection would lie in case of bills for discov-
911'; but it was the settled rule that an an-
swer, though under oath, was evidence only
for the party who obtained it. The P8113’
who has in his possession books or papers
which may be material to the case of his
opponent has no moral right to conceal them
from his adversary. If, on inspection. the
party calling for them finds nothing to his
advantage, his omission to put them in evi-
deuce does not prevent the party producing
them from proving and introducing them in
Widence if they are competent against the
other party. The party calling for books
and papers would be subjected to great
hazard if an inspection merely, without
more, would make them evidence in the
vase. That rule tends rather to the sup-
pression than the ascertainment of truth,
keeping es 9
is no foundation for tfiienk Vldence in ravm.
rule which pr . his We think the,-
it is said, frommtiligsl In sco:tte“fl°'1- Th:
bO0kS Of 8. tradegmggv Of ate (adopted.
011
gaged in business co and).
1' Other
co _ _ ntal Person en-
ant’ kept Ill the 01- lung items of ac-
din“ -
accounts, are admissible 1;] yf;‘€l|FS9f0f book-
‘Or 0 the per.
ognizegllaz qrlzlgifigzltipn of the rule was re;-.
state’ and has bee al eist tiieclsions in this
with general n ma nta ned by the com-ts
Thayer 12 Ioh uniformity. Vosburgh v_
reason ' Tl; 118. 461. It stands upon clear
or a pa-rt V I eh rule admitting account-books
a deparnllrll ‘is own favor, in any case, was
deuce he horn the ordinary rules of evi-
necesé" _ “as founded upon a supposed
small tr3,da.nd was intended for cases of
confined“ tcls who kept no clerks, and was
course of 3 ti.-msuc-trons in the ordinary
tion of Ber illylng and selling or the rend1_
tion again; ctes. In these cases some protec_
the public“ raudulent entries is affoi-ded in
Y which to a greater or less Q -_
tent attends the manual transfer of tan ' x
articles ot l"'°PeI't5‘ 0!‘ the rendition of gl bl?
ices, and the knowledge which third serv'
“ms may have of the transactions to \v1?er'
the entries relate. But the same nee 101'
does not exist in respect to cash traessity
lilons. Thov are usually I-d nsacr
°' Writing or vouchers i:"tlh:nl§::d:yo1;°1:tl€1.s
e
Party paying or advan i 0 tn
Moreover, entries of cash trgjnsactionsngg
be fabricated with much greater safety a
with less ohance of the fraud being dfsc Dd
ered, than entries oi’. goods sold and (11-loiv-_
ered or Qt services rendered. It would ‘_
unwise to extend the operation of the 1-uh;
admitting a partys books in evidence \>,_\-
yontl its present limits, as would be the QaSe_
we t111nk_ if books containing cash dea\i11gs
were held to be competent. Parties are no “.
competent witnesses in their own behalf.
A 1-eon-_ to books of account is thereby 1-en-
Qv.
llld
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hill. 80 far as our Reports sh((1)\\tDe E51!‘ a(3_ ’ and we aI)_I)(75/fplbl '56:
qmesced in by the courts an 1 1. of " better c:i1(—I1I!l ted; 6 is [Q
the state Without question M1‘ e “@811: / justice. :._‘.]1(3 prvdu,.° up’ as "’""'~°A
P9i‘i°d- The English rule has not riten un1- on notice i s tile mlftioll S Q10; It st.
f01'l1l- Lord Kenyoll, ill $889? V‘ B Chen» 1 If he refuses, it lI)11J’I1It"lI~ ,1“ boe tlleems to
E5p_ 209, held that production of 8- P&Der on I-ze the Oi-1 1 er pgI,t.J_ t: as -if aetn smldenqs
notice did not make it evidence: he Pllle dence of tlieir conteo Q-is Iq.°1' the pal’?
seems to have been held otherwise by Lord having lrcsssession ,1 “ts, v se"11e¢ Q9311;
Denman in Calvert v. Flower, 7 CPR & P. producing tliem. Bdtnllot “'11,-(,°°m1 ,._,,u”'°1'-
335, and in two or three other nisi prius favorable to the Oth It t Then the pa‘f""~
oases, but without any special examination. be disclose-(1; and jfer Q;qbB_y O "naive, The courts of Pennsylvania and New Hamp- the party 1 ¢:~t'us;ng In Di-Dd‘ Q, tbeonruin 5., shire held the view that production and in- ger of having second H3» Justlt-tion 2 Ollgbt to
spection alone do not make the paper evi- contents. The claimflry Dr Iy incur refu d_
dence. Withers v. Gillespy, 7 Serg. & R. books were compete is a18°0l'g1ventl1edan-
10; Austin v. Thomson, 45 N. H. 113. Gib- ot the entries under at as 0 ade H?! the!”
son, J., in Withers v. Gillespy, referring to of account in certain th I_u(1)I'iginaI e‘_i*(111;?the
the practice on bills of discovery, says: of the party (‘as 9 making bofffi
T3
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
07
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
/'----
~JO~~ 
DECLABfto .l~ COURSE o.::::a::.e ~ ~J'. 
~.. -«, bee.n · ' ~~ 
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\ 
'1411, 80 far as our Reports sll0 tlle ba Ile- f and the <> ~ .I'0116fro ~ • 
quiesced In by the courts and 1 a l" or better <-nJL<:"~-..i1.aeer/ to~ I& £011a. 
the state without question untlt bee l"ecent justlce. "I::-.ll::::a ~ prottu,_.tJ. Pl-~ ~ ./"f- e ~ 
period. The English rule bas no !{it hi>. llni- on notice I .I/SS t-be 1"0104 °4 0~o"fe 8eellJ 
form. Lord Kenyon, In Sayer v. e en, 1 If be ret"~ao;;s~s. I& ll111~ t~':J.. .b0o tlJe e8 to 
Esp. 209, held that production of a Paper on fze the o~lf~-er part_,, t l.l.s 1'11 ~<->t- lc8 .tllJd 'll<Ja 
notice did not make It evidence. The rule dence or -t Jbelr contello ~I~ ~l#tt or tJie !:Pe. 
seems to have been held otherwlt1e by Lord having I><>ss:seBS/on call t&, ~ ~clliec1, llllt}J rtJ 
Denman In Calvert v. Flower, 7 Car. & P. producing "'t:~em. But llot llt~11 °llda,._,, e:/' 
386, and In two or three other nlsl Prins favorable t<> the othel" 1t> t1i 11:~e.11 a tbe Part:i·-
casee, but without any special examination. be dlsclos~ ; and Jt &lei e~ co '18 JVer bj· 
The courts of Pennsylvania and New Hamp- the party ~~1'usfng .ma lll'oci'tl e. the;yllta111 ractH 
ihlre held the view that production and In- ger of havl.Jag Beconda J> Jll80c·uo.n ls 011gbt to 
speetlon alone do not make the paper evl- contents. ':l:'he claf.rm ? l>l"Q ~ lllcur :;rused. 
dence. Withers v. Glllespy, 7 Serg. & R. books were compet:-ellt & a180 or Klvp11 0 /t:!g: 
10; Austin v. Thomson, 45 N. H. 113. Gib- o:f the ent:rfea under th~ O!-/ lnade that the 
eon, J., In Withers v. Glllespy, referring to ot account In certain e J'uJ Kl11a1 evidence 
the practice on bills ot discovery, says: of the party keepfn ~llse8 e: llllllcJag books 
"The reason• drawn :from analogy render le no foundatfon r:i. tbeD:J. .::ence la favor 
the argument almost insuperable." The rule which Prevails 1 . Uus co t e think therp 
New Hampshire case was decided upon an It ls said, t'rom the 1 ll thle 8~~ntloa. The 
elaborate examination of' the English and books ot a tradesrn!: :~ .:a-ollaa~J. <~;!r~':i; 
American authorities, and contains the most gaged In business conta r other person ea-
thorough opinion on the question to be ,. count, kept Jn the ordJn hlfng ltem8 of ac-
found In the books. The courts of Massa- accounts, are admfssfbJ ary coul"Be of book-
cb\lletts, Maine, and Delaware seem to have : son keeping them agaf e fn ravor ot the per. 
followed the supposed English rule on the I w-hom the charg~s are nst the party against 
1ubject. It was said In the earliest case in : preliminary tacts are sh Dlade, after certain 
M8811achusetts on the subject (Com. v. Da- ! tlon to the case or book own, has no appJlca-
vldson, 1 Cush. 33) that It was a mooted ' to cash fte s or entries relatlng I ti ms or dealings between the pa~ point whether calling for the books of the 0 es. This quallftcatlon of' the rule Wll8 ret·-
opposlte party and inspecting them, and tgntfzed In the earliest decisions In this 
doing nothing more, makes the books evl- s a e, and has been maintained by the courts 
dence; but In Clark v. Fletcher, 1 Allen, 53, with general uniformity. Vosburgh v. 
the point was decided. In Maine (Blake v. Thayer, 12 Johns. 461. It stands upon clear 
RUBS, 33 Me. 360)" the question was decided reason. The rule admitting account-books 
without assigning any reasons; and the rul-1 ot a party In his own favor, In any case, was 
1ng in the Delaware case (Randel v. Chesa- a departure trom the ordinary rules of evl-
peake Co., 1 Har. [Del.] 284) was made on , dence. It was rounded upon a supposed 
the trial, and, so far as appears, without I necessity, and was Intended for cases of 
any examination. The authorities on the 1· small traders who kept no clerks, and was 
question are divided. But we perceive no confined to transactions· In the ordlnars 
reason for departing from the rule as un- course of buying and selling or the rendJ. 
derstood In this state. Tbe claim that it · tlon ot services. In these cases some protec-
gtves the party calling for a paper an unfair I tlon against fraudulent entries Js atl'orded J 
advantage, if he may Inspect It, and then j the publicity which to a greater or Jess e;x.n 
decline to put It In evidence, seems to us 1 tent attends the manual transfer ot tanglbl -
rather speclona than sound. The same ob- articles of property or the rendition ot se e 
jectlon would Ue In case of bills for dlscov- lees, and the knowledge whlch third Pe~­
ery; but It was the settled rule that an an- sons may have of the transactions to Wht r-
awer, though under oath, was evidence only the entries relate. But the same necessi~h 
for the party who obtained It. The party does not exist in respect to cash tran Y 
who baa In his possession books or papers tlons. They are usually evidenced by nc'.!!'"c-
wblcb may be material to the case of his or writing or vouchers In the hands or 1:::.FJ 
opponent has no moral right to conceal them party Paying or advancing the mone e 
from his adversary. If, on Inspection, the Moreover, entries of cash transnctlons couid 
party calling for them finds nothing to his be fabricated with much greater safety, a.na 
adnntage his omission to put them In evl- with less chance of the fraud being disco 
dence d~ not prevent the party producing ered, than. entries of good11 sold and <l~l \:~ 
them from proving and Introducing them In ered or ot: services rendered. It would 'be 
evidence If they are competent against the unwise to extend the operation of the X-U.le-
otber party. The party calllng tor books admitting a pat'Q''s books ln eYlden.ce \.:>~­
and papers would be subjected to gn•ut yond its Drese nt Umlts, as would be the cnae , 
buard lf an Inspection merely, without we think. if bo<>ks containing caRh dealln..;;s 
more, would make them evidence In the were held to be competent. Partle.s are ne>'W 
l'll&e. That rule tends rather to the sup- competent: ~ltnesses In their o"n beha.l:r. 
Preaslon than the ascertainment ot truth, A resort 1:o 1>00ks of account ls thereby reu-
:1.. '7a 
Case No. 60] RELE \~'A\' CY.
dored unnecessary in the majority of cases. should therefore be reversed, and a new trial
We think the ledger was erroneously ad- ordered. All concur, except MAYNARD, J.,
mitted in evidence, and the judgment below taking no part.
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dered unnecessary in the majority of cases. I should therefore be reversed, and a new trial 
We think the ledger was erroneously ad- ordered. All concur, except MAYNARD, J., 
mltted in evidence, and the judgment below taking no part. 
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S
”ECLAW> IN 00v1isE 0 E* 50»?
1 B ‘
(30RMAc v. WESTERN \vHI'rF R0921; I 1078. L,‘ II, bar Q, @883
C0“ 32,) N. ll}. Re I}, 8 [0
(41 N. W. -iso, 17 IoWB- _ 344,- Pull xx-1an_ K 0/1"‘/e "'91:, 7 “Q
Supreme Court of Iowa. JaI1- 20' 1889_ cases tlif-1-31' I1 6’/Z603‘ Cato’), ‘Val Io".
. . 1k e fencliinl: 3 3 tog],-_s1;1,s0 _O 3 96- Ike, F- 2;
Appeal from district court’ P0 ount-Y5 Plaintilf s ll bSL'I'11)6iI "Pt" Stu 0- 8",‘)? 1:
JQQIAII GIVEN, Judge. but he Les I: i fies that t fol‘ gob lsks. J25: 4
Action _to recover an amount alleged to be from 20 to 5” Wnho Ii D; 0 sh)0k 8,1845; l
due toplaintiff on account of salary earned as thorny, a D d that hem; hislybbe a,-as ogws ¢;,‘.
'5°¢"‘t“ry and '¥“*“ag@P °f defend?-"V There holder. Ii e votled a evx ‘Thor “'88 ch.st""1*'
was atrial by Jury, and a verdict and judg- lioldels On the st kt Ines‘: be "'1:-age "".5'ea
ment for plaintiff. The defendant appea1s_ virtue of a pm or: of _E:.t1“gs0-‘nut, a s¢;r.-iu.
Parsons ct-1’c~rr_1/. for appellant. James M_ taken by def-mg-_7' His “kin "fun, st0‘:fl':\'-
&' 96°11]? E- M°Ca".9h"'"- f°l' *1PPene°- any triiiisac-tion bill: 201:9 :15‘; ("'1-so Id»;
mu be tlr - - een - 013 "lkill w.-
ROBINSON, J. Plaintifl was the Secretary storfk in h1§t0‘.¥"‘“ ‘"1’ huff §1n¢1°,',’,.‘.‘°¢<,~n.¢ 0';
and manager of defendant during the _vea.rs for it.and that ii“ name WI intendglftirr. It
1885 and 1886, and for the month of Jan uary, St0ckinql.l(9Sl:1'Un£_|I;_I‘0cl“_ ien be subggritffff
13257, and cl-aims a balance due on accountof
salary of $755.62. Defendant denies the al-
leged indebtedness, and seeks to recover of
defendant $890.29, on counter-claims for
money of defendant alleged to ll?l.\'€ been col-
lected by plaintifi and converted to his own
use. and for unpaid assessments on capital
stock of defendant alleged to be owned by
plaintiff. 'l‘he jur_v found that defendant
owed to plaintiff the sum of $379.20.
1. Plaintiff introduced in evidence certain
books of account, which belonged to and had
been kept for the defendant. Some of them
were objected to on the ground that they had
been kept by plaintiff while he was acting as
secretary of defendant. and on the further
ground that they were not shown to be books
of original entries. \Ve are of the opinion
that the books were properly retained in evi-
dence. After they were introduced it was
admitted that they were defendant’s books of
original entries; that they were kept in the
ordinary manner, and in the regular course
of business; and that the entries therein
were made at the time oi’ the traiisactioiis
which they represented. This made them
competent evidence as against defendant.
The fact that some of the entries were made
by plaintiff was imniaterial. under the issues
of the case. He made them. not for liiiiiselh
but for the defendant, and as its agent; and
the books when completed, were the books of
defendant, admissible in evidence against it.
2. One Eakln procured of defendant a cer-
tificate for shares representing $3.000 Of ii-8
capital stock. I-Ie agri.-ed with plainlifi to sell
and transfer this to him when he should pay
the amount required therefor. A note for
$7-50 was given to E-akin by plaintiff on ac-
count of this stock, and the certilicute was
placed in the hands of one Fuller. to be de-
livered to plaintiff when he should pay the
note. The note was not paid, and the stock
was not transferred. On the books of the com-
puny it stood in the name of Eakin. While
the plaintiff had an interest in this stock, he
never owned it, and never agreed with de.
tendaint to pay for it. He was not. there-
fore. liable to defendant for unpaid assess-
ments uizide on account of it. See Code, §
- _ I115 ed E. -
§.‘.;’i.‘.1.§".i?..‘.““.f --ode---:.‘;a.".;::i'<~
a ak _ _ iscri
by}; On :1;-ny¢,pnwt7.b°'
:l_h‘esc('~)’:J1(tW|||Ch
ir 1- 1
1'0"] t-‘IQ jg,‘-yu He‘?
in H3: Ogle I1:-ilrin
ade in .1 n ll'f1)?lFct'1On
. t-(Er P13"-"l1'lT‘s1i':i-
v I or argument of
.lh6 reiiiark was
d I .
was actually Iukei€;fend"nl:
COl‘l'8|-fly in wjthd
consideration of
ilk ‘
ra win 1 I],
RSSPQSID
, and was not of
to have been consiilervd while they
were dcliberatiii - .
the .d- _ 3 upon their verdict, mile-s
“_e3ca:1sl::LgaPlled the charge of the court. and
3 T, ‘presume that they did.
- 18 (-Ourt refused to submit to the
Special interro
books
jury
Tl gatories asked by di-1‘.-mi-
ofl_8 first was as follows: “_(l_) l)i.| 111.,
in the m account kept by the plaintiff, \_\~i|i1e
as its a flnagement of defendant s lJll.\']||r-S5
count ofg:"_|~, Show that lie received, 011 ac_
out. and ieiendant, more rri’oney‘tli:inl1e|i:ii¢l
relewlnt-to so. wlml; sum B :|.lllS was nu;
ProPerl r fflny Issue In the c‘.'s"' and was
was as}; ‘cl: used.“ The second 1n_tei'i'og:itur_y
the timeouoigrs: (2) Did he receive. duri Hg
fendmw bin _ I(-' had the mamigeineiit or (|e_
S "~‘"1'l@88. any sums 0fll10|16_\'w||iL.h
do not ap ezir
and for “?hich ullpt-?':liltS‘“:1Ol:oi(:](-fgOl1f|(:'L’(_'i' |b-‘t' |lil']J.|
dcigendant. and, if so, what sum?» ‘Wt the
11° P1'Pp‘rll'+'d to = lh - - “"6
been properly s"sh‘g“tt:; 1-Allfjnjlgtllil’ not lin \-6'
appear to us that [)!‘ej1|,(]icI€a c{f||(:t|?0‘_J“ not
suited from the refusal to suinmt iipe ""*“"*r Which could 1- - . - '_ ‘*0
have 00111;;-oiled the g]::,§,.;’le‘J'e|5d'i:‘;“ 011 lnl
353*’-I106 of other Spl‘0llll llfidlnvq D'l. 1,“ tl ‘B
R"l1“'".Y £10., 59 lowa. 601 1?; ‘N we ‘Yr V-
754- The third special interrosatilrv ~_=I...§“P't
mhilve the jurv st"-its \\'llt'l,ll9l'n ' ‘L; X
_ , . _ . pl-until? \\-“S
;1:.;'l;‘:'f;‘"":‘;;‘:‘::r*i§;:l:t:::t:;;£ :1r‘.;='.‘.‘.‘“'.‘~~
war. ~ - 2 _-. r
!Eill_\:l'll'l1t, jf 3-\,n_\',$ll2\'\l!5 \\.ll8l‘;'Ol1 and ui1p=\i(:£
iis was ob ma I‘, ma eriu by any issue
evidence iii: the cave. 1)rfeinl:int does n‘.:l;_
seek to re.-°ver an usubscri tion for stock . hi \\;
on stock a cc;-tiiicate lor which \\'-.is l>'S\.l(BLl Lo
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'(lO~a l>Et:LA.R.~ l~ COURSE<> ::i:: 
..rtlJ !iJ:l ..P~ •. ~kllAc v. WESTERN w111·.. 0~~.E ·r~ :r~ ~ 1078; Lta :a-=»~~ . ,,. 
co. ~.) 
(41 N. W. 480. 77 low•• 25 
Supreme Oourt of Iowa. JaJl• ' 1889. 
N. W • .R~ ~- S. / .IJ'.,i, ~-"iu.. l"Oaa,, 
844; PulI man Y. l/p e ,.~. ~ 
. Appeal from district court. polk COunty; 
/08IA.H GIVEN, Judge. 
· Action to recover an amount alleged to be 
.due toplaintitr on account ofsalaryearnf'd 88 
. secretary and manager of defendant. There 
cases tbea.-~11:1 c/Utl,· o. to,, ~ ".l /"0~ 
fendant's .2' tock_Hll/Jac Oo~: 9e ~el'. 't JJ; 
plaiutifr es ._. bser.1'/JecJ r. l'ipt10&~o~ • s. t/k_ I< 
but he tesJ a; a Iles that tf,:r- •">o l1 ~8• § 2"6_ • ' 
from 20 t<> .50 wit/Jollt; lltllq &IJ" It- 8ho..,; .l. 
thority, a rJt d thnt he I> ht:s le- be~ ::S o~ st;~ 
holder. ~ e voted 4t e~~~ :!_o..,1f!d.llll Cb1111gfld 
h?lde1"8 o ~ &he stocJc 0?e .. t111'Vftc,,11111 'Ke or 1111• was a trial by jury. and a verdict and Judg- . ment tor plaintiff. The defendant appeals. 
Par10R8&Per1'1J, for appellant. Ja~M. 
ct George B. McOa:ughan. forappell~ 
. virtue or ~ Pro>r:y. it· ~~lcl lI8 01 th a stuck. 
ROBINSON, J. Plaintiff was the secretary 
and manager of defendant during the years 
1885 and 1886, and for the month of January, 
1887, and claims a balance due on accountuf 
salary of $755.62. Defendant denies the al-
leged indebtP<lneea, and seeks to recover of 
defendant 8890.29, on counter-claims for 
money of defendant alleged tu have been col-
lected by plaintiff and converted to his own 
use, and for unpaid RSSessmenta on c<4pital 
stock of defendant alleged to be owned by 
plaintiff. The jury found that defendant 
owed to plaintiff the suro of 8379.20. 
L Plaintiff introduced in evidence certain 
books of account, which belonged to and had 
been kept tor the defendant. Some of them 
were objected to on the ground that they had 
been kept by plalntiff while he WRS acting as 
secretary of defend1mt, and on the further 
ground that they were not shown to be ~ks 
of original entries. We are of the op101on 
tb11t the books were properly retaine<l in evi-
dence. After they were introduced it was 
admitted that they were defendant's books of 
original entries; that they were kept in the 
ordinary manner, and in the regular coui;te 
of bosiness· and that the ent1·ies therein 
were made 'at the time of the tranaactions 
which they represented. This made them 
competent evidence as agal net ddendant. 
Tbe fact that some of the entries were made 
by plaintilr was immaterial, under the i<Jsues 
of the case. He made them, not !or bi mself, 
but for the defendanL, and ws its ngtmt; 1md 
&he books whP.n completed, were the books ot 
defendant, adntiBSible in evldencA ~gainst it. 
taken by d efendun t Is llo '>, but .e stock. 
any transa<...·f;ion bet;~ blJt; 11 te to E;/k1 so by ~~! .. ~ thhat plain titti,_ri 1t :~d OIJ 11ceo11!t"":;; 
s ........ •n is own na ~ · Plaint/It. 1 for it, and that he r Ille \\rl>~ntendecl to ~: 
stock in question in 1;0 7ur8d F:n ~e aubsC!ri/JfJd 
tion, but that would 11 lflltnent'&loa_totnk,.tbe 
t Wet"n him and defend Of, l'llaJce or his su1_11Jcrlp. 
wasactua)Jy takeu b 1tnt 00 thny priv1ty be-
corre1·tly in Wilhd 'Y ~It.kin The stoc:k wl1lcb 
• f • ra "'' n • e court rult'd 
cons den&t1on ot a8Sf"Ss B rrom tl1e Jury all 
stock. Complaint fa rn' ll'.le'?ts oa tl1e Eltkiai 
of a remark of the eourt&<Je Jn this co11nPCtion 
H_B_opinion on the quesurnttde fn ,._nuouncing 
b1hty on the Eakin st k on of pla1nt;tf•8 l/11• 
counsel oo that qnesti • a~"?r argument of 
not designed . un • 1 he re11uirk was 
and could not ~s an ~~strucuon to the Jury, 
WHS t ave .,...en so understoo•I. It 
no addrf'RSl'd to tlaern, and was not of 
a nature. to have been consi<lert'd whilt" they 
u.ere ~ehbentt111g upon tht>ir '·erdict, unle-s 
ey disregarded the cha1·ge of the court. und 
we cannot presume tlmt they did. 
8. Tb~ co~rt refused to submit to the jury 
five special interrogatories asked by deft-ncl-
ant. The first w88 3:1 follows: "(ll l>itl the 
books of account kept by the plain ti Jr, while 
In the management of defendant's ilnsi 111-ss 
as its agent, show thnt he receive1I, on ac-
count of defendant. ruore moneytlum he pnid 
out. and, if so, what sum?" 'rllis w11s not 
relevant to 1my issue in the CHSP, and w .. 8 
properly refused. The second interrogJ&tor,y WM~ follows: "(2) Did he receive, tlurfn 
the tnne that ht' hacl the man11geme11t or dell 
fendant's ilusiness. any sums of money Which 
do not appear upon the books keJlt b\• h; rn 
and tor which he hns not acco1111ted ·to tJ • 
defendant, and, If so, what sum?" w .. I\ ltj 
not prt-part>d to say that tJ1is might not ha ~e 
been properly submitted, and yet it doe11 n' e' 
appear to us Lhat prtjudice could Jul\·e r-ot 
suited fro~ the rt>fusal to sulimit it. ~~ 
answ1>r Which could have been given w 01 1 have cont1·01\ecl t.he general verdil-t, in t:.'. d 
absence of other sp•·cml llndings. Dr~ht»r •e 
Railway Co., 59 lowu, 601, la N. W. U . .-;· 
75-J. The third special interroriaL11ry S•n•ght 
2. One Eakin procured of deft:ndamt a c~r­
tillcate for shares representing $3,000 of its 
e&Jlital stock. He agree<l with plai ntUY to sell 
and transfer this to him when be should pay 
the amount required therefor. A. note for 
t7SO was given to E11kin by plaintiff on &e· 
count of this stock, and the certltlcnte w11s 
placed in the hands of one Fuller. to be de-
livered to plainliJr when he should p11y the 
note. The note Wll8 not paid, and the stock 
was not transferred. On thti books of the com. 
pany it stood in the name of Eakin. While 
the plaintilt had an interest. In this stork, he 
never owned it, and nen•r agreed with de-
fendant to pay tor it. He wKS n_ot, the1·e. 
fore, liable to defendant tor unpaid Mli*'Ss-
menta made on account of it. :See Cotle, § 
to have the jury slate _whl'l.her plains iff "'- .,,8 
a suhscriber to the capital slock of tlt.'fe11t\u.nt 
and ff he \1\-us to stat." the amount or cu.u~ 1-0~ 
paym ·nt. if any, umlle ther .. on and ~· n pa i~\. 
'!his was 110t anadt! 111at1>r1al by any 1,.s ll 8 , >r 
evlilence i tht' ca-<e. Dl'ft>nc\ant dot>s n "'" 
sel'ktoa·e 0 eronas11bscri tinnforstock. \u,t; 
on stock :;,0 ;'1rtillcl\l" Ior which was i1:1sueu to 
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E-akin. N0 call was ever made on plaintiffs
subscription. The fourth special interroga-
tory asked inquired in regard to a settlement
of accounts between plaintiff and the board
of directors of defendant, and was properly
ref used, for the reason that there was no ev-
idem-e of such a settlement. The fifth spe-
cial interrogatory was to be answered only in
the event that the jury answered the fourth,
and was therefore properly refused.
4. Counsel for appellant base some argu-
ment upon the weight and eifect of the evi-
176
dence. We do not deem it necessary to re-
view this at length, nor to notice more par-
ticularly other questions raised. The ab-
stract does not purport to set out all the evi-
dence given on the trial, and some of the
questions discussed have no foundation in the
record as presented to us. It is suflicient lo
say that We have examined all questions pre-
sented by the record with care, but do not
find any error prejudicial to defendant. The
judgment of the district court is therefore
atflrmed.
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Caae No. til] HELEVANCY. 
Eakin. No call WM ever mndA on plaintiff's 
sulJscription. 'fhe fourth special iriterroga· 
tory asked inquil'ed in rep:ard to a settlement 
of accounts between plaintiff and the board 
of director.i of defendant, and was properly 
refused, for the reason that there was no ev-
i<lt'Dee of such a settlement. The fifth spe-
cial interrogatory was to be answered only in 
the event that the jnry answered the fourth, 
and was therefore properly refused. 
4. Counsel for apptillant base some argu-
ment upon the weight and e1l'.ect of the evi-
176 
dence. We do not deem it necessary tor&-
view this at length, nor to notice more par-
ticalllrly other questions raisPd. The ab-
stract does not purport to set out all the evi-
dence given on the trial, and some of the 
questions discussed have no foundation in Lhe 
record ~ presented to us. It is sufficient l<> 
say that we have examined all questions pre-
sented by the record with care, but do not 
Hn<l any error prejudicial to defendant. Th& 
judgment of the district court i8 therefore-
atllrmed. 
DECLARAT1ON$ 1-N c0U1‘$E or Busi
NESS. [Case N0. 62
offlcc0§1ut0f 5*
PRATT v. \\'H1TE_
(132 Mass. 477.)
Jlliiiciul Court of 1\Ia_qS
Meir. March 2, 1882
q_Q_'fj1'l'ell & N. H. Pratt, for
,) iiumivml, for defendant-
aehusetts_
supreme
plaintiff.
The admission of the books
party to prove items of ‘vork
delivered, when Supported
or, if he is deceased, that of
or executor’ has long been
state? and Under various
created by statute, in all
Uni0Ii. It has been sane-
tion i0 the general rule of
isle“ that a Party should
his OWE! Case. and from
Sky, in 01‘ 91‘ 0 Drevent a
he .1» allowed
to ‘W0 ecord of his dally transac-
_ Erodu n_ of which, on account of their
t1oQs,to ma S mutene/Ss_ it cannot be ex_
vLXietY and “,1-u be witnesses.
ilicted therehzicomt to decide upon the ad-
it lS for g the book offered, although the
‘=:1lsS“’““y O to it afterwards must be
' en
weight ta be gw for the jury, in connec-
t‘on
Large\y&&h‘1“‘t‘*SS‘am,eamnce, the lnanner in
ting hwé is kept and the other evidence in
\\~ c '
ear to have been hon-
me case" It :21 sgotpsntentionally erased or
only kepndato have been the record of the
‘me-‘°“' M.‘ S of me pafly, made for the
daily busmestablishing a charge against an-
i““'1’°“° °t es 8,.-fly 1-egflfd is to be had to
“men Ne.cessot “J8 party‘ his methods and
“‘° ““,“§“:,‘°:,._ buB,,,eS,,_ em, in deciding this
2:23:25 COEBWQU V. Doliiver, 2 ‘Mass. 217;
P’
Prince v. .Smith.£4fl11l:i1cSo8‘-1;1t0;1o admit the book
_ The d€C\:1iOD ocmsive unless from its chap
l:c’?eIra1oi'mfr0cIgnthat which W35 5°“ght to be
wrnous, EV. -12
pill/s\‘_\'S, J.
done a 11d 5°
in his cuwn Oath’
his sa\x\\iuistrM°_"
permitted in this
restritriong, S0319
the s‘mes of the
rloneq as an circle?“
law§ M0,-met Y ‘
um \; ,, witnefils in
.‘i'
O
Provefi by it, it could not hare been admitted
(Wen 1_f it met those tests. Although some-
“'““‘ "1'@gvIfl1'l:' made a part of the excel)-
ti0l1B to be examined by the court, the book
has not been produced by the defendant for
our inspection. It appears that measure,
weight, and quantity were not given in con-
nection with the items of goods charged,
but for this reason we are not prepared to
say that it was inadmissible. If the book
contain the record of the party, daily trans-
actions made for the purpose of a charge,
it may be admitted, even if deficient in many
respects. It docs not follow that, before a
plaiiitiflf can fairly ask a verdict, he may not
be compelled to supply deficiencies in the
evidence his book affords. This bill of ex-
ceptions does not show that other evidence
was not introduced.
A time book which has only the name of
the party and marks under particular dates
has been admitted. Mathes v. Robinson, 8
Metc. (Mass) 269. Upon the same principle,
marks on a shingle or upon a notched stick
have been admitted. Kendall v. Field, 14
Me. 30; 1 Green]. Ev. §§ 118, 119. Yet, with-
out additional evidence, these would afford
but incomplete proof of a claim. In Hooper
v. Taylor, 39 Me. 224, a book similar to the
one here in question in omitting the weight
and quantity of articles was admitted with
but little discussion.
There would seem to be no reaon why :1
delivery of specific articles might not be
shown by a book of accounts, even if more
evidence were needed to show the amount
which the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
It is easy to imagine many facts in connec-
tion with which such charges might be very
important. Vi-‘e have no reason to suppose
more weight was given to them than that
to which they were fairly entitled, and we
must presume that the book was submitted to
the jury under all proper instructions.
Exceptions overruled.
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DECLA.R.A.T.l.O:Ns l.:N colJ!tSE OF BUISL.'iESS. (Case No. 62 
PRA.TT v. WHITE. 
(132 Maas. 4 77.) 
~11~~e J~dic\a\ Court of Mo.ssach URet:t:a 
·• Norfolk. Mo.rch 2, 1882. · • 
c. Q. 1'.'lrrell & N. H. Pratt, for plalntl:tr. 
J, nurol'bfey, for defendant. 
1 The admission of t:be books pjJl'.S;NS, · rtY to prove lten:ie o:r -work 
of aC<.\'l~ut of a. padeUvered, when supported ~®e a -xid goods r if be Is deeea.sed, tba. t of 
'ofli.\& c.wn oath, 0 0~ executor, has long been 
\i.\% a~\n\stro.~ state; and under various ~nn\~:tEd In s created by eta. t.ute, ln all tt'&tt\~t.lons. some Union. It has been sanc-
the 8"\ates of tbe tlon to the genera.I rule of tloD~ as an e:s.~epe:s.isted that a party should ~w lib._"" 1ttorroer ! In bis own case. and from 
not ~ a w\tnes ltY In order to prevent a 
lllPllllll>osed necess tbo.t he shall be allowed 
tall::::::,ire of justi~~ord of bis daily tra.nsac-
to ~roduce the of -wblcb, on account of their 
tto~s. to roanY lnuteness. it cannot be ex-
va.._ ""S:'lety and Ill 11 be witnesses. ~ted there wl ourt to decide upon the ad-
lt Is tor the c e book offered, although the 
TC;::a.\BS\bU\tY of ;en to lt o.fterwa rds must be 
'il'V'" elg'nt to be tion for tbe 3ury, in connec-~8.rgely a ques ppearo.nce, the manner In ~<>n w\tb \ts a and the otber evidence In 
i 
\ 
""<N1Uc'n lt ls ke!~st appear to have been hon-
"\Jle case. lt d not Intentionally erased or 
e11Uy ke-pt, a~ bave been the record of the 
alteted, and 0 of tbe party, made for the 
dally bus\nes; bl\sh\ng a charge against an-
purpose of e a e rd ls to be had to 
other. Necessa;l~i:e rp~y, his Illethods and 
the educat\on ° ln deciding tbls 
knowledge ocf buwsle~~~s, ~~~ii.ver, 2 l\lass. 217; 
question. ogs · 
Prince v. Smith, 4 Masa. 454. the book 
Tbe decision of the court to sa:;:ti! Its char-
ls l:lnal and conclusive, unles ht to be ~m that wblch was soug acter, or uu 
"WILGUB,BV.-12 
• 
pr0'1'ed by Jt, ft could not ha•e been admitted 
e"\'en 1t lt met those tests. Although some-
what Jrregularly made a part of the excep-
tions to be examined by the court, the book 
bas not been produced by the defendant for 
our Inspection. It appears that measure, 
weight, and quantity were not given In con-
nection with the Items of goods charged, 
but for this reason we are not prepared to 
say that It was Inadmissible. It the book 
contain the record of the party, dally trans-
actions made for the purpose of a charge, 
It may be admitted, even if deficient In many 
respects. It does not follow that, before a 
plalntUf can fairly &Bk a verdict, he may not 
be compelled to supply deficiencies In the 
evidence his book alfords. This blll of ex· 
ceptlons does not show that other evidence 
was not Introduced. 
A. time book which has only the name of 
the party and marks under particular dates 
has been admitted. Mathes v. Robinson, 8 
Mete. (Mass.) 269. Upon the same principle, 
marks on a. shingle or upon a notched stick 
have been admitted. Kendall v. Field, 14 
Me. 30; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 118, 119. Yet, with-
out additional evidence, these would afford 
but Incomplete proof of o cln.im. In Hooper 
v. Taylor, 39 Me. 224, a book similar to the 
one here In question In omitting the weight 
and quantity of articles was admitted with 
but little discussion. 
There would seem to be no reason why a 
delivery of epecl.fl.c articles might not be 
shown by a book of accounts, even If more 
evidence were needed to show the amount 
which the plaintiff was entitled to recover. 
It le easy to Imagine many facts In connec· 
tlon with which such charges might be very 
important. We have no reason to suppose 
more weight WBB given to them than that 
to which they were fairly entitled, and we 
must presume that the book was submitted to 
the jury under all proper Instructions. 
Exceptions overruled. 
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ELLIS v. HARRIS.
(11 S. E. 248, 106 N. C. 395.)
' Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 31,
1890.
Appeal from superior court, Franklin
county; Co.\'.\"oa, Judge.
F. S. Spruill and Ba tchelordir Devereux,
for plaintiff. 0. M. Cooke, for defendant.
AVERY. J. The plaintiff claimed through
a deed from Bennett Gay. administrator
of James Burgess, to \Villium Crowder,
dated January 17,1859, and immediately
under a deed dated June 5. 186%), from E.
A. Gupton, sheriff of Franklin county. to
the plaintiff, reciting a sale by virtue of ex-
ecutions against Willie Urowder. The de-
fendant insiste.d that plaintiff’s deed did
not cover the land in controversy, and,
as evidence of title in himself, offered the
recoi-d‘of a. special proceeding and a deed
from W. H. Spencer. administrator of J. B.
Mann, reciting asale to make assets in ac-
cordance with a decree in said special pro-
cecding.and alsointroduced evidence tend-
ing to show that the calls of said deed in-
cluded the land in dispute. The plaintiff
testified that he was present at the sale of
the land of Willie Crowder by the sheriff
in the year 1869, and bought the land of
said Crowder. including the reversionary
interest in the portion occupied as dower
by the widow of James Burgess, who re-
mained in possession of that portion of
the land till her death, in the year 1&8-1,
when he took and retained possession of
it till the defendant entered by force, and
expelled him, in the year 18%. On the
cross-examination of the plaintiff, the de-
fendant's counsel were permitted to ask
him ho\v many acres of land were con-
ve_ved by the deed of the sheriff. and he an-
swered: “s21~’. ” He then stated, in re-
sponse to a question, (plaintiff objecting.)
that he gave in for taxation 1,100 acres of
land afterhispurchase at sheriff‘s sale, and
before he sold 172 acres off his tract. The
plaintiff excepted. At a subsequent stage
of the trial, plaintiff was recalled. and ex-
plained that he listed the dower land for
taxation, first. in 1885, the widow having
paid tax on it previously, and that he had
listed for taxation, in 1871, 922 acres. in-
cluding 90 acres bought from Spencer, ad-
ministrator.
it is true that in Thornburgh v. Mastin,
93 N. C. 258. the court said: “ Any one sup-
posing he has a claim upon the land of an-
other may list it, and pay the taxes; but
that would be verv slight, if any, evidence
tending to establish his title.” In the
t-use of ltuflin v. (iv:-rbv, SS N.C.369.it had
been previously held that paying tax on
land without actual possession would not
perfect a colorable title. But in the case
of Austin v. king. 97 N. C. 341, 2 S. E. Rep.
678. Justice DAVIH. delivering the opinion
of the court. settles the question bylaying
down the rule that the payment of taxes
b_v u party ante Iitem motam is his act as
distinguished from his declaration in
|'efer<-nce to the land. and is some evidence
to be weighed by the jury in passing upon
the issue involving title. This principle
disposes of the first. third, seventh, and
ninth exceptions.
The plaintiff then offered in evidence a
deed from N. Patterson to James Burgess,
executed in 1845, and a deed from Alfred
Burgess to James Burgess. executed in the
year 1846, in which the lands conveyed are
described bv metes and bounds, and as
419 acres on Tar river. The plaintiff also
introduced the record of the petition of the
widow of James Burgess for dower, show-
ing a decree making an allotment to her
by metss and bounds. W. N. Fuller then
testified, on behalf of the plaintiff, that he
surveyed the Burgess tract of land, and ‘
very nearly located it by the deeds, and
that he also had the survey made when
the dower was allotted. The plaintiff
then“ proved. as set forth in the statement.
that James Burgess owned this land. and
resided on it, from 1845 until his death.
and owned no other land in Franklin
county, and that Willie Crowder died in
1870-71. and was plaintiffs brother-in-
law. ” This statement comprehends all of
the material evidence for plaintiff; and.
as instruction was asked predicated upon
all of the testimony, it is necessary to
know what it was. Theland conveyed in
the sheriff‘s deed to plaintiff (executed 1869)
was described therein as “eight hundred
and twenty-seven acres of land adjoining
the lands of J. B. Mann, deceased, Mrs.
Jane Wilder. Gaston Wilder, and others.
containing, by estimation, eight hundred
and twenty-seven acres, more or less.”
The descriptive clause in the administra-
tor’s deed to (frowder, in 1859, is as fol-
lows, viz.: “All that tract or parcel of land
belonging to the estate of James Burgess,
deceased, lying on Tar river. adjoining
lands of the said Willie Crowder, Dr. Jo-
seph B. Mann, and-others, and supposed
to contain fourhundred and nineteen acres,
except the life-estate of Lucy Ann Burgess,
the widow of James Burgess, in that por-
tion ofsaid land assigiierl to her as dower,
the meaning and intent of this deed being
to convey to the said Willie Crowder, ab-
solutely. the whole of the said land not
covered by the widow's dower, to vest in
possession immediately, and to convey
that portion covered by the widow‘s
dower to vest in possession at the death
of said widow.” The sheriff, Gupton,tes-
tified that he levied on and sold Crowder‘s
land under a description given by him in
1:569, and also referred to the tax-list for
description; that he sold all of the inter-
est of Crowder in the land described in the
deed. but said nothing at the time about
dower. ialvin Benton testified for the de-
fendant that the do wer tract did not adjoin
the lands of Mrs. Jane Wilder or Gaston
Wilder, nor did it join the Mann land till
Mann bought the Burgess land.
The defendant offered to prove the dec-
larations of C-rowder while in possession
of the land conveyed to him by Gay, ad-
ministrator of Burgess. characterizing his
possession, but stated that he did not
know whether it was before or after the
sale by the sheriff: that it was aftur
i\fa.nn’s death, in 1865. (he thought it was
in 1870 or 1871,) but that at the time Ellig_
the plaintiff. was not living on the lanvl_
but was living somewhere else. Theron rt
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EJ..I..JS v. IIARRIS. 
(11 S. E. 248, 106 N. C. 396.) 
Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 31, 
1890. 
Appeal from superior court, Franklin 
county; Coxxon, Judge. 
P. &. Spruill and Batcllelor & Devereu:r, 
for plalntitt. 0. M. Cooke, for defendant. 
AVERY,J. TheplalntlffclRimed through 
a deed from Bennett Gay, administrator 
of James Burge11s, to WUllum Crowder, 
dated Jnnunrv 17, 1859, and Immediately 
undl'r a deed ilatecl June !'i, 1869, from E. 
A. Gupton, 11heriff of Franklin county, to 
the pluintlff, r<.'Citlng tt sale by virtue of ex-
ecutions against Willie Crowdf'r. The de-
fendant lm1l11ted that plaintiff's deed did 
not co\·er the land In controveni,v. and, 
as el'hlence of title In bhnirelf, off(•red the 
record ·of a 11peclal proceeding :md u deed 
f!"om W. H. Spencf'r, admlnl11tr1:1.tor of J.B. 
Mann, reciting 11sale to make aBHete In ac-
cordance 'vlth a decree In e1\ld special pro-
ceecllng, and also Introduced evidence tend-
ing to show that the calls of Maid deed In-
cluded the land In dh1pute. The plaintiff 
testified that he was present at the sale of 
the land of Willie Crowder by the sheriff 
In the year li;Jf19, and bought the hrnd of 
said Crowd<'r, tm:ludlng the reverelonary 
lnt1>n•11t In the portion occupied as dower 
by the widow of .Jamee Burge88, who re-
mained in JIOH11e11slou of that portion of 
t.he land till her death, In the year 1884, 
when he took and retained possession of 
it till the defendant entered by force, and 
expelled him, in the year 18~4. On the 
croH11-examinatton of the plaintiff, the de-
fend1rnt'H counHPI were permitted to ask 
him how man~· acres of land were con-
ve.vecl by the dN·d of tbe sheriff, and he an· 
swered: "S~." He then Htated, In re-
sponse to a question, (plaintiff objecting,) 
that ht• gave in for taxation 1,100 acres of 
land after hlH pnrchase at sheriff's sale, and 
before he sold 172 acres off his tract. The 
pin inti ff exc!'pted. At a subsequent stage 
of the trial, plaintiff was rrealled, and ex-
plained tlrnt he l111ted the dower hmd fo1· 
taxation, first, In 188:>, the widow having 
paid tax on it previously, and that he had 
listed for taxation, In 1871, 92'2 ucres, in-
cluding 90 acreH bought from Spencer, ad-
ministrator. 
It 111 true thut In Thornburgh v . Mastin, 
93 N'. C. 258. the court saltl: ··Any one eup-
J1<1Hi11g be has a elu.im upon the land of an-
other may list It, and pay the taxes; but 
that would be verr slight, If any, evidence 
tending tu PRta!Jlieh h111 title." In the 
<'llHe ol HufHn v. On•rbv, 8S N. C. 369. It had 
bcPn pre,·lously held that paying tax on 
land without actual possee1don would not 
perfect a colorable title. But in the case 
of Austin v. King. 97 N. C. 341, 2 S. E. Rep. 
6iM, Ju1:1ticl• D.HIH, delivering the opinion 
of the court, 1:1ettl<.•H the queHtion by laying 
down the rulP tlwt the payment of taxes 
h.\' n pnrty 11nte litem motam ls bb1 act as 
dlRtlngulHhc<.I from bis d<>Claratlon ln 
1·t•fpr1•nce to the land, and is some evidence 
to he weigherl by the Jury in paH11ing upon 
till' i11sue lm·ulvlng title. This principle 
178 
dlspoRes or the ftrst. third, seventh, and 
ninth exce11tlons. 
The plaintiff then offered fn evidence a 
deed from N. Patterson to James Burgees, 
executed In 1845, and a deed from Alfred 
BurgeRS to Jamee Burgess, executed In the 
year 11:146, fn which the lands conveyed are 
described by metes and bounds, and as 
419 acres on Tar river. The plaintltt n.leo 
introdncetl the record of the petition of the 
widow of James BurgeHS for dower, show-
ing a decree making an allotment to her 
by met~ and bounds. W. N. Fuller then 
testified, on behalf of the plaintiff, that be 
surveyed the llurges11 tract of land, and · 
very nearly located ft by the deeds, and 
that he also had the survey made when 
the dower was allotted. The plaintiff 
then" proved, u set forth in the statement. 
that .James Burgess owned tbi~ land, and 
ret1lded on It, fl•om 1845 untll his death, 
and owned no other land tn Franklin 
county, and that Willie Crowder died in 
1870-71, and was plaintiff's brother-ln-
law." This Rtatement comprehends all of 
the material evidenee for pl1tlntlft; and, 
as tnstruetton wait asked predicated upon 
all or the testimony, It ls necessary to 
know what It was. ThPland conveyed in 
tbe11lwrlff'sdeed toplalntlrf(executed 1~691 
was descrll>ed therein us "eight hundred 
and twenty-seven acres of land adJolnlng 
the lands o: J. B. Mann, deceu11ed, Mrs. 
Jane Wilder, Gaston Wilder, and othl'rs, 
containing, by estimation, eight hundred 
nnd twenty-seven acres, more or lees." 
The desrrl1)tive clause in the administra-
tor's deed to Crowder, In 1859, IR as fol-
low e, Yiz. : "All that t1·uct or pnr.:l'i of land 
belonging to the estate of James nurgeqi, 
deceased, lyh1g on Tar river, adjoininar 
lands of the said Willie Crowder, Dr. Jp. 
11eph n. Man11, and. others, and 1mppoeed 
to contain four hundred and nineteen acres, 
except the ltfe-estate of Lucy Ann Bnrgees, 
the widow of Jamee BllrgellS, In that por-
tion oflluid land llH!!lgned to her as dower, 
the meaning and Intent of this deE-d being 
to con \'ey to the said Wlllie Crowder, ab-
solutely. the whole of the said land not 
covered by the widow's dower, to vest In 
po11ses11lon Immediately, and to convey 
that portion covered by the widow's 
dower to \'eKt in pos11e11sion at the death 
of said widow." The sheriff, Gupton, tes-
tified that be levied on and sold Crowder's 
land under a description given by him iu 
1S69, ancl also referred to the tax-llf1t for 
deec1·lptlon; that he sold all of the Inter-
est of Crowder to the land de11cribed In the 
deed, but said nothing at the time about 
dower. Calvin Benton testlfted for the de-
fendant that the dower tract did not a1ljoln 
the lands of Mr11. Jane Wilder or Ga11ton 
Wilder, nor did It join the Mann land tlll 
Mann bought the Burgess land. 
The defendant off1rcd to pro\'e the dec-
larations of Crowder while In possession 
of the land conveyed to him by Gay, ad-
ministrator of Burgess, characterizing bis 
possession, but stuted that be did n<>t: 
know whether lt was before or afte1· tne 
sale by the 11berlff: that It w1111 afh.•r 
Mann's death, in 1865. (he thought tt was 
tn 1870 or 1871,) but that at the time Ellie. 
the plaintiff. wa11 not llvlng on the land. 
but was living 11omewbere else. Th{•co11 r"t 
DECLAR
ltted ti <1 -i
ii“? “.‘l,/n“@@i>te<i1.e Tlibe ’
P\““‘(‘)l\§“‘~’(;i1 “Crowder Sl1O\\'Qd_SS i
i“ s "‘lien. 1 saw ti
“*“‘;\“-‘(X ll ran from a. lge-§},<_§,-gI,"’°‘1 line~
“°' incline to the river. The‘ luv? 1" 3
V _ ‘ . _
atifiifllerirsiv dollars per acre wa“
p\a'\\\iiil,l:llis,su,ytliatlieovvnefl all 0
- ~51; iiiliic Crowder had in -
mm (Cro vder)owne<1- I hav U1-e “"30
fmthemb‘ hood iori'.Y—five $:\;‘1‘.ed m
///if "mg 01;] 1 helped to 1;\.\; t]](I_,
{1/Fl! Dy, M81; ‘bad posse:-sision of an the
4\l)\\'&_]-_ except the d()VVe1‘, fI‘()m the
Y’:'\\l\\-\i§= fnilsillle sale by Gay ’ the ad D‘ i 11 i S traitor.
ssion of part
. had lloslfe _ _ after
‘l§§\m‘;.em(1eatli. “O11 16\;'oss-i-ex u II] i n a ti on
- '* (l'- D1" ‘"1" was not in
i\\° \\‘lliii‘il5 “aithe widow's dower. I do
Dr. Mann was in poSse,_,_
ll of it. The large Dart wzis in
_ Crowaer," ltlfi eVi(\QI\t_ 1_he1-9.
3,0 \8€ii:l0€\‘?i‘s honor found that the decla_
T §e.I 8 _ ade by _Crowiie.i- wiine he
“':‘{‘lB0illl‘! vuSHegai0n_, beioie the sale-,_ by the
fl°’$~\_i‘t3"t‘(t)1ndl]11(1it‘l\i;hat beheld less l a n (I th an the
f the
P05-SQ iun 0
not nlfan tbs?
ms un era. deed for all of
K\\iiintiii Hg? °‘§:, that. if it be conceded
Kin interfocélung we \1n_e, as 111 arked, from
‘Wit-by Y to the river, arid adopting
tlieiieiiS<¢- S a corner, it would have been
the pine 5 ,‘_0“-Q91-'3) interest to surren-
agiiinsi ill‘! ‘L
dci-all outside of that line. the testimony
. tent. Hearlen v. Wo-
was not gIY\‘58'2€:; Jones v. lienry, 84 N.
ma¢i.*“*.“;,'0,,'v_ Fort, 98 N. c. 173, 3 s. E.
Magen v. Blankenship, 95 N. C.
8]). 1
55% witness fur the de-
Badger tsfilllgfsag follows : “ I know
k‘“da“t' E er and knew when the land
\“me Crowd as sold. Before the sale,
'2 - gy w
‘ inst? ‘lllanii. W
\‘ Brmgermme Sm.veym-_ running the line
l(l
Y-k(‘i$i1:l.t0Tii‘¢‘>.1l:iiie ran tlirollgh
']‘h9f()1‘(-'gOlllg testimony was also except’
d to The declaration was clearly one
.e _
made by Crowd“ m explanation of the
character and _eX _
a.m1,heinp; against his interest, was un
q ::'r:i:,?)t!?el'rlItlli2ie(l to testify fur-
‘ - . follows: “ I
ther’ p‘“1i,"u1gi1{f,b§§§¢tlll'i’;t ll]: did not claim
hm.“ J3 2'1 “-91- except the nine acres, un-
8.“-l O! tdem? Harris got to arguing about
?“ h-ehlm l found bv his papers that he bud
‘t’ “ §“t1'§.. to tliewliole of it.” When tlie
a g(i)0tifi Fills was cross-exaniined, he
‘Th-'1“. -~\'vh:,n \{Yidow Biirgcss died,l niade
to the land. ” The defendant was
tlicn permitted, his counsel ol).ll‘"fl"_g, t0
ask him as to his (leclzirations, “&In(<i1_:1l1 ret-
sponse to the question he said . h (11 no
any that I had no interest in tv e 0\I:l(.1‘
(._m.pt the 10 acres. I did not so’? so to r.
Robert Moore, nor to any one. The tes-
tiinony objected to on both occasions was
competent tocontrndict Lllis, and to show
that in fact lie did not cluim the whole of
the dower land. _
The exception growing out of t-lie tes-
timony of the witness Wilder_ I8 iZOV@l'l18d
by the 5111119 principle to wlncli we have
flu. “
ATIONs AGAINST INTEREST.
i-owder and Dr. Mann. Crowder ‘
t i lit linetothe T
hehad a 8 m 2 the dower.” '
(a;“?]_“]9l‘t£'(l in discussing tneexccption to the
qt 1 cnce of (.al\'ln Benton and of Badger
». allliigs. and theauthoritics alreadycited
spsymm the judge in overruling the plain-
tiff s objection.
_ It was not error in tliecourt to refuse to
instruct the jury that the plaintiff was en-
titled to recover upon the whole of the tes-
t1niony,or any of the different pliases of it,
suggested by the instructions asked by the
plaintiff, which were as follows: “The
deeds shown in evidence show that Willie
Crowder was the owner of the Burgess
tract of land,includlng the reversion in the
dower after the widow’s death, and there
is no evidence that any other person had
any legal title to any part of said t-ran-t of
land. [This instruction was not given,
and the plaintiff excepted] The jury can-
not consider the declarations of Crowder
or Ellis as affecting the title of eitlierCrowd-
er or Ellis to said land, and there is no
evidence which can be considered by the
jury to show that the said Crowder, up to
the sheriff’s sale, and Ellis after the sher-
iff’s sale, did not have the title to said
land, including the part in controversy in
this action. [This instruction was not
given, and the plaintiff excepted] There
is no evidence that Dr. Mann ever liad any
title to any part of the land in contro-
versy, and the deed to the defendant con-
veys no title, to any part of the land in
controversy. [This instruction was not
given, and the plaintiff excepted] If the
jury believe the testimony of the witnesses,
they will find the first issue in favor of the
plaintiff. [This instruction was not given,
and the plaintiff excepted] if the jury be-
lieve the evidence of the plaintiff, Ellis, and
I the witness Gupton, they will find the first
- issue in favor of the plaintiff.
5 struction was not given, and the
illle Crowder, and Joe :
[This in-
plaintiff
exce-pted.] ” The deeds setforth the hoiind-
ai-ics of land, but it is the testimony that
locates them. In this case, the conflict
arising out of contradictoryevidence as to
the extent of the plaiiitiffs land, wlietlicr
it included the whole of the dower, or tin-
lines should be so run as to exclude 10
_ , acres, covering the land on which the al-
um; of his possession, »
1 tied only by thejury. If tliedeclarations of
ieged trespass wascommitted, could be set-
(Jrowder and Ellis were competent, as we
have held they were, then the jury could
consider the testimony as to what they,
or either oi them, said in reference to the
location of the llnc, for what they deemed
it worth, as tending to show whether the
land in controversy was sold by the sher-
iff, and was covered by plaintiffs deed
from hiin. The plaintiff could not recover
only on the strength of his own title, and,
if the land was not embraced witliin the
boundaries of his deed from the sheriff, lie
could not recover; and in that event it
was imiiiateiial whether the adniinistra-
tor’s deed included the disputed territory
or not. It would have been error in the
court to predicate itsinstrnction upon the
supposed truth of the testimony of one or
more witnesses of the plaintiff, as asked,
when the testimony of Benton, Staliings,
Wilder, and the defendant tended to con-
tradict it, and when there was some con-
flict between the evidence olthe plaintiff
and Gupton, the witnesses mentioned.
[Case N0. 63
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DECLAR.A Tio~s AG~l~sT INTEREST. 
i\~ltted the decla.ra tl (Case No. 63 \~~11~\\\ ~~~c~pted. The wlti~~~ ~nd the P \o\\o<W" · Crowder showed eatlfted 
Iii ate. \.~og.pen. I ea.w the eho :i:n.e a. Pine 
11Re. ia\C\. I~ ran from a hedge-1: ~~od line. 8tralg\I.~ hne to the river. The la vv. in a 
wort\1-titeorelx dollars per a.ere rd V\78.tJ ~\&int\'1, Ell111,euy tbathe O'Wnecl - a. ll heHrd 
Jpff!i'Bt \VUJi('! Crowder had in th 0~ the 
tuat•elCrowder) owned. I have u~-e:'i~ 
t/JIJf neighborbool b~~~~~-1\~e 1 Yea rs. 1 
1:111'11' Dr. Me.i;:i·ba.d posseHstou. ~f ~fl !~e (\oW~l'. Mad except the do-wer, ~rorn th~ 
'1111~ E!lll Ian a'.le bY Gay' the ad ui t n Is tra tor 
t\me c:ilth~~1nd 1,08session of pa rt: afte; 
Ilt. ~err~ t\l " On crosH-exnn:•lnatl \\allt."tl'~ dea · . "Dr. "h-Innn 'V on 
t\w '"·\t11ess Ra\1l. i iow'e d a.a not In 
posl'I. Ion of thew' o~er. I do 
not" ~RA tbat Dr. Mann was in poases-
slo lllean of it. 'l'he ,,large JHU-t "W' us In 
po ~of~~~ofCrowder. ltisevhlent.1.bcre-fo~sess t h\s }lonor found thn t the <l~la­
r ~e, tha were made by Cro"v iler V\-hne he "~t1ous ot-tReKt1\on, before the 8a le by the 
Min 11 d when \twas against hl 8 Inter 
t1'11l"'lerlfl. a.n \t that beheld less la ncI than th; ~ttoa~m wcla\ms under a. deed for all or 
i;;:-."""111lntl not so that. ii it be conceded 
'11h lnte~~U~g lhe Une, as in a rked, from 
-that, by ·ow to the r\ver, a.nd a.dopttng 
thehellge-t acorner,\twouid have IJeen 
the p\ne1 f' !Cl'owder's)lntere1,1t to surren-
aga\nst 1 :s\dc of t\1at \\ne. the testimony 
dcl' al\ ou \ncompetent. Headen v. Wo-
waa n~ N C 4~~ ,\ones v. Henry, 84 N. 
n,ia3~·. ('\\ttou' v. Fort. 98 N. C. 173, _3 8. E. 
C ;ni{.. Magee v. B\ankenshtp, 9a N. C. 
Rev.'"'" 
00.~ d er Sta\\\ngs, a w\tuess fur the de-
f : 1\ testltte1l as to\\O'WB : " I know ,~~ll~:c~owder, nnd knew when t:he land 
t overt1y wuR t10\d. Before the snle, 
in run r ,,1 n \\'\\\le Crowder and Joe I t111w Dr. " an • • Bridgers the surveyor. ruun\ng the llnl:' 
between 'crowder and Dr. l.1.ann. Crowder 
then told me be bad a stru\ght ltne to th~ 
road. The \\ne ran through the dower. 
The lorrgoing testimony was also except-
·ed to. 'l'hc ckclarntlon was clearly one 
made by Crowtler in explanation of the 
dH\rncter and extE>nt of hle poeHeHsion, 
and, being against bis interest, was un-
<1 uestlonalJly competent. . . 
'l'be wltnl'sswns permitted totestlfl fm-
ther, plaintlH objecting, as follows: "I 
heard John E\l\B 11ay that be did not claim 
DY of tbe dower except the ntne acres, un-~ll hennd Dr. Ha;.nR irot to arguing abont 
.' when he found bv hlH J>apers that hE' l>nd 
!!'11:ood title to the whole of it." When the 
plnlntlff, :Ellis, wll.R eross-examlnecl, he 
11aill: "When Widow Burµ;l:'RH died, I mnde 
-c\nlm to the land. " The defe1ulunt WUB 
tlll'll per111ittell, his counsel objt•etl~g, to 
.a11k him as to bis cleclaratlons; and m re-
l-1\JODKe to the question he said: "I did not 
tin\' that I bad no Interest In the dower 
except the 10 aeres. I did not RO.;\' so to Mr. 
Robert Moore, nor to an.v one." The tes-
tlmonv objected to on both occasions was 
<'ompetent to contradict Ellie, and to show 
that in fact he dtd not clulm the whole of 
the dower land. 
The exception growing out of the tes-
timony of the witness Wilder Is governed 
bythe same principle to which we have 
Bd Vertoo In discussing tlleexcl'ptlun to the ~V"idence of Cal\'111 J3enton and of Ba,Jger 
"- tamn~. and theauthoritfoe already cited 
SjUffR'taln the judge In overruling the.plain-
t s objection. 
1 twas not error in the court to refuse to 
inHtruct the jury that the plttlntlff w11s en-
titled to recover upon the wbole or the teM-
timony,or any of the different phases of It, 
suggested by the Instructions Mked by tho 
plaintiff, which were 8J! follows: "The 
deeds shown In evidence show that Willie 
Crowder was the owner of the Burgess 
tract of land, Including the reversion In the 
dower after the widow's <leath, and there 
is no eYldence that any other person had 
any legal title to an.v part of said trru·t of 
land. ('fills Instruction was not given, 
and the plaintiff excepted.] The jury ca.n-
not eonHlder the declarations of Crowder 
or Ellis WI affecting the title of el ther Crowd-
er or Ellis to said land, and there Is no 
evidence which can be considered by the jury to show that the Hald Crowder, up to 
the sherlff'11 sale, and ElllH after the sher-
iff's Knie, did not have the title to said 
land, Including the part in contro\·erev In 
this action. [This Instruction wa.R ·not 
gtven, and the platntlff excPpted.J There 
Is no evidence that Dr. Mann ever had any 
title l;O any part of the land In contro-
versy, and the deed to the defendant con-
veys uo tltl~ to any part of the land In 
controveniy. [This Instruction WWI not 
given, and the plaintiff excepted.] If the jury believe the testimony of the wl tnesHes, 
they will find the first lsHue In favor or the 
plaintiff. [This Instruction was not given, 
and the plalntltt excepted.] lithe jnry be-
lieve the evidence of the plaintiff, ElllR, nnu 
th'3 wltneSR Gupton, they wm find the flrHt 
Issue in favor of the plaintiff. [This In-
struction was not given, and the plaintiff 
, excepted.]" The deeds set forth the bound-
arleM of land, hut It le the testimony that 
locates them. In this case, the conflict 
arising out of contradlctm·y e\·ldence 1U1 to 
the extent of the plalnt.lff's land, whether 
it Included the whole of the dower, or till' 
lines should be so run a.s to exclude 10 
acres, covering the land on which the al-
legPd treRpal!H waecommltted, could be set-
tled only b~· the jury. lf the declarations of 
Crowder and EIUs were competent, as we 
have held they were, then the jury could 
consider the testimony as to what they, 
or el ther of them, sale\ in reference to the 
loc1ttlon of the line, for what they d<'emecl 
It worth, as tending to show whether the 
lnnrl In controversy was sold by the sher-
iff, and was covered by plaintiff's cleed 
from him. The plaintiff could not recover 
only on the strength of hie own title, and, 
If the Jund WDB not embru.ee<l within the 
boundurieH of hie deed from the sheriff, he 
could not recover; and in that event It 
was Immaterial whl'thcr th11 admlnlRtra-
tor'e deed Included the disputed territory 
or not. It would have been error In the 
court to predicate itRlnetruct.lon upon the 
suppoRed truth of the testimony of one or 
more witnesses of the JllalntiH, as aHked, 
when the testimony ol Benton, Stalllngi-;, 
Wilder, and the defendant tended to con-
tradict It, and when there was Rome con-
filrt between the ev\c\ence of the platntlff 
and Gupton, the wltneMsei.i mentioned. 
179 
Case No. 63]
RELEVANCY.
We see no error in the charge of the
court ofwhich the plaintiff can justly com-
plain. A review of the charge will show
that it was even more favorable to the
plaintiff than was requisite in restricting
the jury to the purposes for which they
could consider certain testimony men-
tioned. The court charged the jury as fol-
lows: “The plaintiff contends that the
deed made by the sheriff in 1869 conveys
the land in controversy, being that part of
the Burgess land known as the dower.
The defendant denies this averment, and
says that the description in the deed does
not cover or include the dower. Your ver-
dict will depend .upon the view which,
upon the whole testimony, you may take
of this question. As a matter of law, I
charzrc you that all of the interest which
\Villie Crowder had in the land described
in the deed passed to the plaintiff. It is
for you to say what land was sold, and is
described in the sheriff's deed. [Plaintiff
excepted to this part of the charge.] The
evidence of the declarations of Willie Crowd-
er in regard to the settlement ofa lien,
etc.,is not admitted for the purpose of
showing‘ ti tie. and you should not consider
it for that purpose; but it is proper for
your consideration as hearing upon the
question as to what land the sheriff sold.
The sheriff swears that he obtained a de-
scription of the laud for the purpose of
making a levy from Willie Crowder; that
he also consulted the tax-hooks. The tes-
timony of the witnesses in regard to the
possession of the land is admitted for the
same purpose. The testimony in regard
to the deciara tions of Ellis after the death‘
of the widow is admitted for the same pur-
pose; so the tax-lists, etc. [To this part
180
of the charge plaintiff excepted] The tes-
timony of the acts, conduct, and declara-
tions of Willie (‘rowder and John Ellis are
not admitted for the purpose of affecting
the title of Crowder. but to aid you in de-
termining what land was levied upon and
sold by the sheriff. in this same connec-
tion, you may consider the testimony in
regard to the description given by Crowd-
er to Gupton, sheriff. for the purpose of
enabling him to make levy. [This part of
the charge was excepted to by the plain-
tiff.] When the boundaries of a tract of
land areestablished and known,the quan-
tity or number of acres called lor by the
deed is immaterial, and could not affect
the boundaries; but when the boundaries
are unknown,not established, and the jury
are charged with the duty of locating the
land, the number of acres called for may
be considered by them, in connection with
other testimony. in ascertaining what
land is in fact covered by the deed. [The
plaintiff excepted to this part of the
charge] ”
Counsel, in the argument, contended that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover be-
cause this was an action for possession
only, and the plaintiff had testified that
defendant expelled him from the land by
force in the year 1884. Upon referring to
the record, we find that the pleadings dis-
tinctly raise the question of title, and that
the court submitted issues involving the
ownership, wrongful possession, and dain-
age. without objection. It is needless to
add that the testimony tended on the one
hand to establish, and on the other to dis-
prove, that the title to the land in contro-
versy was in piaintitf. There is no error.
Judgment affirmed.
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Case No. 68] RELEVANCY. 
We see no error In the charge of the 
court or which the plaintiff c1tn Jm;tly com-
plain. A re\·iew of the charge will Rhow 
that it was even more favorable to the 
plaintiff than was requi11lte In J'e!!trlctlng 
the Jury to the purposes for which they 
could consider certain testimony men-
tioned. The court charged thP jury as fol-
lows: "The plaintiff contends that the 
deed made by the sheriff In 1869 conveys 
the lnnd in controversy, being that part of 
the Burgees land known as the dower. 
The defendant denies this averment, and 
says that the description In the deed does 
not cover or include the dower. Your ver-
dict wlll depend .upon the view whl<'h, 
upon the whole testimony, you may take 
of thh1 question. As a matter of law, I 
charge you that all or the interest which 
Wlllle Crowder had in the land described 
In the deed pa11eed to the plaintiff. It Is 
for you to say what land was sold, and b1 
describe(] in the sherlff'EI deed. [Plnlntlff 
excepted to this part of the charge.] '.rhe 
evideuceof the l1eclaration11 of Willie Crowd-
er in regard to the settlement of a lien, 
etc., iR nut admittecl for the purpm1e of 
11howing ti tie. and you should not l'On11l«ler 
it for that purpose; but it ill pro11er for 
your con11lderatlon as bearini;r upon the 
question as to what land the sheriff sold. 
The 11herlff swears that be obtained a de-
scription of the land for the purpose of 
making a levy from Willie Crowder; that 
he also <'unsuited the tax-books. The tes-
timony of the witnesses In regard to the 
po11eeseloo of the land Is admitted for the 
e11.me purpose. The testimony in regard 
to the declarations of Ellie after the death 
of the widow le admitted for the same pur-
pose; so the tax-lists, etc. [To this pa.rt 
180 
of the charge plaintiff excepted.] 1.'he tes-
timony of the arts, conduct, and declnra-
tlone of WllUe f'rowder and John Eilts are 
not admitted for the purpo11e of affecting 
the title of Crowder. but to nld you In de-
termining what land was levied upon and 
sold by the sheriff. Ju this same connec-
tion, you may comdde1· the tet1tlmony In 
regard to the deecrlptlon given by Crowd-
er to Gupton, sheriff, for the purpose uf 
enabling him to make levy. ['l'hle purt of 
the charge was excepted to by the plain-
tiff.] When the boundaries of a tract of 
land areestabllshe<l and known, the quan-
tity or number of acres called for by the 
deed le immaterial, and could not affect 
the boundaries; but when the boundaries 
are unknown, not established, and the jury 
are charged with the lluty of locating the 
land, the number of acres called for may 
be considered by them, In connection with 
other testimony, In ascertaining what 
lanu Is In fact covered by the deed. [The 
plaintiff excepted to this part of the 
ChRr&"e.]" 
Counsel, In the argument, con tended that 
the plalntltf was entitled to recover be-
cause this was an uctlon for poseeRsion 
only, and tb11 phtlntlff bad teRtltteli tbut 
defendant expelkd him from the land by 
force In the year 1884. Upon referrlnir to 
the record, we find that the pleadings llls-
tlnctly raise the question of title, and that 
the court euhmitted Issues lnvoh·fng the 
ownership, wrongful possession, and dam-
age, without objection. It le needless to 
udd that the testimony tended on the one 
hand to establish, and on the other to dlt1-
prove, tbut the title to the land in contro-
versy was In plaintiff. There is no error. 
Judgment affirmed. 
DECLARATIQNS OF TEST XTOR
‘ : AS T
O LOST WILL. [Case N0. 64
PICKENS v. DAVIg_
(134 Mass. 252.)
$“,,,,,,¢l\1<li¢in Court of l\Iass
Plymouth. Feb. 3, 1883
lI;)“Il_s note.questions the soundness of the
3 °‘e doctrine.‘ Page 529, note. While this
ilplbareut discrepancy in the respective
00ll_I'ts remained not fully reconciled, in
1331, the English statute of wills was passed
(St 7 Wm. IV. and 1 Vict. c. 26) section 22
of which provided that “no will or codicil,
or any part thereof, which shall be in any
manner revoked. shall be rcvived otherwise
than by the reexecution thereof, or by a
codlcil executed in manner hereinbefore re-
quired. and showing an intention to revive
the same." Since the enactment of this stat-
ute. the decisions in all the courts have been
uniform that, after the execution of a sub-
sequent will which contained an express rev-
ocation, or which, by reason of inconsistent
provisions, amounted to an implied revoca-
tion of a former will, such former will
would not be revived by the cancellation or
destruction oi.‘ the later one. Major v. Wil-
liams, 3 Curt. Ecc. 432; James v. Cohen, Id.
770. 782; Brown v. Brown, 8 El. & Bl. 876;
Dickinson v. Swatman, 30 L. J. Prob. &
Mat. & Adm. 84; Wood v. Wood, L. R. 1
Prob. & Div. 309. In order to have the effect
of revocation, it must, of course, be made to
appear that the later will contained a rev.)-
catory clause, or provisions which were in-
consistent with the former will; and the
mere fact of the execution of a subsequent
will, without evidence of its contents, has
been considered insuflicient to amount to a
revocation. Cutto v. Gilbert, 9 Moore, P. C.
131. See, also, Nelson v. McGifl’ert, 3 Barb.
Ch. 158.
In the United States there is a like dis-
crepancy in the decisions in dlflerent states,
though the clear preponderance appears to be
in favor of a doctrine substantially like that
established in the ecclesiastical courts. This
It chusetts_
Apptll-1 from Probate Court, Ply ulouth (-_.oun_
W ,\loff°I1, Judge.
1’/7 /71011111309, for appellant‘ H‘ Kingman,
/4/mflieiiee.
L The two questions in this
°;@§“.“il{-st. sew we -a-Q-11-mm or .1
Q“ ‘vas executed, am ca\\\L\\“ed a clause expressly revoking T011118!‘
“ fleet, I18 mattel‘ of law, to
-ills the 9 . - .
r:vi\: mstormer W1“ wmd‘ lfas not been
destleiead or whether in each ‘nstanmfl it 18
10- _
d as a question of intention, to
géfioaefiergefrom an the circurnstances of
lb<0 se' and, secondly, if it ls to be re-
ca - a question ot_ intention, whether
Bl§_rded ilflt oval declarations of the testator
stilisequepsible in evidence for the purpose
at: adms W t his intention \vaS_ These
($1 showing “ostlons in this commonwealth,
its 00°“ qBoflaIld, 14 Mass. 208, the second
in Rem V. valid tor want of due attestation.
wrillwas lxnn V ,Mkms' 1 Pick 535’ the sec-
“in Laugh ° S Qdjodged to he null and void,
(ma My wfiee“ procured through undue in-
as “mug and the whole decision
1 ud'
flueiitceuxig ts: étouno that it was never
wen
id not he.
mm‘ and co“ egg questions has been much
th
The first of England and‘ America;
n i
os§\13s;<:l;s (‘glen bio“ said that the courts of
81!
common law and the ecclesiastical courts in
_ 1 cg upon it. See 1 VVil-
f‘Q§:n%:,1,:a€5:€r 2?“. Ed.) 15-i—156, where
the authorities are Q
rt was thus stated in
fl:;4e$1%§:goti‘;c: 1wrc(l">1av:den, 2 Add. Ecc. 116,
law “The legal.I>I'e$\1II1l1“°“ is “"m‘°‘ “d'
verse to nor in tavor of, the revival of a
3
1 (1 n the cancellation ot
ztlonfiix; 11I:¢::::'§0el_y' Having furnished
_. - hdraws altogether;
I313lL’§lf;;"fi.§“§ul1Il0ZY‘i-
of urely and open to a decision either way,
D l according tofacts and circumstances."
sole yalso Moore v. Moore, 1 Phlllirn. 406;
Siison v’ vvuson 2. Phillim. 543. 554; Hoot-
En v Head, Id. éo; Kirircudbi-i::11t v- Kirk-
cudbright, 1 Haas E¢<1- 325; “em "- I’
11og,1 Moore, P. C. 299. In Pow. Dev. ( 1(-
1g‘_>7) 527, 528, a. distinction is taken between
the ettect of the cancellation of a second
will which contains no express clause re-
voking former wills, and °f a W1“ which
contains such a clause; and 111 respect 1"
the latter it is said that: “If 8 PI‘i0I‘ Wm
be made, and then a subsequent one, ex-
pressly revoklng the former, in such 0889.
although the first will be left entire, and
the second will afterwards canceled, yet
the better opinion seems to be that the
former is not thereby set up 11$-1111.” Jar-
rule was established in Connecticut in 1821,
in James v. Marvin, 3 Conn. 576, where it
was held that the revocatory clause in the
second will proprlo vigore operated instan-
taneously to effect a revocation, and that the
destruction of the second will did not set up
the former one; and the like rule was do
clared to exist in New York by the supreme
court of that state, in 1857, in Simmons v.
Simmons, 26 Barb. 68. The question was
greatly considered in Maryland, in 1863, in
Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357, 391, and the
court declared that “a clause in a subse-
quent will, which in terms revokes a pre-
vious will, is not only an expression 01' tho
purpose to revoke the previous will, but an
actual consummation of it, and the revoca-
tion is complete and conclusive, without re-
gard to the testamentary provisions of the
will containing it.” The court further held
that the cancellation of a revoking will prima
facie is evidence of an intention to revive
the previous will. but the presumption may
be rcbutted by evidence of the attending cir-
cumstances and probable motives of the tes-
tator. In Harwell v. Lively, 30 Ga. 315, in
1860, a similar rule was laid down and main-
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l>"ECLARATIONs OF 
PICKENS v. DA "\?"[S. 
0.34 Maas. 252.) 
TEST.A '.l'On AS TO LOST WILL. (Case No. €4 
~~~e Judicial Court of Masaacb 
P\nnouth. Feb. 3. 1883. uaetta. 
A.\l\ll'Jl-1 from Probate Court, Ply~ou.t:h 
/Ji )i()rton, Judge. coun. 
S ~blll80n, tor appellant. H. KJ ngi:nnn, 
/p,/ 1;.llJellee. 
S ;r 'f}le two questions tn this 
C. ~LLE~rst' • wbetber the cancellation ot a 
(lilt llL -n· 1'' • ted 
· as dulY execu • and -which :~ ~~c! :a use expressly revoking former 
irl11a the ettect. as matter or law to ~ )la8 ill which hacs • revl~ for111er w · "" not been d~ ~ a or wbetber \n each ln.st:ance It le 
to -:::.r:· rded as a question or lnt:en:tlon, to 
be ga fr<>JD all tbe clrcun:urtnn.cee of 
th con~ed and. secondly, if It ts to be re-
..._ caae. question of intention, 'Whether 
~ :rded 88 t oral declaratlone or the testator 
~ "beque~ \ble \n evidence for t:he purpose ·~~ adm 88 wbat b\s intention. 'Was. These ~~ 111owtng uesUons \n this commonwealth. 
&::::are open \orland, 14 Mass. 208, the second ~~v\nvalid, for want of due attestation. 
nton v. A.tldns, 1 Fick. 535, the sec-
-in Lau~ was ad3udged to be null and void, 
<ind w \ been -procured through undue ln-
811 bav °:nd fraud; and the whole decision 
1luentce :pon the ground tbat lt -wae never 
wen u 
valid and cou\d not be. Th~ 1lrst ot tbese questions bas i:-een much 
d1Bc\188ed. both in Eng\and and America; 
and it nas often been said tbat the courts of 
rommon law and the ecc\eeiastlcnl courts In 
E land are at variance upon lt. See 1 Wll-ii:!.. Ex'rs (Mb A.m. Ed.) 154-156, where 
tbe authorlt\es are cited. The doctrine of 
the eccleslastlcal courts was tbus stated In 
1824 In Ustlcke v. Bawden, 2 Add. Ecc. 116, 
l2ii: ''The legal presumption ts neither ad-
verse to, nor in favor of, tbe revival of a 
former uncanceled, upon tbe cancellation of 
a later, revocatory, wlll. Having furnished 
this principle, the law withdraws altogether; 
and leaves the question, as one of Intention 
purely, end open to a decision either wa~; 
lely according to· facts and circumstances. :e. alao Moore v. Moore, 1 P.hllllm. 400; 
~llBon v: Wilson, 3 PhlWm. 543, 554; Hoot-
on v. Head, Id. 26; Klrkcudbrlght v. Klrk-
cudbrlght, 1 Hagg. Eec. 325; Welch v. Pbll-
1\1)8, 1 Moore, P. C. 299. In Pow. DeY. (Ed. 
1827) 527, 528, a distinction Is taken between 
the effect of the cancellation of a second 
will which contains no express clause re-
voking former wills, and of a will whft>h 
(()Dtalns such a clause; and In reBPect to 
the latter It le said that: "If a prior will 
be made, and tben a subsequent one, ex-
Pl'l!llllly revoking the former, In 1mch case, 
although the ftrst will be left entire, and 
the aecond will afterwards canceled, yet 
the better opinion seems to be that the 
former 18 not thereby set up again." Jar-
JJl~ll'e note questfone the soundness ot the 
a Ve doctrine.' Page 529, note. While this 
apparent discrepancy In the respective 
court.a remained not fully reconciled, In 
1837, the Englfeh statute of wllle was passed 
(St. 7 Wm. IV. and 1 Viet. c. 26) section 22 
ot which provided that "no wUl or cocUcU, 
or any part thereof, which shall be In any 
manner revoked, shall be revived otherwise 
than by the ~xecutfon thereof, or by a 
codicil executed In manner herelnbefore re-
quired, and showing an Intention to revive 
the same." Since the enactment of tbls stat-
ute, the decisions In all the courts have been 
uniform that, atter the execution of a sub-
sequent will which contained an exprese rev-
ocation, or which, by reason of lnconslBtent 
provleloDB, amounted to an Implied revoca-
tion of a former will, such former will 
would not be revived by the cancellation or 
destruction of the later one. Major v. Wll-
llams, 3 Curt. Ecc. 432; James v. Cohen, Id. 
770. 782; Brown v. Brown, 8 El. & Bl. 876; 
Dickinson v. Swatman, 30 L. J. Prob. & 
Mat. & Adm. 84; Wood v. Wood, L. R. 1 
Prob. & Div. 309. In order to have the elfect 
of revocation, It must, of f!Ouree, be made ti) 
appear that the later wlll contained a rel"J· 
catory clause, or provisions which were in-
coll.lllstent with the former will; and th3 
mere fact of the execution of a subsequent 
will, without evidence of Its contents, baa 
been considered lneuftlclent to amount to • 
revocation. Cutto v. Gilbert, 9 Moore, P. C, 
131. See, also, Nelson v. McGlffert, 3 Barb. 
Ch. 158. 
In the United States there 18 a like dls-
crepnncy In the decisions ln dllferent states, 
though the clear preponderance appears to be 
In favor of a doctrine substantially like that 
established In the ecclesiastical courts. This 
rule was established In Connecticut In 1821, 
In .James v. :Marvin, 3 Conn. 576, where It 
was held that the revocatory clause In the 
second will proprlo vfgore operated lnstan· 
taneoll8ly to elfect a revocation, and that the 
destruction of the second will did not set up 
the former one; and the like rule was de-
clared to exist In New York by the supreme 
court ot that state, In 18:'i7, In Simmons v, 
Simmons, 2H Barb. GS. '.rhe question was 
greatly considered In ::\laryland, In 1863, In 
Colvin v. Warford, 20 l\ld. 357, 391, and the 
court declared that "a clause In a subse-
quent will, which In terms revokes a pre-
vious will, Is not only an expression of tho 
purpose to revoke the previous will, but an 
actual consummation of It, and the revoca· 
tlon ls complete and conclusive, without re-
gard to the testamentary provisions of the 
will containing It." The court further beld 
that the cancellation of a revoking will prlma 
facle Is evidence of an Intention to revlYe 
the previous will. but the presumption may 
be rebutted by evf<lenct- of the attending cir-
cumstances and prohnble motives of the tes· 
tator. In Harwell v. Lively, 30 Ga. 315, tn 
l&JO, a _similar rule was laid down and main-
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tained with great force of reasoning. The
opinion of the court concludes with the fol-
lowing pertinent suggestion: “It must be
conceded there is much law adverse to the
doctrine. " " "‘ Calculated as it is to sub-
serve and enforce the tenor and spirit of our
own legislation, and to give to our people
thc full benefit of the two hundred years’
experience of the mother country, as em-
bodied in the late act, is it not the dictate
of wisdom to begin in this state where they
have ended in England? We think so." See,
also, Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332. The
courts of Mississippi, in 1836, and of Michi-
gan, in 1881, adopted the same rule. Bo-
henon v. Walcot, 1 How. (.\Iiss.) 336; Scott
v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N. W. 799. It is to
be observed that some of the foregoing deci-
sions are put expressly on the ground that
the later will contained an express clause
of revocation. 45 Mich. 2-16, 7 N. W. 799;
90 Md. 392. An examination of the cases de-
cided in Pennsylvania leads us to infer that
a similar rule would probably have been-
adopted in that state, it the question had
been directly presented. Lawson v. Morri-
son, 2 Dali. 286, 290; Boudinot v. Bradford,
2 Yeates, 170; Id., 2 Dali. 266. Flintham v.
Bradford, 10 Pa. St. 82, 85, 92.
On the other hand, in Taylor v. Taylor, 2
.\‘ott. & .\IcC. 482, in 1820, it was held in
‘south Carolina that the earlier will revives
upon the cancellation of the later one; and
the same rule prevails in New Jersey, as is
shown by Randall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq.
M3, and cases there cited.
In various states of the Union statutes
have been enacted substantially to the same
effect as the English statute above cited,
showing that wherever, so far as our ob-
servation has extended, the subject has been
dealt with by legislation, it has been
thought wiser and better to provide that an
earlier will shall not be revived by the can-
cellation of a later one. There are, or have
been, such statutes in New York, Ohio, Indi-
ana, Missouri, Kentucky, California, Arkan-
sas. an'l Virginia, and probably in other
states. Concerning these statutes of New
York, it is said in 4 Kent, Comm. 532, that
they “have essentially changed the law on
the subject of these constructive revoca-
tions, and rescued it from the hard opera-
tion of those tecnnical rules of which we
have complained, and placed it on juster and
more rational grounds."
On the whole, the question being an open
one in this state, a majority of the court has
come to the conclusion that the destruction
of the second will in the present case would
not have the effect to revive the first, in the
absence of evidence to show that such was
the intention of the testator. The clause of
revocation is not necessarily testamentary in
its character. it might as well be executed
as a separate instrument. The fact that it
is inserted in a will does not necessarily
show that the testator intended that it
should be dependent on the continuance in
force of all the other provisions by which
his property is disposed of. It is more rea-
sonable and natural to assume that such
revocatory clause shows emphatically and
conclusively that he has abandoned his
former intentions, and substituted therefor
a new disposition of his property, which for
the present, and unless again modified, shall
stand as representing his wishes upon the
subject. But when the new plan is in its
turn abandoned, and such abandonment is
shown by a cancellation of the later will, it
by no means follows that his mind reverts
to the original scheme. In point of fact, we
believe that this would comparatively sel-
dom be found to be true. It is only by an
artificial presumption, created originally for
the purpose oi.‘ preventing intestacy, that
such a. rule of law has ever been held. It
does not correctly represent the actual oper-
ation of the minds of testators in the ma.-
jority of instances. The wisdom which has
come from experience in England and in
this country seems to point the other way.
In the absence of any statutory provision
to the contrary, we are inclined to the opin-
ion that such intention, if proved to have ex-
isted at the time of canceling the second will,
would give to the act of suclrcancellation
the efiect of reviving the former will; and
that it would be open to prove such inten-
tion by parol evidence. Under the statute
of England, and of Virginia, and perhaps of
other states, such revival cannot be proved
in this manner. Major v. Williams, and
Dickinson v. Swatman, above cited; Rudisill
v. Rodes, 29 Grat. 147. But this results
from the express provision of the statute.
In the present case there was no evidence
tending to show that the testatrix intended
to revive the first will, unless the bare fact
that the first will had not been destroyed
amounted to such evidence. Under the cir-
cumstances stated in the report little weight
should be given to that fact. The will was
not in the custody of the testatrix, and the
evidence tended strongly to show that sue
supposed it to have been destroyed.
The question, therefore, is not very impor-
tant, in this case, whether the ubsequent
declarations of the testatrix were admissi-
ble in evidence for the purpose of showing
that she did not intend by her cancellation
of the second will to revive the first, be
cause, in the absence of any affirmative ev-
idence to prove the existence of such inten-
tion, the first will could not be admitted to
probate. Nevertheless, we have considered
the question, and are of opinion that such
declarations were admissible for the pur-
pose of showing the intent with which the
act was done. The act itself was consistent
with an intention to reviveor not to revive
the earlier will. Whether it had the one
eiiect or the other depended upon what was
in the mind of the testatrix. It would in
many instances be more satisfactory to lI8.\‘(-3
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talned with great force of reasoning. The 
opinion of the court concludes with the fol-
lowing pe1'tlnent suggestion: "It must be 
conceded there ts much law adverse to the 
doC'trine. • • • Calculated as It ls to sub-
serve and enforce the tenor and spirit of our 
own legislation, and to give to our people 
thP full benefit of the two hundred years' 
experience of the mother country, as em-
bodied In the late act, ts It not the dictate 
ot wisdom to begin to this state where they 
have ended ln England? We think so." See, 
also, Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332. The 
courts of Mlsslsslppl, ln 1836, and or. Mlcbl-
gan, In 1881, adopted the same rule. Bo-
hanon v. Walcot, 1 How. (Miss.) 336; Scott 
v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N. w. 700. It ls to 
bo~ observed that some of the foregoing decl-
81008 are put expressly on the ground that 
the later will contained an express clause 
of revocation. 45 Mich. 246, 7 N. W. 799; 
20 Md. 302. An examination of the cases de-
cided In PeDD8ylvanla leads us to Infer that 
a similar rule would probably have been 1 
adopted In that state, if the question had 
bee'l dlre<'tly presented. Lawson v. Morrl-
l'OD, 2 Dall. 286, 290; Boudinot v. Brat•ford, 
2 Yeates, 170; Id., 2 Dall. 266. Fllnthnm v. 
Bradford, 10 Pa. St. 82, 85, 92. 
On the other band, In Taylor v. Taylor, 2 
Sott. & McC. 482, In 1820, It was held In 
'IJoutb Carolina that the earlier wlll revives 
upon the cancellation of the later one; and 
the same rule prevails lo New Jersey, as ls 
shown by Randall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eci. 
f'.!3, and cases there cited. 
In various states of the Union statutes 
have been enacted substantially to the same 
effect as the English statute above cited, 
showing that wherever, so ta1· as our ob-
servation has extended, the subject has been 
dealt with by legislation, It bas been 
thought wiser and better to provide that an 
earlier will shall not be revived by the can-
cellation of a later one. There are, or have 
been, such statutes in New York, Ohio, Indi-
ana, Missouri, Kentucky, California, Arkan-
sas. an1 Virginia, and probably In other 
states. floncernlng these statutes of New 
York, it ls said In 4 Kent, Comm. 532, that 
they "have essentially changed the law on 
the subject of these constructive revoca-
tloD8, and rescued It from the hard opera-
tion of those tecnnlcal rules of which we 
have complained, and placed it on juster and 
more rational grounds." 
On the whole, the question being an open 
one In this state, a majority ot the court has 
come to the conclusion that the destruction 
of the second will In the present case would 
not have the e!Tect to revive the first, In the 
absE-nce of evidence to show that such was 
the Intention of the testator. The clause of 
revoeauon ts not necessarily testamentary In 
Its character. It might as well be executed 
as a separate Instrument. The tact that It 
ls Inserted in a will does not necessarily 
show that the testator Intended that It 
182 
should be dependent on the continuance In 
force of all the other provisions by which 
his propt"rty ls disposed of. It ls more rea-
sonaole and nntural to assume that such 
revocatory l'lnuse shows emphatically and 
conclusively that he has abandoned his 
former Intentions, and substituted therefor 
a new disposition of his property, which for 
the present, and unless again modified, shall 
stand as representing his wishes upon the 
subject. But when the new plan Is In Its 
tum abandoned, and such abandonment Is 
shown by a cancellation of the later will, It 
by no means follows that his mind reverts 
tp the ortglnal scheme. In point of fact, we 
believe that this would comparatively sel-
dom be found to be true. It ls only by 11n 
artificial presumption, created originally for 
the purpose of preventing Intestacy, that 
such a rule of law has ever been held. It 
does not correctly represent the aetnal oper-
a tlon of the minds of testators In tbe ma-
jority of Instances. The wisdom which has 
come from experience In 'England and In 
this country seems to point the other way. 
In the absence of any statutory provision 
to the contrary, we are inclined to the opin-
ion that such intention, If proved to have ex-
isted at the time of canceling the second will, 
would give to the act of such .cancellation 
the etrect of reviving the former will; and 
that it would be open to prove such lnten· 
tlon by parol evidence. Under the statute-
of England, and of Virginia, and perhaps or 
other states, such revival cannot be proved 
In this manner. Major v. Wllllams, and 
Dickinson v. Swatman, above cited; Rudisill 
v. Rodes, 29 Grat. 147. But this results 
from the express provision of the statute. 
In the present case there was no evidence 
tending to show that the testatrix Intended 
to revive the first wlll, unleBB the bare fact 
t.uo.t the first will had not been destroyed 
amounted to such evidence. Under the <'lr-
cumstances stated lo the report little weight 
should be given to that fact. The wlll was 
not in the custody of the testatrix, and the 
evidence tended strongly to show that Slle 
supposed It to have been destroyed. 
The question, therefore, ts not very Impor-
tant, In this case, whether the subsequent 
declaratloDB of the testatrix were admissi-
ble lo evidence for the purpose of sbgwlng 
that she did not intend by her cancellation 
of the second will to i:evlve the first, be-
cause, in the absence of any aftlrmative ev-
idence to prove the existence of such Inten-
tion, the first wlll could not be admitted to 
probate. Nevertheless, we have consldel'C<I. 
the question, and are of opinion that su<'b 
declarations were admissible for the pur-
pose of showing the Intent with which th<>:-
act was done. The act Itself was consistent 
with an Intention to revlve·or not to revlve-
the earlier will. Whether It had the OllE"-
enect or the other depended upon what was 
In the mind of the testatrix. It would In 
many IDBtances be more satisfactory to hav~ 
DECL.-\R.*\T1()NS Q1,
TESTATOR AS TO LOST WILL. [Case No. 64
mill decl r tion . .
will llwjshowinga glearlyuigicég (ft the "91’?
1&‘§‘w_ mflence oi’. declaratio
QM Qfl" 8 to be received
Tm melllmve been made for the ~,.-er _ Dm__
Se 0; msleading the hear-er as to the dis_
,,,s\t\@n\vh1ch the speaker meant; to mak
- en, . trier 11 °°f
jjgplllp i’ On theo and, they may
M76‘ been made “nae? éuch . circuDJStl1DC9S
flm furnish an entirely satisfactory
offilk rea1pu1‘P°5e' —1ttli:(§l:-le that it
rmt\v< propel‘ to P¥°‘° or revoect act 9f can"
N“a‘iOn, de5tf\1Cil0D,there is c'tahtioI1 1_n this
NMQQ,-' Butwl1e“_ and oh Q1‘ evidence
oi on act oi revocilflml» eafli“'_ en the Q1168-
tion oitlie revival of *1? te i‘ will depends
upon memtention of nets s at01‘_. which is
to [M gathered from lac find circumstan-
ces his declarations’ S 1°“ mg Such i11t9l1'
ma‘ whether ri<>1'- °°“temp°"“.n“°“S’ °r
S ‘L ent may be proved in evidence.
‘§hse<£1 géeat cage oi! Sugden v, gt Leon-
a 1“ t ePr0b_ Div. 154, th<_%_ question under-
rdsv 1 ii discusion, in 1816. wvhether writ-
Rrcnt fig om, declarations rnade by 11 testa-
‘Q11 lm before and after the execution of
ior. both W the event of its loss, admis-
' evidence of its contents;
decided in the aifirinative. It
(1 in the argument at one stage
i the discussion that such subsequent dec-
o
“PS 111‘-1111* at
“ll Caution.
may
1121 1'31 (ft(>'|_~ of.
E‘: atlons would be admissible to rebut 11 pre-
_mDtion of revocation of the will; but,
151118 being afterwards questioned, it was de-
clared and held, on the greatest considera-
tion, not only that these, but also that dec-
larations as to the contents of the will, were
admissible. See page-s 174, 198, 200, 214,
215, 219, 220, 225, 227, 228, 240, 241. ’.|.ue
09-se of Keen v. Keen, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div.
105, is to the same effect. See, also, Gould
v. Lakes, 6 Prob. Div. 1; Doe v. Alien, 12
Adol. & E. 451; Usticke v. Bawden, 2 Add.
Ecc. 123; Welch v. Phillips. 1 Moore, P.
C. 299; Whiteley v. King, 10 Jur. (N. S.)
1079; In re Johnson's Will, 40 Conn. 587;
Lawyer v. Smith, 8 Mich. 411; Patterson v.
Hickey, 32 Ga. 156; 1 Jarm. lVills (5th Am.
Ed. by Bigelow) 130, 133, 134, 1-12, and notes.
The question was also discussed, and many
cases were cited, in Collagan v. Burns, 57
Me. -1-10, but the court was equally divided
in opinion. Many, though not all, of the
case. which at first sight may appear to
hold the contrary, will be found on examina-
tion to hold merely that the direct fact of
revocation cannot be proved by such decla-
rations.
The result is that, in the opinion of :1 ma-
jority of the court, the will should be disal-
lowed, and the decree of the probate court
reversed.
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ln~:cL:\RA.TlO~s OF ·.rEs·rA.".l'Oa .AS TO LOST WJJ,L. (Case No. 64 
~lslte declaration made u t: t:h 111111e~,u~showlng clearly the charn:te';,e~. 
tlme, t Evidence of declarations .... ~~d t \\le ac . es 1 .......... ~ e a Q~t ~ s to be rece\ved vvitb caution. 
Tllel \ll~y have been made 1'.or the very pur-
~se ot mlsleadlng the hearer n.s t:o 1:be dis-
\)Ollltlotl Which the speaker men.nt to make of 
}J}8J>foperty. On the other hand. they niay 
'I! ,a,een made under such clrcumstu.nces 
/Jlf< [ rnlsh an entirely sntisfn<"tory proof 
P /IJ 0 uri>08e. lt \s true tba. t 1 t may 
of !Ifs-. real P to prove the direct net of can-
uot ~proper trUctioO, or revoca. tion. in this 
ce\\a~Ion, des •"en there is other evidence But '\'1.... d 
' I 
I 
rull.lllli:ii..er. vocation, an "'\Vben the ques-o~ ll."'IQ. net ot r:\val of an earlier -will depends 
uo\\. ot the re uon of t11e test:a tor, vvblch ls 
UJJ{)ll, tue lnteD fl'Olll facts and circumstan-
tO ~ gatbere:ratlone, showing such lnten-
Cel!'.., his decl rtor contemporaneous, or th'~. whether a; be 'proved in eYldeuce. 
8-....11seciuent, ~ case of Sugden. v. St:. Leon-
ln the grea DlV. 1M, the question under-
a :rds, 1 Prob. l:lflOD ln 1876, ""bethe1· writ-~-~ut full dlSC~ec\ar~tlODS made by a testn-t_~U and ora~ e and after the execution of ~r, botb be 0[n the event of its loss, admie-
hls w\1\, are, da.n' evidence of its content11; 
slble as seco:ec\ded \n the afllrmative. It 
and It was \n the argument a. t one stage 
was admitted ion that such subsequent dec-
ot the &scuss 
1s.1·attol18 would be admlssllJle to relJut a prc-
SUinptlon of revocation of the will; but, 
this being afterwards questioned, It was de-
clared and held, on the greatest coneldern-
tlon, not only that these, but a.leo that dec-
larations ae to the contents of the will, were 
admlssilJle. See pages H4, 198, 200, :!14, 
215, 219, 220, 22:>, 22;, 228, 240, 241. '..1.J..Le 
ell.Se of Keen Y. Keen, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div. 
105, ls to the same ef!'ec·t. S~e. also, Goul<l 
v. Lakes, G Prob. Div. 1; Doe v. Allen, 12 
Adol. & E. 451; Ustlcke v. Bawden, 2 Add. 
Ecc. 123; Welch v. Phillips. 1 Moore, P. 
C. 299; Whiteley v. King, 10 Jur. (X S.) 
torn; In re .Johnson's \Ylll, 40 Conn. :i8i; 
Lawyer v. Smith, 8 likh. 411; Patterson v. 
Hickey, 32 Ga. 156; 1 Jarm. Wille (;Jth Am. 
f~d. by Bigelow) 130, 133, 134, 142, and notes. 
The question was also discussed, and muny 
cases were cited, ln Colla.gan v. Burns, 57 
l\Ie. -HU., but the court was e<1unlly dlYlded 
tn opinion. Many, though not all, of the 
cases. which at first eight may appear to 
hold the contrary, will be found on examlna-
uon to hold merely that the direct fact of 
revocation cannot be proved IJy such decla.· 
rations. 
'£he result le that, in the opinion of a ma-
jority of the court, the will should be disal-
lowed, and the decree of the probate court 
reversed. 
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Case No. 65]
RELEVANCY.
YOUNG v. KANSAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R.
CO.
(39 Mo. App. 52.)
_ Court of Appeals of Missouri. Jan. 21, 1890.
Appeal from circuit court, Howell county;
J. F. Hale, Judge.
Wallace Pratt and Olden & Green, for ap-
pellant.
ROMBAUER, P. J., delivered the opinion
of the court.
This is an action for double damages, un-
der the provisions of section 809 of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1879. There was judg-
ment for plaintiff below, and the defendant,
appealing, assigns for error that the state-
ment is jurisdictionally defective, that the
court admitted illegal and incompetent evi-
dence, and that the evidence is insutiicient
to support the judgment.
The statement, the suiliciency of which is
thus challenged, is as follows:
"Before W. W. Tucker, J. P., Hutton Val-
ley township, in Howell county, Missouri.
George K. Young vs. Kansas City, Ft. Scott
& Memphis Railroad Company. Damages.
Plaintiff states that the defendant is and
was on the seventh day of September, 1888,
a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the state of Missouri, and, as
such corporation, owned and operated a rail-
road passing and running through Dry
Creek township, in said county and state
aforesaid; that on the seventh day of Sep-
tember, 1888, the said defendant, by its
agents, servants, and employés, while run-
ning a locomotive and train of cars on said
road in said DryCreek township, ran against,
struck, and killed a certain mule of plaintiff
of the value of one hundred dollars, and one
calf of plaintiff of the value of ten dollars,
to plaintiffs damage in the sum of one hun-
dred and ten dollars; that said mule and
calf came upon the track of said railroad in
said township where it passes through un-
enclosed lands where said railroad company
was and is by law required to erect and
maintain a good and lawful fence on each
side of its railroad, and where there was
not any crossing of said railroad by a public
or private highway; that the defendant on
said seventh day of September, 1888, and for
a long time prior thereto, failed and neg-
lected to keep and maintain a lawful fence
on the sides of said road, at a point where
said mule and calf got upon the track and
were killed, and that, by reason thereof, said
mule and said calf got upon said railroad
track and were killed, and the killing of
said mule and said calf was occasioned then
and there by the neglect and failure of the
defendant to erect and maintain lawful fen-
ces on the sides of its said railroad afore-
said. Plaintiff also states that Hutton Vai-
ley township is adjoining to said Dry Creek
township in said county. Wherefore plain-
tin‘, by reason of the killing of said mule
and said calf, as aforesaid, and by virtue of
section 809 of the Revised Statutes of Mis-
souri of 1879, demands judgment for double
the value of said mule and the said calf in
the sum of two hundred and twenty dol-
lars.”
No particular defect in the statement is
pointed out by appellant, and we can see none.
It states all necessary jurisdictional facts.
It expressly states the obligation of the de-
fendant to fence its track where the acci-
dent occurred, and that the animals came
upon the track where it was unfenced, and
where the defendant was under legal obli-
gation to fence, and that they were killed
in consequence. It further states that this
happened in an adjoining township to the
one where the suit is brought. That the
suit is brought in Hutton Valley township
appears by the statement, by the justices
transcript, and by the circuit clerk's certif-
icate, which describes the transcript filed in
his office as being a trans<.‘ript from the of-
fice of W. W. Tucker, one of the justices of
the peace of Hutton Valley township in How-
ell county. The first assignment of error
is, therefore, clearly untenable.
Upon the trial the plaintiff gave oral evi-
dence to the effect that Dry Creek township,
where the accident occurred, and Hutton
Valley township, where the suit was insti-
tuted, were adjoining townships. This evi-
dence was objected to by the defendant, on
the ground that such fact was matter of
record, which could not be established by
oral evidence. The law, as embodied in
sections 7426 and 7427 of the Revised Stat-
utes of 1879, requires the county court to
divide the county into convenient townships,
to cause its clerk to enter the description
of the townships of record, and, within thir-
ty days after establishing a township, to
transmit to the secretary of state a descrip-
tion of such township and its boundaries.
The general rule unquestionably is that oral
evidence cannot be substituted for any in-
strument which the law requires to be in
writing, such as records, public documents,
etc. (1. Greenl. Ev. § 86); but we do not un-
derstand the rule as excluding evidence of
reputation, where the fact sought to be es-
tablished is a boundary not of particular
but of general public interest. Upon prin-
ciple the same rule should, and unquestion-
ably does, apply to such boundaries. as ap-
plies at common law to ancient boundaries
of parishes, manors, and the like, which are
of public interest, and touching which oral
proof was always admissible. 1 Greenl. Ev.
5 145.‘ The boundaries of a township are of
public interest to all its inhabitants, as, un-
der our laws, questions of taxation for local
purposes are determined by such bounda-
ries. We must, therefore, conclude that the
second assignment of error is likewise un-
tenable.
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Case No. 65] RELEVANCY. 
YOUNG v. KAl'ISAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R. 
co. 
(39 Mo. App. 52.) 
Court of Appeals of Missouri. Jan. 21, 1890. 
Appeal from circuit court, Howell county; 
J. F. Hale, Judge. 
Wallace Pratt and Olden & Green, for ap-
pellant. 
ROlIBA t:ER, P. J., delivered the opinion 
or the court. 
This Is an action for double damages, un-
der the provisions of section 809 of the Re-
vised Statutes of 18W. There was judg-
ment for plaintltr below, and the defendant, 
appealing, assigns for error that the state-
ment ls jurisdictionally defecth"e, that the 
court admitted Illegal and Incompetent evi-
dence, and that the evidence ls lnsutHclent 
to support the judgment. 
The statement, the sufficiency of which le 
thus challenged, le as follows: 
"Before W. W. Tucker, J. P., Hutton Val-
ley township, In Howell county, Missouri. 
George K. Young vs. Kansas City, Ft. Scott 
& Memphis Railroad Company. Damages. 
Plalntllf states that the defendant le and 
was on the seventh day of September, 1888, 
a corporation organized and existing under 
the laws of the state of Missouri, and, 118 
such corpo1-atlon, owned and operated a rail-
road passing and running through Dry 
Creek township, In said county and state 
aforesaid; that on the seventh day of Sep-
tember, 1888, the said defendant, by Its 
agents, servants, and employ~, while run-
ning a locomotive and train of cars on said 
road ln said Dry Creek township, ran against, 
struck, and killed a certain mule of plaJntltr 
of the value of one hundred dollars, and one 
calf of plalntUf of the value of ten dollars, 
to plaintltr's damage In the sum of one hun-
dred and ten dollars; that said mule and 
calt l'ame upon the track of said railroad In 
snld township where It passes through un-
enclosed lands where said raJlrood company 
was and Is by law required to erect and 
maintain a good and lawful fence on each 
side of Its rallrood, and where there was 
not uny crossing of said railroad by a public 
or printte highway; that the defendant on 
said seventh day of September, 1888, and for 
a long time prior thereto, failed and neg-
lected to keep and maintain a lawful fence 
on the sides of said road, at a point where 
Bllld mule and calf got upon the track and 
were killed, and that, by reason thereof, said 
mule and said calf got upon said railroad 
track and were killed, and the killing of 
said mule and said calf was occasioned then 
and there by the neglect and failure of the 
defendant to erect and maintain lawful fen-
ces on the sides of its said railroad afore-
said. Plaintiff also states that Hutton Val-
It>~· township is adjoining to said Dry Creek 
township In said county. Wherefore plaln-
184 
tlt't, by reason of the killing of sald mule 
and said calf, as aforesaid, and by virtue of 
section 809 of the Revised Statutes of Mis-
souri of 1879, demands judgment for double 
the value of said mule and the said calf ln 
the sum of two hundred end twenty dol-
lars." 
No particular defect in the statement Is 
pointed out by appellant, and we can see none. 
It states all necessary jurisdictional facts. 
It expressly states the obligation of the de-
fendant to fence Its tmck where the acci-
dent occurred, and that the animals came 
upon the track where It was unfenced, and 
where the defendant was under legal obli-
gation to fence, and that they were killed 
in consequence. It further states that this 
happened in an adjoining township to the 
one where the suit Is brought. That the 
suit Is brought In Hutton Valley township 
appears by the statement, by the justice·s 
transcript, and by the circuit clerk's certif-
icate, which describes the transcript ftled In 
his office as being a tranectlpt from the of-
fice of W. W. Tucker, one of the justices of 
the peace of Hutton Valley township In How-
ell county. The ftrst 118Signment ot error 
ls, therefore, clearly untenable. 
Upon the trial the plalntllf gave oral evi-
dence to the etrect that Dry Creek township, 
where the accident occurred, and Hutton 
Valley township, where the suit was Insti-
tuted, were adjoining townships. This evi-
dence was objected to by the defendant, on 
the ground that such fact was matter of 
record, which could not be e11tabllshed by 
oral evidence. The law, as embodied In 
sections 7426 and 7427 of the Revised Stat-
utes of 1879, requires the county court to 
divide the county Into convenient townships, 
to cause Its clerk to enter the description 
of the townships of record, and, within thir-
ty days after establishing a township, to 
transmit to the secretary of state a descrip-
tion of such township and Its boundaries. 
The general rule unquestionably ls that oral 
evidence cannot be substituted for any In-
strument which the law requires to be In 
writing, such as records, public documents, 
etc. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 86); but we do not un-
derstand the rule as ex<'luding evld<.>nce of 
reputation, where the fact sought to be es-
tablished Is a boundary not of particular 
but of general public interest. Upon prin-
ciple the same rule should, and unquestion-
ably does, apply to such boundarll's. as ap-
plies at common law to anc>lent boundaries 
of parishes, manors, and the like, which are 
of public Interest, and touching which oral 
proof was always admissible. 1 Greenl. Ev. 
§ 145'\ 'Ille boundaries of a township are of 
public Interest to all its Inhabitants, as, un-
der our laws, qu(>Stlons of taxation for local 
purposes are determined by such bounda-
ries. "'\Ve must, therefore, conclude that the 
second assignment of error is likewise un-
tenable. 
• 
DECLAR
A'r1o.\rs AS TO PUBLrc man
TS, ETC. [Case No. 65
\‘\o\\s\o ‘ _ _ , _
m_1&1- lhe fact ihift the plalntiflf we-as
W, smwn to be an adimfllllg Owner xvas im_
/1/./1/a//'-1111511109 there was n° pretense that
the animals came upon the track from ad-
joining fields which were fenced, as was the
0888 in Ferris v. Railroad, 30 M0. App, 122,
and cases there cited, but it was shown that
the railroad, at the place where the aniumls
came upon the track and were killed. ran
through open and unenclosed lands.
All the judges concurring, the judgment ls
aflirmed.
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DECLA..RA TIONs A.s TO ~lll3uc RIGHTS, ETC. [Case No. 6S 
~8.Salgnment is like'\Vlse untenable. Tut\\~~nce was suttlc\ent to justify the 
'I\lt t~ ~jlfer that the tm\n1a.ls ca.~e upon 
\llT1 \t\e~· and were killed, at a pol n. t -where ~ \\~adeom-po.ny was under legal obllga-~!n~\o fence. Vaughan v_ Railroad, 34 l\lo. 
1_.1. The fact that the plaint:l:rr ,v88 ~\lj~lJOll'n to be an adjol.nlng O'Wner vvas Im-~ _ _,_, since there was no pretense that JJ}i/t'f1411Jr 
tbe animals came upon the track from ad-
joining llelds which were fenced, as was the 
case In Ferris v. Railroad, 30 Mo. App. 122, 
and cases there cited, but It was shown thnt 
the railroad, at the place where tbe anlmnls 
came upon the track and were kllled, ran 
through open and unenclosed lands. 
All the judges concurring, the judgment ls 
affirmed. 
Case No. 66]
RELEVANCY.
SITLER et al. v. GEHR.
(105 Pa. St. 577.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
1884.
Error to court of common pleas, Berks
county.
A. G. & H. D. Green (Wharton Morris and
Wm. H. Livingood, with them), for plaintiffs
in error. Isaac I-iiester (Humes & Frey and
John F. Smith, with him), for defendant in
error.
March 7,
PAXSON, J. The first five assignments
of error may be considered together. They
raise the question of the admissibility of the
declarations of Anna Marla Gehr and John
Gehr upon a question of pedigree. The pur-
pose of offering said declarations was to es-
tablish relationship between the plaintiff,
and Balser Geehr, of Berks county. The evi-
dencc was objected to because it was not
shown allunde that the declarants were of
the family of the Berks county Balser Geehr.
The evidence was admitted and bill sealed
for the defendants.
The rules of evidence applicable to pedigree
cases are: (1) That the statements must be
made ante litem motam. (2) Declarant must
be dead. And (3) But a prior condition to
both these is that it should be proved by
some source of evidence. independent of the
statement itself, that the person making the
statement is related to the family about
which he speaks. Smith v. Tebbitt, L. R. 1
Prob. & Div. 354.
It was not denied that the first two condi-
tions had been fulfilled. Neither was it ques-
tioned that the declarants were shown by
evidence dehors the declaration to be relat-
ed to the family of Joseph Gehr, the ancestor
of the plaintiff, but it was contended that
the declarants must be shown by evidence
allunde to be related to Balser Geehr, of
Berks county; in other words, to the person
last seised of the estate, or his particular
branch of the family. To state the question
in another form: The declarants were Anna
Maria Gehr and John Gehr. The plaintiffs‘
ancestor was Joseph Gehr. The deceased
ancestor was Balser Geehr, of Berks county.
It was not denied that the declarants were
of the family of Joseph Gehr, and it was at-
tempted to show by their declarations that
the above-named Joseph Gehr and Balser
Geehr were related to each. The question
was whether sufficient ground had been laid
for such declarations.
The plaintiffs in error contend, not only
that the declarants must be shown by evi-
dence allunde to be related to the family as
to which the declarations were made, but
also that they must also be thus shown to
be related to the person who died seised.
The first part of this proposition is undoubt-
edly true under all the authorities. The lat-
ter portion of it is not so clear. I have care-
fully examined all the authorities cited on
both sides upon this point, and many others
to which our attention was not called upon
the argument; and, although there is some
conflict in the cases, the weight of authority
seems to be that, while a deciarant must be
shown by evidence allunde to belong to the
family, it does not appear to be necessary to
show that he belong to the same branch of
it. In Vowies v. Young, 13 Ves. 1-17, it was
held that the declarations of a deceased hus-
band concerning the descent or pedigree of
his wife are admissible. And in Jewell v.
Jewell, 1 How. 219, that the declarations of
a deceased husband and of one of the plain-
tiffs, claiming as heir of her father, that his
wife was not married to her father, were ad-
mitted. ‘
It would seem. however, that the declara-
tions of a husband in regard to his wife's
family, or of 11 wife in regard to her hus-
band's, rest upon substantially the same
principles as those of a relation by blood,
and these cases do not throw much light up-
on the question we are considering.
Doe d. Jenkins v. Davies, 59 E. C. L., 314,
cited by plaintifl’ in error, was an action of
ejectment, and the vital question in the case
was, whether Elizabeth Jenkins was legiti-
mate. If she was, it was admitted the ver-
dict must be for defendant. After the plain-
tiff had offered evidence to show that E. J.
was not legitimate, an attorney produced a
certificate of the marriage of Eleanor Diller
to John Davies, the father of E. J ., and stat-
ed that he had received it from E. J. when
he was inquiring into the pedigree. He was
then asked whether E. J. made any state-
ment regarding her mother-’s marriage. The
question was objected to upon various
grounds: “(1) That she was not yet con-
clusively proved to be a member of the fam-
ily; and (2) that the question whether E. J.
was a member of the family was in fact the
issue for the jury, and, if she was decided to
be legitimate, her declarations to prove her
legitimacy were superfluous." It was held
by Lord Denman, in regard to the first ob-
jection, that it was the duty of the judge to
decide whether it was proved to him, and he
decided that it was; and as to the second ob-
jection, he answered it by saying: “Neither
the admissibility nor the effect of the evi-
dence is altered by the accident that the fact
which is for the judge as a condition preced-
ent is the same fact which is for the jury
in the lssue." Here the deciarant was not
shown allunde to be a member of the family.
Her declaration tended to make her so.
Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 185, also
cited by plaintiffs in error, docs not sustain
their contention. In this case the question
was whether Dr. Crawford had been mar-
ried to Elizabeth Taylor. The plaintiffs
claimed to be his nieces and nephews. To
prove this relationship, they offered the dec-
laration of one Sarah Evans, who was a Sis-
ter of Elizabeth Taylor. The evidence was
held incompetent, because she did not belong
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Cue No. 66] BELEY .ANCY. 
SITJ,ER et al v. GEHR. 
(106 Pa. St. 577.) 
l::lupreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 7, 
1884. 
~l'l'or to court of common pleas, Berks 
<'OUDty. 
A. G. & H. D. Green (Wharton Morris and 
Wm. H. Livingood, with them), for plalntltls 
lo error. Isaac Hiester (Humes & Frey and 
John b'. !Smith, with him), tor defendant in 
error. 
P.A.XSOX, J. The llrst five assignments 
of error may be considered together. They 
raise the question of the admlsslblllty of the 
declarations of Anna Marla Gehr and John 
Gehr upon a question of )ledlgree. The pur-
pose of olferlng said declarations was to es-
ta bllsh relotloushlp between the plalntltl, 
and Balser Geehr, of Berks county. The evi-
dence was objected to ))e(•ause It was not 
shown allunde that the declarants were of 
the family of the Berks county Balser Geehr. 
The evidence was admitted and bill sealed 
for the defendants. 
The rules of evidence applicable to pedigree 
cu11es are: (1) That the statements must be 
made ante litem motam. (2) Declarant must 
be dead. And {3) But a prior condition to 
both these ls that It should be proved by 
some source of evidence. Independent of the 
statement Itself, that the person making the 
statement ls related to the family about 
which he speaks. Smith v. Tebbltt, L. R. 1 
Prob. & Div. 3M. 
It was not denied that the first two condi-
tions had been fulfilled. Neither was It ques- 1 
tloned that the declarants were shown by 
evidence dehore the declaration to be relat-
ed to the famlly of Joseph Gehr, the ancestor 
of the plalntltr, but It was contended that 
the declarants must be shown by evidence 
allunde to be related to Balser Geehr, of 
Berke county; in other wor<\B, to the person 
last seleed of the estate, or hie particular 
branch of the family. To state the question 
in another form: The declarants were Anna 
Marla Gehr and John Gehr. The platntltls' 
ancestor was Joseph Gehr. The deceased 
ancestor was Balser Geebr, of Berks county. 
It was not denied that the declarants were 
of the family of Joseph Gehr, and It was at-
tempted to show by their declarations that 
the above-named Joseph Gehr and Balser 
Geehr were related to each. The question 
was whether sufHcient ground had been laid 
tor such declarations. 
The plnintltrs in error contend, not only 
that the declarants must be shown by evi-
dence allunde to be related to the family as 
to which the declarations were made, but 
also that they must also be thus shown to 
be related to the person who died selsed. 
The llrst part of this proposition ls undoubt-
edly true under all the authorities. The lat-
ter portion of It ls not so clear. I have care-
fully examined all the authorities cited on 
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both sides upon this point, and many others 
to which our attention was not called upon 
the argument; and, although there ls some 
confifct In the cases, the weight of authority 
seems to be that, while a declarnnt must be 
shown by evidence aliuude to belong to the 
family, It does not appear to be necessary to 
show that be belongs to the same branch of 
It. In Vowles v. Young, 13 Ves. 14i, it was 
held that the declarations of a deceased hus-
band concerning the descent or pedigree or 
bls wife are admissible. And In Jt:'well v. 
Jewell, 1 How. 219, that the declarations of 
a dt~eas<>d husband and or one of the plain-
tiffs, claiming as heir of her father, that his 
wife was not matTled to her father, were ad-
mitted. 
It would seem, however, that the declara-
tions of a husband In regard to his wife's 
family, or of a wife In regard to her hus-
band's, rest upon substantially the same 
principles as those of a relation by blood. 
and these cases do not throw much light up-
on the question we are considering. 
Doe d. Jenkins v. Davies, 59 E. C. L., 314, 
cited by plalntUr in error, was an action of 
ejectment, and the vital question lo the case 
was, whether Elizabeth Jenkins was legiti-
mate. U she was, it was admitted the ver-
dict must be for defentlant. After the plaln-
tllr had otrered evidence to show that E. J. 
was not legitimate, an attorney produced a 
certificate of the marriage of Eleanor Diller 
to John Davies, the father of E. J., and stat-
ed that he had received It from E. J. when 
he was Inquiring Into the pedigree. He was 
then asked whether E. J. made any state-
ment regarding her mother's marriage. The 
question was obj~te<l to upon various 
grounds: "(l) That she was not yet con-
clusively proved to be a member of the fam-
lly; and (2) that the question whether E. J. 
was a member of the family was In fact the 
Issue for the jury, and, If she was decided to 
be legitimate, her declarations to prove her 
legitimacy were superfluous." It was held 
by Lord Denman, In regard to the first ob-
jection, that It was the duty of the Judge to 
decide whether It was proved to him, and he 
decided that It was; and as to the second ob- .. 
Jectlon, he answered It by saying: "Neither 
the admissibility nor the etrect of the evi-
dence ls altered by. the accident that the tact 
which ls for the judge as a condition preced-
ent ls the same fact which ls for the jury 
in the issue." Here the declarant was not 
shown allunde to be a member of the family. 
Her declaration tended to make her so. 
Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall ls:>, also 
cited by plalntltrs In error, does not sustaln 
their contention. In this case the question 
was whether Dr. Crawford bad been mar-
ried to Elizabeth Taylor. The plalutltrR 
claimed to be his nieces and nephews. To 
prove this relationship, they otrered the dE'<.·-
laratlon of one Sarah Evans, who was a sis-
ter of Elizabeth Taylor. The evidence was 
held Incompetent, becau,1e she did not belong 
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\ie\ of that e language of that a_\1\-_hol.ity_»
Attorney General» referred to
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by ~1~,,,¢i¢e SwflY“°*
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ln final?“ :l;lSG(;1I31 em, v_ Kohler, 9 g_ L_ Gas_
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_-,.\ _ d as authority against the p931.
zfivwesffig by the P13-mutf5- There the
\ n as as the right of succession to the es.
“Sue W He George Keylor, an_ oific-er of gr.
Qie of o'ho died intestate. Clhe claims of
t ‘mm W dents depended “D011 their estab-
lhe resnon meumy 01 the intestate with one
fishing the aeflck Koenler, which they otter.
Gem-ge F‘-3 the declarations of Johann Ja-
Qd ‘O90 lyr an uncle of George Frederick
cob Loch en. havmg been established that
K°°hm' t was the uncle of George Fred-
me decmm“ declarations were admit-
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eréidtk fsfihefig’ pedigree of George Frederick
1 a
1- hm. and the events oi‘. his early life,
\0€
- .1 mm into the artillery service, and
im with George Iieylor, the in-
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Keylor, the artilleryman.
"‘““°d t° Geurge that he belonged to
11; was shown, however,
l\ .
a It:a(‘31l§:‘11p(x)1fa:1h'?v h(13‘l?agmfl“’ 2 c°nn' 347' the
d t name the person whose dec-
;v“n:;s:1‘i1l‘el?8‘.)d sworn to, nor did it ever ap-
am 0 t the decmrant was dead. It was
perfigegx: held that the evidence W118 inadmis-
P
able‘ 1 C1-Q1111). & J. 587, it
In Da1v§’i§§t)fi::§::ita0ns of deceased cor-
wasagi: were evidence Of n custom to ex-
o
v 5 not shown that
clude fol:-‘eignte1:.aB Eu; of me cm_p0m_
‘¢1\1<::ndecInr£g1oe v. Randall, 2 Moore & P. 20,
it was held that declarations or fl mvty_ @011-
nected by marriage are admissible. easel‘
\-_ 0-gmunessy, 7 Jur. 1140, was an attempt
to pl-we declarations of a Catholic priest as
to the legitimacy of the parties. It was not
contended that he was related to any of the
parties, and his declarations were only to
the effect that the parties had always been
ltlputed to be husband and wife in his par-
ish. In Johnson v. Lawson, 2 B1111; 361
it was held that declarations of servants
and intimate acquaintances are not admis-
sible evidence in questions of pedigree.
But this declaration of '
glrfiise v. Barrett, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 919,
"Wed a question of custom, in which it
W98 hold that “declarations of a. deceased
l<_31‘d of the manor as to the extent of his
fights over the wastes of a manor are not
admissible; aliter if spoken of the extent of
the waste only." In Jackson v. Browncr, 18
Johns. 37, the witnesses were not connected
with the family, and had no personal knowl-
edge of the fact of which they spoke, and
did not derive their information from per-
sons connected with the family. Waldron v.
Tuttle, -1 N. H. 371, merely confines the rule
to declarations of deceased persons who had
no interest and \vho were relatives. Gregory
v. Baugh, -1 Rand. 611, is principally a re-
view of all the laws concerning Indian slav-
ery in the state of‘ Virginia, and it was held
that in questions of freedom, evidence that
there had been a belief in the neighborhood,
more than fifty or sixty years before, that
the female ancestor of the plaintiff was en-
titled to her freedom, was not admissible.
Whltelocke v. Baker, 13 Yes. 514, was a case
of partition, and it was merely ruled that the
tradition must be from persons having such
a connection with the party to whom it re-
lates that it is natural and likely from their
domestic habits and connections that they
are speaking the truth, and that they could
not be mistaken.
Many of the above authorities were not
cited by the plalntllfs in error. Host of them
are, however, referred to in the authorities
they rely upon, and I have gone over them,
at the risk of being tedious, in order to as-
certain just what they decide. It will be
seen that those of them which bear upon this
question at all do not go beyond the admit-
ted principle that, before declarations of de-
ceased persons can be received in questions
of pedigree, the declarant must be shown
aliunde to be related to some branch of the
family as to which the declarations are of-
fered. The whole question is thus summed
up by Mr. Wharton in his work on Evidence
(page 216): “Declarations as to a family, in
order to be received, must emanate from de-
ceased persons connected with such family
by blood or marriage.” The same rule is
laid down in most of the approved text-books.
See Phil. Ev. § 275; Taylor, Ev. 576. The
last case to which I shall refer is that of
Monkton v. Attorney General, 2 Russ. & M.
157, where it was said by Lord Brougham:
“I entirely agree that, in order to admit hear-
say evidence in pedigree, you must by evi-
dence dehors the declarations connect the
person making them with the family. But I
cannot go the length of holding that you
must prove him to be connected with both
the branches of the family, touching which
his declaration is tendered. That he is con-
nected with the family is sufficient; and that
connection once proved, his declarations are
then let in upon questions touching that fam-
ily; not declarations of details which would
not be evidence, but declarations of the na-
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PED1Gll.E~. (Case No. 61.) 
~Y. The question -wa.e \o\llteza<t'~ld's helra? It was -l~ho 'Were ~~\\ct?i~allle, ln delivering the opt by · Mr. \\\eto11tl-~ "It lt bad been proved b nlon of 
ndent '\'..l!StllllOny that Sarah Evans Y inde-~ted 'of blood to any branch or the ~as re-
ot David Crawtord, and her decla.rn.tto!~Y 
/Jff!ll t1Ltered to prove the relationship o'f an~ 
p//;er _QJ'SOD clahntng or clnhned. to belong 
,.,_that tuntly, this case-Monkto 
dtJ "--J era! 2 RUSS. & M. 1;;7 n "'· 
A.ttoro.......ey G: paUit. But thls <leclnra.t~~ul~ 
\llve ~n offered to prove thu. t her sl~­
Sa?al:a Evans. ed bY marriage -with ~ w- onnect a niem-:t ~~\~t taniily, was neither 'V\'lthln the 
prlnt!\\)le nor the ianguage of that: authority." 
M~\lktOD v • .A.ttorne:Y General. rercrred to 
by,;i-'18tlce swayne, wlll be comin.en.ted upon 
Jal~ In thlll opinion. ~ rneY General v. Kobler. 9 H. L. Cas. 
~tto regard as authority against the posi-
t\ ' we ed bY the plaintiffs. There the 
C::::::..n aesuin the rtght of succesl!llon to the es-
la....ue was George Keylor, an ottlcer of ar-
a. ~e of on:O dled Intestate. The claims or 
1 '1!ery, w dents depended upon their eetab-
~e ~ \dentltf of the intestate -with one 
--iianlnll Frederick Koehler, whlch they offer-
~rged bY the declarat\ons of'. Johann Ja-
~ to'K! Ohl.er an uncle of George Frederick 
<.'Ob 100 lt' '-av\ng been established that Xoeb er. ,_ :f 
d ,A-nt was the uncle o George Fred-the ec ..... a ,_ t' . 
rl It Koehler, 'Ills dec .... ra .• ona -were admit-
~~ as to the pedlgree ot George Frederick 
Koehler and the events of his early llte, 
tracing blm mto the artlllery service, and 
Identifying h\m with George Keylor, the in-
testate. It wlll be noticed in tbls case that 
there was no evidence auunde to show that 
Johann Jacob Koehler, the declarant, was 
related to George Keylor, the artllleryman. 
It was shown, however, tbat be belonged to 
a branch of the tamlly · 
ID Chapman·v. Chapman, 2 Conn. 347, the 
witness dld not name the person whose dec-
laration he bad swom to, nor did it ever ap-
pear that the declarant was dead It was 
properly held that the evidence was lnadmls· 
alble. 1n Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587, lt 
was ruled that declarations of deceased cor-
ratora were evidence or a custom to ex-
~ude foreigners. But it waa not shown that 
the declarant was a member of the corpora-
tion. In Doe v. Randall, 2 Moore & P. 20, 
tt waa held that declarations of a party con-
nected by marriage are admissible. Casey 
v. O'Sbaunesey, 7 Jur. 1140, waa an attempt 
to prove declarations of a Cathollc priest as 
to the legitimacy or the parties. It was not 
contended that be was related to any of the 
'Pirtle&, and bis declarations were only to 
the elrect that the parties bad always been 
reputed to be husband and wife in his par-
iah. In Johnson v. Lawson, 2 Bing. 86, 
It was held that declarations of servants 
and Intimate acquaintances are not admia-
alble evidence ln questions of pedigree. 
c::~lse v. Barrett, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 919. 
I lved a question ot custom, ln which It 
was held that "declarations of a deceased 
lord ot the manor as to the extent of his. 
rights over the wastes ot a manor are not 
admissible; aUter 1t spoken or the extent or 
the waste only." In Jackson v. Browner, 18. 
Johns. 37, the witnesses were not connected 
with the famUy, and had no personal knowl-
edge of the tact ot which they spoke, and 
did not deri¥e their Information from per-
sons connected with the famJly. Waldron v. 
Tuttle, 4 N. H. 371, merely confines the rule 
to declarations or deceased persona who had 
no Interest and who were relatives. Gl."E'gol'y 
v. Baugh, 4 Rand. 611, ls principally a re-
view or all the laws concerning Indian slav-
ery In the state of' YJrglnla, and It was held 
that 1n questions of freedom, evidence that 
there had been a belier In the neighborhood, 
more than fifty or sixty yeare before, that 
the female ancestor of the plaintiff was en-
titled to her freedom, was not ad.mlaaible. 
Whltelocke v. Baker, 13 Yea. 514, was a case 
of partition, and it was merely ruled that the 
tradition must be from pel'lllODS having such 
Ii. connection with the party to whom It re-
lates that it la natural and likely from their 
domestic habits and connections that they 
are speaking the truth, and that they could 
not be mistaken. 
Many or the above authorities wel'e not 
cited bf the plaintUl'a In error. Moat or them 
are, however, referred to In the authorities 
they rely upon, and I have gone over them, 
at the risk of being tedious, In order to as-
certain just what they decide. It will be 
seen that those or them which bear upon this. 
question at all do not go beyond the admit-
ted principle that, before declamtlone of de-
ceased peraone can be J'e<'elved In queetlone 
of pedigree, the declarnnt must be shown 
allunde to be related to some branch or the 
family as to which the declaratione are ot-
tered. The whole question Is thus summed 
up by Mr. Wharton In hla work on Evldence-
(page 216): "Declarations as to a tamny, ln 
order to be received, must emanate from de-
ceased persons connected with such ramJly 
by blood or marriage." The same rule la 
laid down in most of the approved text-books. 
See Phil. Ev. I 275; Taylor, Ev. i'ii6. The-
laat case to which I shall refer la that o! 
}lonkton v. Attorney General, 2 Rues. & M. 
157, where It was said by Lord Brougham: 
"I entirely agree that, In order to admit hffir-
say evidence in pedigree, rou must by evi-
dence dehora the declarations connect the-
pereon making them with the family. But I 
cannot go the length or holding that you 
must prove him to be connected with both 
the branches of the tamlly, touching which 
bis declaration la tendered. That he le con-
nected with the family ta eutliclent; and that 
connection once proved, bis declarations are 
then let ln upon questions touching tbat fam-
ily; not declarations or details which would 
not be evidence, but declarations or the na-
187 
Case N0. 66]
RELEVAN CY.
ture of pedigree,—that is to say, of who was
related to whom, by what links the relation-
ship was made out, whether it was a rela-
tionship of consanguinity or of afiinity only,
when the parties died, or whether they are
actually dead; everything, in short, which
is, strictly speaking, matter of pedigi-ce,—
may be proved as matter relating to the con-
dition of the family, by the declarations of
deceased persons, who, by evidence dehors
those declarations have been previously con-
nected with the family respecting which
their declarations are tendered. To say that
you cannot receive in evidence the declara-
tions of A., who is proved to be a relation by
blood of B., touching the relationship of B.
with 0., unless you have first connected him
also by evidence dehors his declaration with
C., is a proposition which has no warrant ei-
ther upon the principle upon which hearsay
is let in, or in the decided cases; and it
plainly involves this absurdity: that if, in
order to connect B. with (3., '1 am first to
prove that A. is connected with B., and then
to superadd the proof that he is connected
with 0., I do a thing which is vain and su-
perfluous, for then the declaration is used to
prove the very fact which I have already es-
tablished; inasmuch as it is not more true
that things which are equal to the same
thing are equal to one another, than that
persons related by blood to the same individ-
ual are more or less related by blood to each
other. It is clear, both upon principle and
from total want of any contrary authority in
adjudged cases, or in the dicta of judges or
text writers, that the argument fails en-
tirely, which would limit the rule respecting
evidence of that description to a greater ex-
tent than by requiring you to connect with
the family, by matter dehors the declaration
itself, the party whose declaration you re-
ceive.”
This case was much relied upon by the
defendant in error. and the facts certainly
are strikingly similar to those of the case in
hand. The decedent, Samuel Troutback,
died at Madras in 1785. After reciting in
his will that he had no relation or kindred
alive to his knowledge or belief, having
outlived them all, he gave "unto Mr. John
Troutbeck, surgeon, late of the ship Speke,
in the English East India Company’s serv-
ice, the sum of five gold star pagodas " “' '
as a person nearly of the same name with
Troutback, though I solemnly believe and
declare that the said John Troutbeck is not
in any way related to me, or of the same
family or kindred with me,and I disclaim all
relationship with him or to hin1.” The tes-
tator then proceeded to dispose of his prop-
erty by charitable bequests which were void.
On the appeal the main question was how
far the vice chancellor was right in reject-
ing from his consideration, as evidence of
the relationship between the testator and
the claimants, certain documents purporting
to be a. genealogical narrative and pedigree
of the Troutbeck family. These papers were
in the handwriting of John Troutbeck (the
surgeon mentioned as legatee in the will).
and were found among his papers at the
time of his death, which occurred in 1792.
The result of the narrative and pedigree
was that George, the narrator's father, and
Samuel, the testator, who died at Madras,
were descended from the same grandfather,
and were therefore first cousins. There was
no ditllculty in connecting the claimants and
the narrator with George of Riding; and
the testator was distinctly shown to be the
son of Samuel Troutback of Wapping. The
ditilculty lay in connecting George with
Samuel, and this was fully made out by
the narrative or pedigree referred to, which
was held to be admissible for that purpose.
It was to these facts that Lord Brougham
applied the language I have cited from his
opinion, and the case shows very satisfac-
torily that while a deciarant must be con-
nected with the family—that is, with some
branch of it—-yet, when that connection is
proved, the relationship between different
members of the family may be shown by his
declarations, or, as is stated in the syllabus
to that case: “Where in a pedigree case the
object is to connect A. with C., after prov-
ing that B., a deceased person, was re-
lated to A., it is competent to give in evi-
dence declarations by B., in which he claim-
ed relationship with C."
We now return to the question of the
competency of the declarations in this ease.
We have already seen that the declarants
were related to the plaintiffs ancestor.
They were therefore of his family. The
plaintiff's name was Baltzer Gehr, and the
question was whether he was related to the
Balser Geehr of Berks county. The depo-
sition of the plaintiff, taken after he was
one hundred years old, was read upon the
trial below, and he testified that he was
named after Balser Geehr of Berks county,
and that the said Balser Geehr was his
uncle, a brother of his father. It is true
that his knowledge of this relationship was
derived from his mother. He said: “About
his being my uncle, my mother told me that,
she always called him my uncle; that's
what made me know." Was this suflicient
to justify the learned judge in admitting
the declarations?
It is to be observed, in the first place, the
evidence was to the court, not to the jury.
It is the province of the court to decide
whether a sufiicient connection had been es-
tablished to permit the declaration to go to the
jury. As was said in Doe d. Jenkins v. Davies,
supra, in a similar case: “It was the duty
of the judge to decide whether it was proved
to him. There are conditions precedent
which are required to be fulfilled before evi-
dence ls admissible for the jury. Thus. an
oath or its equivalent, and competency, are
conditions precedent to admitting viva voce
evidence; and apprehension of immediate
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ture of pedigree,-that ls to say, of who was 
related to whom, by what links the relation-
ship was made out, whether it was a rela-
tlo11Bblp of consanguinity or of am.ntty only, 
when the parties died, or whether they are 
actually dead; everything, In short, which 
ls, strictly speaking, matter of pedigree,-
may be proved as matter relating to the con-
dition ot the family, by the declarations of 
deceased persons, who, by evidence debors 
those declarations have been previously con-
nected with the tamlly respecting which 
their declarations are tendered. To say that 
you cannot receive In evidence the declara-
tions of A., who ls proved to be a relation by 
blood of B., touching the relationship of B. 
with C., unleBB you ba ve first connected him 
also by evidence dehors his declaration with 
C., ls a proposition which has no warrant ei-
ther upon the principle upon which hearsay 
ls let tn. or ID the decided cases; and it 
plainly involves this absurdlt;r: that If, in 
order to conned B. with C., ~ am first to 
prove that A. ls connected with B., and then 
to superadd the proof that he ls connected 
with C., I do a thing which ls vain and su-
perduoue, tor then the declaration ls used to 
prove the very fact which I have already es-
tablished; inasmuch as It ls not more true 
that things which a.re equal to the same 
thing are equal to one another, than that 
persons related by blood to the same individ-
ual are more or leBB related by blood to each 
other. It is clear, both upon principle and 
from total want of any contrary authority in 
adjudged cases, or in the dicta of judges or 
text writers, that the argument falls en-
tirely, which would limit the rule respecting 
evidence of that description to a greater ex-
tent than by requiring you to connect with 
the family, by matter dehors the declaration 
itself, the party whose declaration you re-
<?eive." 
Thie case was much relled upon by the 
defendant in error, and the facts certainly 
are strikingly similar to those of the case In 
hand. The decedent, Samuel Troutback, 
died at Madras in 1785. After reciting in 
his wlll that he had no relation or kindred 
alive to his knowledge or belief, having 
outlh·ed them all, he gave "unto ?t!r. John 
Troutbeck, surgeon, late of the ship Speke, 
In the English East India Company's serv-
ice, the sum of five gold star pagodas • • • 
as a person nearly of the same name with 
Troutback, though I solemnly believe and 
dt'<'lare that the said John Troutbe<>k ls not 
In any way related to me, or of the same 
family or kindred with me, and I dls<'lalm all 
relatiom1hlp with him or to him." The tes-
tator thE'n proc>E'E'ded to dispose of his prop-
erty by charitable bequests which were void. 
On the appeal the main question was how 
far the vlc•e chancellor was right in reject-
ing from his consideration, as evidence of 
the relationship between the testator and 
the claimants, certain documents purporting 
to be a genealogical narrative and pedigree 
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of the Troutbeck: family. These papera were 
In the handwriting of John Troutbeck (the 
surgeon mentioned as legatee In the will), 
and were found among his papers at the 
time of his death, which occurred In 1792. 
The result of the narrative and pedigree 
was that George, the narrator's father, and 
Samuel, the testator, who died at Madras, 
were descended from the same grandfather, 
and were therefore first cousins. There was 
no d111lculty In connecting the claimants and 
the narrator with George of Riding; and 
the testator was .dlstlnctly shown to be the 
son of Samuel Troutback of Wapplng. The 
dltll.culty lay In connecting George with 
Samuel, and this was fully made out by 
the narrative or pedigree referred to, which 
was held to be admlulble for that purpose. 
It was to these tacts that Lord Brougham 
applied the language I have cited from his 
opinion, and the case shows very satlsf~ 
torlly that while a declarant must be con-
nected with the family-that ls, with some 
branch of it-yet, when that connection ls 
proved, the relationship between dlft'.erent 
members of the family may be shown by his 
declarations, or, as ls stated In the syllabus 
to that case: "Where lo a pedigree case the 
object ls to connect A. with C., after prov-
ing that B., a deceased person, was re-
lated to A., it ls competent to give ID evi-
dence declarations by B., In which he clalIU-
ed relationship with C." 
We now return to the question of the 
competency of the declarations In this case. 
We have already seen that the declarants 
were related to the plaintiff's ancestor. 
They were therefore of his family. The 
plaintiff's name was Baltzer Gehr, and tht> 
question was whether he wall related to the 
Balser Geehr of Berks county. The depo-
sition of the plalntlft'., taken after he was 
one hundred years old, was read upon the 
trial below, and he testified that he was 
named atter Balser Geehr of Berks county, 
and that the said Balser Geebr was his 
uncle, a brother of his father. It ls tn1e 
that his knowledge of this relationship was 
derlvE'd from his mother. He said: "About 
his being my uncle, my mother told me that, 
she always called him my uncle; that's 
what made me know." Was this sutll.clent 
to justify the learned judge in admitting 
the dN'laratlone? 
It ls to be observed, In the first place, the 
evldenc>e was to the court, not to the jury. 
It le the province of the court to decide 
whether a sutll.clent connection bad been es-
tablished to pennlt the declaration to go to the 
jury. As was said in Doe d. Jenkins v. Davies, 
supra, lo a similar case: "It was the duty 
of the judge to decide wheth<'r it was proved 
to him. There are conditions precedent 
which are requlr(>() to be fulftlled before <'Vl-
dE'nce ls admissible for the jury. Thus, an 
oath or Its equivalent, and competency, are 
conditions precedent to admitting viva voce 
evidence; and apprehension of Immediate 
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f0l'1118 part of a family atmosphere. The
, exislience of such relationship constitutes the
fiullily. A family, in this sense, is an object
‘ of immediate instead of mediate perception.
To say that A. is a brother, or a cousin, or
an uncle, or an aunt, is not hearay, but
primary evidence. But recognition of pedi-
gree is not limited to such conditions. Even
where there is no family consensus to be
appealed to, what is said by one member of
the family to another as to pedigree may be
received to prove such pedigree. Hence it is
admissible for A. to prove, with the limita-
tions hereafter exprcssed. what was told
him by deceased relatives as to family rela-
tions." _
We cannot say, therefore, that the plaintiff
was an incompetent witness to prove his re-
lationship to the Balscr Geehr of Berks coun-
ty, nor that his testimony was incompetent
1 from the fact that his knowledge upon that
subject was derived from his deceased moth-
er. She always told him that Balser Geehr
was his uncle. It was a part of their fam-
ily history; one of their family traditions,
furnished by one who had the means of
knowledge, and no possible motive to falsify,
, so far as appears in the case. When the
plaintiff testified that Balser Geehr, of Berks
county was his uncle, he tcstified to a fact.
The evidence was primary, not secondary.
This puts at rest all question of the declara-
tions of Anna Marla Gehr and John Gehr.
They are shown to belong to a branch of the
Gchr family and from their position as such
likely to have had accurate information of
the matters to which their declarations re-
ferred. The learned judge below thought the
connection between the families suliiciently
established to admit the evidence, and in this
we see no error.
The sixth assignment of error does not re-
quire an extended discussion. The evidence
rejected does not come within any recognized
rule in regard to pedigree. No declarations
of any deceased person were offered. It was
simply a conversation between two living
persons in regard to the Gehr family. Even
the conversation was not offered, but merely
the conclusion which they drew from it. The
offer was properly rejected.
The seventh and eighth assignments relate
to the rejection by the court of “the original
record of the Kutztown Evangelical Lu-
theran Church, commencing in 1810, for the
purpose of showing the burial record of Han-
nah Bast, and the names of her parents,
place of birth, dates of birth and death,
which was the usual way of keeping the rec-
or .” Objection was made to this because
it was not a church record, but merely a prl-
vate book kept by the pastor, Rev. John
Knoske, claimed by him as his private prop-
erty, and containing :1 minute of his acts out-
side as well as inside of the church.
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decide wlletber the condition bas be as to existence of such relationship co.astltutes the 
fil\el\. u: Proof \s by wltuesses, he rn ~~t ful- tawily. A family, In this sense, Is an object 
tidt' pj)DD their credlb\Uty. If counter e~~ of immediate Instead of mediate perception. 
"'reitl ofered, be must receive it befo - To say that A. Is a brother, or a cousin, or 
ift'/Ji d be bllS no right to re an uncle, or an aunt, Is not hearsay but 
/It' tlttl-.jeS, an on the fact as :sk. the primary evidence. But recognition of 'pedl-
opfllfoa of the }.urYsee Bartlett v. Srnl ~ondl- gree ls not limited to such conditions. .l!:ven 
t\ou \\r-.ecedent. h, 11 where there Is no famlly consensus to be 
\\eea. & w. 483. below was eatl ft appealed to, what Is said by one member of 
'Th11 '-~arned judge 'Ve can 8 ed and the family to another as to pedigree may be 
ttte\"~<l the ev\den:intlft'. was an~! say he received to prove such pedigree. Hence It ls 
'W\\I W"J:>ong. The p l w and hi t rnpetent admissible for A. to pl'ove, with the limlta-
wttn~~. made so bY awlth Bals!r estlmony, tlons hereurter expressed, what was told 
u ~ lils relationship 1 i Geehr, of him by deceased relatives as to family rela-Berl!;..: .., was proper Y rece Ved_ It le tlons." 
~ coun.,, u was derived f · -true his lnforma on th t ext rom his We cannot say, therefol'e, that the plalntllf 
mol.._ner and was to a t th eut hearsay. was an Incompetent witness to prove his re-
Bu~ a'larl!e proportion ° he kno'1Vledge lationshlp to the Balser Geehr of Berks coun-
wb.....:t.ch every Intelligent man as le derived ty, nor that his testimony was Incompetent 
f~1D! hearsllY· Indeed, we scarcely realize 1 trow the tact that his knowledge upon that 11~., Utile we actuallY know from our own 1 subject was derived trom his deceased moth-o~servaUon and investigation. ~ e learn the I er. She always told him that Balser Geehr 
~ths ot hi.story, the secrets of science and 1 was his uncle. It was a part of their fam-~~r Jmowledge ot the world generally, from I lly history; one of their family traditions, 
what we uave read, or from 'INhat others I furnished by one who had the means of 
~ve told us. What does a man kno"W" of his knowledge, and no possible motive to falsify, 
deceased ancestors but what he has learned I so far as appears In the case. When the 
~TOm bis Immediate relatives'! Ho~ was the I plaintilf testified that Balser Geehr, of Berks 
'l!lalnti!t, who bad never seen Balser Geehr, county was his uncle, he testified to a fact. 
of Berks county, to know that the latter The evidence was primary, not secondary. 
was his uncle, except from his mother? It ] This puts at rest all question of the declara-
ls in just such cases that the strict i:ules of tlons of Anna Maria Gehr and John Gehr. 
evidence are relaxed as regards hearsay. If They are shown to belong to a branch of the 
it were otherwise, pedigree could not be Gehr family and from their position as such 
proved at all in many cases, and in one likely to have had accurate Information of 
sewie It Is primary, not secondary. evidence. the matters to which their declarations re-
Tlle law upon this po\nt \s clearly stated In !erred. 'l'he learned judge below thought the 
1 Whart. Ev. l 201: "l'edl.gree, from the na- connection between the families sutticlently 
ture of things, Is open to proof by hearsay established to admit the evidence, and In this 
In respect to all family Incidents as to we see no error. 
which no living witness can be found. It The sixth assignment of error does not re-
wbat bas been banded down in families can- quire an extended discussion. The evidence 
not be in this way proved, pedigree could rejected does not come within any recognized 
not, In most cases, be proved at all. Nor is rule in regard to pedigree. No declarations 
such tradition, in its best sense, open to the , of any deceased person were olfered. It was 
obje<"t\ons applicable to hearsay. A .• called ' slmply a conversation between two living 
as n witness to pedlgi·ee, may indeed say, I persons in regard to the Gehr family. Even 
•B told me this.' But pedigree testimony \ the conversation was not olfered, but merely 
n~uallY takes another shape. It ls not, 'B. j the conclusion which they drew from it. 'l'he 
told this,' but •such was the understanding olfer was properly rejected. 
ot tbe family.' The constitution ot a family I The seventh and eighth assignments relate 
may become a matter of Immediate percep- to the rejection by the court ot "the oliginal 
t\on. A., B., c., and D., are brought up as I record of the Kutztown Evan~elical Lu-
brothers In the same household. If any one I theran Church, commencing in 1810, tor the 
says to A., 'B. Is your brother,' A. would not I purpose of showing the burial record of Han-
regard such an announcement as any more nah Bast, and the names of her parents, 
disclosing a ract to him than would tile au- I place of birth, dates of birth and death, 
nouncement to him that he Is a human which was the usual way of keeping the rec-
being. That B. ls his brother Is one of tile ord." Objection was made to this because 
conditions of his family existence. He fits it was not a church record, but merely a prl-
into a family ot which B. is a member in vate book kept by the pastor, Rev. John 
the Bame way that one stone fits into an Knoske, claimed by him as his private prop-
arch of which another stone Is part. The erty, and containing a minute of bis acts out-
poaitlon of one presupposes tlie position of slde as well as inside of the church. 
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The further objection was made that the
record was not evidence of any thing except
the death and burial of the person mentioned
and the time and place thereof.
The learned judge held that the book in
question was a church registry for mar-
riages, deaths, and burials; that it was in-
tended to be" kept, and possibly was kept, ac-
cording to the requirements of the act of
1.800; that it would be evidence to show the
deaths of Mary Eva Zimmerman and Han-
nah Bast, but that for the other purposes
offered it was incompetent. Without discuss-
ing the character of the book, we are of opin-
ion it was properly rejected. It was not al-
leged that the time of the death of these
ladies was material to the issue; on the con-
trary, the manifest object of the offer was to
prove that Hannah Bast was the daughter
of Conrad Geehr and Anna Maria, his wife,
and to show when and where she was born.
This burial list was competent to show the
death and burial of these ladies, but what
the pastor put down in the book as to their
parentage, and the time and place of their
birth, was incompetent, for the plain reason
that it was no part of his duty to make such
entries. Such registers are not, in general.
evidence of any fact not required to be re-
corded in them, and which did not occur in
the presence of the registering otticer, 2 Phil.
Ev. "280. It was held in Clark v. Trinity
(.‘hu1-ch, 5 Watts &. S. 266, that "an entry in
1811, in the handwriting of the pastor of a
church, in a book kept in the church as a
registry of baptisms and births, the object
of which entry was to register the baptism of
a person, and not his biith; and in which
the time of the birth is introduced merely by
way of description, is not evidence cl-‘ the
date of the birth."
The rule is thus stated by .\Ir. Greenleaf
in his work on Evidence (volume 1, § 493):
“A parish register is evidence only of the
time of the marriage, and of its celebration
dc facto; for these are the only facts neces-
sarily within the knowledge of the person
making the entry. So a reglter of baptism,
taken by itself, is evidence only of that fact,
though. if the child were proved aliunde to
have been then very young, it might afford
presumptive evidence that it was born in the
same parish. Neither is the mention of the
child's age in the register of christenings any
evidence of the day of his birth, to support
a pica of infancy. In all these and similar
cases, the register is no proof of the identity
of the parties there named, with the parties
in controversy, but the fact of identity must
be established by other evidence. 1t is also
necessary in all these cases that the register
be one which the law requires should be
kept. and that it be kept in the manner rc-
quircd b_v law." This principle i recognized
l
I
Car. & P. 690; Williams v. Lloyd. 39 E. C. L.
.'iii.'»; Whitcher v. McLaughlin, 115 Mass. 168;
Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 \Vall. 189.
We are unable to see any error in the rc-
jection of the mortgage referred to in the
ninth assignment. The object of this oflfer
was to show that the Conrad Geehr mention-
ed by the defendants' witnesses as the father
of the Geehrs of Berks county resided in
Philadelphia as early as 1739, and that the
family of Geehr in Berks county were entire-
ly different from the Lancaster county fam-
ily of the same name, from whom the plain-
tiff was descended. The obvious objection to
this evidence was that none of the defend-
ants‘ witnesses speak of any Conrad Geehr
residing at Germantown, and the recital in
the mortgage in no way connected the Con-
rad Geehr, who was the mortgagor, with the
Conrad Geehr mentioned by the witnesses.
The bare fact that a Conrad Geehr lived in
Germantown, that he borrowed money and
gave a mortgage to some one in Oley town-
ship in 1743, many years before Balser Geehr
is heard of in that township, would not of
itself connect that Conrad with this Balser
Geehr. Here identity of name must be ac-
companied with some circumstances of time
or place before we can attach any value to
it as aflecting rights of property.
It is true there are some authorities which
hold that identity of name is prima facie
evidence of identity of person. So much was
said by Justice Sharswood in McConeghy v.
Kirk, 18 P. F. Smith, 203. That this is the
ordinary rule may be conceded. But it does
not apply where the transaction is remote.
The true rule is believed to be that laid
down by Chief Justice Gibson in Sailor v.
Hertzogg, 2 Pa. St. 182. where he says:
“Identity of name is ordinarily, but not al-
ways, prima facie evidence of personal iden-
tity. The authorities on the subject ma_v be
consulted in Sewcll v. Evans, 4 Adol. & E.
626, from which Lord Denham and other
judges of the queen's bench, concluded that
identity of name is something from which
an inference may be drawn, unless the name
were a very common one or the transaction
remote; and the reason given for casting the
onus on the party who denies is that dis-
proof can be readily had by calling the per-
son whose identity is denied into court. The
name in this instance is not a very common
one; but, after more than a quarter of a,
century, there ought certainly to be some
preliminary evidence, however small.“ The
soundness of this rule cannot be success-
fully questioncd. It would work great in-
justice if rights of property, after a great;
length of time, were allowed to depend upon
mere identity of name. A prima facie C1131‘
thus submitted to a jury might be extreino-
ly ditllcult, if not impossible, to disprove. I
in most of the leading text-books and numer-
ous decisions in England and in this country.
It is suflicicnt to refer to Rex v. Clapham,
4 (‘an-. & P. 29; Burghart v. Angerstein, 6
know of no case in which mere identity of
name has been held suflicient after the grout
lapse of time which exists here.
The assignments from the tenth to the
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Thl' furthe1· objection was made that tht> 
record was nut e\·ldence of any thing except 
the death and burial of the person mentioned 
and the tlwe and place thereof. 
The learned judge held that the book In 
qut'fltlon was a cbur<'h registry for mar-
rlagt>s, deaths, and burials; that It was ln-
ten<led to be' kept, and possibly was kept, ac-
<:ordlng to the requirements of the act of 
1800; that it would be evidence to show the 
deaths of Mary l<~va Zimmerman and Han-
nah Bast, but that for the other purposes 
<>tiered It was incompetent. Without dl&euSB-
lng the <•harn<'ter of the book, we are of opin-
ion lt was p1·011erly rejected. It was not al-
leged that the time of the death of these 
ladles was material to the issue; on the con-
trary, the manifest object of the otter was to 
prove that Hannah Bast was the daughter 
of Conrad Geehr and Anna Marla, his wife, 
and to show when and where she was bom. 
This burial list was competent to show the 
death and burial of the11e ladles, but what 
the pastor put down lo the book as to their 
parentage, and the time and place of their 
birth, was Incompetent, for the plain reason 
that lt was no part of his duty to make such 
~ntrles. Such registers are not, ln general, 
evldt>nce of any fact not required to be re-
<'Ortled ln them, and which did not occur In 
the 1>resence of the registering otHcer. 2 Phil. 
J<:,·. *280. It was helcl ln Clark v. Trinity 
Chun.·h, ;; 'Vatts & S. 266, that "an entry In 
llill, ln the handwriting of the pastor of a 
<"imrch, In a book kept In the church as a 
registry of baptisms and births, the object 
-0f which entry was to register the baptism of 
a person, and not his birth; and In which 
the time of the birth Is Introduced merely by 
way of description, ls not evidence <:-t the 
date of the birth." 
The rule ls thus stated by Mr. Greenleaf 
In his work on Evlden<'e (volume 1, I 4U3): 
"A parish register Is evlden<.'e only of the 
time of the marriage, and of its celebration 
de fa<'to; for these are the only facts neces-
flllrily within the knowledge af the person 
making the entry. So a register of baptism, 
taken by itself, ls evldenc·e only of that fact, 
though, lf the child were proved nllunde to 
have bt>en then very young, lt might afford 
p1·t>11umptlve e\'ldc>nce that It was born In the 
1111tm1• 11nrl11h. ~f'lther ls the mention of the 
cldld's age In the register of <.'hrlstenlngs any 
evhll'n<.'e ot the day of his birth, to support 
a 1>len ot Infancy. In all th..,se and similar 
<·1111e11, Ute 1·eglster Is no proof of the Identity 
-0t the parties there named, with the parties 
In 1·ontro\'ersy, but the flll't of Identity must 
be Nltabllshed by other evidence. It Is also 
nt.><·t't'!lll.ry In all these cases that the register 
l>e <me which the law requires should be 
kt•pt. an<l that It be k..,pt In the manner re-
tJnlrl'd by law." This principle Is n>eognlzed 
tu mo.it of the leading text-books and numer-
ous d<'<'lslons In :England and In this country. 
It 111 sutftclent to refer to Rex v. Clapham, 
4 <'nl'. & P. 29; Burghart v. Angersteln, 6 
100 
I Car. & P. 000; Williams v. IJoyd. 39 E. C. L. :i!l:i; Whlt<•ht>r v. McLaughlin, 11:; Mass. 168; 
i Blackburn v. ('rawtords, 3 Wall. 189. 
We are una1'1e to see any error In the re-
l Jectlon or the mortgage referred to In the 
ninth asslgnmeut. The object of this otrer 
was to show that the Conrad Geehr mention-
ed by the defendants' wltneSBes as the father 
of the Geehrs of Berks county resided 1n 
Phllndelphla as early as 17'J9, and that the 
family ot Geehr In Berks county were entire-
ly different trow the IALDcaster county fam-
ily of the same name, from whom the plain-
tiff was descendl'd. The obvious objC<"tlon to 
I this evidence was that none of the defend-ant&' witnesses speak of any Conrad ~hr 
residing at Germantown, and the recital In 
the mortgage In no way connected the Con-
! rad Geehr, who was the mortgagor, with the 
Conrad Geehr mentioned by the witnesses. 
'l'he bare fact that a Conrad Geehr llved In 
Germantown, that he borrowed money and 
gave a mortgage to some one In Oley town-
ship In 1743, many years before Balser Geehr 
Is heard of In that township, would not of 
Itself connect that Conrad with this Balser 
, Geehr. llere Identity of name must be ac-
comJ>anled with some circumstances of time 
or pince before we can attach any value to 
1 It as atrectlng rights of property. I It Is true there are some authorities which hold that Identity of name Is prlma facle 
I evidence ot Identity of person. So mn<·h wu 
said by Justice Sharswood ln McConeghy v. 
I Kirk, 18 P. F. Smith, 203. That this ls the ordinary rule may be conceded. But It does 
not apply where the transaction ls remote. I The true rule Is bellevl'd to be that laid 
down by Chief Justke Gibson In Sailor v. 
1 Hertzoirg, 2 Pa. Rt. 182, where he says: 
I "Identity of name ls ordinarily, but not al-
l ways, p11ma facle e\·lden<'t' of personal lden-
11 tlty. The autho11tles on the subject may be 
consulted In Sewell v. E\·ans, 4 Adol. & E. 
1 626, from which Lord Denham and other 
1 judirf's of the queen's bench, concludl'd that 
' Identity of name ls something from whkh 
an Inference may be drawn, unless the name 
wt>re a very common one or the transaction 
remote; and the reason given for casting the 
1 onus on the party who denies is that dl&-
: proot <.'an bt> readily bad by calling the per-i son whose Identity Is denied Into court. The 
: name In this instance ls not a very common 
one; but, atter more than a quarter of a 
century, tht>re ought certainly to be some 
preliminary evidence, however small." The 
soundness of this rule cannot be success-
fully questioned. It would work great In-
justice If rights of property, after a gren t 
length of time, were allowed to de1>end upon 
mere l<l..,ntlty of name. A prlma fa<'le ('Id~.~ 
thus submitted to a jm·y might be exh:t•n\~"-
1.y dltftcult, lf not lmtlOssible, to dls1iro\'e. I 
know of no case In which mere identity of' 
name has be<>n held suftlclent after the gr~~u t 
lapse of time which exists here. 
The assignments from the tenth to the 
PI<:mGBEE.
“w“4J1rciusive allege Q1-1-01.
M 4.’ “tries of volurninous
@1"$i°““ mu-
mmme ic records of Lancaster coun-
I To 50 “iii these papers in detail
jxtem dais opinion to an lDCOI1\’el1ie11t M would serve no good pur-p0se_ The ob:
W01 the otters, us I understand tllelll, was
/ammviilepeaigree of the 1>1a1nurg-S ram
/7% 411] that he was not Qonnected vvith the
i|.V of Berks county. {phey Show
flfifik fillmwiris,oeedB»‘“°“g:‘geS» etc- There
MAL S ories of fissessmen S and °t11e1' Pfi-
arr“ sag“ Me‘ P91-haps, the equivalent of
Xlhsifieclarutlous of decegsfid persoI.‘s’ but
there 1,; nothing '¢° connécm. ' -or enher °“"
mm uh the Baltzer e vs o rs the plain.
‘ W or Wm! the Berks county
ff ~ " Suit! _
I.-i1I:\}n fltuiblechr. Hence the °bjeQt.lOns made
ill ylfeflleteudflllts to the admisslon of the
{Anna Marla Gelrr and John
g‘§mru:2:?<i)swl,1lch have already been consid-
Q -hr, W with far greater force to these
1§cd, ai>iiRegM_dmg them as declarations, me
i‘§1P°"5' V e not shown alrunde to belong
‘\Q°‘“"‘“ts at ii of the fau1lly_ xve am of
. brauc _ _
iqpigidfilthat these records W81 e p1 Qpel-ly ex-
“-1)
in the ex-
dofiurnents
n but the fifteenth and six-
nents, in which error is as-
“mm asshfix charge of the court in some
(19 by the learned judge
mm commelxsllteesng? if not entirely accurate,
they disclose no such error as vvould justify
a reversal.
Judgment amrmem
(May 16. F34)-
3 A motion has been made for
' he above case, based up-
(1 to the exclusion of
ords by the court.
PAXSON»
3 1-gargrllhelli in i
on our ruling in 1'95“?
the Lancaster count)’ 1'9“
The iullliresslon fiDl)9*“'s to mievau that be-
‘ f er-
\ cl the assignments °
cause we dism ss r mm without an ex_
i 1
; ror relating i0 this illleb .
’ tended discussion we had I1°t 9-‘gifilinted tn
I’ with care, or were misled “D011 9 “C S-
" -rtainly incorrect.
Ilnle fi’?,t,e§s:§;:‘1,‘:§:¢§;;0r11e case with all
thtéxisnngm care from the fact that we were
not aided by an extended oral. argument.
Y bookg, however, supplied us with
The we g 1 1-inted argument, so that the
3 1-el§t(.'fl.l'G lgrali arvument was not so im_
w::ta(nt 3: it may seem to the learned coun-
gel for the plaintiff in error. That the poiint
was not more fully discussed in the 0Dl11 0!!
was owing to the fact that it had already
. been extended to what I feared was an un-
X reasonable length i? td£S"“S"i';7" the mare im-
. rtant uestions 0 e culls -
1 poll caregul re-examination and study of the
<-use has failed to satisfy us that we were
misled either “DOB the facts Or the MW‘
. The records referred to were ofi"crcd to
rebut the testimony of the il1=""_mT fwd t°
establish the pedigree of his family ll] Lan-
caster county. The P11111193 in his (‘PDQ-<1"
tlon had stated that when he was six years
p ter county, were brothers;
, ready flied, and need not be repeated.
[Case N 0. 66
Old (1788), his father, with his family, mov-
Bd from Cor-allco township, Lancaster coun-
U’, Where he had lived on his b1-other Paul's
1111111; second, that his father's name was
J0Scpl1, and that he was the youngest of
the family; and third, that his father had
three brothers, Paul, Andrew, and John, who
lived in the same neighborhood in Lancaster
county. The plaintiff did not know his
grandfather's name; he never saw him. And
then stated that Balser Gcehr, of Berks coun-
ty, was his uncle, upon information derived
from his mother.
The defendants attempted to show by the
excluded records that Joseph Gehr, the plain-
tiiT's father, and Paul, Andrew, and John
Gehr, mentioned in the records of Lancas-
that they were
the sons of John Gehr, senior, and hence
could not have been the sons of Conrad
Geehr, a brother of the Balser Geehr, of
Berks county.
The difllculty in the way of the defendants
is that there is nothing but identity of name
to connect the Gehrs named in the records
with the family of the plaintiff. This will
not do as to people who died a hundred
years ago. The reason and the authority for
this position were given in the opinion al-
Not
only is there no proof aliunde to connect
them, but there is evidence as to Paul and
Andrew, at least, which makes their identity
more than doubtful. Indeed, it seems hard-
ly possible that they are the Paul and An-
drew referred to by the plaintiff. To show
the competency of the evidence, the argu-
ment was made that the plaintiff had spo-
ken of his father living on his brother I’aul’s
land in Cocallco township, Lancaster coun-
ty. But we must remember that the plain-
tiff was born in 1782; he left Lancaster
county in 1788, when about six years old,
and the records show that the Paul Gehr
named therein died in 1773, which was five
years before the plaintiff was born. And as
to Andrew Gehr the case was still stronger,
for the plaintiff testified to having seen his
father's brother Andrew, while the Andrew
Gehr of the records must have died prior
to 1772, according to the records themselves.
It is not correct, therefore, to say, that there
was proof aliunde to connect these Gehrs
with the plaintiff. and that the plaintiffs own
deposition furnishes such proof. There is
really nothing but identity of name, and
even if this were some evidence it would be
too weak and inconclusive to base a ver-
dict upon. Unless the plaintiff's case is a
fabrication, and the testimony false as to
the declarations of the deceased members oi.‘
his family, his relationship to Bnlser Geehr,
of Berks county, was established. There is
nothing in the case to indicate such a fab-
rication, and if the evidence rejected had
been admitted, it would not be sufficient to
justify a jury in coming to such a conclu-
slon.
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PED1GJ1.~E. [Case No. 66 
t.,e_tr.\~ ln~\usi\"e allege error 1 t~~slor.a-1' a sertes of volun1inous dn the ex- odld (1788), J1fs father, wfth his famfly, mov-
etlll1ll \he ~Ub\ic records of r 4nn.cas~cuments e from CocuJlco township, Lancaster coun-
,1. 'tot." orer these papers ln de~ir coun- ty, Where he had lfved on his brother Paul's 
~xten~t}'.l\Bop\nlon to an inconvenient 1 -would land; second, that his father's name was 
ar.d wovld serve no good purpose_ .. r;::gth, Joseph, and that he was the youngest of 
jee\ ot tile otters, as 1 understand th ob- the family; and third, that his father had 
/p/}JIJlf tbe pedigree of the l>laintu~~::· f was three brothers, Paul, Andrew, and John, who 
i!.h #P~ that be was not connected 'Vi th~:; lived in the same neighborhood In I.anc1tster 
n;,~'/ '•m!I," of :serks county. They show county. The plaintiff did not know uls 
ue<'P· '" ·' ds mortga grandfather's name; he never saw him. And 
recfta .... In wills, dee ' gee, etc. There then stated that Balser Geeh1·, of Be1·ks coun-
s 1 8 of assessments and other at~dliir.:socoPi;__ perbaps, the equiva.Ientpoaf- ty, was his uncle, upon Information de1i,·ed 
tJe1'll· TheY .... ~. f deceased from his mother. 
t\le ~«larations 0 persons, but The defendants attempted to show by the tM~ 18 noth\ng to connect them, or either of excluded records that .Joseph Gehr the plaln-
\"'e..r. with the Baltzer Gehr who ls the plain- t""'' f h ' .u """• Ith th B lu. s at er, and Paul, Andrew, and John 
tJJr \ll tills suit, or w e erks county Gehr, mentioned In the records of Lancas-fa~ \l t Geebr. Bence the objections made ter county, were brothers; that they were 
by ._. 10detendants to the admission or the the sons of John Gehr, senior, and hence 
,be f A.nna Maria Gehr a d J de~1arations o b already b n. ohn 
1 
could not have been the sons of Oonrlld 
~hr and which ave t r_ een. consld- Geehr, a brother of the Balser Geehr of e~-ed' apply wltb far grea er orce to these 1 Berks county. ' 
ll ' Regarding them as declarations, tbe I The d111lculty In the way of the defendants 
~~ts are not sbown all_unde to be"long I Is that there Is nothing but identity of name 
~ either branch of tb~fam 11:-V- '\.Ve are of to connect the Gehrs named In the records 
~pinion that these reco 8 wet e properly ex- with the famlly of the plaintiff. This w111 
1 ded not do as to 1>eople who died a hundred 
.c ~he~ rema\n but !be fi.:~~i:-nth and six- years ago. The reason and the authority for 
-teenth asst11:nments, in w c error Is as- this position were given in the opinion al-
ed to tbe charge of the court in some ready filed, and need not be repeated. ~ot 
~:t comments made by the ~en.rued judge I only Is there no proof allunde to connect 
the ev\dence. If not entirely accurate, \ them, but there Is evlcleuce as to Paul nnd 
~:;disclose no such error 118 'Would justify Andrew, at least, which makes their Identity 
a reversal. more than doubtful. Indeed, It seems hard-
Judgment atnrmed. ly possible that they are the Paul and An-
drew referred to by the plaintiff. To show 
, ()lay lG, ll"Si). the competency of the eYltlence, the argu-
PAXSON, l . A mot\on \ms been made for ment was made that the plalnUft' had spo-
a reargument ln tbe abo'\'e 1.'Use, based up- I ken of his father living on hls brother l'nul's 
on our ru\lng ln regard to the exclusion of I land In Cocalico tow1n1hlp, Lancnster coun-
the Lancaster county recon\s by the court. ty. But we must remember that the plaln-
The impression apvear1:1 to pre\"all that be- tiff was born in li82; he left Lanc·aster 
cause we d\smlssetl tbe at1signments of er- county in 1788, when aoout six years old, 
ror relating to this question without an ex- and the records show thnt the Paul Gehr 
tc:-nded (Uscuss\on we uatl not examined It named therein died In 1773, which was five 
with care, or were misled upon the facts. years before the plaintil'l' was born. And as 
The first assumption is c!'rtalnly lncon-ect. to Andrew Gehr the case was still stronger, 
I examined this branch of the case with all for the plaintiff testified to having seen hls 
the more care from the fact that we were t'nthet·'s brother Amll·ew, while the Andrew 
not aided by an extended oral argument. Gehr of the records must have died prior 
Tbe paper books, however, supplied us with to 1772, according to the records thenu1elves. 
a very careful printed argument, so that the It ls not con·ect, therefore, to suy. thnt there 
1088 ot an oral argument was not so lm- I was proof allumle to connect the8(• Gehrs 
portnnt as lt may seem to the learned conn- I with the plaintiff. and that the plnlntitI"s own 
sel for the plnlntlft' In error. That the point \ deposition furnishes such proof. There is 
wns not more fully discussed in the opinion really nothing but Identity of name, und 
was owing to the tnct that lt had already I e,·en if this were some eYhlenee it would be 
been extended to wltat I feared was an un- too weak and lnconclm1ive to base a '\'er-
reasonable length In disc·u8>1lng the more lm- dkt upon. Unless the plaintiff's case ls a 
portant questions of the c·ause. I fabrication, nnd the testimony false us to 
A eareful re-examination and study of the I the declamtlons of the deceased members of 
cnse bas tailed to satisfy us that we were his tarully, his relntionshlp to Balser Geehr, 
mlsletl eltber upon the fncUI or the lnw. of Berks county, wns estnhlisbell. There ls 
The records referred to w<>rP offer<>d to nothing In the ca8e to imlieute such a fnh-
rehut the testimony of the pluiutin: and to rlcation, and If the e'l"idence rejected had 
establ111b tlte pedigree of his fumlly in Lan- been admitted, lt woultl not be suftlclent to 
cnster county. The plalntlft' In his <lepoRI- jui;tlfy a jury In com\ug to such a conclu-
tlon bad stated that when he wus six years sion. 
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RELE VAN CY.
The rejected records do not contradict the
plaintifl’s testimony. As a 1l('(1l;§l'L‘(3 of his
family, it rests upon a number of circum-
stances, each dependent upon the other.
With the essential links relating to Paul and
192
Andrew Gehr broken, the whole superstruc-
ture crumbles.
We see no sufficient reason to order a ru-
argument, and the motion therefore is re-
fused.
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Case No. 66] HELEV A:NCY. 
The rejected records do not contradict the 
plalntllf'e testimony. Ae a pedigree ot hie 
tamlly, It rests upon a number ot circum-
stances, each dependent upon the other. 
With the essential links relating to Pa.ul a.nd 
192 
Andrew Gehr broken, the whole superstmc-
ture crumbles. 
·we see no sufficient reason to order a re-
argument, and the motion therefore Is re-
tused. 
PEDIGREE.
“mff_i0N et al. v. Hornxrms
,6 F>“l1-Ct. rso, 11? U. s. 389-)
éam of the United States_
22,1ssu.
to errol‘ to the circuit court of the United
States wt the we_stem mSt_mct 0f W’i1'ginla.
M/3. |y:1'Sa11 action of et;i1cct11\ent_ The de_
/2%/Mts ill error were t e plaintiffs in the
et 8.1.
$\\ii“‘-me 11 arch
- the heirs at 1
, 7 U11 and W919 aw of
fl/Mi/Rlcltincsy deceased‘ They brought the ac-
Jolm 0 ' 13-;1,torecover a. tract of 3,000
\'\o\\'\L igulfiljfin Lee county. in the state of
“\,‘Q':re\:it\(:i,a The defendaDi$ Izliaded the gen-
eml Xsgue. The case W3-5 trhed by a. jury,
and th ewas a Verdict or , e_p1ainufl7$- 011
er endercd juflglnent, and the
out this writ of er-1-Q1-_
mm the bill of e_X(?'3I)tio11s um
to sustain the 1tSS\J‘.:e fon their
deuce a. pa en 1-om the
P"§g ofleredtglofivglrirginia to S:-unuel Young,
(‘L my 7’ 1137, tor the Dfelrlises in con-
ted‘ which was admitted vvrthout objec-
trwiemy‘ “en offered a deed for the same
"~°"-_Th°y m gamuel 0. Young to John
mremlsefl "° 6 my 12, 1:-519. This at-ea re-
€1°1m°s’ date“; by the commonvve-alth of Vii-.
tlied megm “Q1 Young of the premises in
gill“ to Sam Samuel Young, the pat-
. L“ t
c°:“°v€-,Zy'd1eqaintestate; that Samuel O.
en ee.
_ . was his only child and
Y°.““g' “‘e,§,‘,,“,m¢(:é title to said lands had
hwfl’ “Pd “D Appellded to the deed was a
“SM m h 1 acknowledgment dated July 15,
cemficate O Eastern district of Pennsylvania,
l8‘:){)o1;tt1t1i\ge to have been taken by Richard
D
t t “age for the dltrlct
P““""' “med S a ‘*3 jsigned by him.
or Pennsyhxrilmaiginto have been witnessed
(l1)eedJc?lFr?e,S1baw and John C\'IliSe- Immedi-
y .
ately after vt‘l::>.tce\11't‘li:)C“i::1 °tt0*1b°:‘t1l‘l):"Il_$(c1(;gi1;1te'(:€
gg.‘r)r‘:\ai::l9dC“YourI1)g gr the consideration mon-
ey mentioned in the deed, which was $ég3O2'
signed by him and witnessed ‘DY -7° “ 3 '
The plaintiffs Dl'°‘°d the hand: ti1tiian:l;ea(t)i11:
Judge Peters to the certificate, 11" hi h
I John Shaw, one of the witnesses, w c
0 la more than M Years before the
23?; pA(pepended to the deed was the follow-
‘“§ flegiliateig iegtljrtrftatliggun and held for
1,9: county, at the court-house thereof, on
the fifteenth day of Jamwry. 1859- this "1"
denture of bargain and sale for land between
Samuel C. Young of the 0118 i>l11't- mid John
Holmes of the other D1111, W93 admmed to
record upon the certificate of Richard Peters.
judge gf the Pennsylvania district of the
United States. J. W. S. Morrison. D- C-"
The deed bore the following 1nd<>1'Se111eI1i=
“Recorded in the clerk’s oiiice of the coun-
tv court of Lee, in book N0- 7, Page 491-
Testc: J. W. S. Morrison, D. G."
The plaintiffs also introduced evidence
tending to show that the patent to Samuel
Young. and the (iced from Samuel C. Young
wnrc-us,nv.—-13
[Case N 0. 67
to J0hn Hoimcs, were found among the pn-
Df*1'$ Of the latter after his death, in 1834.
11193? also oillered the testimony of John
Hfilmes, a son-in-law of John Holmes, the
grantee of the land, who testlfied that no
knew that said grantee owned a tract oi’
3.000 acres of land in Lee county, Virginia,
and that the deed for the land was in the
possession of John Holmes, the elder, at the
time of his death; that at the request of one
of the executors of John Holmes, the elder,
and of the family, the witness, in the year
1836, went to Virginia, to examine the lauds;
that he took with him a map and plan and
two deeds, one being the patent above men-
tioned for the lands in controversy, the oth-
er the deed from Samuel G. Young to John
Holmes for the same lands; and that these
papers had been in his possession or under
his control for a period of 37 or 38 years. On
his said visit the witness went upon the
lands with Peter Fulkerson, who lived in
sight of them, and who, as well as Frederick
D. Fuikerson and Mr. Ewing, brother-in-law
of the latter, recognized him as representing
the owners of the land. It was at that time
called the “Holmes Plantation." There were
no intruders upon the land, and no one in
actual possession. In 1840, Frederick D.
Fulkerson treated by letter with the witness
for the purchase of the land, and, in 18-iii,
James Fulkerson wrote the witness to learn
the least he would take for the land, and re-
peated his inquiry in the year 1847. It may
be here stated that the defendants claimed
possession under patents issued, one to the
Peter Fulkcrson above mentioned, dated Oc-
tober 30, 1838, and another to said Frederick
D. Fulkerson and James Fulkerson and Eliz-
abeth Fulkerson, dated October 31, 1846, and
by subsequent conveyances from said pat-
entees. Having introduced this evidence the
plaintifls rested.
One of the defenses set up to the action by
the defendants was that under the laws of
Virginia the lands in controversy had been
forfeited to the state, and the title by reason
thereof lmd, ipso facto, reverted to the state,
and was therefore out of the plaintiff. The
acts of the state of Virginia applicable to the
present case, providing for the forfeiture of
lands delinquent for the non-payment of
taxes, were as follows: The second section
of the act ot February 27, 1833, after recit-
ing, by way of preamble, that whereas, it
was “known to the general assembly that
many large tracts of land lying west of the
Allcglially mountains which were granted by
the commonwealth before the first day of
April, 1831, never were, or have not been for
muny years last past, entered on the books
of the commissioner of the revenue where
they respectively lie, " ' *” declared that
every owner of any such tract of laud should,
on or before the first day of July, 1836, cu-
ter, or cause to be entered, on the books or
the commissioner of revenue for the county
in which the lands lay, any land owned by
193
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• PEDIGH:g~. [ C11se No. 67 ym,U~~N et al. "· HOY .. l\J:Es et l~ ;lup.ct. 780, 117 u. s. S89.) al. 
%·~• Ourt of the United S1:a. t:ea 
,.. 22, 1886. • March 
'In ett01 to the circuit court of'. the U 1 
SIJ.tei t41f the Western district or Vlr n t:ed 
!/7J/S JV8I an action of ejectinent. ~~1:: 
/fllt/Plb fD error were the plalntltrs In. the 
..1.-1/ urt and were the heirs at: la. 'W f 
fffe"" CO , deceased· They brought the ao 
Iolul ~o!DleB. t 1811, to recover a tract or 8 ~ 
~n\lL.. .A~\n i,ee county, in the stat~ of 
;~ c::!. ~be defendants pleaded the gen-
~~ 'tbe case was tried by a. jury ~o th~~".IVas a verdict for the Pla.ln.tltrs, o~ 
whle-'h. the court rendered judgment. and the 
defe--.. ti sued out this writ or error. 
It -..dnD red froJD the blll of exceptions that 
the ~Pfnu«s. to sustain the iBBue on. their 
ia~P~lfered in evidence a pa tent :rroin the 
co . , wealth of Virginia to Samuel Young, ~~0~1 '7 1787, for the premises In con-~ whlch was admitted 'Without obJec· 
~ ;-ve~y next ottered a deed :ror the same 
~n. from Samuel C. Young to .John 
=mlaeB dated July 12, 1819. This deed re-
o:~e gn.nt bJ tbe common'Wea.lth of Vlr-
~la to Samuel "Young of the premises In 
ray· that Samuel Young. the pat-
~:'"~4 'died intestate; that Samuel c. 
~ ' the grantor, was b\s only child and 
n:~g'and that tbe tlt\e to eald lands had 
vest~ \n b\m. Appended to the deed was a 
cert\lleate of acknowledgment cla"ted July 15, 
1819 al the Eastern district of Pennsylvania, 
purPort\ng to bave been taken by Richard 
Peters, United States ludge for the district 
of Pennsylvania, and signed by him. The 
deed appeared also to ba.ve been wttnessetl 
by Jobn Sbaw and Jobn Craige. Immedi-
ately after the cert\tlcate of acknowledgment 
appeared what purported to be the receipt of 
Samuel C. Young for the consideration mon-
ey menUoned in the deed, wblcb was $10,400, 
atgued by him and witnessed by John Cmlge. 
The plalntltrs proved the handwriting of 
Judge Peters to the certlftcate, and the death 
of John Shaw, one of the witnesses, which 
took place more than 00 years before the 
trial. Appended to the deed was the follow-
\ng certificate of registration: 
"Vlrglnla. At a court begun and held for 
i,ee county, at the court-house ~hereof, on 
the filteenth day of January, 1838, this ln-
dentnre of bargain and sale for land between 
Samuel C. Young of the one part, and John 
Holmee of the other part, was admitted to 
record upon the certUicate of Richard Petel"ll, 
Judge of the Penm~ylvanla district of the 
United States. J. W. S. Morrison, D. C." 
Tbe deed bore the following lndorsement: 
"Recorded In the clerk's otH.ce of the coun-
ty ronrt of IA?e, In book :So. 7, page 401. 
Teste: J. W. S. Morrison, D. C." 
Tbe plalntHfs also Introduced evlden~c 
tending to show that the patent to Samuel 
Young, and the deed from Samuel C. Young 
10 
to John Holmes, were found among the pa-
pere of the latter atter h1s death, In 1834 
They a1Bo otrered the testimony of Joh~ 
Hohnes, a son-In-law of John Holmes, the 
grantee of the land, who testified that uc 
knew that said grantee owned a tract of 
3,000 acres of land In Lee county, Virginia, 
and that the deed for the land was In the 
possession of John Holmes, the elder, at the 
time of his death; that at the request of one 
of the e.'tecutors of John Holmes, the elder, 
and of the family, the wltne88, In the year 
1830, went to Virginia, to examine the lands· 
that he took with him a map and plan and 
two deeds, one being the patent above men-
tioned for the lands In controversy, the oth-
er the deed from Samuel C. Young to John 
Holmes for the same lands; and that these 
papers had been ln his po88esslon or under 
his control for a period of 37 or 38 years. On 
his said visit the witness went upon the 
lands with Peter Fulkerson, who lived In 
sight of them, and who, as well as Frederick 
D. Fulkerson and Mr. Ewing, brother-In-law 
of the latter, recognized him as representing 
the owners of the land. It was at that time 
called the "Holmes Plantation." There were 
no Intruders upon the land, and no one In 
actual posse88lon. In 1840, Frederll'k D. 
Fulkerson treated by letter with the witness 
for the purchase of the land, and, tn 18-W, 
James Fulkerson wrote the witness to learn 
the least he would take for the land, and re-
pea ted his Inquiry in the year 1847. It may 
be here stated that the defendants claimed 
possession under patents Issued, one to the 
Peter Fulkerson above mentioned, dated Oc· 
tober 30, 1838, and another to said Frederll'k 
D. Fulkerson and James Fulkerson and Eliz· 
abeth Fulkerson, dated October 31, 1846, and 
by subsequent conveyances from said pat-
entees. Having lntl'oduced this evidence the 
plalntUrs rested. 
One of the defenses set up to the action by 
the defendants was that under the laws of 
Virginia the lands In controyeray had been 
forfeited to the state, and the title by reason 
thereof had, Ipso facto, re\"erted to the state, 
and was therefore out of the plalntltrs. The 
acbl of the state of Virginia applll'nble to the 
present case, providing for the forfeiture or 
lands delinquent for the non-payment of 
taxes, were as follows: The second section 
of the act of February 2'7, 18:-hl, after rel'lt· 
Ing, b:V way of preamble, tbat whereas, It 
was "known to the general assembly tllat 
many large tracts of land lying west of the 
All<>ghany mountains which were granted by 
the commonwealth before the first day of 
April, 1831, never were, or ba\"e not been for 
many years last past, entered on the bookR 
of the commissioner of the re\"enue where 
they respectively lie, • • •" 1leclared thnt 
every owner of any such tract of land should, 
on or before the ftrst day of July, 1831\, en-
ter, or cause to be entered, on the bookR of 
the commissioner of revenue for tbe county 
in which the lands lay, any land owned by 
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him the title of which came through grants
by the commonwealth, and have the same
charged with all taxes and damages in ar-
rears properly chargeable thereon, and pay
all such taxes and damages which had not
been relinquished and exonerated by the sec-
ond section of the act concerning delinquent
and forfeited lands, passed March 10, 1832;
and upon failure to do so such lands, not
in the actual possession of said owner. should
become forfeited to the commonwealth after
the first of July, 1836. Laws Va. 183-l, 1835,
c. 13, p. 12. The second section of the act of
.\larch 10, 1832, referred to in the statute
just recited, provided that all taxes and dam-
ages due and chargeable on lands lying west
of the Alleghany mountains, returned delin-
quent for the year 1831 or any previous year,
and which had not been redeemed, or ex-
onerated by former laws, should be dis-
charged, and the lien of the commonwealth
therefor relinquished, provided said taxes
and damages did not exceed $10. See Laws
Va. 1832. c. 73, p. 67. By successive acts oi’
the legislature of Virginia——act of March 23,
1836, (chapter 3, p. 7; Act 1835—36;) act of
.\[arch 30, 1837, (chapter 8, p. 9, Acts 1836-
37;) act of March 15, 1838. (chapter 8, pp.
16, 17, Acts 1838,)—the time for entering
lands upon the books of the commissioners
of revenue. and paying the taxes and dam-
ages charged thereon, and thereby saving
them from forfeiture, was extended to the
first day of July, 1838.
In order to prove the forfeiture of the land
in controversy to the state of Virginia the
defendants introduced “:1 table of tracts of
land in Lee county assessed with taxes,” cer~
tlfied on September 5, 1876, by the auditor of
public accounts of the state of Virginia.
This table showed that three tracts of land,
containing in the aggregate 6,300 acres, had
been listed for taxation against Samuel
Young, of Philadelphia, for the years from
1827 to 1832, inclusive. The taxes on the
three tracts for the five years from 1827 to
1831. inclusive, were, according to the table,
unpaid. and amounted in all to 38 cents. The
taxes for 1832 were marked paid. The audi-
tor of public accounts certified that the books
of Lee county prior to 1827 were missing;
that the records showed that the taxes on
said three tracts of Samuel Young had been
paid up to and including the year 1822; that
the taxes were released to 1831, inclusive;
and that said lands were returned among th'e
unascertainable lands in 1832, and subsc-
quently dropped from the commissioners‘
books of Lee county.
To rebut this testimony introduced by the
defendants the plaintiffs put in evidence the
certificate of the deputy-sheriff of Lee coun-
ty, dated December 14, 1837, to the effect that
he had placed a tract of land in the name
of Samuel Young for 3.000 acres, which was
returned in the year 1834 not ascertainable,
on the commissioners’ books of said county
of Lee, and taxed the damages thereon.
They also introduced “an extract," certified
September 5, 1 75, by the auditor of public
accounts, "from the land-books of the com-
missioners of the revenue for the county of
Lee, for the years 1838 to 1875, both inclu-
sive, " * '" of lands assessed successively
to John Holmes, John Holmes, Jr., and John
Holmes‘ estate, for each of said years. The
extract showed that a tract of 3,000 acres of
land, conveyed by Samuel C. Young, was list-
ed for taxation to John Holmes and John
Holmes, Jr., of Philadelphia, and to the es-
tate of John Holmes, for the years above
mentioned. The taxes down to 187-1, except-
ing one year. appeared to have been paid or
released by law.
John A. Buchanan, for plaintiffs in error.
Wm. Pinkney Whyte, Patrick Hagan, and
John A. Campbell, for defendants in error.
\VOODS, J. It is first assigned for error
that the circuit court “allowed the deed from
Samuel C. Young to John Holmes to be read
in evidence without instructing the jury that
the recitals therein in respect to the death of
Samuel Young and the heirship of Samuel C.
Young were not evidence against the defend-
ants, even if it were admissible at all, with-
out proof of its execution or possession ac-
companying and held under it." The deed
of Samuel C. Young to John Holmes was
rightfully admitted in evidence as an an-
cient deed, without proof by the subscribing
witnesses, or of possession by the plaintiffs or
those under whom they claimed. vvhen of-
fered it was more than 60 years old. It was
produced from the custody of the heirs of.
John Holmes, the grantee, who claimed the
lands described therein. It, as well as the
patent for the same land from the common-
wealth of Virginia to Samuel Young, was
shown to have been found among the papers
of John Holmes. The lands described there-
in were shown to have been listed for taxation
to John Holmes, or to his heirs, for a period
beginning with the year 1838 down to and
including the year 1875, which was after the
bringing of this suit; and it appeared that
during that time they had paid the taxes as-
sessed on said lands, or the same had been
released to them by law. It was further
shown that the judge before whom the ac-
knowledgment of the deed had been made
was dead; that his signature to the certiti-
cats of acknowledgment was genuine; that
the deed had been recorded in the county
where the lands lay for more than Q \-em-3
before it was offered in evidence; and‘ that
before and after the deed was put upon 1-eo-
ord the lands described therein were re-
ported to be the lands of John H01meS_ the
grantee, and his heirs, and were known and
designated in the neighborhood where the-v
lay as the “Holmes Plantation." This state
of facts amply justified the admission of the
deed in evidence as an ancient docutngnt
without other proof. Caruthers v. Eldridwo‘
12 Gmt 670; Apnlegate v. Mining cuft}
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blm the title of which came through grants 
by the commonwealth, and have the same 
charged with all taxes and damages ln ar-
rears properly l'bargeable thert'On, and pay 
all such taxes and damages which had not 
been relinquished and exonerated by the sec-
ond section of the act concerning dellnquent 
and forfeited lands, passed }la1·ch 10, 1832; 
ancl upon fallure to do so such lands, not. 
ln the actual possession of 811.ld owner, should 
become forfeited to the commonwealth after 
the first of July, 1836. I,aws Ya. lS:U, 183:>, 
c. 13, p. 12. The second section of the act of 
llnrch 10, 1832, referred to ln the statute 
just recited, provided that all taxes and dam-
ages due and chargeable on lands lying west 
of the .Alleghany mountains, returned delin-
quent for the year 1831 or any previous year, 
and which bad not been redeemed, or '!X· 
onerated by former laws, should be dls-
<·barged, and the llen of the commonwealth 
the1·efor relinquished, provided eald taxes 
and damages did not exceed •to. See Laws 
Ya. 1882, c. 73, p. 67. By successive acts of 
the legislature of Virginia-act of March 23, 
183(1, (chapter 3, p. 7; .Acts 1835-36;) act of 
:\larch 30, 1837, (chapter 8, p. D, Acta 1836-
:J7;) act of llnr<'h 15, 1888, (chapter 8, pp. 
l<l, 17, ActM 1838,)-the time for entering 
lands upon the books of the commissioners 
of revenue, and paying the taxes and dam-
ages <'ha1·ged thereon, and thereby saving 
them from forfeiture, was extended to the 
first day of July, 1838. 
In order to prove the forfeiture of the land 
In controversy to the state of Virginia the 
defendants lntro<lu<'ed "a table of tracts of 
land ln Lee county assessed with taxes." eer· 
tlfied on September 5, 1876, by the auditor of 
public n<'counts of the state of Virginia. 
•r111s table showed that three tracts of land, 
<"ontalnlng In the aggregate 6,300 acres, bad 
been listed for taxation against samuel 
Young, of Philadelphia, for the years from 
1827 to 1832, inclusive. The taxes on the 
three traet11 for the five years from 1827 to 
1831. lndmd \"e, were, according to the table, 
unpaid, an<l amounted In all to 38 cents. The 
taxes for 1832 were marked paid. The audi-
tor of publl<" accounts certified that the books 
of I..ee county prior to 1827 were missing; 
that the records showed that the taxes on 
Raid three tracts of Samuel Young had been 
paid up to and lneludlng the year 1822; thnt 
the taxes were released to 1831, Inclusive; 
and that said lands were returned among tlie 
unilscertalnable lands In 1832, and subse-
quently dro1>ped from the commissioners' 
books of Lee county. 
To rebut this testimony Introduced by the 
defentlants the plalntltt's put In evidence the 
certlfl<'ate of the deputy-sheritr of Lee coun-
ty, dated December H, 1837, to the etreet that 
be had placed a tract of land lo the name 
of Samuel Yoong for 3,000 acres, which was 
returned In the year l~H not ascertainable, 
on the commissioners' bOOks of said county 
of Lee, and taxed the damages thereon. 
™ 
They also lntl"Oduced "an extract," certUled 
September :;, 187:i, by the auditor of public 
accounts, "from the land-books of the com· 
mlesloners of the revenue for the county of 
Lee, for the years 1838 to 1875, both inclu-
sive, • • *" of lands ft88e88ed successively 
to John Holmes, John Holmes, Jr., and John 
Holmes' eRtnte, for each of said years. The 
extract showed that a tract of 3,000 acres of 
land, conveyed by Samuel C. Young, was list· 
ed for taxation to John Holmes and John 
Holmes, Jr., of Ph1ladel1>hla, and to the es-
tate of John Holmes, for the years above 
mentioned. The taxes down to 1874, except-
ing one year. appeared to have been paid or 
released by law. 
John A. Buchanan, for plalntlfl's In error. 
Wm. Pinkney Whyte, Patrick Hagan, and 
John A. Campbell, for defendants ln error. 
WOODS, J. It Is first assigned for error 
that the circuit court "allowed the deed from 
Samuel C. Young to John Holmes to be read 
in evidence without Instructing the Jury that 
the recitals therein In res11ect to the death ot 
Samuel Young and the helrshlp of Samuel C. 
Young were not evidence agalni,it the defend-
ants, even If lt were admlsslble at all, with· 
out proof of Its execution or possession ac-
companying and held under It.·• The deed 
of Samuel C. Young to John Holmes was 
rightfully admitted In evidence as an an-
cient deed, without proof by the sube<'rlblng 
witnesses, or of possession by the 1>lalnt11re or 
those under whom they claimed. 'When of· 
fered lt was more than 60 years old. .It was 
lJroduced from the custody of the heirs of. 
John Holmes, the grantee, who claimed the 
lands described therein. It, as well as the 
patent for the same land from the common-
wealth of Vlrglnla. to Samuel Young, was 
shown to have been found among the papers 
of John Holmes. The lands described there-
in were shown to have been listed tor taxation 
to John Holmes, or to his heirs, for a period 
beginning with the year 1838 down to and 
Including tbe year 187:>, whlcb was atter the 
bringing of this suit; and lt appeared that 
during that time they bad paid the taxes as-
sessed on said lands, or the same bad been 
released to them by law. It was furtha-
sbown that the judge before whom the ac-
knowledgment of the deed bad been ma<le 
was dead; that his signature to the c~rtitl­
cate of acknowledgment was genuine; that 
the deed had been recorded in the county 
where the lands lay for more than 42 years 
before lt was offered ln evidence; and that 
before and after the deed was put UPon rec-
onl the lands described therein were rt--
ported to be the lands of John Holmes, the 
grantee, and his heirs, and were known and 
designated in the neighborhood where thev 
lay as the "Holmes Plantation." This eta~ 
of facta amply justified the admission of tbe 
deed ln evidence as an ancient document. 
without other proof. Caruthers v. Eldridge. 
12 Grat. 670; Applegate v. Mlnlng Cu., u 
1 
J 
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PEDIGREE.
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Sup. Ct. 742 (decided at the preent term),
and cases there cited.
The question is therefore fairly presented
whether the recitals made in the deed of
Samui C. Young to John Holmes, to the ef-
fect that Samuel Young, the patentee, had
died intestate, leaving one child only, namely,
the said Samuel C. Young, the grantor, were
admissible in evidence against the defend-
ants. who did not claim title under the deed.
The fact to be established is one of pedigree
The proof to show pedigree forms a well-
settied exception to the rule which excludes
hearsay evidence. This exception has been
recognized on the ground of necessity; for as
in inquiries respecting relationship or de-
scent facts must often be proved which oc-
‘curred many years before the trial, and were
known to but few persons, it is obvious that
the strict enforcement in such cases of the
rules against hearsay evidence would fre-
quently occasion a failure of justice. Tayl.
Ev. § 635. Traditional evidence is therefore
admissible. Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 99;
Jackson v. Browner, 18 Johns. 37; Jackson
v. King, 5 Cow. 237; Davis v. Wood, 1
Wheat. 6. The rule is that declarations of
deceased persons who were de jure related
by blood or marriage to the family in ques-
tion may be given in evidence in matters of
pedigree. Jewell v. Jewell, 1 How. 219;
Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 1’i'5;' John-
son v. Liwson, 2 Bing. 86; Vowles v. Young,
13 Yes. 147; Monkton v. Attorney General,
2 Russ. 8: M. 150; White v. Strother, 11 Ala.
720. A qualification of the rule is that be
fore a declaration can be admitted in evi-
dence the relationship of the declarant with
the family must be established by some
proof independent of the declaration itself.
Monkton v. Attorney General, 2 Russ. & M.
156; Attorney General v. Kohler, 9 H. L.
Pas. 660; Rex v. All Saints, 7 Barn. &. C.
T89. But it is evident that but slight proof
of the relationship will be required, since the
relationship of the declarant with the family
might be as difficult to prove as the very fact
in controversy.
Applying these rules, we are of opinion that
the recital in the deed of Samuel C. Young
to John Holmes, supported as it was by the
circumstances of the case shown by the evi-
491199. was admissible, as tending to prove
the facts recited, namely, that Samuel Young,
the patentee, was dead, and Samuel C.
Young. the grantor, was his only child and '
heir.
As the deed in which the recital was made
was entitled to be admitted in evidence, it
fltfinils upon the same footing as if its exe-
cution had been proved in the ordinary way.
The fact, therefore, that on the twelfth day
of July. 1819, the date of the deed, in the
"ft? °t Phflildelllhitl, before Richard Peters,
United 3W9‘! Judge, and two other persons
as witnesses, Samuel C. Young, the grantor
in the deed mentioned, made the declaration
ll fillesflofl, may be taken as established.
It is not disputed that when, upon the trial
of the case in the circuit court in October,
1880, the deed containing the recitals was
offered in evidence, the declarant, Samuel C.
Young, was dead. It only remained, there-
fore, to offer some evidence that the declar-
ant, Samuel C. Young, was related to the
family of Samuel Young. One circumstance
relied on to show his relationship was the
similarity of names. This, after the lapse of
so great a time, was entitled to weight. An-
other fact was that the patent to Samuel
Young for the land in controversy was found
with Che deed of Samuel C. Young to John
Holmes among the papers of the latter after
his death. The well-kno\vn practices and
habits of men in the transfer of title make ,
it clear that the patent was delivered to
Holmes by Samuel C. Young when the latter
delivered his own deed to Holmes for the
premises conveyed by the patent. There was
therefore persuasive proof that on January
12, 1819, Samuel C. Young had in his posses-
sion, claiming it as a muniment of his title,
the patent issued by the commonwealth of
Virginia to Samuel Young, and the presump-
tion is that his possession of the patent was
rightful. The fact that Samuel C. Young,
representing himself to be the son and heir
of Samuel Young, had in his rightful posses-
sion the title papers of the latter to a valu-
able estate, is a fact tending to prove the
truth of his asserted relationship. Another
circumstance of weight is that Samuel C.
Young, having assumed, as the son and sole
heir of Samuel Young, to convey the landed
estate of the latter, and his grantees having
for more than 60 years claimed title under
his conveyance, the right of Samuel C. Young
to make the conveyance has never, so far as
appears, been questioned or challenged by
any other person claiming under Samuel
Young. After a lapse of 61 years we. think
these circumstances were suflicient to prove
that Samuel C. Young was of the family of
Samuel Young, and that the declaration of
the former, deliberately made in an ancient
writing, signed, sealed, witnessed, acknowl-
edged, and recorded, to the effect that the
declarant was the only child and heir of Sam-
uel Young, and that the latter was dead,
was of right admitted in evidence as tending
to prove the facts so recited. This conclu-
sion is sustained by the case of Decry v.
Cray, 5 Wall. 795, which is directly in point.
See, also, Carver v. Astor, 4 Pet. 1; Crane
v. Astor. G Pet. 598; Garwood v. Dennis-. 4
Bin. 314; Stokes v. Dawes, 4 Mason. 268;
Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 99. In view,
therefore, of the circumstances of the case,
there was no error in the refusal of the court
to instruct the jury that said recital was not
evidence against the defendants.
The next and only other ground of error
alleged by’the defendants is that the court
refused to charge the jury on the question of
forfeiture. We think there was no error
here. The forfeiture of the lands in contro-
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Sup. Ct. 742 (decided at the present term), It Is not disputed that when, upon the trial 
and caaes there cited. of the case ln the circuit court In October, 
The question I.a therefore falrly presented 1880, the deed containing the recitals was 
whether the recitals made In the deed of ofrered In evidence, the declarant, Samuel C. 
Samul C. Young to John Holmes, to the et- Young, was dead. It only remained, there-
fect that Samuel YOUDg, tbe patentee, had fore, to <>«er some evidence that the declar-
-Oled Intestate, leaving one child only, namely, ant, Samuel C. Young, was related to the 
the llllld Samuel C. Young, the grantor, were family of Samuel Young. One circumstance 
admlasible ID evidence against the defend- relied on to show his relationship was the 
ants, who did not claim title under the deed. BlmllaJ'fty of names. This, after the lapse ot. 
The fact to be established Is one of pedigree so great a time, was entitled to weight. .An-
The proof to show pedigree forms a well- otber fact was that the patent to Samuel 
11ettled exception to the rule which excludes Young tor the land In controversy was found 
hee.l'Blly evidence. This exception has been with the deed of Samuel C. Young to John 
recognlZed on the ground of necessity; for as Holmes among the papen of the latter after 
In Inquiries respecting relationship or de- his death. The well-known practices and 
:acent facts must often be proved which oc- habits of men In the transfer of title make , 
• <.111Ted many years before the trial, and were It clear that the patent was dellvered to 
known to but few pel'80ns, It ls obvloU8 that Holmes by Samuel C. Y otmg when the latter 
the strict enforcement ID such cases of the delivered bls own deed to Holmes for the 
rules against he81'88Y evidence would fre- preml.ees conveyed by the patent. There was 
quently oceaslon a failure of justice. Tnyl. therefore persuasive proof that on January 
Ev. I 635. Traditional evidence ls therefore 12, 1819, Samuel O. Young had ln his po88eB-
admlsslble. Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 99; slon, clalmlng It as a munlment of his title, 
J'ackson v. Browner, 18 Johns. 37; Jackson the patent lssued by the commonwealth of 
v. King, IS Cow. 237; Davis v. Wood, 1 Virginia to Samnel Young, and the presump-
Wbeat. 6. The rule ls that declarations ot tlon Is that bis poBBeeslou of the patent wu 
decmsed persons who were de jure related rightful. The tact that Samuel C. Young, 
by blood or marriage to the family In ques- representing himself to be the son and heir 
tlon may be given In evidence ID matters of ot Samuel Young, had ID his rightful poeees-
pedlin-ee. Jewell v. Jewell, 1 How. 219; sfon the title papen of the latter to a valu-
Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall 175;· John- able estate, ls a fact tending to prove the 
son v. Lawson, 2 Bing. frl; Vowles v. Young, truth of his asserted relationship. .Another 
13 Yes. 147; Monkton v. Attomey General, circumstance of weight Ill that Samuel o. 
2 HUS& & M. 159; White v. Strother, 11 Ala. Young, having 8118umed, as the son and sole 
720. A qualification of the rule ls that be- heir of Samuel Young, to convey the landed 
fore a dec-laratlon can be admitted In evl- estate of the latter, and bis grantees having 
<dence the relationship of the declarant with for more than 60 yean claimed title under 
the family must be established by some bis conveyance, the right of Samuel C. Young 
proof Independent ot the declaration itself. to make the conveyance has never, so tar 88 
Monkton v. Attorney General, 2 RU8s. & M. appears, been questioned or challenged by 
156; Attorney General v. Kobler, 9 H. L. any other person claiming under Samuel 
<'as. 660; Rex v. All Salut15, 7 Barn. & C. Young. After a lapse of 61 years we think 
~- But It 18 evident that but slight proof these circumstances were suftlclent to prove 
~f the relationship wlll be required, since the that Samuel C. Young was of the family of 
relatlonslilp of the declarant with the family Samuel Young, and that the declaration of 
might be as difficult to prove as the very fact the former, deliberately made ln an ancient 
In controversy. writing, signed, sealed, witnessed, acknowl-
Applylng these rules, we are of opinion that edged, and recorded, to the effect that the 
the recital In the deed of Samuel C. Young declarant was the only child and heir of Sam· 
to J'ohn Holmes, supported as It was by the uel Young, and that tbe latter was dead, 
<'il'CUllllltances of the case shown by the evl- was of right admitted In evidence as tending 
dence, was admiBslble, as tending to prove J to prove the facts so recited. This conclu-
tbe facta recited, namely, that Samuel Young, slon ls sustalned by the case of Deery v. 
t~ patentee, was deed, and Samuel C. I Croy, 5 Wall. 795, which ls directly In point. 
Young, tbe grantor, was his only child and j See, also, Carver v. Astor, 4 Pet. 1; Crane 
heh·. I v. Astor, 6 Pet. 598; Garwood v. Dennis, 4 
.As the deed In which the recital was made Bin. 314; Stokes v. Dawes, 4 Mason, 268; 
was entitled to be admitted In evidence, It Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 00. In view, 
11tnnds upon the same footing as If its exe- therefore, of the clreumstan<'eS of the <'lll!e, 
<·utlon had been proved In the ordinary way. there was no error ID the refusal of the court 
The fact, therefore, that on the twelfth day to lnstruC't the jury that said recital was not 
-Of July, 1810, the date of the deed, In the evidence against the defendants. 
dty of Philadelphia, before Richard Peters The next and only other ground of error 
United States judge, and two other pel'BOW: alleited by ·the defendants ls that the court 
aa wltnet!Se8, Samuel C. Young, the grantor refll8e(l to charge the jury on the question of 
In the deed mentioned, made the de<.>laratlons forfeiture. We think there was no error 
In question, may be taken as established. here. The forfeiture of the lands In contro-
19j 
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versy is alleged to have occurred by virtue
of the provisions of the second section of the
act of ‘February 27, 1835. Two classes of
lands were declared subject to forfeiture by
this act. The first was lands which had
never been entered upon the books of the
commissioners of revenue for the county in ‘
which the lands lay. There is a failure to
show that the lands in question had never
been listed for taxation upon the books of
the commissioners of Lee county, within
whose limits they were included. It is true
the certificate of the auditor of public ac-
counts, introduced by the defendants, ltates
that the records of Lee county prior to 1827
are missing; but it can hardly be maintain-
ed that when a party shows his inability to
prove an essential fact, the fact may be in-
ferred from his inability to prove it. But
the same certificate shows that the lands of’
Samuel Young were placed on the books of
the commissioners of Lee county for six
years, namely, from 1827 to 1832, inclusive.
and that the taxes on the same lands had
been paid up to and including the year 1822.
Upon the showing of the defendants them-
selves, it appears that the lands in question
do not belong to the class which had never
been entered upon the books of the commis-
sioners of revenue.
Nor are the defendants any more successful
in showing that the lands in controversy fell
within the second class liable to forfeiture,
namely, those which for many years previous
to February 27, 1835, the date of the act
declaring the forfeiture, had not been entered
upon the books of the commissioners of reve-
nue. For, referring to the second section of
the act of March 10, 1832 (Laws Va. 1832, c.
73, p. 67), it appears that only those tracts
of land on which the unpaid taxes exceeded
$100 were liable to forfeiture under the act
of February 27, 1835. There is no proof that
the taxes and damages on the lands in ques-
tion exceeded that amount. On the contrary,
196
if the table of lands showing the taxes there-
on for the years 1827 to 1832, inclusive, certi-
fled by the auditor of public accounts, in-
cludes the lands in controversy, as the de-
fendants contend, the taxes thereon for all
the years stated amounted to only 38 cents,
and the taxes were therefore released and
relinquished by the second section of the act
of March 10, 1832; and if this table did not
_‘ include the lands in controversy, then there
is an entire failure to show what the taxes
were. The defendants, therefore, have fail-
ed to prove that the lands in controversy
were liable to forfeiture under the act of
February 27, 1835.
But there is affirmative proof that no for-
feiture could have occurred, for the time for
entering the lands on the commissioners‘
books for taxation, and for paying the taxes,
and thereby preventing forfeiture, was ex-
tended, as has been stated, to the first day
of July, 1538; and it was shown by the cer-
tificate of Crabtree, the deputy-sherifi, that
as early as December 14, 1837. the lands in
controversy were placed upon the tax-hooks.
and the damages thereon taxed; and it was
further shown that the state of Virginia
never claimed the lands as forfeited, but.
from the year 1838 down to the beginning of
this suit, a period of more than 33 years, had
assessed and collected taxes therefor from
the plaintiffs and those under whom they
claim. It follows that the failure to show a
forfeiture of the lands under the act of Feb-
ruary 27, 1835, was complete. It would,
therefore, have been the duty of the court.
if it gave any instruction upon this branch of
the defense, to say to the jury that the de-
fendants had failed to maintain it. It can
hardly be urged by them, as a ground for the
reversal of the judgment, that the court did
not so charge. Brobst v. Brock, 10 \Vall.
519; Phillips Const. Co. v. Seymour, 91 U,
S. 646.
Judgment affirmed.
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versy Is alleged to have occurred by virtue I If the table of lands showing the taxes there-
of the provisions of the second section of the on for the years 1827 to 1832, inclusive, certl-
act of 'February 27, 1833. Two <.>lasses of 11.ed by the auditor ot public accounts, In-
lands were declared subject to forfeiture by eludes the lands ID controversy, as the de-
tbls act. The ti.rat was lands which had j fendants contend, the taxes thereon for all 
never been entered upon the books of the 1 the years stated amounted to only 38 cents, 
commls81oners of revenue for the county In I and the taxes were therefOl'e released and 
which the lands lay. There ls a fallure to relinquished by the second section of the act 
show that the lands in question bad never of March 10, 1832; and it this table did not 
been llsted for taxation upon the books of Include the lands In controversy, then there 
the commlsBloners of Lee county, withlD ls an entire failure to show what the taxes 
whose limits they were Included. It 111 true were. The defendants, therefore, have fall-
the certlftcate of the auditor of public ac- ed to prove that the lands In controYersy 
counts, introduced by the defendants, ttates were liable to forfeiture under the act ot 
that the records of Lee county prior to 1827 j .It'ebruary 27, 1835. 
are missing; but it can hardly be maintain- But there ls affirmative proof that no for-
ed that when a party shows his inabl11ty to felture could have occurred, for the time for 
prove an essential fact, the fact may be In- entering the lands on the commissioners' 
ferred from his Inability to prove It. But books tor taxation, and tor paying the taxes, 
the same certitl<.>ate shows that the lands of· and thereby preventing forfeiture, was ex-
Samuel Young were placed on the books of tended, WI has been stated, to the first day 
the commissioners of Lee county for six of July, 1!:138; and It was shown by the cer-
years, namely, from 1827 to 1832, Inclusive, tlf:lcate of Crabtree, the deputy-sherttr, that 
and that the taxes on the same lands had as early as December 14, 1837, the lnnds in 
been paid up to and Including the year 1822. controveniy were placed upon the tax-bookR. 
Upon the showing of the defendants them- and the damages thereon taxed; and lt was 
selves, It appears that the lands In question further shown that the state of Virginia 
do not belong to the claBs which had never never claimed the lands as forfeited, but. 
been entered upon the books of the commls- from the year 1838 down to the beginning of 
&loners of revenue. this suit, a period of more than 33 years, had 
Nor are the defendants any more suC<'etl8ful aeseBBed and colleeted taxes therefor from 
In showing that the Janda In controversy tell the plalnturs and those under whom they 
within the second class liable to forfeiture, claim. It follows that the failure to show a 
namely, those which for many years previous forfeiture ot the Janda under the act of Feb-
to February 27, 1835, the date of the act ruary 27, 1835, was complete. It would, 
declaring the forfeiture. had not been entered therefore, have been the duty of the court. 
upon the books of the commissioners of reve- if It gave any Instruction upon this branch ot 
nue. For, referring to the second section of the defense, to say to the jury that the de-
the act of March 10, 1832 (Laws Va. 1832, c. fendnnte had failed to maintalD it. It can 
73, p. 67), It appears that only those tracts hardly be urged by them, as a ground for the 
of land on whkh the unpaid taxes exceeded reversal of the judgment, that the court did 
$100 were liable to forfeiture under the act not so charge. Brobst v. Brock. 10 Wall. 
of February 27, 1835. There ls no proof that 519; Philltps Const. Co. v. Seymour, 91 u. 
the taxes and damages on the lands ID ques- S. 646. 
tton exceeded that amount. On the contrary, Judgment aftlrmed. 
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OPINIONS.
[Case N 0. 68
WIGHT FIRE-PROOFING CO. V. POC-
ZEKAI.
(22 N. E. 543, 130 Ill. 139.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 31, 1889.
Appeal from appellate court, first district.
Action by Peter Poczekai for the use of
James G. Weart against the Wight Fire-
Proofing Company. Defendant appeals.
Wm. Eliot Furness, for appellant. Nelson
Monroe, for appellee.
BAKER, J. Appellee recovered judgment
in the superior court of Cook county iii case I
for $2,000, and on appellant's appeal the
judgment was aflirmed by the appellate court
of the first district. Bnsse &Sturtevant had
the contract for the mason-work on a. build-
ing which the Phoenix Insurance Company
of Brooklyn was erecting on the south- west
corner of Clark and Jackson streets, in Chi-
cago, and appellee was working for them.
(hi December 6, 1886, the mason-work was
finished, and appellee was employed with
others in lowering certain planks, which had
been used by the masons for scaffolding. from
the attic floor of the unfinished building
through an elevator way, by means of a rope,
to the floor below. In the perform.-ince of
this duty and at the time he was injured ap-
pellee was using due and ordinary care.
Over him, on the frame-work of the roof,
some of the servants of the appellant were at
work. Appellant had a contract for doing
the lire-proofing of the building, and its
servants on the frame of the roof composed
a gang of three or four men who were pre-
paring the centerings, so called. necessary to
be put in place in order to enable. the appel-
lant to lay the fire-proof arches between the
girders iorining the frame of the roof. The
centerings were a sort of platform supported
from above, built close to and under the
girders, on which the tiles of the arches, fiat
on the under side, were laid, and rested un-
til the mortar with which they were built
should harden, and on which the workmen
0mplo_\'ed in springing the arches stood while
working. The appellant had nothing to do
with the iron-work of the building, and tho
girders of the roof had been put in place by
a contractor who had done the iron-work.
They ran north and south, were some six or
seven fe.-t apart, and, as the morning in
question was frosty, they were slippery. The
centering gang were working over that part
of the attic floor where appellee was at work,
and Lynch, the foreman of the gang, in step-
Plflg around upon the roof girders, stepped
On a short iron girder weighing five or six
hundred pounds, and loose at both ends,
which _was no part of the roof, and which
was lying east and west across the north and
south girders, which were in that place about
as far apart as the short girder was long.
Lynch called the attention of Lee, another of
appellant's workmen, to the fact of the loose
girder. A few moments thereafter he or-
dered Lee to go below to the attic floor, and
tie the timber cross-pieces to a rope, by which
he (Lynch) would haul them up. This order
was obeyed by Lee, and when the rope was
tied to one of the cross-pieces he notified
Lynch to pull up. The latter at this time
was standing with the rope on one of the
girders this loose girder was resting on. and
not more than three or four feet away from
it. Lee, who was a witness for appellee,
stated in his testimony: “As he [Lynch]
hauled away l looked up after the cross-piece,
and as the cross-piece got up I seen this girder
turn over on its end and drop.” This short
girder, in falling, struck appellee, and inflict-
ed upon him the injuries to recover damages
for which the suit was brought.
Several grounds are urged for the reversal
of the judgment-. It is claimed there is a
variance between the declaration and the evi-
dance in respect to the acts of negligence
which caused the injury. The variance sug-
gested does not seem to be of a very siibstan-
tial character, but, be this as it may, appel-
lant cannot now avail himself of it. It does
not appear from the record that any claim of
variance on the ground now indicated was
made in the trial court; and if there made,
and deemed essential, it could readily have
been obviated by amendment. The failure
of appellant to there object on the ground of
the variance must be regarded as a waiver of
the objection. City of Elgin v. Kimball, 90
Ill. 356; Railroad Co. v. Estes, 96 Ill. 470;
Society v. Fietsam, 97 Ill. 474.
The main ground of alleged error is that
when appcllee rested his case the superior
court denied the motion of appellant to direct
the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
The gist of the action was the alleged negli-
gence of the defendant, through its servants,
and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury to the plaintiif. There
was evidence before the jury tending to
prove both of these propositions. The fore-
man of appellant knew the girder was
loose, and that it rested upon frosty and
slippery iron supports; and whether or not
it was culpable negligence, under sncli cir-
cumstances, to stand upon the supporting
girder, and in such close proximity to the
short and loose girder, and pull up timbers
from below with a rope. was a proper ques-
tion of fact for the determination of tbejury.
As the cross-piece got up to where Lynch
was standing, not more than three or four
feet from the girder, the girder was seen to
turn on its end and fall. We are unable to
say, as matter of law, it was not a legitimate
inference and conclusion for a jury from this
testimony, taken in connection with the other
circumstances in proof, that the timber or
rope with which it was hauled came in con-
tact with the girder, and caused one end of it
to slide from its support. There was no error
in the action of the court in refusing to take
the case from the jury.
The court sustained objections to two
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WIGHT FIRE-PROOFING .co. v. roc-
ZEKAL 
(22 N. E. 543, 130 ID. 139.) 
Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 31, 1889. 
Appeal from appellate court, first district. 
Action by Peter Poczekai for the use of 
JamPs G. Weart against the Wight Fire-
Prooling Company. Defendant appeals. 
Wm. Eliot Furness, for appellant. Nelson 
Monroe, for appellee. 
BAKER, J. AppelleP recovered judgment 
in the superior court of Cook county in case 
for ~2,000, and on appellant's 11ppeal the 
judsnnent was affirmed hy the appellate court 
of the first district. Busse & Sturtevant had 
the contract for the mason-work on a build-
ing which the Phoonix Insurance Company 
of Brooklyn was erecting on the south-west 
corner of Clark and Jackson strPets, in Chi-
cago, and appellet> was working for tllt'm. 
On December 6, 1886, the mason-work was 
finished, and appellee was employed with 
others in lowering certain planks, which had 
been used by the masons for scaffolding, from 
the attic floor of the unfinished building 
through an elevator way, by means of a rope, 
to the floor below. In the performance oi 
this duty and at the time he wa.'! injured ap-
pellee was using due and ordinary care. 
Over him, on the frame-work of the roof, 
some of the servants of the appellant were at 
work. Appellant had a contract for doing 
the fire-proofing of the building, and its 
servants on the frame of the roof compoaed 
a gang of three or four men who were pre-
paring the centerings, so called, necessary to 
be put In place in order to enable the appel-
lant to lay the fire-proof arches between the 
girders forming the frame of the roof. The 
centenngs were a sort of platform supported 
from al.Jove, built close to and under the 
girders, on which the tiles of the arches, ftat 
on the under side, were laid, and rested un-
til the mortar with which they were built 
should harden, and on which the workmen 
employed in springing the arches stood while 
workii1g. The appellant had nothing to do 
W:itb the iron-work or the building, and th6 
guders of the roof had been put in place b1 
a contractor who h11d done the iron-work. 
They ran north and south, were some six or 
seven. fe:t apart, and, as the morning in 
quest1011 WllS frosty, they were slippery. The 
centering gang were working ove1· that part 
of the attic floor where appellee was at work, 
and Lynch, the foreman of the gang, in step-
pmg around upon the roof gir1Jers, stepped 
on a abort iron girder weighing five or six 
hundred pounds, and loose at both ends, 
Which was no part of the roof, and which 
was lying east and west across the north and 
south girders, which were iu that place about 
as far apa1·t as the abort girder was long. 
Lynch called the attention of Lt-e, another of 
ap1iellant.'s workmen, to the fact of the loose 
girder. A few moments thereafter be or-
dered Lee to go below to the attic floor, and 
tie the timl.Jer cross-pieces to a rope, by. which 
he (Lynch) would bani them up. This order 
was obeyed by Lee, and when the rope was 
tied to one of the cross-pieces he notified 
Lynch to pull up. The latter at this time 
was standing with the rope on one of the 
girders this loose girder Wl\S rE>sting on, and 
not more than three or four feet away from 
it. Lee, who wns a witness for appellt>e, 
stated in his tE'stirnony: "As he [Lynch] 
hauled away J looked up after the cross-piece, 
and as the cross-piece got up I seen thii1 g i rdt>r 
turn over on its enrl and drop." This short 
girder, in falling, struck appellee, and Inflict-
ed upon him the injuries to recover damages 
for which the suit was brought. 
Several ~rounds are urged for the reversal 
of the judgment. It is claimed there is a 
variance bet ween the clecluration and the evi-
dence in respect to the acts of negligence 
which ransed the injury. The variance sug-
ge;ited does not seem to be of a very substan-
tial character, but, be this as it may, appel-
lant cannot now avail himself of it. It does 
not appear from the record that any claim of 
variance on the ground now indicated was 
made in the trial court; and If there maite, 
and deemed essential, it could readily have 
been obviated by amendment. The failure 
of appellant to there object on the ground ot 
the variance must be regarded as a waiver of 
the objf'ction. City of Elgin v. Kimball, 90 
Ill. 3:i6; Railroad Co. v. Estes, 9ti Ill. 470; 
Society v. Fietsam, 97 lll. 474. 
The main ground of alleged error is that 
when appellee rested bis case the supe1·ior 
court denied the motion of appellant to direct 
the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. 
Thi' gist of the action was the alleged negli-
gence of the defendant, through it.8 servants, 
and that such negligence was the proximate 
cause of the injury t.o the plaintiff. There 
was evidence before the jury tending to 
prove both of these propositions. The fore-
man of appellant knew the girder was 
loose, and that it rested upon frosty and 
slippery iron supports; and whether or not 
it was culpable 11egiigence, under such cir-
cumstances, to stand upon the supporting 
girder, and in such close proximity to the 
short and loose girder, and pull up timbers 
from below with a rope, was a proper ques-
tion of fact for the determination or the jm·y. 
As the cross-piece got up to where Lynch 
was standing, not more than three or four 
feet frnm the girder, the girder was seen to 
turn on its end and fall. We are unalile to 
say, as matter of law, it was not a legitimate 
inference 11nd conclusion for a jury from this 
testimony, taken in connection with the other 
cit·cu111stances in proof, that the timber or 
rope with which it was hauled came In con-
tact with the girder, and caused one end of it 
to slide from its support. There was 110 error 
in the action of the court in refusing to take 
the case from the jury. 
The cou1·t sustamecl objections to two 
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questions asked of the witness Wight, and
such refusal is assigned as error. The ques-
tions wereas follows: “Placing the center-
ing boards in position, what efiect would it
have as to any mass of plank resting on top
of the beams, with reference to its reaching
or falling below?" and, “When the center-
ing beams are in position, can anything fall
from above down below?” Such ruling was
not erroneous. and for two sufiicient reasons.
In the first place, the rule is that, as to mat-
ters which do not so far partake of the nature
of a science as to requirea course of previous
habit or study in order to an attainment of a
knowledge ofthem, the opinions of witnesses,
though experts, are not admissible as evi-
dence. Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan. 101 Ill.
93. and authorities there cited. Besides this,
the negligence here in issue was not in the
mere act of placing the centering boards in
position, but was in the alleged negligent
manner in which the servants of appellant
proceeded in getting ready for the perform-
ance of such work.
It is not claimed it was error to refuse the
last instruction in the series asked by ap-
pellant, but it is insisted the modification
made therein by the court rendered it erro-
in-ons. The modilication made was the inser-
198
tion of the word “sutficient.” The conclu-
sion of the instruction, as given to the jury,
was as fo1‘ows: “If the fact of negligence be
doubtful from the evidence, the defendant is
entitled to the verdict. The fact of an acci-
dent having occurred is not of itself sulfi-
cienl: evidence of negligence.” It would
seem that the fact the girder did fall affords
some evidence that it was lying in such
condition and position upon the beams as
that it was liable to be precipitated below,
where appellee and others were at work, if a
moving body came in contact with it. The
servants of appellant knew it was there. and
were fully advised that it was loose. and that
the irons which supported it were frosty and
slippery, and we see no good reason why the
fact it actually fell should have been vrholly
excluded from the juryin the consideration of
the question of the alleged negligence. The
court told the jury, in substance. that the
fact it fell did not establish negligence,
but, beyond that, left the question of negli-
gence to be determined by the jury upon all
the evidence before them. We are unable to
see that appellant has any cause of complaint
in this action of the court. We find no error
in the record, and the judgment of the appel-
late court is aflirmed.
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questions asked of the witness Wight, and 
such refusi&l is assigned as error. Tile ques· 
tions were as follows: "Placing the center-
ing boards in position, what elfect would it 
have as to any mass of plank 1·esting on top 
or the beams, with reference to its reaching 
or falling below?" and, "When the center-
ing beams arti in position, can anything fall 
from above down below?" Such ruling was 
not erroneous. and for two sufficient reasons. 
In the first plRCe, the rule is that, 88 to mat-
ters which do not so far partake of the nature 
of a science as to require a course of previous 
habit or study in order to an attainment of a 
know ledge of them, the opinions of w itnesse11, 
though experts, are not admissible as evi-
dence. Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan, 101 Ill. 
93, and anthorilies there cited. Besides this, 
the negligence here in issue was not in the 
mere act of plRClng the centering boards in 
posit'on, but was in the alleged negligent 
manner In which the servants of appellant 
proceeded in getting ready for the perform-
ance of such work. 
It is not claimed it was error to refuse the 
last instruction iu the series asked by ap-
pellant, but it is insisted the modification 
made therein by the court rendered it erro-
lll'ous. The moJi Ii cation wade was the inser-
198 
tion of the worll "sufficient." The conclu-
sion of the instrnction, a11 given to the jury, 
was as fol~ows: "lf the fact of negligence be 
doubtful from the evidence, the dl'fendant is 
entitled to the verdict. The fact of an acci-
dent having occurred is not of itself 11uffi-
cient evidence of negligence." It would 
seem that the fllct the girder did fall affords 
some evidence that it was lying in such 
condition and position upon the beams aa 
that it was liable to be precipitated bt'low, 
whPre appellee and others were at work, if a 
moving body came in contact with it. The 
servants of appellant knew it was there, and 
were fully advised that ft Wl\S loose. and that 
the irons which supported it were frost,r and 
slippery, and we see no irood reason why the 
fact it actually fell should have been wholly 
excluded from the jury in the consideration of 
the question of the alleged negligence. '£he 
court told the jury, in substance, that the 
fact it fell did not establh1h negligence, 
but, beyond that, left the question of negli-
gence to be determined by the jury upon all 
the evidence before them. We are unable to 
see that appellant h11s any cause of complaint 
in this action of the court. We find no error 
in tt.e record, and the judgment of the a1ipel-
late coul't is affirmed. 
OP1Nl()NS.
[Case No. 69
McKILLOP v. DYLTTH ST. RY. C’).
(55 N. VV. T39. 53 .\1inn. 532.)
Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 21, 1893.
Appeal from district court, St. Louis coun-
ty; Ensign, Judge.
Action by Alexander McKillop against the
Duluth Street-Railway Company to recover
for personal injuries received while plaiutifl
was lying in a public highway on defend-
ant's track, in an unconscious condition.
Plaintiif had judgment, and defendant ap-
peals. Reversed.
Billson & Congdon. for appellant. Edson
& Edson, for respondent.
GILFILLAN, G. J. The court below erred
in excluding the opinions of the witnesses
that plaintiff was intoxicated. It was hard-
ly a. question for expert testimony, so that-
the facts and circumstances, his acts, ap-
pearance, and’ speech, being detailed by other
witnesses—u witness might be called to state
whether, in his opinion, they indicated in-
toxication, for the matter being one of ob-
servation, and not of science or skill, the
jury can judge, from the details given, as
well as any one, to whom they might be
stated. But there are certain conditions,
mental or physical, or both together, the in-
dications of which it is impossible for any
witness to adequately describe, so that the
relation of them shall have on the mind of
the jury the same effect that witnessing
them legitimately had on the mind of the
spectator. In such cases, from necessity, so
that the matter may be fully laid before the
jury, the spectator may state the effects
the acts, appearance, and speech had on his
mind; that is, may give his opinion as to the
condition they indicated. It is so in respect
to joy, grief, hope, or despondcncy, (Tobin v.
Shaw, 45 Me. 331;) friendliness or hostility,
(Blake v. People, 73 N. Y. 586;) fright,
(Brownell v. People. 38 Mich. 732; Darling
v. ivestmoreland. 52 N. H. 401;) jests or
earnest, (Ray v. State, 50 Ala. 104;) offensive
or insulting manner, (Raisler v. Springer, 38
Ala. 703.) So that a person appears to be
well or iii, or acts sancly or otherwise. (Jan-
nady v. Lynch, 27 Minn. 435, 8 N. W. Rep.
164. So a. witness not an expert, who tes-
tifies to acts and declarations showing an
opportunity to form an opinion, may give
his opinion, based on such facts, of mental
‘capacity. Woodcock v. Johnson, 36 Minn.
217, 30 N. W. Rep. 894. That another cause
of. plaintiifs demeanor was suggested by the
evidence made no difference with the propri-
ety of allowing the witnesses to give their
opinions as to his intoxication. It was for
the jury to determine what caused such de
meanor,—an injury or intoxication; and it
was necessary, in order to do so, that they
have all the evidence before them. If intox-
ication was the cause of plaintlfs falling,
and lying in a helpless condition, on defend-
ant's track, it was contributory negligence on
his part.
The defendant's ofler speciiied in the
fourth assignment of error was rightly ex-
cluded. A municipal corpot-a.tiou has.
through its council, control and charge of the
streets, and may regulate the laying of
street-railway tracks upon them; and if the
council directs the railway company to lay
the tracks upon a specified level or grade,
and so laying them makes the street unsafe
for ordinary travel, the municipal corpora-
tion would doubtless be liable for injuries
resulting therefrom. But it could hardly be
said that so laying them would be an act
of negligence on the part of the railway
company. The offer did not propose to show
any such direction, or even authority, from
the council, but only that, the village engi-
neer having indicated by stakes a grade for
paving the street contemplated and contract-
ed for, the railway company, in llllfiL'l]):ltin11
of such intended paving, laid its tracks in
accordance with the grade thus indicated.
That the street was, some time in the fu-
ture, to be brought to that grade, was no
authority to the company to at once lay the
tracks according to it, if so doing would
render the street unsafe, and thus render-
ing it unsafe would be negligence with re-
spect to any one injured in consequence.
The evidence of the Witness Labby, ob-
jected to, was proper.
As there must be a new trial, for the error
first above specified, it is unnecessary to con-
sider the assignments of error based upon
the charge of the court, further than to say
that in the part of the charge specified in
the ninth assignment the rule of care r_e-
quired of defendant, under the circum-
stances, might be understood by the jury
more strongly than, we suspect, the trial
court intended. Order reversed.
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OPINlONS. (Case No. 6.9 
McKILLOP v. Dl"IXTII ST. RY. C'l. 
(55 :S. W. 739, 53 :\!inn. 532.) 
Supreme Court of Minn('Sota. June 21, 1893. 
Appeal from dlstrlot court, St. Louis coun-
ty; l'~nsign, Judge. 
Action by Alexander :McKille>p against the 
Duluth Street-Rallway Company to recover" 
f->r pet"SOna.l Injuries received while pla.lntltf 
wa11 lying 1D a public highway on defeod-
ant'S' track, In an unconscious condition. 
Plaintltf had judgment, and defendaoit ap-
peals. Reversed. 
Blllson & Congdon, for appellant. Ed800 
& Edson, for respondent. 
GILFILLAN, C. J. The court bel<>W erred 
In excluding the opinions of the witnesses 
that plnlntttr was intoxlcnted. It was hard-
ly a question for expel't testimony, so that-
the facts and clrcumstances. hls actll, ap-
pearmoe, an<fspeech, being detalled by other 
wttn~ witness might be called to state 
'\\1let2ler, ID hls oplntoo, they tndioated In-
toxication. for the matter being one ot ob-
servutlon, and not ot science or aklll, the 
Jury can jUdge, from the details given, aa 
well as any one, to whom they m!Jcht be 
stated. But there are certain oonditions, 
mental or physical, or both together, the ID-
dicatioos of wblch it is impossible for any 
witness to adequately describe, so that the 
relation of them shall have on the mind of 
1he jury the aame etteet that witnessing 
tbem legitimately bad on the mind of the 
spectator. lo such aises, from necessity, so 
that the matter may be fully laid before the 
jury, the spectator may state the ettects 
the acts, appearance, and speech had on his 
mind; that ls, may give his oplnton as to the 
condition they tndicated. It is so ID respect 
to joy, grief, hope, or despondency, (Tobin v. 
Shaw, 45 Me. 331;) triendllneas or hostility, 
(Blake v. People, 73 N. Y. 580;) trlght, 
(Brownell v. People, 38 Mloh. 732; Darling 
v. Weetmorel.•mrt. 52 N. H. 401;) jests or 
e&me8t, (Ray v. State, 50 Ala. 104;) otrenslve 
or lnamltlng manner, (Ralsler v. Springer, 38 
Ala. 703.) So that a person appears to be 
well or tll, or actB aanely or otherwise. Can-
nady v. Lynch, 27 Minn. 435, 8 N. W. Rep. 
lM. So a witness not an expert, who tes-
Wles to acts and declarattODB showing an 
opportunity to form an opinion, may give 
bis oplD.loo, based on such tacts, ot mental 
· c:tpadty. Woodcock v. Johnson, 36 ~linn. 
217, 30 :N. W. Rep. 894. That another cause 
of. pllllntUf's demeanor was sugg(':;Jted by th& 
e\"idence made no dilference with the propri-
ety of allowing the witnesses to give their 
opinions as to his Intoxication. It was for 
the jury to determine what caused sueoh de-
meanor,-an injury or intoxication; and It 
was necessary, in order to do 80, that they 
have all the evidence befor~ them. It Intox-
ication was the cause of plalntl1r's tulllnit. 
nnd lying tn a helpless condition, on defend-
ant's track, it was contributory negligence on 
his part. 
The defendant's olfer specltll'd In the 
fourth assignment of ·error was rightly ex-
cluded. A municipal oorpor:i.tlon hae, 
through its council, control and charge of the 
streets, and may regulate the laying ot 
street-railway tracks upon them; and it the 
oount'il directs tlhe railway company to lay 
the tracks upon a speclfted level or grade, 
and so laying them makes the street unsafe 
for ordinary travel, the municipal corpora-
tion would doubtless be lla.bl.e for injuries 
resulting therefrom. But it could ha1·dly be 
said that eo laying them would be an net 
of negllgence on the part of the railway 
company. The olfer did not propose to show 
any such direction, or even authority, from 
the council, but only that, tbe village engi-
neer having lndtcated by stakes a grade for 
paving the street contemplated and contl"act-
ed for, the raJlwa;r company, to nntklpntlon 
of such wt.ended paving, laid its track.ii in 
Cll"COrdance with the grade tbus Indira ted. 
That the street was, some time In the fu-
ture, to be brought to that grade, was no 
authority to the company to at onee lay the 
tracks according to it, if 80 doing would 
render the stroot unsafe, and thus render-
ing it unsafe would be negligence with re-
spect to any one Injured 1D consequence. 
The evidence of the Witness Labby, ob-
jected to, was proper. 
As there must be a new trial, for the error 
11.rst above speclfted, it ls unnecessary to con-
sider the assignments of error based upon 
the charge of the court, further than to say 
that 1D the part e>f the dln.rge specified In 
the Dinth &11Slgnment the rule of care r.e-
qulred of defendant, under the clrcum-
st:uices, might be understood by the jury 
more strongly than, we snspect, the trial 
court Intended. Order reverBed. 
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Case No. 70]
IKELEVANCY.
CONNECTICUT MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v.‘
LATHROP.
(4 Sup. Ct. 533, 111 U. S. 612.)
Supreme Court of the United States.
V 188-}.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the Unit-
ed States for the Western District of Mis-
souri.
May 5,
Jeff. Chandler, for plaintiff in error.
\Vallace Pratt and Jefl’. Brumback, for de-
fendant in error.
iIARLA‘.\‘, J . This is a writ of error from
a judgment in favor of Helen Pitkin, the
beneficiary in two policies issued by the
Connecticut .\Iutual Life Insurance Company
upon the life of her husband,—0ne, on the
tenth day of August, 1866, for the sum of
$.'»,000; and the other, on the twenty-fourth
day of September, 1873, for the sum of $i23.
The insured, George E. Pitkin, died on the
twenty-ninth day of September, 1878. After
the case came here, the beneficiary in the
policies (lied, and there was a revivor against
her personal representative. The defense
~ was the same as to each policy. Briefly stat-
ed, it is this: That the policy expressly pro-
vies that in case the insured shall, after its
execution, become so far intempemte as to
impair his health, or induce delirium tre-
mens, or should die by his own hand, it
shall be void and of no effect; that, after
its execution and delivery, he did become
so far iutemperate as to impair his health,
and induce delirium tremens; also, that he
died by his own hand, because, with pre-
meditation and deliberation, he shot himself
through the heart with a bullet discharged
by himself from a pistol, by reason whereof
he died. Further, that the atfirmatlve an-
swer by plaintiff, in her application for in-
surance, to the question whether the insured
was then and had always been of temperate
habits, being false and untrue, the contract
was annulled, because, by its terms, the
policy was to become void if the statements
and representations in the application—1-on-
stituting the basis of the contract between
the parties—were not in all respects true and
correct. The plaintiff, in her reply, put in
issue all the material allegations of the an-
swer, except that alleging the self-dcstruc-
tion of her husband; as to which she aver-
red that, “at the time he committed said act
of self-destruction, and with reference there-
to,” he "was not in possession of his mental
faculties, and was not responsible for said
act."
At the close of the evidence introduced for
the plaintiff. the defendant, by counsel, mov-
ed the court to instruct the jury that upon
the pleadings and evidence the piaintifl! could
not recover. That motion was denied, and
the action of the court—to which the de-
fendant at the time exccpted—is assigned
for error. This instruction, it is claimed,
should have been given upon the ground
that the evidence disclosed no symptom
whatever of insanity upon the part of the in-
sured. But that position cannot be sustain-
ed upon any proper view of the testimony.
There certainly was evidence tending to
show a material, if not radical, change for
the worse in the mental condition of the in-
sured immediately preceding his death. In
the judgment of several who knew him in-
timately, and had personal knowledge of
uch change, he was not himself at the time
of the act of self-destruction. Whether his
strange demeanor immediately before his
death was the result of a deliberate, con-
scious purpose to feign insanity, so as there-
by the more readily to defraud the com-
pany, was a matter peculiarly within the
province of the jury to determine. If the
refusal of the court to sustain the motion
would have been error, had there been an
entire absence of proof to sustain the plain-
tiff's suit. it is suflicient to say that there
was evidence of a substantial character tend-
ing to show that the insured was insane
when he took h-is life.
In Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 238,
where the question was made as to the duty
of the court, on a motion by the defendant
for a peremptory instruction based wholly
on plaintiff's evidence, it was said that “if
there was any evidence tending to prove
that the deceased was insane when he took
the poison which caused his death, the judge
was not bound to, and, indeed, could not
properly, take the evidence from the jury.
The weight of the evidence is for them, and
not for the judge, to pass upon."
The case clearly comes within the rule an-
nounced in Insurance Co. v. Doster, 106 U.
S. 32, 1 Sup. Ct. 18, that “where a cause
fairly depends upon the effect or weight of
testimony, it is one for the consideration and
determination of the jury, under proper di-
rections as to the principles of law involved.
It should never be withdrawn from them
unless the testimony be of such a conclu-
sive character as to compel the court, in the
exercise of a sound legal discretion, to set
aside a verdict returned in opposition to it."
When the evidence was concluded on both
ides the defendant submitted requests for
instructions. Some of them were given and
some refused, but it does not appear from
the record which were given and which re-
fused. As the exception which was taken
related to the refused instructions, and since
it does not appear which of them belonged
to that class, none of the series asked by
defendant can be noticed. We may, how-
ever, remark that the charge of the court,
to which no exception was taken, embodied
all of defendant's instructions that were ap-
plicable to the case, and which could prop-
erly have been given.
This brings us to the consideration of the
substantial questions presented by the as-
signments of error. They relate to the ad-
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Case No. 70] UELEVAXCY. 
COX~ECTICUT lfUT. LIFE !XS. CO. v: 
LATHROP. 
(4 Sup. Ct. 533, 111 U. S. 612.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. May 5, 
• lSS!. 
In Error to the Circuit Court of the Unit-
ed Htates for the Western Dlstrict of Mis-
souri. 
Jetr. Chandh~r. for plalntltr In error. 
Wallace Pratt and Jeff. Brumback, for de-
fendant In error. 
HARLA~. J. This la a writ of error from 
a judgment In fayor of Helen Pitkin, the 
beneficiary In two poll<'ll'll Issued by the 
Connecticut :\lutual Life Immmnce Company 
upon the life of her husband,--0ne, on the 
tenth day of August, 18UO, for the sum of 
~,llOO; and the other, on the twenty-fourth 
dny of ~eptember, 18i3, for the sum of $123. 
The Insured, George E. Pitkin, died on the 
twenty-ninth day of September, 18i8. After 
the <'O.se <'ame here, the benefi<'lary In the 
lJOll<'les died, and there was a revlvor against 
her personal representative. The defense 
' was the snme as to each policy. Brlctly stat-
ed, It Is this: That the policy expressly pro-
vies that In t1lse the Insured shall, after Its 
execution, become so far Intemperate as to 
Impair his health, or Induce delirium tre-
mena, or should die by his own hand, It 
shall be void and of no etrect; that, after 
Its exe<'utlon and delivery, be did become 
so far Intemperate as "to Impair his health, 
and Induce delirium tremens; also, that he 
died by his own hand, because, with pre-
meditation and dellberatlon, he shot himself 
through the heart with a bullet discharged 
by himself from a pistol, by reason whereof 
he died. Further, that the aftlrmatlve an-
swer by plalntlJr, In her application for In-
surance, to the question whether the Insured 
was then and had always been of temperate 
habits, being false and untrue, the contract 
was annulled, because, by Its terms, the 
policy was to become void If the statements 
and representations in the ap11llcatlon--con-
stltuttng the basis of the contract between 
the parties-were not In all respects true and 
cor1't•ct. The plnlnt!Jr, In her reply, put in 
Issue all the material allegations of the an-
swer, except that alleging the self-destruc-
tion of her husband; as to which she aver-
r(>(} that, "at the time he committed said act 
of self-destruction, and with reference there-
to," he "was not In possession of his mental 
faculties, and was not responsible for said 
act.'' 
At the close of thP evidence Introduced for 
the plaintiff, the dt>fendant, by counsel, mov-
ed the court to Instruct the jury that upon 
the pleadings and eYldence the plalntltr could 
not re<'OVl'r. That motion was dt>nled, and 
the action of the court-to which the de-
fendant a.t the time excepted-ls assigned 
tor error. This Instruction, It ls claimed, 
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should have been given upon the ground 
that the evidence disclosed no symptom 
whatever of Insanity upon the part of the In-
sured. But that position <.'annot be sustain-
ed upon any proper view of the testimony. 
There certainly was evidence tending to 
show a material, If not radical, change for 
the worse In the mental condition of the In-
sured Immediately preceding hls death. In 
the judgment of several who knew him In-
timately, and had personal knowledge of 
such change, he was not himself at the time 
of the a<'t of self-destruction. Whether his 
strange demeanor Immediately before his 
death was the result of a dellberate, con-
S<'lou11 purpose to feign Insanity, so as there-
by the more readily to defraud the com-
pany, was a matter peculiarly within the 
province of the jury to determine. If the 
refusal of the court to sustain the motion 
would have been error, had there been an 
entire absen<'e of proof to sustain the plaln-
tltr's suit, It Is suftl<.'lent to say tha.t there 
was evl<len<'e of a substantial character tend· 
Ing to show that the Insured was insane 
when he took bis life. 
In Insuran<'e: Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 238, 
where the question was made as to the duty 
of the court, on a motion by the defendant 
for a peremptory Instruction based wholly 
on platntitr's evidence, ft was said that "If 
there was any evidence tending to prove 
that the deceased was Insane when he took 
the poison which caused his death, the judge 
was not bound to, and, Indeed, could not 
properly, take the evldenCf' from the jury. 
The weight of the evidence ls for them, and 
not for the judge, to pass upon." 
The case clearly comes within the rule an-
nounced In Insurance Co. v. Doster, 106 U. 
S. 32, 1 Sup. Ct. 18, that "where a cause 
fairly depends upon the effect or weight of 
testimony, It ls one for the consideration and 
determination of the jury, under proper di-
rections as to the principles of law Involved. 
It should never be withdrawn from them 
unless the testimony be of such a conclu-
sive character as to compel the court, in the 
exercise of a sound legal discretion, to set 
aside a verdict returned In opposition to It." 
When the evidence was concluded on both 
sides the defendant submitted requests for 
Instructions. Some of them were given and 
some refused, but It does not appear from 
the record which were given and which re-
fused. As the exception which was taken 
related to the refused Instructions, and since 
It does not appear which of them belonged 
to that <.'lass, none of the series asked by 
defendant can be noticed. " 'e may, oow-
eyer, remark that the <'barge of the court, 
to which no exception was taken, embodll'd 
all of defendant's lnstru<'tions that were ap-
plicable to the case, and which could prop-
erly have been given. 
This brings us to the consideration of the 
substantial questions presented by the U· 
slgnments of error. They relate to the ad· 
OPINIONS.
[Case No. 70
mission, against the objection of the de-
fendant, of certain evidence touching the
condition of the mind of the insured at or
about the time he destroyed his life.
Before the introduction of the particular
testimony to which the objections related,
there was, as we have already said, proof
tending to show that Pitkin was not entirely
sound in mind. Witnesses well acquainted
with him remarked the unusually excited,
wild expression of his face. A domestic in
his family testified that “he looked very wild
and frightened out of his eyes; he looked
like some one that was crazy." Within a few
hours before death he bade one witness,
whose store he visited, good-bye, saying that
he was “going to a country where there is no
return." To another witness, on the same
occasion, he appeared to be "out of his head;
kind of mad, insane."
At this stage of the case one Streiu was in-
troduced as a witness for plaintiff. Pitkin
was in his saloon about 11 o’clock of the day
on which he took his life, and a few hours
only before his death. So much of his ex-
amination (omitting the questions) as is nec-
essary to a proper understanding of the ob-
jections made by plaintiff in error is here
given: "Answer. He asked for a glass of
wine, and I gave it to him. He said he
hadn't had a drink yet that day, or since
the one he had last night from me,—that
was a glass of wine. He said, ‘I may look
queer this morning or drunk to other people,
but I ain't drunk.‘ He said, ‘Some people
may think me drunk, but I am not; I am
not drunk in my body, but I am in my
mind.’ He looked unusual to me. He had
on his old clothes, and his neck-tie was out
of shape, his face was red, and his eyes
staring at me, which made me think he was
quite out of his usual way. His appearance
and the look ,was quite diiferent from his
usual appearance prior to that time. He
looked, in his face, quite red, and his eyes
had quite another expression. He had them
open wide, with a look that was wild, and
he looked around the room awhile and walk-
ed up and down, and seemed very restless.
He would not stand at one place like he
usually did, but walked up and down. I
spoke a few words after that, but I did not
notice him very much, for I was very busy.”
The witness being asked to state the impres-
sion made upon him by wh-at he saw of
Pitkin‘s condition, the defendant objected
to the question as incompetent. But the ob-
jection was overruled, and an exception was
taken. The witness answered: “My im-
pression was that he seemed to be quite out
of his head that morning. I could not say
the reason. I didn't know then anything
about his disappointment; I found that out
afterwards."
Another witness, l\Ir. Ferry, an attorney at
law, was introduced by the plaintiff. He saw
Pitkin the morning of the day he killed him-
self. What occurred was thus stated by him:
“I came down Broadway, walking, and Mr.
Pratt came down from his residence on Wash-
ington street, in a street car, and got out on
the corner of Sixth and Broadway, and we
went there in front of the office. Mr. Pitkin
was standing very near the door, and as we
passed up the stairway going to our oflice
we both said. ‘Good morning’ to him, and Mr.
Pratt says, ‘Pit., why ain’t you at church?’
Mr. Pitkin said, ‘I am not going to church,
I am going to hell;' and we immediately
passed on up stairs and into the doorway, but
as we started up stairs Pitkin stuck his head
into the door and says, ‘Do you want to send
any word to him?’ Mr. Pratt says, ‘To
whom?’
and he turned immediately and went out of
the door." Being asked how Pitkin looked
during that conversation, he said that “he
seemed very much agitated and nervous; his
face was flushed; the pupil of his eye dilated
and bright, and there was no expression in
it." Against the objections of defendant he
was permitted to testify that the impression
left on hi mind, from the conduct, actions,
manner, expressions, and conversation of Pit- '
kin, was that “he was crazy, and didn't know
what he was doing.”
Exception was also taken to the action of
the court in permitting the witness Aldrich
to answer a certain question. He saw the de-
ceased a few moments before his death, and
observed that he “looked strange;” had “a
very peculiar look,” one that he had never
seen before. It was “a wild look." Being
asked what impression Pitkin made upon him
by his manner and conduct at the time, he
answer-ed,—the defendant's objection to the
evidence being overruled,—"I thought he was
out of his head."
It is contended, in behalf of plaintiff in er-
ror, that the impressions and opinions of these
non-professional witnesses as to the mental
condition of the insured, although accompa-
nied by a statement of the grounds upon which
they rested, were incompetent as evidence of
the fact of insanity. This question was sub-
stantially presented in Insurance Co. v. Rodel,
ubi supra, which was an action upon a life
policy containing a clause of forfeiture in case
the insured died by his own hand. The is-
sue was as to his sanity at the time of the
act of self-destruction. \Vltnesses acquainted
with him described his conduct and appear-
ance at or about,and shortly before, his death.
They testified as to how he looked and acted.
One said that he “looked like he was insane;”
another, that his impression was that the in-
sured “was not in his right mind." In that
case the court said that “although such testi-
mony from ordinary witnesses may not have
great weight with experts, yet it was com-
petent testimony, and expressed in an in-
artificial the impressions which are usually
made by insane persons upon people of ordi-
nary understanding." The general rule un-
doubtedly is that witnesses are restricted to
proof of facts within their personal knowl-
‘To the devil; I am going to hell,’ .
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OPINIONS. [CIUe No. 70 
mission, against the objections of the de· 
fendant, of certain evidence touching the 
condition of the mind of the ln11ut-ed at or 
about the tlwe he destroyed his life. 
Before the introduction of the particular 
testimony to which the objections related, 
there was, as we have already said, proof 
tending to show that Pitkin was not entirely 
SOWld ln mind. \Yitnesses well acquainted 
with him remarked the unusually excited, 
wild expression of his face. A domestic in 
his family testified that "he looked very wild 
and frightened out of his eyes; he looked 
like some one that w·as crazy." \Vithin a few 
hours before death he bade one witness, 
whose sto1-e he visited, A'OOd-bye, saying that 
he was "going to a country where there Is no 
n.>tnru." To another witness, on the same 
0<·(•aslon, he appeared to be "out of hls bead; 
kind of mad, lni:ane." 
At this stage f)f the case one Streln was ln· 
troduced WI a witness fol' plalntilT. !'Itkin 
was in his saloon about 11 o'dock of the day 
on which he took his life, and a few hours 
only before his den.th. So much of his ex-
amination (omitting the questions) as ls nec-
e8Sllry to a proper understanulng of the ob-
Jeetlons made by plaintllf In error Is here 
given: "Answer. He asked for a glass of 
wine, and I gave It to him. He said he 
lmdn't had a drink yet that day, or since 
the one he had last night from me,-that 
wn.s a glass of wine. He said, 'I may look 
queer this morning or drunk to other people, 
but I ain't drunk.' He said, 'Some people 
may think me drunk, but I am not; I am 
not drunk ln my body, but I am in my 
mind.' He looked unusual to me. He had 
on his old clothes, and hls neck-tie was out 
of shape, his face was red, and his eyes 
staring at me, which made me think he was 
quite out of hls usual way. His appearance 
and the look ,was quite different from his 
usual appearance prior to that time. He 
looked, ln his face, quite red, and his eyes 
bad quite another expression. He had them 
open wide, with a look that was wild, and 
be looked around the room awhlle and walk-
ed up and down, and seemed Ye1-y restless. 
He would not stand at one place like he 
usually did, but walked up and down. I 
spoke a few ,,·ords after that, but I did not 
notice him very much, for I was yery busy.'' 
The witness being asked to state the lmpt·es-
sion made upon him by whnt he saw of 
Pltkiu's condition, the defendant objected 
to the question as incompetent. But the ob-
jection was overruled, and an exc·eptlou was 
taken. The witness answered: ".My lm-
pre11slon was that he seemed to be <1u1te out 
of his head that morning. I could not say 
thP reason. I didn't know tllen anything 
about his disappointment; I found that out 
afterwards." 
Another witness, l\Ir. Ferry, an attorney at 
law, was introduced by the plnlntlfl'. He saw 
Pitkin the morning of the day he killed him-
self. What occurred was thus stated by him: 
"I came down Broadway, walking, and Mr. 
Pratt came down from hls residence on Wash-
ington street, in a street car, and got out on 
the corner of Sixth and Broadway, and we 
went there ln front of the omce. :Mr. Pitkin 
was standing very near the door, anll as we 
passed up the stairway going to our omce 
we both said, 'Good morning' to hlm, and Mr. 
Pratt says, 'Pit., why ain't you at church?' 
l\Ir. Pitkin said, 'I am not going to church, 
I am going to hell;' and we Immediately 
passed on up stairs and Into the doorway, but 
as we started up stairs Pltkln stuck his head 
Into the door and says, 'Do you want to send 
any word to him?' Mr. Pratt says, 'To 
whom?' 'To the devil; I am going to hell,' 
and he turned immediately and went out of 
the door.'' Being asked how Pitkin looked 
during that CQnverSlltlon, he said that "he 
seemed very much agitated and net·vous; his 
face was tlushed; the pupil of his eye dilated 
and bright, and there was no expression ln 
lt." Against the objections of defendant he 
was pern1ltted to testify that the impression 
left on hls mind, from the conduct, actions, 
manner, expressions, and conversation of Pit-
kin, was that "he was crazy, and didn't know 
what he was doing." 
Exct•ptlon was also taken to the action of 
the court in permitting the witness Aldrich 
to answer a certain question. He saw the de-
ceased a few moments before his death, and 
observed that he "looked strange;" had "a 
very peculiar look," one that he had never 
seen before. It was "a wild look." Being 
asked what lmpresslon Pitkin made upon hlm 
by his manner and conduct at the time, he 
nnswered,-the defendant's objection to the 
evidence being overruled,-"! thought he was 
out of his head." 
It Is contended, in behalf of plaintiff In er-
ror, that the Impressions and opinions of these 
non-professional witnesses as to the mental 
condition of the Insured, although accompa-
nied by a statement of the grounds upon which 
they rested, were Incompetent as evidence of 
the fact of Insanity. This question was sub-
stantially presented ln Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 
ubl supra, which was an action upon a Ute 
policy containing a clause of forfeiture In case 
the Insured died by Ills own hand. The Is-
sue wal!I as to his sanity at the time of the 
act of self-destruction. Wltn~::ises acquainted 
with him desNlbed his conduct and appenl'-
ance at or nbout,aml shortly before, his death. 
They testified as to how he looked and acted. 
One said that he "looked like he was insane;" 
another, that his hup1·esslon was that the ln-
sul'ed "was not In his right mind." In that 
case the court said that "although such testi-
mony from ordinary witnesses may not have 
great wel~ht with experts, yet It was com-
petent testimony, and ex11l'essed in an in-
nrtlttclal the Impressions which are usually 
made by Insane persons upon people of ordl· 
nary understanding.'' The g-eneral n1le un-
doubted!;\· Is that wltneRses are restl'l<'ted to 
proof of facts within their personal kuowl· 
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edge, and may not express their opinion or
judgment as to matters which the jury or the
court are required to determine, or which
must constitute elements in such determina-
tion. To this rule there is a well-established
exception in the case of witnesses having
special knowledge or skill in the business, art,
or science, the principles of which are involv-
ed in the issue to be tried. Thus the opinions
of medical men are admissible in evidence as
to the sanity or insanity of a person at a par-
ticular time, because they are supposed to
have become, by study and experience, famil-
iar with the symptoms of mental disease, and
therefore qualified to assist the court or jury
in reaching a correct conclusion. And such
opinions of medical experts may be based as
well upon facts within their personal knowl-
edge, as upon a hypothetical case disclosed
by the testimony of others. But are there no
other exceptions to the general rule to which
we have referred?
Counsel for the plaintiff in error contends
that witnesses who are not exports in medical
science may not, under any circumstances. ex- 1
press their judgment as to the sane or insane ‘
state of a person's mind. This position, it
must be conceded, finds support in some ad-
judged cases as well as in some elementary =
But. in our opinion, it i
cannot be sustained consistently with the.
treatises on evidence.
weight of authority, nor without closing an
important avenue of truth in many, if not in
every case, civil and criminal, which involves
the question of insanity. Whether an indi-
vidual is insane, is not always best solved by
abstruse metaphysical speculations, expressed
in the technical language of medical science.
The common sense, and, we may add, the
natural instincts of mankind reject the sup-
position that only experts can approximate
certainty upon such a subject. There are
matters of which all men have more or less
knowledge, according to their mental capacity
and habits of observation,-—matters about
which they may and do form opinions suf-
flciently satisfactory to constitute the basis
of action. \Vhile the mere opinion of a non-
professional witness, predicated upon facts
detailed by others, is incompetent as evidence
upon an issue of insanity, his judgment, based
upon personal knowledge of the circumstan-
ces involved in such an inquiry, certainly is
of value; because the natural and ordinary
operations of the human intellect, and the ap-
pearance and conduct of insane persons, as
contrasted with the appearance and conduct
of persons of sound mind, are more or less
understood and recognized by every one of
ordinary intelligence who comes in contact
with his species. The extent to which such
opinions should influence or control the judg-
ment of the court or jury ,must depend upon
the intelligence of the witness, as manifested
by his examination, and upon his opportuni-
ties to ascertain all the circumstances that
should properly affect any conclusion reached.
It will also depend, in part, upon the degree
of the mental unsoundness of the person
whose condition is the subject of inquiry; for
his derangement may be so total and palpable
that but slight observation is necessary to
enable persons of ordinary understanding to
form a reasonably accurate judgment as to
his sanity or insanity; in other cases, the
symptoms may be of uch an occult character
as to require the closest scrutiny and the high-
est skill to detect the existence of insanity.
The truth is, the statement of a n0n-1m~.fc.<-
sional witness as to the sanity or insanity.
at a particular time, of an individual, whose
appearance, manner, habits, and conduct
came under his personal observation, is not
the expression of mere opinion. In form it is
opinion, because it expresses an inference or
conclusion based upon observation of the ap-
pearance, manner, and motions of another
person, of which a correct idea cannot well
be communicated in words to others without
embodying, more or less, the impressions or
Judgment of the witness. But in a substan-
tial sense, and for every purpose essential to
a safe conclusion, the mental condition of an
individual, as sane or insane,is a fact, and the
expressed opinion of one who has had ade-
quate opportunities to observe his conduct and
appearance is but the statement of a fact‘.
not. indeed, a fact established by direct and
positive proof, because in most, if not all
cases it is impossible to determine, with abso-
lute certainty, the precise mental condition of
another; yet, being founded on actual obser-
vation, and being consistent with common ex-
perience and the ordinary manifestations of
the condition of the mind, it is knowledge,
so far as the human intellect can acquire
knowledge upon such subjects. Insanity “is
a disease of the mind which assumes as many
and various forms as there are shades of dif-
ference in thehuman character." It is, as has
been well said, “a condition which impresses
itself as an aggregate on the observer," and
the opinion of one, personally cognizant of
the minute circumstances making up that ag-
gregate, and which are detailed in connec-
tion with such opinion, is, in its essence, only
fact “at short-hand.” 1Whart.&. S. Med.Jur.
§ 257. This species of evidence should be ad-
mitted, not only because of its intrinsic value,
when the result of observation by persons of
intelligence, but from necessity. We say
from necessity, because a jury or court, hav-
ing had no opportunity for personal observa-
tion, would otherwise be deprived of the
knowledge which others possess; but, also,
because, if the witness may be permitted to
state—as, undoubtedly, he would be where
his opportunities of observation have been
adequate-“that he has known the individual
for many years; has repeatedly conversed
with him and heard others converse with
him; that the witness had noticed that in
these conversations he was incoherent and
silly; that in his habits he was occasionally
highly pleased and greatly vexed without a
cause; and that in his conduct he was wild,
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Case No. 70] HELEVANCY. 
edge, and may not express their opinion or 
judgment as to matters which the jury or the 
court are required to determine, or which 
must constitute elements In such determina-
tion. To this rule there ls a well-established 
exception in the case of witnesses having 
special knowledge or skill In the business, art, 
or scle1we, the principles of which are involv-
ed in the Issue to be tried. Thus the opinions 
of medical men are admiBBlble in evidence as 
to the sanity or Insanity of a person at a par-
ticular time, because they are supposed to 
have become, by study and experience, famil-
iar with the symptoms of mental disease, and 
theref01·e qualified to assist the court or jury 
In reaching a correct conclusion. And such 
opinions of medical experts may be based as 
well upon facts within their personal knowl-
edge, as upon a hypothetical case disclosed 
by the testimony of others. But are there no 
other exceptions to the general rule to which 
we have referred? 
Counsel for the plaintiff in error contends 
that witnesses who are not experts in medical 
sclenee may not, under any circumstances. ex-
l)ress their judgment as to the sane or Insane 
state of a person's mind. This position, lt 
must be conceded, finds support in some ad-
judged cases as well as In some elementary 
treatises on evidence. But. in our opinion, it 
cannot be sustained consistently with the 
weight of authority, nor without closing an 
Important avenue of truth in many, if not in 
every case, civil and criminal, which involves 
the question of insanity. Whether an indi-
vidual Is Insane, Is not always best solved by 
abstruse metaphysical speculations, expressed 
in the technical language of medical science. 
The common sense, and, we may add, the 
natural instincts of mankind reject the sup-
position that only experts can approximate 
certainty upon such a subject. There are 
matters of which all men have more or less 
knowledge, according to their mental capacity 
and habits of observatlon,-matters about 
which they may and do form opinions suf-
ficiently satisfactory to constitute the basis 
ot action. \Vhlle the mere opinion of a non-
professional witness, predicated upon facts 
detailed by others, Is incompetent as evidence 
upon on Issue of Insanity, his judgment, based 
upon personal knowledge of the circumstan-
ces Involved in such an Inquiry, certainly ls 
of value; because the natural and ordinary 
operations of the human intellect, and the ap-
pearance and conduct of Insane persons, as 
contrasted with the appearance and conduct 
ot persons of sound mind, are more or less 
understood and recognized by eYery one of 
ordinary Intelligence who comes in contact 
with his species. The extent to which such 
opinions should inftuence or control the judg-
ment of the court or jury .must depend upon 
the lntelllgence of the witness, as manifested 
by his examination, and upon his opportuni-
ties to as<"et1aln all the circumstances that 
shoulll properly affect any conclusion reached. 
It will also depend, in part, upon the degree 
~ 
of the mental unsoundness of the person 
whose condition Is the subject of Inquiry; for 
his derangement may be so total and polpalJle 
that but slight observation is necessary to 
enable persons of ordinary understanding to 
form a reasonably accurate judgment as to 
his sanity or insanity; in other cases, the 
symptoms may be of such an occult charact!'r 
as to require the closest scrutiny and the high-
est skUl to detect the existence of insanity. 
The truth Is, the statement of a non-prufe~· 
slonal witness as to the sanity or Insanity. 
at a particular time, of an individual, whose 
appearance, manner, habits, and conduct 
came under his personal observation, ls not 
the expression of mere opinion. In form It is 
opinion, because It expresses an Inference or 
conclusion based upon obserrntlon of the ap· 
pearance, manner, and motions of another 
person, of which a coITect idea cannot well 
be communicated in words to others without 
embodying, more or less, the lmpreBBlons OC' 
judgment of the witness. But in a substan-
tial sense, and for eyery purpose essential t<> 
a safe conclusion, the mental condltlon of an 
individual, as sane or insane, ls a fact, and the 
expressed opinion of one who has had ade-
quate opportunities to observe his conduct and 
appearance ls but the statement of a tact; 
not, indeed, a tact established by direct and 
positive proof, because In most, It not an 
cases It ls Impossible to determine, with ab~ 
lute certainty, the precise mental condition or 
anothe1·; yet, being founded on actual obser-
vation, and being consistent with common ex-
perience and the ordl111uy manifestations of 
the condition of the mind, It Is knowledge, 
so tor as the human intellect can acquire 
knowledge upon such subjects. Insanity "ls 
a disease of the mind which assumes as many 
and various forms as there are shades of dif-
ference in the human character." It ls, as has 
been well said, "a condition which impresses 
itself as an aggregate on the observer," and 
the opinion of one, personally cognizant or 
the minute circumstances making up that ag-
gregate, and which are detailed In connec-
tion with such opinion, ls, In its essence, only 
fact "at short-hand." 1 Whart. & S. lied. Jur_ 
§ 257. This species of evidence should be ad-
mitted, not only because of its Intrinsic value. 
when the result of observation uy persons or 
Intelligence, but from necessity. We say 
from necessity, because a jury or court, hav-
ing had no opportunity for personal obset"Va-
tlon, would otherwise be deprived of the 
knowledge which others possess; but, also, 
because, if the witness may be permitted to 
state-as, undoubtedly, he would be whe~ 
his opportunities of obserratlon have been 
adequate-"that he has known the· Individual 
for many years; has repeatedly conversed 
with him and heard others converse with 
him; that the witness had noticed that in 
these conversations he was incoherent and 
silly; that In his habits he was occasionally 
highly pleased and greatly vexed without a 
cause; and that in his conduct he was wild, 
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irrational, extravagant, and crazy,—what
would this be but to declare the judgment or
oplnioii of the witness of what is incoherent
or foolish in conversation, what reasonable
cause of pleasure or resentnient. and what
the indicia of sound or disordered intellect?
It he may not so testify, but must give the
supposed silly and incoherent language, state
the degrees and all the accompanying cir-
cumstances of highly excited emotion, and
specifically set forth the freaks or acts regard-
ed as irrational, and thus, without the least
intimation of any opinion which he has form-
ed of their character, where are such witness-
es to be found? Can it be supposed that
those, not having a special interest in the
subject, shall have so (?ll:ll'j.'Q(l their memories
with these matters, as distinct, independent
facts, as to be able to present them in their
entirety and simplicity to the jury? Or, if
such a witness be found, can he conceal from
the jury the impression which has been made
upon his mind; and, when this is collected,
can it be doubted but that his judgment has
been influenced by many, very many, circum-
stances which he has not communicated,
which he cannot communicate, and of which
he himself is not aware?" Clary v. Clary, 2
Ired. Law, 83. The jury, being informed as
to the witness’ opportunities to know all the
circumstances, and of the reasons upon which
he rests his statement as to the ultimate gen-
eral fact of sanity or insanity, are able to
test the accuracy or soundness of the opinion
expressed, and thus, by using the ordinary
means for the ascertainment of truth, reach
the ends of substantial justice.
These views are sustained by a very large
number of adjudications in the courts of
this country, some of which are cited in the
nia.rgin.1 In several of those cited the whole
subject was very fully considered in all its
aspects. While the cases are. to some ex-
tent, in conflict, we are satisfied that tne
rule most consistent with sound reason, and
sustained by authority, is that indicated in
this opinion.
Counsel for the plaintiff in error calls our
attention to the case of Wright v. Tatham, 5
Clark & F. 670, as an authority for the broad
proposition that non-professional witnesses
cannot give their opinions and impressions
1 Clary v. Clary, 2 lred. Law, 83: Dunham's
Appeal, 27 Conn. 193: Grant v. Thom ison, 4
Conn. 203; Hardy v. Merrill. 56 N. H. 2‘ 7. sub-
stantially overruling Boardman v. Boardman.
47 N. H. 120: State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, and
State v. Archer, 54 N. H. 468; Hathaway's
Adm’r v. Insurance Co.. 48 Vt. 350; Morse v.
Orawford, 17 Vt. 499; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio,
483; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 330; Potts v.
House. 6 Ga. 324; Vanaiikeifs Case, 10 N. J.
Eq. 190; Brooke v. Townshend. 7 Gill, 10;
De_Witt v. Barly, 17 N. Y. 342, ex laining
decision in same case in 9 N. Y. 371; glewlett
v. \Vood 55 N. Y. 634; Clahplp v. Fullerton, 34
N. Y. 190; Rutherford v. orris, 77 111. 397;
Duflield v. Morris’ Ex’r, 2 Har. 384; Wilkin-
son v. Pearson, 23 Pa. St. 119; Pidcock v.
Potter 68 Pa. St. 342; Doe v. Reagan, 5
Blackf. 218; Dove v. State, 3 Heisk. 348; But-
concei-ning the state of a person's mind,
even in connection with the facts within
their personal knowledge, upon which such
opinion is based. On a question of the com-
petency of a party to make a will, certain
letters, written to that party by third per-
sons, who had died before they were oifered
as evidence, and which letters were found
many years after their date among the tes-
tator's papers, were held, in that case, not
to be admissible without proof that he acted
on them. Whether the opinions of non-ex-
perts, in connection with a statement, under
oath, of the facts, are admissible upon an in-
quiry as to the insanity of an individual,
was not involved or determined in that case.
On the contrary, the observations made by
some of the judges, in illustration of their
opinions upon the precise point in judgment,
would indicate a concurrence in the general
views we have expressed. After stating that
the letters were offered as evidence of the
opinions of the writers. Baron Alderson said:
“The objection of their admissibility is that
this opinion is not upon oath, nor is it pos-
sible for the opposite party to test by cross-
exaniination the foundation on which it
rests. The object of laying such testimony
before the jury is to place the whole life
and conduct of the testator, it possible, be-
fore them, so that they may judge of his ca-
pacity; for this purpose you call persons-
who have known him tor years, who have
seen him frequently, who have conversed
with him or corresponded with him. After
having thus ascertained their means oi’
knowledge, the question is put generally as
to their opinion of hi capacity. I conceive
this question really means to involve an in-
quiry as to the effect of all the acts which
the witnesses have seen the testator do for
a long series of years, and the manner in
which he was, during that period, treated
by those with whom he was living in fa-
miliar intercourse. This is not properly
opinion, like that of experts; but rather a
compendious mode of putting one instead of
a multitude of questions to the witness un-
der examination, as to the acts and conduct
of the testator." 5 Clark & F. 720. And
Baron Parke: “These letters are sufliciently
proved to have been written and sent to the-
liouse of the deceased by persons now dead,
ler v. St. Louis Life Ins. Co. 45 Iowa, 93;
People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29; State v. Klinger,
46 Mo. 229; Holcomb v. State, 41 Tex. 123:
M1.-Ulackey v. State, 5 Tex. App. 320; Norton
v. Moore, 3 Head, 482; Powell v. State, 2-'3
Ala. 28; 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. §§ 536-540; 1 Whart.
& S. Med. Jur._§ 257; VVhnrt. Ev. § 510 at
seq.; 1 Redf. Wills, c. 4, pt. 2, in a. recent edi-
tion of which (page 145, note 24) it is said.
touching the decision in Hardy v. Merrill, ubi
supra: “There will now remain scarcely any
dissentients among the elder states; and those
of recent origin, whose decisions have been
based upon the authority of the earlier decisions
of some of the older states, which have since
abandoned the ground. may also be ex ected to
change." See, also, May v. Brndlee, 1-7 Mass.
414; Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122.
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OPINIONS. (Case No. 70-
irrational, extravagant, and crazy,-what 
would this be but to declare the judgment or 
opinion of the witness of what ls incoherent 
or foolish in conversation, what reasonable 
cause of pleasure or resentment. and what 
the lndicla of sound or dlaordered intellect? 
If he may not so testify, but must give the 
supposed sllly and Incoherent language, state 
the degrees and all the accompanying cir-
cumstances of highly excited emotion, and 
specifically set forth the freaks or acts regard-
ed as Irrational, and thus, without the least 
intimation of any opinion which he has form-
ed of their character, where are such witness-
es to be found? Can It be supposed that 
those, not having a special Interest In the 
subject, shall have so charged their memories 
with these matters, as distinct, Independent 
facts, as to be able to present them In their 
entirety and simplicity to the Jury? Or, if 
such a witness be found, can he conceal from 
the jury the Impression which has been made 
upon his mind; and, when this ls collected, 
can it be doubted but that his judgment has 
been infiuenced by many, very many, circum-
stances which he bas not communicated, 
which he cannot communicate, and ot which 
he himself Is not aware?" Clary v. Clary, 2 
Ired. Law, 83. The jury, being informed as 
to the witness' opportunities to know all the 
circumstances, and of the reasons upon which 
he rests his statement as to the ultimate gen-
eral tact of sanity or Insanity, are able to 
test the accuracy or soundness of the opinion 
expressed, and thus, by using the ordinary 
meam for the ascertainment of truth, reach 
the ends of substantial justice. 
These views are sustained by a very large 
number of adjudications In the courts of 
this country, aome of which are cited In the 
margin.1 In several of those cited the wholP 
subject was very tully considered In all Its 
aapects. While the cases are, to some ex-
tent, In conJllct, we are satisfied that tne 
rule most consiatent with sound reason, and 
sustained by authority, ls that indicated in 
this opinion. 
Counsel for the plalntltr In error calls our 
attention to the cue of Wright v. Tatham, 5 
Clark & F. 670, as an authority for the broad 
proposition that non-professional witnesses 
cannot give their opinions and impressions 
i Clary v. Clary, 2 Ired. Law, 83; Dunham's 
Appeal1 Z1 Conn. 193; G,rant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203; Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, sub:-
stantially overruling Boardman v. Boardman, 
47 N. H. 120·h State v. Pike, 40 N. H. 309, and 
State v. Arc er, 54 N. H. 468; Hathaway's 
Adm'r v. Insurance Co .. 48 Vt. 350; Moree v. 
Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 
483; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 330; Potts v. 
House, 6 Ga. 324; Vanauken's Case, 10 N. J. 
Eq. 190; Brooke v. Townshend. 7 Gill, 10; 
De Witt v. Bai:ly, 17 N. Y. 342, expJnining 
decision in same c11Se in 9 N. Y. 371; Hewlett 
v. WoodJ..~oo N. Y. 634; Clapp v. :Fullerton, 34 
N. Y. lw; Rutherford v. Morrie, 77 Ill. 397; 
Duffield v. Morris' Ex'r, 2 Har. 384; Wilkin-
llOn v. Pearson, 23 Pa. St. 119; Pidcock v. 
Potter 68 Pa. St. 342; Doe v. Reagan, 5 
Blackf. 218; Dove v. State, 3 Heisk. 348; But-
concerning the state of a person's mind, 
even in connection with the facts within 
their personal knowledge, upon which such 
opinion ls based. On a question of the com-
petency of a party to make a will, certain 
letters, written to that party by third per-
sons, who had died before they were offered 
as evidence, and which letters were found 
many years after their date among the tes-
tator's papers, were held, In that case, not 
to be admissible without proof that he acted 
on them. Whether the opinions of non-ex-
perts, in connection with a statement, under 
oath, of the facts, are admissible upon an In-
quiry as to the Insanity of an lndll"idual, 
was not involved or determined In that case. 
On the contrary, the observations made by 
some of the judges, In lllustrntlon of their 
opinions upon the precise point in judgment, 
would indicate a concurrence in the general 
views we have expressed. Arter stating that 
the letters were otrered as evidence of the-
opluions of the writers, Baron Alderson said: 
"The objection of their admissibility Is that 
this opinion ls not upon oath, nor ts It pos-
sible for the opposite party to test by cross-
examlnatlon the foundation on which It 
rests. The object of laying such testimony 
before the jury Is to place the whole life-
and conduct of the testator, It possible, be-
fore them, so that they may judge of his ca-
pacity; for this purpose you call persons. 
who have known him for years, who hal"e 
seen him frequently, who hal"e conversed 
with him or con-esponded with him. After 
havmg thus ascertained their means of 
knowledge, the question ls put generally as 
to their opinion of his capacity. I conceive 
this question really means to Involve an in-
quiry as to the eft'ect of all <the acts which 
the witnesses have seen the testator do for 
a long series ot years, and the manner in 
which he was, during that period, treated 
by those with whom he was living In fa.-
mll1ar Intercourse. This Is not properly 
opinion, like that of experts; but rather a 
compendious mode of putting one Instead of 
a multitude of questions to the witness un-
der examination, as to the acts and conduct 
of the testator." 5 Clark & F. 720. And 
Baron Parke: ''These lettel'S are sufficiently 
proved to have been written and sent to the· 
house of the deceased by persons now dt>nd. 
!er v. St. Louis Life Ina. Co. 45 Iowa, 93; 
Pl'<>Ple v. ~anford, 43 Cal. 29; State v. Klingt>r, 
46 Mo. 229; Holcomb v. State, 41 Tex. 12:>: 
McC!o.ckey v. State, 5 Tex. App. 320; Norton 
v. Moore, 3 Head, 482; Powell v. State, 2;; 
Ala. 28; 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. §§ 536-540; 1 Whart. 
& S. Med. Jur. A 257; Whart. Ev. I 510 et 
seq.; 1 Redf. Wills, c. 41: pt. 2, in a recent edi-
tion of which (page 140, note 24) it ie said. 
touching the decision in Hardy v. Merrill, ubi 
supra: "There will now remain scarcely any 
di88entients among the elder states; and those 
of recent origin, whose decisions have been 
based upon the authority of the earlier decisiom• 
of some of the older states, which hn.ve aince 
abandoned the ground. may also be exp,ected to 
change." See, also, May v. Brndll'<.', 127 MaSB. 
414; Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 llal!I!. 122. 
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and they indicate the opinion of the writers
that the alleged testator was a rational per-
son, and capable of doing acts of ordinary
business. But. it is perfectly clear that, in
this case, an opinion not given upon oath in
a judicial inquiry between parties is no ev-
idence; for the question is, not what the
capacity of the testator was reputed to be,
but what it really was in point of fact; and,
though the opinion of a witness upon oath
as to that fact might be asked, it would be
only a compendious mode of ascertaining the
result of the actual observation of the wit-
ness. from act done, as to the habits and
demeanor of the deceased." Id. 735.
One other assignment of error remains to
be considered. It relates to the admissions
of the statements made by two witnesses of
what passed between each other on the oc-
casion of their seeing and conversing with
the deceased, within an hour or two before
he shot himself. They detailed what puss-
ed between them and the deceased, describ-
ing the latter‘s appearance and condition as
indicating, in their judgment, that he was
not in his right mind. As he left the pres-
ence of these witnesses, one of them re-
204
-—--——>* 7
marked to the other that “Pitkin is not him-
self; George looks kind of crazy.” The oth-
er, in response, expressed substantially.
though in different language, his concur-
rence in that opinion. To the admission of
this brief conversation between the witness-
es, on the occasion referred to, the defend-
ant objected. but the objection was over-
ruled, and an exception taken. We do not
think there was in this any error to the prej-
udice ot the substantial rights of the compa-
ny. The witnesses, when under oath, ex-
pressed the same opinion as to the condition
of the deceased. What passed between them
at the time to which their testimony refer-
red was a part of what occurred on the oc-
casion when they saw the deceased, and
may well have been repeated to the jury,
as showing that their opinion as to the men-
tul condition of the deceased was not then
presently formed, but was one formed at tne
very moment they saw him, within a very
few hours before his death.
Upon the whole case we perceive no error
in the proceedings of which plaintiff in er-
ror may complain, and the judgment is af-
firmed.
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and they Indicate the opinion of the writers 
that the alleged testator was a rational per-
son, and capable of doing acts of ordinary 
business. But It Is perfectly clear that, In 
this case, an opinion not given upon oath in 
a Judicial inquiry between parties ls no ev-
idence; for the question ls, not what the 
eapa<'ity of the testator was reputed to be, 
but what it really was ln point of tact; and, 
though the opinion of a witness upon oath 
as to that fact might be asked, It would be 
only a compendious mode of ascertaining the 
result of the actual obt!ervatlon of the wit-
ness, from acts done, 88 to the habits and 
demeanor ot the deceased." Id. 73S. 
One other assignment of error remains to 
be <'Onsldered. It relates to the admissions 
of the statements made by two wltne11ses ot 
what passed between each other on the oc-
<:>aslon of their seeing and con¥erslng with 
the deceased, within an hour or two before 
he shot himself. They detailed what pass-
ed between them and the deceased, describ-
ing the latter's appearance and condition 88 
lndwatlng, In their judgment, that he was 
not In his right mind. As he left the pres-
ence of these wltnesees, one of them re-
204 
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marked to the other that "Pitkin ls not him-
self; .George looks kind of crazy." The oth-
er, In response, expressed substantially. 
though In dUferent language, his concur-
rence In that opinion. To the admission of 
thls brief conversation between the witness-
es, on the occasion reterred t.o, the defend-
ant objected, but the objection was over-
ruled, and an exception taken. We do not 
thlnk there was in this any error to the prej-
udice of the substantial rights of the compa-
ny. The witnesses, when under oath, ex-
pressed the same opinion as t.o the condition 
of the d~ased. What passed between them 
at the time to which their testimony refer-
red was a part of what occurred on the oc-
C8810n when they saw the deceased, and 
may well have been repeated to the jury, 
as showing that their opinion as to the men-
tal condition of the deceasetl was not then 
presently formed, but was one formed at tne 
very moment they saw him, within a very 
few hours before his death. 
Upon the whole case we perceive no error 
In the proceedings of which plaintiff In er-
ror may complain, and the judgment la af-
flrmP.d. 
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WILLIAMS v. SPENC-ER et al.
(23 N. E. 105, 150 Mass. 346.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
\Vorcester. Jan. 1, 1890.
Exceptions from supreme judicial court,
Worcester county; Cnxnuzs Dsvmxs,
Judge.
An appeal from the decree of the probate
court for Worcester county. admitting to
probate the will of Polly Crosby, and ap-
pointing petitioner administrator. The
will was made on March 25, 1885. An issue
was submitted to the jury whether testa-
trix was sane when the will was made. Ap-
Dellants proposed to ask one of the attest-
ing witnesses what his present opinion
wasas to thesouuduess of testatrix’s mind
at the time of the execution of the will.
The witness having testified that he formed
no opinion on the subject at the time he
witnessed the will, but had an opinion at
the time of the trial, which had been
formed.in part.from what be-had seen and
heard since, and in part from what he saw
at the time, the question was excluded,
and the appellants excepted. Petitioner
called one Upham, at whose house testa-
trix visited from April 20, 1885, till August
22, 1585. who testified in chief that he saw
testatrix a few times after her husband
died, November, 1884, and that while she
was at his house he never saw any change
in her intelligence, coherence of speech, or
memory, and gave accounts of several con-
versations and acts tending to show sound-
ness of mind. To impeach his evidence ap-
pellants offered evidence tending to show
that since testatrix's death the witness had
declared that he had never seen her, since
her husband died, when she was fltto make
a will. The evidence was excluded, and
the appellants excepted. The jury an-
swered the issue in favor oi the sanity of
the testatrix.
F. P. Gonlrling and J. M. Cochran, for
appellants. W. S. B. Hopkins, for appel-
ee. -
KNOWLTON, J. How far the opinion of
witnesses as to the mental condition of n
testator may be received in evidence in
proceedings to establish the validity of a
will is a. question about which there is :1
great conflict of authority. in this com-
monwealth, and in the courts of common
law in England, and in many of the states
of this countrv,it is held that an ordinary
witness cannot give a mere opinion, what-
ever opportunities of observation he may
have had. On the other hand, in the eccle-
siastical courts of England, and in many
courts in the United States, all witnesses
have been permitted to give, not only facts
upon which an opinion may properly be
formed, but their opinions founded on tbosc
iacfs. It is universally held that an attest-
ing witness may give his opinion. formed at
the time, as to thesanity or insanity of the
testator when the will was executed. In
those courts where opinions are admitted
on the ground that conclusions in regard
to the mental condition of another, formed
by one who has had an opportunity oi ob-
serving him, are in theniselves valuable
and unobjectionable as evidence, there may
be good reasons for holding that the final
opinion of the witness at the time of the
trial should be received. But where a dif-
ferent doctrine is held the opinions of at-
testing witnesses to a will stand upon a
peculiar ground. The witnesses are chosen
by the testntor, and are thereby, under the
law, charged with an important duty in
relation to the execution and proof of the
will. It maybe presumed that, in the per-
formance of that duty, they will observe
carefully the appearance oi the testator at
the time, and form an opinion as to his
sanity. That opinion naturally and prop-
erly may determine their action in signing
or refusing to sign as witnesses. It is re»
garded as afact of somesignificance, which
enters into the transaction,and which the
court should be permitted to know and
consider, like any other fact touching the
execution of the instrument. Upon this
theory, the opinion of an attesting witness,
formed at another time, before or after the
execution oi the will, should stand like
that of any other witness. It might be
competent, in cross-examination, to affect
the value of his testimony as to his conclu-
sion at the time of attestation,but itcould
not be received on account of the value to
be attached to it as a. mere opinion. In
Poole v. Richardson, 3 Mass. 330,'the court
permitted the witnesses to give“ the judg-
ment they formed of the soundness of the
testat0r‘s mind at the timeofexecuting the
will.” In Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369,
409, referring to the time of execution of a
will, the court say: “It is the opinion
then formed that is admissible.” In (‘lapp
v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190, it is said of the
facts testified to by the witnesses, which
occurred at the time of attesting, that “ it
is legitimate to give them such additional
weight as may be derived from the con-
viction the_v produced at the time." Jar-
man states the rule to be that “subscrib-
ing witnesses are permitted to testify as
to the opinion they form of the testator’s
capacity at the time of executing his w_ill.”
1 Jarm. Wills, 74. Rediield says: “It is
admitted in nearly all the cases that the
subscribing witnesses to the will are com-
petent to express an opinion of the testa-
tor’s apparent sanity at the time of execu-
tion.” 1 Redf. Wills,140. The only case to
which we nave been referred which decides
that a subscribing witness may give an
opinion formed afterwards is Runyan v.
Price, 15 Ohio St. 1; and in Ohio, all wit-
nesses who have had an opportunity of ob-
serving a. testator are permitted to give
their opinions, founded on what they have
seen. We are of opinion that, under the
authorities in this commonwealth, the
testimony of the attesting witness was
rightly excluded.
Whether the declaration of the witness
Upham, offered to contradict him, should
have been received, depends upon whether
it was inconsistent with his former testi-
mony. If it be assumed that the expres-
sion, “ lit to make a will,” referred to the
mental condition of the testatrix, and that
it is generally known that a. person of full
age and sound mind is fit to make a will,
and if we disregard the differences of opin-
ion that may be presumed to exist as to
what constitutes soundness of mind or fit-
205
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OPINIONS. [Case No. 71 
WILLIAMS v. SPENCER et al. 
(23 N. E. 105, 150 :Maas. 346.) 
Supreme .Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
\Vorcester. Jan. 1, 1890. 
Exceptions from supreme judicial court, 
Worcester county; CHARLES DEVENS, 
Judge. 
An appeal from the deereeof the probate 
court for Worcester county. admitting to 
probate the will of Po11.v Crosbv, and ap. 
pointing petitioner administrator. The 
will was made on March :?;>, Ul85. An Issue 
was submitted to the jury whether testa-
trix was sane when the will was made. Ap-
pellants proposed to ask one of the attest-
ing wltnesscs what hie present opinion 
wae as to the soundness of teetatrlx'11 mind 
at the time of the execution of the will. 
'l'he wltneas ha vlng testified that he formec.J 
no opinion on the subject at the time he 
witnessed the will, but had an opinion at 
the time of the trla.J, which had been 
formed. In part, from what be bad eren and 
beard since, and in part from what he saw 
at th~ time, the question was excludeil, 
and the appellants excepted. Petitioner 
called one Upham, at whose house tetoita-
trlx visited from April 20, 1885, till Augu1:1t 
:!2, 1RS5, who testified In chief that he saw 
tt't!tatrlx a few times after her husband 
died, .November, 1884, and that while she 
was at hie house he never saw any cbnnge 
in her Intelligence, coheren<>e of speech, or 
memory, and gave accounts of several con-
versations and acts tending to Hhow sound-
ness of mind. To Impeach his evidence ap-
pellants offered evidence tending to show 
that elncetestatrlx'edeath tbewitneee had 
declared that be bad never seen her, since 
her husband died. when she was fttto make 
a will. The evidence was excluded, and 
the appellants excepted. 'l'he jury an-
swered the issue In favor of the sanity of 
the tel!tatrlx. 
F. P. GotJ/r/fng and J. l'tf. Cochran, for 
appellants. lV. S. B. Hopkins, for appel-
lee. 
KNOWLTON,J. Howfartheoplnlon of 
witnesses as to the mental condition of o 
testator may be r~>celved In evidence In 
proceedings to establish the validity of a 
will ls a qu~tlon ah11ut which there is n 
great conflict of authorltv. In this com-
monwealth, and In the courts or common 
law In England, and In ma.ny of the state;; 
or this countrv, It Is held that a.n ordinar.v 
wltneee cannot give a mere opinion, what-
ever opportunities of observation he ma,y 
have bad. On the other hand, in the eccle-
Bl811tlcal courttl of England, and in many 
courts in the United States, all wltnesseH 
have been permitted to give, not only factfi 
upon which an opinion may properly be 
lonned, but their oplulonl! founded on thos(' 
facts. It le universally held thatun attest-
ing witness may give hie opinion, forme1I at 
the time, as to the sanity or lnimnit.v of the 
teHtator when the will wnl! execut~d. In 
those courts where opinions are mlmltterl 
on the ground that conclusions In regurtl 
to the mental condition of another, formed 
by one who bll8 had an opportunity or ob-
serving him, a~ In themKelveB valuable 
and unobjectionable 11.11 evidence, there way 
be good reaeonR for holding thnt the final 
opinion of the witness at the time of the 
trial should be receln~d. But where a dif-
ferent doctrine le held the opinions of at-
teHting wltne11see to a will stand upon a 
peculiar ground. 'l'bewltnessesarechoeen 
by the testator, and are thereby, under the 
law, charged with an important duty In 
relation to the execution and proof of the 
wm. It may be presumed that, In the per-
formance of that duty, they will observe 
carefully the appearance of the testator at 
the time, and form an opinion as to hie 
sanity. That opinion naturally u.nd prop-
erly may determine their action In signing 
or refusing to sign as wltne88e8. It Is re-
garded asafactof 11omesignlfic1:1.nce, which 
enters Into the transaction, and which the 
court should be permitted to know and 
consider, like any other fact touching the 
execution of the Instrument. Upon this 
theory, the oplnlou of an attesting witnl'se, 
formed at another time, heforeor after the 
execution of the will, should stand like 
that of any other witneeR. It might be 
competent, In croRs-examlnatlon, to affect 
the value of his testimony as to hl11 coqclu-
slon at the time of attestation, but it could 
not be received on account of the value t<> 
be attached to it as a mere opinion. In 
Poole v. Rlclrnrdsnn, 3 !\Jase. 330, the court 
permitted the witnesses to give" the judg-
{llent they formed of the eoundne11s of the 
testator's mind at the time of executing the 
wlll." In RohlnMon v. Adame, 62 Me. 360, 
409, referring to the time of execution of a 
will, the court say: "It Is the opinion 
then formed that li,i admlsHlble." In Clapp 
v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 100, It le said of the 
facts teHtifled to bv the wltneefies, which 
occurred u.t the time of atteHtlng, that "It 
Is legitimate to give them such additional 
weight as mRy be derived from the con-
viction they produced at the time.'' Jar-
man stat<'s the rule to be that" subscrib-
ing wltnPHi;es are permitted to te11tHy as 
to the opinion they form of the testator's 
capacitv at the time of executing his will ." 
1 .J arm: Wille, 74. Redfield says: "lt is 
admitted In nearly all the cases that the 
sul1scrlblng witnesses to the will are com-
petent to express au opinion of the testa-
tor's apparent sanity at the time of execu-
tion." 1 Redf. Wills, 140. 'fhe only case to 
which we narn been referred which decides 
that a subscribing wltne!IB mn.v give an 
opinion formed afterwards is Runyan v. 
Price, 15 Ohio St. 1; and In Ohio, all wit-
nesses who have had an opportunity of ob-
serving a. testator tt.re permitted to give 
their opinions, founded on what the.v have 
seen. We are of opinion that, under the 
authorities In this commonwealth, the 
testimony of the attesting witness was 
rightly excluded. 
Whether the declaration of the witness 
Upham, offered to contrtullct him, 11houlcl 
have been received, depends u11on whl'ther 
It was inconRlstent with his former testi-
mony. Ir It be tteHumNl that the expreR-
elon "fit to make a will," referred to the 
mental condition of theteHtat1ix,and that 
It Is generally known that IL person of full 
age aml sound mind le fit to make a will, 
and If we diRrc~nrd the differcnceR of opin-
ion that mn.v be presumed to exif1t aH to 
what con1:1titutes sounc.Jne1:1sof mind or fit-
20i> 
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ncss to make a. will, we cannot say that
the declaration was contradictory to the
previous testimony. It may or may not
have been, according as the facts not re-
ported were oi one kind or oi another.
The witness “gave accounts oi several
conversations and acts tending to show
soundness of mind.” That certain iacts,
indicating that the testatrlx was of sound
mind, could be shown by his testimony,
did not necessarily imply that he believed
her to besane. We do not know the iullsig-
nificanee oi those acts and conversations.
and other facts within his knowledge may
have shown that she was insane. Upon
this ground the case oi Hubbell v. Bissell,
2 Allen, 196. is authority in favor of the rul-
ing. Nor upon the facts reported can we
say that his testimony that “ he never saw
any change in her intelligence, coherence oi
206
speech, or memory," while she was at his
house, alter the death of her husband,
proves that he believed her to be fit to
make a will. So far as the bill of excep-
tions shows, and so far as we have infor-
mation from any source, she may have been
all her life of such mental capacity and
condition as to make it doubtful whether
she was ever of sound mind. and the wit-
ness may have always considered her un-
fit to make a. will. The unreported facts
oi the case may have been such as to make
the evidence competent. If the testimony
had been reeelved.anrl the appellee had ex-
cepted, we should have assumed. on this
bill oi exceptions, that they were. But
against the excepting party, who must es-
tabllsh the error on which he relies, we
must assume that they were not. Excep-
tions overruled.
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neMS to make e. wlll, we cannot say that 
the declaration was contradlr.tory to the 
previous testimony. It may or may not 
have been, according as the facts not re-
ported were of one kind or of another. 
The witness "gave accounts of several 
~onversattons and actK tending to sbow 
Hount1ness of mind." That certain facts, 
Indicating that tbetestatrlx was of sound 
mind, could be shown by bis testimony, 
<lid not necessarily Imply that he believed 
hertobesane. Wedonotknowthe full sig-
nificance of those acts and conven1atlon1t, 
and other facts within his knowledge may 
have shown that she waR Insane. Upon 
this ground the case of Hubbell v. Bl1JHell, 
2Allen,196. is authority In favor of the rul-
ing. Nor upon the facts reported can we 
say that bis testimony that "be never saw 
any cha.nge In her intelligence, coherence of 
206 
speech, or memory," while she waa &t hie 
house, after the death of her husband, 
proves that he bt>lleved her to be flt to 
make a will. 80 far as the bill of excep-
tions Khows, and so fnr as we have infor-
mation from any source, she may ha ye been 
all her lHe of such mental capacity and 
condition as to make It doubtful whether 
she was ever of sound mind, and the wit-
ness may have always conslt.lered her un-
fit to make a. will. The unreported facb! 
or the case may have been such as to make 
the evidence competent. If the testtmony 
had been received, anrl the appellee had ex-
cepted, we should have aBKumed, on this 
bill of exceptlon11, that they were. But 
against the exeeptlng party, who nmst es-
tablish the error o,n which he n>lleK, we 
must aseume that they were not. Excep. 
tlons overruled. 
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LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. R. CO. v. "WOOD.
(14 N. E. 572, 113 Ind. 5+1.)
Supreme Court of Indiana. Dec. 21, 1887.
Appeal from circuit court, Washington ,
county; T. S. Collins, Judge.
This was an action brought by Lizzie
Wood against the Louisville, New Albany
& Chicago Railroad Company tor injuries
caused by the negligence of a conductor on
one of the company's trains. The plaintiff
recovered Judgment, and the defendant ap-
pealed.
Geo. W. Easley, Geo. W. Friediey, and W.
H. Russell, for appellant. Voyles & Morris
and John A. Zaring, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J. The material facts stated
in the appellee‘s complaint‘ are these: On
the twenty-first day of October, 1882, the
appellee purchased a ticket, and entered
one of the appellant's passenger trains.
The ticket entitled her to a passage from
Salem to Campbellsburg. At the place 01'
the appellant failed and
refused to stop the train a suflicient length
of time to enable her to leave it; but, hav-
ing stopped the train, the conductor who
had charge thereof, “before the plalntifl
had suiiicicnt time to get safely off the
cars, and while the plaintiff was standing
on the platform of the cars, which point
she had reached while the train was not in
motion, signaled the train so soon as she
(the plaintiff) had reached the platform, to
move on. The engineer did obey the signal,
and did start the train in motion before the
plaintiff could get otf, and while she was
standing on the platform. After the en-
gineer had started the train, the conductor
willfully, carelessly, and improperly seized
her, and, without any fault or negligence
on her part whatever, wrenched her of! the
steps, and jerked her to the ground," caus-
illir her to sustain very great bodily injury.
We cannot perceive the slightest ground
for the contention of counsel that the com-
plaint is bad. The carrier clearly violated
a legal duty in not stopping the train a
suflicient length of time to permit the ap-
pellee to alight in safety. Railroad Co. v.
Buck, 96 Ind. 346. Railroad Co. v. Carper,
(May Term) 14 N. E. 352. The conductor
in jerking the appellee from the train was
i~'11ili_\' of a tort while engaged in the line
of his duty, and the appellant is unques-
tionably liable for such a tort. This lia-
bility exists even though the tort was a
Ilrgligent, and not a willful, one! Railroad
Co. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19; Railroad Co.
\‘. Kelly, 92 Ind. 371; Railway Co. v. Sav-
age. 110 Ind. 156, 9 N. E. 85; Railroad Co.
\'. ('nrper. supra, and cases cited. Counsel
-“ilyi “There is no averment that the plain-
tiff was invited or directed to alight at the
iioint she did. so as to bring the case with-
in Railway C0. v. Farrell, 31 Ind. 406.”
i
The halting of the train at the station to
which the appellant undertook to carry the
appellee was an implied invitation to alight;
so that, even it the complaint proceeded on
the theory that it is assumed by counsel it
does, it would be good. The theory, how-
ever, on which it does proceed is that the
conductor in charge of the train heedlessly
and wrongfully pulled the appellee from it
while it was in motion. The cases we have
cited show beyond all controversy that the
conductor in the management of the train,
and in caring for passengers in entering
and alighting from the train, is the repro-
sentative of the company in whose service
he is engaged, so that the complaint is good
on the theory on which it does proceed.
llndoubtedly, there must be, as counsel as-
sert, a connection between the negligence
and the injury (Pennsylvania Co. v. Hensii.
70 Ind. 569; Railway Co. v. Conn, 104 Ind.
‘ oi, 3 N. E. 636); but we think it too clear
to require discussion that the complaint
docs show that the tort of the conductor
caused the appellee‘s injury.
It is said by counsel: “While the carrier
is responsible for negligence willfully or
carelessly inflicted upon passengers by serv-
ants employed in the performance of du-
ties within the general scope oi‘. their em-
ployment, the question in such cases is
whether the servant, when he inflicted the
injury, was acting within the line of his
employment; not whether the particular
act was authorized or not. Railroad (To.
\'. Kelly, 92 Ind. 371." We fully assent to
the rule as counsel state it, but we cannot
agree that they give it a corr;--ct applica-
tion. We have already shown that the con-
duct0r’s act was within the scope of his
employment, so that the rule which counsel
invoke i decisively against them. It is
also said by counsel that “the case of Rail-
road Co. v. Jackson, S1 Ind. 20, in its dic-
tum, goes too far;” but counsel are in error,
for that case states the rule as counsel con-
cede it, and is abundantly supported by au-
thority. Railway Co. v. Savage, supra.
It is further contended that, as the coin-
plaint does not directly allege that the con-
ductor was acting within the scope of his
employment, the complaint is bad, and we
are referred to the case of Heifrich v. Wil-
liams, 84 Ind. 553. The plain answer to
this is that the facts stated do show that
the conductor was acting within the line
of his duty when he pulled the passenger
from the train, instead of affording her an
opportunity to safely alight, as it was his
duty to do.
The morning after the injury occurred,
Dr. Rife was called to give the appellee
medical attention, and he testified that she
told him “what her trouble was." This
testimony was competent. In order to en-
able a. physician to intelligently prescribe
or advise, he must be informed of the pains
suffered by his patient, and where they are
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LOUISVILLE, X. A. & C. R. CO. v. WOOD. 
(H N. E. 1>72, 113 Ind. 544.) 
Supreme Court of lnaiana. Dec. 21, 1887. 
Appeal from circuit court, Washington . 
county; T. S. Collins, Judge. I 
'fhis was an action brought by Lizzie i 
Wood against the Louisvllle, New Albany 
& Clllcago Rallro&d Company for injuries 
caused by the negllgen<'e of a conductor on 
one of the company's trains. The plalntllr 
l'ecovered judgment, and the defendant ap-
pealed. 
Geo. W. Easley, Geo. W. Frledley, and W. 
H. Ru88ell, for appellant. Voyles & Morrls 
and John A. Zaring, for appellee. 
ELLIOTT, J. The material facts stated 
in the appellee'e complaint· are these: On 
the twenty-first day of Octeber, 1882, the 
appellee purchased a ticket, and entered 
one of the appellant's passenger trains. 
The ticket entitled her to a passage from 
Salem to C4mpbellsburg. At the place of 
·her deetlnatloo, the appellant failed and 
refused to stop the train a suftlclent length 
of Ume to enable her to leave it; but, hav-
lng stopped the train, the conductor who 
had charge thereof, "before the plalotur 
had softlcfent time to get safely oft the 
cars, and while the plalotlft was standing 
on the platform of the cars, which point 
she had reached while the train waa not In 
motion, signaled the train so soon as she 
(the plaintiff) had reached the platform, to 
move on. The engineer did obey the signal, 
and did start the train In motion before the 
plalntltt could get oft, and while she was 
standing on the platform. After the en-
gineer had started the train, the conductor 
wllltullr, carelessly, and improperly seized 
her, and, without any fault or negligence 
on her part whatever, wrenched her oft the 
steps, and Jerked her to the ground," caus-
ing her to austaln very great IJodlly Injury. 
We cannot perceive the slightest ground 
tor the contention of counsel that the com-
plaint ls bad. The carrier clearly violated 
a legal duty in not stopping the train a 
llllfllclent length of time to permit the ap-
pellee to alight in safety. Railroad Co. v. 
Buck, 96 Ind. 346, Railroad Co. v. Carper, 
(May Term) 14 N. E. 352. The conductor 
in Jerking the appellee from the train was 
gullty of a tort while engaged in the line 
of his duty, and the appellant Is unques-
tionably Hable for such a tort. '£his Ila· 
hlllty exists even though the tort was a 
D('gliJrent, and not a wlllful, on~ · Railroad 
C',o. v. Jackson, 81 Iml. 19; Railroad Co. 
v. Kelly, 92 Ind. 371; Railway Co. v. Sav-
age, 110 Ind. 100, 9 N. E. 85; Rnllrond Co. 
'"· Cnl'J:>er, supra, and cases cited. Counsel 
!18y: "There ls no averment that the platn-
tlfr was Invited or dire<'ted to all,,;ht at the 
rolnt she did, so as to bring the case with-
in Railway Co. v. Fnnell, 31 Ind. 408." 
The halting of the tralo at the station to 
which the appellant undertook to carry the 
appellee was an implied Invitation to alight; 
so that, even If the complaint proceeded on 
the theory that it Is assumed by counsel ft 
does, it would be good. The theory, how-
ever, on which it does proceed ls that the 
conductor in charge of the train heedlessly 
and wrongfully pulled the appellee from tt 
while lt was In motion. The cases we have 
cited show beyond all controversy that the 
conductor in the management of the train, 
and in caring for passengers in entering 
and alighting from the train, 18 the repre-
senta tive of the company in whose service 
be ls engaged, so that the complaint ls good 
on the theory on which it does proceed. 
rmlouhtedly, there must be, as counsel as-
sc1·t, a connection between the negligence 
and the injury (Pennsylvania Co. v. Hensll, 
iO Ind. 009; Railway Co. \". Conn, 104 Ind. 
6-1, 3 N. E. 636); but we think It too clear 
to require discussion that the complaint 
d<.es show that the tort of the conductor 
caused the appellee's Injury. 
It ls said by counsel: "While the carrier 
ls responsible for negligence willfully or 
C'&relessly Inflicted upon passengers by serv-
ants employed In the performance of du-
ties within the general scope of their em-
ployment, the 11uestlon In such roses ls 
whether the servant, wllen he lntllcted the 
injury, was acting within the llne of his 
employment; not whether the particular 
net was authorized or not. Railroad Co. 
,._ Kelly, 02 Ind. 371." We fully assent to 
the l'Ule as coun@el state .It, but we <·nnuot 
nicree that they give it a corr,!Ct 111>plk'fl· 
tlou. We have already shown that tlle <'Oll-
ductor's net ·was within the srope of bis 
employment, so that the rule which counsel 
invoke ls decisively a11:alnst them. It ls 
also said by counsel that ••the ca~e of Rail-
road Co. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 20, in Its dic-
tum, goes too tar;" but counsel are In error, 
for that ease states the rule as rounsel con-
<'ede It, ltnd ls abundantly supported by au-
thority. Railway Co. v. Savage, supra. 
It Is further contended that, as the com-
plaint does not directly allege that the con-
ductor was acting within the scope of bis 
employment, the complaint fa bad, and we 
are referred to the case of Helfrich v. Wil-
liams, 84 Ind. 553. The pla.111 answer to 
this ls that the facts stated do show that 
the conductor was acting within tlle line 
of hls duty when he pulled the passenger 
from the train, Instead of alTordlng her au 
opportunity to safely alight, as It was hie 
duty to do. 
'I'l>e morning after the Injury occurred, 
Dr. Rife was called to give tbe :tppellee 
medleal attention, and he testified that she 
told him "what her trouhle was." ·rhls 
testimony was competent. In order to en-
able a physician to lotelllg<.>ntly prescribe 
or advise, be must be lnfornu>d of the pnlnH 
sufrered lly his patient, and where they are 
2ffl 
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located. To this effect the authorities uni-
formly go. Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, 102
Ind. 138, 1 N. E. 364, and cases cited; Rail-
road Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 .\'. E.
S36, and cases cited; Railway Co. v. Falvey, *
101. Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389. and 4 N. E. 908.
All that the appellee testifled that she told
her physician was what her pains were,
and in what part of her body they were
located. Counsel are mistaken in asserting
that Dr. Rife was not called as a physician,
for he was called in that capacity, and in
that capacity prescribed for the appellee.
The appellee, while on the witness stand
giving testimony, was allowed to remove a
shawl from her feet. and exhibit them to the
jury. There was no error in permitting this
to be done. The text writers and the deci-
sions all agree that such an exhibition is not
improper. Dr. Wharton says: “Injury to
the person may also be proved by inspection.
Thus, in an action to recover damages for
an injury to a limb, the injured limb may be
exhibited on trial.” Whart. Cr. Ev. 5 312.
Mr. Best, speaking of this species of evi-
dence, denominates it “real evidence," and
says: “Immediate evidence is where the
thing which is the source of the evidence
is present to the senses of the tribunal. This
is of all proof the most satisfactory and con-
vincing.” 1 Best, Ev. (Morgan's Ed.) 307.
The old writers often speak of such evidence,
and in Hale, P. C. 633, a notable instance is
given of its force. Mr. Taylor collects a
number of cases, affirms that the species of
evidence here under discussion is always
competent, and assigns to it the highest
rank. 1 Tayl. Ev. § 512. An American au-
thor, discussing the subject, says: “The in-
jured member may be exhibited to the jury."
Abb. Tr. Ev. 599. In a recent article by
Judge Thompson, entitled “Trial by Inspec-
tion," many cases are collected, all holding
that exhibitions of persons or things are
proper. 25 Cent. Law J. 3. Henry Wade
Rogers, in an article entitled “Profert of the
Person," also discusses the subject, and col-
leets many authorities. all agreeing that ex-
hibitions of injuries are not improper. 15
Cent. Law J. 2. Cases on the general sub-
ject are also collected in Thurman v. Bert-
ram, 20 Alb. Law J. 151. In Osborne v.
City, 32 Fed. 36, it was held not error for a
surgeon to thrust a pin into the side of a
person, alleged to he paralyzed, in the pres-
ence of the jury. Without further comment,
we refer to other cases which are directly
in point: Schroeder v. Railroad Co., 47 Iowa,
375; Mulhado v. Railroad Co., 30 N. Y. 370,
and note; State v. Wicners, 66 Mo. 29. The
principle has been asserted in many cases
by this court. Car Co. v. Parker, 100 I11d.
181; Story v. State, 99 Ind. 413; l\IcDonel
v. State, 90 Ind. 320; Short v. State, 63 Ind.
376; Beavers v. State, 58 Ind. 530. Counsel
for the appellant, although they argue the
question at length, cite only a single case,
that of Ihinger v. State, 53 Ind. 251; but, as
shown in Car Co. v. Parker, supra, that case
is not in point, for the reason that the only
question decided arose upon an instruction.
More nearly‘ in point are the cases of Rot»
inius v. State, 63 Ind. 235; Swigart v. State.
(ii Ind. 598; and Bird v. State, 104 Ind. 38-1,
3 N. E. 827,—but these cases form an excep-
tion to the general rule. In those cases, the
question was whether the personal appear-
ance of a party could be considered by a
jury in determining a person's age, and it
was held that it could not. These cases
have been vigorously assailed by many writ-
ers and courts; but we do not feel it nec-
essary to depart from them, for we think
they are distinguishable from our other cases.
as well as from the present case. As said
of Robinins v. State, in one of our former
cases: "There is a distinction between such
a. case and the present, for, where age is the
material question, as it was in the case
cited, the decision upon inspection really de-
termines the whole question; while, in such
a case as the present, the inspection of the
wounded member simply illustrates and
makes clear the testimony of the party, and
assists in determining the character of one
of the facts in the case." Car Co. v. Parker,
supra. To what was there said we may
add that here the exhibition of the injured
member affects only the extent and charac-
ter of the injury, which is only a single fact
in the case; while, ina case where the de-
cision depends upon the age of a party. the
opinion oi’ the jury upon inspection conclu-
sively settles the whole question, thus ef-
fectually depriving the party aggrieved of
the benefit of an appeal. But, in a case like
this, the inspection of the injured part set-
tles nothing more than the extent and char-
acter of the injury, if, indeed, it can be
justly said to settle so much. At most, then,
an inspection of an injured limb does no
more than supply evidence upon a ingle
fact, and it does not deprive the party of
any substantial right on appeal; for it is
conclusively settled that the appellate court
will not weigh the evidence in any case
where there is a conflict. It is obvious,
therefore, that the case under discussion is
very different from one in which age de-
cisively determines the whole controversy.
It is evident that the learned counsel have
expended much labor on this point, and, as
they cite only the single case we have re-
ferred to, we may well infer that there are
no others that lend any support to their posi-
tion. VVe have ourselves given the subject
very careful study, and our search has not
revealed a'solitar_v authority that opposes,
directly or indirectly, the doctrine that it is
competent to exhibit an injured limb to the
jury. It certainly has always been the prac-
tice, as Mr. Chitty says, to exhibit models.
articles of apparel, or other chattels; and the
case before us is the same in principle.
Miss Drumond testifled that she was ac-
quainted with the appellee; described her
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located. To this etrect the authorities uni- shown In Car Co. v. Parker, supra, that cs.ae 
forruly go. Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, 10'.l ls not In point, for the reason that the only 
Ind. 138, 1 N. E. 36!, and cases cited; Rall- qu<>stlon decided arose upon an Instruction. 
road Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 :X. E. llore nt>arly· In point are the cases of Rob-
S:Ul, and cases cited; Railway Co. v. Falyey, ; lnius v. State, 63 Ind. 235; Swigart v. State, 
10.i l'ld. 409, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 !II. E. UOS. 'I 6! Ind. 598; and Bird v. State, 104 Ind. 384, 
All that the appellee testified that she told 3 N. E. 827,-but these cases form an excep-
her physician was what her pains were. tlon to the general rule. In those cases, the 
and In what part of her body they were 
l0<·ated. Counsel are mlstttken in asserting 
thnt Dr. Rife was not called as a physician, 
for he was called in that capacity, and In 
that capacity pres<>rlbf!d tor the appellee. 
The appellee, while on the witness stand 
giving testimony, wl18 allowed to remove a 
shawl from her feet. and e:r:hlblt them to the 
jury. There was no error in permitting this 
to be done. The text writers and the dld-
slons all agree that such an exhibition ls not 
improper. Dr. Wharton says: "Injury to 
the person may also be proved by Inspection. 
Thus, in an action to recover damages for 
an Injury to a limb, the injured limb may be 
exhibited on trial." Whart. Cr. Ev. I 312. 
Mr. Best, speaking of this species of evi-
dence, denominates it "real evidence," and 
SBys: "Immediate evidence ls where the 
thing which ls the source of the evidence 
ls present to the senses of the tribunal. This 
ls of all proof the most satisfactory and con-
vincing." 1 Best, Ev. (Morgan's Ed.) 307. 
The old writers often speak of such evidence, 
and In Hale, P. C. 633, a notable Instance ls 
given of Its force. Mr. Taylor collect11 a 
number of cases, aftlrms that the apecles of 
evidence here under dlacusslon ls always 
competent, and assigns to It the highest 
rank. 1 Tayl. Ev. § 512. An American au-
thor, discussing the subject, says: "The In-
jured member may be exhibited to the jury." 
A bb. Tr. Ev. 599. In a recent article by 
Judge Thompson, entitled ''Trial by Inspec-
tion," many cases are collected, all holding 
that exhibitions of persons or things are 
proper. 2il Cent. Law J. 3. Henry Wade 
Rogers, In an article entitled "Profert ot the 
Person;• also discusses the subject, and col-
lects many authorities. all agreeing that e:r:-
hlbitlons o! Injuries are not Improper. ll'i 
Cent. Law J. 2. Cases on the general sub-
ject are also collected In Thurman v. Bert-
ram, 20 Alb. Law J. 151. In Osborne v. 
City, 32 Fed. 36, It was held not error for a 
surgeon to thrust a pin Into the side of a 
pel'lilon, alleged to be paralyzed, In the pres-
ence of the jury. Without further comment, 
we refer to other cases which are directly 
In point: Schroeder v. Railroad Co., 47 lowa, 
37U; Mulhado v. Railroad Co., 30 N. Y. aiO, 
and note; State v. Wlene1·s, 66 Mo. 29. The 
principle bas been asserted In many C'8ses 
by this court. Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 
181; Story v. State, 99 Ind. 413; M<'Donel 
v. State, 90 Ind. 320; Short v. State, 63 Ind. 
376; Beavers v. State, 58 Ind. 530. Counsel 
for the appellant, although they. argue the 
question at length, <'lte only a single case, 
that of lhluger v. Stote, 03 Ind. 2:'>1; but, as 
208 
question was whether the personal appear-
ance of a party could be considered by a 
jury In determining a person's age, and It 
was held that It could not. These cases 
have been vigorously assailed by many writ-
ers and courts; but we do not feel lt nec-
essary to depart from them, for we think 
they are distinguishable from our other cases, 
as well as from the present case. As said 
of Roblnlus v. State, In one ot our former 
cases: ''There ts a distinction between such 
a case and the present, for, where age ls the 
material question, as It was In the case 
cited, the decision upon Inspection really de-
termines the whole question; whlle, In such 
a case as the present. the Inspection ot the 
wounded member simply lllustrates and 
makes clear the testimony of the party, and 
assists in determining the character of one 
ot the facts In the case." Car Co. v. Parker, 
supra. To what was there said we may 
add that here the e:r:hlbltlon of the Injured 
member streets only the e:r:tent and charac-
ter of the Injury, which ls only a single fact 
In the case; while, In ·a <'Ilse where the de-
cision depends upon the age of a party, the 
opinion of the jury upon Inspection conclu-
sively settles the whole question, thus ef-
fectually depriving the party aggrieved of 
the benefit ot an appeal. But, ID a case like 
this, the Inspection of the Injured part set-
tlea nothing more than the extent and char-
acter of the Injury, If, Indeed, It can be 
justly said to settle so much. At most, then, 
an Inspection of an Injured limb does no 
more than supply evidence upon a single 
fact, and It does not deprive the party of 
any substantial right on appeal; for It ls 
conclusively settled that the appellate court 
will not weigh the evidence In any case 
where there ls a contltct. It ls obvious, 
therefore, that the case under discussion ts 
very dltrerent from one In which age de-
cisively determines the whole controversy. 
It ls evident that the learned counsel have 
expended much labor on this point, and, as 
they cite only the single case we haYe re-
ferred to, we may well Infer that there are 
no others that lend any support to their posi-
tion. We have ourselves given the subject 
very careful study, and our search has not 
revealed a ~lltary authority that opposes, 
directly or lndll"e<'tly, the doctrine that It la 
competent to exhibit an Injured limb to the 
jury. It certainly has always been the prac-
tice, as Mr. Chitty says, to exhibit modE>ls, 
articles of apparel, or other chattels; and the 
case before us Is the same In principle. 
Miss Drumond testified that she was ac-
quainted with the appellee; described her 
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personal appearance and physical condition
previous to her injury. She also described
the appellee's condition immediately after
the accident, and for a few days afterwards.
After she had testiiicd to these facts, she
stated that she saw the appeilee a month
afterwards; that she (the appeliee) had
grown worse, and the witness described her
condition as it then existed. If this case
was one requiring a non-expert witness to
state facts before expressing an opinion, wé
should have no hesitation in holding that the
facts stated were sutflcient to entitle the wit-
ness to express an opinion. But we do not
understand that upon such a question a
knowledge of facts is required to be stated
in advance, or that the witness must be an
expert. Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, supra.
In Hardy v. Herriii, 56 N. H. 227, a very
learned opinion was delivered, in which very
many decisions of the English and American
courts were cited; and it was said, among
other things, that “all concede the admissi-
bility of the opinions of non-professional
men upon a great variety of unscientific
questions arising every day, and in every
judicial inquiry. There are questions of iden-
tity, handwriting, quantity, value, weight,
measure, time, distance, velocity, form, size,
age, strength, heat, cold, sickness, and
health.” Dr. Wharton lays down a like
rule, and cites many authorities. 1 \Vhart.
Ev. § 513. Other text writers assert the
same rule. Rog. Exp. Test. 5 3; Lawson,
Exp. Ev. 470. Counsel cite upon this point
two cases. The first of these (Com. v. Start-
ivant, 117 Mass. 122) bears upon the ques-
tion here under discussion, inasmuch as it
decides that, (1) where the trial court ad-
judges that a witness is qualified to give an
opinion, the appellate court cannot review
the decision; (2) that it is competent for a
witness to give an opinion as to the health
of a party; and (3) that it is not improper to
call upon him to describe specifically the
matter of which he speaks. In discussing
the second of these propositions, the court,
after stating the general rule that non-ex-
pert witnesses may express opinions in many
cases. says: “It is competent for a witness
to testify to the condition of health of a
person; that he is ill or disabled, or has a
fever, or is destitute, or in need of relief.
Parker v. Steamboat Co., 109 Mass. 449; Wil-
kinson v. Moseley, 30 Ala. 562; Barker v.
Coleman, 35 Ala. 221; Autauga Co. v. Davis,
32 Ala. 703.” As we read the case cited, it
lends counsel no support whatever, but, on
the contrary, is strongly against them. The
court fully adopts the view expressed in
Steamboat v. Logan. 18 Ohio, 378, that, “it
i not true, as a legal proposition, that no
one but an expert can give an opinion to a
Jiury." The second of the cases cited (Reid
v. Insurance Co., 58 Mo. 425) is not well con-
sidered, as there is neither argument nor
authority adduced. The witness in that case
was asked as to whether the assured was in
w11.oUs,av.—14
good health, and the court simply held that
the question was incompetent; saying that
“the question involved a mere conclusion,
and was objectionable.” This is not the law,
for every answer of a witness to such a
question is necessarily a conclusion, and yet,
as we have seen, it is well settled that such
a conclusion is competent. Turnpike Co. v.
Andrews. It is said, however, that the evi-
dence should have been excluded, because it
permitted the witness to institute a com-
parison. There is no strength in this posi-
tion. The testimony of the witness was di-
rected to the condition of the appcllce a
month subsequent to her injury, and, after
fully describing it, the witness said that it
was worse than it was immediately after the
accidcnt. In determining whether an in-
jured person is growing better or worse, a
non-expert witness must necessarily exprcss
an opinion, for, as the cases we have cited
hold, the tact is one that cannot be described
by any other than an expert witness. Any
witness of ordinary intelligence may be able
to state that a sick or wounded person has
grown worse, or has improved, without being
able to give an accurate description of his
condition, and this brings the case fully
within the authorities. Undoubtedly, the
facts on which the conclusion rests may be
asked for on cross-examination; but the
opinion is not incompetent merely because
the witness cannot adequately tate the
grounds on which it rests, although the fail-
ure to do so may. perhaps, weaken its pro-
bative force. But in this case the facts
were as fully stated as any non-expert could
posibly state them; so that, even if we were
wrong in relying on the authorities we have
cited, the appellant cannot prevail, for the
case is fully within the rule that, where a
non-expert witness states facts on which his
opinion is based, the opinion is competent.
One of the medical witnesses who had seen
and examined the appeliec, and who had de-
scribed her condition, was asked: “Wl1at,
in your opinion as a medical expert, pro-
duccd the symptoms you saw in her case?"
There was no error in permitting this ques-
tion to be asked and answered. Railway
Co. v. Falvey, 10-i Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389, and
4 N. E. 908, and authorities cited. Railway
Co. v. Savage, supra. If it were conceded
that Van Deusen v. Newcomer, -i0 Mich. 120,
does decide what the appellant claims, and
that it is sound, it would not avail the ap-
pellant, for here the medical expert did detail
the facts within his knowledge to the ju1'_\'.
Haggerty v. Brooklyn, 61 N. Y. 62-i, cited
by appellant, simply decides that it was not
competent to ask a non-expert witness "if
the conductor did all in his power to avoid
an accident."
A long hypothetical question was asked Dr.
C. TV. Murphy, and it is objected that it did
not embrace all the evidence in the case.
It ls settlcd beyond controversy that a party
who propounds an hypothetical question may
209
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EXPERTS. [Carte No. i2 
personal appearance and physical condition 
previous to her injury. Sbe also described 
the appellee's condition Immediately after 
tbe accident, and for a few days afterwards. 
After she had testified to these facts, she 
stated that she saw the appellee a month 
afterwards; that she (the appellee) had 
grown worse, and the witness described her 
condition as it then existed. If this case 
was one requiring_ a non-expert witness to 
state facts before expre11slng an opinion, we 
should have no hesitation lo holding that the 
facts stated were sufllclent to entitle the wlt-
ne88 to express an opinion. But we do not 
understand that upon such a question a 
knowledge of facts ls requlred to be stated 
In advance, or that the witness must be atl 
expert. Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, 11upra. 
In Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, a very 
learned opinion was delivered, In whi<'h vt•ry 
many declsloDB of the Engllah and American 
eourts were cited; and It was said, among 
other things, that "all concede the admlsel-
bWty of tbe oplnlons of non-profeBBlonal 
men upon a great ftriety of unsclentl1lc 
questions arising every day, and In every 
judicial lnqnlry. There are questions of Iden-
tity, handwriting, quantity, value, weight, 
measure, time, distance, velocity, form, Blze, 
age, strength, heat, cold, sickness, and 
health." Dr. Wharton lays down a like 
rnle, and cites many authorities. 1 "\\'hart. 
Ev. I 513. Other text writers assert the 
•me rule. Rog. Exp. Teat. t 3; Lawson, 
Exp. Ev. 470. Counsel cite upon this point 
two cases. The first of these (Com. v. Sturt-
lnnt, 117 :Maes. 122) bears upon the ques-
tion here under dlecu&11lon, lnHmucb as It 
decides that, (1) where the trial court ad-
judges that a witness le qualified to give an 
oplnlon, tbe appellate court cannot review 
the decision: (2) that It le competent for a 
wltneBB to give an opinion as to the health 
of a party; and (3) that 1t 18 not Improper to 
call upon blm to describe specifically the 
matter ot which be speaks. In discueelng 
the second of these propositions, ·the court, 
after stating the geneml rule that non-ex-
pert witnesses may exprees opinions In many 
cases, Pays: "It ls competent tor a wltnel!B 
to testify to the condition of health of a 
person; that be le Ul or disabled, or hne a 
fever, or ls destitute, or In need of relief. 
Parker v. Steamboat Co., 109 Maes. 449; Wll-
klDBOn v. Moseley, 30 Ala. 562; Barker v. 
Coleman, 35 A.la. 221; Autauga Co. v. Davle, 
32 A.la. 703." As we read the case elted, It 
lends counsel no support whatever, but, on 
the contrary, le strongly against them. The 
court fully adopts the view expreBSed In 
Steamboat v. Logan, 18 Ohlo, 378, that, "lt 
ls not true, as a legal propoeltlon, that no 
one but an expert can give an opinion to a 
jury." The second o( the eases cited (Reid 
v. Insurance Co., GS Mo. 425) ls not well con-
1fd('red, as there le nelth('r argument nor 
authority adduced. The witness In that <'llfle 
Wll8 aaked as to whether the aeeured was In 
WILGUS,BV.-14 
good health, and the court simply held that 
the question waa incompetent; saying that 
"the question IDvolved a mere concluBlon, 
and was objectionable." Thie ls not the lnw, 
for every answer of a wltneBB to such a 
question 18 necessarily a concluelon, amt yet, 
as we have seen, It la well settled thnt such 
a conclusion 18 competent. Turnpike l'o. v. 
Andrews. It le said, however, that the evi-
dence should have been excluded, because It 
permitted the witness to Institute a com-
parison. There le no strength lo this i>oel-
tlon. The testimony of the witness was di-
rected to the condition ot the a1>p('llee a 
month subsequent to her Injury, and, after 
fully describing It, the witness said that It 
was worse than It was Immediately after the 
accident. In determining whether an In-
jured person ls growing better or worse, a 
non-expert wltnel'IB must neceBSarlly exprc11s 
an opinion, for, as the cases we have cited 
hold, the fact 18 one that cannot be described 
by any other than an expert witness. Any 
witness ot ordinary lnt('lllgence may be able 
to state that a sick or wounded person has 
grown worse, or has Improved, without being 
able to give an accurate de11Crlptlon of his 
condition, and this brings the case fully 
within the authorities. Undoubtedly, the 
facts on which the conclusion rests may be 
asked for on cross-examination; but the 
opinion ls not Incompetent merely be<'ftnse 
the wltneBB cannot adequately state tile 
grounds on which It rests, although the fail-
ure to do so may. perhaps, weaken Its pro-
bative force. But In this case the fn<'ts 
were as fully stated as any non-expert could 
poBSibly state th~m; so that, even If we were 
wrong In relying on the authorities we hove 
cited, the appellant cannot prevail, tor the 
case ls fully within the rule that, where a 
non-expert witness states tacts on which hie 
opinion ls based, the opinion le competent. 
One ot the medical witnesses who had seen 
and examined the appellee, and who had de-
ecrlbecl her condition, was asked: "What, 
In your opinion as a medleal expert. pr~ 
du<'ed the symptoms you saw In her case?" 
There was no error In permitting this ques-
tion to be asked and anewere<l. Railway 
Co. v. Falvey, lM Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389, and 
4 N. E. 908, and authorities cited. Railway 
Co. v. Savage, supra. If It were conce<led 
that Van Deusen v. Neweomer, 40 l\llch. 120, 
does decide what the appellant dolme, and 
that It ls sound, lt would not u·all the ap-
pellant, tor here the medical expert did detail 
the tacts within his knowledge to the jury. 
Hagi:erty v. Brooklyn, G1 N'. Y. 62-l, ('ftecl 
by appellant, simply de<•il.les that it was not 
cow1wtent to ask a non-expert wlt11l'ss •·tf 
the eondnctor did all In bis power to avoid 
an accld('nt." 
A long h,vpothetlenl question was asked Dr. 
C. W. l\lurplly, and It ls obJe<·ted that It did 
not embnwe all the evlden<'e In the ease. 
It ls settled bE>yond controversy that a party 
who propounds an hypothetical question may 
209 
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assume such facts within the range of the
evidence as he believes the evidence tends to
establish. Railway Co. v. Falvey, 10-1 Ind.
412, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 N. E. 908, and au-
thorities cited; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind.
550, and authorities cited; Elliott v. Russell,
92 Ind. 526; Guetig v. State, 66 Ind. 94. Mr.
Rogers, in discussing this question, says:
“lf framed on the assumption of certain
facts. counsel may assume the facts in ac-
cordance with his theory of them; it not be-
ing csseiitial that he should state the facts
as they actually exist.” Exp. Test. 39. An-
other author says: “It is the privilege of
counsel in such cases to assume, with the
limits of the evidence, any state of facts
which he claims the evidence justifies, and
have the opinion of the expert upon the
facts assumed." Lawson, Exp. Ev.153. Coun-
sel say: "The hypothesis should include the
substance of all the evidence.” In support
of this proposition, they refer us to Com. v.
Rogers, T Metc. (i\-lass.) 500, and People v.
Lake, 12 N. Y. 362. Neither of these cases
supports the proposition. The New York
cases are fully and strongly against the doc-
trine of couns Stearns v. Field, 90 N. Y.
6-10; Mercer Vose, 67 N. Y. 56; Harnett
v. Garvey, 66 N. Y. 641. It is evident that
the proposition cannot be sound. If it be
regarded as correct, then, in every case, the
court must determine what facts were or
were not proved, and this would be an
usurpation of the functions of the jury. If,
as happens in most cases, the evidence is
conflicting, then, if counsel are right, the as-
sumption must of necessity contain contra-
dictoi" statements. These reasons are in
themselves enough to condemn the proposi-
tion of counsel, even in the absence of au-
thority; but all the authorities are against
them, so that the overthrow of their position
is decisive and complete.
Dr. Neal, a medical expert, was permitted
to testit'y that the irritation of the mouth
of the urethra produced the contracted con-
dition of the appellee’s legs. \Vhat we have
said in considering the testimony of another
medical witness disposes of this point. It
is, however, said that the question which
drew out the testimony was leading. If it
were granted that the question was leading,
it would not entitle the appellant to a re-
versal. It is generally held that permitting
a leading question to be asked will not be
sufiicient cause for reversal, although some
of the cases hold that, where there is a
clear abuse of discretion, the rule is other-
wise. \\'e need not decide which line of
cases "hath the better reasonz" it is enough
for us to decide. as we do, that there was no
such abuse of discretion as would require :1
reversal, even if we accepted the latter line
of cases as correctly expressing the rule.
Counsel say: “The twelfth and thirteenth
caliscs assigned in the motion for a new
trial were intended to bring before the jury
the accepted views of medical writers and
practitioners as to what was_commonly un-
derstood by and known to the medical pro-
fession, that the condition of the lower
limbs of the plaintiff is frequently produced
by uterine trouble. If this was the fact,
the defendant had a clear right to have it in
proof before the jury. If it was an unusual
fact, it would have made against the de-
fendant; but if it were usual, and was com-
monly understood by medical authors and
practitioners, it would have much weight in
favor of the defendant. There can he no
just reason assigned for excluding evidence
as to what is commonly understood and
known by the medical profession in that re-
gard.” We have copied all that is said by
counsel upon this subject, and we are by no
means convinced that the trial court erred.
if the question had arisen on cross-examinzr
tion, a different rule would perhaps obtain;
but the witness was introduced by appellant
and his opinion elicited. The qualification
of the witness was thus asserted, and it
was not necessary for the appellant to go
further than to show the knowledge and
experience of the witness, while, on cross-
examination, it would perhaps have been
proper to test his knowledge and experience
by a proper examination. If a witness
should be permitted to state what “ls com-
monly understood by the medical profes-
sion,” a never-ending investigation would be
opened, and a collateral matter presented
that would, as the evidence before us makes
apparent, lead to an almost endless conflict
of opinion. There would be, at best, an in-
tangible conflict of opinion, without any au-
thoritative method of settling it. If the de-
fendant were permitted to ak such a ques-
tion, then the plaintiff would be entitled to
meet it, so that the contest would fall upon
the vague and uncertain subject of what
professional men “commonly understood.“
What men commonly understand can be de-
termined only by an inquiry into their men-
tal processes, and such an inquiry ought not
to be allowed upon a purely collateral ques-
tion. A matter so vague and so intangible
ought not to be made the subject of in-
quiry, unless it is directly in issue, as mo-
tive, intention, or the like.
Appellee’s counsel asked on the cross-ex-
amination of Dr. Painter, one of the expert
witnesses introduced by appellant, this ques-
tion: “Suppose she received a shock upon
her feet going a distance of four or five feet
outward and some three feet downward. as
much as two years and six months ago. how
far would such a shock account for her
present condition?" We have no doubt, ai-
though the question is somewhat confused,
that the ruling of the trial court was right.
The witness testified, in his evidence in
chief, that he had examined the appellee,
described her condition, and gave his opin-
ion upon various phases of her case. it
was therefore competent for the appellee to
ask him for his opinion, not only for the
210
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&S8nme such facts '\°\'lthlu the range of the 
evidence as be belle,·es the evlden<'e tends to 
establish. Uallway Co. v. Falvey, lot Ind. 
412, 3 N. E. 389, nnd 4 N. E. 008, and au-
thorities cited; Goodwin v. State, 00 Ind. 
550, nnd authorities cited; Elliott v. Russell, 
92 Ind. 1'i26; Guetig v. State, 66 Ind. 94. Mr. 
Rogers, in discussing this question, says: 
"It fmmed on the assumption of certain 
facts. C'ounsel may asRume the facts In ac-
<'ordance wUb his theory ot them; it not bt>-
ing l'!<Rentlal that he should state the tacts 
as they a<'tually exist." Exp. Test. 39. An-
other author says: "It is the prlvllege of 
counsel in such cases to assume, with the 
limits of the evidence, nny state of facts 
whl<'h he claims the evidence justlftes, and 
have the opinion of the expert upon the 
facts assumed." Lawson, Exp. Ev. Hi3. Coun-
sel Ray: "The hypothesis should Include the 
substance of all the evidence." In support 
of this proposition, thv refer us to Com. v. 
Rogers, 7 Mete. (MnsS.) 500, and People v. 
Lake, 12 N. Y. 362. iNelther of these cases 
supports the proposition. The New York 
cases are full1ud strongly against the doc-
trine of couns Stearns v. Field, 00 N. Y. 
640; Mercer Vose, 67 N. Y. 00; Hamett 
v. Harvey, 66 N. Y. 641. It ls evident that 
the proposition cannot be sound. It It be 
regarded as correct, then, in every case, the 
court must determine what facts· were or 
were not proved, and this would be an 
usurpation of the functions of the jury. It, 
as happens in most cases, the evidence ls 
<'Onfilctlng, then, If counsel are right, the as-
sumption must of necessity contain contra-
dictory statements. These reasons are in 
themselves enough to condemn the proposi-
tion of <'Ounsel, even In the absence of au-
thority; but all the authorities are against 
them, so that the overthrow of their position 
ls declRh·e on<l <.'OlllJ>lete. 
Dr. :Seal, a medical expert, was permitted 
to testify that the Irritation of the mouth 
of the urethra produced the contracted con-
dition of the appellee's legs. What we have 
said In conRldering the testimony of another 
medical witness disposes of this point. It 
is, however, said that the question which 
drew out the testimony was leading. If It 
were granted that the question was leading, 
It would not entitle the appellant to a re-
veninl. It ls generally held that permitting 
a leading question to be asked will not be 
sutttclent cause for reversal, although some 
ot the cases hold that, where there is a 
dear nbuRe of discretion, the rule ls other-
wise. We need not decide which line of 
<:U!l('S "hnth the better reason:" It is enough 
for us to decide, us we do, tbat there was no 
such abuse of discretion as would require a 
reversal, even If we accepted the latter line 
of cases as correctly expressing the n1le. 
Counsel say: "The twelfth nnd thlrtt>euth 
<·nu~l'S a11slg11ell In the motion tor a uew 
trial were Intended to bring before the Jury 
the accepted views of medical writers and 
210 
practltloners as to what was.commonly un-
derstood by and known to the medical pro-
fesalon, that the condition of the lower 
limbs of the plalntur ls frequently produced 
by uterine trouble. It this was the fact, 
the defendant had a clear right to have it ln 
proof before the Jury. It It was an unusual 
fact, It would have made against the de-
fendant; but If It were usual, and was com-
monly underst.ood by medical authors and 
practitioners, It would have much weight In 
favor of the defendant. There can be no 
just reason assigned for excluding evidence 
as to what is commonly understood and • 
known by the medical profession ln that re-
gard." We have copied all that ls said by 
counsel upon this subject, and we are by no 
means convinced that the trial court erred. 
It ~he question had arisen Oll cross-examlllfl-
tion, a dlft'erent rule would perhaps obtain; 
but the witness was Introduced by appellant 
and his opinion eli<'lted. The quallftcatlon 
of the witness was thus asserted, and It 
was not necessary for the appellant to go 
further than to show the knowledge and 
experlencs of the wltnesa, while, on cross-
examlnatlon, It would perhaps ba,·e been 
proper to test his knowledge and experience 
by a proper examination. If a witness 
should be permitted to state what "l.8 com-
monly understood by the medical profes-
sion," a never-ending investigation would be 
opened, and a collateral matter presented 
that would, as the evidence before us makes 
apparent, lead to an almost endless conftlct 
of opinion. There would be, at best, an In-
tangible con.ti.let of opinion, without any au-
thoritative method of settling lt. If the de-
fendant were permitted to ask such a ques-
tion, then the plalntitr would be entl~ed to 
meet It, so that the contest would fall upon 
the vague and uncertain subject of what 
profeBBlonal men "commonly understood." 
What men commonly understand can be de-
termined only by an Inquiry Into their men-
tal processes, and such an Inquiry ought not 
to be allowed upon a purely collateral ques-
tion. A matter so vague and so Intangible 
ought not to be made the subject of In-
quiry, unless it 1.8 directly In 188ue, as mo-
tive, Intention, or the like. 
Appellee's counsel asked on the cross-ex-
amination of Dr. Painter, one of the expert 
wltnenes Introduced by appellant, this ques-
tion: "Suppose she received a shock upon 
her feet going a distance of four or five feet 
outward and some three feet downward. as 
much as two years and six months ago, how 
far would such a shock account for her 
present condition?" We have no doubt, al-
though the question ls somewhat confused, 
that the ruling of the trial court was right. 
The witness testified, In bis e\-ldence ln 
chief, that he had examined the 01>pellet', 
described her condition, and gave his opin-
ion upon various l>hases of her case. It 
was then>fore competent for the a1>pellee to 
ask him for his opinion, not only for the 
EX PE R TS.
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purpose of testing his ability as an expert,
but also for the purpose of placing the opin-
ion before the jury as sustaining her theory.
Railway C0. v. Falvey, supra, and cases
cited; Rog. Exp. Tet. 50. It is a mistake
to suppose that when counsel, in the exam-
ination in chief, open on a general subject,
that the line of examination adopted must
be followed by cross-examining counsel; on
the contrary, it is well settled that, where
the direct examination opens on a general
subject, the cross-examination may go into
any and all phases of that subject. De
Haven v. De Haven, 77 Ind. 236;
-On a cross-examination, counsel may direct
and separate, or unite and join, the facts
involved in the general subject.
Vogel v. E
Harris (December 8, 1887), 14 N. E. 385. ‘
The only ;
restriction upon the right of cross-examina- E
tion. so far as aifects the question as it is '
here presented, is that it must be confined ,
to the subject-matter of the examination in .
chief. As decided in Higham v. Vanosdol,
101 Ind. 162, a distinct and independent sub-
ject cannot be introduced on cross-exa1nina-
tion, but the cross-examination may go to ‘
all matters involved in the subject embraced
in the examination in chief.
It is said by counsel that "the eighteenth
cause for a new trial raised the question
whether Dr. E. P. Easly could answer cer-
tain questions from his opinions derived
from medical books." We do not think that
the record presents the question just as
counsel state it. The witness was asked:
“What effect would her [the plaintiff] living
with a man who was a paralytic have upon
her; how and in what way would it affect
her?“ To this he answered: “I can’t say
what effect it would have upon her. I
could recite the reported cases. We know
that persons have become paralytics simply
by waiting on a paralytic.”
the opinion that it would not, in any event,
be proper to recite special cases reported in
medical books; but, however this may be,
no offer of evidence was made, and no ques-
tion is presented which will avail the appel-
lant. In this instance. we may observe, the
witness was permitted to give his opinion
derived from the books, and the only effect
.' 104 Ind. 26-i, 3 N. E. 836;
We incline to '
Exp. Test. 81-107. The cases cited by coun-
sel are directly against them, for they both
concede that it is competent to ask an
opinion as to probable results, although it i
held that merely speculative opinions are
not competent. In the last of the cases
cited it was said. in speaking of an instruc-
tion, that the true rule was, as laid down,
that “the plaintid could only recover dam-
ages for such pain and suffering as the evi-
dence rendered reasonably certain would
necessarily result from the injury."
One of the attorneys of appellant had
made an aflidavit in support of an unsuc-
cessful motion for a continuance; and this,
when offered in evidence, was excluded.
Clearly, there was no error in this ruling.
Appellant offered to prove by the same
attorney what the conductor who, as the
evidence shows, pulled the appellee from
the train, said as to attending the trial.
There was no error in this ruling. What the
witness proposed to state was mere hearsay,
and its exclusion is sustained by one of the
plainest rules of evidence. The appellant
had a right, either by compulsory process or
by deposition, to the testl ny of the wit-
ness, but it had no right to have his state-
ment rehearsed to the jury. We think ap-
pellant's counsel are in error in assuming, as
they impliedly do, that Dr. Neal did not ex-
amine the appellec in a professional capac-
ity, for the record shows, not only that he
visited her in that capacity, but that he di_d
so under the order of the court. It is well
established by authority that statements
made to a physician in his professional ca-
pacity are competent, when descriptive of
existing symptoms or pains, although they
are not admissible when mere narratives of
past occurrences. Railroad Co. v. Newell,
Railroad Co. v.
Falvey, and cases cited; Murphy v. Rail-
road Co., 66 Barb. 125; Kent v. Lincoln, 32
Vt. 591-59”; Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen,
322; Looper v. Bell, 1 Head, 373; Hatch v.
‘ Fuller, 131 Mass. 574; Railroad Co. v. Johns,
‘ 36 Kan. 769, 14 Pac. 237.
of the ruling was to deny the right to give 1
special cases reported in the works of med- '
icai writers. Lawson, Exp. Ev. 169, and
cases cited.
The only argument made in support of one
of the points stated by counsel is this:
twenty-first, twenty-second, and twenty-
third causes assigned for a new trial are
good, under the rulings of the cases of
Strohm v. Railroad Co., 96 N. Y. 305, and
Curtis v. Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. 541." The
questions asked the medical witnesses were
as to the probable results that would follow
from an injury described by the witnesses
who testiticd on the trial. We understand
it to be well settled that such questions are
proper. Lawson, Exp. Ev. 108-114; Rog.
1 go to the jury.”
urrhe i
In the case last
cited, the authorities are collected and re-
viewed, and it was said: “But the mere
fact that the declarations are made after
suit has been commenced, and while it is
pending, will not be sutlicient to exclude the
declarations, and they should be allowed to
This is in accordance with
our decisions, and with the decided weight
of authority. Following Quaife v. Railway
, Co., 48 Wis. 513, 4 N. W. 658, this court said,
in speaking of declarations such as those
hcre given in evidence: “They are especial-
ly competent, and of more weight, when
made to a physician for the purpose of re-
ceiving treatment, or to a medical expert
who makes an examination at the request
of the opposite party, or by direction of a
court, for the purpose of basing an opinion
upon as to the physical situation of the
party whose condition is the subject of in-
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EXPERTS. [Case No. 72 
purpose of testing bis ablllty as an expert, Exp. Test. 81-107. The cases <:lted by coun-
but also for the purpose of placing the opin- se1 are directly against them, for they both 
ion before the jury as sustaining her theory. concede tlUAt It ls competent to II.Elk an 
Railway Co. v. Falvey, supra, and cases oplnlon as to probable results, although It Is 
cited; Rog. Exp. Test. 50. It ls a mistake held that merely speculative opinions are 
to suppose that when counsel, ln the exam- not competent. In the last of the cases 
!nation in chief, open on a general subject, I cited it was said, in speaking of an lnstruc-
that the line of examination adopted must I tion, that the true rule was, as laid down, 
be followed by cross-examining counsel; on that "the plalntltr could only recover dam-
the contrary, It ls well settled that, where ages for such pain and sutrering as the evl-
the direct examination opens on a general dence rendered reasonably certain would 
-subject, the cross-examination may go into necessarily result from the injury." 
any and all phases of that subject. De One of the attorneys of appellant bad 
HaV"en v. De Haven, 77 Ind. 236; Vogel v. ' made an atlldavlt ln support of an unsuc-
Harrls (December 8, 1887), 14 N. E. 385. i cessful motion for a continuance; and this, 
-On a cross-examination, counsel may direct , when otrered in evidence, was excluded. 
and separate, or unite and join, the facts 1 Clearly, there was no error in this n1llng. 
lnvoh·ed In the general subject. The only Appellant otrered to prove by the same 
restriction upon the right of cross-examlna- attorney what the conductor who, as the 
tlon. so fur as atrects the question as It ls evidence shows, pulled the appellee from 
here presented, ls that it must be contlned the train, said as to attending the trial. 
to the subject-matter of the examination in There was no error in this ruling. What the 
chief. As decided In Higham v. Vanosdol, witness proposed to state was mere hearsay, 
101 Ind. 162, a distinct and independent sub- and Its exclusion Is sustained by one of the 
ject cannot be introduced on cross-examina- ' plainest rules of evidence. The appellant 
tlon, but the cross-examination may go to had a right, either ]\V compulsory proce88 or 
all matters Involved In the subject embraced ; by deposition, to the testl~ny of the wlt-
in the examination ln chief. I ness, but lt had no right to have his state-
It ls said by counsel that "the eighteenth , ment rehearsed to the jury. We think aP-
-cause for a new trial raised the question I pellant's counsel are in error in assuming, as 
whether Dr. E. P. Easly could answer cer- i they lmplledly do, that Dr. Neal did not ex-
taln questions from his opinions derived f amine the appellee In a professional capac-
from medical books." We do not think that lty, for the record shows, not only that he 
the record presents the question Just as visited her in that capacity, but that be did 
·<'OlllllK'l Rt.ate It. The wltnPss was asked: so under the order of the court. It Is well 
"What effect would her [the plalntltf] llvlng established by authority that statements 
with a man who was a paralytic have u1>on made to a physician In his profeeslonal ca-
ber; how and In what way would lt atrect pa<'lty are competent, when descriptive of 
her?" To this he answered: ''I can't say existing symptoms or pains, although they 
what etrect It would have upon her. I are not admissible when mere narratives of 
could recite the reported cases. We know past occurrences. Railroad Co. "· Newell, 
that persons have bet"Ome paralytics slmi>lY 104 Ind. 26i, 3 N. E. 836; Railroad Co. v. 
by waiting on a paralytic." We Incline to Falvey, and cases cited; Murphy v. Rall-
the opinion that lt would not, In any event, road Co., 66 Barb. 125; Kent v. Lincoln, 32 
be proper to recite special cases reported In Vt. 5111-597; Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 
medical books; but, however this may be, 322; Looper v. Bell, 1 Head, 373; Hatch v. 
no otrer of evidence was made, and no ques- Fuller, 131 Mass. 574; Railroad Co. v. Johns, 
tlon ls presented which will avail the appel- 36 Kan. 700, 14 Pac. 237. In the case last 
lant. In this instance, we may observe, the cited, the autboJlltles are collected and re-
wltneu was permitted to give his opinion viewed, and it was said: "But the mere 
derived from the books, and the only etrect fact that the declarations are made after 
of the ruling was to deny the right to give suit bas been commenced, and while It ls 
apeclal cases reported in the works of med- pencllng, wlll not be sutllclent to exclude the 
lcal writers. Lawson, Exp. Ev. 100, and declarations, and they should be allowed to 
eases cited. go to the jury." This ls ln accordance with 
The only argument made In support of one our dedslons, and with the decided weight 
of the points stated by counsel ls this: "Tho of authority. Following Quaife v. Railway 
twenty-ti.rat, twenty-second, and twenty· Co., 48 Wis. 513, 4 N. W. 658, this court said, 
third causes at1Blgned for a new trial are in speaking of declarations such as those 
good, under the rullngs of the cases of here given in evidence: "They are especlal-
8trohm v. Railroad Co., 00 N. Y. 300, and ly competent, and of more weight, when 
(,'urtle v. Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. 541." The made to a physician for the purpmie of re· 
questions asked the medical witnesses were celvlng treatment, or to a medical expert 
a& to the probable results that would follow who makes an examination at the request 
from an Injury described by the witnesses of the opposite party, or by dlredlon of a 
who testltiP.<l on the trial. We understand court, for the purpose of basing an opinion 
It to be well settled that such questions are upon as to the phy11l<'al situation of the 
proper. Lawson, Exp. Ev. 108-114; Rog. party whose condition ls the subject of ln-
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quiry.” Railroad Co. v. Newell, supra. As
suggested in the case from which we have
quoted, and in some of the Massachusetts
cases, without some information as to the
seat and character of pain, and as to the
symptoms of the sick or injured person, it
is impossible, in many cases, for :1 physician
to form an intelligent opinion; for many of
the organs of the human body are concealed
from view. Roosa v. Loan Co., 132 Mass.
439; Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush. 581; Barber
v. .\Ierriam, 11 Allen, 322. It results that,
as said in Railroad Co. v. Newell. and other
cases, the evidence is admitted on the
ground of necessity. That this is true is
obvious, since its denial would in many
cases completely thwart justice. Another
well settled legal principle supports the rule,
and that is this: Where an act or transac-
tion is competent, declarations forming part
of the thing done are also competent.
Dr. Neal was asked “whether the condi-
tion of the womb in which you found it day
before yesterday will account for the condi-
tion of the spine and its tenderness, as well
as the drawn limbs, and all the conditions
now." The objection to this question is
that the witness had not stated the facts
to the jury. We think it only necessary to
say, on this point, that counsel's position
rests on an erroneous assumption. We think
the facts relevant to the opinion were fully
in evidence. Indeed, the question itself di-
rects the attention of the witness to a fact
that must have come under his own ob-
servation, and, of necessity, involved in the
matter on which his opinion was asked.
We set out the instructions given at the
request of the appellce, as they contain the
'.' trongest expression of the law against the
" pellant found in the series. These are the
instructions: “(ii If the plaintiff was a pas-
senger upon defendant's road in one of de-
fendant's coaches, as charged in her com-
plaint, the defendant‘s obligation was to car-
ry hcr safely and properly; nnd, if the de-
fendant intrusted this duty to the servants
of the company, the law holds the defend-
ant responsible for the manner in which they
execute it. The carrier is obliged to protect
its passengers from improper and unneces-
sary violcncc at the hands of its own serv-
ants. And it is the established law that a
carrier is responsible for the negligence and
wrongful conduct of its servants, suffered
or done in the line of their employment
whereby a passenger is injurcd. (2) The du-
ty of :1 carrier is to safely can-1'_v passengers.
It is true that a carrier of passengers is not
an insurer of the safcty of those whom it
lnitlcrtakcs to carry, against all the risks of
travel: but nevcrthclcss there rests upon
such cnrricr this general duty of safely car-
rying. (th A carrier of passengers for pay
is responsible for injuries sustained by a pas-
senger through the neglect, recklessness, and
carelessness of the servants of such carrier,
while such servants are engaged in the gen-
eral scope of their employment, whether the
act was or was not authorized by the mas-
ter. (4) A passenger is warranted in obey-
ing the direction of the servants and agents
of the carrier, when given within the scope
of their duty, unless such obedience leads to
a known peril which a prudent person would
not encounter. (5) If, in this case, the jury
believe, from a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the plaintiff obeyed the defend-
ant's conductor, in charge of the train upon
which she was a. passenger, in getting ofi? of
the train, and if she was not then apprised
of any peril that she would encounter there-
by, she would not be guilty of contributing
to any injuries received by her in thus alight-
lng from the train. (6) if the fact be that
the defendant’s conductor, having charge of
the train upon which plaintiff was a pas-
senger, seized hold of her while the train
was in motion and was moving on, and
pulled her from the platform of the coach
by the exercise of physical force, and there-
by caused her to strike the ground or other
hard substance below, whereby she was in-
jured, she would not be guilty of contribut-
ing to injuries received thereby. (T) If plain-
tiff did not receive the injuries complained
of by any contributing act of negligence or
fault of her own, but was injured at the
time complained of by the carelessness and
negligclice or fault of the defendant's serv-
ants, or one of them, committed in the gen-
eral scope of employment as such servants
or servant, the defendant is liable for such
damages as she may have sustained by the
injuries thus received. (8) If you find for
the plaintiff, you are instructed that. in as-
sessing plaintiff's damages, you cannot ex-
ceed the sum sued for in the complaint, which
is twenty-five thousand dollars; and, in as-
sessing the damages, it is proper that you
consider the injuries received by plaintifl,
their extent, whether of a temporary or per-
manent character, and you may take into
consideration loss of time. expenses incur-
red, physical suffering. bodily pain, and per-
manent disability, if proved to be direct
results of the injuries described in the com-
plaint, and you should thereupon assess such
compensatory damages as in your opinion
the evidence before you warrants. (9) A
railroad company carrying passengers for
hire has not discharged its duty, or relieved
itself from liability. to them, till it stopped
at the end of their journey a reasonable
time for them to get off the train in safety.”
In our judgment, these instructions state
the law quite as favorably to the appellant
as it had a right to ask. If there is error
in them it is against the appellec. It is said
by counsel that the first and second instruc-
tions given for the plaintiff are more ab-
stract propositions. We, however, regard
them as correct statements of the law, well
applied to the particular casc. The fourth
and fifth instructions are correct in their
statement of legal principles. Railroad Co.
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Case No. 72] RELEVANCY. 
qulry." Railroad Co. v. :Sewell, supm. As 
suggested In the case from which we )lave 
quoted, and ID some of the llassa(•busetts 
cases, without some Information as to the 
aeat and character of pain, and as to the 
symptoms of the sick or Injured person, It 
Is Impossible, In many cases, for a physlolan 
to form an lotelllgent opinion; for many of 
the organs of the human body are concealed 
from view. Roosa v. Loan Co., 132 :\lass. 
439; Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush. 581; Barber 
v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322. It results that, 
as said In Railroad Co. v. Newell, and other 
cases, the evidence Is admitted on the 
ground of neceplty. That this Is true Is 
obvious, since Its denial would In many 
cases completely thwart justice. Another 
well settled legal principle supports the rule, 
and that Is this: Where an act or transac-
tion Is competent, declarations forming part 
of the thing done are also competent. 
Dr. :Seal was asked "whether the condi-
tion of the womb In which you found It day 
before yesterday will account for the condl: 
Uon of the spine and Its tenderness, as well 
as the drawn limbs, and all the conditions 
now." The objection to this question Is 
that the witness had not stated the facts 
to the jury. We think It only necessary to 
say, on this point, that counsel's position 
rests on an erroneous assumption. We think 
the facts relevant to the opinion were fully 
ln evidence. Indeed, the question Itself dl-
~ts the attention of the witness to a fact 
that must have come under bis own ob-
servation, and, of neceBBlty, Involved In the 
matter on which his opinion was asked. 
We set out the Instructions given at the 
request of the appellee, as they contain the 
~ngest expression of the law against the 
'tlppellant found In the series. These are the 
l•tructlons: "(1) It the plalntUf was a pas-
etnger upon deCendant's road In one of de-
fendant's <'Ollches, as charged ID her com-
plaint, the defendant's obligation was to car-
ry her safely and properly; and, If the de-
fendant lntrusted this duty to the servants 
of the company, the law holds the defend-
ant responslbh• for the manner In which they 
execute It. The carrier Is obliged to protect 
Its pn.ssengers from Improper and unneces-
Hary violence at the bands of Its own serv-
ants. And it ls the established law that a 
(•arrler ls resj)Onslble for the negllgen<'e and 
wrongful conduct of Its servants, suffered 
or done In the line of their employment 
whereby a passenger Is Injured. (2) The du-
ty of a C'arrler Is to safely <.'arry passengers. 
It ls tnie that a carrier of passPngers Is not 
an ln11urer of the safety of those whom It 
un<l1•rtnk1•s to curry. against all the risks of 
trnvPl; hut nev<>rtlwl<>ss th<>re re11ts upon 
sm•h <'lllTIPr this ~l'neral duty of safely car-
rying. (:II A <.'arrler of passengers for pay 
ls r<>s1>011sll>l<> for lnjurll'e sustained by a pas-
BE'nger through the n<'glt><•t, reckl1>ssness, and 
carelt'esnese of the servants of such <.'arrler, 
while such sen-ants are engaged in the gen-
212 
eral scope ot thelr employment, whether the 
act was or was not authorised by the mas-
ter. (4) A passenger is warranted In obey-
ing the direction of the serviants and agents 
of the carrier, when given within the scope 
ot their duty, unless such obedience leads to 
a known peril which a prudent person would 
not encounter. (5) It, In this case, the jury 
belle'l"e, from a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the plslntlft' obeyed the defend-
ant's conductor, In charge of the train upon 
which she was a passenger, In getting off of 
the train, and If she was not then apprised 
of any peril that she would encounter there-
by, she would not be guilty of contributing 
to any Injuries received by her In thus alight-
ing from the train. (6) It the fact be that 
the defendant's conductor, having charge o! 
the train upon which plalntl1f was a pas-
senger, seized bold of her while the train 
was In motion and was moving on, and 
pulled her from the platform of the coach 
by the exercise of physical foree, and there-
by <'&Used her to strike the ground or otber-
hard substance below, whereby she was In-
jured, she would not be guilty of conhibut-
lng to Injuries recel'l"ed thereby. (7) It plaln-
tl1f did not receive the Injuries complained 
of by any contributing act of negligence or 
fault of her own, but was Injured at the 
time complained of by the C'arelessneBS and 
1 negligence or fault of the defendant's serv-
ants, or one of them, committed In the gen-
eral sco1>e of employment as such servants. 
or servant, the defendant Is liable for such 
damages as she mny have 1metalned by the 
Injuries thus received. (8) If you ftnd for 
the l>lalntlft', you are Instructed that, In as-
sessing plaintiff's damages. you cannot ex-
ceed the sum sued for In the complaint, whlN1 
Is twenty-ftve thousand dollars; and, In as-
set~1dng the damages, It Is proper that you 
consider the Injuries received by plalntltr, 
their extent, whether of a temporary or per-
manent character, and you may take Int<> 
consideration loss of time, expenses Incur-
red, physl<'al suffering, bodily pain, and per-
manent dlsablllty, If proved to be direct 
results of the Injuries de8<'rlhed In the com-
plaint, and you should thereupon assess such 
compenl'atory damages as In your opinion 
the evlden<.'e bPfore you warrants. (9) A 
railroad company carrying pa88engers for 
hire has not discharged Its duty, or reUeved 
lts<'lf from llablllty, to them, till It stopped 
at the end of their journey a reasonable 
time for them to get oft' the train In safety." 
In our judgment, these Instructions state 
the law quite as favorably to the appellant 
as It bad a right to ask. If there Is error 
In them It Is against the appellee. It ls said 
by counsel that the first and 11econd lm~truc­
tlons glvPn for the plaintiff are W<'l't' ab-
i;;tra<.'t propo11ltlons. \Ve, bowen•r, regar1l 
thl'm as COITt><·t statements of the law. Wt>ll 
applied to the partl<'ular en11e. The fourth 
and ftftb Instructions are c.·orrect In thrlr 
statement of legal principles. Railroad Co. 
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v. Carper (this term) 14 N. E. 352: Rail-
way Co. v. Pinchln (this term) 13 N. E. 6.77.
We do not, in this holding, controvert the
doctrine that a passenger must not obey the
directions of the employés where it will lead
to known danger which a prudent person
would not encounter. On the contrary, we
approve these instructions, because they as-
sert that doctrine. VVe cannot hold that the
instructions are not relevant to the evidence;
nor can we hold that they are not within
the issue tendered by the complaint. The
use of the epithet “willt'ul" does not control
the other averments. We think it must be
regarded as conclusively settled by our ca-
ses that the use oi.' the words “wlllful" or
“willful negligence" does not change the
character of the pleading. As a matter of
pleading, epithets are of no great force.
Palmer v. Railroad Co. (this term) 14 N.
I-1. 70; Gregory y. Railroad Go. (Ind. Sup.)'
14 N. E. 228; Railway Co. v. Ader, 110
lad. 376, 11 N. E. 437; Railway Co. v. Bryan,
107 Ind. 51, 7 N. E. 80"; Railroad Co. v.
Mann, 107 Ind. 89, 7 N. E. S93; Railway
Co. v. Schmidt, 106 Ind. 73, 5 N. E. 684.
lt is alleged in the complaint, among other
things, that “the plaintiif sustained said in-
juries without any fault on her part, and
that the same were received by her because
of the negligent, careless, willful, heedless,
and improvident acts of said conductor.”
This, taken in connection with other aver-
ments, makes the cause of action one of neg-
ligence, rather than of intentional and ma-
licious wrong. What the conductor did, al-
though constituting a tort, did not, upon the
theory of the complaint, constitute a. willful
and intentional assault. It is evident that
the theory on which the complaint proceeds
is that the wrong was not an intentional or
malicious one, tor it is alleged that it was
heedless and negligent, and that there was
no contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiilf. The court below construed the
complaint as we construe it, and so, also,
did the appellant, as appears from the in-
structions given at its request; the ilrt of
which reads thus: “(1) The jury are in-
structed that this is an action on the part
01' the plaintifl to recover damages against
the defendant for injuries alleged to have
been sustained by the plaintiil‘. on the night
of the twenty-first day of Uctober, 1882, in
getting oi! of the steps of a car of one of
defendant’s passenger trains at Campbells-
burg; the plaintiff alleging that ‘the con-
ductor oi! said train negligently, heedlessly,
willfully, carelessly, and improperly seized
her while said train was in motion, and,
without any fault or negligence of the plain-
tiff whatever, he wrenched her off of said
steps, and jerked her to the ground, where
she alighted in a twisted posture,‘ thereby
injuring her feet, legs, and body generally,
and causing a concussion of the spine, re-
sulting in paralysis of the lower limbs. ren-
dering her unable to walk, and that such in-
juries are permanent. The answer of the
defendant is a general denial, which casts
upon the plaintiif the burden of proving—
First, that she was wrenched of! of the steps
of said car, and jerked to the ground, by the
conductor; second, that the injuries alleged
by the plaintiif were the direct and imme-
diate consequences of the manner in which
she was taken off the train; and, third, that
the plaintiff did not, by any act or conduct
of hers at the time, contribute to the injury,
and that she was free from fault or negli-
gence on her part." The doctrine in Carver
v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497-516, applies here with
peculiar force: “When a theory is thus
adopted, and acted upon below, with the con-
currence of both parties, a judgment ought
not to be reversed because the court in-
structs the jury in accordance with it."
The only objection urged against the in-
structions given by the court on its own mo-
tion, not disposed of by what we have al-
ready said, ls that they direct the jury to find
a. generalverdict, and thus lmpliedlyinstruct-
ed them not to return a special verdict. A
number of interrogatories were submitted by
the partie and the court; and we are in-
clined to the opinion that the fair meaning
of the instruction on this point is that, in
case answers were returned to the interrog-
atories, there must also be a general ver-
dict. If this be true, there was no error;
but it we are wrong in this, still there can
be no reversal, for our statute provides that,
“in all actions, the jury, unless otherwise
directed by the court, may render a special
or general verdict." Rev. St. § 546; Work,
Pr. § $49. The court has authority to direct
8 general verdict, and we must presume that
the authority was justly exercised; tor, un-
til the contrary appears, all reasonable in-
tendments are indulged in favor of the rul-
ings of the trial court.
C-onceding that the fourth instruction ask-
ed by the appellant was correct, (a conces-
ion not warranted, as we incline to think.)
it was substantially embodied in the third
instruction given at appellant's request. It
is too well settled to require the citation of
authorities that a trial court is not bound to
repeat its instructions. What we have said
oi‘ the fourth instruction applies to the sixth,
seventh, and eighth instructions asked by the
appellant, for, so far as they were correct,
they were substantially included in other in-
structions given. The tenth instruction does
not express the law. and was rightfully re-
fused. It is not necessary that the wrong-
doer should apprehend the particular conse-
quences which may proximately result from
his acts, although the act must be of such a.
nature as to produce some injurious result.
To illustrate: A man ill with consumption,
who is wrongfully injured in alighting from
a train, and so injured as that a hemorrhage
results, has a right to recover although the
servants of the carrier may not have had rea-
son to apprehend such a result. Railroad
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EXP EB TS. [Case No. 7j 
v. Carper (this term) H N. E. 852; Rail-
way Co. v. Plnchln (this term) 13 N. E. 6.77. 
We do not, In this holding, controvert the 
doctrine that a passenger mWlt not obey the 
directions ot the employ4!8 where It will lead 
to known danger which a prudent person 
would not encounter. On the contrary, we 
approve theae instructions, because they 11&-
sert that doctrine. We cannot hold that the 
Instructions are not relevant to the evidence; 
nor can we hold that they are not within 
the Issue tendered by the complaint. The 
use ot the epithet "willful" does not control 
the other averments. We think It must be 
regarded as conclusively settled by our ca-
ses that the use of the words "wflltul" or 
"wllltul negligence" does not change the 
character ot the pleading. As a matter ot 
pleading, epithets are ot no great fol'<!(>. 
Palmer v. Railroad Co. (this term) 14 N. 
E. 70; Gregory v. Railroad Co. (Ind. Bup.1 
14 N. E. 228; Rallway Co. v. Ader, 110 
Ind. 376, 11 N. E. 487; Railway Co. v. Bryan, 
107 Ind. 51, 7 N. E. 807; Railroad Co. v. 
Mann, 107 Ind. 89, 7 N. E. 893; Railway 
Co. v. Schmidt, 106 Ind. 73, 5 N. E. 684. 
It ls alleged In the complaint, among other 
things, that "the plalntUr sustained said In-
juries without any fault on her part, and 
that the same were received by her be<'ause 
ot the negligent, careless, wllltul, heedleBS, 
and Improvident acts ot sa.ld conductor." 
This, taken In connection with other aver-
ments, makes the cause of action one of neg-
ligence, rather than of Intentional and ma-
licious wrong. What the conductor did, al-
though constituting a tort, did not, upon the 
theory ot the complaint, constitute a wllltul 
and Intentional auault. It la evident that 
the theory on which the complaint proceeds 
ls that the wrong was not an Intentional or 
malicious one, for It ls alleged that It waa 
heedless and negligent, and that there was 
no contributory negligence on the part of 
the plalntur. The court below construed the 
complaint aa we construe it, and so, also, 
did the appellant, as appears from the In-
structions given at Its request; the first of 
which reads thus: "(1) The jury are In-
structed that this la an action on the part 
of the plaintiff to recover damages against 
the defendant for Injuries alleged to have 
been sustained by the plaintiff on the night 
of the twenty-first day of October, 1882, In 
getting off of the atepa of a car of one ot 
defendant's paBBenger trains at Campbells-
burg; the plalntltr alleging that 'the con-
ductor of said train negligently, heedlessly, 
wlllfnlly, careleBBly, and Improperly seized 
ht>r while said train was In motion, and, 
without any fault or negligence of the plaln-
tltr whatever, he wrenched her otr of snld 
steps, and jerked her to the ground. where 
she alighted lo a twisted posture,' thereby 
injuring her feet, legs, and body generally, 
and causing a concussion of the spine, re-
sulting In paralysis of the lowt>r limbs, ren-
dering her unable to walk, and that such lo-
jurtea are permanent. The anewer of the 
defendant ls a general denial, which cast. 
upon the plalntur the burden ot provinc-
Flrst, that she was wrenched otr ot the atepa 
of said car, and jerked to the ground, by the 
conductor; 11eeond, that the Injuries alleged 
by the plaintiff were the direct and imme-
diate consequences of the manner In which 
she was taken off the train; and, third, that 
the plalntur did not, by any act or conduct 
of hers at the time, contribute to the Injury, 
and that she was tree from fault or negll-
gence on her part." The doctrine in Carver 
v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497-4>16, applies here with 
peculiar force: "When a theory ls thua 
adopted, and acted upon below, with the con-
currence of both parties, a judgment ought 
not to be reversed because the court In-
structs the jury ln accordance wlth It." 
The only objection urged against the In-
structions given by the court on its own mo-
tion, not disposed of by what we have al-
ready said, ls that they direct the jury to find 
a general verdict, and thus Impliedly Instruct-
ed them not to return a special verdict. A 
number of Interrogatories were submitted by 
the partlea and the court; and we a.re in-
clined to the opinion that the fair meaning 
of the Instruction on this point la that, lo 
case answers were returned to the Interrog-
atories, there must also be a general ver-
dict. It this be true, there was no error; 
but if we are wrong ln this, still there can 
be no reversal, for our statute provides that, 
"lo all actions, the jury, unleBB otherwise 
dlre<>ted by the court, may render a special 
or general verdict." Rev. St. I 546; Work, 
Pr. I 849. The court has authority to direct 
a general vt>rdlct, and we must presume that 
the authority wns justly exercised; for, un-
til the contrary appears, all reasonable ln-
tendments are Indulged lo favor of the rul-
ings of the trial court. 
Conceding that the fourth Instruction ask-
ed by the appellant was correct, (a conces-
sion not warranted, as we Incline to think,) 
It was substantially embodied In the third 
lnstn1ctlon given at appellant's request. It 
ls too well settled to require the citation of 
authorities that a trial court ls not bound to 
repeat Its Instructions. What we have said 
ot the fourth Instruction applies to the sixth, 
seventh, and eighth Instructions asked by the 
appellant, for, so tar as they were correct, 
they were substantially Included lo other ln-
struetions given. The tenth Instruction does 
not express the lnw, nnd was rightfully re-
fused. It Is not necessary that the wrong-
doer should apprehend the 11artlcular conse-
quences which may proximately result from 
his a<'ts, although the act must be of such a 
nature as to produce some injurious result. 
To lllustrnte: A man lll with consumption, 
who ls wrongfully Injured lo alighting from 
a train, and so Injured as that a hemorrhage 
results, has a right to recover although the 
se1"1"aots of the carrier may not llave had rea-
son to app1·ehend such a result. Unllrond 
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Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568. In no case is it
necessary that the particular result which
follows should be anticipated. Certainly, no
man who strikes a. feeble person and injures
him can be heard to say that he did not an-
ticipate that it would hurt him more than it
would have done a robust man. Where a
tort is (f0I1‘il.‘llii~"B(1 from which injury may
reasonably be anticipated, the wrong-doer is
liable for the proximate results of that in-
jury, although the injury extends further
than it would have done had the injured per-
son been in perfect health. It is the general
character of the act, and not the particular
result, that the law regards. It is true that
the act which causes the injury must be a
negligent one, and this it cannot be unless
the facts show that it was one which ordi-
nary care would have enabled the person
who does it to foresee and provide against.
Railway Go. v. Locke (this term) 14 N. E.
391. There is a plain difference between the
wrongful act and its consequences: for, when
a wrongful act is done, the wrong-doer must
answer for all proximate consequences, al-
though he may not have foreseen or antici-
pated the particular form or character of the
resulting injury. The doctrine which the au-
thorities lay down is thus stated in Hill v.
Winsor, 118 Mass. 251: “The accident must
be caused by the negligent act of the defend-
ants, but it is not necessary that the conse-
quences of the negligent act should be fore-
seen by the defendants. It is not necessary
that either the plaintiff or the defendants
should be able to foresee the consequences
of the negligence of the defendants, in order
to make the defendants liable. It may be a
negligent act of mine in leaving something in
the highway. It may cause a man to fall
and break his leg or arm, and I may not be
able to foresee the one or the other.” ln an-
other case it was said: “It is not necessary
that injury in the precise form in which it
in fact resulted should have been foreseen.”
Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136. In
Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. P89, the court
was asked to charge the jury “that, if the
defendant's acts and conduct would not have
injured a person of ordinary nerve and cour-
age, then there can be no rec0very;” and it
was held that this instruction was properly
refused. But we cannot add to the length of
our already very lengthy opinion by com-
menting upon the authorities. We refer,
without discussion, to some of the many de-
cided cases: Railroad Co. v. Riley. supra;
Railroad Go. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346; Railway
Co. v. Falvey, supra; Railway Co. v. Jones,
108 Ind. 551, 9 N. E. 476; Railroad Co. v.
I'itzer, 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310, 10 N. E. 70,
and cases cited page 188, 109 lnd., and pages
Rlliand 70 of 6 and 10 N. E.; Stewart v. City,
38 \Vis. 58-i; 0ii\'er v. Town, 36 \Vis. 592:
Kellogg v. Railway Co., 26 Wis. 233; Mc-
Namara v. Village, G2 \Vis. 207, 22 N. W. 472;
Brown v. Railway Co., 5-1 Wis. 342, 11 N. VV.
356; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217;
Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264; Beauchamp
v. Mining Co., 50 Mich. 163, 15 N. W. 65;
Barbee v. Reese, 60 Miss. 906; Railway (Jo.
v. Kemp, 61 .\id. 74; Fitzpatrick v. Railway
Co., 12 U. C. Q. B. 645. “The general rule,"
says an eminent court, “is that, in actions of
tort like the present, the wrong-doer is liable
for all the direct injury resulting from his
wrongful act; and that, too, although the ex-
tent or special nature of the injury could not,
with certainty, have been foreseen or con-
templated as the probable result of the act
done." Railway C0. v. Kemp,'supra. A late
writer collects many cases, and lays down
the rule, in very strong terms, as we have
declared it. 2 Wood, Ry. Law, 1232. We
eonclude that, both upon principle and au-
thority, an injured person may recover com-
pensatory damages for injuries sustained,
although the wrong-doer did not know, or
could not foresee, that the special or particu-
lar injury would be greater to the person
upon whom the wrong was actually inflicted
than to one in full strength and robust
health. A person, feeble or strong, young or
old, is entitled to recover full compensation
for the injury actually sustained by the acts
of a wrong-doer.
In instruction given at the request of the
appellant, the court asserted in express
terms, and, probably, in stronger language
than the law warrants, that the plaintiff
could not recover if the injuries resulted from
disease, and not from the negligence of the
defendant. and it was unnecessary to repeat
these instructions. Two of these instructions
read thus: “(7) By direct and immediate
cause and proximate cause, as used in all
the instructions in this case, is meant such
cause or causes as are usually and ordinarily
followed by the result attributed to the act
or acts, and such as a person of ordinary ex-
perience and judgment could reasonably ap-
prehend would follow as the direct eifect of
the act or acts charged as being the cause
of the injury." “(13) If the jury believe
from the evidence that the plaintiffs injured
and diseased condition is due to chronic
wonib disease, and other ailments existing
prior to the twenty-first of October, 1882, and
not the direct and immediate result of the
manner in which she was assisted from the
car-steps, then the verdict of the jury must
be for the defendant." It may be that the
appellee can justly complain of these instruc-
tions, but certainly the appellant cannot.
The instruction asked after the argument
was closed was properly refused. A party
has no right to demand an instruction at so
late a period in the trial.
Seventy-five interrogatories were submitted
by the appellant, and the court refused to
send 60 of them to the jury, but did send 15
of them, and did also prepare and submit
other interrogatories to the jury. We per-
ceive no error in the ruling of the court on
this subject. All of the rejected interroga-
tories, except, perhaps, the sixty-fifth, are
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Co. v. Rlley, 89 l'nd. 1568. In no case is It 
nece88ll.ry that the pnrtlcular result which 
follows should be anticipated. Certainly, no 
man who strikes a feeble person and injures 
him can be henrd to say that he did not an-
ticipate that It would hurt him more than It 
would have done a robust man. Where a 
tort ls comml:.:-ed from which Injury may 
reasonably be anticipated, the wrong-doer Is 
liable for the proximate results of that In-
jury, although the Injury extends further 
than It would have done had the Injured per-
son been In 1rerfect health. It Is the general 
character of the act, and not the particular 
result, that the law regards. It ls true that 
the net which causes the Injury must be a 
negligent one, and this It cannot be unless 
the facts show that It was one which ordi-
nary care would have enabled the person 
who does It to foresee and provide against. 
Railway Co. v. Locke (this term) 14 N. E. 
391. There ls a plain dUl'erence between the 
wrongful net and Its con11equences: for, when 
a wrongful act ls done, the wrong-doer must 
answer for all proximate consequences, al-
though he may not have foreseen or antici-
pated the particular form or character of the 
resulting injury. The doctrine which the au-
thorities lay down is thus stated In Hill v. 
'Winsor, 118 Mass. 251: ''The accident must 
be caused by the negligent act of the defend-
ants, but it ls not necessary that the conse-
quences of the negligent act should be fore-
seen by the defendants. It ls not necessary 
that either the plaintiff or the defendants 
should be able to foresee the consequences 
of the negligence of the defendants, in order 
to make the defendants liable. It may be a 
negligent act of mine In leaving something In 
the highway. It may cause a man to fall 
and break his leg or arm, and I may not be 
able to foresee the one or the other." In an-
other case it was said: "It ls not necessary 
that Injury In the precise form in which It 
In fact resulted should have been foreseen." 
Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136. In 
Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. f>89• the court 
was asked to charge the jury "that, If the 
defendant's acts and conduct would not have 
Injured a person of ordinary nerve and cour-
age, then there can be no recovery;" and It 
was held that this Instruction was properly 
refused. But we <'annot add to the length of 
our already very lengthy opinion by com-
menting upon the authorities. We refer, 
without discussion, to some of the many de-
cided cases: Railroad Co. v. Riley, supra; 
Unllroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346; Railway 
Co. v. Falvey, supra; Railway Co. v. Jones, 
108 Ind. wl, 9 N. E. 476; Railroad Co. v. 
Pitzer, 109 Ind. 170, 6 N. E. 310, 10 N. E. 70, 
and cases cited Jlage 188, 109 Ind., and pages 
ato nml 70 of 6 and 10 N. E.; Stewart v. City, 
38 Wis. f>84; Oliver v. Town, 36 Wis. 592; 
l~ellogg v. Hallway C-0., 26 Wis. 233; Mc-
Namara v. Village, o'2 Wis. 207, 22 N. W. 472; 
Brown v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N. W. 
356; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217; 
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Ehrgott v. Mayor, 00 N. Y. 261; Bean<'hnmp 
v. Mining Co., 00 Mich. 163, 15 N. W. 6.1; 
Barbee v. Reese, El> Miss. 006; Railway Co. 
v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74; Fitzpatrick v. Railway 
Co., 12 U. C. Q. B. 645. ''The general rule," 
says an eminent court, "la that, In actions of 
tort like the present, the wrong-doer ls liable 
for all the direct Injury resulting from his 
wrongful act; and that, too, although the ex-
tent or special nature of the Injury could notr 
with certainty, have been foreseen or con-
templated as the probable result of the act 
dooe." Railway Co. v. Kemp;supra. A late 
writer collects many cases, and lays down. 
the rule, In very strong terms, as we have 
declared it. 2 Wood, Ry. Law, 1232. We 
conclude that, both upon principle and au-
thority, an Injured person may recover com-
pensatory damages for Injuries sustained, 
although the wrong-doer did not know, or 
could not foresee, that the special or particu-
lar Injury would be greater to the person 
upon whom the wrong was actually Indicted 
than to one In full strength and robust 
health. A person, feeble or strong, young or 
old, ls entitled to recover full compensation 
for the injury actually sustained by the acts 
of a wrong-doer. 
In Instructions given at the request of the 
appellant, the court asserted In exprees 
terms, and, probably, In stronger language 
than the law warrants, that the plaintiff 
could not recover If the Injuries resulted from 
disease, and not from the negligence of the 
defendant, and It was unnecessary to repeat 
these Instructions. Two of these Instructions 
read thus: "(7) By direct and Immediate 
cause and proximate cause, as used In all 
the Instructions In this case, ls meant such 
cause or causes as are usually and ordinarily 
followed by the result attributed to the act 
or acts, and such as a person of ordinary ex-
perience and judgment could reasonably ap-
prehend would follow as the direct effect of 
the act or acts charged as being the cause 
of the Injury." "(13) If the jury believe 
from the evidence that the plaintiff's Injured 
and diseased condition la due to chronle 
womb disease, and other ailments existing 
prior to the twenty-first of October, 1882, and 
not the direct and Immediate result of the 
manner In which she was assisted from the 
car-steps, then the verdict of the jury must 
be for the defendant." It may be that the 
appellee can justly complain of these Instruc-
tions, but certainly the appellant cannot. 
The Instruction asked after the argument 
was closed was properly refused. A party 
has no right to demand an instruction at so 
late a period In the trial. 
Seventy-five interrogatories were submitted 
by the appellant, and the court refused to 
send 60 of them to the jury, but did send 15 
of them, and did also prepare and submit 
other Interrogatories to the jury. WI! per-
ceive no errol' In the ruling of the court on 
this subject. All of the rejected interroga-
tories, except, perhaps, the slxty·fi.fth, are 
EXPERTS.
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open to the objection that they ask for evi-
dence, and not facts. There is everywhere in
jurisprudence an important difference be-
tween evidence and facts, and in no branch
of jurisprudence is it more important than in
that which governs the verdicts and findings
of juries. It would lead to most evil conse-
quences to permit a party to compel the jury
to rehearse mere items of evidence. But it
is needless to discuss the question; our stat-
ute and our decisions forbid the practice
here defended by the appellant. We cannot
examine the interrognltorics in detail; it is
enough to say that if there was error at all
in the ruling of the court, as we think there
was, it was in giving some of the interroga-
tories submitted by the party who now com-
plains. The 19 interrogatories submitted in-
cluded 15 of those asked by appellant, and
certainly were as many as it was proper to
submit; they were, indeed, more than the
case required.
There is evidence very satisfactorily prov-
ing that prior to the accident Mrs. Woods
was a strong and healthy woman about 40
years of age. It is further shown that her
husband was a paralytic, and that she did
the household work of a woman, and the
Work of a man in managing the business af- 3
fairs of a farm. The evidence also shows
that prior to the accident she did a farmer's
hard work: such as hauling wood, making
hay, and the like. Since the accident she has
been physically almost helpless, and is una-
ble to do any work. Her injuries are of a
permanent nature, and, from the evidence,
the fair inference is that she will probably
grow worse. She has suffered much, and, it
is reasonably certain, will suffer more as the
years go by. Her vision is affected, her
hands and legs are partially, if not totally
paralyzed, and there is some curvature of the
spine. It is very apparent, therefore, that
there is evidence fully warranting the infer-
ence that the appellee is a physical wreck,
and, indeed, the evidence fairly justifies the
inference that her mental powers are seri-
ously impaired. We cannot, under the cir-
cumstances, declare that the damagcs are
the result of passion, prejudice, or corrup-
tion, and it is only where this can be justly
asserted that a verdict can be set aside.
Hougland v. Moore, 2 Blackf. 167; Guard v.
Risk, 11 Ind. 156; Yater v. Mullen, 23 Ind.
562; Alexander v. Thomas, 25 Ind. 268;
Reeves v. State, 37 Ind. -H1; Railway Co. v.
Coliarn, 73 Ind. 261; Railway C0. v. Fix, 88
Ind. 381; Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181;
Turnpike Go. v. Andrews, 102 Ind. 138, 1 N.
E. 364; Railway Co. v. Falvey, supra; Rail-
road Co. v. Holland. 18 Ill. App. 418; Groves
v. Rochester, 39 Hun, 5; Osborne v. City, 32
Fed. 36.
It is alleged as a cause for a new trial that
some of the jurors were guilty of misconduct.
The evidence upon this point very fully and
satisfactorily supports the finding of the
court, and we cannot interfere. It has long
been the rule in this, as in other appellate
courts, that, where a question of fact is de-
cided by the trial court, it will not be dis-
. turbed if there is evidence fairly sustaining
it. Pcdigo v. Grimes (May term) 13 N. E.
700, and authorities cited.
We have thus, with patience and care, ex-
amined ali the questions properly saved, and,
as we are not able to find any error, we must
aifirm the judgment.
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open to the objection that they ask for evi-
dence, and not facts. There is everywhere in 
jurisprudence an Important dllTerence be-
tween evidence and facts, and In no branch 
of jurisprudence Is it more Important than ln 
that which governs the verdicts and findings 
of juries. It would lead to most evil conse-
quences to permit a party to compel the jury 
to rehearse mere items of evidence. But 1t 
ls needless to discuss the question; our stat-
ute and our decisions forbid the practice 
here defended by the appellant. We cannot 
examine the Interrogatories ln detail; lt ill 
enough to say that lf there was error at all 
In the ruling of the court, as we think there 
was, It was ln giving some of the Interroga-
tories submitted by the party who now com-
plains. The :W Interrogatories submitted in-
cluded 15 of those asked by appellant, and 
certainly were as many as it was proper to 
submit; they were, ·indeed, more than the 
case required. 
There ls evidence very satisfactorily prov-
ing that prior to the accident l!rs. Woods 
was a strong and healthy woman about 40 
years of age. It ls further shown that her 
husband was a paralytic, and that she did 
the household work of a woman, and the 
work of a man lu managing the business af-
fairs of a farm. The evidence · also shows 
that prior to the accident she did a farmer's 
bard work; such as hauling wood, making 
hay, and the llke. Since the accident she has 
been physically almost helpless, and ls una-
ble to do any work. Her Injuries ue of a 
permanent nature, and, from the evidence, 
the falr Inference Is that she wlll probably 
grow worse. She bas sulTered much, and, It 
ls reasonably certain, wlll suf!'er more as the 
years go by. Her vision 111 alTected, her 
bands and legs are partially, If not totally 
paralyzed, and the1·e ls 1;ome curyature of the 
spine. It ls Yery apparent, therefore, th:it 
there ls evidence fully warranting the Infer-
! ence that the appellee ls a physical wreck, I and, Indeed, the evidence fairly justifies the 
Inference that her mental powers are se1i-
ously Impaired. We cannot, under the cir-
cumstances, declare that the danlllges are 
the result of passion, prejudice, or co1·111p-
tlon, 11IJ.d It ls only where this can be justly 
asserted that a verdict can be set aside. 
Hoogland v. l\loore, 2 Blnckf. 167; Guard v. 
Risk, 11 Ind. 156; Yater v • .Mullen, 23 Ind. 
562; Alexander v. Thomas, 25 Ind. 268; I Reeves v. State, 37 Ind. 441; Rallway Co. v. 
Collarn, 73 Ind. 261; Railway Co. v. Fix. 88 
I Ind. 381; Cur Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181; Turnpike Oo. v. Andrews, 102 Ind. 138, 1 X. 
E. 3!i4; Hallway Co. v. Falvey, supra; Unll-
1 
road Co. v. Holland, 18 Ill • .App. 418; Oroyes 
v. Rochester, 39 Hun, 5; Osborne v. City, 32 
I Fed. 30. 
I It ls allegec'I. as a cause for a new trial that 
some of the jurors were gullty of misconduct. ! The evidence upon this point very fully and 
satisfactorily supports the finding of the 
court, and we cannot Interfere. It has long 
been the rule In this, as In other np)l('llnte 
comts, that, where a question of fact Is de-
cided by the trial court, lt wlll not be dis· 
turbed lf there Is e\·ldence fairly sustaining 
lt. Pedigo v. Grimes (May term) 13 N. E. 
700, and authorities cited. 
"\Ye have thus, with patience and care, ex-
amined all the questions properly saved, and, 
as we are not able to find any error, we must 
afllrm the judgment. 
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CITY OF BLO().\IING'I‘O.\’ v. SHROCK.
(110 Ill. 219.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. June 11, 1884.
Appeal from appellate court, Third dis-
trict.
John T. Lillard, for appellant.
Phillips, for appellee.
Fifer &
SCH()I.I~‘IELD, J . This was an action on
the case for negligence, by appellee against
appellant. Appellee, a married woman, was
violently thrown down while walking along
a sidewalk adjacent to one of appellant's
streets, by reason of a defect in the side-
walk, and thereby received injuries which
she claimed resulted in causing her to have
an abortion. It was contended by appellant
upon the trial that she was guilty of such
contributory negligence as to bar her right
to recover, in omitting proper care and cau-
tion to avoid the abortion; and this was the
most important question upon the trial, al-
though there were other questions of minor
consideration contested. '
Dr. Luce was called and examined as a.
witness on behalf of appellant, as an expert,
and gave evidence tending to prove that ap-
pellee was guilty of negligence in the re-
spect contended by appellant. He quoted
from and made reference to no book. but
upon his cross-examination counsel for ap-
pellee inquired of him whether he was ac-
quainted with “Playfa.ir” and “Bedi’ord"
(treatises on midwifery), and, upon his re-
sponding in the affirmative, and that they
were standard authorities on questions of
this character, counsel proceeded to read at
length from each of these authors, consec-
utively, and then inquired of the witness
whether he agreed with the authors as to
the parts so read. This was objected to by
the counsel for appellant, but allowed by
the court, and the witness was required to
inalze answer.
The weight of current authority is decid-
edly against the admission of scientific
books in evidence before a jury, although
in some states they are admissible. 1
Greenl. Ev. § 440, and note; Whart. Ev. §
665; Rog. Exp. Test. §§ 168, 169, et seq., and
cases cited in notes. And the weight of
current authority is, also, against allowing
such treatises to be read from, to contra-
dict an expert, generally. See authorities
supra, and Com. v. Sturtevant, 117 Mass.
122; Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15; State V.
()’Brien, 7 R. I. 336. Where, however, an
216
expert assumes to base his opinion upon the
work of a particular author, that work may
be read in evidence to contradict him. This
was, in eifect, our ruling in Insurance Co.
v. Ellis, 89 Ill. 516; and it was expressly so
ruled in Pinney v. Cahill, -18 Mich. 584, 12 H.
W. 862; City of Ripon v. Bristol, 30 Wis.
614; and Huffman v. Click, 77 N. C. 55.
See, also, Marshall v. Brown, 50 Mich. 148,
15 N. W. 55; Rog. Exp. Test. § 181.
But counsel for appellee insist the rul-
ing of the court below is in exact conformity
with the ruling of this court in Insurance
Co. v. Ellis, supra. This is a misapprehen-
sion. In that case the witness stated "that
he had read text books that he might be
able to state why he diagnosed the case as
delirium tremens"; and it was held “not un-
fair to the witness to call his attention to
the definitions given in the books of that
particular disease, and asking him whether
he concurred in the definitions." And it
was said: “That is, in no just sense, read-
ing books to the jury as evidence, or for the
purpose of contradicting the witness." The
source of his professed knowledge was giv-
en, and it was allowed to show that he was
mistaken, by resorting to that source. In
the present case, it has been seen, the course
pursued was entirely different. The witness
based no opinion which he gave upon the
authority of books, and they were only
brought in to impair his evidence on cross-
examination.
Where a witness says a thing or a theory
is so because a book says so, and the book,
on being produced, is discovered to say di-
rectly to the contrary, there is a direct con-
tradiction which anybody can understand.
But where a witness simply gives his opin-
ion as to the proper treatment of a given d_is-
ease or injury, and a book is produced rec-
ommending a difierent treatment, at most
the repugnance is not of fact, but of theory;
and any number of additional books ex-
pressing different theories would obviously
be quite as competent as the first. But
since the books are not admissible as orig-
inal evidence in such cases, it must follow
that they are not admissible on cross-exam-
ination, where their introduction is not for
the direct contradiction of something as-
serted by the witness, but simply to prove a
contrary theory.
We think the court erred in admitting this
evidence, and for that error the judgment
is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.
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Case No. 73] , RELEVANCY •. 
CITY OF BLOOill~GTO~ v. SHROCK. 
(110 Ill. 219.) 
Supreme Court of Illinois. June 11, 1884. 
Appeal from appellate court, Third dis-
trict. 
John T. Llllard, tor appellant. Fifer & 
Phllllps, for appellee. 
SCHOL~'IELD, J. Thia was an action OD 
the t'88e for negligence, by appellee against 
appellant. Appellee, a married woman, wae 
violently thrown down while walking along 
a sidewalk adjacent to one of appellant'• 
streete, by reason of a detect In the side-
walk, and thereby received Injuries which 
she claimed resulted In causing her to have 
an abortion. It was contended by appellant 
upon the trlal that she was guilty of such 
contributory negligence as to bar her right 
to recover, In omitting proper care and cau-
tion to avoid the abortion; and this was the 
most Important question upon the trial, al-
though there were other questions of minor 
consideration contested. · 
Dr. Luce was called and examined as a 
wltne88 on behalf of appellant, as an expert, 
and gave evtdence tending to prove that ap-
pellee was guilty of negligence In the re-
11pect contended by appellant. He quoted 
from and made reference to no book. but 
upon bis cro88-examlnatlon counsel for ap-
pellee inquired of him whether be was ac-
quainted with "Playfalr" and "Bedford" 
(treatises on midwifery), and, upon his re-
sponding In the atflrmatlve, and that they 
were standard authorities on questions ot 
this character, counsel proceeded to read at 
length from each of these authore, consec-
utively, and then Inquired of the witness 
whether he agreed with the author11 as to 
the parts so read. This was obje<'ted to by 
the couneel for appellant, but allowed by 
the court, and the witness was required to 
mn!!:e answer. 
The weight of current authority Is decid-
edly against the admission of scientific 
books In evidence before a jury, although 
In some states they are admissible. 1 
Greenl. Ev. f 440, and note; Whart. Ev. f 
(}(};); Rog. Exp. Test. ff 168, 169, et seq., and 
<'ase11 elted In notes. And the weight of 
<'Urrent authority is, also, against allowing 
RU<'h treatises to be read from, to contra-
dl<'t an expert, genemlly. See authorities 
1mpra, and Com. v. Sturtevant, 117 Mass. 
12'..?; Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15; State v. 
O'Brien, 7 R. I. 336. Where, however, an 
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expert assumes to base his opinion upon the 
work of a particular author, that work may 
be read in evidence to contradict him. Thi• 
was, In effect, our ruling In Insurance Co. 
v. Ellls, 89 Ill. 516; and It was expressly so 
ruled In Pinney v. Cahill, 48 Mich. 584, 12 ! .... 
W. 862; City of Ripon v. Bristol, 30 Wis. 
614; and Hutrman v. Click, 77 N. C. 65. 
See, also, Marshall v. Brown, 50 Mich. 148, 
15 N. W. 55; Rog. Exp. Test. 1181. 
But counsel for appellee Insist the rul-
ing of the court below ls In exact conformity 
with the ruling of this court In Insurance 
Co. v. Ellis, supra. Thie ls a mlsapprehen· 
slon. In that case the witness stated "that 
he had read text books that he ml&"ht be 
able to state why he diagnosed the case as 
delirium tremens"; and It was held "not un· 
fair to the wltne88 to call his attention to 
the definitions given In the books of that 
particular disease, and· asking him whether 
be concurred In the definitions." And It 
was said: "That ls, In no just sense, read-
ing books to the jury a.s evidence, or for the 
purpose of contradicting the witness." 'l'he 
source of his professed knowledite was giv-
en, and It was allowed to show that he was 
mistaken, by resorting to that souree. In 
the present case, It bas been seen, the course 
pursued was entirely different. The wltnesa 
based no opinion which be gave upon the 
authority of books, and they were only 
brouitht In to Impair his ~vldence on crose-
examlnation. 
Where a wltne88 says a thing or a theory 
ls so beeause a book says eo, and the book, 
on being produced, ls discovered to say di-
rectly to the contrary, there le a direct con-
tradiction which anybody can understand. 
But where a wltne88 simply gives his opin-
ion as to the proper treatment of a given qi• 
ease or Injury, and a book is produced ree-
ommendlng a different treatment, at most 
the repugnance ls not of fact, but of theory; 
and any number of additional books ex-
pressing dlft'erent theories would obvtously 
be quite as competent ae the first. But 
sln<'e tile books are not admissible as orig-
inal evidence In such cases, •t must follow 
that they are not admissible on cross-exam-
ination, where their Introduction ls not for 
the direct contradiction of something as-
serted by the witness, but simply to prove a 
contrary theory. 
We think the court erred In admitting this 
evidence, and for that error the judgment 
ie reversed, and the cause remanded. 
Judgment reversed. 
EXPERTS.
[Case No. 74
SIZOCOVICH et al. v. ORIENT MUT. INS.
CO.
(14 N. E. 802, 108 N. Y. 56.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 17, 1888.
Action by George Slocovich and others
against the Orient Mutual Insurance Com-
pany on a policy of marine insurance; Judg-
ment was rendered for plaintitfs by the gen-
eral term, and the defendant appeals.
Edward M. Shepard, for appellant. Sidney
Chubb, for respondents.
EARL, J. This action was brought to re-.
cover on a policy of marine insurance issued
by the defendant to insure a “port risk in
the port of New York” upon the ship Zorka.
The policy was in favor of the plaintiffs, un-
der their firm name of Slocovich & 00., "on
account of whom it may concern;" loss, if
any, to be paid to them or order. The risks
which, by the terms of the policy, the de-
fendant assumed, were, among others, “per-
ils of the seas, fires, and all other perils,
losses, and misfortunes that have or shall
come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of
the said vessel, or any part thereof." The
ship was valued in the policy at the sum of
$111000, and was insured for $11,001). It was
alleged in the complaint that after the issuing
of the policy, and on or about the fifth day
of April, 1883, the Zorka, while lying at an-
chor in the port of New York, was burned
and partially destroyed by the perils insured
against. The answer admitted the making
of the policy, and that on the day named the
ship was burned and partially destroyed by
fire, but denied that the plaintiffs had an
insurable interest in her to the amount of
$16.000, or, otherwise, that she was destroy-
ed by perils insured against in the policy;
and alleged by way of counter-claim that
the valuation of $16,000 was excessive to the
plaintiffs‘ knowledge; that the ship was in
fact worth not more than $5.000; that she
was by the plaintiffs valued at $16,000
fraudulently, and to defraud and induce the
defendant to accept such valuation and ex-
ecute the policy, and that the defendant, re-
lying on the accuracy of such valuation,
made and delivered the policy, and that she _
was burned and destroyed by fire by and
through the act and negligence of the plain-
tiffs, and by and with their knowledge, pro-
curement, and assent; and judgment was
demanded for the defendant that the com-
plaint be dismissed, that the policy be ad-
judged and decreed void and of no effect,
and that the same be delivered to defendant
for cancellation. To the counter-claim the
plaintiffs served a reply, denying the allega-
tions thereof. At the trial the issues of fact
litigated were as to the insurable interest
of the plaintiffs in the vessel; as to the cause
of the fire,-—the claim on the part of the
defendant being that the ship was set on
tire by the captain, at the instigation of, and
in collusion with, the plaintiifs; and as to
the value of the ship,—the claim of the de
fendant being that there was a fraudulent
overvaluation. Upon these issues of fact
there was sufliclent evidence for the con-
sideration of the jury; and their determina-
tion, having been satisfactory to and ap-
proved by the general term, concludes us.
We deem it important now simply to notice
a few of the principal errors relied upon for
a reversal of the judgment.
1. As above stated, there was an issue up-
on the trial as to the value of the vessel at
the time of her insurance, and of her de-
struction soon thereafter by fire, and several
experts were called and testified upon both
sides as to her value, who varied widely in
their judgments. Among the witnesses call-
ed on the part of the defendant was Francis
A. Martin, who testified that he was a ma-
rine surveyor; that he had been engaged in
that business altogether 25 years; that he
had followed the sea six or seven years, and
had been in command of a vessel; that his
business had led him to be familiar with the
market values of vessels in the port of New
York for 10 years; that in his regular busi-
ness he had been called upon to value ves-
sels, principally by adjusters of averages;
that he knew the ship Zorka, and had been
on board of her a good many time, but not
within five or six years. He stated, in an-
swer to a question, that he thought he was
able, from hisexperienceand personal knowl-
edge, and the personal examination he had
made of her, to form an opinion as to her
value in 1883. He was then asked this ques-
tion: “What, in your judgment, judging
from your personal knowledge of the vessel
gathered from your personal observation,
and your knowledge of the ordinary results
of wear and tear in ordinary use, was the
market value in the port of New York of the
ship Zorka in the month of April, 18\‘3'!"
This question was objected to by the plain-
tiifs, and excluded by the court, on the
ground, as we must assume from the record,
that the witness did not have suflicient
knowledge of the vessel to testify as to her
value at the time she was burned. It will
be observed that the witness was asked for
his judgment based solely upon his personal
knowledge. it was for the trial judge to
determine, in the first instance, whether the
witness was competent as an expert to tes-
tify to the value of this vessel. He had not
seen her for five or six years, and knew noth-
ing about her condition at the time of her
destruction. It did not appear what her con-
dition was at the time he last saw her; and
it appeared that, subequently to that time,
and after the year 1880, the plaintiffs had ex-
pended at least $7,000 in repairing her. Un-
der such circumstances, we cannot say that
the judge committed any error in exclud-
ing the testlmony. If the evidence had been
received it certainly would not have been
entitled to very much weight with the jury.
While it would not, we think, have been er-
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EXPEl\TS. 
SLOCOVICH et al. v. ORIE!'IT :MUT. INS. 
co. 
(14 N. Ill. 802, 108 N. Y. 56.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 17, 1888. 
Action by George Slocovlch and others 
against the Orient .Mutual Insurance Com-
pany on a policy of marine Insurance; Judg-
ment was rendered for plalntld's by the gen-
~ral term, and the defendant appeals. 
Edward M. Shepard, for appellant. Sldne7 
Chubb, tor respondents. 
EARL, J. Thia action was brought to re-. 
<!Over on a policy of marine Insurance issued 
by the defendant to Insure a "port risk In 
the port of New York" upon the ship Zorka. 
The pollcy was in favor of the plalntlft'.s, un-
der their firm name of SiO<!Ovicb & Co., "on 
account of whom it may concern;" loss, if 
any, to be paid to them or order. The risks 
which, by the terms of the policy, the de-
fendant assumed, were, among others, "per-
ils of the seas, fires, and all other perils, 
10illle8, and misfortunes that have or shall 
<!Ome to the hurt, detriment, or damage of 
the said vessel. or any part thereof." The 
ship wa11 valued in the policy at the sum of 
$16,000, and waa insured for $11,000. It wu 
alleged In the complaint that after the l.ssuing 
of the policy, and on or about the fifth day 
-Of April, 1883. the Zorka, wblle lying at an-
<:hor In the port of New York, was burned 
and partially destroyed by the perils Insured 
against. The answer admitted the making 
-0f the policy, and that on the day named the 
ahlp wa11 burned and partially de8troyed b7 
fire, but dented that the plaintld's had an 
Insurable Interest in her to the amount of 
$16.000, or, otherwise, that she was destroy-
ed by perils insured against in the policy; 
and alleged by way of counter-claim that 
the valuation of $16,000 was excessive to the 
plaintift'.s' knowledge; that the ship was in 
fact worth not more than $:i,000; that she 
was by the plalntld's valued at $10,000 
frauclulently, and to defraud and induce the 
dt•ft•ndant to accept such valuation and ex-
ecute the policy, and that the defendant, re-
lying on the accuracy of such valuation, 
made and dellvered the pollcy, and that she 
was burned and destroyed by fire by and 
through the act aad negligence of the plain-
tld's, and by and with their knowledge, pro-
-curement, and assent; and judgment was 
demanded for the defendant that the com-
plaint be dismlll8ed, that the policy be ad-
judged and decreed void and of no ed'ect, 
and that the same be delivered to defendant 
for cancellation. To the counter-claim the 
plalntld's served a reply, denying the alle~a­
tlons thereof. At the trial the issues of fact 
litigated were as to the Insurable int{'rest 
of the plalnturs in the Ye88el; as to the cause 
of the ftre,-the claim on the part of the 
<lefendant being that the ship was set on 
tlre by the captain, at the instigation of, and 
in collwdon with, the plalntllrs; and as to 
the value of the ship,-the claim of the de-
fendant being that there was a fraudulent 
overvaluatlon. Upon these issues of fact 
there was su11lcient evidence for the con-
Bideration of the jury; · and their determina· 
tion, having been satisfactory to and ap-
proved by the general term, concludes us. 
We deem it important now elmply to notice 
a few of the principal errol's relied upon for 
a reversal of the judgment. 
1. As above stated, there was an issue up-
on the trial u to the value of the vessel at 
the time of her insurance, and of her de-
struction soon thereafter by fl.re, and several 
experts were called and testlded upon both 
sides as to her value, who varied widely in 
their judgment& Among the witneBBes call-
ed on the part ot the defendant was Francis 
A. Martin, who testified that he was a ma-
rine surveyor; that he had been engaged In 
that business altogether 25 years; that he 
had followed the sea six or seven years, and 
had been In command of a vessel; that his 
business had led him to be familiar with the 
market values of veBSels In the port of New 
York for 10 years; that In his regular busi-
ness be had been called upon to value ves-
sels, principally by adjusters of averages; 
that he knew the ship Zorka, and had been 
on board of her a good many times, but not 
within five or six years. He st.a ted, in an-
swer to a question, that he thought he waa 
able,from hlsexperienceand pel'80nal knowl-
edge, and the pe1'80nal examination he had 
made of her, to form an opinion aa to her 
value in 1883. He was then asked this ques-
tion: "What, in your judgment, judging 
from your personal knowledge of the vessel 
gathered from your personal observation, 
and your knowledge of the ordinary results 
of wear and tear In ordinary use, was the 
market value In the port of New York of the 
ship Zorko. in the month of .A.prll, 18S3 t• 
This question was objected to by the plain-
tid's, and excluded by the court, on the 
ground, as we must assume from the record, 
that the witness did not have su11lclent 
knowledge of the vessel to testify as to her 
value at the time she was bumed. It wlll 
be observed that the witness was asked for 
his judgment based solely upon his personal 
knowledge. 1t was for the trial judge to 
determine, in the first instance, whether the 
wltneBB was competent as an expert to tes-
tify to the value of this vessel. He had not 
seen her for five or six years, and knew noth-
ing about her condition at the time of her 
destruction. It did not appear what her con-
dition was at the time he last saw he1·; and 
it appeared that, subsequently to that time, 
and after the year 1880, the plalntltrs had ex-
pended at least $i,OOO in re1>alrlu.g her. Un-
der such circumstances, we cannot say that 
the judge committed any error In e:iwlud-
ing the testimony. If the evidence had been 
received it certainly would not have been 
entitled to very much weight with the jury. 
While It would not, we thl~k, have been er-
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roneous to receive and submit the evidence
to the jury for what it was worth, we cannot
say, as matter of law, that the judge ex-
ceeded the bounds of a. reasonable discre-
tion in holding that the witness was not
qualified as an expert to give an opinion as
to the value of the ship at the time she was
burned. The rules determining the subjects
upon which experts may testify, and pre-
scribing the qualifications of experts, are
matters of law; but whether a witness of-
Iered as an expert has those qualifications is
generally a question of fact to be decided by
the trial judge; and it has been held that
his decision in reference thereto is not re-
viewable in an appellate court. Sarle v.
Arnold, 7 R. I. 582; Dole v. Johnson, 50 N.
H. 455; Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546;
Wright v. Williams, 47 Vt. 222. Without
going the full length of these cases, it is
suflicient to hold here that the decision of the
trial judge in such a matter should not be
held to present an error of law, and on that
account be reversed, unless it is against the
evidence, or wholly or mainly without sup-
port in the facts which appear. Here, we
think, it was a fair matter for the judgment
of the trial judge whether this witness had
the requisite knowledge and qualitications
to give an opinion as an expert as to the
judgment is not the subject of review here.
witness and examined him as an expert as
to the value of the vessel. He tesiiiicd that
he had been a ship-broker and a ship-owner
in the city of New York for ten years past,
and for five years before that in London;
that in 1883 he knew the fair market value
of ships in the port of New York; that during
the last 15 years he had bought and sold over
200 ships and steam-boats; that he had seen
the Zorka once, and knew her from report,-—
from the books, the American Lloyds, the
Green Book, and the Record Book; that those
books were published in reference to the stand-
ing of all ships, giving their descriptions,
and are used by the underwriters and mer-
chants; that he never made any personal
examination of the Zorka, but that his knowl-
edge of her was substantially confined to
the information he got from the general rec-
ords used ln his business and reports made
therein. b_v which he was always guided in
buying and selling ships. He was then ask-
ed this question: “Do you know what would
be a fair market value in the port of New
York during the months of March and April,
1883, of the Zorka?” The defendant object-
ed to the question, on the ground that the
witness had no personal knowledge of the
vessel. The objection was overruled, and
the witness answered, “Yes, I know." This
was a mere preliminary question, and was of
itself entirely harmless, and no error was
committed by the court, in permitting it to
be answered. Thereafter, without any fur-
. ship.
‘~ an opinion.
ther objection, and apparently with the con-
sent oi.‘ the defendant, the witness was per-
mitted to testify as to the market value of
the vessel. But if it should be assumed that
' all the further evidence was suivject to the
same objection, we should still be of opinion
that no error was committed in receiving it.
It is true that the witness had no knowledge
of this vessel, based upon any personal ex-
amination, and that, substantially, all his
knowledge was derived from the reports,
books, and records to which he referred. But
there was evidence showing her age, tonnage,
condition, and character. There wasevidence,
also, tending to show that those books and
records contained a full and accurate descrip-
tion of her character, condition. age, ton-
nage, and the material of which she was
made; and that they were commonly refer-
red to by underwriters, merchants, and per-
sons buying and selling ships, for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the condition and de-
scription of the ships; and it is to be infer-
red that their standing in the market and
among business men depends somewhat, it
not largely, upon those records. They were
regarded as sufliciently reliable for the guid-
ance ot underwriters, merchants, and buy-
ers and sellers of ships; and they have been
, so frequently before the courts that we may
value of this ship. And hence we think that ‘
take judicial notice of the fact that they are
. referred to by business men for the purpose
2. The plaintiff called one Boyesen as a .
of ascertaining the condition, capacity, age.
and value of ships. It was not a sutiicient
objection to the competency of this witness
that he had no personal knowledge of the
An expert is qualified to give evidence
as to things which he has never seen. He
may base an opinion upon facts proved by
other witnesses, or upon facts assumed and
embraced within the case. Questions may
be put to him assuming the facts upon which
he is asked to base his judgment and express
In this case, the question put
to the witness might have assumed the age,
tonnage, character, condition, and quality of
the vessel, and he could have been asked to
give an opinion as to her value based upon
such facts; or the facts relating to the ves-
sel appearing in the books and records which
he referred to, and which were also proved
upon the trial, might have been assumed in
the question put to the witness, and he asked
to give an opinion as to her value based upon
them. The plaintifl! was not asked to pursue
this course in putting his question, and there
was no objection that the witness did not
have sufiicient facts before him upon which
to base his opinion as to the value of the
ship. The sole objection was that he did
not have personal knowledge of the vessel.
It seems to have been assumed that the char-
acter, condition, and quality of the vessel
were sufiiciently proved, and that all the con-
ditions existed which would qualify the wit-
ness to give an opinion as to value. except
that of personal knowledge, and that, as we
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Case :N' o. U] REI~EV.~.NCY. 
roneous to receive and submit the evidence 
to the jury for what it was worth, we cannot 
say, as matter of law, that the judge ex· 
ceeded the bounds of a reasonable discre-
tion ln holding that the witness was not 
qunlllled as an expert to give an opinion as 
to th<" \'nlue of the ship at the time she was 
burned. The rules determining the subjects 
upon which experts may testify, and pre-
scribing the qualifications of experts, are 
matters of law; but whether a witness Of· 
fe1·ed ne an expert has those quaiUl.catlons ls 
generally a question of fact to be decided by 
the trial judge; and It has been held that 
hls decision In reference thereto is not re-
vlewahle In an appellate court. Sarle v. 
Arnold, i R. I. 582; Dole v. Johnson, uO N. 
H. 4a::i; Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546; 
W1·lght v. Williams, 47 Vt. :?22. Wlthout 
going the full length of these cases, It Is 
sutttdent to hold here that the decision of the 
trlnl judge In such a matter should not be 
held to p1·esent an error of law, and on that 
account be reversed, unless It Is against the 
evidence, or wholly or mainly without sup-
port In the facts which appear. Here, we 
think, It was a fair matter for the judgment 
of the trial Judge whether this witness had 
the requisite knowledge and quallllcatlons 
to give an opinion as an expert as to the 
value of this ship. And hence we think that 
judgment le not the subject of review here. 
2. '£he plaintiff called one Boyesen as a 
witness and examined him as an expert as 
to the value of the vessel. He testified that 
he had been a ship-broker and a ship-owner 
ln the city of New York for ten years past, 
and for five years before that In London; 
that In 1883 he knew the fair market value 
of ships In the port of New York; that during 
the last rn years he had bought and sold over 
200 ships and steam-boats; that he had seen 
the Zorka once, and knew her from report.-
from the books, the American Lloyds, the 
Green Book, and the Uecord Book; that those 
books were published ln reference to the stand-
ing of all ships, giving their desc11ptlons, 
and are used by the underwl'lters and mer-
chants; that he never made any personal 
examination of the Zorka, but that his knowl-
edge of her was substantially confined to 
the Information be got from the general rec-
ords used In his buslnei;s and reports made 
thert!ln, by which he was always guided in 
buying and selllng ships. He was then ask-
ed this question: "Do you know whnt would 
be a fair market value in the port of New 
York during the months of March and April, 
1883, of the Zorka ?" The defendant object-
ed to the question, on the ground that the 
witness had no personal knowledge of the 
vessel. The cbjectlon was ovel'ruled, and 
the wltn!'ss answered, "Yes, I know." This 
was a mere preliminary que11t1011, and was of 
itselt entirely harmleRR, and no error was 
committed by the court, In permitting It to 
be answered. Thereafter, without any fur-
218 
ther objection, and apparently with the con-
sent of the defendant, the witness was per· 
mltted to testify as to the market value of 
the Yessel. But If It should be assumed that 
all the further evidence wa:1 s11~1Ject to the 
same objection, we should still l.Je of opinion 
that no error was committed In receiving lt. 
It ls true that the witness bad no 'knowledge 
ot thls vessel, based upon any personal ex-
amination, and that, substantially, ail his 
knowledge 'vas derived from the report!'!, 
books, and records to which he referred. But 
there was evidence showing her age, ~oanage, 
condition, and character. There waseyldence, 
also, tending to show that those books and 
records contained a full and accurate descrip-
tion of her character, condition. age, ton-
1 nage, and the material of which she was 
made; and that they were commonly refer-
red to by undenVl'lters, merchants, and per-
sons buying and selllng ships, for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the condition and de-
scription of the ships; and lt ls to be infer-
red that their standing In the market and 
among business men depends somewhat, lf 
not largely, upon those records. They were 
regarded as sutflclently reliable for the guid-
ance of underwriters, merchants, and buy-
ers and sellers of ships; and they have been 
so frequently before the courts that we may 
take judicial notice of the fact that they are 
referred to by business men for the purpose 
of ascertaining the condition, capacity, age, 
and value of ships. It was not a sutflclent 
objection to the competency of this witness 
that he had no personal knowledge of the 
ship. An expert is qualified to give evidence 
as to things which be has never seen. He 
may base an opinion upon facts proved by 
other wltnesKl'S, or upon tacts assumed and 
embraced within the case. Questions may 
be put to him assuming the tacts U(lOD which 
he ls asked to base bis judgment and expreBB 
an opinion. In this case, the question put 
to the witness might have assumed the age, 
tonnage, character, condition, and quality of 
the vessel, and he could have been asked to 
give an opinion as to her value based upon 
such facts; or the facts relating to the ves-
sel appearing in the books and reco1'tls which 
he referred to, and which were also proved 
upon the trial, might have beE-n assumed ln 
the question put to the witness, and he asked 
to give an opinion ns to her value based upon 
them. The plaintiff was not asked to pursue 
this course In putting his question, and there 
w11s no objection that the witness did not 
have sufficient facts before him upon wllkh 
to base bis opinion 11!1 to the Ynh11> of th•' 
ship. The sole objection was that he did 
not have personal knowledge of the vessel. 
It seems to have been assumed that the char-
acter, condition, and quality of tilt' ,.,.,.,.cJ 
were sutflclcntly proved, and that all the cou-
dltions existed which would qualify the \Vtt-
ness to ~ive nn opinion ns to 'l'alue. except 
that of personal knowledge, and that, as we 
EXPERTS.
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have seen, was not necessary. If the de-
fendant had requested that the facts appear-
ing in the evidence should be assumed and
stated in an hypothetical question, it is fair
to assume that his request would have been
complied with. We are therefore of opinion
that there was no error in receiving the evi-
dence of this witness as to the value of the
vessel.
3. Alfred Ogden, defendant's vlce-presi-
dent, was called by it as a witness, and ask-
ed this question: “According to your under-
standing of the use of words in the business
of insurance, what do the words ‘port risk’
mean?” This was objected to on the part of
the plaintiff as being no longer an open ques-
tion in this state, as the court of appeals had
settled what “port risk" means, in Nelson v.
Insurance Co., 71 N. Y. -153. The court ex-
cluded the question, and the defendant ex-
cepted to the ruling. The counsel for the de-
fendant gave the court no information as to
what he expected to prove by the witness,
and in no way indicated the particular pur-
pose of the question. The attention of the
court was called to the case referred to,
where it is stated in the opinion that “port
risk in a marine insurance policy means a
risk upon a vessel while lying in port, and
before she had taken her departure upon
another voyage." That decision having been
made several years before this policy was is-
sued, we think it just to hold that the term
must have been used in the policy with the
meaning thus given to it by this court. If
if was the purpose of the question to show
that it did have sucn meaning, then it was
wholly unnecessary. If it was intended to
show that it had any other or different mean-
ing, or if there was any other purpose, the
intent and purpose should have been dis-
closed to the court, so that the proper ruling
could have been intelligently made. It is
impossible to perceive what the object of the
question was, as, at the time of her destruc-
tion, the vessel was in the port of New York,
and had not yet started upon her voyage.
She was not rigged for the voyage, and her
crew had not yet been shipped. It is impos-
sible to perceive why the destruction of the
vessel under such circumstances was not a
“port risk in the port of New York;" and the
trial judge did not err, in the absence of any
further information than was given him. in
so holding. But we think that in all policies
issued in this state since the opinion in the
case referred to was pronounced and pub-
lished, these words should have the meaning
given them therein, as it is most probable
that such would be the meaning attached
to them by the parties using them.
4. The defendant's counsel requested the
court to charge the jury as follows: "The
burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to estab-
lish to your satisfaction that the loss of this
vessel took place without any agency or in-
strumentality of the plaintiffs, direct or in-
direct,” and that “the plaintifl's must estab-
lish this fact, that the loss was without any
agency or instrumentality of theirs, by a
clear preponderance of credible testimony."
The court refused to charge either of these
requests, and to the refusals the defendant
excepted; and it is now claimed that in this
the court erred. The rule contended for by
the defendant would be quite unfair and im-
practicable in the trial of insurance cases.
Where there is an insurance against a loss
by tire, and it is proved or admitted that the
property insured has been destroyed by fire,
the loss is brought literally and exactly
within the terms of the policy. If, in such a.
case, the insurance company claims to be ex-
empt from paying the sum insured, because
there has been a breach of some condition
contained in the policy, or the violation of
some obligation or duty imposed upon the
insured by the law or contract, the burden
rests upon it to establish the facts Which it
thus relies upon as a defense to the claim
under the policy. Every presumption of law
is against the commission of a crime, and in
all forms of action, civil and criminal, ev-
ery person is presumed to be innocent until
his guilt has been established by at least a
preponderallce of evidence. These humane-
rules of law would be violated if a person
suing upon a policy insuring his property
against tire was bound to assume the burden
of showing that he was not guilty of the
crime of burning his own property. The de-
fendant making that allegation against him
must bear the burden of establishing it. Tid-
marsh v. Insurance Co., 4 Mason, 439, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,024; Fiske v. Insurance Co., 15
Pick. 310; Murray v. Insurance Co., 85 N.
Y. 236; Hellman v. Lazarus, 90 N. Y. 672;
1 Green]. Ev. § 35; Roscoe, Ev. 52. The bur-
den in such a case to prove the crime of in-
cendiarism should rest upon him who alleges
it, just as the burden of proving insanity
rests upon him who assails a will, deed, or
other instrument upon that ground. 1 Wil-
liams, Ex’rs (6th Am. Ed.) 24; 1 Iiedf. Wills,
c. 8, § 4; Schouler, Wills, §§ 1'-i7, 173. In
1 Greenl. Ev. (Redf. Ed.) 5 SO, the learned
author says: “Where the negative allegation
involves a criminal neglect of duty, whether
oiiicial or otherwise, or fraud, or the wrong-
ful violation of actual lawful possession of
property, the party making the allegation
must prove it; for in these cases the pre-
sumptlon of law, which is always in favor
of innocence and of quiet possession, is in
favor of the party charged." Here the burn-
ing and destruction of the vessel are admit-
ted in the answer, and the defendant makes
the allegation and tenders the issue that the
fire was caused by the insured; and in such
a case it is a just rule to hold that the de-
fendant, by the issue it has thus made, has
assumed the burden of maintaining its al-
legations.
We have carefully considered the other al-
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.EXPEaTs. [Case No. 74 
have seen, was not necessary. If the de· 
fendant had requested that the facts appear-
ing in the evidence should be assumed and 
stated In an hypothetical question, it ls fair 
to assume that his request would have been 
<.'Omplled with. We are therefore of opinion 
that there was no error in receiving the evi-
dence of this wltne88 as to the value of the 
vessel. 
3. Alfred Ogden, defendant's vice-presi-
dent, was cnlled by it as a witness, and ask-
ed this question: "According to your under-
standing ot the use of words in the business 
of insurance, what do the words 'port rlsk' 
mean?" This was objected to on the part of 
the plalntur as being no longer ari open ques-
tion in this state, as the court o! appeals had 
settled what "port risk" means, ln Nelson v. 
Insurance Co., 71 N. Y. 4:;3. The court ex-
cluded the question, and the defendant ex-
cepted to the ruling. The counsel !or the de-
fendant gave the court no information us to 
what he expected to prove by the witness, 
and in no way indicated the particular pur-
pose of the question. '£he attention of the 
court was called to the case referred to, 
where lt ls stated in the opinion that "port 
risk In a marine Insurance pollcy means a 
risk upon a vessel while lying in port, and 
before she had taken her departure upon 
another voyage." That decision having been 
made several years before this policy was is-
sued, we think it just to hold that the term 
must have been used in the policy wlth the 
meaning thus given to it by this court. If 
lf was the purpose of the question to show 
that It did have sucn meaning, then 1t was 
wholly unnecessary. If lt was Intended to 
show that It had any other or dl!Terent mean-
ing, or if there was any other purpose, the 
Intent and purpose should have been dis-
closed to the court, so that the proper ruling 
could have been intelligently made. It ls 
Impossible to perceive what the object of the 
question was, as, at the time of her destruc-
tion, the vessel was ln the port of New York, 
and bad not yet started upon her voyage. 
She was not rigged for the voyage, and her 
crew bad not yet been shipped. It ls impos-
sible to perceive why the destruction of the 
vessel under such circumstances was not a 
"port risk in the port ot New York;" and the 
trial judge dld not err, in the absence of any 
further lu!ormatlon than was given him, ln 
110 holding. But we think that ln all policies 
Issued ln this state since the opinion ln the 
ease referred to was pronounced and pub-
lished, these words should have the meaning 
given them therein, as lt ls most probable 
that such would be the meaning attached 
to them by the parties using them. 
4. '.fhe defendant's counsel requested the 
court to charge the jury as follows: "The 
burden of proof ls on the plalntltTs to estab-
lish to your satisfaction that the loss of this 
vessel took place without any agency or ln· 
strumentallty of the plalntllrs, direct or ln-
direct," and that "the plalntltTs must estab-
llsh this fact, that the loss was without any 
agency 01· instrumentality of theirs, by a 
clear prC'ponderance of credible testimony." 
The court refused to charge either of these-
requests, and to the refusals the defendant 
excC'pted; and it is now claimed thnt in this 
the court erred. The rule contended for by 
the defendant would be quite unfair and lm-
practkal>le ln the trial of Insurance cases .. 
Wherl.l there ls an insurance against n loss 
by tire, and lt ls proved or admitted thnt the 
property Insured has been destroyed by fire, 
the loss is brought llterally nud exactly 
within the terms of the policy. If, in such a 
case, the Insurance company claims to be ex-
empt from paying the sum Insured, be<·nuse 
there bas been a brench of some condition 
cont.nlned in the pollcy, or the violation of 
some obllgatlon or duty imposed upon the-
lnsured by the law or contract, the burden 
rests upon lt to establl11h the facts whld1 it 
thus relles upon as a defense to the claim 
under the pollcy. Every presumption of law 
ls against the commission of a crime, and ln 
all forms o! action, clvll and crlmlnnl, ev-
ery person ls presumed to be Innocent untll 
his guilt has been e11tnbllshed by at least a 
preponderance of evidence. These humane· 
rules of law would be violated If a person 
suing upon a policy insuring hls property 
against fire was bound to assume the bm·den 
of showing that he was not guilty of the 
crime of burning bis own property. The de-
fendant making that allegation against him 
must bear the burden of establishing lt. Tid-
marsh v. Insurance Co., 4 Mason, 439, Fed. 
Cas. No. 14,0-.:!4; lt'lske v. Insurance Co., 15 
Pick. 310; Murray v. Insurance Co., 8;) N. 
Y. 236; Hellman v. Lazarus, 00 N. Y. 6i2; 
1 Greenl. Ev. § 35; Uoscoe, Ev. 52. The bur-
den in such a case to prove the crime of ln-
cendia11sm should rest upon him who alleges 
lt, just as the burden of proving Insanity 
rests upon hlm who assails a wlll, deed, or-
otber Instrument upon that ground. 1 Wll-
llams, Ex'rs (6th Am. Ed.) 24; 1 Uedf. Wllls, 
c. 3, § 4; Schouler, Wllls, H 147, 173. In 
1 Greenl. Ev. (Red!. Ed.) I 80, the learned 
author says: "Where the negative allegation 
Involves a criminal neglect of duty, whether 
oftl.clal or otherwise, or fraud, or the wrong-
ful violation ot actual lawful possession of 
property, the party making the allegation 
must prove It; for In these cases the pre-
sumption of law, which ls always In fuvor 
of Innocence and of quiet possession, ls ln 
favor of the party charged." Here the burn· 
Ing and destruction of the vessel nre admit-
ted ln the answer, and the defendant makes 
the allegation and tenders the Issue that the 
fire was caused by the insured; and in such 
a caHe lt ls a just rule to hold thnt the de-
fendant, by the Issue lt has thus mnde, has 
assuml'd the burden of maintaining Its al-
lega tlons. 
We have carefully considered the other al-
219 
Case N0. 74] lH'ILE\'.\l\'CY.
legations of error to whlr-h our attention has further attention here. The judgment should
been called, and are satisfied that they are be aflirmed, with costs.
not well founded. They are sufliciently .All concur, except ANDREWS and PECK-
treated in the oplnlon below, and need no HAM, JJ., dissenting.
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Case No. 7-!] HELE\ .• \NCY. 
legations of error to whfrh our attention has 
been called, and are eatlsfl.m that they are 
not well founded. They al'e sufficiently 
tl'ented In the opinion below, and need no 
220 
further attention here. The judgment should 
be affirmed, with costs. 
. All concur, except ANDREWS and PECK-
HAM, JJ., dlBBentlng. 
EXPE l . T 5.
[Case No 75
PEOPLE V. MCELVAINE.
(24 N. E. 46-3, 121 N. Y. 250.)
Court of Appeals of New York. April 29, 1890.
Appeal from court of oyer and terminer,
Kings county.
George .il. Curtis, for appellant. James
W. Ridgway, Dist. Atty., for respondent.
RUGER, C. J. The defendant upon trial
was convicted of the crime of murder in
the first degree, for having killed one Luca.
in his own house, in Brooklyn, about 3
o'clock in the morning of the 23d day of
August, 1889. The evidence showed that
the defendant entered the house through
a window in the second floor. by means of
a ladder, which he found on the premises,
and that such entrance was effected by
forcibly removing a wire screen from the
window. Access to this window was ob-
tained from a. back yard, into which an
unlocked gate opened i'rom the street.
The deceaed was killed by stabs with a
knife inflicted upon him while endea voring
to forcibly prevent the escape of the ac-
cused from the room which he first en-
tered. Twelve stabs were given. of which
four were described to have been mortal.
The defendant was positively identified by
two persons who saw him in the net of
inflicting the wounds, and wasimmediate-
ly arrested by the police officers in the
street near the gate, within 100 feet of the
premises, with a bloody knife in his pos-
session. Independent of the confessions
subsequently made by the defendant to
the police officers and others, no doubt
could possibly be entertained, on the evi-
deuce. as to the identification of the ac-
cused us the person who committed the
homicide. No effort was therefore made
on the trial to show that he was not the
person who caused the death of Luca.
The soiedeiense attempted was the alleged
insanity of the accused. Considerable evi-
dence was given on the trial in his behalf,
tending to show that he possessed a. de-
fective mental organization, and was sub-
ject to delusions and hallucinations. which
were claimed to be evidence oi his insani-
ty. Two witnesses were called on his be-
half, as experts. who respcc tively gave evi-
dence tending to show a belief that he
was, to a certain degree, insane. Two ex-
pert witnesses were also called on behalf
oi the prosecution, to give opinions upon
the question of the defendant's sanity, and
each testified that he wus.in their opinion.
sane. itcannot be questioned but that the
evidence of these witnesses was material,
and had weight with the jury, upon the
question of the deiendant’s men tai condi-
tion. If these opinions were based upon an
erroneous hypothesis, and were founded
in any material respect upon indefinite or
unascertainabie conditions, or upon con-
siderations which were not the proper sub-
jectof expert evidence, they must be re-
gezzrded as having been erroneously admit-
The only serious objection to the con-
viction arises upon an exception to the
ruling of the court permitting Dr. Gray,
a witness for the prosecution, and an ex-
pert of high reputation and character,‘ to
answer, against objection, a. hypothetical
question as to the defendant’s sanity.
The question put by the district attorney,
and the proceedings accompanying the
question, were as follows: “Question.
Now, are you able to say whether,in your
judgment, based upon all the testimony,
the acts oi the defendant on the night of
this homicide. the testimony as to ins past
life given by the witnesses in his defense,
and based upon the whole case, whether
this young man is sane or insane? Mr.
Curtis. lobject, as it is not a question
properly put. The Court. Why not? Mr.
Curtis. It is too vague and indefinite. In
order to put an hypothetical question prop-
erly, so say the court of appeals, it must
consist of specifically proven facts, which
come within the pale of the proof; not
where a. person, for instance, is permitted
to give an anomalous opinion. TheCourt.
You had better frame the question. Mr.
Ridgway. Then I will ask thestenograpller
to read all the evidence to this witness.
The Court. I don’t see why the question is
not competent. Mr. Curtis. The way is,
to take compact, substantial, concentrat-
ed oral proof,—what the learned counsel
relies on to prove the defendant is sane.
The Court. Where a medical witness, who-
is called as an expert, has been in court:
during the whole trial, and heard all the
testimony in the case, everything that has
been done and said by everybody, I don‘t
see why it is not competent to ask him
whether, upon those facts, all he heard
testified to, he thinks the defendant is
sane or insane. This witness has heard
all that has been sworn to by everybody.
To the Witness. You have heard all the
testimony in the case? The District At-
torney. Pass the whole testimony of the
prosecution and the defense, including
the hypothetical question put by Judge
Curtis, and everything that you heard
sworn to hcre,—now will you answer the
question? (Thedcfenseexcepts.) A. lhavo
formed an opinion. Q. State it. (Thede-
fense excepts.) A. I believe the defendant
is sane. Q. What do you believe he was
at the time of the commission of the of-
fense? A. I believe he was sane at the
time of the commission oi‘ the offense."
We cannot doubt but that this question
was improper. The witness was thus
permitted to take into consideration all
the evidence in the ease given upon a long
trial, extending over nine days, and, upon
so much of it as he could recollect, deter-
mine for himself the credibility of the wit-
nesscs, the probability or improbability of
their statements, and, drawing therefrom
such inferences as, in his judgment, were
warranted by it, pronounce upon the sani-
ty or insanity of the defendant. It can-
not be questioned but that the Witness
was by the question putin thcpiace of the
jury, and was allowed to determine, upon
his own judgment, what their verdict
ought to be in the case.
It hardly needs discussion or authority
to how the impropriety of this question,
and, indeed, the learned trial judge, at u
subsequent stage of the proceedings, em-
phatically protested against the implica-
tion that he had permitted such aquestlon
to be put to the witness. A reference to
221
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
07
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
EXPEl.T3. [Case No i:> 
PEOPLE T. :McELVAINID. 
(24 N. E. 463, 121 N. Y. 260.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. April 29, 1800. 
Appeal from court of oyer and termlner, 
Kings county. 
George .\I. Curtis, for appellant. James 
W. Ridgwll.J', Dist. Atty., for respondent. 
RUGER, C.J. The defendant upon trial 
was convicted of the crime of murtler In 
the first degree, for ha vlng killed one Luca. 
In bis own house, In Brooklyn, about 3 
o'clock In the morning of the 23d day of 
August, IRS&. The evidence showed that 
tbe defendant entered the house through 
a window In the second door, by means of 
a ladder, which he found on the premb1es, 
and that such entrance was ettected by 
forcibly removing a wh-e scr~n from the 
wludow. Access to this window was ob-
tained from a. back yard, Into which an 
unlocked gate opene•l from the strt>et. 
The deceased was kmed by stabs with a 
knife lnftlcted upon him while endeavoring 
to forcibly prevent the escape of the ac-
cul!ed from the room which he first en-
tered. Twelve stttbs were given, of which 
four were described to have been mortal. 
The defendant was posltlvelyldentlfted by 
two persons who saw him In the act of 
IDftlctlng the wounds, and was Immediate-
ly arrested by the police officers In the 
street near the gate, within 100 feet of the 
premises, with a bloody knife In his pos-
Be881on. Independent of the confesslon11 
subsequently made by the defendant to 
the police officers and others, no doubt 
could possibly be entertained, on the evi-
dence, as to the Identification of the ac-
cused a.s th~ penion who committed the 
homicide. No effort was therefore made 
on the trial to show that he was not the 
person who caused the death of Luca. 
'l'he aoledefeneeattempted was the alleged 
Insanity of the accused. Con1ddera.ble evi-
dence was given on the trial In his behalf, 
tending to flhow that be posseH1ttl(l a de-
fective mental organization, and WWI sub-ject to delu11loneand halluclnatlons. which 
were claimed to bP. evidence or hh1 lntmnt-
ty. Two witnesses were called on hie be-
half, as experts, who res11rettvely gave evi-
dence tenc.llng to show a belief that he 
was, to a certain degree, Insane. 1.'wo ex-
pert witnesses were also called on behalf 
of the prosecution, to glvt> opinions upon 
the question of the defe11da.nt'11sanity,aml 
eacb teetUlec.l that he w11s. ln their opinion, 
sanP.. It cannot be q uestloned but that the 
evidence of tbetie wltnesi;eii was matcrt11l, 
and hud weight with the Jury, upon the 
question of the defendant's mental condi-
tion. If these opinions were bused upon an 
erroneoua hypothesis, aml we1·p founded 
In any material respect upon ludeflnitc or 
11n1U1Certalnahle conditions, or upon con-
elderattons which were not the pro1wr sub-ject of expert evidence, they must bt• re-
garded as ha.Ying been erroneously adwlt-
t.ed. 
The only serious objection to the con-
viction arlfleS upon an exce}ltion to the 
ruling of the r.ourt 11ermlttlng Dr. Gray, 
a wltnt'88 for the prosecution, and an ex-
pert of high reputation and character, to 
answer, against objection, a hypothetical 
question ae to the defendant ·s sanity. 
The que11tlon put by the dlstl'ict attornt>y, 
and the proc8Eldlngs accompanying thtt 
question, were as follows: "\!uestlon. 
.!Sow, are you able toea.y whether, In your 
JmJgment, based upon all the testimony, 
the acts ol the defendant on tht' night of 
this homicide. the testimony as to lus past 
lHe. given by the witnesses In his defense, 
and based upon the whole case, whether 
this young wan ls sane or insane? Mr. 
Curtis. I object, as It Is not a queatlon 
properly put. The Court. Wbynot'? Mr. 
Curtis. It ls too vague and Indefinite. In 
order to put an hypothetical question prop-
erly, ao say the court of appe11ls, It must 
consist or specltl<'ally pro\"en facts, whkh 
come within the pale of the proof; not 
where a penion, for Instance, is permitted 
to gt ve au anomalous opinion. TbeCourt. 
You had better frame the question. Atr. 
Ridgway. Then I will ask thestenogra)>l1er 
to read all the evidence to this wl tness. 
The Court. I don't "lee why the question ls 
not competent. Mr. Curtis. The way ls, 
to take compact, substantial, <'oncentrat-
ed oral proof,-what the learned counsPl 
relies on to prove the defendant ls sane. 
The Court. Where a medical wltneas, who 
Is called as an expert, has been In court 
during the whole trial, and beard all th& 
testimony in the case, everything that has 
been done and said by everybody, I don't 
see why It iB not competent to ask him 
whPther, upon those facts, all he heard 
te11tlfled to, he thinks the defemlunt ls. 
sane or Insane. This wltnesa has heard 
all that hes been sworn to by eiveryhody. 
To the Witness. You have heard all th& 
testimony In the case? The District At-
torney. Pase the whole testimony of th& 
prosecution and the defcn~e. Including 
the hypothetical question put by Judge 
Curtis, an<l everythi~ that you heurd 
sworn to here,-now wm you answer the-
questlon? (Thedefenseexcepts.) A. lhavtt 
formed an opinion. Q. l:)ta.te It. lThede-
fem1e exceptit.) A. I believe the defendant 
Is sane. CJ. What do you believe be was 
at the time or the commission of the of-
fense·! A. I believe he was sane at the-
time of the commission of the offense." 
We cannot doubt hut that this question 
was Improper. The witneBs wus thus. 
permitted to take Into consideration all 
the evidence In the case given upon a long 
trial, extending over nine days, and, upon 
so much of It its he could recollect, deter-
mine ror hlmAelf thP. credibility of the wit-
nesses, the prohablllty or lmprohat>lllty of 
their statementlt, and, drawing therefrom 
such Inferences as, In his judgment, were 
warranted by It, pronounce upon the sani-
ty or lmmnlty of the defendant. It can-
not be questioned but that the wltnl•ss 
was by the quesrlon put In tbepluce of the 
Jury, 11n<l was allowed to <lett>rmlne, upon 
hl11 own judgment, what their verdict 
onght to be In the case. 
It hardly needs discussion or authority 
to show the Impropriety of thl11 question. 
and, Indeed, the learnec.l trial Jm.lge, at a 
sub111equent stnge of the proccedlngs, em-
phatically proteRted agalnc1t the Implica-
tion that he had permlttetl such aqueHtlon 
to be put to the witness. A reference to 
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the record, however, shows that thecourt
must then have been laboring under some
misconception as to what had really tak-
en place. Thismigbt reasonably have bap-
pened to any judge from the prejudice ex-
cited by the exasperating mode in which
the defense was conducted by the prison-
er's counsel. The rule as to the condi-
tions governing the formation of hypo-
thetical questions to expert has frequent-
ly been discussed and illustrated in the re-
ported cases in this court. It was said by
Judge Asnimws, in the case of People v.
Barber, 115 N. Y. 491, 22 N. E. Rep. I82,
that “the opinion oi medical experts. as
to the sanity or insanity of thedefendant.
based upon the testimony in the case, as-
sumed for the purpose oi the examination
to be true, was undoubtedly competent.
S0. in connection with their opinion, they
could be permitted to state the reason
upon which it was founded. ' ' ‘ But
inferences from facts proved are to be
drawn and found by thejury, and cannot
be proved as facts by the opinion of wit-
nesses. " In Reynolds v. I{obinson,6-i N. Y.
595, Judge EARL, in speaking of evidence
attempted to be given under an hypothet-
ical question, says: “In such a case it is
not the province of the witness to recon-
cile and draw inierences from the evidence
of other witnesses, and to take in such
facts as he thinks their evidence has estab-
lished. or as he can recollect and carry in
his mind, and thus form and express an
opinion. His opinion may be obtained by
stating to him a hypothetical case, taking
in some or all of the facts stated by wit-
nesses, and claimed by counsel putting the
question to be established by their evi-
dence, and when the question is thus stat-
ed the witness basin his mind a definite
state of facts, and the province of the
triers. whether referees or jurors. is not
interfered with. ” So, too, it was said by
-Iudge Mff.I.l<2Riil Gnlterman v. Steam-Ship
Co., 83 N. Y. 358, thatitis not theprovlnce of
an expert witness “to draw inferences, or
to take in such facts as he can recollect,
and thus form an opinion.” In Gregory
v. Railroad Co., reported in 28 N. Y. st. Rep.
726. 8 N.Y. Supp. 525, the court hold ' “An
expert witness cannot be asked to give an
opinion based upon what he has heard
other witnesses testify. Such opinion must
be based on an liypotlietical question con-
taining iucts which are assumed to have
been proven. ” Thecase of People v.Lake,
I2 N. Y. 3.38, is not an authority for appel-
lant on the question under discussion.
'l‘hc court in that casc did not concur in
the opinion written, but placed theirdecls-
ion upon two propositions: one of which
only hen rs upon the question here, and
that was that “the court of oycr and ter-
mincr erred in permitting physicians, who
did not hear all the evidence relating to
the mental condition of the prisoner, to
give opinions as to his sanity, founded on
the portion heard by them." The ques-
tion was not mooted or decided whether,
in c.-ise they had heard all of the evidence,
they could give opinions based thereon:
hut it pusscd off solely upon the question
whether u. person. who had hca rd only a
part of the evidence upon 2|. trial, could
give an opinion based upon thc portion oi‘
the evidence so heard by him. lt is true
.,.,.,
that an implication may be drawn from
the decision that, if the witness had heard
the whole evidence. he might properly
have given his opinion: but that question
was not in the case, and it falls far short
of being an authority on the point.
The case of Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y.
lEi0. is to a similar effect. Two opinions
were delivered in that case, but I'Il!llhfl' oi
them secured the concurrence of the court.
The decision was placed upon the decision
in the Hartung Case, (Id. 95.) and had no
reference to the question under considera-
tion here. Thecase of People v.’1‘hurston.2
Parker Crim. R. 49, was in the supreme
court, and failed to secure the concurrence
of the court in the grounds upon which it
was decided. No rule was therefore le-
gally formulated hy the decision, but the
inferences to be drawn from the opinions
read are plainly opposed to the people's
contention here. No other decisions from
this state are cited, and we deem it unnec-
essary to discuss or consider the rules pre-
vailing in other countries, in view of the
reported decisions made in ourown courts.
An attempt was subsequently made to,
in some degree, cure the error committed,
by proving by the witness that in answer-
ing the question he assumed t-he truth of
the evidence given by the defendant's wit-
nesses: bnt we think this did not remove
the vice inherent in the question. Even
as thus affected, it left the uncertainty of
his memory as to all the evidence in the
case, and the freedom of his judgment us
to all other evidence, to give such weight
as he should in his own mind determine it
was entitled to, and substantially allowed
him to usurp the functions of thejury in
deciding the questions of fact. We thinkit
is not competent, in any case, to predicate
an hypothetical question to an expert up-
on all of the evidence in the case. whether
he has heard it all or not-, upon the as-
sumption tbut he then recollects it; for it
would then be impossible for the jury to
determine the facts upon which the wit-
ness bases his opinion, and whether such
fact-s were proved or not. Suppose the
jury conclude that certain facts are not
proved, how are they, in such an event,
to determine whether the opinion is not.
to a. great degree. based upon such facts?
When specific facts, either proved or as-
sumed to have been proved, are embraced
in the question, the jury are enabled to
determine whether the answer to such
question is based upon facts which have
been proved in the case or not. and wheth-
er other facts bearing upon the correct-
ness and force of the answer are contained
therein or have been omitted from it: but,
in the absence of such a question, the evi-
deuce must always be, to a certain extent,
uncertain, unintelligible, and, perhaps,
misleading. We regret that an error of
this character is found in a case which
was otherwise tried by the learned court
with an intelligent understanding of and
adherence to the rules of law applicable
to the case, and a strict regard to the
rights of the accused; but, in compliance
with the uniiorm practice of courts in cap-
ital cases to avoid even the possibility of
injustice to the accused, we think the cr-
ror referred to requires a. new trial. All
concur.
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tht• reco1·1!, however, shows that thecourt 
must then ha,·e been laboring under some 
mlBt'Onl·eptlon as to what bad really tak-
-t.'n place. 'l'hlK might reasonably have ha1>-
pened to any judge from the prejudice ex-
-cited by the exasperating mode In whkh 
the defense was conducted by the prlson-
.er's coum1el. 'l'be rula as to the eondl-
tlonH go\·ernlng the formation of hypo-
thetical 11u~tlons to experts has frequent-
ly been dlscusHed and Ulustrated In the re-
ported cases In this court. It was said by 
Judge ANDREWS, In the case of l'eople v. 
UurlJer, 115 N. Y. 491, 22 N. E. Hep. 1~2, 
thnt "the opinion of medical experts. as 
to the sanity or Insanity or the defendant, 
based upon the teHtimony In the case, as-
sumed for the purpoite of the examination 
to be true, was undoubtedly competent. 
So. In connt..>etlon with their opinion, they 
.could be pPrmltted to Htate the reason 
upon which It was founded. • • • But 
Inferences from facts proved are to be 
drawn and found by the jury, and cannot 
he proved as facts by the opinion of wlt-
nestiee." In Reynolds v.Roblntion,M N. Y. 
n95, Judg;e EARL, In speaking of evidence 
attempted to be glYen under an hypothet-
ical question, sa;ys: "In 1mch a case It Is 
not the province of the wltneRS to recon-
elle and draw lnferenceH from the evidence 
or other witnesses, and to take In Ritch 
fact11 as be thinks their evhlence hasestab-
JIHhe<l. or as he can recollect and carry In 
his mind, and thus form n.nd express an 
OJ>lnlon. Hie opinion may be obtained by 
Htu ting to him a. hypothE'tlcal case. taking 
In eome or all of the f1tcts stat:.ed by wlt-
ne11ses, and claimed bycoun110J putting the 
•111estlon to be eetabllehed by their evi-
dence, and when the question Is thus eta.t-
-ed the witness hM In bis mind a definite 
etate of facts, and the province of the 
triers, whether reft-rees or jurors. ls not 
interfered with." So, too, It was salll by 
.I udge M1u,1rn In Gal term an v. Steam-Ship 
Co., lo!3N. Y. 358, thatlt ls not thefJrovlneeor 
an expert witness "to draw lnfN-enceH, or 
to tnke In such facts as be can recollect, 
and thus form an opinion." In Gregory 
v. Railroad Co., reporterl In 28N. Y. ist. Rep. 
726. SN. Y. Supp. 52.3, the court hold· "An 
expert wltnei;e cannot be asked to give an 
opinion based upon what he has heard 
other wltnerises te11tlfy. Such opinion must 
be bast"d on an hy11othetlcal question con-
taining facts which are assumed to have 
hf'011 pron•n." Tlleca110 of People v. Lake, 
12 N. Y. aas. ls not an authority for appel-
lant on the question under discussion. 
The rourt in that caee did not concur In 
the opinion written, b11t placed thelrdeclH-
lon upon two prop0Hltlon11: one of which 
only hearH u11on the qul'Htlon here, and 
that waH that "the court of oyer and ter-
mlner erred In permitting phyMlclam1, who 
did not hear all the evhleure relating to 
the mental condition of the prisoner, to 
give oplnlone as to his sanity, founded on 
the portion ht>ard by them.•• '.rhe qneH-
tlon waR not mooted or decided whether, 
In •·nH•· thl'y had heard all of the evidence. 
th('.\" 1·011ld give opinions based thereon: 
hut it J>llHHC'd oft solely upon the question 
wht>ther a perHon. who had heard only a 
11urt of the t-vldence upon n trial, could 
J1:lv1• an opinion bal'E'd u1>0n the portion of 
the e\·idence HO beard by hlw. It 111 tt·ue 
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that an Implication may be drawn from 
the decision that, if the witness bad beard 
the whole evidence. he might properly 
have given his opinion: but that qut>Htlon 
was not In the case, and It falls far short 
of being an authority on the point. 
The ease of Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y . 
l!lO. le to a similar effect. Two opinions 
were dellvert>d In that case-, but nt!llh1r ut 
them secured the ~oncurrence of the court. 
The decision was placed upon thE: declKlon 
In the Hartung Cuse. (Id. 95.1 and had no 
reference to the question under considera-
tion here. The case of People v .1'hut"Hton, 2 
Parker Crim. R. 49, woe In the supreme 
court, and failed to secure the concurrence 
of the C{iurt In the grounds upon which It 
f..as decldPd. No rule was thel'Pfore le-
gally formulated hy the decl11lon, but the 
Inferences to be drawn from the opinions 
read are plelnly opposed to the people's 
contention here. No other decisions from 
this state are cited, and we deem It unnec-
essary to discuss or consider the ruleR pre-
valllnar In other countrll'B, In view of the 
reported 1lf'clslons made In our own courts. 
An attempt was subsequently made to, 
In some dE'gree, cure the error committed, 
hy proving by the wltneRS that In answer-
ing the question be assumed the truth of 
the evidence given by the defendant'll w1t-
nessee: but we think this did not remove 
the vice Inherent In the question. Even 
ae thuR a.ft1-ctcd, It left the uncertainty of 
hie memor.v as to all tht> evidence In the 
case, and the fn>edom of hie Judgment as 
to all other eYldf'nce, to give such weight 
as he Mhould In hie own mind determine It 
was entitled to, and substantially allowed 
him to usurp the functions of the Jury In 
declrllng the q uestlons of fact. We think It 
Is not competent, In any case. t.o predicate 
an hypothetical question to an expert up-
on all of the evidence In the case, whether 
he has heard It all or not, upon t·he as-
sumption tbnt he then recollf'Cte It; for It 
would then be tmpoKtJlble for t.he Jury to 
determine the factH u1>on which the wit-
ness bases bis opinion, and whether such 
facts were proved 01· not. 8uppose the jury conclude that certain facts are not 
proved, how ere they, In such an event, 
to determine whether the opinion IR not. 
to a great degree. b11eed upon such facts? 
When epecltlc facts, either proved or as-
Bttmed to have been proved, are embraced 
In the qu1l8tlon, the jury are enabled to 
determine whether the answer to such 
11uet1tlon Is baKed upon facts which have 
been pro,·ed In the case or not, and wheth-
er other facts heurlng upon the corrt'Ct-
nees and force of the answer are contained 
therein or have been omitted from It: but, 
111 the ubst•nce of such a qoeKtion, the evi-
dence muHt always be, to a certain extent, 
uncertain, unlntelllgtlJle, and, perhaps, 
misleading. We regret that an error of 
this char11etcr ls found In a case which 
waR otherwise tried b.,. the lea med court 
with au lntelllgent undt>t"Mtandlng or and 
adhE>rence to the rules ol law applicable 
to the ca11e, and a sttict regarll to the 
rlithte of the accu1Jed; hut. In compllanre 
with the uniform practice of courtH In ea.p-
ltn I eases to uvold even thl:' poMlhlllty of 
lnj11Htlce to the accu110d, we think the t>r-
ror refE>rred to requires a new trial. All 
COlll'Ul'. 
HANDWVRITING.
[Case No. 76
WILSON ct al. v. VAN LEER et nx.
(17 Atl. 1097, 127 Pa. St. 371.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. June 28,
1889. __
Error to court of common pleas, Lancaster
county; D. W. Parrcnsoy, Judge. *
Issue derisavit oel non. Needliam Wil-
son died September 22. 1872. in Lancaster
county. His last will and testament, of
which the plaintiffs in error were executors,
having been duly executed on March 2, 1865.
was admitted to probate on September 28.
1872. On August 18, 1877, suit was brought
by Caroline Van Leer, formerly Carman.
upon the following instrument of writing:
"August 13th. 1865. I give these fiew lilies
to Caroline Carman to show that I want her
to have the sum of twelve hundred dolars
at my death she livd with mee A number of
years And got verry little for it so i thought
it rite to leave her This little sum to be paid
to her out of my home property from NEED-
"AM WILSON.” At that time it was con-
tended for Caroline Van Leer that the paper
was a promissory note. and the court below
so held. but this court held it to be of a tes-
tamentary character, and that it would not
support an action of assumpsit. Wilson v.
Van Leer, 103 Pa. St. 600. .\_‘ubsequently.
on June 23, 1883. this paper was offered for
probate before the register of Lancaster
county as a codicil to the last will and theta-
ment of Needham Wilson, and, having been
admitted, upon an appeal taken by the plain-
tiffs in error. an issue decisavit vel non was
directed. There were no subscribing wit-
nesses to the execution of the paper. One
witness. a sister of Caroline Carman, testi lied
that she saw \\'ilson write and sign the paper,
and the only other witness called in support
of it was a brother, Cornelius Carman, who
undertook to testify to his signature from an
acquaintance with his handwriting. This
witness testified that he had seen Wilson
write once or twice when he. the witness.
was a boy 12 years old. 31 years before the
trial. and once afterwards, 23 years before
the trial, at a tavern in Lancaster. In com-
menting upon the testimony of the other
witness, who said she saw Wilson write and
sign the paper, one of the counsel for plain-
tiffs in error was about to show the jury, by
a reference to the almanac for 1865, that Au-
gust 13th was Sunday, which was in direct
conflict with her testimony. On objection
made by counsel, that as the almanac had
not been formally offered in evidence no ref-
en.-nce could be made to it, the court refused
to allow it to be used.
There was a verdict in favor of plaintiffs.
and defendants bring error, assigning, inter
a/ia,the following grounds: “(2) Thecourt
erred in its answer to del‘entlants' third point
as follows: (3) If the jury do not believe
(‘ornelius Carman is a competent witness
to prove the execution of the alleged codicil,
the verdict must be in favor of the defend-
ants. B1/'the Court. We deny that point
' for the jury, like any other witness.
i seen the writing done.
] as stated. The belief of the jury as to Cor-
nelius Carman being a competent witness
has nothing to do with his competency.
Competency means the legal fitness of a wit-
ness to be heard on the trial of a cause. It
is a legal question, and the court is the sole
judge of his or her competency. The jury
has nothing to do in deciding whether they
are competent. If the court think they are
so interested, or in a position that they can-
not testify. they will rule them out; but if
they decide he is a competent witness. then
that makes his testimony come before you,
like that of any other witness. The court is
the sole judge of his or her competency. The
court admitted Cornelius Carman as a com-
pets-nt witness. His testimony, however, is
His
credibility is for them to determine." “(5)
The court erred in refusing to allow counsel
for defendants below to refer to the almanac
for 1665, in his address to the jury.”
S. H. Reynolds and J. Hay Brown, for
plaintiifsin error. A. Herr Smith and D.
G. Eshleman, for defendants in error.
MITCHELL, J . The competency of Corne-
lius (‘arman was in the first instance ch-arl_v
a matter for the court, and, no subsequent
evidence having raised any dispute of fact
upon it. the learned judge was right in say-
ing that the court was the sole judge of coin-
petency. and refusing to allow the jury to '
review the ruling. Had the facts upon which
the judge held him prima facie competent
been denied or contradicted. it might have
been proper to submit the whole matter to
the final decision of the jury, (Lee v. Welsh,
1 Wkly. Notes C-as. 453,) but there was no
such conflict as made that course niece.--sa|'_\'.
'1‘he learned judge was also within the line
of authorities in holding that Carm-an had
sufficient knowledge of Wilson's handwriting
to make him competent to testify concerning
it. It is said to be sufiicient if the witness
has seen the party write but once, and then
only his name. (1 Greenl. Ev.§ 577;) and
probably no higher standard can be fixed for
a definite rule, though, considering the un-
trustworthincss of opinions on handwriting
in general, (see note of Chief Justice RED-
FIELD to his edition of Greenh-af, vol. 1.
§578,) such evidence ought to be regarded
with great caution. Nor in the nature of
things is it possible to fix any arbitrary limit
of time within which the witnes.-i must have
That must depend
on his intelligence, his habit of observation
of such matters. the apparent strength and
confidence of his memory. etc.. which must
be passed upon in the first instance by the
trial judge. Carman’s knowledge seems
not only to have been extremely stale. but of
the narrowest extent; and if the learned judge
had held that it was too remote and unreli-
able to qualify him we should not have been
disposed to disagree with him. But the inat-
ter was within his discretion. and his conclu-
sion was. as already said, within the line of
233
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HANDWRITING. (Case No. 76 
WILSOX et al. v. YAX LEER et nx. 
(17 Atl. 109i, 127 Pa. St 371.) 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. June 28, 
1889. 
' Error to court of common pleas, Lancaster 
county; D. w. PATTERSON, Judge. ~ 
Issue der'8a"it oel no11. N ee<lham Wil-
aon died September 22, 1872, in Lancasf.er 
county. His last will and testament, of 
""hich the plaintiffs in error were executors, 
having been duly executed on March 2, 1865, 
was admitted to probate on September 28, 
H!72. On August 18, 1877, suit was brought 
-by Caroline Van Leer, formerly Carman, 
upon too followin~ instrument of writing: 
"August 13th, 1865. I give thest> flew lines 
to Caroline Carman to show that I want her 
to have lhe sum of twelve hundred doh1rs 
at my death she livd with mee A number of 
years And got nrry little for it so i thought 
it rite to leave her This little sum to be paid 
to her out of my home property from NEED-
HAM WILSON." At that time it was con-
tended for Caroline Van Leer that the paper 
was a promissory note, ancl the· court below 
so held, but this court held it to be of a tes-
tamentary charRCter, and that it would not 
support an action of aasumptsi.t. Wilson v. 
Van Leer, 103 Pa. 8t. 600. Subsequently, 
on June 23, 1883, this paper was offt>red for 
probate before the register of Lanc11stn 
county as a codicil to the 111st will and t.·sta-
ruent of Needham Wilson, anti, having been 
admitted, upon an appeal taken by the )'lain-
tiffs in error, 1tn issue decisa"it vel non was 
directed. 'fhere wt'l1·e no snbsl'ribing wit-
nesseg to the execution of the paper. One 
wi~ness, a sister or Caroline Carman, testified 
that she saw Wilson write 11nd sign the paper, 
and the only other witness 1·alleJ in support 
of it was a brother, <.:omelius Carman, who 
undertook to testify lo his signatu1·e from an 
acquaintance with his handwriting. This 
witneSB testified that he had seen Wilson 
write once or twice when he, the witness. 
was a boy 12 years old, 31 years before the 
trial, and once afte1·wards, 23 years bt1fore 
the trial, at a tavern in Lancaster. In com-
menting upon the testimony of the other 
witness, who said she saw Wilson write and 
sign the paper, one of the counsel for plain-
tiifs In erPOr was about to show the jury, by 
.a reference to the almanac for 1865, that Au-
gust 13th was Sunday, which was in direct 
conflict with her testimony. On objection 
made by counsel, that as the almanac had 
not been formally olfl'fed in evidence no rer-
erence could b6 made to it, the court refuaed 
k> alJow n ~o be used. 
There was a verdict In favor of plalntitr11, 
~md derendants bring error, assigning, inter 
.afia, thefolJowing grounds: "(2) Theconrt 
erred in lta answer to deren1lnnts' third point 
a" follows : (:I) If the jury tlo not believe 
t'ornelius Carman is a competent witness 
to prove lht! execution of the alleged codicil, 
the \"erllict must be in favor of the defend-
.ant.<J. Bv"th6 Court. We deny that point 
as stated. The belief of the jury as to Cor-
nt>liua Carm1m being a competent witness 
baa nothing to do with his competency. 
Competency means the legal fitness of a wit-
ness to be heard on the trial of a c1rnse. It 
is a lekal question, and the court is the sole 
judge of his or her competency. The jury 
bas nothing to do in deciding whethP-r they 
are competent. If the court think th~y are 
so interested, or in a position that they can-
not testify, they will rule them out; but if 
they decide he is a competent witness, then 
that makes his testimony come before you, 
like that of any other witnes11. The court is 
the sole judge of bis or her <.-ompetency. '.l.'he 
co111"t admitted Cornelius Carman as a com-
petent witness. His testimony, however, Is 
for the jury, like 1my other witness. His 
credibility is for them to determine." "(5) 
'fhe court erred in refusing to allow co•mael 
for defendants below to refer to the almanac 
for lt;65, in his address to the jury." 
8. H. Reynolds and J. Hay Brown, for 
r1laintiffs in error. .A. Herr Smith and D. 
(J. Ealileman, for defendants In error. 
1 MITCHELL, J. The competency of Corne-
1 uns Carman was in the ftr11t Instance <'ll'itrlv 
a matter for the court, and, no s11hseq11erit 
evidence hitving raised any dl11pute of fact 
upon it, the learned judge was right in say-
ing that the co11rt Wits the sole judge of coru-
pet.-ncy, and refnainl( to allow the jury to 
review the ruling. Had the facts upon which 
the judge held him prima facie competPnt 
heen dt>nied or contr1tdicted. it might have 
, been proper to submit the whole matter to 
I the final decision of the jury, (Lee v. WPlsh, 
1
1 Wkly. Notes Cas. 453,) but therP w1ts no 
such conlli1·t as made that course necetll!ltry. 
' The lt'arned judge was also within the line 
of authorities in hohling that Carman had 
sutllciPnt knowledge of Wihlon 's hand writing 
to make him competent to telltify <'Oncerning 
it. It la said to be sufficient if the witness 
has seen the party write but once, and then 
only his name, (1 Green]. Ev. § 577;) and I probably no higher standard can be llxed for I a definite rule, though, consil.lt>ring the un-trustworthinPSS of opinions on handwriting 
I in general, (s~ note of Chief Justice RED-FIELD to his edition of Greenl .. uf, vol. 1. 
~ 578,) such evidence ought to be t-eJ{arded 
I with grt>at caution. Nor in the nnture of things is it pos.'tible to fix any arbitrnry limit 
I of time within whid1 the witnes:1 must have 
J seen the writing done. That must depend 
I 
on his intellige111:e, his habit of observation 
or such matters, the apparent strength and 
confidence of his mf!mory, etc., which must 
1 he passPd upon in the first instance by the 
I trial judge. Carman'a knowledge seems 
not only to have been extremely stale, but of 
the narrowest extent; and if the learned judge 
had hl'ld that it was too remote and unreli-
able to qualify him we should not have been 
di:5posed to disagree with him. Hut the mnt-
ter was within his discretion. and his conclu-
sion was, as already said, within the line of 
2~ 
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the authorities. It was therefore for the
jury, and not 1'or us, to determine the weight
to which the testimony should be entitled.
The assignments of error in relation to Car-
man’s testimony are therefore not sus mined.
We are obliged, however, to hold t rat the
court erred in refusing to permit the conn-
sel for defendant bel0W to refer to the alma-
nac to show, in support of his argument
against the testimony of Margaret Manahan,
that a certain date in 1865 fell upon Sunday.
All of the authorities agree that this is one
of the matters that do not require to be
proved. but are taken judicial notice of \vith-
out evidence. “Neither is it necessary to
prove * * * the coincidence of days of
the week with days of the month.” 1 Greenl.
Ev. § 5; and see Starkey, Ev. pt. 3, § 20, (page
738,10th Amer. Ed.) “Itis * * * wholly
immaterial * * * whether the facts of
public and general history and their dates are
recognized by the court suapte sponte, the
books and chronicles or almanacs being used
merely to aid the memory; or whether they
will remain unnoticed until suggested by
the parties, and verified by the books; or
whether the books themselves are adduced
by the parties, and admitted by the court as
instruinentsof evidence; * * * the pro-
cess and the result being in each case the
same.” 3 Greenl.Ev. §269. The mere mode
of introducing the almanac seems to vary,
as indicated by the last extract from Green-
leaf; but, as all the authorities agree that no
proof is necessary, it follows that it is not
required to be put in evidence at all. “The
almanac in such cases is used, like the stat-
utes. not strictly as evidence, but for the
purpose of refreshing the memory of the
court and jury.” State v. Morris, 47 Conn.
179. “The almanac is part of the law of
England." POLLOcK, C. B., in Tutton v.
Darke, 5 Hurl. & N. 649. In Hanson v.
Shackelton, 4 I)owl. 48, there was a rule to
set aside a writ, on the ground that it was
dated on Sundav, and the report proceeds:
“Cali-ridge. J. Have _vou any atlidavit show-
ing that the day on which this writ is dated
was a Sunday? Bag/ly. The afiidavit does
not state that the day * * * was a Sun-
day, but, -* * * the day of the month
being given, the court is bound to take ju-
dicial notice on what day of the week that
day fell. * * * Cur. adv. molt. Cole-
1'z'd;/e. J. I have consulted the other judges
of the court, and they are of opinion that I
ought to take judicial notice of what the day
was on which this day of the month fell.
* * * Rule absolute." So in Reed v.
Wilson. 41 N. J. Law, 29, there was a dec-
laration on a note dated August 12th. at
four months; and on demurrer assigning,
inter alirl, that the nar-1'. showed demand and
protest on December 14th, one day too soon,
the court took judicial notice that December
224
15th was Sunday, and therefore that the de-
mand was rnade on the proper day. In
Railroad Co. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 226. it was
held that “it is the duty of the court to no-
tice the days of the week on which particular
days of the month fall; and hence we know,
without other averment. (on demurrer.) that
th_e 28th of July, 1878. was Sunday.” And
in McIntosh v. Lee. 57 Iowa, 358, 10 N. W.
Rep. 895. it was said by the court: “The
petition alleges that the defendant entered
into the written lease on March 10, 1878.
Courts take judicial notice that the ltlth day
of March, 1578, was Sunday. The petition,
therefore. in etfectalleges that the lease was
executed on Sunday;" and it was therefore
held that, under the pleadings, evidence was
not admissible that the lease was executed
on Monday. These autl|orities—and none
have been found in opposition to them—
show clearly that, however often departed
from as a matter of convenience, the rule is
that matters of which judicial notice is taken.
including the dates in the almanac. do not
require to be put in evidence at all.
It is argued for the defendant in error that
the fact of August 13th having been Sunday
did not necessarily contradict Mrs. Mana-
han. and therefore that, even if the court be-
low committed an error, it was an immateri-
al one, for which the judgment should not
be reversed. But there was an apparent con-
tradiction, which at least required explana-
tion. and, in a case where the evidence in
support of the plaintifi"s case was so mea-
ger, it is impossible to say that even a slight
_doubt thrown on the testimony of the main
witness would not have turned the scale in
the minds of the jury.
lt is also argued that the almanac, having
been brought forward at so late a st-ace in
the case, deprived the plaintiff below of the
benefit of an argument upon it by one of her
counsel. But in this respect it was like any
other ar,qument or illustration which counsel
may make towards the end of a case. If it
has not been anticipated, it is a surprise, and
that is a risk which parties must encounter
In every case. If counsel had run the cal-
sulation back himself. so as to show that that
day was Sunday. no one could have ques-
tioned his right to do so. His reference to
‘the almanac was no more than a 1'4*.fel‘ell('e to
the multiplication table. as a labor-saving
mode of refreshing or conllrming knowledge
legally presumed to be in everybody‘s mind.
This kind of surprise is one of the dangers
incident to every contest, and the only relief
against it is the discretion of the judge, where
the new matter or new view may lead to sub-
stantial injustice, and is such as could not
reasonably have been foreseen, to allows an
opportunity of reply, or subsequently to grant
a new trial. Judgment reversed, and venire
de novo awarded.
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the authorities. It was therefore for the 
jury, and not fo1• us, to dPtermine the WPight 
to which the testimony should be entitled. 
The assignments of error In relation to Car-
man's testimony are therefore not sns~ined. 
We are obliged, however, to hold tFiat the 
court erred in refusing to permit the coun-
sel for defendant below to rl!fer to the alma-
nac to show, in support of his argument 
against the testimony of Margaret Manahan, 
that a certain date in 1865 fell upon Sunday. 
All of the authorities Hgree that this is one 
or the matters that do not require to be 
proved, but are tHken judicial notice of with-
out evidence. "Neither is it necessary to 
prove * * * tltl' coincidence of days of 
t.he week with da,·s of the month." 1 Green I. 
Ev.§ 5; and see Starkey, Ev. pt. 3, § 20, (page 
738, 10th Am,.r. Ed.) "It is • • * wholly 
immaterial • • • whether the facts of 
pul•lic and general history and their dates are 
recognized by the court suapte sponte, tile 
books and chronicles or almanacs being used 
merely to aid the memory; or whether they 
will remain unnoticed until suggested by 
the parties, and verified by the IJooks; or 
whether the books themselves are adduced 
by Um parties, and admitted by the court as 
i11stru111entsof evidence; * • • the pro-
cess and the result bPing in each case the 
same." 3 Green I. Ev.§ 269. 'fhe mere mode 
of introducing the almanac seems to vary, 
as indicated by the last extract from Green-
leaf; but, as all the authorities agree that no 
proof is necessary, it follows that it is not 
r"quired to be put in evidence at all. "The 
almanac in such cnses is used, like the stat-
utes, not strictlv as evidence, but for the 
purpose of refr~1d1ing the memory of the 
court and jury." State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 
179. "The almanac is part of the law of 
England." POLLOCK, C. B., in Tutton v. 
Darke, 5 Hurl. & N. 649. In Hanson v. 
Shack1-lton, 4 Dow I. 48, there was a rule to 
set aside a writ, on the ground that it was 
dated on Sunda\', amt the repm·t proceeds: 
"Col•·rid.qe, J. Have you any affidavit show-
ing that the day on which this writ is datetl 
was a Sunday? Bayly. The affidavit dotls 
not state that the day * * • was a Sun-
da~·. but, ·* • • the day of the month 
bPing given, the court is bound to take ju-
dicial notice on what day of the week that 
day fell. • • * Cur. a<lv. tJttlt. Cole-
rirl.qe, J. I have consulted the other j11LlgPs 
of the court, and they are of opinion that I 
ought to take judicial notice of what the day 
was on which this day of the month fell. 
• • • Rule ahsolutEi." So in Reed v. 
Wilson, 41 N. J. Law, 29, there was a dec-
laration on a note dated .August 12th, at 
four months; and on demurrer assigning, 
intn· alirI, that the nan'. showed demand aud 
protest on December 14th, one day too soon, 
the court took judicial notice that December 
224 
15th was Sunday, and therefore that the de-
mand was made on the prope1· day. In 
Railroad Co. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 226, it was 
held that "It is the duty of the court to no-
tice the days of the week on which particular 
days of the month fall; and hence we know, 
without other averment, (on demurrer,) that 
tl~e 28th of July, 1878, was Sunday." Arni 
in Mcintosh v. I.ee, 57 Iowa, 358, 10 N. W. 
Rep. 895, it wa~ said by the court: "The 
petition alleges that the defendant entered 
into the written lease on March 10, 1878. 
Courts take jmlicial notice that the 10th day 
of March, 1878, was Sundny. The petition, 
therefore, in effect.alleges that the lease was 
executed on Sunday;" and it was therefore 
held that, under the pleadings, evi<lence was 
not admissible that th1i lease was executed 
on Monday. These authorities-and none 
have be6n found In opposition to them-
show clearly that, however often departed 
from as a matter of convenience, the rule is 
tlrnt m1ilte1'8 of which judicial notice is taken, 
inclucling the dates in the almanac, do not 
require to be pnt in e\•i<lence at all. 
It is argued for the defendant in e'rror that 
the fact of Augu!lt 13th having been :Sunday 
did not necessarilv contradict Mrs. Mana-
han, 1md therefore· that, even if the court be-
low committed an error, it was an immateri-
al one, for which the judgment should not 
be reversed. But there was an apparent con-
tradiction, which at least required explana-
tion. and, in a case where the evidence in 
support of the plaintiff's case was so mea-
ger, it is impossible to say that even a slight 
~loubt thrown on the testim1111y of the main 
witness would not have turned the scale in 
the minds of the jury. 
It h also argued that the 11lmanac, having 
been brought forward at so late a staice in 
the case, deprived thti plaintilf below of the 
bt>nefit of an argument upon it by one of her 
con nsel. Hut in this respect it was like any 
other argument or illustration which counsel 
may make towards thti end of a cnse. If it 
has not been auticipatt>d, it is a surprise, and 
that is a risk which parties must encounter 
ln every case. If counsel had run the cal-
:mlation back himself. so as to show that that 
~ay was Sunday, no one could have ques· 
tioned his right to do so. His refereucc to 
the almanac was no more than a refrren<"e to 
the multiplication table. as a labor·saving 
mode of refreshing 01· cunllrming knowledge 
le11ally presumed to be in everyb1•dy's mind. 
This kind of surprise is one of the dangers 
incident to every contest, and lhe only rt>lief 
against it is the discretion of thA jndge, where 
the new matter or new view may lead to sub-
stantial injustice, and is such as could not 
reascnabl.v have been foreseen, to allow au 
opportunity of reply, or subsequently to gorant 
a new trial. Judgment reversed, and ve1ifrtt 
de novo awarded. 
HANDWRITING.
[Case No. 77
BEVAN v. ATLANTA NAT. BANK.
(31 N. E. GT9, 142 Ill. 302.)
June 17, 1892.
Appeal from appellate court. Third dis-
trict.
Assumpsit by the Atlanta National Bank
against John L. Bevan. administrator of the
estate of Alice Williams, deceased, upon a
promissory note. Plaintiff obtained judg-
ment, which was afiirmed by the appellate
court. Defendant appeals. Reversed.
Beach & Hodnett, for appellant. F. L.
Capps and Biinn & Hoblit, for appellee.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
PER CURIAM. This is an action of as-
sumpsit brought by the Atlanta National
Bank against John L. Bevan, administrator
of the estate of Alice Williams, deceased, up-
on a promissory note for $1,000, which pur-
ported to be executed by C. E. Pratt and
Alice Williams. To the declaration the de-
fendant pleaded the general issue sworn to,
and upon a trial the plaintiff recovered a.
judgment for the amount due on the note,
which judgment was aflirmed in the appel-
late court. No complaint is made against
the decision oi.‘ the court in instructions, but
it is claimed that the court erred in its rul-
ings in the admission and exclusion of evi-
dence, and upon this ground it is insisted
that the judgment is erroneous. The note in
controversy bears date May 1, 1883. payable
60 days after date, to the order of Atlanta
National Bank, signed, "C.E. Pratt, Alice Wil-
liams." No question was raised in regard to
the execution of the note by Pratt, but, as to
the execution of the instrument by Alice
Williams, on the one hand it is claimed by
plaintiff that the note contains her genuine
signature, while on the other hand the ’de-
fendant, the administrator of her estate,
claims that the signature of Alice Williams
to the note is a forgery.
Stephen A. I\‘ole_v, a witness for the plain-
tiff, testified, against the objection of the de-
fendant, that he had a conversation with
Alice Williams at Atlanta in July or August,
1888, which was, in substance, as follows:
“We were talking about family affairs, and
finally we came to Charlie, and I asked her
if she thought that she would be likely to
lose anything by Charlie. I meant Charles
E. Pratt. She said she would not. She did
not think she should. Charlie had been very
good to her, even better than her own chil-
dren. She said to me, ‘You know I have
assisted Charlie, and I don't think I will
ever lose anything by it.’ " It ls claimed that
the testimony has no reference to the note,
and hence is inadmissible. It is true that the
note was not mentioned, but it was proper
to show the relation existing between the
two parties; also that Mrs. Williams had as-
sisted Pratt, and that she did not anticipate
any loss on account of the assistance ren-
wn.ous,nv.-15
'I1(-BSSI
dered; and it was for the jury to determine
whether the assistance she had rendered had
reference to the note or to some other trans-
action. We do not regard the evidence en-
titled to much weight, ‘but, at the same time,
we think it was competent for the considera-
tion of the jury in connection with the other
evidence.
On the trial the plaintiiif called as a wit-
ness Sylvester Hobiit, who testified that he
had seen Alice Williams write, and was ac-
quainted with her signature, and, upon being
shown the note in controversy, he testified
that the signature of Alice Williams was her
genuine signature. On cross-examination
the following questions were asked the wit-
“Question. You may now examine a
note dated Atlanta, Ill., July 14, 188-1, for $50,
and state whether or not that is one 01' the
signatures of Alice Williams that you saw
her make, and upon which you base your
knowledge of her handwriting. (Note shown
to witness, marked ‘No. 3, L. E. W.’) Q.
If there is any difference in the signature of
Alice Williams upon that note and the signa-
ture of Alice Williams on the note in contro-
versy, you may state in what that difference
consists. Q. You may examine the note
shown to you dated October 10, 1884, signed
by Alice Williams, and state whether or not
that is another of the notes you saw her
make, and upon wi1ich you base your knowl-
edge of her signature. (Marked ‘No. 4, L.
E. W.,’ for identification bystenograplier.)
Q. If there is any difference between the sig-
nature of Alice Williams upon the note last
shown you and the signature to the note in
controversy, you may state in what particu-
lar it exists. Q. You may examine the note
shown to you of date June 1, 1885, with the
name of Alice Williams signed to it, and
state if that is another of the notes you saw-
her make, and upon which you base your
knowledge of her signature. Q. If there is
any diflerence between the signature of Alice
Williams upon that note and her signature
upon the note in controversy, you may state
what it is. (Note marked ‘No. 5, L. E. W.,'
by stenographer for identification.) Q. Is it
not true in all of the notes you saw her sign,
and which have been shown to you, and to
which your attention has been called, she
wrote her name ‘Allie Williams?’ Q. Is it
not true that there is a difference between
the signature of Alice Williams on all of
these notes you saw her sign, and to which I
have called your attention, and upon which
you, in whole or in part, base your knowl-
edge of her signature, and the signature of
Alice Williams on the note in controversy?
Q. Is it not true in all the notes you saw her
sign, and to which your attention has been
called here, and upon which you say you
base your knowledge of Alice Williams’
handwriting. she spells her name different
from the way it is spelt in the note in con-
troversy?” The plaintiff objected to the sev-
225
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HANDWRITING. [Case No. 77 
BEV AN v. ATLANTA NAT. BANK. 
(31 N. E. 6i9, 142 lll. 302.) 
Supreme Oourt of Illinois. June 17, 1892. 
Appeal from appellate .court. Third dis-
trict. 
Assumpelt by the Atlanta National Bank 
against John L. Bevan. administrator of the 
estate of Alice Williams, deceased, upon a 
promissory note. Plaintltr obtained judg· 
ment, which was amrmed by the appellate 
court. Defendant appeals. Reversed. 
Beach & Hodnett, for appellant. F. L. 
Capps and Blinn & Hoblit, for appellee. 
PER CURIAM. This Is an action of as-
mmpslt brought by the Atlanta National 
Bank against John L. Bevan, administrator 
of the estate of Alice Williams, deceased, up-
on a proml88ory note for ,1,000, which pur-
ported to be executed by C. E. Pratt and 
Allee Williams. To the declaration the de-
fendant pleaded the general llllue sworn to, 
and upon a trial the plaintiff recovered & 
judgment for the amount due on the note, 
which judgment was afilrmed In the appel-
late court. No complaint le made against 
the decision of the court In Instructions, but 
It Is claimed that the court erred in its rul-
ings In the admission and exclusion of evi-
dence, and upon this ground It le Insisted 
that the judgment Is erroneous. The note in 
controversy bears date May 1, 1888, payable 
00 days after date, to tl:e order of Atlanta 
National Bank, signed, "C. E. Pratt, Alice Wil-
liams." No question was raised In regard to 
the execution of the note by Pratt, but, as to 
the execution of the Instrument by Alice 
Williams, on the one hand It ls claimed by 
plaintiff that the note contains her genuine 
elgnature, while on the other hand the 'de-
fendant, the administrator of her estate. 
claims that the signature of Allee Williams 
to the note le a forgery. 
Stephen A. Foley, a witness for the plaln-
tltr, testified, against the objection of the de-
fendant, that he had a conversation with 
Alice Williams at Atlanta In July or August, 
1888, which was, In su.bstance, as follows: 
"We were talking about family atralrs, and 
finally we came to Charlie, and I asked her 
if she thought that she would be likely to 
lose anything by Charlie. I meant Charles 
E. Pratt. She said she would not. She did 
not think she should. Charlie had been very 
good to her, even better than her own chil-
dren. She snicl to me, 'You know I ha'\"e 
assisted Charlie, and I don't think I will 
ever lose anything by It.'" It Is claimed that 
the testimony has no rererence to the note, 
and hence Is Inadmissible. It Is true that the 
note was not mentioned, but It was proper 
to show the relation existing between the 
two parties; also that Mrs. Willlams bad as-
sisted Pratt, and that she did not antlcipat~ 
any loss on account of the assistance r'el'-
ll'ILOUB,Ev .-15 
dered; and It was for the jury to determine 
whether the assistance she had rendered had 
reference to the note or to some other trans-
action. We do not regard the evidence en-
titled to much weight, but, at the same time, 
we think It wr-s competent for the considera-
tion of the j11r7 In connection with the other 
evidence. 
On the trial the plalntur called as a wlt-
neBB Sylvester Hoblit, who testified that he 
had seen .Alice Wllllams write, and wll8 ac-
quainted with her signature, and, upon being 
shown the note In controversy, be testltled 
that the signature of Allee Williams was her 
genuine signature. On cross-examination 
the following questions were asked the wit· 
·ness: "Question. You may now examine a 
note dated Atlanta, Ill., July 14, 1884, for $j(), 
and state whether or not that Is one of the 
signatures of Alice Williams that you saw 
her make, and upon which you base your 
knowledge of her handwriting. {Note shown 
to witness, marked 'No. 3, L. E. W.') Q. 
· If there Is any dl!rerence In the signature of 
Allee Williams upon that note and the slgna. 
ture of Alice Williams on the note In contro-
versy, you may state In what that dltrerence 
consists. Q. You may examine the note 
shown to you dated October 10, 188-l, signed 
by Alice Williams, and state whether or not 
that Is another of the notes you saw her 
make, and upon which you base your knowl-
edge of her signature. (Marked 'Xo. 4, L. 
E. W.,' for ldentlftcatlon by· stenographer.) 
Q. If there Is any dltrerence between the sig-
nature of Allee Williams upon the note last 
shown you and the signature tq the note In 
controversy, you may state In what particu-
lar It exists. Q. You may examine the note 
shown to you of date June l, 1885, with the 
name of Alice Williams signed to It, and 
state If that Is another of the notes you saw: 
her make, and upon which you base your 
knowledge of her signature. Q. If there la 
any dltrerence between the signature of Alice 
Williams upon that note and her signature 
upon the note In controversy, you may state 
what it Is. (Note marked 'No. 5, L. E. \V.,' 
by stenographer for Identification.) Q. Is It 
not true In all of the notes you ea w her sign, 
and which have been shown to you, and to 
which your attention has been called, she 
wrote her name 'Allie Williams?' Q. Is It 
not true that there ls a mtrerence between 
the signature of Alice Williams on nil of 
these notes you saw her sign, and to which I 
have called your attention, and upon which 
you. in whole or In part, base your knowl-
edge of her signature, and the signature of 
Allee Williams on the note In conh·oyerAy·1 
Q. Is It not tme In all the notes you saw her 
sign, and to which your attention has been 
called here, and upon which you say you 
base your knowledge of Allee Wiiiiams' 
handw1·1ting. she spells her name dl:tlerent 
from the way It Is spelt In the note in C'On· 
troversy?" The plolntl1f objected to the sev-
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eral questions, the court sustained the ob-
jection, and the defendant excepted. Simi-
lar questions were asked other witnesses,
and the court made a like ruling. It was
claimed by the defendant that Mrs. Williams,
in the execution of notes and papers, signed
her name “Allie Williams," while the note
involved was signed “Alice Williams.” Un-
der such circumstances, we are induced to
think the rule of cross-examination adopted
by the court was too restricted. The several
notes which the witnesses had seen Mrs.
Williams execute, upon which they predi-
cated their opinion that the signature to the
note in question was genuine, were produced
and shown the witnesses. Now, if in the
execution of all of these notes Mrs. Williams
made her given name "Allie" instead of
“Alicc," no reason is perceived why it was
not competent to establish such fact on cross-
examination, for the purpose of testing the
soundness of the opinion given by the wit-
nessesthat the signature to the note in ques-
tion was genuine. In many cases, in order
to ascertain the truth and arrive at a. correct
result. it is necessary that considerable lati-
tude be given in the cross-examination of
witnesses in order to test the accuracy of
their evidence. The genuineness of the sig-
natures to the several notes to which the at-
tention of the witness was called was not
in controversy, and the purpose was not to
prove a signature by comparison, but, as
was done in Melvin v. Hodges, 71 Ill. 425, to
test the accuracy of the witness’ opinion or
judgment which had in the direct examina-
tion gone to the jury. If the witnesses call-
ed by the plaintiff to prove that the signa-
ture of Mrs. Williams in the note in ques-
tion predicated their judgment, in whole or
in part, upon signatures to notes they saw
her sign, and the signatures to these notes
differed from the signature in the note in
question, it seems plain that the defendant
had the right to call out that fact in cross-
examination, as it was a fact proper for the
consideration of the jury in determining what
weight they should give to the opinion of the
226
witnesses who gave their opinion that the
note was genuine.
The defendant ofiered in evidence the notes
which were exhibited to the several witness-
cs in cross-examination, but the plaintiif ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection.
and this decision of the court is relied upon
as error. We perceive no ground upon
which the notes were admissible in evidence.
The law is well settled in this state that the
genuineness of a signature to a note or other
instrument in writing cannot be proved or
disproved by comparing it with another sig-
nature, admitted to be genuine. Kernin v.
Hill, 37 lli. 209; Massey v. Bank, 10-1 Ill.
330. It is true that the evidence was not
offered for comparison of hands, but that did
not obviate the difliculty. There are cases
where certain evidence may be competent for
one purpose, but incompetent for another;
but here we do not regard the offered evi-
dence competent for any purpose, and, had it
been admitted, its eflfect on the jury could
not have been other than prejudicial to the
rights of the plaintiff.
Several of the witnesses of the plaintifl
were asked, on cross-examination, whether
they held notes signed by Pratt and Mrs.
Williams. where the genuineness of her sig-
nature was disputed, or were interested in
any bank which held such notes, and the
court excluded the evidence. It is not claim-
ed that the holding of such a note, or having
an interest in the bank which held such a
note, would disqualify the witnesses from
testifying in the case; but the claim is that
the witnesses were interested. and the evi-
dence was competent as affecting their credi-
bility. It is always competent to show, on
cross-examination, that a witness is inter-
ested in the result of the suit; but here the
witnesses had no direct interest in the result
of the suit; the interest, if any, was so re-
mote that we do not regard the ruling of the
court regarding the evidence as erroneous.
For the error indicated the judgment of the
circuit and appellate courts will be reversed,
and the cause remanded.
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eral questions, the court sustained the ob-
jection, and the <lefendant ext·epted. Simi-
lar questions were asked other witnesses, 
and the court made a like rullng. It was 
dnhned by the defendant that Mrs. Wllllams, 
In the execution of notes and papers, signed 
her name "Allie 'Villlams," while the note 
h1voh-ed was slgne<l "Alice Williams." Un-
der such Circumstances, we are induced to 
think the rule of cross·f'xnmlnntion adopted 
by the court was too re8trlcted. The several 
notes which the witnesses bad seen llrs. 
Wiiliams execute, upon which they predl~ 
cated their opinion that the signature to the 
note lo question was genuine, were produced 
and shown the witnesses. Xow, It In the 
execution of all of these notes Mrs. 'Yllllams 
made her given name "Allle" Instead of 
"Alice," no 1·eason ls perceived why It was 
not competent to establish such fact on cross-
examination, tor the purpose of testing tbi! 
soundness of the opinion given by the wit-
nesses ·that the signature to the note In ques-
tion was genuine. In many cases, In order 
to ascertain the truth and arrive at a correct 
result. It ts necessary that considerable lati-
tude be given in the cross-examination of 
witnesses In order to test the accuracy of 
their evidence. The genuineness of the sig-
natures to the several notes to which the at-
tention of the witness was called was not 
in controversy, and the purpose was not to 
prove a signature by comparison, but, as 
was done In :\lelvln v. Hodges, 71 Ill. 425, to 
test the accuracy of the witness' opinion or 
judgment which had in the direct examlnn-
tton gone to the jury. It the witnesses call-
ed by the plaintiff to prove that the slgnn-
ture ot Mrs. Wllllams In the note In que~­
tlon predicated their judgment, In whole or 
In part, upon signatures to notes they saw 
her sign, and the signatures to these notes 
differed from the signature in the note in 
question, It seems plain that the defendant 
bad the right to call out that fact In cross-
examination, as It was a tact proper tor the 
consideration of the jury 1n determining what 
weight they should give to the opinion of the 
226 
witnesses who gave their opinion that the 
note was genuine. 
The defendant offered in evidence the notes 
which were exhibited to the several witness-
es In cross-examination, but the plaintiff ob-
jected, and the court sustained the objection, 
and this decision of the court Is relled upon 
as error. '\Ve perceive no ground upon 
which the notes were admissible In evidence. 
The law ls well settled in this state that the 
genuineness of a signature to a note or other 
instrument In writing cannot be proved or 
disproved by comparing it with another sig-
nature, admitted to be genuine. Kernin v. 
Hill, 37 Ill. 209; Massey v_ Bank, 1().1 Ill. 
330. It ls true that the evidence was not 
offered for comparison of bands, but that dill 
not obviate the dlftlculty. There are cases 
where certain evidence may be competent for 
one purpose, but incompetent for another; 
but here we do not regard the offered evi-
dence competent tor any purpose, and, bad It 
been admitted, its effect on the jury could 
not have been other than prejudicial to the 
rights of the plaintiff. 
Several ot the witnesses ot the plalntltr 
were asked, on cross-examination, whether 
they held notes signed by P1·att and lira. 
Williams, where the genuineness of her sig-
nature was dls1mted, or were interested in 
any bank which held such notes, and the 
court excluded the evidence. It Is not claim-
ed that the holding of such a note, or having 
an Interest 1n the bank which held such a 
note, would dlsquallfy the witnesses from 
testifying In the case; but the claim Is tbnt 
the witnesses were interested, and the evi-
dence was competent as al'f'ecting their credl-
blllty. It ls always competent to show, on 
cross-examination, that a witness ls Inter-
ested in the result of the suit; but here the 
witnesses bad no direct Interest In the result 
of the suit; the Interest, it any, was so re-
mote that we do not regard the ruling of the 
court regarding the evidence as erroneous. 
For the error Indicated the Judgment of the 
circuit and appellate courts will be reversed, 
and the cause remanded. 
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CANFIELD v. JOHNSON et ai.
NEW ENGLAND MONUMENT CO. v.
JOHNSON et al.
(22 Ati. 974, 144 Pa. St. 61.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 5, 1891.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Ti-
oga county; John I. Mitchell, Judge.
Action of assumpsit by (J. B. Caniield, sur-
viving partner of O. B. Canfleld and G. T.
Batterson, doing business as the New Eng-
land Monument Company, against F. A.
Johnson and A. J. Van Dusen, partners as
Johnson & Van Dusen. Judgment for de-
fendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed
The evidence tended to show that the
George Cook Post, G. A. R., determine-l to
erect a monument, and appointed a com-
mittee to select a suitable design, and pro-
cure estimates of the probable cost. Plain-
tifis, through their agent, one Douglass, sub-
mitted a certain design to the comm ttee,
and it was adopted. Afterwards the cym-
ntittee held another meeting for the pu-pose
of receiving bids, at which Douglass was
-also present. Plaintiffs claimed that Doug-
lass, as their agent, entered into an agree-
ment with defendant Johnson, on behalf of
defendants, by which plaintiffs were to al-
low defendants to make the lowest bid for
the erection of the monument, and then that
plaintiffs should make and ship the morn-
ment according to the design furnished by
them, and adopted by the committee, and
defendants were to lay the foundation and
put it up; each party, out of the contract
price between defendants and the committee,
to receive fair pay for the materials fur-
nished and work done by them, respectively,
and to divide any surplus. Defendants pur-
-chased the monument from other persons,
having it made after the design furnished
by plaintiffs, and this action was brought
by plaintiffs to recover one-half of the prof-
its made by defendants.
Stephen F. Wilson, Jerome B. Niles, Aaron
R. Niles, and Alfred J. Niles, for appellants.
G. \V. Merrick. .\i. F. Elliott, and F. E. \Vat-
rous, for appellees.
GREEN, J. The contract in question he-
tween these parties was made with the de-
fendants by an agent of the plaintiffs. On
the trial, the plaintiffs, having examined the
agent who made the contract, and proved by
him its terms, as he had made it, proposed
to prove that he informed them of what he
had done, and that they thereupon accepted
the contract, and undertook to execute it.
’l'his offer of proof was rejected by the
learned court below. It is difficult to under-
stand upon what principle this testimony was
rejected. The contract having been made
through the intervention of an agent, it was
clearly competent to show that the action
of the agent was communicated to his prin-
cipals, and that they accepted and ratified
the contract as he had made it, and that
they undertook to carry it out. It is only
in that way that the assent of both parties
to the contract can be shown, and their will-
ingness to be bound by its terms established.
The first and second assignments are sus-
tained.
The plaintiffs proved by overwhelming tes-
timony that the design (No. 161) for the mon-
ument was adopted by the Grand Army
post and the committee, and that this design
was furnished by the plaintiffs. In the
course of putting in the testimony on this
subject, the plaintiffs offered to prove by
whom the design was prepared, and that no
similar design had been made by others.
This offer was rejected, for the singular rea-
son that no letters patent or copyright of the
design had been taken out by the plaintiffs,
and therefore they had no exclusive owner-
ship therein. We eannot possibly assent to
such a doctrine. Most assuredly, when an
architect prepares a design for a building,
for one who is about to erect such a struc-
ture, he is entitled to be paid for it with-
out being obliged to have it patented or
copyrighted. He would be entitled to com-
pensation for it whether it was accepted or
not, unless he had expressly agreed other-
wise; but certainly, where his design was
accepted and actually used by the party to
whom it was furnished, it would be a per-
version of justice to deny compensation to
the designer because he had no patent or
copyright for his design. In this particular
case, the proof was also admissible because
it tended strongly to corroborate the plain-
tiffs’ claim to having made the contract in
question with the defendants. \Ve therefore
sustain the third assignment, and we also
sustain the tenth, because the narr. counted
as well for compensation for use of the de-
sign as upon the entire contract alleged.
We are quite unable to understand why
the ofiers of testimony covered by the fourth,
fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth assignments
of error were rejected. They related to the
subject of the cost of building the monu-
ment and pedestal upon which it was to
stand, the cost of transporting them to the
place where they were to be erected, and
the cost of setting them up in place. These
were all perfectly legitimate matters of
proof; indeed, absolutely essential in order
to enable the plaintiffs to recover upon their
theory of the case; and the sources of the
proof were those from which the best at-
tainable information could be obtained. The
persons who actually built the monument
which was in reality erected by the defend-
ants, and who shipped the same to the de-
fendants, were not allowed to testify to the
cost of the shipments, though they named
the weight and cost per 100 pounds and the
final amount paid; the persons who partic-
ipated in the transportation of the monu-
ment and pedestal from the place where they
were made to the place where they were set
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BEST EVIDENCE. [Case No. i8 
CANJ!,IELD T. JOHNSON et al. 
NEW ENGLAND MONUMENT 00. 'T; 
JOHNSON et aL 
(22 Atl. 974, 144 Pa. St. 61.) 
'Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 5, 1891. 
Appeal fMm court of common pleas, Ti-
~ga county; .John I. Mitchell, Judge. 
Action of ll.BBumpsit by C. B. Canfield, s1•r-
vlvlng partner of c. B. Canfield and G. T. 
Batterson, doing business as the New .Eng-
land Monument Company, against F. A. 
Johnson and A. J. Van Dusen, partn.~re as 
Johnson & Van Dusen. Judgment lo~ de-
fendants, and plillntllrs appeal. Revel"!K•d. 
The evidence tended to show that the 
George Cook Post, G. A. R., determlm°!'l to 
erect a monument, and appointed a com-
mittee to Belect a suitable design, and pro-
cm·e estimates of the probable cost. l'l11ln-
tllfs, through tl1elr agent, one Douglass, rnb-
mitted a certnln design to the comm ttee, 
.and it was adopted. Afterwards the c Jm-
mlttee held another meeting for the PU"J)()Se 
of receiving bide, at which Douglass was 
also present. Plaintltrs claimed that D?ug-
Iass, as their agent, entered Into an agree-
ment with defendant Johll80n, on behalf of 
defendants, by which plaintltrs were to al-
low defendants to make the lowest bid tor 
the erection of the monument, nod then that 
plalntllrs should make and ship the ruoru-
ment according to the design furnished by 
them, and adopted by the committee, and 
defendants were to lay the foundation and 
11ut It up; each party, out of the contract 
price between defendants and the committee, 
to receive fair pay for the materials fur-
nished and work done by them, respectively, 
and to divide any surplus. Defendants pur-
chased the monument from other persons, 
ha 'l"lng It made after the design furnished 
by phlintltrs, and this action was brought 
by plaintiffs to recover one-halt of the prof-
its made by defendants. 
Stephen I<'. Wilson, Jerome B. Niles, Aaron 
R. Niles, and Alfred J. Niles, for appellants. 
G. W. Merrick, :ll. F. Elllott, and 1',. E. Wat-
l'OWI, for appellees. 
GREEN, J. '.fhe contract In question be-
tween these parties was made with the de-
rendnnts by an agent of the plalnturs. On 
the trial, the plalntltrs, having examined the 
agent who made the contmct, and proved by 
him Its terms, as he bad made it, proposed 
to pro,·e that he informed them of what he 
had done, and that they thereupon accepted 
the contract, and undertook to execute It. 
'fhis otrer of proof was rejected by the 
learned court below. It ls di!Hcult to under-
stand upon what principle this testimony wn11 
rejected. The contract having been made 
through the Intervention of an agent, It was 
clearly competent to 11how thnt the action 
or the agent was communicated to his prln-
elpals, and that they accepted and ratlfted 
the contract as be had made It, and that 
they undertook to carry It out. It Is only 
in that way that the ll88ent of both parties 
to the contract can be shown, and their wlll-
lngneBB to be bound by its terms established. 
The first and second assignments are sus-
tained. 
The plaintiffs proved by overwhelming tes-
timony that the design (No. 161) for the mon-
ument was adopted by the Gmnd Army 
post and the committee, and that this design 
was furnished by tbe plalntltrs. In the 
course of putting In the testimony on this 
subject, the plaint.Ure otrered to prove by 
whom the design wu prepared, and that no 
slmllar design had been made by otherM. 
This otrer was rejected, for the singular rea-
son that no letters patent or copyright of the 
design bad been taken out by the plalntUrs, 
and therefore they had no excluBlve owner-
ship therein. We eannot po881bly assent to 
such a doctrine. Most assuredly, when an 
architect prepares a design for a building, 
for one who Is about to erect such a struc-
ture, he le entitled to be paid tor it with-
out being obliged to have it patented or 
copyrighted. He would be entitled to com-
pensation for It whether it was accepted or 
not, unless he had expreBBly agreed other-
wise; but certainly, where his design was 
accepted and actually used by the party to 
whom It was furnished, it would be a per-
version of justice to deny compen1111.tlon to 
the designer because he bad no patent or 
copyright tor his design. In this particular 
rose, the proof was also a.dmlsstble because 
it tended strongly to corrobomte the plaln-
tllrs' claim to having made the cont1'1lct In 
question with the defendants. We therefore 
sustain the third aselgnment, and we also 
sustain the tenth, because the nalT. counted 
as well for compensation for use of the de-
sign as upon the entire contract alleged. 
We are quite unable to understand why 
the offers of testimony covered by the fourth, 
fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth assignments 
of error were rejected. They related to the 
subject of the cost of building the monu-
ment and pedestal upon which it was to 
stand, the cost of transporting them to the 
place where they were to be erected, and 
the cost ot setting them up lo place. These 
were all perfectly legitimate matters of 
proof; Indeed, absolutely essential In order 
to enable the plalntltrs to recover upon their 
theory of the case; and the sources of the 
proof were those from which the best at-
tainable Information could be obtained. The 
persons who actually built the monument 
which was In reality erected by the defend-
ants, and who shipped the same to the de-
fendants, were not allowed to teetlty to the 
eost of the shipments, though they named 
the weight and eost per 100 pounds and tbe 
final amount paid; the persons who partic-
ipated In the transportation of the monu-
ment and pedestal from the place where they 
were made to the place where they were set 
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up were not allowed to testify to their knowl-
edge upon that subject; the original freight-
bills, containing upon their face the precise
amounts of freight paid, were rejected for
untenable reasons; and the testimony of an
experienced and competent person, having an
extensive, and claiming to have an accurate,
knowledge of the cost of building such mon-
uments and pedestals as the one in question,
and of the cost of removing and transport-
ing them, and of setting them up in place,
was entirely rejected, and the plaintiffs
thereby deprived of the opportunity of prov-
ing the very essential facts of their case.
The objections to these offers were that they
were incompetent and irrelevant. Irrelevant
they certainly were not, because they re-
lated to the very matters in controversy.
They tended to prove directly how much
profit the defendants had made by violating
their alleged contract with the plaintiffs.
Neither were they incompetent, because the
persons and the papers offered were the orig-
inal persons and papers, from whom and
which original and material information
could be obtained. We have examined all
these ofiers of testimony, and the objections
to them, and we are clearly of opinion that
they should have been allowed. The objec-
tion which seems to be chiefly urged to their
admissibility, and which appears to have con-
trolled the court below, is that the offers do
not furnish the precise and exact cost in the
actual dollars and cents paid by the defend-
ants; and it is argued that the plaintiffs
might have called the defendants as witness-
es, and proved by them the precise amounts
paid in each instance, and, as this was the
best evidence, any other testimony was for
that reason incompetent. We cannot avoid
an expression of surprise that uch an objec-
tion should have prevailed. It amounts to
this: that where a plaintiff who claims dam-
ages for the breach of a parol contract for
the division of the profits of a mutual trans-
action seeks to establish his claim, he must
call the defendants to prove the exact
amounts paid by them in the course of the
transaction, on penalty of having all other tes-
timony on that subject rejected. There is no
such rule of evidence. The rule that the best
evidence of a fact must be produced, if it
can be had, has no such meaning. It re-
quires that where two different grades or
qualities of proof exist, that which is the
best shall be adduced, if practicable; as, for
instance, the contents of a writing must be
proved by the production of the writing be-
fore secondary evidence can be given. But
that rule has no application to a choice be-
tween witnesses, where both have legitimate
knowledge of the subject-matter of‘ the in-
quiry. Some may have a better knowledge
than others, but that will not exclude the
knowledge of those who are the less in-
formed. if it is otherwise competent. It is
for the jury to judge of the sutiiciency of the
proof. So, also, the proof oifered by the.
expert testimony of Mr. Douglass was en-
tirely legitimate, and should have been re-
ceived. He had a competent experience to
qualify him for proving the probable cost of
building and transporting the monument and
pedestal, and of setting them up, and there-
fore he was a. competent witness for that
purpose. Even if there were others who
had a better knowledge than he, that would
not exclude his testimony. Least of all
would it be excluded because the defendants
knew exactly what they had paid, and there-
fore would be the only persons who could
testify on that subject. Non constat that
they paid more than they should have paid.
and thus deprive the plaintiffs of more than
their legitimate share of the profits which
might have been made had the defendants
performed their contract literally. The proof
of what the defendants did pay rested with
them, and their right to give such proof was
not at all impaired by admitting the plain-
tiffs‘ offers. After the evidence was all in,
the whole case would be for the decision of
the jury. All of these several assignments
of error are sutained.
The seventh assignment is not sustained.
The mere opinions of the members of the
committee, as to whether there was a con-
tract between the plaintiffs and defendants,
would not be evidence to prove that fact.
\Ve do not agree with the learned court
below in holding that there could not be
a recovery in the action of assumpsit. The
allegations and proof of the plaintiffs were
that the defendants had not carried out the
contract with them.. They had not engaged
in the execution of a contract of partner-
ship, or any contract for their mutual ad-
vantage or profit. On the contrary, they had
proceeded to have the monument and pedes-
tal built and placed exclusively on their own
account, and for their own benefit and ad-
vantage, and had thus violated the contract
which the plaintiffs claimed and gave evi-
dence to prove. In other words, they had
broken the contract of partnership or joint
interest, and therefore no such contract was
performed or executed. In such circumstan-
ces, the injury or breach which gives a legal
remedy is a violation of the contract of part-
nership, and not its execution and conse-
quent partnership liability. Hence a part-
nership bill which lies between persons who
actually are partners, and for the settle-
ment of the partnership accounts. is not the
proper remedy, simply because, although the
defendants agreed to become partners with
the laintiffs in this transaction. in point of
fact hey did not, and hence the relation did
not exist. The action, therefore, must be re-
garded as an action to recover damages for
the breach of a contract to become partners,
and for that purpose the proper remedy
would be an action of assumpsit on the un-
dertaking. But, of course, willie all this is
true, the measure of damages would be in
accordance with the terms of the contract,
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up were not allowed to testify to their knowl-
edge upon that subject; the original frelght-
bllls, containing upon their face the precise 
amount& of freight paid, were rejected for 
untenable reasons; and the testimony of an 
experienced and competent person, having an 
extensive, and claiming to have an accurate, 
knowledge of the coat of building such mon-
uments and pedestals as the one In question. 
and of the cost of removing and transport-
ing them, and of setting them up In place, 
was entirely rejected, and the plalntltrs 
thereby deprived of the opportunity of prov-
ing the very essential facts of their case. 
'.fhe obJectlone to these otrers were that they 
were Incompetent and Irrelevant. Irrelevant 
they certalnly were not, because they re-
lated to the very matters In controversy. 
They tended to prov.e directly how much 
profit the defendants had made by violating 
their alleged contract with the plalntltrs. 
Neither were they Incompetent, because the 
persons and the papers otrered were the orig-
inal persons and papers, from whom and 
which original and material information 
could be obtained. We have examined all 
these offers of testimony, and the objections 
to them, and we are clearly of opinion that 
they should have been allowed. The objec-
tion which seems to be chiefly urged to their 
admlasiblllty, and which appears to have con-
trolled the court below, Is that the otrers do 
not furnish the precise and exact cost in the 
actual dollars and cents paid by the defend-
ants; and it is argued that the plaintiffs 
might have called the defendants as witness-
es, and proved by them the precise amounts 
paid in each instance, and, as this was the 
best evidence, any other testimony was for 
that reason incompetent. We cannot avoid 
an expression of surprise that such an objec-
tion should have prevailed. It amounts to 
this: that where a plaintiff who clalms dam-
ages fo1· the breach of a parol contract for 
the division of the profits of a mutual trans-
action seeks to establish his claim, he must 
call the defendants to prove the exact 
amounts paid by them In the course of the 
transaction, on penalty of ha vlng all other tes-
timony on that subject rejected. There Is no 
such rule of evidence. The rule that the best 
evidence of a fact must be produced, if It 
can be had, has no such meaning. It re-
quires that where two dilterent grades or 
qualities of proof exist, tbat which Is the 
best shall be ad(luc·ed, If practicable; as, for 
instance, the contents of a writing must be 
proved by the production of the writing be-
fore secon<l111·y evldenq~ can be given. But 
that rule lms no application to a choice be-
tween witnes.<1eR, where both have legitimate 
knowledge of the subject-matter of· the In-
quiry. 8ome may lmve a better knowledge 
than others, but that will not exclude the 
knowle1lge of those who are the less in-
formc<l. If It is otherwise competent. It Is 
for the jury to judge of the sut1klency of the 
proof. So, also, the proof offered by the . 
228 
expert testimony of Mr. Douglass was en-
tirely legitimate, and should have been re-
ceived. He had a competent experience to 
qualify him for proving the probable cost of 
bulldlng and transporting the monument and 
pedestal, and of setting them up, and there-
fore he was a competent witness for that 
purpose. Even it there were others who 
had a better knowledge than he, that would 
not exclude his testimony. Least of all 
would It be excluded because the defendants 
knew exactly what they had paid, and there-
fore would be the only pel'80ne who could 
testify on that subject. Non constat that 
they paid more than they should have paid, 
and thus deprive the plalntlfre of more than 
their legitimate share ot the profits which 
might have been made had the defendants 
performed their contract literally. The proof 
of what the defendants did pay rested with 
them, and their ·right to give such proof was 
not at all Impaired by admitting the plain-
tiffs' otrers. After the evidence was all In, 
the whole case would be for the decision of 
the jury. All of these several assignments 
of error are sustained. 
The seventh assignment Is not sustained. 
The mere opinions ot the members of the 
committee, as to whether there was a con-
tract between the plaintltrs and defendants. 
would not be evidence to prove that fact. 
We do not agree with the learned court 
below In holding that there could not be 
a recovery ln the action of assumpslt. The 
allegations and proof of the plaintiffs were 
that the defendants had not carried out the 
contract with them. , They had not engaged 
In the execution of a contract of partner-
ship, or any contract for their mutual ad-
vantage or profit. On the contrary, they had 
proceeded to have the monument and pedes-
tal built and placed exclusively on their own 
account, and for their own benefit and ad· 
vantage, and had thus violated the contract 
which the plaintiffs claimed and gave evi-
dence to prove. In other words, they had 
broken the contract of partnership or joint 
Interest, and therefore no such contract was 
performed or executed. In such clrcmnstan-
ces, the Injury or breach which gives a legal 
remedy ls a violation of the contract of part-
nership, and not Its execution and conse-
quent partnership liability. Hence a part-
nership blll which Iles between persons who 
actually are partners, and for the settle-
ment ot the partnership accounts. Is not the 
proper remedy, simply because, although the 
defendants agreed to become partners with 
the JJlalutlffs In this trallBll<'tlon. In point of 
faC't lhey did not, and hence the relation did 
not exist. The action, therefore, must be re-
ga1·ded as an a('tion to recover dnmages for 
the brench of a contract to be(•ome partnerio:, 
and for that purpose the proper remedy 
would be an action of assurupsit on the uu-
de1·taking. But, of course, while all this Is 
true, the measure of damages would be in 
accordance with the terms of the contract, 
BEST EVIDENCE.
[Case No. 78
to-wit, one-half of the profits which the de-
fendants did make, or ought to have made,
in doing the work in question. Hence it was
quite legitimate for the plalntifls to claim
in the narr., and to prove on the trial, that
they were entitled to have the one-half of
those profits from the defendants, and to
give evidence as to what those profits were
or should have been. Moreover, as this was
a single transaction, without any complicated
accounts to adjust, we would incline to hold,
were it necessary to do so, that the case
came properly within the somewhat numer-
ous decision of this court, in which it is
held that, where the transaction is single,
without complicated accounts, and there are
no debts to be adjusted, a bill in equity is
not necessary for the settlement of the ac-
counts, but an action of assumpsit will lie.
instances o this are to be found in Wright
v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. St. 103; Cleveland v.
Fararr, 4 Brewst. 27; Gaibreath v. Moore,
2 Watts, 86; Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. St.
336. It ls not necessary to rest the decision
of the present case upon this principle, how-
ever, as we regard the proceeding as an ac-
tion to recover damages for the breach of a
contract to enter into a. partnership or joint
relation, and not as a proceeding to settle
partnership accounts. The eleventh assign-
ment is sustained.
While it may be that there was not suf-
ficient evidence to show what the profits
made by the defendants were, that result
was largely due to the rejection by the court
of the plaintiffs’ offers of testimony, and the
plaintiffs could not fairly be held responsible
therefor. Technically, therefore, the defend-
ants’ _second point may have been correctly
answered, in view of the actual state of the
admitted testimony, and for that reason only
we do not sustain the twelfth assignment.
The thirteenth assignment is sustained be-
cause we do not agree with the learned court
below in holding that there was no evidence
that Van Dusen had any knowledge of the
contract made by Johnson, and that Johnson
had no authority to bind the firm by such
a contract as is alleged by the plaintiffs. It
was a contract fairly in the line of their busi-
ness, and therefore within the authority of
a. partner. Moreover, Johnson, as a partner,
was the authorized agent of the firm for
the making of contracts within the scope
of the firm's business, and we are of opinion
that this contract was within that class. In
addition to this, however, the letter of Jan-
uary 18, 1886, to Douglass, signed by the
‘firm name, and in direct answer to the one
written by Douglass to the defendants on
January 13th, just preceding, would be quite
suflicient to take this question of Van Du-
sen’s knowledge to the jury. The letter of
the firm to Douglass, of November 28, 1885,
is in the same category of testimony. But
it would require a most violent presumption,
against all the probabilities of the case,
to declare that Van Dusen had no knowledge
of the contract made by Johnson with the
plaintiffs, and we do not consider that the
court had any right to make such a presump-
tion as a matter of law. It was for the jury
at the best, and there were plenty of facts
and circumstances in the case to enable the
plaintiffs to challenge the correctness of any
such presumption by the Jury. A matter
much discussed by the counsel for the de-
fendants was the legality of the contract
made, or alleged to have been made, by the
plalntiifs with the defendants. It was de-
cided against the defendants by the court
below, and is not before us. We therefore
do not consider it, but that circumstance
must not be taken as a concession that there
was error in the court’s ruling on that sub-
ject. While there was perhaps some evi-
dence that the defendanis had made profit out
of their work, it was scarcely specific enough,
or complete enough, to leave to the jury, and
we therefore do not sustain the fourteenth
assignment. The fault, however, was due
to the improper rejection of the plaintiffs’
offers of proof, and they cannot be regarded
as responsible for the insuificiency of the
proof. Judgment reversed, and new venire
awarded.
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BEST .EVIDENCE. [Case No. 7~ 
to-wit, one-half of the proft.t.s which the de-
fendants did make, or ought to have made, 
in doing the work In question. Hence 1t was 
quite legitimate for the plalntllfs to claim 
In the narr., and to prove on the trial, that 
they were entitled to have the one-half of 
those proftts from the defendants, and to 
give evidence as to what those proftts were 
or should have been. Moreover, as this was 
a single transaction, without any complicated 
a('('()unts to adjust, we would Incline to hold, 
were It necessary to do so, that the case 
eame properly within the somewhat numer-
ous deeildons of this court, In which it Is 
held that, where the transaction Is single, 
without compli<'ated accounts, and there are 
no debts to be adjusted, a bill In equity Is 
not necessary for the settlement of the ac-
counts, but an action of assumpMlt will lie. 
Instances oJ this are to be found In Wright 
v. Cum1J11ty, 41 Pa. St. 103; Cleveland v. 
Farnrr, 4 Brewst. 27; Galbreath v. l\loore, 
2 Watts, 86; Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. St. 
336. It Is not necessary to rest the decision 
of the present case upon this principle, how-
ever, as we regard the proceeding as an ac-
tion to recover damages for the breach of a 
rontt·act to enter Into a partnership or joint 
rein tlon, and not as a proceeding to settle 
partnership accounts. The eleventh assign-
ment Is sustained. 
While It may be that there was not suf-
ftctent evidence to show what the profits 
made by the defendants were, that result 
was largely due to the rejection by the court 
of the plnlntltfs' offers of testimony, and the 
plalnttrrs could not fairly be held responsible 
therefor. Tl'Chnlcally, therefore, the defend-
ants' .second point may have been con·ectly 
ans,vered, In view of the actual state of the 
admitted testimony, and tor that reason only 
we do not sustain the twelfth assignment. 
The thirteenth assignment Is sustained be-
cause we do not agree with the learned court 
below In holding that there was no evidence 
that Van Dusen had any knowledge of the 
contract made by Johnson, and that Johnson 
had no authority to bind the firm by such 
a contract as ls alleged by the plalntltrs. It 
was a contract fairly ln the line of thelr busi-
ness, and therefore within the authority of 
a partner. Moreover, Johnson, as a partner, 
was the autho.rlzed agent of the firm for 
the making of contract.s within the scope 
of the firm's business, and we are of opinion 
that this contract was within that class. In 
addition to this, however, the letter of Jan-
uary 18, 1886, to Douglass, signed by the 
'firm name, and in direct answer to the one 
written by Douglass to the defendants on 
January 13th, just preceding, would be quite 
sufticlent to take this question ot Van Du-
sen's knowledge to the jury. The letter of 
the firm to Douglass, of November 28, 18&3, 
Is In the same category of testimony. But 
It would require a most violent presumption, 
against nil the probabilities of the case, 
to deelare that Van Dusen had no knowledge 
of the contract made by Johnson with the 
plalntltrs, and we do not consider that the 
court bad any right to make such a presump-
tion as a matter of law. It was for the jury 
at the best, and there were plenty of facts 
and circumstances In the case to enable the 
plalntltrs to challenge the correctness of any 
such presumption by the Jury. A matter 
much discussed by the counsel for the de-
fendant.s was the legality of the contract 
made, or alleged to have been made, by the 
plaintiffs with the defendants. It was de-
clde<l against the detendant.s by the court 
below, and Is not before us. We therefore 
do not consider It, but that circumstance 
must not be taken as a concession that there 
was error In the court's ruling on that sub-
ject. While there was perhaps some evi-
dence that the defendants had made profit out 
of their work, It was scarcely specific enough, 
or complete enough, to leave to the jury, and 
we therefore do not sustain the fourteenth 
assignment. The fault, however, was due 
to the Improper rejection of the plaintiffs' 
offers of proof, and they cannot be regarded 
as responsible for the lnsufticlency of the 
proof. Judgment reversed, and new venlre 
awarded. 
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Case No. 79]
PROOF.
GADY v. STATE.
(3 South. 429, 83 Ala. 51.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 6, 1888.
Appeal from criminal court, Jefferson coun-
ty; S. E. Greene, Judge.
Indictment for embezzlement.
The indictment in this case charged, in a
single count, that the defendant, Ada Gady,
“did embezzle, or fraudulently convert to her
own use, or fraudulenly secrete with intent
to convert to her own use, eighty dollars in
money, consisting of ten-dollar bills and twen-
ty-dollar bills, currency of the United States
of America, a more particular description of
which money is unknown to the grand jury;
which said money was deposited with said
Ada Gady by Charles Reed, the property of
said Charles Reed, of the value of eighty dol-
lars, and which the said Ada Gady received
as the bailee of said Charles Reed." A trial
was had on issue joined on the plea of not
guilty, which resulted in a verdict of guilty
as charged, the value of the money embez-
zled being assessed at $60. A motion in ar-
rest of judgment was made, on the ground
that the indictment “charges no oi'fense,—is
too uncertain in the description of the money
alleged to have been embezzled;” which mo-
tion was overruled. “On the trial,” as the bill
of exceptions states, “the testimony for the
state tended to prove that, about two months
before the finding of the indictment in this
case, Charles Reed, the prosecutor in this
case, gave to the defendant seventy dollars in
money, to be safely kept by her, and to be re-
turned to him when demanded; that this
occurred in said county of Jefierson; that de-
fendant returned but ten dollars of said mon-
ey to said Reed, and had never paid the bal-
ance, although often demanded by him to
do so, but had embezzled the same. Said
Reed, the witness, could neither read nor
write, did not know what kind of money he
had delivered to the defendant, and could not
tell the jury whether it was French or Span-
ish money, or currency of the United States
of America. The solicitor handed the witness
a ten-dollar bill, which he stated was a na-
tlonal bank-bill of the United States, and ask-
ed the witness if it looked like the money he
gave the defendant; and the witness answer-
ed that it looked like the money he delivered
to the defendant. To this question and an-.
swer, each, the defendant duly objected and
excepted. The defendant, then being exam-
ined as a Witness, stated that she got sixty
dollars in greenbacks from said Reed. This
was, substantially all the evidence in the case.
The defendant thereupon asked the court to
230
charge the jury that they must find a verdict
of not guilty, if they believed the evidence."
The court refused this charge, and the defend-
ant excepted.
W. J’. Callahan, for appellant. Thos. N. Mc-
Clellan, Atty. Gen., for the State.
SOMERVILLE, J . 1. The amended return,
made in response to the certiorari issued from
this court, shows that the grand jury was
regularly organized and impaneied in accord-
ance with the requirements of the statute.
This obviates the objection in this particular
based on the original imperfect record, con-
ceding that the objection was well founded.
2. The judgment of the court sentencing the
defendant to hard labor to satisfy the costs
was perfectly certain, the number of days of
imprisonment being specified, as well as the
amount of the costs. In this respect it was
more full and definite than the judgment of
sentence in Hill v. State, 78 Ala. 1, and other
cases there cited.
3. The indictment was good without aver-
ring that the money alleged to have been
stolen was of any particular value. It being
averred to be “currency of the United States
of America," the court judicially knows that
the bills, as matter of law, were prima facie
of a commercial value equal to that imported
by their face. This obviated the necessity of
either allegation or proof of such value.
Sands v. State, 80 Ala. 201; Whart. Cr. Pl.
(8th Ed.) §§ 216, 218; Duvall v. State, 63 Ala.
12; Grant v. State, 55 Ala. 201.
4. The evidence tended to show that the
money alleged to have been stolen was “green-
backs,” and this was no variance from the
description given in the indictment. Levy v.
State, 79 Ala. 259; Duvall v. State, 63 Ala.
12.
5. The testimony of the witness Reed, that
the money stolen from him “looked like" the
ten-dollar bill exhibited by the solicitor to
him, in presence of the jury, was relevant as
a mode of identification. As the witness could
neither read nor write, he could testify to
nothing more satisfactory than mere appear-
ance or resemblance. The weight of such
testimony was for the jury to determine.
This testimony was competent whether the
bill exhibited was proved to be United States
currency or not.
6. The evidence tended to prove the d<.~
fendant’s guilt, as charged in the indictment,
and this fact authorized the refusal of the
general charge asked in behalf of the defend-
ant.
The judgment of conviction is afiirmed.
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Case No. 71.l] PROOF. 
GADY v. STATE. 
(3 South. 429, 83 Ala. 51.) 
Supreme Court of Alabama. Jan. 6, 1888. 
Appeal from criminal court, Jefferson coun-
ty; S. E. Greene, Judge. 
Indictment for embezzlement. 
The Indictment In this case charged, In a 
single count, that the defendant, Ada Gady, 
"did embezzle, or fraudulently convert to her 
own use, or fraudulenly secrete with Intent 
to convert to her own use, eighty dollars In 
money, consisting of ten-dollar bills and twen-
ty-dollar bills, currency of the United States 
of America, a more particular description of 
which money Is unknown to the grand jury; 
which said money was deposited with said 
Ada Gady by Charles Reed, the property of 
said Charles Reed, of the value of eighty dol-
lars, and which the said Ada Gady received 
as the bailee of said Charles Reed." A trial 
was had on Issue joined on the plea of not 
guilty, which resulted In a verdict of guilty 
as charged, the value of the money embez-
zled being assessed at $60. A motion In ar-
rest of judgment was made, on the ground 
that the indictment "charges no otrense,-ls 
too uncertain In the description of the money 
alleged to have been embezzled;" which mo-
tion was overruled. "On the trial," as the bill 
of exceptions states, "the testimony for the 
state tended to prove that, about two months 
before the finding of the Indictment In this 
case, Charles Reed, the prosecutor ID this 
case. gave to the defendant seventy dollars In 
money, to be snfely kept by her, and to be re-
turned to him when demanded; that this 
occurred In said county of Jetrerson; that de-
fendant returned but ten dollars of said mon-
ey to said Reed, and had never paid the bal-
ance, although often demanded by him to 
do so, but bad embezzled the same. Said 
Reed, the witness, could neither read nor 
write, did not know what kind -0f money he 
had delivered to the defendant, and could not 
tell the jury whether It was French or Span-
ish money, or currency of the United States 
-0f America. The solicitor handed the witness 
a ten-dollar bill, which he stated was a na-
tional bank-blll of the United States, and ask-
ed the witness If It looked Ilk" the money he 
Jtave the defendant; and the witness answer-
ed that It looked like the money he delivered 
to the defendant. To this question and an-. 
swer, each, the defendant duly objected and 
excepted. The defendant, then being exam-
lnoo as a wltnE>ss, stated that she got sixty 
dollars In greenbacks from said Reed. This 
was, suhstantlally all the evidence In the C8Se. 
The defendant thereupon asked the court to 
230 
charge the jury that they must find a verdict 
of not guilty, If they believed the evidence." 
The court refused this charge, and the defend-
ant excepted. 
W. J. Callahan, for appellant. Thos. N. Mc-
Clellan, Atty. Gen., for the State. 
SOMERVILLE, J. 1. The amended return. 
made In response to the certiorari Issued from 
this court, shows that the grand jury was. 
regularly organized and Impaneled in accord-
ance with the requirements of the statute. 
This obviates the objection In this particular 
based on the original Imperfect record, con-
ceding that the objection was well founded. 
2. The judgment of the court sentencing the 
detendant to bard labor to satisfy the costs 
was perfectly certain, the number of days ot 
imprisonment being specified, as well a,s the 
amount ot the costs. In this relpect It was 
more full and definite than the judgment of 
sentence in Hiil v. State, 78 Ala. 1, and other 
cases there cited. 
3. Tbe Indictment was good without aver-
ring that the money alleged to have been 
stolen was of any particular value. It being 
averred to be "currency of the United States 
of America," the court judicially knows that 
the bills, as matter of law, were prime facle 
of a commercial value equal to that Imported 
by their face. Tbis obviated the necessity o! 
either allegation or proof of such value. 
Sands v. State, 80 Ala. 201; Whart. Cr. Pl. 
(8th Ed.) §§ 216, 218; Duvall v. State, 63 Ala. 
12; Grant v. State, 55 Ala. 201. 
4. The evidence tended to show that the 
money alleged to have been stolen was "green-
backs," and this was no variance from the 
description given in the Indictment. Levy v. 
State, 79 Ala. 259; Duvall v. State, 63 Ala.. 
12. 
5. The testimony of the witness Reed, that 
the money stolen from him "looked like" the 
ten-dollar blll exhibited by the solicitor t<> 
him, In presence of the jury, was relevant as 
a mode of identification. As the witness could 
neither read nor write, he could testify to 
nothing more satisfactory than mere appear-
ance or resemblance. The weight of such 
testimony was for the jury to determine. 
This testimony was competent whether the 
blll exhibited was proved to be United States 
currency or not. 
6. The evidence tended to prove the d~ 
fendant's guilt, as charged In the Indictment, 
and this fact authorized the refusal of the 
general charge asked In behalf of the defend-
ant. 
The judgment of conviction le amrmed. 
JUD l CIAL N O'1‘ICE.
[Case No. 60
HANLEY et al. v. DO.\'OGHUI<J.
(6 Sup. Ct. 242, 116 U. S. 1.)
Supreme Court of the United States.
1885.
In error to the court of appeals of the
state of Maryland.
F. J. Brown, for plaintiifs in error. E. G.
Eichelberger, for defendant in error.
Dec. 14,
GRAY, J. This was an action brought
by Michael Hanley and William F. \Velch
against Charles Donoghue in the circuit
court for Baltimore county in the state of
Maryland upon a judgment for $2,000 re-
covered by the plaintiffs on June 4, 1877,
in an action of covenant against the de-
fendant, Charles Donoghue, together with
one John Donoghue, in the court of com-
nion pleas of Washington county in the state
of Peiinsylvania, and there recorded. The
declaration contained three counts. The first
count set forth the recovery and record of the
judgment as aforesaid in said court of com-
mon pleas, and alleged that it was still in
force and unreversed. The second count con-
talned similar allegations, and also alleged
that in the former action Charles Donoghue
was summoned, and property of John Donog-
hue was attached by process of foreign at-
tachment, but he was never summoned, and
never appeared, and that the proceedings
in that action were duly recorded in that
court. The third count repeated the al-
legations of the second count, and further
alleged that “by the law and practice of
Pennsylvania the judgment so rendered
against the two defendants aforesaid is in
that state valid and enforceable against
Charles Donoghue, and void as against John
Donoghue," and that, "by the law of Penn-
sylvania, any appeal from the judgment so
renlered to the supreme court of Pennsyl-
vania (which is the only court having juris-
diction of appeals from the said court of
common pleas) is required to be made with-
in two years of the rendition of the judg-
ment; neverthelcss no appeal has ever been
taken from the» judgment so rendered
against the said defendants, or either of
them.” The defendant filed a general de-
murrer to each and all of the counts, which
was sustained, and a general judgment
rendered for him. Upon appeal by the
plaintiffs to the court of appeals of the
state of Maryland, the judgment was af-
firmed. 59 Md. 239. The plaintiffs there-
upon sued out this writ of error on the
ground that the decision was against a
right and privilege set up and claimed by
them under the constitution and laws of
the United States.
The question presented by this writ of
error is whether the judgment of the court
of appeals of the state of Maryland has
denied to the plaintiffs a right and privi-
lege to which they are entitled under the
first section of the fourth article of the con-
stitution of the Unitcd States, which de-
clares that “full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the public acts, rec-
ords, and judicial proceedings of every
other state; and the congress may by gen-
eral laws prescribe the manner in which
such acts, records, and proceedings shall be
proved and the efiect thereof;" and under
section 905 of the Revised Statutes, which
re-enacts the act of May 26, 1790, c. 11, (1
Stat. 122,) and prescribes the manner in
which the records and judicial proceedings
of the courts of any state shall be authenti-
cated and proved, and enacts that “the said
records and judicial proceedings, so authen-
ticated, shall have such faith and credit giv-
en to them in every court within the United
States as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the state from which they are
taken."
By the settled construction of these pro-
visions of the constitution and statutes of
the United States, a judgment of a state
court, in a cause within its jurisdiction, and
against a defendant lawfully summoned,
or against lawfully attached property of
an absent defendant, is entitled to as much
force and effect against the person sum-
moned or the property attached, when the
question is presented for decision in a court
of another state, as it has in the state in
which it was rendered. Maxwell v. Stew-
art, 22 Wall. 77; Insurance Co. v. Harris,
97 U. S. 331; Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall.
139; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308. Anld
it is within the power of the legislature of
a state to enact that judgments which shall
be rendered in its courts in actions against
joint defendants, one of whom has not been
duly served with process, shall be valid as
to those who have been so served, or who
have appeared in the action. Mason v.
Eldred, 6 Wall. 231; Eldred v. Bank, 17
Wall. 545; Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160,
168; Sawin v. Kenny, 93 U. S. 289.
Much of the argument at the bar was de-
voted to the discussion of questions which
the view that We take of this case ren-
ders it unnecessary to consider; such as
the proper manner of impeaching or avoid-
ing judgments in the state in which they are
rendered, for want of due service of process
upon one or all of the defendants; or the
effect which a judgment rendered in one
state against two joint defendants, one of
whom has been duly summoned and the oth-
er has not, should be allowed against the
former in the courts of another state, with-
out allegation or proof of the eifect which
such a judgment has against him by the
law of the first state. No court is to be
charged with the knowledge of foreign laws;
but they are well understood to be facts
which must, like other facts, be proved be-
fore they can be received in a court of jus-
tice. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 38;
Church v. Hnbbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 236;
Strother v. Lucas, 6 Pet. 763, 768; Daiuese
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HANLEY et al. T. DO~OGHUE. 
(6 Sup. Ct. 242, 116 U. S. 1.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 14, 
1885. 
In error to the court of appeals of the 
state of Maryland. 
F. J. Brown, for plalntltfa 1n error. E. O. 
Eichelberger, for defendant In error. 
GRAY, J. Thla was an action brought 
by Michael Hanley and Wllllam F. Welch 
against Charles Donoghue in the circuit 
court for Baltimore county In the state of 
Maryland UI>Qn a judgment for $2,000 re-
covered by the plalntltra on June 4, 1877, 
1n au action of covenant against the de-
fendant, Charles Donoghue, together with 
one John Donoghue, 1n the court of com-
mo11 pleas of Washington county in the state 
of l'enni;ylvanla, a11d thf're recorded. The 
declaration contained three counts. The first 
t'(>Unt set forth the recovery aud record of the 
judgment as aforesaid In said court of com-
mon pleas, and alleged that It was atlll in 
force and unreversed. The second count con-
talned similar allegations, and also alleged 
that 1n the former action Charles Donoghue 
was summoned, and property of John Donog-
hue was attached by process of foreign at-
tachment, but he was never summoned, and 
never appeared, and that the proceedings 
in that action were duly recorded in that 
court. The third count repeated the al-
legations of the second count, and further 
alleged that "by the law and practice of 
Pennsylvania the judgme11t so rendered 
ag11.lnst the two defendants aforesaid la ln 
that state valid and enforceable agalnst 
Charles Donoghue, and Yold as against John 
Donoghue," and that, "by the law of Penn-
sylvania, any appeal from the judgment so 
renlered to the supreme court of Pennsyl-
vania (which ls the only court having juris-
diction of appeals from the said court of 
common pleas) is required to be made with· 
1n two years of the rendition of the judg· 
ment; nevertheless no appeal has ever been 
taken from the. judgment so rendered 
against the said dcfendants, or either of 
them." The defendant filed a general de-
murrer to each and all of the counts, which 
was sustained, and a general judgmeut 
rendered for him. Upon appeal by the 
plaintiffs to the court of nppenls of the 
state of Maryland, the judgment was af-
firmed. 59 Md. 239. The plalntltrs there-
upon sued out this writ of error on the 
ground that the decision was against a 
right and privilege set up nud claimed by 
them under the constitution and laws of 
the United States. 
'l'he question presented by this writ of 
error Is whether the judgment of the court 
of appeals of the state of ~laryland has 
denied to the plaintiffs a right and privi-
lege to which they are entitled under the 
ft.rat section of the fourth article ot the con-
stltution of the Unit<.'d States, which de-
clares that "full faith and credit shall be 
given In each state to the public acts, rec-
ords, and judicial proceedings of every 
other state; and the congress may by gen-
eral laws prescribe the manner 1n which 
such acts, records, and proceedings shall be 
proved and the etrect thereof;" and under 
section 905 of the Revised Statutes, which 
re-enacts the act of :May 26, 1700, c. 11, (1 
Stat. 122,) and prescribes the manner ln 
which the records and judlclal proceedings 
of the courts of any state shall be authenti· 
cated and proved, and enacts that "the said 
records and judicial proceedings, so authen-
ticated, shall have such faith and credit giv-
en to them In every court wlthln tl1e United 
States as they have by law or usage ln the 
courts of the state from which they are 
taken." 
By the settled construction of these pro· 
visions of the constltutlon and statutes of 
the United States, a judgment of a state 
court, In a cause within Its jurlsdlctlon, and 
against a defendant lawfully summoned, 
or against lawfully attached property of 
au absent defendant, ls entitled to as much 
force and effect against the person sum· 
m'>ned or the property attached, when the 
question ls presented for declslon ln a court 
of another state, as lt has In the state In 
which It was rendered. Ma..xwell v. Stew-
art, 22 'Vall. 77; Insurance Co. v. Harris, 
07 U. S. 3.31; Green v. Yan Buskirk, 7 Wall. 
139; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308. And 
It ls within the power of the legislature of 
a state to enact that judgments which shall 
be rendered In Its com-ts ln actions against 
joint defendants, one of whom has not been 
duly served with process, shall be valld as 
to those who have been so serYed, or who 
have appeared In the action. :Mason v. 
Eldred, 6 Wall. 231; Eldred v. Bank, 17 
Wall. 545; Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 100, 
168; Sawin v. Kenny, 93 U. S. 2SD. 
l\Iuch of the argument at the bar wns de-
voted to the dlscusslon of questions which 
the view that we take of thla case ren· 
ders lt unnecessary to consider; such as 
the proper manner of impeaching or avoid· 
Ing judgments In the state In which they are 
rendered, for want of due service of process 
upon one or all of the defendants; or the 
effect which a judgment rendered 1n one 
state against two joint defendants, one of 
whom has been duly summoned and the oth· 
er has not, should be allowed against the 
former ln the courts of another state, with· 
out allegation or proof of the eiTect whkh 
such a judgment has against him by the 
law of the first state. No court ls to ba 
charged with the knowledi:e of foreign laws; 
but thc:>y are well understood to be facts 
which must, llke other facts, be proYed be-
fore they can be rc:>ceived In u court of jus-
tiC'e. Tnlbot v. ~eeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 38; 
Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 230; 
Strother v. Lucas, 6 Pet. 763, 768; Dalnr:-ie 
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v. Hale, 91 U. S. 13, 20. It is equally well
settled that the several states of the Union
are to be considered as in this respect for-
eign to each other, and that the courts of
one state are not presumed to know, and
therefore not bound to take judicial notice
01', the laws of another state. In Buckner
v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586, in which it was held
that bills of exchange drawn in one of the
states on persons living in another were for-
eign bills, it was said by Mr. Justice Wash-
ington, delivering the unnnimou opinion of
this court: “For all national purposes em-
braced by the federal constitution the states
and the citizens thereof are one, united un-
der the same sovereign autliority. and gov-
erned by the same laws. In all other re-
spects the states are necessarily foreign to
and independent of each other; their consti-
tutions and forms of government being, al-
though republican. altogether diiferent, as
are their laws and institutions.” 2 Pet. 590.
Judgments recovered in one state of the
Union, when proved in the courts of anoth-
er, difl’er from judgments recovered in a for-
eign country in no other respect than that
of not being re-examinable upon the merits,
nor impeachable for fraud in obtaining
them, if rendered by a court having juris-
diction of the cause and of the parties.
Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 592; 1\IeElmoyle v.
Cohen. 13 Pet. 312, 324; D'Arcy v. Ketchum,
11 How. 165, 176; Christmas v. Russell, 5
Wall. 290. 30.'>;Thou1pson v. Whitman, 18
Wall. -I37. Congress, in the execution of the
power conferred upon it by the constitution,
having prescribed the mode of attestation
of records of the court of one state to enti-
tie them to be proved in the courts of anoth-
er state. and having enacted that records so
authenticated shall have such faith and
credit in every court within the United
States as they have by law or usage in the
state from which they are taken, a record
of a judgment so authenticated doubtless
proves itself without further evidence; and
' if it appears upon its face to be a record of
a court of general jurisdiction, the jurisdic-
tion of the court over the cause and the par-
ties is to be presumed, unless disproved by
extrinsic evidence or by the record itself.
Knowles v. Gas-Light & Coke Co., 19 Wall.
58; Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U. S. 4-14. But
congress has not undertaken to prescribe in
what manner the effect that such judgments
have in the courts of the state in which they
are rendered shall be ascertained, and has
left that to be regulated by the general rules
of pleading and evidence applicable to the
subject.
Upon principle. therefore, and according to
the great preponderance of authority (as ls I
shown by the cases collected in the mar-
gin 1). whenever it becomes necessary for
1 Scott v. Coleman. 5 Litt. 349; Thomas v.
Robinson, 3 \\'en<i. 267: Sheldon v. Hopkins,
7 Wend. 43-3; Van Buskirk v. Muiock, 18 X.
a court of one state, in order to give full
faith and credit to a judgment rendered in‘
another state, to ascertain the effect which
it has in that state, the law of that state
must be proved, like any other matter of
fact. The opposing decisions in Ohio v.
Hinchman, 27 Pa. St. 479, and Paine v. Sche-
nectady Ins. Co., 11 R. I. 411, are based up-
on the misapprehension that this court, on
a. writ of error to review a decision of the
highest court of one state upon the faith
and credit to be allowed to a judgment ren-
dered in another state, always takes notice
of the laws of the latter state; and upon Lhe
consequent misapplication of the postulate
that one rule must prevail in the court of
original jurisdiction and in the court of last
resort. When exercising an original juris-
diction under the constitution and laws of
the United States, this court, as well as ev-
ery other court of the national government,
doubtless takes notice, without proof, of the
laws of each of the United States. But in
this court, exercising an appellate jurisdic-
tion, whatever was matter of law in the
court appealed from is matter of law here,
and whatever was matter of fact in the
court appealed from is matter of fact here.
In the exercise of its general appellate juris-
diction from a lower court of the United
States, this court takes judicial notice of the
laws of every state of the Union, because
those laws are known to the court below as
laws alone, needing no averment or proof.
Course v. Stead, 4 Dali. 22, 27, note; Hinde
v. Vattier, 5 Pet. 398; Owings v. Hull, 9
Pet. 60", 625; U. S. v. Turner, 11 now. 663,
668; Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65;
Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd. 20
How. 227. 230; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall.
108; Junction R. Co. v. Bank of Ashland.
12 Wall. 226, 230; Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.
S. 218, 5 Sup. Ct. 857. But on a writ of er-
ror to the highest court of a state, in which
the revlsory power of this court is limited to
determining whether a question of law de-
pending upon the constitution, laws, or trea-
ties of the United States has been erroneous-
ly decided by the state court upon the facts
before it, while the law of that state, being
known to its courts as law, is of course
within the judicial notice of this court at
the hearing on error; yet, as in the state
court, the laws of another state are but
facts. requiring to be proved in order to be
conidered, this court does not take judicial
notice of them, unless made part of the rec-
ord sent up, as in Green v. Van Buskirk, 7
J. Law, 18-i; Elliott v. Ray, 2 Blackf. 31:
Cone v. Cotton, Id. 82; Snyder v. Snyder. %
Ind. 399: Peiton v. Platner, 13 Ohio. 209; Hor-
ton v. Critchfield. 18 ill. 133: Ra v. lleaton.
9 \\'is. 328: Crafts v. Clark. I Iowa. T7;
Taylor v. Barron. 10 Fost. T8, and 35 N. H.
4%-1; Knapp v. Abel]. 10 Alien, -18-'3; 1\iowr_v v.
(Yhase, 100 Mass. 79; \\'right v. Andrews. 130
Mass. 1-19: Bank of U. S. v. l\ierchants' Bank,
7 Gill. 415, 431; Coates v. Mackey, 56 Md.
416, 419
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,., Hale, 91 U. S. 13, ~. It la equally well a court of one state, In order to give full 
M'ttled that the several atatell ot the Union faith and credit to a judgment rendered In' 
are to be conaldt>red as In this respect tor- another state, to ascertain the eft'ect which 
elgn to each other, and that the courts of It has In that state, the law of that state 
one state are not presumed to know, and must be proved, like any other matter of 
therefore not bound to take judicial notice fact. The opposing decisions In Ohio v. 
ot, the laws of another state. In BucknPr Hinchman, 27 Pa. St. 479, and Paine v. Scbe-
v. Flnll'y, 2 Pet. :>86, ID which It was held nectady Ins. Co., 11 R. I. 411, are bast'd up-
tbat bills of exchange drawn In one ot the on the misapprehension that this court, on 
states on p<>rsons living In another wt>re tor- a writ ot error to review a decision of the 
elgn bills, It was said by Mr .• Tustlce Wash- highest court of one state upon the faith 
lngton, dt'llYl'rlng the unanimous opinion of and credit to be allowed to a judgment ren-
thls court: "For all national pul'l>Oees em- dered In another state, always takes notice 
bmct'd by the federal constitution the states of the laws of the latter statt>; and upon the 
and the cltlzt>ns thereof are one. united un- consequent misapplication of the postulate 
der the same sovereign authority, and gov- that one rule must prevail In the court ot 
erned by the BOme laws. In all other re- original jurisdiction and In the court of last 
spects the states are neceBSarlly foreign to resort. \\'hen exercising an original Jori.s-
and Independent of each other; their constl- diction under the constitution and laws of 
tuttons and forms of government being, al- the Unltt'd States, this court, as well as ev-
tbough republican, altogether dlft'erent, as ery other court of the national government, 
are their laws and Institutions." 2 Pet. 590. doubtleBS takes notice, without proof, of the 
Judgments recovered In one state of the laws of each of the United States. But In 
Union, when proved In the courts of anotb- this court, exer<'lslng an appellate jurlsdlC* 
er, dlfl'er from judgments recovered In a tor- tlon, whatever was matter of law In the 
elgn country In no other respect than that court appealed from Is matter of law here, 
of not being re-examinable upon the merits, and whatever was matter of tact In the 
nor Impeachable for fraud In obtaining court appealed from ls matter of fact here. 
them, If rendered by a court havlnir Juris- In the exercise of Its general appellate jurl• 
dl<'tlon of the cause and of the parties. diction from a lower court of the United 
Buekner v. I<'lnley, 2 Pet. 592; M'cElmoyle v. States, this court takes judicial notice of the 
Collen, 13 Pet. 312, 324; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, laws of every state of the Union, because 
11 How. 16.i, 176; Christmas v. RuBSell, 5 thQse laws are known to the court below as 
Wall. 200, 30.i; Thompson v. Whitman, 115 laws alone, needing no averment or proof. 
Wall. -hli. Congress, In the execution of the Course v. Stead, 4 Dall. 22, 27, note; Hinde 
power conferred upon It by the constitution, v. Yattler, :> Pet. 398; Owings v. Hull, 9 
having prescribed the mode of attestation Pet. 607, 62:>; U. S. v. Turner, 11 now. 663, 
of records of the courts of one state to entl- 6ri8; Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65; 
tie them to be proved In the courts or anoth- Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, W 
er state, and having enacted that reeords so How. 227, 230; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 
authentl<'ated shall have such faith and 108; Jun<>tlon R. Co. v. Bank of Ashland, 
credit In every court within the United 12 Wall. 2'.?6, 230; Lamar v. Mlcou, 114 U. 
States as the:r have by law or usage to the S. 21R, u Sup. Ct. 8:i7. But on a writ of er-
state from whleh they are taken, a record ror to the highest court of a state, In which 
ot a judgment so authenticated doubtless the revlsory power of this court Is limited to 
pro'\"es Itself without further evidence; and determining whether a question of law de-
. If It appears upon Its face to be a record of pending upon the constitution, laws, or trea-
a court of general jurisdiction, the jurlsdtc- ties of the United States has been erroneous-
tlon of the court over the cause and tile par- ly decided by the state c8urt upon the facts 
ties ls to be presumed, unless dlsnroved by before It, while the law of that state, being 
extrinsic evidence or by tile record lt11elf. ! known to Its courts as law, ls of course 
Knowles v. Gas-Ught & Coke Co., 19 Wall. I within the judicial notice of this court at 
US; Settlemler v. Sullivan, 97 U.S. 444. But I the hearing on error; yet, as In the state 
con1rress bas not undertaken to preseribe In rourt. the laws of another state are but 
what manner the etl'ect that such jmlgments tacts, requiring to be proved In order to be 
have In the <'Ourts of the state In whl<'b they considered, this court doe-R not takP judl<'tal 
are rendered shall be aecertalned, and has notice of them, unless made part of the rec-
left that to be regulated by the general rules ord sent up, as In Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 
ot pleading and evidence applicable to the 
subject. J. Law, lSl; Elliott v. Ray, 2 Blackf. 31; 
c110n principle thPrefore and according to Cone v. Cotton, Id. 82; Snyder V:· ~n~·der. 25 
• • Ind. 399: Prlton v. Plntni>r, 13 Oh10, 209: Hor-
thl' great pre1mnderance of authority (as ts 1. ton v. Critchfit>hl, 18 lll. 1:~: Rape v. lll'tlton. 
shown by the <'llet>R colle<'ted In the mar- 9 Wis. 3!..>s: Crafts v. Clark, 31 Iowa. ii; 
gin 1) whene\"er It becomes necessary for Taylor v. Barron. 10 FOllt. i8, end 3:i S. H. 
' 4.~4; Knapp v. AIK'll, 10 Alli>n, 48j; !\lowry "· 
Ohasc, 100 Mass. i9; Wright v. Andl't'\\'11, 130 
l\la11s. 149: Bnnk of U. S. v. Merchantll' Bank, 
7 Gill. 41U, 431; Coates v • .Mackey, U6 Md. 
416, 419 
1 Seott v. Coli>ruan. u Litt. 349; Thom11s v. 
Rohinson, 3 ".t>ntl. 267; 8hl'ldon v. Hopkins, 
7 Wend. 43J; YllD Bmklrk v. Mulock, 18 ~. 
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Wall. 139. The case comes, in principle,
within the rule laid down long ago by Chief
Justice Marshall: “That the laws of a for-
eign nation, designed only for the direction
of its own affairs, are not'to be noticed by
the courts of other countries, unless proved
as facts, and that this court, with respect to
facts, is limited to the statement made in
the court below, cannot be questioned."
Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 38. Where
by the local law of a state, as in Tennessee
(Hobbs v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 9 Heisk.
873), its highest court takes judicial notice
of the laws of other states, this court, also,
on writ of error, might take judicial notice
of them. But such is not the case in Mary-
land, where the court of appeals has not
only afiirmed the general rule that foreign
laws are facts which, like other facts, must
be proved before they can be received in ev-
idence in courts of justice, but has held that
the effect which a judgment rendered in an-
other state has by the law of that state is a
matter of fact, not to be judicially noticed
without allegation and proof; and conse-
quently that an allegation of the eifect
which such a judgment has by law in that
state is admitted by demurrer. Baptiste v.
De Volunbrun, 5 Har. &. J. 86, 98; Wernwag
v. Pawling, 5 Gill & J. 500, 508; Bank of U.
S. v. Merchants‘ Bank, 7 Gill, 415, 431;
Coates v. Mackey, 56 Md. 416, 419.
From these considerations it follows that
the averment in the third count of the dec-
laration, that by the law of Pennsylvania
the judgment rendered in that state against
Charles Donoghue and John Donoghue was
valid and enforceable against Charles, who
had been erved with process in that state,
and void against John, who had not been so
served, must be considered, both in the
courts in Maryland and in this court, on
writ of error to one of those courts, an al-
legation of fact admitted by the demurrer.
Upon the record before us, therefore, the
plaintiff appears to be entitled, under the
constitution and laws of the United States,
to judgment on this count. It having been
admitted at the bar that the other counts
are for the same cause of action, it is unnec-
essary to consider them. The general judg-
ment for the defendant is erroneous, and the
rights of both parties will be secured by or-
derlng, in the usual form, that the judgment
of the court of appeals of Maryland be re-
versed, and the case remanded to that court
for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
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Wall. 139. The case comes, In principle, 
within the rule laid down long ago by Chief 
Justice Marshall: "That the laws of a for-
eign nation, designed only for the direction 
of Its own affairs, are not· to be noticed by 
the courts ot other countries, unleBB proved 
as tacts, and that this court, with respect to 
tacts, Is limited to the statement made In 
the court below, cannot be questioned." 
Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Crnnch, 1, 38. Where 
by the local law of a state, as In TenneBSee 
(Hobbs v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 9 Helsk. 
873), Its highest court takes judicial notice 
ot the laws of other states, this court, also, 
on writ of error, might take judicial notice 
ot them. But such ls not the case In Mary-
land, where the court of appeals has not 
only atllrmed the general rule tho.t foreign 
lo.we are tacts which, like other facts, must 
be proved before they can be received In ev-
idence In courts of justice, but has held that 
the etrect which a judgment rendered In an-
other state has by the law of that stRte Is & 
matter of fact, not to be judicially noticed 
without allegation and proof; and conse-
quently that an allegation of the effect 
which such a judgment has by law In that 
11tate ls admitted by demurrer. Baptiste v. 
De Volunbrun, 5 Har. & J. 86, 98; Wernwag 
v. Pawling, 5 Gill & J. 500, 508; Bank of U. 
S. v. Merchants' Bank, 7 Glll, 415, 431; 
Contes v. Mackey, 56 Md. 416, 419. 
From these considerations It follows that 
the averment In the third count of the dec-
laration, that by the law of Pennsylvania 
the judgment rendered In that state against 
Charles Donoghue and John Donoghue was 
valid and enforceable against Charles, who 
had been served with process In that state, 
and void against John, who had not been so 
served, mu'1; be considered, both In the 
courts In Maryland and lo this court, on 
writ of error to one of those courts, an al-
legation of tact admitted by the demurrer. 
Upon the record before us, therefore, the 
plaintiff appears to be entitled, under the 
constitution and laws of the United States, 
to judgment on this count. It having been 
admitted at the bar that the other counts 
are for the same cause of action, It ts unnec-
essary to consider them. The general judg-
ment ffM' the defendant ls erroneous, and the 
rights of both parties wlll be secured by or-
dering, In the usual form, that the judgment 
of the court of appeals of Maryland be re-
versed, and the case remanded to that court 
for further proceedings not Inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
(Jase No. 81]
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LLOYD v. MATTHEWS et ai.
(15 Sup. Ct. 70, 155 U. S. 222.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 3,
189-l.
No. 81.
In Error to the Court of Appeals of the State
of Kentucky.
Hattie A. Matthews held the demand note
of E. L. Harper for $5,000, on which the in-
terest had been paid to January 1, 1882.
June 21, 1887, Harper was the owner of some
shares of stock in the Fidelity Building, Sav-
ings & Loan Company of Newport, Ky.,
worth about $5,000, which he, being insol-
vent, transferred on the morning of that day
to Miss Matthews in part payment of the
debt, by blank indorsement in the building
company’s book. Afterwards the name of
J. H. Otten was inserted as a proper person
to obtain the money, and for this reason he
was made a party to these proceedings,
though having no real interest therein. A
few hours after the transfer, Harper made
an assignment of all his property for the ben-
efit of his creditors under the insolvent laws
of Ohio. and, the person named as ussignee
failing to qualify, H. P. Lloyd, the present
plaintiff in error, was appointed, by the prop-
er court, such assignee. Certain creditors of
Harper brought suit in the chancery court of
Campbell county, Ky., on their several debts,
and attached the stock as the property of
Harper. These cases were consolidated, and
while they were pending, September 16, 1887,
Miss Matthews and Otten filed their joint
petition to be made parties defendant, which
was done. They alleged the ownership by
Harper of the stock; the transfer by indorse-
ment in the book. which was made an ex-
hibit; that Miss Matthews was a creditor of
Harper to an amount equal to the face value
of the stock; that the transfer of the stock was
made some h0_urs before the execution of the
deed of assignment by Harper, and was bona
fide, and for a valuable consideration, and
passed all Harper's interest; that Harper
was a citizen and resident of the state of
Ohio at the time of the assignment and there-
tofore; that “by the laws in existence at that
time in said state of Ohio, debtors had the
right to make preferences in the payment of
their creditors, either in the deed of assign-
ment or by paying them theretofore, in such
a way as they saw proper"; that Lloyd had
been made a party as assignee, and was
claiming the stock as part of Harper's estate,
while the plaintiffs in the consolidated cases
asserted their claims under the attachments;
and praying that the stock be adjudgctl to
Miss Matthews. January 14, 1888, Miss .\Iat-
thcws and Otten flied a joint amended an-
swer, attaching the note as an exhibit, and
making this and their former petition a cross
petition. On the same day Lloyd, assignee,
filed a reply to the answer and answer to the
234
This pleading contained five
paragraphs. The first denied that Harper
owed Miss .\1atthews anything at the time the
stock was assigned; admitted that at the time
cross petition.
' of the execution of the assignment Harper
' and Miss Matthews were both citizens and
residents of the state of Ohio; denied “that
at the time of making said assignment debt-
ors had by the laws of the state of Ohio the
right to prefer their creditors in the deed of
assignment." The second paragraph assert-
ed that the transfer and conveyance of the
stock to Otten by Harper was made for the
purpose and with the intent to defraud the
creditors of Harper of their just and lawful"
debts, and that such transfer and assignment
was fraudulent and void under and by virtue
of section 4196 of the Revised Statutes of the
state of Ohio, which provided as follows, to
wit:
“Every gift, grant, or conveyance of lands,
tenements, hereditaments, rents, goods or
chattels, and every bond, judgment or execu-
tion made or obtained with intent to defraud
creditors of their just and lawful debts or
damages, or to defraud or to deceive the per-
son or persons purchasing such lands. tene-
ments, hereditaments, rents, goods or chat-
tels, shall be deemed utterly void and of no
effect."
The third paragraph denied any considera-
tion for the transfer. The fourth alleged the
transfer to be fraudulent and done with in-
tent to hinder and delay Harper's creditors.
The fifth averred that the transfer was made
by Harper with the intent to prefer Miss Mat-
thews, if she was a. creditor. which defend-
ant denied, over his other creditors. and was
void under section 6343 of the Revised Stat-
utes of the state of Ohio, which reads as fol-
lows:
“All assignments in trust to a. trustee or
trustees. made in contemplation of insolven-
cy, with the intent to prefer one or more cred-
itors. shall inure to the equal benefit of all
creditors in proportion to the amount of their
respective claims, and the trusts arising un-
der the same shall be administered in con-
formity with the provisions of this chapter.”
On May 18, 1888, Miss Matthews filed reply
to the original answer and cross petition of
Lloyd, trustee, as follows:
“The defendant Hattie A. Matthews, for re~
ply to answer and cross petition of H. P.
Lloyd says she admits E. L. Harper was in-
solvent when he assigned the building as-
sociation stock to her.
“She admits that he assigned the tock to
her with the intention to prefer her to the
exclusion of the creditors, but, as was stated
in her original pleadings, this was allowable
under the laws of Ohio.
“She denies that under the provisions of
the laws which are set out in said pleading
of Lloyd, to which this is a reply, there is
anything which invalidates the transfer of
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LLOYD v. MATTHEWS et al. 
(13 Sup. Ct. 70, lM U. S. 222.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Dee. 3, 
189-1. 
No. 81. 
In Error to the Court of Appeals of the State 
ot Kentucky. 
Hattie A. Matthews held the demand note 
ot E. L. Harper for $5,000, on which the In-
terest had been paid to January 1, 1882. 
June 21, 18~7. Harper was the owner ot some 
shares of stock In the Fidelity Building, Sav-
'tngs & Loan Company of Newport, Ky., 
worth about $5,000, which he, being Insol-
vent, transferred on the morning ot that day 
to Miss Matthews In part payment of the 
debt, by blank lndorsement In the bulldlng 
company's book. Afterwards the name of 
J. H. Otten was Inserted as a proper person 
to obtain the money, and for this reason he 
was made a party to these proceedings, 
though having no real Interest therein. A 
tew hours after the transfer, Harper made 
an assignment of all his property tor the ben-
efit of his creditors under the Insolvent laws 
ot Ohio. and, the person named as assignee 
falling to quality, H. P. Lloyd, the present 
plaintiff In error, was appointed, by the prop-
er court, such assignee. Certain creditors of 
Harper brought suit In the chancery court of 
Campbell county, Ky., on their several debts, 
and attached the stock as the property of 
Harper. These cases were consolidated, and 
whlle tlley were pending, September 16, 1887, 
Ml88 Matthews and Otten flied their joint 
petition to be made parties defendant, which 
was done. They alleged the ownership by 
Harper of the stock; the transfer by lndorse-
ment In the book, which we.a made an ex-
hibit; that Miss Matthews was a creditor of 
Harper to an amount equal to the face value 
of the stock; that the transfer ot the stock was 
made some ho,urs before the execution ot the 
deed of assignment by Harper, and was bona 
tide, and for a valuable consideration, and 
passed all Harper's Interest; that Harper 
was a citizen and resident of the state of 
Ohio at the time of the assignment and there-
tofore; that "by the laws In existence at that 
time In said state ot Ohio, debtors bad the 
right to make preferences In the payment of 
their creditors, either In the deed of assign-
ment or by paying them theretofore, In such 
a way as they saw proper"; that Lloyd had 
been made a party as assignee, and was 
claiming the stock as part of Harper's estate, 
whlle the plaintlll's In the consolldatC'd cases 
asserted their claims under the attachml'nt~; 
and praying that the stock be adjudged to 
Miss Matthews. January 14, 1888, :\Iiss ~Int­
thcws and Otten flied a joint amended an-
swer, attaching the note as an exhibit, and 
making this and their former petition a cross 
petition. On the same !lay Lloyd, assignee, 
filed a reply to llie answer and answe1· to the 
234 
cross petition. This pleading contAlned five 
paragraphs. The first denied that Harper 
owed :\Ilse ~la tthews anything a.t the time the 
stock was assigned; admlttE>d that at the time 
of the execution of the a..o.;slgn111Pnt Harper 
and Miss Matthews were both citizens and 
residents of the state of Ohio; denied "that 
at the time ot making said assignment debt-
ors had by the laws of the state of Ohio the 
right to prefer their creditors In the deed of 
assignment." The seeond paragraph assert-
ed that the transfer and conveyance ot the 
st-OCk to Otten by Harper was made tor the 
purpose and with the intent to defraud the 
cre<\iton ot Harper of their just and lawtu? 
debts, and that such transfer and nsslgnment 
was fraudulent and void under and by virtue 
of section 4196 ot the Re\"Jsed Statutes ot the 
state of Ohio, which provided as follows, to 
wit: 
"Every gltt, grant, or conveyance ot lands, 
tenements, heredltaments, rents, goods or 
chattels, and every bond, judgment or execu-
tion made or obtalned with Intent to defraud 
creditors of their just and lawful debts or 
damages, or to defraud or to deceive the per-
son or persons purch1u1lng such land11. tene· 
ments, hereditaments, rents, goods or chat-
tels, shall be deemed utterly void and ot n<> 
effect." 
The third paragraph denied any considera-
tion for the transfer. The fourth alleged the 
transfer to be fraudulent and done with In-
tent to hinder and delay Harper's creditors. 
The fifth averred that the transfer was made 
by Harper with the Intent to prefer Miss Mat-
thews, If she was a creditor. which defend-
ant denied, over his other creditors, and was 
void under section f':.343 ot the Revised Stat-
utes of the state of Ohio, which reads as fol-
lows: 
"All assignments In trust to a trustee or 
trustec>s, made In contemplation ot Insolven-
cy, with the Intent to prefer one or more cred-
itors, shall Inure to the equal benefit of all 
creditors In proportion to the amount or their 
respective claims, and the trusts arising un-
der the same shall be administered In con-
formity with the provisions ot this chapter." 
On May 18, 1888, Miss Matthews filed reply 
to the original answer and cross petition or 
Lloyd, trustee, as follows: 
"The defendant Hattie A. Matthews, for re-
ply to answer and cross petition or H. P . 
Lloyd says she admits E. L. Harper was In-
solvent when he assigned the building as-
sociation stock to her. 
"She admits that he assigned the stock t<> 
her with the Intention to prefer her to the 
exclusion of the creditors, but, as was stated 
In her original pleadings, this was allowable 
under the laws of Ohio. 
"She denies that under the provisions or 
the laws which are set out In said pleading 
of Lloyd, to which this ls a reply, thNe is 
anything which Invalidates the tran11ter of 
JUDICIAL NOTlCE.
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the stock to this defendant, the same involved
in the case.
“WVherefore the defendant prays as in her
original pleadings, and for general relief.”
The chancery court rendered judgment in
favor of Lloyd, trustee, for the full value of
the stock, amounting as a money demand
against the building association to the sum
of $4.91-1.89, and Miss Matthews and Otten
appealed to the court of appeals of the state
of Kentucky, which reversed the judgment of
the chanccry court, and remanded the cause,
with directions to render judgment in favor
of Miss Matthews, in conformity to the opin-
ion. Matthews v. Lloyd, 89 Ky. 625, 13 S.
W. 106.
To review this judgment a writ of error
from this court was allowed.
H. P. Lloyd and C. L. Raison, Jr., for
plaintiff in error.
J. Helm, for defendant in error.
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating
the facts in the foregoing language, delivered
the opinion of the court.
The federal question upon which plaintiff
relies to sustain our jurisdiction is that, under
the statutory law of Ohio set out in his plead-
ing, the transfer of the stock in question was
void, and that the court of appeals of Ken-
tucky in rendering judgment did not give
that full faith and credit to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of the state
of Ohio which the constitution and the law of ‘
the United States require.
Rev. St. § 905.
The first error assigned is as follows: “The
court of appeals of Kentucky erred in the dc-
cision rendered in this case below, in failing
to give full faith and credit to the laws of
the state of Ohio which were presented in the
pleadings, in failing to give full faith and
credit to the judicial construction of such
laws by the highest court of said state, and
in failing to give full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings of the probate court of
Hamilton county, Ohio, as set forth in the
pleadings.”
We do not find that the record contains any
judicial proceedings of the probate court of
Hamilton county, Ohio, but suppose the refer-
ence to be to proceedings in insolvency upon
the filing of the deed of assignment by Har-
per, under which Lloyd, trustee, claims, and
that such insolvency proceedings could have
no greater effect on the question of title than
allowed by the laws of Ohio in the matter of
the preference of creditors.
The court of appeals of Kentucky held that,
as the parties all resided in Ohio, and the en-
tire transaction occm-red there, its validity
was to be tested by the law in force there;
that at common law a debtor had a right to
prefer a. creditor, either by payment or an
express preference in a deed of assignment;
that he had a right to pay his debt, and it
was only by virtue of statutory law that such
Const. art. 4, § 1;
Chas. H. Fisk and Chas. 1
a payment could be held invalid, and the
creditor be compelled to s1n'render his ad-
vantage; that in the absence of any showing
of the existence of such a statute in another
state, it must be presumed that the common
law was in force there; that section 6343 of
the Revised Statutes of Ohio, set out in the
pleadings, did not appear “to embrace a case
like this one, but to relate alone to prefer-
ences made in deeds of assignment to trustees
for creditors generally”; that this transfer
could not properly be held to be a part of the
deed of assignment; and that, tested by the
rules of the common law, the preference was
not invalid.
Now, in arriving at these conclusions, the
court of appeals did not concur with the
views of Harpcr’s asslgnee; but does it there-
= fore follow that full faith and credit was de-
nied to the laws of Ohio and to the con-
struction of such laws by the highest court of
that state? The courts of the United States,
when exercising their original jurisdiction,
take notice, without proof, of the laws of the
several states; but in the supreme court of
the United States, when acting under its ap-
pellate jurisdiction, whatevcr was matter of
fact in the state court whose judgment or de-
cree is under review is matter of fact there.
And whenever a court of one state is required
to ascertain what effect a public act of an-
other state has in that state, the law of such
other state must be proved as a fact. Chi-
cago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry 00., 119
U. S. 615, 7 Sup. Ct. 398; Hapley v. Donoghue,
116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242.
The court of appeals was obliged to deter-
mine the case on the record, and plaintiff in
error had failed to plead the construction
given the Ohio statutes by the courts of Ohio,
or to introduce the printed books of cases ad-
judged in the state of Ohio, or to prove the
common law of that state by the parol evi-
dence of persons learned in that law, or to
put in evidence the laws of that state as
printed under the authority thereof, or a
certified copy thereof, as provided by the law
of Kentucky. Gen. St.‘ Ky. 1888, c. 37, §§ 17,
19, pp. 5-16, 547.
The court of appeals was left, therefore, to
construe the parts of the Ohio laws that were
pleaded as it would local laws; and it is set-
tled that under such circumstances, where
the validity of a state law is not drawn in
question, but merely its construction, no
federal question arises. As was remarked in
Glenn V. Garth, 147 U. S. 360, 368, 13 Sup.
Ct. 350: “If every time the courts of a state
put a construction upon the statutes of an-
other state, this court may be required to de-
termine whether that construction was or
was not correct, upon the ground that if it
were concluded that the construction was in-
correct it would follow that the state courts
had refused to give full faith and credit to
the statutes involved, our jurisdiction would
be enlarged in a manner never heretofore be-
235
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JUDICIAL NOTICE. [Case No. 81 
the stock to this defendant, the same involved 
in the case. 
''Wherefore the defendant prays as In her 
original pleadings, and for general relief." 
The chancery court rendered judgment in 
favor of Lloyd, trnstee, for the tull value or 
the stock, amounting as a money demand 
against the building association to the sum 
of $4,914.89, and :mas Matthews and Otten 
appealed to the court of appeals or the state 
of Kentucky, which reversed the judgment of 
the chancery court, and remanded the cause, 
with directions to render judgment In favor 
of Miss Matthews, In conformity to the opin-
ion. Matthews v. Lloyd, 89 Ky. 625, 13 S. 
W.106. 
To review this judgment a writ of error 
from this court was allowed. 
H. P. Lloyd and C. L. Raison, Jr., tor 
plaintiff In error. Chas. H. Fisk and Chas. 
J. Helm, for defendant in error. 
Mr. Ch(et Justice FULLER, after stnttna: 
the facts In the foregoing language, delivered 
the opinion or the court. 
The federal question UPon which plalntttr 
relies to sustain our jurisdiction Is that, under 
the statutory law or Ohio set out In his plead-
ing, the transfer of the stock In question was 
void, and that the court of appeals of Ken-
tucky In rendering judgment did not give 
that full faith and credit to the public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings of the state 
of Ohio which the constitution and the law of 
the United States require. Const. art. 4, I l; 
Rev. St. § 905. 
The first error 11BSlgned ls as follows: "The 
court of appeals of Kentucky erred In the de-
cision rendered In this case below, In falling 
to give full faith and credit to the laws of 
the state of Ohio which were presented In the 
pleadings, in falling to give full faith and 
credit to the judicial construction of such 
laws by the highest court of said state, and 
In failing to give full faith and credit to the 
judicial proceedings of the probate court of 
Hamilton county, Ohio, as set forth in the 
pleadings." 
We do not find that the record contains any 
judicial proceedings of the probate court of 
Hamilton county, Ohio, but suppose the refer-
ence to be to proceedings In insolvency u1>0n 
the filing or the deed of assignment by Har-
per, under which Lloyd, trustee, claims, and 
that such Insolvency pr<><;eedlngs could have 
no greater effect on the question or title than 
allowed by the laws or Ohio In the mattci' of 
the preference of creditors. 
The court of appeals or Kentucky held that, 
as the parties all resided In Ohio, and the en-
tire transaction occurred there, Its validity 
was to be tested by the law In force there; 
that at common law a debtor had a right to 
prefer a creditor, either by payment or an 
l'Xpress preference in a deed or assignment; 
that he bad a right to pay his debt, and it 
waa only by virtue of statutory law that such 
a payment could be held Invalid, and the 
creditor be compelled to surrender his ad-
vantage; that ln the absence of any showing 
or the existence or such a statute In another 
state, it must be presumed that the common 
law was In force there; that section 6343 of 
the Revised Statutes or Ohio, set out in the 
pleadings, did not appear "to embrace a case 
like this one, but to relate alone to prefer-
encee made In deeds of assignment to trustees 
for creditors generally"; that this transfer 
could not properly be held to be a part of the 
deed of assignment; and that, tested by the 
rules of the common law, the preference was 
not Invalid. 
Now, In arriving at these conclusions, the 
court of appeals did not concur with the 
views of Harper's asslgn<'e; but does It there-
fore follow that full faith and credit was de-
nted to the la\vs of Ohio and to the con-
struction of such laws by the highest court or 
that state? The courts of the United States, 
when exercising their original jurlsdlctlon, 
take notice, without proof, of the laWB of the 
several states; but In the supreme court of 
the United States, when acting under its ap-
pellate jurisdiction, whatever was matter of 
fact In the state court whose judgment or de-
cree is under review ls matter of fact there. 
And whenever a court or one state ls required 
to ascertain what etrect a publlc act of an-
other state has In that state, the law of such 
other state must be proved as a fact. Chi· 
cago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 
U.S. 615, 7 Sup. Ct. 398; Ha.niey v. Donoghue, 
116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242. 
The court of appeals was obllgcd to deter-
mine the Cll8e on the record, and plaintiff in 
error had failed to plead the construction 
given the Ohio statutes by the courts of Ohio, 
or to introduce the printed books of cases ad-
judged In the state of Ohio, or to prove the 
common law of that state by the parol evl· 
dence of persons learned in thnt law, or to 
put in evidence the laws or that state as 
printed under the authority thereof, or a 
certified copy thereof, as provided by the law 
of Kentucky. Gen. St.' Ky. 1888, c. 37, H 17, 
19, pp. 5-16, 547. 
The cow·t of appeals wns left, therefore, to 
construe the parts or the Ohio laws that were 
pleaded as It would local laws; and It ls set-
tled that under such cll"CUmstances, whel"e 
the validity of a state law ls not drawn in 
question, but merely Its const:rUctlon, no 
federal question arises. As was remarked In 
Glenn v. Garth, 147 U. S. 360, 368, 13 Sup. 
Ct. 350: "It every time the courts of a state 
put a construction upon the statutes of an-
other st.1te, this court may be required to de-
termine whether that construction was or 
was not co1Tect, upon the ground that If It 
were concluded that the construction was In-
correct It would follow that the state courts 
had refused to give run faith and credit to 
the statutes Involved, our jurisdiction would 
be enlarged In & manner never heretofore be-
235 
Case No. 81] PROOF.
lleved to have been contemplated." Banking than was given them by the court; of appeals
Co. v. Marshall, 12 How. 165; Cook Co. v. of Kentucky.
Calumet & C. Canal & Dock Co., 138 U. S. Writ of error dismissed.
635, 11 Sup. Ct. 435.
This record contains nothing to show as Mr. Justice HARLAN was of opinion that
matter of fact that the public acts of Ohio the writ of error should be retained and the
hud by law or usage in Ohio any other efifect judgment aiiirmed.
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lleved to have been contemplated." Banking 
Co. v. Marshall, 12 How. 165; Cook Co. v. 
Cnlumet & C. Canal & Dock Co., 138 U. S. 
63.1, 11 Sup. Ct. 435. 
'l'hle record contalnB nothing to show as 
matter of fact that the public acts of Ohio 
ha.d by law or usage In Ohio any other effect 
236 
than was given them by the court of appeals 
of Kentucky. 
Writ of error dlsmls8ed. 
Mr. Justice HARLAN was of opinion that 
the writ of error should be retained and the 
Judgment aftll•med. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
[Case No. b2
STATE ex rel. THAYER v. BOYD.
(51 N. W. 96-i, 34 Neb. 435.)
Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 7, 1892.
On motion to reinstate. Motion denied.
M. B. Reese, Joseph H. Blair, and Chas.
A. Goss. for the motion. J. C. Cowin, op-
posed.
POST, J. A sufliclent statement of the
facts in this case will be found in the sev-
eral opinions heretofore filed (31 Neb. 682.'
48 N. W. T39. and 12 Sup. Ct. 375), revers-
ing the judgment of ouster against the re-
spondent in favor of the relator, and re-
mandlng the case for further proceedings in
this court. On the 15th day of March the
respondent filed with the clerk of this court
the mandate from the supreme court of the
United States, and moved for judgment in
his favor on the pleadings. The motion
aforesaid came on for hearing the next day,
in accordance with the practice of the court,
and was sustained, and the action dismissed,
the relator making no appearance. The re-
lator now, by the motion under consideration,
asks to have the judgment of dismissal set
aside, and for leave to reply and proceed to
trial on the merits of the case. It is claimed
by him that his failure to resist the motion
for judgment is not attributable to any fault
or negligence on his part, but to the fact that
he was at the time in question absent, in a
distant part of the state, and had no notice
of the respondent's intention to take any ac-
tion at that time. This claim, in my judg-
ment, is fully sustained by the aflldavits ac-
companying the motion, which are not con-
tradicted. If this were an ordinary proceed-
ing,—that is, one in which a cause of action
by a competent and proper party is con-
ceded,—I would say without hesitation that
the present motion should be sustained. It
could not, in that case, be denied, without
reversing the rule which has prevailed in this
court since my first acquaintance with it.
The respondent as well as the court acted
upon the assumption that due and sufficient
notice of his motion had been given. The
neglect to give proper notice was occasion-
ed by a change of counsel for the relator. It
is evident that the parties were acting in
good faith, and we have no occasion to im-
pute blame to any one for the failure.
It is insisted by counsel for the relator
that the only question determined by the
supreme court of the United States is that
the naturalization of the respondent's fa-
ther is well pleaded in the answer; in other
words, that under the allegations thereof re-
spondent might prove that his father com-
pleted his naturalization during his (respond-
ent’s) minority; and he accordingly ten-
ders a reply in the nature of a general de-
nial of that part of the answer. It is not
necessary for the purpose of this motion to
consider the question of the citizenship of
the respondent, or to determine to what ex-
tent, if at all, the judgment of the supreme
court is conclusive on that question, since
the motion should be denied on other grounds.
Nor is it necessary to determine whether, in
case the respondent is not a citizen, and
therefore not eligible to the ofiice of governor,
the relator or the lieutenant governor would
be entitled to the possession and emoluments
thereof. Whatever right the relator may
have had to institute this action in the first
instance, it is clear to my mind that he has
now no authority to prosecute it further. It
appears from the records in this case that a
writ of ouster was issued from this court, by
virtue of which the respondent was remov-
ed from the oflice of governor, and the re-
lator installed therein. It is a fact of which
we must take notice that the respondent is
now in possession of said otiice, and dischar-
ging thc duties thereof. \Ve know, too, from
our records, that no order has been allowed
or issued for restoration to respondent of the
ofiice from which he was ousted. The infer-
ence is, therefore, that the oflice was volun-
tarily surrendered by the relator. It is not
necessary, however, to rest our conclusion
upon an inference. That the relator, on the
8th day of February, 1892, voluntarily, and
on his own motion, surrendered the ofilce
in question to the respondent, is a fact which
ought to be and is generally known. It is
a part of the political history of the state,
of which the courts will take notice without
proof. 1 Greenl. Ev. 6; Brown v. Piper, 91
U. S. 37, 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 151.
It is a rule well settled in this state that
a private person, having no direct interest
in the oflice in controversy, cannot maintain,
on his own relation. proceedings by quo war-
ranto to test the title of another thereto.
State v. Stein, 13 Neb. 530, 14 N. W. 481;
State v. Hamilton, 29 Neb. 198, 45 N. W.
T9. Having voluntarily surrendered the of-
fice, the relator has no better title thereto,
or right to prosecute this action, than any
other private citizen of this state. His title
is possessory only. His right to hold over in
case the respondent is ineligible is at most
an incident to his prior possession of the ot-
fice. The distinction should be kept in mind
between this case and one in which the state
in its sovereign capacity interposes in the
manner prescribed by law for the purpose of
testing the title of an incumbent to an of-
flce. The statutory authority for this pro-
ceeding is found in section 1, c. 71, Comp.
Laws, as follows: “Section 1. VVhen any cit-
izen of this state shall claim any oflice which
is usurped, invaded, or unlawfully held and
exercised by another, the person so claim-
ing such oiiice shall have the right to file
in the district court an ini‘or1nation in the
nature of a quo warranto. upon his own re-
lation, and with or without the consent of
the prosecuting attorney. and such person
shall have the right to prosecute said in-
formation to final judgment: provided, he
shall have first applied to the prosecuting at-
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JUDICIAL NOTICE. [Case No. b2 
STATE ex rel. THAYER v. BOYD. 
(51 N. W. 964, 34 Neb. 435.) 
Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 7, 1892. 
On motion to reinstate. Motion denied. 
M. B. Reese, J'oseph H. Blair, and Chas. 
A. Goss, for the motion. J'. C. Cowin, op-
posed. 
POST, J. A sufficient statement of the 
facts In this case wlll be found In the sev-
eral opinions heretofore filed (31 Neb. 682, 
48 N. W. 739, and 12 Sup. Ct. 375), l'P.vers-
lng the Judgment of ouster against the re-
spondent In favor of the relator, and re-
manding the case for further proceedings In 
thlB court. On the 15th day of March the 
respondent filed with the clerk of this court 
the mandate from the supreme court of the 
Cnlted States, and moved for Judgment In 
his favor on the pleadings. The motlou 
aforesaid came on for hearing the next day, 
In accordance with the practice of the court. 
and was sustained, and the action dismissed, 
the relator making no appearance. '.fhe re-
lator now, by the motion under consideration, 
aaks to have the judgment of dlsrul881ll set 
1181de, and for leave to reply and proceed to 
trial on the merits of the case. It Is claimed 
by him that his failure to resist the motion 
for judgment ls not attributable to any fault 
or negligence on his .part, but to the fact that 
he was at the time In question absent, In a 
distant part of the state, and had no notice 
of the respondent's lntentlou to take any ac-
tion at that time. This claim, In my JwlA· 
ment, Is fully sustained by the affidavits ac-
companying the motion, which are not con-
tradicted. If this were an ordinary proceed-
lng,-that Is, one In which a cause of action 
by a competent and proper party ls con-
ceded,-! would Blly without hesitation that 
the present motion should be sustained. It 
could not, In that case, be denied, without 
reversing the rule which has prevailed In this 
court since my first acquaintance with It. 
The respondent as well as the court acted 
upon the &Bsumptlon that due and sufficient 
notice of his motion had been given. The 
neglect to give proper notice was occasion-
ed by a change of counsel tor the relator. It 
Is evident that the parties were acting In 
good faith, and we have no occasion to Im-
pute blame to any one for the failure. 
It Is Insisted by counsel for the relator 
that the only question determined by the 
supreme court of the United States Is that 
the naturalization of the respondent"s fa-
ther Is well pleaded In the answer; In other 
words, that under the allegations thereof re-
spondent might prove that bis father com-
pleted his naturalization during bls (re11pond-
ent's) minority; and he accordingly ten-
ders a reply In the nature or a general de-
nial of that part of the answer. It ls not 
nece11sary for the purpose of this motion to 
consider the question or the cltlzl'nRhlp of 
the respondent, or to determine to what ex-
tent, If at all, the judgment of the supreme 
court ls conclusive on that question, since 
the motion should be denied on other grounds. 
Nor is It necessary to determine whether, In 
case the respondent 18 not a eltlzen, and 
therefore not eligible to the office of governor, 
the relator or the lieutenant governor would 
be entitled to the possession and emoluments 
thereof. Whatever right the relator may 
have had to Institute this action in the first 
Instance, It ls clear to my mind that he has 
now no authority to prosecute It further. It 
appears from the records In tbls ease that a 
writ of ouster was Issued from this court, by 
virtue of which the respondent was remov-
ed from the otftce of governor, a.nd the re-
lator Installed therein. It lw a fact or which 
we must take notice that the respondent Is 
now in possession of said office. and dischar-
ging the duties thereof. We know, too, from 
our records, that no order h&B been allowed 
or issued for restoration to respondent of the 
ofllce from which he was ousted. The Infer-
ence ls. therefore, that the office was volun-
tarily surrendered by the relator. It ls not 
necessary, however, to rest our conclusion 
upon an Inference. That the relator, on the 
8th day of February, 1892, voluntarily, and 
on his own motion, surrendered the ofllce 
In question to the respondent, Is a fact which 
ought to be and ls generally known. It Is 
a part of the political history of the state. 
of which the courts will take notice without 
proof. 1 Greenl. Ev. 6; Brown v. Piper, 91 
U. S. 37, 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, lril. 
It Is a rule well settled In this state that 
a private person, having no direct inter • .st 
In the otfl.ce In controversy, cannot maintain, 
on his own relation, proceedings by quo war-
ranto to test the title of another thereto. 
State v. Stein, 13 Neb. 530, 14 N. W. 481; 
State v. Hamilton, 29 Neb. 198, 45 N. W. 
2W. Having voluntarily surrendered the of-
fice, the relator bas no better title thereto, 
or right to prosecute this action, than any 
other private citizen of this state. His title 
ls possessory only. His right to hold over In 
case the respondent Is Ineligible Is at most 
an Incident to his prior possession of the of-
fice. The distinction should be kept In mind 
between this case and one in which the state 
In Its sovereign capacity Interposes In the 
manner prescribed by law for the purpose of 
testing the title of an Incumbent to an of-
fice. The statutory authority for this pro-
ceeding Is found In section 1, c. 71, Com1 •. 
Laws, as follows: "Section 1. 'When any cit-
izen o! this state shall claim any office which 
Is usurped, Invaded, or unlawfully held and 
exercised by another, the person so clnhn-
lng such ofllce shall have the right to file 
In the district court an lnfonnatlon In the 
nature of a quo warranto, upon his own re-
lntlon, and with or without the consent of 
the prosecuting attorney. and such person 
shall have the right to prosecute !<:li tl ln-
ronnatlon to final judgment: provlllt•d, he 
shall have first applied to the prosecuting at-
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Case No. 82]
PROOF.
torney to file the information, and the pros-
ecuting attorney shall have refused or neg-
lected to file the same.” The proceeding con-
templated by the section quoted is a contest
between two claimants for an oflice. It does
not diifer materially from any other conten-
tion involving private rights. Like other ca-
ses in which the plaintiff relies upon prior
possession as evidence of title, proof of a.
voluntary abandonment is a complete de-
fense. It is said in Shortt on Informations
(Am. Ed.) 133: “He alone is a competent
relator who has some interest other than
such as belongs to the community at large
in the question to be tried by the quo war-
ra.nto, and who has not by any of the meth-
ods already adverted to disqualified himself
from acting as prosecutor.” Among the acts
which are referred to above as disqualifying
one to act as relator are the following (page
177), viz.: Where it is sought to impeach a
title conferred by a corporation election, in
which the relator has concurred. Where the
relator was present and concurred in the
election of the respondent as mayor. Where
it was claimed an election to membership in
a board of health was void for the reason
that the official ballots were informal, it was ‘
held that the relator was disqualified by rea-
son of having voted a similar ballot. This
case is clearly within the principle of these
authorities. The act of the relator in sur-
rendering the ofllce to the respondent, and
voluntarily retiring therefrom, disqualifles
him to longer act as relator, and is in eifect
an abandonment of the action.
It is suggested that the surrender of the
oflice to the respondent was the result of
a misconception of the effect of the judg-
ment of the supreme court of the United
States, and of what issues are concluded
238
thereby. In his aflidavit he says, in sub-
stance, that on the 8th day of February he
was induced to believe that when the man-
date of that court was received it would con-
tain an order to this court to enter judg-
ment that the respondent had for more than
two years last prior to the general election
in 1890 been a citizen of the United States.
The records of the courts in this country are
always accessible to those interested in their
judgments and decrees. A mandate is a ju-
- dicial command, issued by a court or magis-
trate, directing the proper ofiicers to enforce
a judgment or decree. Bonv. Law Dict. The
z relator was bound to know, and we must as-
‘ sume did know, that the mandate, when is-
sued, would be merely a direction to take
further proceedings in accordance with the
judgment of the supreme court. The judg-
ment of that court. if entered, was notice to
relator of what issues were concluded there-
by. If judgment had not been formally en-
tered upon the records of the court, he must
have known from the opinions filed to what
extent his rights were determined by the
court. It is a fact within our knowledge that
the substance of the opinions was made pub-
lic within a few hours of the time they were
filed. It is not enough for relator to an-
swer that he was wrongly informed as to the
eifect of the decision. He was bound at his
peril to know the law of the case as declared
by the court of last resort. Since it is ap-
parent that the relator is without authority
to further prosecute. and that this proceed-
ing must for that reason result in a judg-
ment for the respondent, it is evident that
the motion to set aside the judgment already
rendered, and for leave to reply, should be
denied. Motion denied.
The other judges concur.
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torney to file the Information, and the pros- thereby. In his a.flldavlt he says, in sub-
ecutlng attorney shall have refused or neg- stance, that on the 8th day of February he 
lected to file the same." The proceeding con- was induced to believe that when the man-
templated by the section quoted is a contest date of that court was received It would con-
between two claimants for an ofllce. It does taln an order to this court to enter judg-
not dll'fer materially from any other conten- ment that the respondent had for more than 
tion invo!Ylng private rights. Like other en- two years last prior to the general election 
11es In which the plaintiff relies upon prior In 1800 been a citizen of the United States. 
posseBSion as evidence of title, p1·oof of a The records of the courts in this country are 
voluntary abandonment ls a complete de- always accessible to those interested in their 
tense. It ls said In Shortt on Informations judgments and decrees. A mandate ls a ju-
{Am. Ed.) 183: "He alone is a competent 1 dlcial command, Issued by a court or magis-
relator who has some interest other than I trate, directing the proper officers to enforce 
such as belongs to the community at large a judgment or decree. Bouv. Law Dict. The 
in the question to be tried by the quo war- relator was bound to know, and we must as-
ranto, and who has not by any of the meth· i sume did know, that the mandate, when !s-
ods already adverted to disqualified himself I sued, would be merely a direction to take 
from acting as prosecutor." Among the acts I further proceedings In accordance with the 
which are referred to above as disqualifying judgment of the supreme court. The judg-
one to act as relator are the following (page , ment of that court, 1f entered, was notice to 
1i7), viz.: Where 1t ls sought to Impeach a 1
1 
relator of what Issues were concluded there-
title conferred by a corporation election, in by. If judgment had not been formally en-
which the relntor has concurred. Where the I tered upon the records of the court, be must 
relator was present and concurred In the have known from the opinions filed to what 
election of the respondent as mayor. Where I extent his rights were determined by the 
it wns claimed an election to membership In court. It ts a fact within our knowledge that 
a board of health was void for the reason the substance of the opinions was made pub-
that the official ballots were Informal, It wns I lie within a few hours of the time they were 
held that the rel:ltor was disqualified by rea- filed. It Is not enough for relator to an· 
son of having voted a similar ballot. This 1 ewer that he was wrongly Informed as to the 
case Is clearly within the principle of these eft'ect of the decision. He was bound at his 
authorities. The act of the relato1· In sur- peril to know the law of the case as declared 
rPndering the ofllce to the respondent, and by the court of last resort. Since It Is ap-
yoluutarlly retiring therefrom, disqualifies parent that the relator Is without authority 
him to longer act ae relntor, and is In effect to further prosecute. and that this pl'O('eed-
.an abandonment of the action. Ing must for that reason result in a judg-
It Is suggested that the surrender of the ment for the respondent, It Is evident that 
-Office to the respondent was the result of the motion to set aside the judgment already 
a misconception of the effect of the judg- rendered, and for leave to reply, should be 
ment of the supreme court of the United denied. Motion denied. 
States, and of what issues are concluded The other judges concur. 
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COMMON\VEALTH v. DUNLOP.
(16 S. E. 273, 89 Va. 431.)
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
1892.
Error to circuit court of city of Peters-
burgh. -
These proceedings were instituted by Mr.
Dunlop against the commonwealth to estab-
lish the genuineness of coupons tendered by
him in payment of taxes, and to recover back
the money collected from him for such taxes.
There was a judgment in plaintiifs favor,
and the commonwealth brings error. Af-
firmed.
W. H. Mann and R. Taylor Scott, Atty.
Gen., for the Commonwealth. Maury &.
Maury, for the defendant in error. -
Dec. 1.
l.E\YlS, P. This was a proceeding under .
the statute for the verification of coupons
previously tendered by the plaintiff in pay-
ment of taxes. At the trial the plaintiif
proved, as alleged in his petition, that no
part of the taxes for which the coupons were '
tendered were school taxes or liquor license
taxes. He also introduced a witness, who
exhibited for the inspection of the court and
jury the bonds from which the coupons had
been cut. The witness then testified, with-
out objection. that they were the genuine
bonds of the state; that he himself had cut
the coupons from them; and that the cou-
pons were genuine; and this was all the evi-
deuce in the case. The bonds, copies of
which are exhibited with the record, are reg-
ular on their face, purporting to be under the
seal of the state, and signed by the treasurer
and countersigned by the second auditor of '
the state. They all purport to have been
issued pursuant to the act of March 30, 1871,
commonly known as the "Funding Bill," ex-
cept one which purports to be under the act
of March 28, 1879. entitled “An act to pro-
vide a plan of settlement of the public debt."
The commonwealth demurred to the evi-
dence, but the court overruled the demurrer,
and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
It is contended for the commonwealth-
First, that, to prove the genuineness of the
coupons, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to
prove the genuineness of, the bonds; and, sec-
ondly, that this he has failed to do, because
the witness does not say that the signatures
to the bonds are genuine, or that he is an
expert in matters of handwriting. or that the
seal affixed to the bonds is the genuine seal
of the state. The circuit court decided that
the seal proved itself, and that, in the ab-
sence of evidence to prove that the bonds
were spurious, the evidence adduced estab-
lished the genuineness of the coupons. We
are of opinion that this ruling is correct. It
is a rule of evidence. universally recognized,
that the courts of a state take judicial notice
of its seals and of the signatures of the heads
of departments; nor will it be supposed, with-
out proof, that any particular seal is counter-
feit or irregularly impressed. The law as-
sumes that the seal of the state is known to
all of her judicial ofiicers, and there is noth-
ing in the statute requiring the production of
the bonds, in a proceeding like the present,
which affects the rule of the common law.
The statute now carried into section 412 of
the Code simply provides that upon the de-
mand of the party contesting the genuineness
of the coupons the bonds from which they
were detached shall be produced by the plain-
tiff as a condition precedent to his right of
recovery. Nothing is said about the burden
of proving the genuineness of the bonds being
on the plaintiff, or that the seal of the state
shall not, as in other cases, prove itself; and,
had the legislature intended to alter the rule
above mentioned, such intention would surely
have been unmistakably expressed. This was
virtually decided in Com. v. Hurt, 85 Va.
918, 9 S. E. 148. There the question was
Whether, upon the production of the bonds by
the plaintiff, it was competent for the com-
monweulth to cross-examine the witnesses as
to the genuineness of the signatures to the
bonds. The trial court ruled that it was not,
unless a plea of non est factum should be
first tiled. But this court reversed that rul-
ing on the ground that the commonwealth
was entitled to show, if she could, without
filing such plea, which was not contemplated
by the statute, that the bonds were spurious,
and thereby to show that the detached cou-
pons were not genuine. It was not suggest-
ed, either by counsel or by the court in that
_ case, that the statute required anything more
than the production of the bont'.\. On the
contrary, it was assumed that the burden of
proving that the bonds were not genuine was
on the commonwealth, and the statute is the
same now in this particular as it was when
that case was decided. It is also contended
- for the defendant in error (the plaiutlfi be-
low) that the provision of the statute requir-
ing the production of the bonds to prove the
genuineness of the coupons is unconstitu-
tional. And Mctlahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S.
662, 10 Sup. Ct. 972, is relied on for this po-
sition. That, however, was a suit by the
state against the taxpayer. while the present
is a suit by the taxpayer against the state;
and it is an established principle that, when
the sovereign consents to be sued, the terms
and conditions upon which such consent is
given must be observed. Nor can a party
avail himself of the benefit of a statute, and
at the same time contest its validity. Pur-
cell v. Conrad, 84 Va. 557, 5 S. E. 545; Dan-
iels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415. A taxpayer
whose tender of coupons is refused may un-
doubtedly set up the tender as a defense in
any subsequent suit by the state against him
for the recovery of the taxes. But if, upon
the refusal of the tender, he chooses, as in
the present case. to pay in money, and then
sues the state to establish the genuineness of
the coupons, and to recover back the money
239
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
07
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
JUDICIAL NOTICE. [Case No. 83 
COMMONWEALTH v. DUNLOP. 
(16 S. E. 273, 89 Va. 431.) 
Supreme Oourt of Appeals of Virginia. Dec. 1, 
1892. 
Error to circuit court of city of Peters-
burgh. 
These proceedings were Instituted by Mr. 
Dunlop against the commonwealth to estab-
lish the genuineness of coupons tendered by 
him in payment of taxes, and to recover bnck 
the money collected from him for sueh taxes. 
There was a judgment in plnlntllf's favor, 
and the commonwealth brings error. Af-
firmed. 
W. H. Mann and R. Taylor Scott, Atty. 
Gen., for the Commonwealth. Maury & 
Maury, for the defendant In error. 
LEWIS, P. This was a proceeding under 
the statute tor the verification ot coupons 
previously tendered by the plalntltr In pay-
ment ot taxes. At the trial the plaintltr 
proved, as alleged in his petition, that no 
part of the taxes for which the coupons were 
tendered were school taxes or liquor license 
taxes. He also Introduced a witness, who 
exhibited for the Inspection of the court and 
jury the bonds from which the coupons had 
been cut The witness then testified, with-
out objection, that they were the genuine 
bonds of the state; that he himself had cut 
the coupons from them; and that the cou-
pons were genuine; and this was all the evi-
dence In the mse. Tl:ie bonds, copies of 
which are exhibited with the record, are reg-
ular on their face, purporting to be under the 
seal of the state, and signed by the treasurer 
111ld countersigned by the second auditor of 
the state. They all purport to have been 
Issued pursuant to the act of M1m·h 30, 1871, 
commonly known as the "1''nndlng Bill," ex-
cept one which purports to be under the act 
Of March 28, 1879, entitled "An act to pro-
vide a plan of settlement of the public debt." 
The commonwealth demurred to the evl-
delletl, but the court overruled the demurrer, 
and gave judgment for the plalntltr. 
It Is contended for the commonwealth-
Flnrt, that, to prove the jg!nulneness of the 
coupons, lt was incumbent on the plalntitr to 
prove the genuineness of. tlhl bonds; and, sec-
ondly, that this he has failed to do, because 
the witness does not say that the signatures 
to the bonds are genuine, or that he ls an 
expert In mattel'B of handwriting, or tbnt the 
aeal atft.xed to the bonds ls the genuine seal 
of the state. The circuit court decided that 
the seal proved itself, and that, In the ab-
sen~ of evidence to prove that the bonds 
were spurious, the evidence adduced estab-
llsbed the genuineness or the coupons. We 
are of opinion that this rullng Is correct. It 
is a rule of evidence, unlvel'l!ally recognized, 
that the courts of a state take judicial notice 
of Its seals and of the slgnnturl:'s of the heads 
of departments; nor wlll lt be supposed, with-
out proof, that any particular seal ts counter-
feit or Irregularly impressed. The law as-
sumes that the seal of the state ls known to 
all of her judicial oftlcel'B, and there is noth-
ing in the statute requiring the production of 
the bonds, in a proceeding llke the present, 
which atrects the rule of the common law. 
The statute now carried into section 412 of 
the Code simply provides that upon the de-
mand or the party contesting the genuineness 
of the coupons the bonds from which they 
were detached shall be produced by the plaln-
tUf as a condltlon precedent to his right of 
recovery. Nothing ls said about the burden 
ot proving the genuineness of the bonds being I on the plalntltr, or that the seal of the state 
I shall not, as in other cases, prove Itself; and, 
I hnd the legislature intended to alter the rule 
I above mentioned, such Intention would surely have been unmistakably ex1iressed. This was I virtually decided in Com. v. Hurt, 8.3 Va. 
918, 0 S. E. 148. There the question was 
whether, upon the production of the bonds b~· 
the plalntltr, It was competent for the com-
monwealth to cross-examine the witnesses as 
I to the genuineness of the signatures to the 
I bonds. The trial court ruled that it was not, 
I unless a plea of non est factum should be 
I first filed. But this court reversed that rul-
1 
lng on the ground that the commonwealth 
was entitled to show, if she could, without 
I ftllng such plea, whkh was not contemplated by the statute, tb1tt the bonds were spurious, 
I and thereby to show tlmt the detached cou-pons were not genuine. It was not suggest-
ed, either by counsel or by the court In that 
. case, that the statute required anything more 
: than the production of the bom'. 1. On the 
I contrary, It was assumed that the burden of 
· proving that the bonds were not genuine was 
on the commonwealth, and the statute ls the 
same now In this partlculnr as it was when 
that case was decided. It ls also contended 
for the defendant in error (the plaintiff be-
low) that the provision of the statute requir-
ing the production of the bonds to prove the 
genuineness of the coupons ls unconstitu-
tional. And McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 
662, 10 Sup. Ct. 072, ls relled on for this po-
sition. That, however, was a suit by the 
state against the taxpayer, while the present 
ls a suit by the taxpayer agnlnst the state; 
and it Is an establlsbed prlnelple that, when 
the sovereign consents to be sued, the terms 
I and conditions upon which such consent Is I given must be observed. Nor can a party 
I avail himself of the benefit of a statute, and at the same time contest its validity. Pur-
cell v. Conrad, 84 Va. 557, 5 S. E. 545; Dan-
iels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415. A taxpayer 
whose tender of coupons Is refused may un-
doubtedly set up the tender as a defense In 
any subsequent suit by the state against him 
for the recovery of the taxes. But if, upon 
the refusal of the tender, be cbOOl!es, as in 
the present case, to pay in money, and then 
sues the state to establish the genuineness of 
the coupons, and to recover bnck the money 
239 
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so paid, he must conform to the conditions already stated, and without considering any
prosvribed by the statute, giving him per- other question disvussed at the bar, the judg-
mission to sue. For the reasons, however, ment must be affirmed.
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Case No. 8:3] PROOF. 
so paid, he must conform to the condltlona I already stated, IUld without considering any 
pres<'rlbed by the statute, giving him per- other question d181'uased at the bar, the judg-
mlBSlon to sue. For the reasons, however, inent must be afllrmed. 
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PIERCE et al. v. INDSETH.
(1 Sup. Ct. 418. 106 U. S. 546.)
Supreme Court of the United States.
1883.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Minnesota.
This is an action by the piaintifl in the
court below, Ole A. Indseth, against the de-
fendants, composing the firm of Pierce, Sim-
mons & Co., on a foreign bill of exchange,
payable at sight to his order, drawn by them
at Red Wing, in Minnesota, on the Chris-
tiania Bank, in Norway, which is as follows:
“Exchange 15,441 50-100 kroner, per stamp 2c.
Pierce, Simmons & Co., Bankers.
"Red Wing, Minnesota, February 1, 1877.
"At sight of this original of exchange (du-
plicate unpaid) pay to the order of 0. A.
Indseth 15,4-ii 50-100 kroner, value received,
and charge same to account of Sk. P. I. 8:
Co., Chicago, as per advice from them.
Pierce, Simmons & Go.
“To Christiania Bank of Kredit Kasse,
Ghristiania, Norway."
Jan. 8,
The value of these kroners in our money
was $4,469.35.
Indseth resided at the time near Eidsvold,
in Norway, and the bill was purchased by
his agent in Minnesota, who forwarded it to
him. He received it February 27, 1877, and
retained it in his possession until April 12th
following, when he presented it to the bank
for payment, which was refused. He then
caused the bill to be protested by a notary
of Nor\\"a_v for non-payment. The drawers
were notified of its non-payment by letter
from the plaintiflf, which they received at
Red Wing as early as May 15, 1877, and also
by the original certificate of protest of the
notary, which, with a translation, was at
that time shown to one of them by the agent
of the plaintiff. to whom the document was
sent for that purpose.
it appears from the findings of the court
below that the drawers had no money to
their credit with the (Jhristiania bank when
the bill was drawn, but depended for its
acceptance and payment upon advices to the
bank by Skow, Peterson, Isberg & Co., bank-
ers, at Chicago. That firm failed and made
an assignment on the twenty-first of March,
1877. It had, however, from February 28th
to that date, inclusive, to its credit with the
bank, money suflicient to pay the bill, but
no portion of it had been set apart for that
Purpose, and it has been since paid to the
assignee of the firm. On the fifteenth of
February, 1877, the drawers wrote to the
Payee a letter stating that, fearing their
draft might not be paid. they had caused a
cable dispatch to be sent to Christiania di-
recting payment, but there was no evidence
that the bank received such a dispatch, if
Bent. or gave them any credit on it.
Eidsvold, at or near which the plaintiff re-
sided, is distant about 50 miles from Chris-
wmous, Ev-16
tiania, the place where the bank was sit-
uated, and between them there was daily
communication by mail and by railway.
In proof of the presentment of the bill to
the bank and the latter's refusal to pay the
same, a copy of the notary’s certificate of
protest was given in evidence by the plain-
tiif, the defendants having stipulated for the
admission of a copy with the like effect as
the original, which was needed elsewhere.
Subsequently the defendants themselves pro-
duced the original for the purpose of show-
ing its character, insisting, at the time, that
it had no authenticity as the act of the
notary, and was not, therefore, competent
evidence of the presentation and non-pay-
ment of the bill. To meet the objection of
unnecessary delay in presenting the bill the
plaintiff gave in evidence, against the objec-
tion of the defendants, the deposition of a
lawyer of Norway as to the law of that
country respecting the presentation of bills
of exchange for payment. Exception was
taken to the ruling of the court in its ad-
mission. It appeared, from the deposition,
that by the law of Norway, the holder of a
foreign bill of exchange, payable at ight,
is allowed a year after its date within which
to present it to the drawee for payment; and
that the drawer is not relieved from liability,
if the presentation be not made within a
year, unless he can prove that owing to the
delay he has suffered a loss in his accounts
with the drawee. Evidence was offered by
the defendants to show that the piaintifl’,
himself, had admitted his negligence in pre-
senting the bill, but on objection of counsel
it was excluded, to which ruling an excep-
‘ tion was taken. The court found in favor
of the plaintiff for the full amount of the
bill. and judgment having been entered on
the finding, the case was brought to this
court for review.
Chas. E. Fiandrau, for plaintiffs in error.
E. C. Palmer, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts
in the foregoing language, delivered the opin-
ion of the court.
The certificate of the protest of the bill
of exchange by the notary in Norway was
properly received in evidence. It is in due
form, and bears what purports to be the seal
of the notary. The seal, it is true, is im-
pressed directly on the paper by a die with
which ink was used. This is evident from
inspection of the original, which has been
transmitted to us from the court below for
our personal examination. The use of wax,
or someother adhesive substance upon which
the seal of a. public oificer may be impress-
ed, has long since ceased to be regarded as
important. It is enough, in the absence of
positive law prescribing otherwise, that the
impress of the seal is made upon the paper
itself in such a manner as to be readily iden-
titled upon inspection.
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PIERCE et al. v. INDSETH. 
{1 Sup. Ct. 418, 106 U. S. 546.) 
Supreme C'.ourt of the United States. Jan. 8, 
1883. 
In error to the circuit court of the United 
States for the district of Minnesota. 
This ls an action by the plaintiff ln the 
court below, Ole A. Indseth, against the de-
fendants, composing the firm of Pierce, Sim-
mons & Co., on a foreign blll of exchan&"e, 
payable at sight to his order, drawn by them 
at Red Wlng, ln Minnesota, on the Chris-
tiania Bank, In Norway, which ls as follows: 
"Exchange 15,441 50-100 kroner, per stamp 2c. 
Ple1'Ce, Simmons & Co., Bankers. 
"Red Wing, Minnesota, February 1, 1877. 
"At sight of this original of exchange (du-
plicate unpaid) pay to the order or 0 . A. 
Indseth 15,441 50-100 kroner, value received, 
and charge same to account of Sk. P. I. & 
Co., Chicago, 88 per advice from them. 
Pierce, Simmons & Co. 
"To Christiania Bank of Kredit Kasee, 
CbrlsUania, Norway." 
The value of these kroners ln our money 
was $4,469.35. 
tlanla, the place where the bank was sit-
uated, and between them there W88 daily 
communication by mall and by railway. 
In proof of the presentment of the bill to 
the bank and the latter's refusal to pay the 
same, a copy of the notary's certificate of 
protest was given in evidence by the plaln-
tltr, the defendants having stipulated for the 
admission of a copy with the like effect 88 
the original, which was needed elsewhere. 
Subsequently the defendants themselves pro-
duced the original for the purpose of show· 
lng its character, insisting, at the time, that 
lt had no authenticity as the act of the 
notary, and was not, therefore, competent 
evidence of the presentation and non-pny-
ment of the blll. To meet the objectlqn of 
unnecessary delay ln presenting the bill the 
plaintiff gave ln evidence, against the objec-
tion of the defendants, the deposition of a 
lawyer of Norway as to the law of that 
country respecting the presentation of bills 
of exchange for payment. Ex<'eptlon was 
taken to the ruling of the court in Its ad· 
mission. It appeared, from the deposltlon, 
that by the law of Norway, the holder of a 
foreign bill of exchange, payable nt sight, 
ls allowed a year after its date within which 
to present lt to the drawee for payment; and 
that the drawer Is not relieved from llablllty, 
lf the presentation be not made within a 
year, unless be <'RD prove that owing to the 
delay he has suffered a loss In his accounts 
with the drawee. E¥ldence was offered by 
the defendants to show that the plalntl.tr, 
himself, bad ndmltted hls negllgence in pre-
senting the blll, but on objection of counsel 
it was excluded, to which ruling an excep-
Indseth resided at the time near Eidsvold, 
In Norway, and the blll was purchased by 
bis agent in :Minnesota, who forwarded lt to 
him. He received it February 27, 1877, and 
retained it in his possession until April 12th 
following, when he presented lt to tile bank 
for payment, w'11ch was refused. He then 
caused the blll to be protested by a notary 
ot Norway for non-payment. The drawers 
were notified of its non-payment by letter 
from the plalntltr, which they received at 
Red Wing as early as May 15, 1877, and also 
by the original certificate ot protest of the 
notary, which, with a translation, was at 
that time shown to one of them by the ngent 
of the plalntltT, to whom the document wns 
sent tor that purpose. 
' tlon was taken. The court found in favor 
I of the plalntltr for the full amount of the blll, and judgment having been entered on 
I the finding, the case was brought to this court for review. 
It appears from the findings of the court 
below that the drawers had no money to 
their credit with the Christiania bank when 
the blll was drawn, but depended for its 
acceptance and payment upon advices to the 
bank by Skow, Peterson, lsberg & Co., bank-
ers, at Chicago. That firm falled and made 
an assignment on the twenty-first ot l\lnrch, 
18i7. It had, however, from February 28th 
to that date, lncluslve, to its credit with the 
bank, money sutftclent to pay the blll, but 
no Portion of lt hnd been set apart for that 
purpose, and it has been since paid to the 
assignee of the firm. On the fifteenth of 1 
February, 1877, the drawers wrote to the 
payee a letter stating that, fearing their 
draft might not be paid, they had caused a 
cable dispatch to be sent to Christiania di-
recting payment, but there was no evidence 
that the bnnk received such a dispatch, lf 
sent. or gave them any credit on It. 
Eidsvold, at or near which the plaintiff re-
sided, la distant about 60 miles from Chris-
'\&tTT nna .....,..,._1A 
Chas. E. Flandrau, for plalntltTs ln error. 
E. C. Palmer, for defendant in error. 
Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts 
ln the foregoing language, delivered the opin-
ion of the court. 
The certificate of the protest of the blll 
of exchange by the notary in ~orway was 
properly received ln evidence. It ls ln due 
form, and bears what purports to be the seal 
of the notary. The seal, lt is true, ls im-
pressed directly on the paper by a die wltb 
which lnk was used. This ls evident from 
Inspection of the original, which has been 
transmitted to us from the court below for 
our personal examination. The use of wax, 
or someotbet· ndheslve substance u11011 which 
the senl of a public officer may be impress-
ed, has long since ceased to be regarded as 
Important. It ls enough, in the absence of 
positlYe law prescribing otherwise, that the 
impress of the sPal Is made upon the paper 
Itself ln such a manner as to be readily iden-
tltted upon Inspection, 
9d.1 
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The language used in Pillow v. Roberts, re-
ported in 13 How. 72, as the sufliciency of
a seal of a court impressed upon paper in-
stead of wax or a wafer, is applicable here.
Said the court, speaking by Mr. Justice
Grier:
“Formerly wax was the most convenient
and the ‘only material used to receive and
retain the impression of a seal. Hence it
was said: 'Sigillum est cera impressa; quia
cera. sine imprcssione non est sigillum.’ But
this is not an allegation that an impression
without wax is not a seal, and for this rea-
son courts have held that an impression
made on wafers or other adhesive substances
capable of receiving an impression, will come
within the deiinltion of ‘cera impressa.' If,
then, wax be construed to be merely a gen-
eral term, including within it any substance
capable of receiving and retaining the im-
pression of a seal, we cannot perceive why
paper, if it have that capacity, should not
as well be included in the category. The
simple and powerful machine, now used to
impress public seals, does‘ not require any
soft or adhesive substance to receive or re-
tain their impression. The impression made
by such a power on paper is as well defined,
as durable, and less likely to be destroyed
or defaced by vermin, accident, or intention
than that made on wax. It is the seal which
authenticates, and not the substance on which
it is impressed; and where the court can
recognize its identity, they should not be
called upon to analyze the material which
exhibits it."
Here there is no difficulty in identifying
the seal. The impression, which is circular
in form, has within its rim the words. "No-
tarial Seal, Christiania." Besides, the court
will take judicial notice of the seals of no-
tarics public, for they are oflicers recognized
by the commercial law of the world. We
thus recognize the seal to the document in
question as that of the notary in Norway,
and as such authenticating the certificate of
protest and entitling it to full faith and
credit. Greenl. Ev. 5 5; Story. Bills, § 277;
Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 179: Chanoine
v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173; Carter v. Burley, 9
H. 559, 568; Holiiday v. McDougal, 20
Wend. 81. The certificate being admitted.
proved the presentation of the bill to the
bank on the twelfth of April, 1870, and its
non-payment. That this presentation was
made within the period allowed by the law
of Norway appears from the deposition of a
lawyer of that country, taken under a com-
mission from the court. That law allowed a
year after the issue of the bill for its presen-
tation; and on the question of timely presen-
tation the law of the place where a foreign
bill of exchange is payable governs, and not
the law of the place where it is drawn. In
giving a bill upon a person in a foreign coun-
try, the drawer is deemed to act with refer-
ence to the law of that country, and to ac-
cept such conditions as it provides with re-
spect to the presentment of the bill for ac-
ceptance and payment. Thus, where days
of grace on bills are different in the two
countries, the rule of the place of payment
must be followed. In England and the Unit-
ed States three days of grace are usually
allowed; in France there are none, and in
some places the number of days varies from
three to thirty. Whatever is required by
law to be done at the place upon which the
bill is drawn, to constitute a sufficient pre-
sentment either in time or manner, must be
done according to that law; and whatever
time is permitted within which the present-
ment may be made by that law, the holder
may take without losing his rights upon the
drawer, in case the bill is not paid. So, also,
if the bill be dishonored, the protest by the
notary must be made according to the laws
of the place. It sometimes happens that
the several parties to a bill. as drawers of
indorsers, reside in different countries, and
much embarrassment might arise in such
cases if the protest was required to conform
to the laws of each of the countries. One
protest is sufficient, and that must be in ac-
cordance with the laws of the place where
the bill is payable.
In this case, the bill having been protested,
the drawers were notified of its dishonor by
letter from the payee, received by them on
the fifteenth of May following, and also by
personal delivery at about the same time of
the original certificate of the protest, with a
translation of it into English, to one of the
drawers by an agent of the payee, to whom
they were transmitted for that purpose. No
question is made that this notice was not
sufficient to charge the drawers. The testi-
mony of the lawyer of Norway as to the law
of that country was admissible under the
statute of Minnesota, which provides that
"the existence and the tenor or effect of all
foreign laws may be proved as facts by paroi
evidence, but if it appears that the law in
question is contained in a written statute or
code, the court may. in its discretion. reject
any evidence of such law that is not ac-
companied by a copy thereof." The general
rule as to the proof of foreign laws is that
the law which is written, that is, statute law.
must be proved by a copy properly authen-
ticated; and that the unwritten law must
be proved by the testimony of experts. that
is, by those acquainted with the law. Ennis
v. Smith, 14 How. 426. But this rule may
be varied by statute, and that of Minnesota.
leaves it to the discretion of the judge to
require the production of a copy of the writ-
ten law when the fact appears that the law
in question is in writing. The discretion of
the judge here was not improperly exercised,
even if in such case his action would be the
subject of review, as contended by counsel.
The admission of the payee that he had
been negligent in presenting the bill was
properly excluded. His negligence in that
respect could not have aflected his legal
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Case No. 84] PROOF. 
Till:' language used In Pillow v. Roberts, re-
ported in 13 How. 4i2. as the suftlcleucy of 
a seal of a court impressed upon paper in-
stead of wax or a wafer, Is applicable here. 
Said the court, speaking by Mr. Justice 
Grier: 
"Formerly wax was the most convenient 
and the ·only material used to receive and 
retain tlre Impression of a seal. Hence it 
was said: '81gilluw est cera impressa; qula 
cera. sine IW(>l"l:'ll81one 11.on est slglllum.' But 
this ls not an allegution that an impression 
without wax ts not a seal, and for this rea-
son courts have held that an impression 
made on wafers or other adhesive substances 
ca.pable of receiving an lmpreBBlon, will come 
within the deflnltlon of 'cera lmpressa.' It, 
then, wax be construed to be merely a gen-
eral term, lnl'ludlng within it any substance 
capable of receiving and retaining the im-
pression of a seal, we cannot perceive why 
paper, if It have thal capacity, should not 
as well be included In the category. The 
simple and powerful machine, now uaed to 
lmpreBS public seals, does· not require any 
soft or adhesive substance to receive or re-
tain their impression. The lmpreBSlon made 
by such a power on paper '8 as well defined, 
as durable, and less likely to be destroyed 
or defaced by vermin, accident, or Intention 
than that made on wax. It Is the seal which 
authenticates, and not the substance on which 
It is Impressed; and where the court can 
recognize its Identity, they should not be 
called upon to analyze the material which 
exhibits It." 
Here there ls no dlftlculty In Identifying 
the seal. The Impression, which ls circular 
In form, has within Its rim the words. '":So-
tarlal Seal. Christiania." Besides, the court 
wlll take judicial notice of the seals of no-
taries public, for they are oftlcers recognized 
by the commercial law of the world. We 
thus recognize the seal to the document lo 
question as that of the notary in Norway, 
and as such authenticating the certificate ot 
protest and entitling It to full faith and 
credit. Greenl. Ev. I 5; Story, Bills, I 27i; 
Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 179; Chanoine 
v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173; Carter v. Burley, 9 
N. H. 559, 568; Holliday v. McDougal, 20 
Wend. 81. The certificate being admitted, 
proved the presentation of the blll to the 
bank on the twelfth of April, 1870, and its 
non-payment. That this presentation was 
made within the period allowed by the law 
of Norway appears from the depoaltlon of a 
lawyer of that country, t11ken under a com· 
mlS!llon from the court. That law allowed a 
year after the Issue of the blll tor its presen-
tation; and on the question of timely presen-
tation the law of the place where a foreign 
bill of exchange ls payable governs, and not 
the law of the place where It la drawn. In 
giving a blll upon a person ln a foreign coun-
try, the drawer ls deemed to act with refer-
ence to the law of that country, and to ac-
cept such conditions u It provides with re-
242 
apect to the presentment ot the bill tor ac-
ceptance and payment. Thus, where days 
of grace on bllls are different ln the two 
countries, the rule of tbe place of payment 
must be followed. In England and the unit-
ed States thre£ days of grace are usually 
allowed; In France there are none, and ln 
some places the number of days varies from 
three to thirty. Whatever ls required by 
law to be done at the place upon which the 
bill ls dmwn, to constitute a suftlclent pre-
sentment either ln time or manner, must be 
done according to that law; and whatever 
time la permitted within which the present-
ment may be made by that law, the holder 
may take without losing bis rights upon the 
drawer, ln case the blll ls not paid. So, also, 
lf the blll be dishonored, the protest by the 
notary must be made according to the laws 
of the place. It sometimes happens that 
the several parties to a blll, as drawers ot 
lndorsera, reside in dltrerent countries, and 
much embarrasBID,rnt might arise ln such 
cases lf the protest was required to conform 
to the laws of each of the countries. One 
protest ls suftlclent, and that must be ln ac-
cordance with the laws of the place where 
the blll la payable. 
In this cue, the blll having been protested, 
the drawers were notUled ot Its dishonor by 
letter from the payee, received by them oo 
the fifteenth of May following, and also by 
personal delivery at about the aame time ot 
the original certificate of the protest, with a 
translation of lt Into Engllfh, to one ot the 
drawers by an agent of the payee, to whom 
they were transmitted for that purpose. No 
question is made that this notice was not 
suftlclent to charge the drawers. The testi-
mony of the lawyer of Norway 88 to the law 
ot that country was admlaalble under the 
statute ot Minnesota, which provides tllat 
"the existence and the tenor or effect ot all 
foreign laws may be proved as facts by parol 
evidence, but If It appears that the law In 
question ls contained In a written statute or 
code, the court may, In Its dlacretlon, reject 
any evidence of such law that la not ac-
companied by a copy thereof." The general 
rule as to the proof of foreign laws la that 
the law which ls written, that ls, statute law, 
must be proved by a copy properly authen-
ticated; and that the unwritten law most 
be proved by the testimony of experts, that 
ls, by those acquainted wlth the law. Ennta 
v. Smith, 14 How. 426. But this rule ma7 
be varied by statute, and that ot Minnesota 
leaves lt to the discretion of the judge to 
require the production of a copy of the writ-
ten law when the fact appears that the law 
In question Is In writing. The discretion of 
the judge here was not Improperly exerclaed, 
even if In such case his action would be the 
subject ot review, as contended by counsel. 
The admission of the payee that he had 
been negligent In presenting the blll was 
properly excluded. His negllgence In that 
respect could not bave aJfected his legal 
JUDlClAL NOTICE.
[Caso N 0. 84
rights, if in point of fact the bill was pre-
sented wlthin the time allowed by the laws
of Norway.
‘We have thus far assumed that the draw-
ers were entitled to notice of the presenta-
tion and non-payment of the bill. But it
may be doubted whether such was the fact.
They had no funds with the bank in Norway
when the bill was drawn or at any other
time, and they relied for its payment upon
the advices of third parties. Although such
third parties had funds at the bank after the
bill had been received by the payee in Nor-
way, there is no evidence that they ever ad-
vised the bank to pay the bill out of such
funds. It is found by the court that the
bank never set apart any portion of them to
meet the bill. The cable dispatch of the
drawers, of which the letter of I+‘ebruary
15th speaks, if it ever reached the bank,
does not appear to have induced it to give
them any credit. In the most favorable
view. therefore, which could be taken of the
position of the drawers, we see nothing which
relieves them from liability.
The judgment is, therefore, aflirmed.
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JUDICIAL NOTICE. [Case No. 84 
rights, lf in point of fact the bill wu11 pre-
sented within the time allowed by the laws 
-Of Norway. 
·we hnYe thus far aBSumed that the draw-
ers were entitled to notice of the presenta-
tion and non-payment of the bill. But It 
ma~· be doubted whether such was the fnct. 
They had no funcls with the bank in Norway 
when the bill was drawn or at any other 
time, and they relied for Its payment upon 
the advices of third parties. Although such 
third parties had funds at the bnnk after the 
bill ball been received by the payee in Nor-
way, there la no evidence that they ever ad-
vised the bank to pay the blll out of suc•h 
funds. It ls found by tile court that the 
bank never set apart any portion of theru to 
meet the bllL The cable dispatch of the 
drawers, of which the letter of February 
15th speaks, If It ever reached the bank, 
does not appear to have Induced it to give 
them any credit. In the most favorable 
view. therefore, which could be taken of the 
position of the drawers, we see nothlngwblch 
relieves them from liability. 
The judgment ls, therefore, aftirmed. 
• 
Case No. S5]
PROOF.
PEOPLE v. WOOD.
(30 N. E. 243, 131 N. Y. 617.)
Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1892.
Appeal from court of oyer and terminer,
Warren county.
Indictment against Joseph Wood for mur-
der. From a judgment of the court of oyer
and terminer, finding the defendant guilty,
defendant appeals. Aflirmed. For former
report, see 27 N. E. 362.
James M. Whitman, for appellant. Ly-
man Jenkins, Dist. Atty. (Charles R. Patter-
son, of counsel), for the People.
FINCH, J . Four unfounded objections,
admitting of brief and easy answers, and in
no respect justifying the delay of this ap-
peal, disclose themselves from a printed case
of 1,400 pages prepared at the expense of
the county of the trial. The prisoner’s coun-
sel raises no question of fact. He concedes
explicitly that upon the proof the verdict is
not to be assailed, either as against the evi-
dence or as unsupported by it, and rests
his argument upon what he claims to have
been errors of law. Three of these are ex-
ceptions to the decision of the court upon a
challenge of individual jurors in cases where
the challenge was sustained, and the jurors
rejected. \Ve have looked at the rulings to
see whether any injustice has been done to
the prisoner of which we ought to take no-
tice. The juror Balcom was rejected be-
cause he had an opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner which he describ-
ed as fixed, and of long standing, and which
would influence his conduct in the jury-box.
Complaint is made that the juror was re-
jected without opportunity for cross-exam-
244
ination by the prisoner’s counsel. It does
not at all appear that the right was either
asserted or denied, or in any manner sought
to be exercised. The jurors Dickinson and
Stewart were rejected because they had con-
scientious scruples against rendering a ver-
dict of guilty in a capital case. They
brought themselves fully within the provi-
sions of section 377 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The juror Cooke was rejected
on account of a present opinion upon the
question of guilt or innocence. Taking his
statement as a whole, his rejection appears
to have been proper. The fourth objection
is that, while the indictment charges the
commission of the crime in the town of
Stony Creek, in the county of Warren, and
while the proof shows the offense in the
town alleged, it does not show that such
town was in the county of Warren. No
such objection was raised at the trial, when
the omission could have been obviated. It
made its first appearance after the verdict,
and on a motion for a new trial on the min-
utes. But, it made when it should have
been, it is a conclusive answer that the court
will take judicial notice of the fact that the
town of Stony Creek is in the county of War-
ren. People v. Breese, 7 Cow. 429; Vander-
werker v. People, 5 Wend. $0; Chapman v.
Wilber. 6 Hill. 475. We have examined the
testimony sufliciently to be satisfied that the
verdict was just. The prisoner admitted the
fact of the killing, and his counsel approved
and stood upon the admission. The defense
of insanity was fairly submitted to the jury,
and it was hardly possible that the verdict
should have been diiferent. The Judgment
must be aifirmed.
All concur.
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Case No. 85] PUOOF. 
PEOPLE v. WOOD. 
(30 N. E. 243, 131 N. Y. 617.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1892. 
Appeal from court of oyer and terminer, 
Warren county. 
Indictment against Joseph Wood for mur-
der. From a judgment of the court or oyer 
and termlner, finding the defendant guilty, 
defendant appeals. Affi.rmed. For former 
report, see 27 N. E. 362. 
James M. Whitman, for appellant. Ly-
man Jenkins, Dist. Atty. (Charles R. Patter-
son, of counsel), for the People. 
FINCH, J. Four unfounded objections, 
admitting of brief and easy answers, and In 
no respect justifying the delay of this ap-
peal, disclose themselves from a printed case 
of 1,4-00 pages prepared at the expense of 
the county of the trial. The prisoner's coun-
sel raises no <iuestlon of fact. He concedes 
explicitly that upon the proof the verdict ls 
not to be assailed, either as against the evi-
dence or as unsuvported by It, and rests 
his argument upon what be claims to have 
been errors of law. Three of these are ex-
ceptions to the decision of the court upon a 
challenge of Individual jurdts In cases where 
the challenge was sustained, and the Jurors 
rejected. We have looked at the rulings to 
see whether any injustice has been done to 
the prisoner of which we ought to take no-
tice. The juror Balcom was rejected be-
cause he had an opinion as to the guilt or 
Innocence of the prisoner which he describ-
ed as fixed, and of long standing, and which 
would influence his conduct In the jury-box. 
Complaint ls made that the juror was re-
jected without opportunity for croBS·exam-
244 
inatlon by the prisoner's counsel. It does 
not at all appear that the right was either 
asserted or denied, or In any manner sought 
to be exercised. The Jurors Dickinson and 
Stewart were rejected because they had con-
scientious scruples against rendering a ver-
dict of gullty In a capital case. They 
brought themselves fully within the provi-
sions of section 377 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. The juror Cooke was rejected 
on account of a present opinion upon the 
question of guilt or Innocence. Taking his 
statement as a whole, his rejection appears 
to have been proper. The fourth objection 
is that, while the indictment charges the 
commission of the crime In the town of 
Stony Creek, In the county of Warren, and 
while the proof shows the otrense In the 
town alleged, It does not show that such 
town was In the county of Warren. No 
such objection was raised at the trial, when 
the omission could have been obviated. It 
made its first appearance after the verdict, 
and on a motion for a new trial on the min-
utes. But, if made when It should ha'l"e 
been, It Is a conclusive answer that the court 
wlll take judicial notice of the fact that the 
town of Stony Creek ls in the county or War-
ren. People v. Breese, 7 Cow. 429; Vander-
werker v. People, 5 Wend. 530; Chauman v. 
Wilber, 6 Hlll. 475. We have examined the 
testimony euffi.ciently to be satisfied that the 
verdict was just. The prisoner admitted the 
fact of the killing, and his counsel approved 
and stood upon the admission. The defense-
of Insanity was fairly submitted to the jury, 
and it was hardly possible that the verdict 
should have been dltrerent. The Judgment 
must be affi.rmed 
All concur. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
[Case No. 86
CO1\iMON\VEALTH v. KING.
(22 N. E. 905, 150 Mass. 221.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Hampshire. Nov. 30, 1889.
Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire
county; BRIGIIAM, Judge. -
This was an indictment charging the de-i
fendant with having run a steam-boat for the
conveyance of passengers on the Connecticut
river at South Hadley, in said county, and
landing and receiving said passengers'at said
South Hadley without having obtained any
license from the selectmen of said town of
South Hadley, as is required by Pub. St. c. 102,
§§ 120-122, which authorize the licensing of
persons to run steam-boats on waters not
within the maritime jurisdiction of the
United States, and punish by tine the run-
ning of such boats without first obtaining a
license. Before the jury were impaneled the
defendant duly moved to quash the indict-
ment against him for the following reasons:
First, because the Connecticut river is a navi-
gable river, and is not a lake, pond, or water,
covered by chapter 102, §§ 120-122, Pub. St.;
semndly, because said indictment, and each
count thereof, is bad for duplicity, inasmuch
as two distinct and separate offenses and
crimes are charged in each count; thirdly,
because it is not alleged in said indictment,
or in any count thereof, that said defendant
was a common carrier at the time of the
commissions of the offenses complained of;
fou-rthly, because it is not alleged in said in-
dictment, or in any count thereof, that said
defendant carried said passengers as afore-
said for hire; fifthly, because no offense or
crime known to the laws of the land is fully
and plainly, substantially and formally, set
out or charged in said indictment. or in any
count thereof. The court overruled the mo-
tion, and the defendant excepted.
At the trial there was evidence tending to
show that upon the dates alleged in the in-
dictment the defendant was in possession of
a certain steam-boat, and carried persons_
from the city of Holyoke, and landed them at
a point about one and one-fourth miles above
Holyoke dam, on the east side of the river
alleged to be within the li its of said town
of South Hadley; that the efendant also
took persons from said point, and carried
them in said steam-boat to said Holyoke; that
on June 24, 1888, the defendant collected
fares of 25 cents from each person on board
said steam-boat, which was for the “round
trip.” including the right to enter the grove
leased by the defendant, and to which grove
said persons went from the landing place;
that the place of landing was at the water’s
edge, several rods from “high-water mark,”
on the easterly or South Hadley side of said
river; that the land on the opposite side of
said stream or river from the said place of
landing was in the city of Northampton; that,
for the purpose of proving that said point at
which said boat landed was in said South
Hadley, the statute incorporating South Had-
ley was put in evidence, and also a map of
the state of Massachusetts, purporting to be
made "by order of the legislature in 1844,
Simeon Borden, superintendent,” was intro-
duced in evidence, subject to the defendant’s
objection; that several witnesses who had no
special knowledge of the boundary line, but
who were residents of the vicinity, were
asked whether they knew in what town the
said point of landing on the east side of the
river was; each answering in the aflirmative,
they were asked and permitted to state that the
place was in South Hadley, and the defend-
ant excepted. It appeared that there were
two dams erected between Hartford, in the
state of Connecticut, and said Hadley, includ-
ing the dam at Holyoke; that before said dam
was built, in 1847, boats were accustomed to
pass through the canal around the falls at
South Hadley, to points further up the stream,
to all towns above. It was admitted at the
trial that said defendant had not obtained any
license from the selectmen of said South Had-
ley to run said steam-boat. This was sub-
stantially all the evidence in the case. After
the evidence was all in. the defendant asked
the court to rule and instruct the jury as fol-
lows: (1) That the Connecticut river, between
Springfield and Hadley, is not a lake, pond,
or water, covered by chapter 102, §§ 120-122,
Pub. St. (2) That the Connecticut river, be-
tween Springlield and Hadley, is within the
maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
(3) That there is no evidence that the Con-
necticut river between Springfield and Had-
ley is not within the maritime jurisdiction of
the United States. (4) That there is no evi-
dence that the defendant ran asteam-boat for
the conveyance of passengers. (5) That there
is no evidence that the defendant landed or re-
ceived passengers within the town of South
Hadley. (6) That, on the whole evidence, the
defendant cannot be convicted. (7) That said
statute, if it applies to the Connecticut river
between Springfield and Hadley, is unconsti-
tutional and void. But the court refused so to
rule in form or substance, and upon the whole
case the court gave full and appropriate in-
structions to the jury, to which no exceptions
were taken save to the refusals to instruct as
above stated. The jury returned a verdict
of guilty, and the defendant excepts.
Ueorge M. Stea-rns and J. B. 0’ Donnell,
for defendant. A. J. Waterman, Atty. Gen.,
and H. A. W3/mun, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the
Commonwealth.
FIELD, J. The only exceptions argued are
the exception to the admission of the map in
evidence, and the exceptions to the refusal of
the court to rule “that there is no evidence
that the Connecticut river, between Spring-
field and Hadley, is not within the maritime
jurisdiction of the United States,” and to the
refusal of the court to quash the indictment,
“because it is not alleged in said indictment,
or in any count thereof, that said defendant
carried said passengers as aforesaid for hire.”
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JUDICIAL NOTICE. [Case No. 86 
COMMONWEALTH v. KING. 
(22 N. E. 905, 150 Mass. 221.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
Hampshire. Nov. 30, 1889. 
Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire 
county; BRIGHAM, Judge. 
'.Chis was an indictment charging the del 
fendant with having run a steam-boat for the 
conveyance of passengers on the Connecticu~ 
river at 8outh Hadley, in said county, fnd 
landing and receiving said passengers-at said 
South Hadley without having obtaint>d any 
license from the selectmen of s1tid town of 
South Iladley, a.sis required by Pub. St. c. 102, 
§§ 120-122, which authorize the licensing of 
persons to run steam-boats on w11ters not 
within the mai·itime jurisdiction of the 
United States, and punish by line the run-
ning of such boats without first obtaining a 
license. Before the jury were impaneled the 
defendant duly moved to quash the indict-
ment against him for the following reasons: 
First, because the Connecticut river is a na vi-
gable ri\'er, and is not a lake, pond, 01· w11ter, 
covered by chapter 102, §§ 120-122, Pub. St.; 
secondly, because said indictment, and each 
count thereof, is bad for duplicity, inasmuch 
as two distinct and separate offenses and 
crimes are charged in each count; thirdl11, 
because it is not alleged in said indictment, 
or in any count thereof, that said defend11nli 
was a common carrier at the time of tho 
comm1ssions of the offenses complulned of: 
fourthly, because it is not alleged in said in· 
dictment, or in any count thereof, that said 
<lefendant carried said p&Ssengers as afo1·~ 
said for hire; fifthly, because no offense or 
crime known to the laws of the land is fully 
and plainly, snl>stnntially and formally, set 
out or charged in said indictment, or in any 
count thereof. The court ovnruled ihe mo-
tion, and the defendant excepted. 
At the trial there was evidence tending to 
show that upon the dates alleged in the in· 
dictment the defendant was in possession of 
a certain steam-boat, and carrit>d persons. 
fl-om the city of Holyoke, and landed them at 
a point about one and one-fourth miles above 
Holy(lke dam, on the east side of the river 
alleged to be within the lilllits of said town 
of South Hadley; thl,lt the 1lefendant also 
took persons from s11id point, and carried 
them in said steam-!Joat to said Hol rnke; that 
on ,June 24, 1888, the defendant collected 
fares of 25 cents from each person on l>oard 
said steam-boat, which was for the "round 
trip." including the l"ight to ente1· th~ grove 
leased by the defendant, and to which grove 
said persons went from the landing place; 
that the place of landing was at the water's 
edge, several rods from "high-water mark," 
on the easterly or South Hadley side of said 
river; that the land on the oppo::1ite side of 
said stream or river from the said place of 
landing was in thecityof Northampton; that, 
for the purpose of proving that said point at 
which said boat landed was in said South 
Hadley, the statute lnco1·porating South Had-
ley was put in evidence, and also a map of 
the state of Massachusetts, purporting to be 
made "by order of the legislature in 1844, 
Simeon Boruen, superintendent," was intro-
ducllll in evidence, subject to the defendant's 
objection; that several witnesses who had no 
special knowledge of the boun<lary line, but 
who were residents of the vicinity, were 
asketl whether they knew in what town the 
said point of landing on the east side of the 
river was; each answering in the affirmative, 
they were asked and permitted to state that the 
place was in South Hadley, and the defend-
ant excepted. It appeared that there were 
two dams erected between Hartford, in the 
state of Connecticut, and s11id Hadley, includ-
ing the dam at Holyoke; that before said dam 
was built, in 1847, boats were accustomed to 
pass through the canal around the falls at 
South Hadley, to points further up the stream, 
to all towns above. It was admitted at the 
trial that said defendant had not obtained any 
licen&e from the selectmen of said South Had-
ley to run said steam-boat. This was sub· 
stantialiy all the evidence in the case. After 
the evid1·nce was all in, the defen11ant asked 
the court to rule and instruct the jury as fol-
lows: ( 1) That the Connecticut river, between 
SpringHeld and Hadley, is not a lake, pond, 
or water, covered by chapter 102, ~~ 120-122, 
Pub. St. (2) 'fhat the Connecticut river, be-
tween Springfield and Hadley, la within the 
maritime jurisdiction of the United States. 
(3) That there ia no evidence that the Con-
necticut river between Springfield and Had-
ley is not within the maritimtl jurisdiction of 
the Unitt!d St.at~a. (4) That there is no evi-
dence that the defendant ran a steam-boat for 
the convt>yance of passengers. ( 5) That tht>r!l 
is no evhlence that the defendant landed or re-
cei ved passengers within the town of South 
Hadley. (6) That, on the whole evidence, tho 
defendant can not be convicted. (7) That said 
statute, if it applies to the C',onnecticut river 
between Springfield and Hadley, is unconsti-
tutional and void. But the COlll't refused so to 
rule in form or substance, and upon the whole 
case the court g1we full and appropriate in· 
struclions to the jury, to which no exct>plions 
were t11ken siwe to the refusah1 to instruct as 
above statt>d. 'fhe jnry returned a verdict 
of guilty, and the defendant excepts. 
<ieorge M. i:itearns and J. B. O'Donnell, 
for defendant. A. J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., 
and H. A. Wyinrm, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the 
CommonweC1!th. 
FIELD, J. The only exceptions argued are 
the exception to the .admission of the map in 
evidence, and the exceptions to the refusal of 
the court to rule "that them is no e\·idence 
that the Connecticut river, betwePn Spring· 
field and Hadley, is not within the maritime 
jurisdiction of tbe United States," and to the 
refusal of the conrt to quash the indictment, 
"because it is not alleged In said indictment, 
or in any count thereof, that said defendant 
carrhid said passengers as aforesaid for hirt>. •• 
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Case No. 86]
PROOF.
The other exceptions taken at the trial must
be regarded as waived. If there was a map
of the towns and counties of the common-
wealth published by authority of the legis-
lature, pursuant to chapter 69 of the Resolves
of the year 1844, it was some evidence of the
boundaries of the town of South Hadley. See
Worcester v. Nortliborough, 140 Mass. 397,
5N. E. Rep. 270. The objection taken in
argument is that the map was allowed to
prove itself, and that it was not shown to
have been published by legislative authority.
Whether this was a genuine map, published
by order of the legislature, as it purported to
be, was a preliminary fact, of which, if dis-
puted, some evidence must have been exhib-
ited to the court before the map could be ad-
mitted iii evidence; but it does not appear
that this fact was disputed, or that the objec-
tion to the admission of the map was taken
on this ground. If such an objection had
been taken, the commonwealth might per-
haps have been able to furnish evidence that
the map was what it purported to be. The
only objection stated in the exceptions is that
the map “was introduced in evidence subject
to the defendant’s objection,” and this must
be considered, not as an objection that sulfi-
cientevidence had not been introduced to show
that the map was what it purported to be,
but as an objection that a map such as this
purported to be was not evidence of the loca-
tion of a boundary line of a town of the com-
monwealth. '
In The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563, it
is said in the opinion that “those rivers must!
be l‘ega1‘(l8d as public navigable rivers in law .
which are navigable in fact; and they are 5
navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce over
which trade and travel are, or may be con-
ducted in the customary modes of trade and ;
travel on water. And they constitute navi-
gable waters of the United States. within the 1
meaning of the acts of congress, in contra-
distinction from the navigable waters of the
states, when they form in their ordinary con-
dition, by themselves or by uniting with oth-
er waters, a continued highway over which
commerce is or may be carried on with other
states or foreign countries, in the customary .
modes in which such commerce is conducted
by water.” Pub. St. c. 102, §§ 120-122, were
first enacted in 1876, (St. 1876, c. 100.)
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Then, as well as now, the statutes of the
United States, regulating steam-vessels, were
contained in title 52 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States. Section 4400 of these
statutes provides that “all steam-vessels nav-
igating any waters of the United States,
which are common highways of commerce, or
open to general or competitive navigation,
excepting public vessels of the United States,
vessels of other countries. and boats propelled
in whole or in part by steam for navigating
canals, shall be subject to the provisions of
this title." See, also, St. U. S. 1882, c. 441;
22 St. at Large, 346. This title contains care-
ful provisions for the inspection of steam-
vessels, and for regulating the number of
passengers which they are permitted to carry.
The statutes of Massachusetts were intended
to regulate steam-boats used for the convey-
ance of passengers which were not subject to
regulation by congress, because they were-
not used in navigating waters of the United
States. We think that the superior court
might take judicial notice that the Connecti-
cut river. above the dam at Holyoke, does
not, either by itself or by uniting with other
waters, constitute a public highway over
which commerce may be carried on with oth-
er states or with foreign countries, although,
‘ if the court had entertained anydoubt on the
subject, it might have required evidence to
be produced. it is well known that the wa-
ters of the Connecticut river, at the place
where it is alleged that the defendant's steam-
boat was employed, can be used by vessels
only for the transportation of persons and
property between different places in Massa-
chusetts. They are therefore waters not
within the maritiinejiii"isdiction of the United
3 States. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568; The
Montello, 11 Wall. 411, 20 Wall. 430; Miller
, v. Mayor. etc., 109 U. S. 385, 395, 3 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 225.
The objection to the form of the indictment
cannot prevail. The indictment follows the
' ‘words of the statute. The word “ passengers"
j ‘is used in the statute and in the indictment
l in its ordinary sense, and has the same mean-
l ing in one as in the other. If, in order to
I constitute a passenger, a person must be car-
ried for hire,—upon which we express no
opinion,-_—tliere was evidence that at least on
i one occasion, which was described in the in-
dictment. the defendant collected fares of the
_ persons carried. Exceptions overruled.
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Case No. 86] PROOF. 
The other exceptions taken at the trial must 
be regarded as waived. If there was a map 
of the towns and counties of the common-
wealth published by authority of the legis-
lature, pursuant to chapter 69 uf the Resolves 
of the year 1844, it was some evidence of the 
boundaries of the town of South Hadley. See 
Worcester v. Northborough, 140 Mass. 397, 
5 N. E. Rep. 270. '.rhe objection taken in 
argument is that the map was allowed to 
prove itself, and that it was not shown to 
have boen published by legislative authority. 
Whether this was a genuine map, published 
by order of the legislature, as it purported to 
be, was a preliminary fact, or which, if dis-
puted, some evidence must have been exhib-
ited to the court before the map could be atd-
mitted in evidence: but it does not appear 
that this fact. was disputed, or that the objec-
tion to the admission of the map was taken 
on this ground. If such an objection had 
been taken, the commonwPalth might per-
haps have been able to furnish evidence that 
the map was what it purported to be. The 
only objection stated In the exceptions ls that 
the m1tp "was Introduced in e\·idence subject 
to the defendant's objection," and this must 
be considered, not as an objection that sufll. 
cientevidence had not been introduced to show 
that the map was what it purported to be, 
but as an objection that a map such as this 
purported to be was not evidence of the loca-
tion or a boundary line of a town of the com· 
monwealth. · 
In The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563, Ill 
is said in the opinion that "those rivers rnusll 
be regarded as public navigable rivers in la\\· 
which are navigable in fact; and they ar" 
navignhle in fact when they are used, or are 
susceptillle of being used, in their ordinary 
condition, as highways for commerce over 
which trade and travel are, or may be con-
ducted in the customary modes of trade and 
travel on water. And they constitute navi-
gable Witters of the United States, within the 
meaning of the acts of congress, in contra· 
distinction from the navigable waters of the 
states, when they form in their ordinary con· 
dition, by themselves or by uniting with oth-
er waters, a continued highway over which 
commel'ce is or may be carried on with other 
states or foreign countries, in the customary 
modes in which such commerce is conducted 
by water." Pub. St. c. 102, §~ 120-122, were 
ft1·11t enacted in 1876, (St. '1~76, c. 100.) 
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Then, as well as now, the statutes of th& 
United States, regulating steam-vessels, wer& 
contained in title 52 of the Revised Statute& 
of the United States. Section 44-00 of these 
statutes provides that "all steam-vessels nav-
igating any waters of the United States, 
which are common highways of commerce, or 
open to general or competitive navigation, 
excepting public vessels of the United States, 
vessels of othercountl"ies, and boats propelled 
in whole or in part by steam for navigating 
camds, shall be subject to the provisions of 
this title." See, also, St. U.S. 1882, c. 441; 
22 ~t. at Large, 846. This title contains care· 
ful provisions for the inspection of steam-
vessels, and for regulating the number or 
passengers which they ar" permitted to Nrry. 
The statutes of MaBSachusetts were intended 
to regulate steam-boats used for the convey-
ance of passengers which were not subject to 
regulation by congress, because they were· 
not used in navigating waters of the United 
Btatl's. We think that the superior court 
might take judicial notice that the Connecti· 
cut river, above the dam at Holyoke, does 
not, either by itself or by uniting with other 
waters, constitute a public highway over 
which commerce may be carried on with oth· 
er states or with foreign countries, althOUJ(h, 
if the court had entertained any doubt on th& 
subject, it might have required evidence to 
be produced. 1t is WPll known that the wa-
ters of the Connecticut river, at the plac& 
where it is alleged that the defend:mt's steam-
boat was employed, can be used by vessels 
only for the transportation of persons and 
property between different places in Massa-
chusetts. They are therefore waters not 
within the maritim-,juri11iliction of the TTriitet\ 
States. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568: Th& 
Montello, 11 Wall. 411, 20 Wall. 4l:JO; Miller 
v. Mayor, etc., 109 U. S. 385, 395, 3 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 22~. 
The objection to the form of the indictment 
cannot prevail. The indictment follows the 
·words of the statute. The word "passengers" 
:is used in the statute and in the indictment 
in its ordinary sense, and has the same mean-
ing in one as in the other. If, in order to 
constitute a passenger, a person must be car-
ried for hire,-upon which we express no 
opinion,- thern was evidence that at least 011 
one occasion, which was described in the in-
dictment. the defendant collected fares of the 
persons carried. Exceptions overruled. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
[Case No. 87
CAREY et ai. v. REEVES et ai.
(26 Pac. 951, 46 Kan. 571.)
June 6, 1891.
Error from superior court, Shawnee
county; W. C. Webb, Judge.
Carey and Bray commenced on October
26, 1883, this action to quiet title toa quar-
ter section of land in Shawnee county.
They alleged ownership and actual pos-
session.
The following are the legal conclusions:
“The questions of law in this action are:
First. Was the affidavit of Wilson Shau-
non, filed in theclc-rk's office of the district
court January 17,1861, described in con-
clusion of fact No. 4. in the action cum-
nienced‘ by Reuben H. Fnrnham againt
said James McCamman,forthe purpose of
reforming and foreclosing the mortgage
hereinbelore described, sufficient in law to
authorize service by publication in said
action against the defendant, James Mc-
Cainman, under section 79.Code of Proced-
ure I859, (Compiled Laws of 1862, c. 26?)
Second. Wa the affidavit of J. T. Cum-
mings, publisher of the newspaper. suffi-
cient in law to show that the publication
notice was made ‘six consecutive weeks?‘
as required by law in such actions? Third.
If both these propositions are found in the
affirmative, then the plaintiffs must fail in
this action. Ifeitherof these propositions
are solved in the negative, then the court
did not have jurisdiction to decree a sale
of the land in controversy described in
plaintiffs‘ petition, and the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover in this action. Fourth.
That the issue of law is against the plain-
tiffs and in f'ivor of the defendants. " To
the conclusions of law in favor of the de-
fendants and against the plaintiffs the
plaintiffs excepted, and bring the case here.
G. C. Plemens, for plaintiffs in error. H.
H. Harris, for defendants in error.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
H()R'I‘ON,C.J. TheUnitedStatesissued
a patent to the land in controversy to
James McCamman on the lst day of June,
1860, and the findings are to the effect that
the plaintiffs are the owners by conveyan-
ces from .\icCamman, unless the judgment
of October 9, 1861, of Reuben H. Farnham
again.-t James Mctlamman and thesale of
the land thereunder divested Mc(Jamman
of his title. When this case was here be-
fore, (Carey v. Reeves. 32 Kan. 718, 5 Pac.
Rep. 22.l Mr. Justice VALENTINE, speaking
for the court, said: “When this affidavit
[for publication service] was filed, is not
shown. it is alleged that the action was
commenced on January 17, liliil, and the
affidavit shows that the petition was filed
‘on the ——— day of January, 1861;’ but
there is nothing to show when the affida-
vit was in fact filed. If it was filed prior
to January 29. 1861, the region of country
known as ‘ Pike‘:-x Peak.’ or a portion
thereof, was in Kansas; but if the affida-
vit was filed after January 29. 1861, then
such region was not in Kansas, and no
part thereof was in Kansas. " " ' We
suppose that when the plaintiffs in this
action say that the foreclosure action
was commenced on January 17. 1861, they
mean that" the petition was filed on that
day. But when the service was made is
not shown: nor is it shown when the
judgment was rendered. It may have
been in 1861, or in 1862, or in some subse-
quent year. We cannot say that the
court below erred in deciding against the
plaintiffs in this particular." At the last
trial it was shown. and the court express-
ly found. that the affidavit for publication
was filed on the 17th day of January,l861.
This was while Kansas existed as a terri-
tory and before its admission asa state
into the Union. it was also shown, and
expressly found at the last trial. that on
January 17.12561, and for some time pre-
vious thereto. James l\icCamman resided
in Denver. and within the territory of
Kansas, and continued to reside there aft-
er the 29th of January, 1861, when Kansas
was admitted as a state. The former de-
cision of this court in this case at its July
term, 1884, (32 Kan. 718, 5 Pac. Rep. 22,) is
not decisive or controlling, because the
facts now presented in the record are ma-
terially different from those which we
considered at the time the former opinion
was handed down. The affidavit for pub-
lication stated that the defendant, James
l\lct‘amman. “has removed from the said
county of Shawnee. and now resides in
that region of country known as ‘Pike's
Peak,‘ and that service of summons can-
not be made on him within this terri-
tory." At the time that Kansas was or-
ganized as a territory its western bound-
ary extended “to the eastern boundary of
the territory of Utah, on the summit of
the Rocky mountains.” We must take ju-
dicial notice of where “the region of conn-
try known as ‘ Pike's Peak ' " existed on
the 17th of January.1861. State v.'l‘eisse-
dre, 30 Kan. 476, 2 Pac. Rep. 650; State v.
Bald win, 36 Kan. 1. 12 Pac. Rep. 318;
Railroad (lo. v. Barge, 40 Kan. 736, 21
Pac. Rep. 589. Lippincott‘s Pronouncing
Gazetteer of the World, (published in
15:36.) referring to Kansas, said: “It is a
territory of the United States of America,
formed by an act of congress passed May.
1854, lying between 37° and 40° N. lat., and
between about 94° 30' and 107° W. ion.
About 100 miles of the W. portion lies be-
tween 3S° and 40° N.lat. It is bounded on
the N. by Nebraska. Territory; E., by the
states of Missouri and Arkansas; S., by
Indian Territory and New Mexico; and
W.. by New Mexico and Utah. This ter-
ritory is about 630 miles in length from E.
to W.. and 208 in its widest, and 139 in its
W. part. including an area of nearly 114,-
798 square miles. The Rocky mountains
separate it from Utah, and the Missouri
river forms a small part of the N. E.
boundary.“ 'l‘he New American (‘yclo-
piedia (volume 10, p.103, published in 1.-460)
described Kansas as follows: “ it isa terri-
tory of the United States. lying between
lat. 37° and 40° N. and long. 94° -ill’ and
106° 50' W., bounded N. by the territory of
Nebraska, E. by the state of Missouri, S.
by the Indian Territory and New Mexico,
and W. by New Mexico and Utah. With
the exception of the N. E. corner of the
territory, where the boundary line fol-
lows the irregular course of the Missouri
river. its shape is that of a parallelogram
as far W. as long. 103°. The boundary
then follows this meridian N. to lat. 38°,
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JUDICIAL NOTICE. [Oase No. 87 
CAREY et aJ. T. REEVES et al. 
(26 Pac. 9M, 46 Kan. 571.) 
Supreme Court of Ka11111J1. June 6, 1891. 
Error from 11uperlor court, Shawnee 
coonty; W. C. Webb, Judy,t>. 
Carey and Bray comwPnced 011 October 
26, l81l3, thlM action to quiet. title to a quar-
ter eectton of land In Shawnee county. 
Thf'y alleged owne:n!hlp and actual pos-
~lon. 
The following are the legal conclusion&: 
"The questions of law In thl11 Hetlon ure: 
Flrllt. Was the atftdavlt of Wilson Rhan-
non. filed In thecle1·k'e otftee of the district 
court Jnnnary 17, l!-C61, d1.11Cribed In con-
elnslon of fact No. 4. In the action com-
menced" by Reuben H. Fnroham against 
said James McCammon, for the purpose of 
reforming and foreclo&log the mortgage 
herelnbelore described, sufticleot In law to 
authorise service by publil'atloo In said 
action agaloat the defeo1laot, James lttc-
Camman, under section 19, Cods ol Proced-
ure 1859, (Compiled Lawa or 1862, c. 26?) 
SPCond. Was tbl' afHdavlt or J. T. Cum-
mlog11, publisher of the newspaper, sutft. 
elent In law to 11how that the publication 
not1ce was mocfo 'six consecutive weeks?' 
u required by la\\' In such actions? Third. 
If both these r1roposttlo1111 are found to the 
affirmative, then the plalntlfts most fall In 
this action. lfeltherol these propositions 
are solved lo the ne11:atlve, then the court 
did not have Jurisdiction to decree a 11&le 
of the land in controversy det1crlb~ In 
plalotlfra' petition, 11.od the plalntlfts are 
entitled to n>eover In this action. Fourth. 
That the Issue of law Is agaln11t the plalo-
tlfts and In f'lvor of the defendants." To 
the coocluslons of law In favor of the d6-
feodants and against lhe plAlntltts ~he 
plaintiffs excepted, and bring the ca11e ht>re. 
G. C. t .'/P.mens, for plalotlff111 In error. B. 
R. Barrlll, for defendants In error. 
HORTON,C.J. TheUnitedStateal1111ed 
a patent to "the land In controvel"l'ly to 
Jan;es McCammon on th~ lst dfty of June, 
lSOO, and the ftndlngB are to tbe effect that 
the plalntlftK are the owner& by conv~9au­
c~11 from McCammao, nnle11a the Jucl11:ment 
of October 9, 1861, of Reubeu H. Farnham 
agatn1<t James MeCammno and the sale of 
the lRod thereunder 1llvested MeCo.mmnn 
of bis tltle. Wheil this ease was here be-
fore, (Cruey v. Reeves. :12 Kan. 718, 5 Pac. 
Rep. 2'.l, l Mr. Justice VALENTINE, speaking 
for the court, said: "When this afftdaYlt 
[for publication service] was ftled, la not 
shown. It Is all~ged that the action watt 
commenced on Jannary 17, 1861, and the 
amdavlt shows thetthe petition was Hied 
'on the --day of January, 1861;' but 
there Is nothlnfl: to show when the afllcla· 
Tit was In far.t ftlelf. If It was tiled prLor 
to Ja1mary 29, 1861, the region or collntry 
known as •Pike's Peak,' or a portion 
tbel't'of, wa11 In Kansas; but If the ufllcla-
vlt was ftled after Januar9 :.!9, 1861, then 
such region was not In Kansas, and no 
part thereof was In Kansas. • ,. • ·we 
suppose that when the plaintiffs lo this 
action say that the lon>elosure Rctlon 
was r.ommeneed on January 17. lRtil, thl'.V 
mean that · the petition was ftled on that 
day. But wht'o the service was made Is 
not shown: nor Is It shown when the judgment was ren<lered. It may bave 
been In 1861, or lo 1!'62, or lo some eub11e-
quent Yf'Rr. We cannot say that the 
court below erred In deciding against the 
plnlntltts In this partlc·alar." At the lut 
trial It was ebowo. and the ec>urt express-
ly found. that the affidavit for publil'ation 
was tllt>d on the 17th day of Jannnry, 1861. 
'l'hls was while Kansas existed as a terri-
tory and before Its all mission as .a Mtate 
Into the Union. It was also shown, and 
expressly found at the last trlul, that on 
January 17, ltlfU, and for some time 11re-
vfous thereto, James McCammao resided 
lo Denver. and within the territory of 
Ken11a!i and continued to reside there aft-
er the :ontth of January, 1861, when Ka1111a.s 
was admitted as a state. The former de-
cision of this court In this caBe at Its July 
term, lss.i, (32 Kao. 718, 5 Pac. Rep. 2'l,) la 
not decisive or contr.>lllng, beeause the 
facts now presented In the record are ma-
teriully .~unerent from those which we 
considered at the time the former opinion 
was banded down. The affidavit for pub-
lication stated tbat the defendant, James 
Mcl'amman, "bas removed from the said 
county of ~ha wnee, and now reeldee in 
that region of country known flll 'Pike's 
Peak; and that service of summons l'an-
oot be made on him within this terri-
tory." At the time that Kansas was or-
ganized a11 a territory l'bl we11tern bound-
ary extended "to the eastern boumhtry of 
the territory of Utah, on the summit of 
the Rocky mounto.ln11." We must take ju-
dicial not!ee or where "the region of ~oun­
try known as •Pike's Peak' .. existed on 
thl' 17th uf January, 1861. l::Jtate v. 'l'elsse-
dre, 80 Kan. 476, 2 Pee. Rep. 650; 8tate v. 
Baldwin, 86 Kan. 1, 12 Pt1c. Rep. lH8; 
Hallroad Co. v. Burge, .W Kao. i36, 21 
Pac. Rep. ~. Llpfllncott's Pronouncing 
G 11zetteer of the World, (lmhl11.d1ed in 
l!S>6,) referring to Kansas, said : "It Is a 
territory or the United 8tates of America, 
formed by an act of congress pas11ed May, 
1854, lying between 37° aud ·i0° N. lat., anll 
betwtto about 94° 30' and 107° W. Ion. 
About 100 miles of the W. 11ortlon lief! be-
tween 88° and 40° N. lat. It 111 bounded on 
the N". by Nebraska Territory; E., by the 
states of Missouri and Arkansas: S., by 
Imllan Tf'rrltory and New Mexico : and 
W ., by New Mexico and Utah. 'l'hls ter-
ritory ts About 680 miles In length from E. 
to W., and 208 lo Its wlcleet, and 181J In Its 
W. part, Including an areft of nearly 114,-
798 square miles. The Rocky mouotaln11 
separate it from Utah, 1tnd the Missouri 
rlvt>r forms a Rmall part of the N. E. 
boundary." 'l'be New American l'yelo-
preclla ( volnme 10, p.103, published In lSGO) 
described Kansas as foilo ws: "It 111 a terri-
tory of the United States. lying betwt-en 
lat. :l7° and 40° N. and lon11:. 94° 40' and 
106° 50' W., bounded N. by the territory of 
.Nebrm1ka, E. by the 11tate of l\lls11ourl, S. 
by the Indian •rerrltory and New Mexico, 
and W. by New Mexico und Utah. With 
the ex<.'eptlon of the N. J<~. corner of the 
territory, where the boundary line fol-
lows the irregular eoun1e of the MiRsourl 
river, Its shape le that of a parellelop:ram 
as far W. as long. 10:J0 • The boundary 
then follows thls meridian N. to lat. 38°, 
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and runs W. along that parallel to long.
106° 50’: thence N. to about lat. 39° 20'.
E. to long. 105° 40’, and finally N. again
until it meets the Nebraska frontier.
Length, E. and W., 550 M.; breadth, E. of
long. 103°. 208 M.; W. of that line, 139 M.;
area. 114,798 Sq. M.” The Encyclopaedia
Britannica. (volume 23. p.4796.) in describ-
ing the Rocky mountains, says: “Gray's
peak (14.3-fl feet) is the highest pointin this
range. (the front, or Colorado range.)
but. although on the continental divide,
it is too far west to be visible from the
plains. This divide. which separates the
Atlantic water from those of the Pacific.
follows the front range as far as Gray‘s
peak, where it is deflected westward for
20 miles to the Sawatch range, which it
follows for about 75 miles. In this defiex-
ion the divide passes between Middle and
South parks, the lowest pass in this part
being that called the ‘Tennessee,’ (10,418
_feet.) which icads from the head of the Ar-
kansas to the Grand River branch of the
Colorado. The Sawatch range is one of
the highest and best marked chains in the
Rocky mountains. It lies west of thehead
of the Arkansas; and its dominating
peaks, along the whole range, exceed 14,-
000 feet. The most northerly of these. the
Mountain of the Holy Cross, (14,176 feet.)
was so named on account oi the existence
on its eastern flank of a large snow-field
lying in two ravines which intersect each
other at right angles, in the form of a
cross. and which in summer is conspicu-
ously visible from a great distance. The
highest point ls Mount Harvard, (145375
feet.) and the passes range from 12,000 to
13.000 feet. The continental dividefoilows
the Sawatch range to its southern cnd, in
lat. 38° 20', and then runs in a south-west-
erly direction for about 75 miles, overa.
high region without any distinctly marked
range. Here it turns, and, running south-
east:-rly, follows the crest of the San Juan
range, which at many points rises above
13,000 feet." Not only as a matterof factis
the summit of the Rocky mountains (the
western boundary of the territory of
Kansas) a. long distance west of Pike’s
Peak. but it was so generally mentioned
in the gnzetteers, geographies, and en-
cyciopuedias in general use in 1861.
248
Therefore “the region of country known
as 'l’ii~:e’s Peak“ on the 17th of January,
1861. and until Kansas was admitted into
the Union,0n January 29.1861, was within
the territory of Kansas. and generally
known to he within the territory of Kan-
sas. The afiidavit for service by publica-
tion showed upon its face that James Mc-
Camman had removed from the county of
Shawnee and resided “in the region of
country known as ‘ l’lke's Pcak."‘ That
region was within. not without. the terri-
tory of Kansas at the date of the tiling of
this afiidavit: therefore McCamman was
not a. non-resident of the territory of
Kansas at the time the service by publica-
tion was made; thereforesuch publication
was void,—that ls, it was invalid as a
constructive service, because 1-he affidavit
for puhlicntion afiirmatively showed that
the defendant resided within the territory
of Kansas. and it was not stated that he '
had departed from the territory or the
county of his residence with the intent to
delay or defraud his creditors. or to avoid
the service of a summons, or to kecp him-
self concealed. It has already been decid-
ed by this court that it cannot be shown
in a collateral attack that the afiidavit
for publication is untrue. Ogden v. Wal-
ters. 12 Kan. 282: Rowe v. Palmer. 29
Kan. 337: (‘arey v. Reeves, 32 Kan. 718. 5
Pac. Rep. :22. But that is not this (ase.
in this case the affidavit is insufficient up-
on its face. It does not state facts to au-
thorize any puhlication service; therefore
no personal or constructive service was
ever had upon McCamman prior to the
rendition of the judgment against him on
the9th day of 0ctober,1§61. Con1p.Laws,
c. 26. tit. 4, 6, §§ 52, 78, 79. See. also, title
11, §3$5, same chapter. Upon the findings
of fact the judgment must be reversed.
and the cause remanded with direction to
the district court to renderjudgment for
the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
This direction will not prevent the defend-
ants from recovering any taxes paid by
them. ii’ any have been paid. while the
land has been in controversy in any of the
courts of this state. Sess. Laws 1876. c.
3-i, § 149. par. 7004. Gen. St. 1889: Wood
v. Grubie. 31 Kan. 69, 1 Pac. Rep. 277. All
the justices concurring.
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case No. 87] PROOF. 
nncl runs W. along that parallel to long. 
106° 50': thence N. to about lat. 39° 20', 
E. to Ion~. 100° 40', and finally N. a,,;Rln 
until tt meets the NPbraska frontier. 
Leugth, E. and W .. 650 M.; breadth, E . of 
long. 108°, 208 M.; W. of that line, 139 M.; 
area, 114,798 Sq. M." The Eneycloruedla. 
Britannica, (volume 23, p.4700.) In describ-
ing the Hoeky mountaln11, says: .. Gray's 
r>ea.k ( 14,:Ul feet) Is the hlghl'Rt point In this 
range. (the front, or Colorado ran11:e.) 
but. although on tba continental dh·lde, 
It Is too far weRt to bt1 vlRlble from the 
plains. Thie divide. whll'h separatf's the 
Atlantic water from those or the Pacific. 
follows the front ranp;e us far as Gray's 
peak, where it Is deftcctl•d wl•stward for 
20 miles to the 8awatch rauge, which It 
follows for al.wot 75 mlleH. In this deflex-
lou the divide p11s11eot between Middle and 
South park11, the lowe11t pass In this part 
being that called the • T1mnf'Bsee, • (10,418 
. feet,) which leads from the head of the Ar-
kamm1t to the Grand Rlveor branch or the 
Colorado. The Sa watch ran11:e h; one of 
the highest and bP.tit marke1l chains In the 
Rocky mountains. It lle1t wet1tof the head 
of the Arkansas; and Its dominating 
peaks, along the whole range>, eic:ct'E.'d 14,-
000 feet. The most northerl.v of these, the 
Mountain of the Holy Cro1111, (1.&,176 feet,) 
was so named on account or the existenee 
on its eastern flank or a large snow-field 
lying in two ravines which intersect each 
otbrr at right angle11, In the form or a 
cross. and which lu summer Is conspl:!U· 
ou11ly \0 lsible from a great distance. The 
hl1Chest point Is Mount Harvard, (14,375 
feet.) and tile pu.sses renire from 12,000 to 
13,000 feet. The continental divide follows 
the Sa watch rangfl to Its southern eu1l, In 
lat. 3S0 20', and then runs In a south-west-
erls direction for about 75 mllCH, over a 
hlgb region without any dlstiuctly marked 
ran11;e. Here It turns, and, running south-
eaHtt•rly, follows the crest of the Sun .Juan 
range, which at many points rh1es above 
13,000 feet." Not only as a matter of fact ls 
the 1rnmmlt of the Rocky mountains (the 
WeHtern boundary of the territory of 
Kansas) a Jong dlstanee wE'tlt of Pike's 
Peak, but it was so generally mentioned 
.lo the i;razettet"rs, geographies, and en-
cyclopa-<llas in general use In 1861. 
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Therefore .. the region of coon try known 
as 'Pike's PPak"' on the 17th of January, 
1861. and until Kansas was admitted Into 
the U11lon, on January 29, lSdl, was within 
the territory of Kan11as, and generally 
known to he within the territory of Kan-
sas. 'l'he afflda vtt for service by 1mblica-
tlon showed upon its faetco that James Mc-
Camman had removed from the county of 
Shawnee and resldt!d "In the region of 
country known us• Pike's Penk.'~ That 
region \Vas within. not without. the terri-
tory of Kansas at the date of the flllnJ( of 
this aftldavlt: thPrefore McCamman was 
not a non-resident of the territory of 
Kansas at the time the service by publica-
tion was mncle; therefora1tuch publication 
was volcl,-that Is, It was lnvaJl<I as a 
construetlve servtre, because 1·he afftda \"It 
for puhllcntlon afttrmatlvely showeod that 
the deft-ndant ~1dded within the territory 
of Kansas, and it was not st11tl'd that he · 
bad departed from the tPrrltory or thto 
eounty of his residence with the Intent to 
delay or defraud hie creditors, or to avoid 
the service of a summons, or to kt"f'I' him-
self concealed. It has already bl:lt!n decid-
ed by thl11 court thnt It cannot beo shown 
In a rolloternl attack that the> affidavit 
for publl<'atlon 111 untrue. Oii;den v. Wal-
ters. 12 Kan. 282: Rowe v. Palmer. 29 
Kan. 837: <'arev v. Ree\·es, 32 Knn. 7JM, 6 
Pac. Re"l. 22. But that ltt not tbl11 ts1te. 
Jn this Cilse the affidavit le lnsufflclPnt up-
on Its face. It doeoe not state facts to au-
thorize any publication l!Prvice; tbeorefore 
no per1wnal or eonstructlve service was 
ever had upon McCamman prior to the 
rf'nclltlou of the jud11:ment against him on 
the9tb day of October,ltsfll. Comp.Laws, 
c. 26, tit. 4, 5, I§ 62, 78, 79. See, also, title 
11, § 31';), same chapter. Upon the tlndlngs 
of fact the jullgment must be reversed, 
and the cam~e remanded with dlreetton to 
tho district court to render JudgmPnt for 
the plaintiffs and against the dt.>fendants. 
ThlH direction wlll not prevent the defend-
ants from recovering any taxes t>ald by 
them. if any have been paid, while the 
land bas been in controvllrsy In any of the 
courts of this state. Sess. Laws l!\76. e. 
84, § H9. par. 7004, Gen. ~t. 18.'lU: Wood 
v. Gruble, al Kan. 69, 1 Pac. Rep. 277. All 
the justices concurring. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
[Case No. 88
WETZLER v. KELLY ct al.
(3 South. 747, 83 Ala. 440.)
Feb. 21, 1888.
Appeal from circuit court, Geneva county;
J. l\I. Carmichael, Judge.
This was a claim suit brought in the magis-
trate‘s court originally. S. A. Wetzler sued
one J. L. Wright in the justicé of the peace
court on a waive note, and obtained a judg-
ment against him, for which an execution is-
sued, and was duly levied on the cotton which
is now the subject of the present claim suit.
Upon the levy being made upon the cotton
which was in the possession of the defendant
in execution, the claimants, G. W. Kelly & Co.,
appellees in the present appeal, interposed a
claim to the cotton so levied upon. Whaley
was shown to be the authorized agent of the
claimants, G. W. Kelly & Co. Upon the evi-
dence, which is sufliciently fully set out in
the opinion of the court, the plaintiff asked
the court to charge the jury in writing,“that,
if they believed the evidence, they must find
for the plaintiif.” The court refused to give
the said charge, and the plaintiif excepted.
The claimants asked the court to give the fol-
lowing charge, which was in writing: “That,
if they believed the evidence, they must find
for the claimants." The court gave the
charge, against the objection of the plaintifi,
and the plaintiff duly excepted. The giving
of this charge at the request of the claimants,
and the refusal to give the charge requested
by the plaintiff, are here assigned as error.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
Marcellus E. Milligan, for appellant. F. J.
.\Iilligan and H. L. Martin, for appellees.
STONE, C. J. It is manifest that the pres-
ent judgment must be reversed, unless the
facts which occurred when Whaley visited
Wright in September, or the act “to amend
section one of an act entitled ‘An act to
amend section 33-ll of the Code,”’ works a.
change of the rights of the parties. The stat-
ute was approved February 28, 1887 (Sess.
Acts. 150). Code 1886, § 3004; Iron-Works
Co. v. Renfro, 71 Ala. 577; Marks v. Robin-
son, 82 Ala. 69, 2 South. 292. Wetzler, the
appellant, claimed a lien on the cotton in
controversy, under an execution issued on a
judgment against one Wright, and which was
levied on the cotton as Wright's in October,
1886. The cotton when levied on was on the
land on which it was grown, the home or
Wright, the defendant in execution. The cot-
ton had been grown by Wright. Kelly & Co.
interposed a statutory claim to the property,
by aiildavit filed that they had a just claim
to it. This claim was interposed October 1G,
1886. after the levy of Wetzlei-‘s execution.
Kelly & Co. had a nio1't;_'age on the crop to
be grown by \Vright in 18813, which was dat-
ed in January of that year. It is common
knowledge that crops of cotton are not plant-
ed in this state until after that time. The
crop not being planted when the mortgage
was made to Kelly & Co., they were without
legal title to it, and could not maintain their
claim at law, by mere force of the mortgage
itself. Iron-\Vorks C0. v. Renfro, 71 Ala. 577;
3 Brick. Dig. 776, §§ 7, 8; Marks v. Robinson,
S2 Ala. 69, 2 South. 292; Jackson v. Bain, 74
Ala. 328.
The testimony of Whalcy neither proved,
nor tended to prove, a delivery of the cotton
to him as the agent of the claimants. 1-ic
did not take possession, nor was it contem-
plated that he should do so. The remark of
Wright referred alike to the ungathcred crop,
and to that which had been gathered. He
said: “You have a mortgage. All that is
yours; you can have it,” referring to the
crop. Whaley instructed Wright to haul the
cotton to the gin, have it ginned, and bring
it to Newton; but the cotton never came into
the actual possession of Whaley, and was al-
lowed to remain in possession of Wright, de-
fendant in execution and mortgagor. While
so in his possession, the levy of Wetzler‘s
execution was made, out of which the pres-
ent contest grew. The remark of Wright had
reference alone to the interest the mortgage
secured to Kelly & Co., and neither changed
the status of the property, nor was it intend-
ed to do so. Nor can the statute, enacted aft-
er the present claim suit was instituted, af-
fect the rights of the parties. Code 1886, §
3004. As we have shown, when the claim
was interposed by Kelly & Co., October 16,
1886, they were without a title which would
avail them in this character of suit. We need
not inquire whether it was within the pale of
legislative power to heal this imperfection by
retroactive enactment» Trust Co. v. Boykin,
38 Ala. 510; Steamboat Go. v. Barclay, 30
Ala. 120. It is suflicient for the wants of this
case that in the act approved February 28,
1887, (Sess. Acts 150,) no intention is shown
to give it a retrospective operation. We feel
bound, therefore, to hold that that statute
can exert no influence in the decision of this
case. 2 Brick. Dig. 462, § 31; Farris v. Hous-
ton, 78 Ala. 250; Warten v. Matthews, 84)
Ala. 429; Security Co. v. Board, etc., 81 Ala.
110, 1 South. 30. As a rule, parties can main-
tain or defend suits only on the title they
have when the suit is commenced. In what
we have said, it is not our intention to de-
clare that the legislature may not provide a
new remedy, which shall apply to existing
rights, as well as to those afterwards to ac-
crue. Anonymous, 2 Stew. 228; Bartlett v.
Lang, 2 Ala. 401; Paschall v. Whiisett, 11
Ala. 472; Holman v. Bank, 12 Ala. 369.
What we do decide is that when a suit is in-
stituted, or a defense interposed, which is at
the time unauthorized by the law, a subse-
quent statute giving such remedy does not
operate on the existing suit, especially when
it does not provide it shall so operate. Re-
versed and remanded.
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JUDICIAL NOTICE. [Case No. 88 
WETZLER v. KELLY et al. 
(3 South. 747, 83 Ala. 440.) 
Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 21, 1888. 
Appeal from circuit court, Geneva county; 
J. JU. Carmichael, Judge. 
This was a claim suit brought In the magis-
trate's court originally. S. A. Wetzler sued 
one J. L. Wright In the justice of the pence 
court on a waive note, and obtained a judg-
ment against him, for which an execution Is-
sued, and was duly levied on the cotton which 
ls now the subject of the present claim suit. 
Upon the levy being made upon the cotton 
which was In the possession of the defendant 
In execution, the claimants, G. W. Kelly & Co., 
appellees In the present appeal, Interposed a 
claim to the cotton so levied upon. Whaley 
was shown to be the authorized agent of the 
claimants, G. W. Kelly & Co. Upon the evi-
dence, which is sufficieutly fully set out In 
the opinion of the court, the plalntit'l asked 
the court to charge the jury in writing, "ti.mt, 
If they belleved the evideuce, they must find 
for the plaintiff." The court refused to give 
the said chru·ge, and the plaintiff excepted. 
The claimants asked the court to give the fol-
lowing charge, which was In writing: "That, 
if they believed the evidence, they must find 
for the claimants." The court gave the 
chnri;:e, against the objection of the plaintiff, 
and the plaintiff duly excepted. The ltiving 
of this charge at the request of the claimants, 
and the refusal to give the chol'ge reque1>ted 
by the plaintlfl', are here assigned us error. 
Marcellus E. Milligan, for appellant. F. J. 
Milligan and H. L. Martin, for appellees. 
STONE, C. J. It Is manifest that the pres-
ent Judgment must be reversed, unless the 
facts which occurred when Whaley visited 
Wright In September, or the net "to ameud 
IK'Mion one of an net entitled 'An net to 
amend section 3341 of the Code,' " works a 
change of the rights of the parties. 'l'he stat-
ute was approved Febl'uury 28, 1887 (Hess. 
Acts, 150). Code 18Sli, § 3004; lron-Wol'ks 
C-0. v. Renfro, 71 Ala. 577; ;\forks v. Robin-
son, 82 Ala. 69, 2 South. 2{)2. Wetzler, the 
appellant, claimed a lien on the cotton in 
controversy, under nu execution Issued on a 
judgment against one 'Vright, and whkh was 
leYied on the cotton as ·w1·i;.:ht's in October, 
1886. The cotton when leYled on wns on the 
land on which It was grown, the home or 
"'right, the defendant In execution. The cot-
ton had been grown by Wright. Kelly & Co. 
interposed a statutory claim to the pro1lerty, 
by affidavit filed that they had n jm1t claim 
to it. This claim was iutel'posed. October lli, 
18Sfl. ofter the levy ot' 'Vetzler's execution. 
Iielly & Co. had a m01·ti:nge 011 the crop to 
he grown by Wright in lS..'ili, which was <lat-
ed in January of that year. It ls common 
knowledge that crops of cotton are not plant-
ed In this state until after that time. The 
crop not being planted when the mortgage 
was made to Kelly & Co., they were without 
legal title to It, and could not maintain their 
claim at law, by mere force of the mortgage 
Itself. Iron-Works Co. v. Renfro, 71 Ala. 577; 
3 Brick. Dig. 776, ff 7, 8; Marks v. Robinson, 
82 Ala. 69, 2 South. 292; Jackson v. Bain, 74 
Ala. 328. 
The testimony of Whaley neither proved, 
nor tended to prove, a dellvery of the cotton 
to him as the agent of the claimants. He 
did not take possession, nor was It contem-
plated thut he should do so. The remurk of 
Wright referred nlike to the ungathered crop, 
and to that which had been gathered. He 
said: "You have u mortgage. All that ls 
yours; you can have it," referring to the 
crop. Whaley Instructed Wright to haul the 
cotton to the gin, have It ginned, and b11ng 
It to Newton; but the cotton never came Into 
the actual possession of \Vhaley, and was al-
lowed to remain In possession of \Vrlght, de-
fendant in execution and mortgagor. While 
so In his possession, the levy ot' \Vetzler's 
execution was made, out of which the pres-
ent contest grew. The remurk of Wright had 
reference alone to the Interest the mortgage 
secured to Kelly & Co., and neither changed 
the status of the property, nor was· it Intend-
ed to do so. Nor can the statute, enacted aft-
er the present claim suit was instituted, af-
fect the rights of the parties. Colle 1886, § 
3004. As we have shown, when the claim 
was interposed by Kelly & Co., October 16, 
1886, they were without a title which would 
avail them In this character flf suit. We need 
not inquire whether It was within the pule of 
legislative power to heal this imperfection by 
retroactive enactment ... Trust Co. v. Boykin, 
38 Ala. 510; Steamboat Co. v. Barclay, 30 
Ala. 120. It Is suftlclent for the wants ot' this 
case that In the act approved l~ebruury 28, 
1887, (Sess. Acts 1;:;(),) no Intention is shown 
to give It a retrospective operation. We feel 
bound, therefore, to hold that that statute 
can exert no influence In the decision of this 
case. 2 Brick. Dig. 462, § 31; Farris v. Hous-
ton, 78 Ala. 2W; Warten v. l\lutthews, 80 
Ala. 429; Security Co. v. Board, etc., 81 Aln. 
110, 1 8outh. 30. As a rule, p111·tles cun main-
tain or defend suits only on the title they 
have when the suit is commenced. In what 
we have said, It Is not our Intention to de-
clare that the legislature may not provide a 
new remedy, which shall apply to existing 
rights, as well as to those afterwards to nc-
crne. Anonymous, ~ Stew. :.!:.!8; Bartlett v. 
Lang, 2 Ala. 401; Paschall v. Whitst>tt, 11 
Ala. 472; Holman v. Bank, 12 Alu. 369. 
What we do dedde is that when a suit Is In-
stituted, or a defense Interposed, which Is at 
the time unauthorized by the law, n subse-
quent statute giving such remedy does not 
operate on the existing suit, especially when 
It does not provide It shall so operate. Re-
versed and remanded. 
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Case No. 89]
PROOF .
SW.-\l.ES v. GRUBBS ct al.
25 N. E. 877, 126 Ind. 106.)
Nov. 19, 1890.
Appeal from circuit court. Dearborn
county; W. H. BANl$RlI)Gl~I, Judge.
Hugh D. Mclllullen and John K. Thomp-
son, for appellant. N. S. Givan and Rob-
erts & Stapp, for appellees.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
MITCH ELL. J. This was a suitby Fran-
cis Swaies against the heirs and personal
representatives of James Grubbs, deceased.
The purpose of the action was to obtain
judgment against the decedent's estate
upon certain promissory notes. alleged to .
have been executed by the latter to the i
plaintiff in his life-time, and to set aside
certain conveyances alleged to have been ‘
fraudulently made by the decedent, in his
life-time, to his children, who are made de-
fendants. It was found that the decedent
did not execute the note sued on, and a.
judgment for the defendants followed, nec-
essarily. it is contended that as only one
of the defendants pleaded non est fiuctum,
the execution of the notes was admitted, ,
and that the finding to the contrary was ‘
therefore outside of the issue. An answer
appears in the record which purports to
have been filed by all of the defendants ex-
cept the administrator. in which the exe-
cution of the notes is denied. It is verified
by only one of the defendants, and it is
now insisted that, as to all the others,
the execution oi the notes was admitted.
The administrator answered, practically
admitting all that was alleged in the
complaint, and aver-ring that he had al-
lowed the claim. it has been held that a
joint answer by two defendants, who are
joint makers of a promissory note in suit,
alleging a material alteration oi the in- I
strument. which is verified by the affidav-
vit of only one oi them, is sufficient only
to put the plaintiff upon proof of the exe-
cution of the note by the one thus verify-
ing the answer. Feeney v. Mazelin, 87 Ind.
226. This decision was made in an action
where the note was the foundation of the
complaint. and where the makers were
parties in court. In the present case, the
action, so far as it affects the appellees. is
not founded on the notes,noris the maker
of the instruments a.part_\'. I<‘ormerly,the
statute read: “ Where a writing, purport-
ing to have been executed by one of the
parties. is the foundation of or referred to
in nnyplending it may be rcud in evidence
on the trial of the cause against such par-
ty without proving its execution. unless
its execution be denied under oath.” Un-
der this statute it was uniformly held that
neither the personal representu tive nor the
heir was within the language or spirit of
the statute. Riser v. Snoddy. 7 ind. 442;
Mahon v. Sawyer, lb‘ Ind. 73; Burnett's
Adm’x v.l.lnion,2$l lnd.254; \Vells v. Wells,
71 ind. 509. in the Revision of I881, (sec-
tion 364,) the language of the statute is
more comprehensive, and provides that
“ where a pleading is founded on a written
instrument, or such instrument is therein
referred to, " " " such instrument
' " ' may be rend in evidence on the
trial of the cause without proving its exo-
cution unless its execution be denied under
oath; “ ' ' butexecutors, administra-
tors. or guardians need not deny the exe-
cution of an instrument, " etc. The notes.
although referred to in the complaint,are
not the foundation of the notion; and
while, possibly, it may have been neces-
sary that the execution of the instruments
therein referred to should have been denied
under oath. (Belton v. Smith, 4-3 ind. 291:
Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497-509.) it was
not necessary that all the heirs should
verify the answer denying that their an-
. cestor and grantor executed the notes re-
ferred to in the complaint. Where an in-
strument is the foundation of or is referred
to in a pleading in an action against par-
ties other than those who are alleged to
be parties to it, joint answers by all or
any number of the defendants, denying its
execution, verified by the oath of any one
of the defendants. puts the plaintiff upon
proof of the execution of the instrument,
as against all those who join in the an-
swer. lndeed. we can see no substantial
reason for requiring all of anumber of
joint makers of an instrument, who join
in a plea of non est factum, to verify the
plea; but we decide nothing upon that
subject now. The decisions of this court
seem to require that all of those who are
parties to an instrument which is the
foundation of a pleading should verify a
plea denying the execution of the instru-
ment in order to require proof of its execu-
tion. We arc not willing to extend this
rule to heirs or other persons not parties
to the instrument.
During the progress of the trial, the
plaintiff below introduced the original
deeds in evidence, copies of which had been
filed with the complaint. After the deeds
had been thus introduced, the court per-
mitted witnesses to compare the signa-
ture of James Grubbs. as it appeared on
theseveraldecds, with his signature on the
notes in suit, and. from ‘the comparison
thus made, to give their opinion as to the
genuineness of the signature on the notes.
By introducing the original deeds in evi-
dence for the purpose of proving what had
been charged in the complaint. viz., that
James Grubbs had conveyed certain lands
in severalty to the defendants. the appel-
lant must he held to have admitted the
genuineness of the signatures to those in-
strumcnts; and the rule is established by
numerous decisions that a comparison
may be made between a signature that is
admitted by the opposite party to be gen-
uine, and is already in evidence for some
other purpose, and has thus becomesubject
lo examination by the jury, and the signa-
ture whose genuineness is in question.
Walker v. Steele, 121 Ind. 436. 22 N. E. liep.
142, 23 N. E. Rep. 271. and cnscs cited ;
Shorb v. Kinzic, 100 Ind.42‘.l-431. The case
was one of equitable cognizance, and was
so regarded and tried by the court, al-
though a jury was called to answer cer-
tain questipns propounded as advisory to
the court. lt was a disputed question
whether or not thenotessued on had been
executed on Sunday. 'l‘he court charged
the jury that certain dates, being the dates
fixed in the notes, each occurred on the
first day of the week, commonly called
“Sunday. ” Courts take judicial notice of
‘.3-'30
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C1lse X o. 89] PROOF. 
SWALES T. GRUBBS et al. 
(2S N. E. 871, 126 Ind. 106.) 
Supreme Court of Indiana. Nov. 19, 1890. 
Appeal from clrcnlt court, llearborn 
county; W. H. BA:liURJDGE, ,Tudp;e. 
llul(h D. l'tlcMullen and John K. Thomp-
son, for appellant. N. S. Giv1Ju and Ro/J-
t'rts ct Stapp, for appelleAB. 
cutlon unles11 I b1 execution be denlec:l under 
oath; • • • butexecntors,e.dmlnlstra-
tore, or guardians need not deny the exe-
cu tlon of an lnKtrumcnt," etc. The t;iotee. 
, altbouarb referred to In the complaint, are 
not the foun<latlon of the uctlon ; and 
while, po88lbly, It may have been neces-
sary that the execution of the Instruments 
therein l't'ferred to11houlcl have been rlenled 
under oath, (Belton v. ~mlth, 4!°> Ind. 291: 
Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497-:509, I It waR 
not neeet:111nry thnt all the beh"H 11hould 
MITCH ELL. J. Thie was a salt by Fran- , verify the 11n11wer denylnir that tbetr an-
cls Swales against the h~lrs and personal ceatnr and grantor executed the notee re-
repl'eflf'ntatlveaof Jamee Grubbs, deceased. ferretl to to the complaint. Where an In-
The purpose of the action was to obtain 1 strument Is the found a tlon of or Is reft'rred 
JodJCment against the decedent's estate I to In a pleading In au action against par-
upon certain promlBSory notes, alleged to 1 ties other than those who are alleged to 
have been executed by the latter to the I be parties to It. Joint answPrs by all or 
plaintiff In bis life-time, and to set aside any number of the defeudants, denying Its 
certain convey1\Dce& alleged to have been exeeutlon, verified by the outh or any one 
fraudulently made by the decedent, In his of the defendant11. potll the plalntlft upon 
life-time, to his children, who are made de- proof of the execution of the lnKtrnment. 
fendunts. It was found that the dcct>dent as against all those \vho join in the an-
did not execute the note sued on, and a swer. Indeed. we can Hee no substtmtlal 
Judgment for the defendants followed, nee- reason for requiring all of a number of 
easarlly. It ts contenrled that as only one Joint makers of an Instrument, who join 
of the defendants pleaded non est factum, In a plea of non t>st factum, to verify thP-
the execution of the notes wae admitted, plea; \Jut we decide nothing npon that 
and that the ftndlu,; to the r.ootrary W88 subject now. The decisions of this court 
tt.el'f'fore outside of the lsRue. Ao answer seem to require that all of those who are 
&J>peare in the record which purports to parties to an Instrument which Is the 
have been ftlPd by all of the defendants ex- foundation of a lllendlng should verify a 
cept the administrator, In which the exe- plea denylntr the execution of the lnstru-
cutlon of the notes ls denied. It ls verifted ment In order to require proof of Its execu-
by only one of the defendants, and It Is tloo. We ure not willing to extt>nd this 
now insisted that, as to all the others, role to heh11 or other persons not parties 
the execution of the not.es was admitted. tu the Instrument. 
The ~dmlnistrator answered, practlr.ally During the progress of the trial, th& 
admitting all that was alleged In the plalnttrr below Introduced the original 
complaint, and averring that he had al- deeds In evlclence,coples of which had been 
lowed the claim. It hne been held that a filed with the complaint. After the deeds 
Joint an11wer b~ two defentlantM, who are bad been thuR Introduced, the court per-
Joint makers of a promlsMory notA In suit, mltted wltnf'BMes to compare the slgna-
allep;lng 11. material alteration of the In- tore of James Grubbs. a11 It appeared on 
strument, which le verified by the aftida- the several deeds, with hla signature on the 
vlt of only one of them, Is sufft1•lent only notes In suit, and, from · the comparison 
to put the plalntln upon proof of the exe- thus made, to give their opinion as to th~ 
cation of the note by the one thus verify- genuineness of the signature on the notes. 
In~ the answer. Feeney v. Mazelln, 87 Ind. By Introducing the original deeds In evl-
226. 'l'bl11 decision wa11 made lu nn action dence fortbe pnrposeof provlntr what bad 
where the note waa the foundation or the been char.red In the com1>Ialnt. vl1., that 
complaint, and where the makers were James lJrobbs had conveyed certain land• 
parties In court. In the present cRse, the In severalty to the defendants, the appel-
actlon, so far as It affects the a11pellees, Is lant must be held to have admitted the 
not founded on the no tee, nor Is the maker genulne11ess of the signatures to those tn-
of the ln11truments a party. Formerly, the strument11; ancl the rule Is established by 
statute read: "Where a wrltln1t, purport- numerous decisions that a comparison 
Ing to have been exl'<.'otud by onP of the may be made beotween a Rlgnature that Is 
parties. Is the foundation of or referred to admitted by the opposite party to be gen-
In nny )Jlf'adlng It may be n.>ad tn e,·hlence nine, and Is all'eady In evidence for some 
on the trial of the cauHe against such par- otherpurpose,and hastbusbecomesnbject 
ty without proving Its execution, unless to examination bytbejury,anclthe11l1rna-
lts execution be dented under oath." Un- turf' wllm1e genulneuei,is ts tu qnl'Mtlon. 
der this statntt- It wa11 uniformly held that Walker''· Steele, 121 Ind. 4-'i6, 2'.? N. E. lteJ•· 
neltherthept'rsonal representative nor the 142, 23 N. E. Rep. 271. and ca11es cited: 
heir was within the language or spirit of Shorh v. Kinzle, 100 Ind. 4~431. Th~ ca11e 
the statute. Riser ''· 8noddy, 7 Ind. 442; wa11 one of equitable cognisance, and waa 
Mahon v. Sawyer, 18 Ind. 73; Bamett's so regarded and tried by the court, al-
Adm'x ""·Union,~ Ind. 2"4; Welle v. Wells, though a Jury was called to answer cer-
71 Ind. 509. In the Hevislon of 1881, (see- taln que11tlpn11 propounded as advisory t<> 
tlon 364,) the language of the 11tntuw Is the court. It was a dlsputetl question 
more comprt'henslve, and provides that wbt-ther or not thenote11sued on had been 
"where a pleading ls foundPd nn a written executed on Sunday. 'l'be court charged 
lnstrumt'nt, or su1·h lustl'nment ls therein the jury that certain dates, being the dates 
referred to, • • • such Instrument fixed lo the nott.>B, each occurred on th.-
• • • may be rend In evidence on the first day of the week, commonly C1'lled 
trial of the cause without proving Its exe- "l::iunday." Courts take judicial notice ol 
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the “days on which iall Sundays and holi-
days,” and it was, therefore. proper to
charge the jury that certain dates fell on
Sunday. 1 Whart. Ev. § 335. The jury
were, however. called ior the purpose of
answering certain questions oi iact pro-
pouuded to them by the court. In chan-
cery cases, the province oi the jury is _to
find facts. and not to administer equities
in the light oi legul rules. This is ior the
court. when the mete are ascertained. It
is enough. therefore, to say that in a case,
like the present, of equitable cognizance,
general instructions as to the law applica-
ble to the (acts ol the case are not proper, .
and available error cannot be predicated
upon the giving or refusal to give instruc-
tions of a general nature. In that re-
spect. the rules which govern where the
jury is required to find a special verdict
are controlling. Ra.ilwa_v Co. v. Frawley,
110 Ind. 18, 9 N. E. Rep. 594.
Therc are some otherquestions oi minor
importance that are suggested on the ap-
peilant’s briefs. We have carefully consid-
ered all the questions, and flnd no error
which \vouidjustli'y a reversal oi the judg-
ment. There was evidence which tends to
sustain the finding. The judgment is ai-
firmed, with costs.
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JUDICIAL XO'I ICE. [Case No 89 
the" days on which fall Sunc.Iay" anti holi-
days," anll It was, therefore, proper to 
charge the jury that certain dates fell on 
~omllly. 1 Wlmrt. Ev. § 335. The jury 
were, however. called for the purpose of 
answering certain questions of fact pro-
pounded to them by th~ court. In chan-
t.-ery cases, the province or the Jury le to 
flJ1d facts. and not to administer equities 
In the light or legal rules. This le for the 
court, when the facts are ascertained. It 
Is enough, there!ore, to eay that In a case, 
like the present, of equitable cognizance, 
general Instructions aH to the law applica-
ble to the facts of the case are not proper, 
aniJ a \"llllable error cannot be pretllcated 
upon tlJP. 11:h·lng or refusal to give ln11truc-
tlons of a gi>nernl nature. In that re-
spect. the rules which govern where the 
Jury le required to flnd a special verdict 
are controlling. Railway Co. v. l~rawley, 
110 Ind. 18, 9 N. E. Rep. i'iU4. 
The1·e are some otherquP.stlons of minor 
Importance that nre s•1ggei,1ted on the ap-
pellant's brlcfa. We have carefully consid-
ered all tbe questions, and flnd no error 
which 'vonldjuetlfy a. reversal of the judg· 
ment. There wa11 evidence which tends to 
11ustaln the flndlnir. The judgment is af-
firmed, with costs. 
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FERRIS v. HARD et al.
(32 N. E. 129, 135 N. Y. 35-1.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 11, 1892.
Appeal from superior court of Buffalo,
general term.
Action by Peter J. Ferris, as trustee of
the city of Buffalo, against Samuel B. Hard
and Margaret Hard and others, to foreclose
a mortgage. From a judgment of the gen-
eral term affirming a judgment for plain-
tiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.
Geo. Wadsworth, for appellants. Price
A. Matteson, for respondent.
PECKHAM, J. This is an action to fore-
close a mortgage executed by defendants
Hard upon land owned by the defendant
Mrs. Hard. The amended complaint sets
forth the fact of the execution of the bond
by defendant Samuel B. Hard to one Jo-
seph Bork on the 10th of September, 1874,
for the payment of $10,000 in four equal
payments of $2,500 on the 10th of Septem-
ber in each of the years 1876, 1877, 1878, and
1879, with interest semiannually on all
sums remaining from time to time unpaid.
To secure such payments the amended com-
plaint alleged that defendants Hard execut-
ed a mortgage bearing even date with the
bond, and whereby they mortgaged the
land described in the amended complaint.
‘lime mortgage was duly acknowledged and
certified, and it was delivered to Bork on
1he day of its date. On February 1, 1876,
Bork duly assigned the same LO plaintiff,
as trustee for the city of Buffalo, and the
city is the real party in interest, and the
sole and absolute owner of the bond and
mortgage. It is then further averred that
there is due and remaining unpaid the sum
of $10,000 and interest thereon from Sep-
tember .10, 1874, at 7 per cent. Further ap-
propriate and ordinary allegations for the
foreclosure of the mortgage were set torth
in the pleading. The defendant Margaret
Hard put in a separate answer, and set up
in the way of an independent allegation
that she was seised, on the 10th of Septem-
ber. 1874, and possessed in her own right,
of the lands described in the amended com-
plaint, and that on such day she executed
a mortgage of the premises mentioned in
the amended complaint, and delivered it
under the circumstances and upon the con-
sidcration and for the purpose then set
forth in her answer. She also therein al-
leged that she was, in September, 1874, in-
formed that her husband was indebted to
the firm of Lyon, Bork & Co. on account
of money loaned by the firm to him. and
she was requested to execute a mortgage
to Joseph Bork, one of the firm, upon her
land, for the purpose of securing such firm
against loss by reason of such loans there-
tofore made and thereafter to be made to
her husband. and she thereupon executed
a mortgage upon lands described in the
amended complaint, and delivered it for
such purpose. She believed the mortgage
set forth in the amended complaint to be
the same one thus executed and delivered.
The answer further stated that the firm
had since that time received moneys which
should be applied on her husband's in-
debtedness to the firm, but there had been
no accounting, and she denied any knowl-
edge, etc., that the sum of $10,000 was due.
She then denied any knowledge or infor-
mation sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations of the amend-
ed complaint, “not hereinbefore admitted,
qualified, or denied, and therefore she de-
nies the same, and each and every of such
allegations." No question appears to have
been raised as to the form of this denial.
The action was referred to a referee for
trial, and he reported in favor of the plain-
tiff for foreclosure and sale of the premises,
to pay the full amount of $10,000 and in-
terest at 7 per cent. from the execution of
the mortgage. Judgment was accordingly
entered, and the same has been aflirmed
upon appeal at general term of the superior
court of the city of Buffalo, and from the
judgment of affirmance the defendants
Hard have appealed to this court.
Upon the trial Samuel B. Hard was called
as a witness on behalf of the defendants.
It appears that his‘ answer to the com-
plaint also contained the allegation that
the mortgage had been executed in order to
secure the firm of Lyon, Bork & Co. for
loans of money thcretofore made and which
might thereafter be made to the witness.
Upon that trial he testified that nothing was
ever said between him and Bork (with
whom the whole transaction concededly
took place) that the mortgage should stand
for anything he owed, nor that it was giv-
en to secure any advances subsequently to
be made by either of the firms or by Bork.
Hard also testified that he told Bork that he
would get his (Hard’s) wife to execute a
mortgage for $10,000 on a part of the creek
property, and that he would give Bork his
own bond, and that Bork should sell the
bond and mortgage. Here was a direct
contradiction between the evidence of Mr.
Hard and his sworn answer. It would seem
that this contradiction was fully under-
stood, and its serious character appreciated.
by the defendants and their counsel. The
record shows that the defendant Mrs. Hard
offered to show by her husband, Mr. Hard.
the witness then on the stand, that when
his and Mrs. Hard’s answers were drawn
Mr. Hard informed the attorney who drew
them that the bond and mortgage in ques-
tion were executcd and delivered to Bork
to be sold by him for the benefit of Mr.
Hard, as absolute securities, and not as
securities for any amount then owing by
him, or for advances thereafter to be made;
and the attorney advised him there was no
legal diiference,—that the mortgagee would
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Case No. 90] PUOOF. 
FERRIS v. HARD et al 
(32 N. E. 129, 135 N. Y. 3M.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 11, 1892. 
Appeal from superior court of Buffalo, 
general terw. 
Action by Peter J. Ferrie, as trustee of 
the city of Buffalo, against Samuel B. Hard 
and Margaret Hard and others, to foreclose 
a. mortgngc. !from a judgment of the gen· 
eral term a1!1.rming a judgment for plain-
titr, defendants appeal Reversed. 
Geo. Wadsworth, for appellants. l'rice 
.A.. Matteson, for respondent. 
PECKHAM, J. Thie ls an action to tore-
efaee a mortgage executed by defendauts 
Hard upon land owned by the defendant 
Mrs. Hard. The amended t.'Omplalnt sets 
forth the fact of the execution of the bond 
by defendant Samuel B. Hard to one Jo-
seph Bork on the 10th of September, 1874, 
for the payment of $10,000 in four equal 
paymeute of $2,000 on the 10th of Septem-
ber In each of the years 1876, 1877, 1878, and 
1879, with lnt~reet semiannually on all 
sums remaining from time to time uupald. 
To secure such payments the amended com-
plaint alli!g•}d that defendants Hard exe<'ut-
ed a mortgage "bearing even date with the 
bond, and whe1-eby they mortgaged the 
land described in the amended complaint. 
~Jbe mortgage was duly ncknowledge<l 9.nd 
eertlfied, and it was delivered to Bork on 
1he day of its date. On February 1, 1~6. 
Bork duly assigned the same LO plaintiff, 
.as trustee for the city of Bulralo, and the 
city is the real party In Interest, and the 
sole and absolute owner of the bond and 
mortgage. It le then further averred tllat 
there ls due and remaining unpaid the sum 
<>f $10,000 and Interest thereon from Sep-
tember 10, 1874, at 7 per cent. Further ap-
propriate and ordinary allegations for the 
foreclosure of the mortgage were set torth 
1n the pleading. The defenllant Margaret 
Hard put ln a separate answer, and set up 
in the way of an Independent allegation 
that she was selsed, on the 10th of Septem· 
ber, 1874, and pof'sessed In her own right, 
<>f the lands described in the amended com-
plaint, and tbci.t on such day she executed 
a mortgage of the premises mentioned In 
the amended complaint, and delivered It 
un<ler the circumstances lllld upon the con-
si<leratlou and for the purpose then set 
forth in her answer. She also therein al-
leged that she was, In September, 1874, ln-
fo1·med that her husband was indebted to 
th.:! firm of Lyon, Bork & Co. on account 
or money loaned by the firm to him. and 
she was requested to execute a mortgage 
to Joseph Bork, one of the firm, upon her 
la:t<l, for the purpose of securing such firm 
against loss by reason of such loans there-
tofore made and thereafter to be rua(le to 
her husband, and she thereupon executed 
a mortgage upon lands described in the 
2;;2 
amended complaint, and delivered it for 
such purpose. She believed the mortgage 
set forth 1n the amended complaint to be 
the same one thus executed and delivered. 
The answer further stated that the firm 
h!ld since that time recelved moneys which 
should be applleO. on her husband's In-
debtedness to the firm, but there had been 
no accounting, and she denied any knowl-
edge, etc., that the sum of $10,000 waa dne. 
She then denied any knowledge or lnfor-
matlon su11lclent to form a belief as to 
the truth of the allegations of the amend-
ed complaint, "not berelnbefore admitted, 
qualified, or denied, and therefore she de-
nies the same, and each and every of such 
allegations." No question appears to have 
been raised as to the form of thlB denial. 
The action was referred to a referee for 
trial, and he reported in favor of the plain-
tiff for foreclosure and eaie of the premises, 
to pay the full amount of $10,000 and in· 
terest at 7 per cent. from the execution of 
the mortgage. Judgment was accordingly 
entered, and the same has been a1D.rmed 
upon appeal at general term of the superior 
court of the city of Bulralo, and from the 
judgment of aftlrmance the defendants 
Hard have appealea to this court. 
Upvn the trial Samuel B. Hard was called 
as a witness on behalf of the defendants. 
It appears that bis· answer to the com-
plaint also contained the allegation that 
the mortgage bad been executed In order to 
secure the firm of Lyon, Bork & Co. tor 
loans of money theretofore made and which 
might thereafter be made to the witness. 
Upon that trial be testified that nothing was 
ever said between him and Bork (with 
whom the whole transaction concededly 
took place) that the mortgage should stand 
for anything be owed, nor that It was giv-
en to secure any advances subsequently to 
be made by either of the firms or by Bork. 
Hard also testlfled that he told Bork that be 
would get bis (Hard's) wife to execute a 
mortgage for $10,000 on a part of the creek 
property, and that be would give Bork his 
own bond, and that Bork should sell the 
bond and mortgage. Here was a direct 
contradiction between the evidence of Mr. 
Hard and bis sworn answer. It would seem 
that tbls contradiction was fully under-
stood, and Its serious character appreciated, 
by the defendants and their counsel. The 
record shows that the defendant Mrs. Hard 
offered to show by her husband, Mr. Hard. 
the witness then on the stand, that when 
his and llrs. Hard's answers were drawn 
Mr. Hard Informed the attorney who (lrew 
them that the bond and mortgage In ques-
tion were executed and delivered to Bork 
to be sold by him for the benefit of Mr. 
Hard, as absolute secm1tles, and not as 
securities for any amount then owing by 
hlm, or for advances thereafter to be made; 
and the attorney advised him there wae no 
legal dlfference,-that the mortgagee would 
ADMISSIONS IN PLEADINGS.
[Case No. 90
have the right to hold them as such secu-
rity, and that such was the legal effect of
the transaction; and that, relying upon
such advice, and supposing it to be correct,
he and the defendant Margaret H. Hard
answered the complaint as shown by their
answers herein. The plaintifl objected to
this evidence as hnmaterial, incompetent,
and irrelevant, and the court sustained the
objection, and the defendants excepted.
We think this offer should have been al-
lowed to be proved. As the evidence stood,
a clear contradiction was shown between
the evidence and the sworn answer of the
witness, and any evidence which tended, if
believed, to explain such contradiction in a
manner consistent with the honesty of the
witness, the defendants were entitled to
give. If the plaintiff claims that the alle-
gation in the answer was an admission of
a fact which concluded the defendants so
long as it remained a part of the pleading,
one answer to such claim is that it comes
too late. The plaintiff had permitted, with-
out objection, the evidence to be given
which showed the contradiction, and it was
then too late to interpose with an objection
which should preclude any explanation of
the contradiction. This is upon common
principles of fairness. If the plaintiff had
a conclusive objection to the proof of any
fact which would contradict the admission
in the answer, he was bound to state it when
the evidence in contradiction was oifered, and
he should not be permitted to acquiesce in
its admission without the least objection,
and subsequently present the objection when
the witness desires to explain this contra-
diction; otherwise the plaintiff obtains the
benefit of the contradiction and its effect
as more or less of an impeachment of the
rest of the evidence of the witness, while at
the same time he secures the conclusive
character of the admission in the pleading.
This he should not be permitted to do.
Upon examination of the so-called "ad-
mission,” we are of the opinion that it is
not of such a. character as to prevent, on
that ground, evidence of an inconsistent fact.
It admits no allegation of the complaint.
That pleading made no allegation as to the
consideration of the bond and mortgage.
It alleged the execution of the bond in the
penal sum of $20,000, with the condition for
the payment of $10,000, as therein stated.
and that the mortgage was executed as se-
curity for the bond. The answer of Mrs.
Hard set up as an affirmative defense the
execution oi’ the mortgage for the purpose
of securing the firm of Lyon, Bork & Co. for
loans already made by that firm to her hus-
band, or which might thereafter be made
to him, and then stated the fufther facts
necessary to secure an accounting, and de-
nied the indebtedness of $10,000. The only
admission that could possibly be here claimi-
ed might consist in an admission of the
execution of a mortgage upon the lands de-
scribed in the amended complaint. It, in
fact, is nothing but an allegation of the exe-
cution of a mortgage, coupled with and
forming part of the allegation as to its con-
sideration. An anwer may contain a direct
or implied admission of some fact alleged
in a complaint. The admission is implied
when the fact alleged in the complaint is
not denied in the answer. It is direct when
the admission is made in terms. Either
form of admission of an allegation contained
in the complaint is conclusive upon a de-
fendant so long as it remains in the plead-
ing, and the plaintiff can point to it as con-
clusive proof of the truth of his allegation.
Paige v. Wiilett, 38 N. Y. 28; Robbins v.
Codman, 4 E. D. Smith, 315, 325. An alle-
gation contained in- an answer setting up an
atiirmative defense, which has no reference
to and does not admit any allegation of the
complaint, is of an entirely different nature.
Such allegation is not an admission con-
tained in a pleading, which is conclusive so
long as it remains in the record. An ad-
mission which so concludes a party admits
something already alleged or set forth in
the pleading to which the pleading contain-_
ing the admission is an answer. In this
case the allegation as to the consideration
of the mortgage admitted nothing as to that
consideration which was set forth in com-
plaint, for there was no allegation therein
as to the consideration, and consequently
the defendant was not concluded from show-
ing a fact which was inconsistent with his
allegation of the consideration, on the
ground that he had admitted the considera-
tion, and could not be heard to prove one
inconsistent with such admission. The
plaintiff could avail himself of the allega-
tion as a declaration by defendant, and the
defendant could explain it by other evidence
so far as possible.
The question whether this evidence of the
consideration, as testified to by Mr. 1la_"_d,
was not objectionable on the ground thaT'1t
changed substantially the defense (Code, §
723). is not now here. No such question was
raised when the evidence was given. Sub-
sequent to that time the defendants request-
ed the referee to give them leave to amend
the answers by striking out the allegations as
to the consideration of the mortgage, and by
inserting allegations in conformity to the
testimony of defendant Hard. This was ob-
jected to by the plaintiff upon the ground
that such amendment would change the is-
sues, and also because the defendants had
been guilty of iaclies. The court denied the
motion for lack of jurisdiction, and not as
discretionary. I suppose the motion was
made so that the evidence already in without
objection might be regarded by the referee
as properly taken upon a question raised by
the pleadings, and in order that he should
not ignore the evidence as not material to
any issue raised, although coming in without
objection. The defendants, of course, desir-
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ADMISSIONS IN PLEADING~. [Case No. 9() 
have the right to hold them as such secu-
rity, and that such was the legal effect of 
the transaction; and that, relying upon 
such advice, and supposing it to be correct, 
he and the defendant Margaret H. Hard 
answered the complaint as shown by their 
answers herein. The plalntur objected to 
this evidence as immaterial, incompetent, 
and irrelevant, and the court sustained the 
objection, and the defendants excepted. 
We think this offer should have been al-
lowed to be proved. As the evidence stood, 
a clear contradiction was shown between 
the evidence and the sworn answer of the 
witness, and any evidence which tended, It 
believed, to explain such contradiction In a 
manner consistent with the honesty of the 
witness, the defendants were entitled to 
give. If the plalntUr claims that the alle-
gatton In the answer was an admission of 
a tact which concluded the defendants so 
long as It remainea a part ot the pleading, 
one answer to such claim Is that it comes 
too late. The plalntifl' had permitted, with-
out objection, the evidence to be given 
which showed the contradiction, and It was 
then too late to lnterposf! with an objection 
which should preclude eny explanation of 
the contradiction. Thie ls upon eommon 
principles of fairness. If the plaintiff had 
a conclusive objection to the proof of any 
fact which would contradict the admission 
In the aUBwer, be was bound to state It when 
the evidence In contradiction was olre1·ed, and 
be should not be permitted to acquiesce ln 
Its admlBSlon without the least objection, 
and subsequently present the objection when 
the wltm~ss desires to explain this contra-
diction; otherwise the plaintiff obtains the 
benefit of the contradiction and its effect 
as more -:>r less of an Impeachment of the 
rest of the evidence of th~ witness, wblle at 
the same time be secures the conclmilni 
character of the admlssl.111 In the plendlng. 
This he should not be permitted to do. 
Upon examination of the so-called "ad-
mission," we are of the opinion that It is 
not of such a character as to prevent, on 
tl:at ground, evldene<! of an Inconsistent fact. 
It admits no allegation of the complaint. 
That pleading maae no nllegatlon as to the 
cowiideratlon of the bond and mortgage. 
It alleged the execution of the bond In the 
J>l'Dal sum of $20,000, with the condition for 
the payment of $10,000, as therein stated, 
and that the mortgage was executed as se-
curity for the bond. The answer of lira. 
Hard set up as an nftlrmatlve defen11e the 
execution of the mortgage for the purpose 
of 1:eecnrlng the firm of Lyon, Bork & Co. for 
loall8 nln::=>.dy made by that firm to hP-r hus-
band, or which might thereafter be made 
to him, and then stated the futther facts 
necessary to secure an ncrountlag. and de-
nied the Indebtedness of $10,000. The only 
admission that could possll>ly be here claim-
ed might consist In an admission of the 
execution of & mortgage upon the lands de-
scribed in the amended complaint. It, In 
fact, Is nothing but an allegation of the exe-
cution of a mortgage, coupled with and 
forming part of the allegation as to Its con-
sideration. An answer may contain & direct 
or Implied admission of some fact alleged 
In a complaint. The admission Ls Implied 
when the fact alleged In the complaint is 
not denied In the answer. It Is direct when 
the admission le made In terms. Either 
form of admission of an allegation contained 
In the complaint Is conclusive upon a de-
fendant so long as It remains In the plead-
ing, and the plnintlll'. can point to It as con-
clusive proof of the truth of bis allegation. 
Paige v. Willett, 38 N. 1'.. 28; Robbins v. 
Cud.man, 4 E. D. Smith, 315, 325. An allP.-
~atlon contained In-an answer setting up an 
affirmative defense, which bas no reference 
to and dCJes not admit any allegation of the 
complaint, Is of un entirely different nature. 
Such allegation ls not nu admission con-
tained In a pleading, which Is conclusive so. 
long as it remains In the record. An ad-
mlselon which 80 concludes a party admits 
something already alleged or set forth lo. 
the pleading to which the pleading contain-
ing the admission Is an an<Jwer. In this 
case the allegation as to the comliderntlon 
of the mortgage admitted nothing as to that 
consideration which was set forth ln com-
plaint, for there was no allegation therein 
as to the consideration, and consequeutly 
the defendant was not concluded from show-
ing a fact which waR Inconsistent with hlit 
allegation of the consideration, on the 
ground that he had admitted the considera-
tion, and could not be heard to prove one 
lnconitlRtent with such admission. The 
plaintiff could ayall hlmirelC of the allega-
tion as a declaration by defendant, and the 
defendant could explain It by other evidence 
so far as possible. 
'.Che qucf!tlon whether this evidence of the 
coueldcratlon, as testified to by Mr. 1111!..d, 
was not objectionable on the ground thn.r 1t 
changed substantially the defense (Code, f 
723). ls not now here. No such question was 
raised when the evidence was given. Sub-
sequent to that time the defendants request-
ed the referee to give them leave to amend 
the answers by striking out the allegations as 
to the consideration of the mortgn~e. and by 
Inserting allegations In conformity to the 
testimony of defendant Hard. This was ob-
jected to by the plaintiff upon the grouud 
that such amendment would change the Is-
sues, and also because the defendants hatl 
l>een guilty lJf lacheit. The court dl'nled the 
motion tor lack of jurisdiction, and not as 
discretionary. I suppose the motion was 
made so that the evidence already In without 
objection might be regarded by the referee 
as properly tnken upon a question raised l>y 
the pleadings, and In order that he should 
not Ignore the evidence as not material to 
any Issue raised, although coming In without 
ol>jectlon. Tbe defendants, of course, deslr-
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ed the benefit of this evidence, if there was
any, and therefore naturally sought to have
it appear as material evidence otfered upon
an issue raised by their answers in the ac-
tion. As there must be a new trial because
of the error in refusing, under the circum-
stances already set forth, to allow the de-
fendant Hard to explain the apparent contra-
diction in his evidence when compared with
his answer, it is not necessary to decide
whether the referee was or was not correct
in his decision. The motion for leave to
amend can be now made at special term, if
defendants be so advised, before another
trial is entered upon, and the court can de-
cide the motion upon such terms as to it
may appear to be just. The rules for per-
mitting amendments to" pleadings before
trial, so as to have them present the case as
the parties desire it, are very properly quite
liberal. and there is no fear that the defend-
ants will be treated with any injustice in
such a matter.
It would be quite unfortunate for the par-
ties if we should send this case back for a
new trial without deciding the real question
which appellants’ counsel has so ingeniously
argued. He says this mortgage was execut-
ed by the defendant Mrs. Hard as a surety
for her husband’s liability, and her contract
must be judged according to the strictest.
rules governing contracts of sureties. The
mortgage, he says, is in terms one to Joseph
Bork, and on its face purports to secure the
payment to him of $10,000; and it cannot be
enforced as security for the payment of Mr.
Hard’s debt to Lyon, Bork & Co., or any oth-
er firm, even though Joseph Bork were a
member thereof, and it can only be enforced
as a security for a debt owing to Joseph
Bork personally. He urges that the contract
is one to answer for the debt of a third per-
son, and must be in writing, and the writing
must govern, even though it do not express
the parol contract which in fact had been
entered into. Thus, if Mrs. Hard had agreed
by parol to secure by her mortgage the debts
-of her husband to Bork, or to any firm of
which he was a member, and the mortgage
was in terms to secure her husband's per-
sonal indebtedness to Bork alone, it could
not, he argues, be enforced for the firm in-
debtedness, because of the want of an agree-
ment ln writing to that effect. The prin-
-ciple claimed by the counsel is correct, but
it is not applicable to this case. It is true
that the indebtedness for which the land of
Mrs. Hard is to be heli liable is that of a
third person, viz., her husband; but her con-
tract in regard to it is in writing, and sign-
ed by her. The statute which forbids hold-
ing her liable for the debt of another unless
by virtue oi’ her own contract in writing, and
signed by her. is thus complied With. Evi-
dence of the real and actual consideration of
the Hlortzfltle may always be given by paroi.
Either party is always at liberty to show, for
any purpose except to prevent its operation
as a valid deed or mortgage, that the consid-
eration was different from that named in
the instrument. Murray v. Smith, 1 Duer,
412, and cases cited. This principle is not
aficcted because one of the parties to the
instrument is a. surety for some third per-
son. Thus, in this case, it seems to me
plain that parol evidence is admissible to
show that the consideration for the execu-
tion of this written security for the pay-
ment of $10,000 was the indebtedness then
existing or subsequently to be incurred of
Mr. Hard, the husband of the mortgagor, to
Mr. Bork, or to any firm of which he was a
member. The mortgagor must be privy to
such consideration. The evidence of the real
consideration does not change the liability of
the party signing the mortgage. It shows
the reasons for assuming the obligation, and
the character thereof. While the instrument
might show a pecuniary consideration for
its execution, parol evidence is admissible to
show that the consideration was other than
pecuniary; and this has been held not to
violate the general rule that parol evidence
is not admissible to contradict a writing.
Case above cited. The same principle ap-
plies to the case of a surety. The considera-
tion, while open to explanation, cannot be
enlarged so as to enlarge the liability beyond
that which the party has entered into in writ-
ing. The amount. of the indebtedness of her
husband for which Mrs. Hard's property de-
scribed in the mortgage could be neld liable
cannot, in any event, exceed $10,000 and in-
terest properly cast. She has only offered
her land as security to that extent, and she
cannot be held beyond it by virtue of any
parol agreement. She agreed to hold her
land liable to secure the payment of $10.000
in sums and at the times mentioned in the
mortgage, and her land is not liable to se-
cure the payment of any greater sum or at
any other times than as she promised. Any
indebtedness, therefore, which her land could
secure, must have been incurred and have
become due not later than the times indicat-
ed for the payment of the moneys set out in
the mortgage. Within the principle permit-
ting parol evidence as to the consideration
for which a written instrument wa execut-
ed, it is entirely competent to show that the
consideration upon which the defendant Mrs.
Hard executed the mortgage to secure the
payment of $10,000 was the indebtedness of
her husband then existing or thereafter to
be incurred in favor of Mr. Bork. or in fa-
vor of any firm of which he was a member.
The agreement by which Mrs. Hard answers
for the debt of a third person is the written
mortgage signed by her. The consideration
for the written agreement may be proved by
oral evidence. This consideration will be a
matter for proof upon the new trial which
must be had, and we will not anticipate fur-
ther the questions which may possibly be
raised on such new trial. -
One other question will necessarily be
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Case No. 90] PROOF. 
ed the benefit of this evidence, If there was 
any, and therefore naturally sought to have 
it appear as material evidence offered upon 
an issue raised by their answers in the ac-
tion. As there must be a new trial because 
of the error 1n refusing, under the circum-
stances already set forth, to allow the de-
fendant Hard to explain the apparent contra-
diction 1n bis evidence when compared with 
bis answer, it is not necessary to decide 
whether the referee was or was not correct 
in his decision. The motion for leave to 
amend can be now made at special term, If 
defendants be so advised, before another 
trial is entered upon, and the court can de-
dde the motion upon such terms as to it 
may appear to be just. The rules for per-
mitting amendments to· pleadings before 
trial, so as to have them present the case as 
the parties desire it, are very properly quite 
liberal, and there Is no fear that the defend-
.ants will be treated with any injustice in 
.auch a matter. 
It would be quite unfortunate for the par-
ties If we should send this case back for a 
new trlnl without deciding the real question 
:which appellants' counsel has so Ingeniously 
argued. He says this mortgage was execut-
ed by the defendant Mrs. Hard as a surety 
for her husband's liability, and her contract 
must be judged according to the strictest. 
rules governing contracts of sureties. The 
mortgage, he says, ls 1n terms one to Joaeph 
Bork, and on its faee purports to secure the 
payment to him of $10,000; and it cannot be 
enforced as security for the payment of Mr. 
Bard's debt to Lyon, Bork & Co., or any 0th-
.er firm, even though Joseph Bork were a 
member thereof, and it can only be enforced 
as a security for a debt owing to Joseph 
Bork personally. He urges that the contract 
is one to answer tor the debt of a third per-
aon, and must be in writing, and the writing 
must govern, even though it do not express 
the parol contract which In fact had been 
entered Into. Thus, It Mrs. Hard had agreed 
by parol to secure by her mortgage the debts 
-0f her husband to Bork, or to any firm of 
which he was a member, and the mortgage 
was in terms to secure her husband's per-
11onal Indebtedness to Bork alone, it could 
not, he argues, be enforced for the firm In-
debtedness, be<'ause of the want of an agree-
ment in writing to that effect. The prin-
-clple claimed by the counsel ls correct, but 
It ls not applicable to this case. It ls true 
that the Indebtedness tor which the land of 
Mrs. Hard la to be heU liable Is that of a 
1hlrd person, viz., her husband; but her con-
tnwt In regard to It ls In writing, and sign-
ed by her. The statute which forbids hold· 
Ing hl'r liable for the debt of another unless 
by virtue of her own contract In writing, and 
fll$med by her, Is thus romplled with. Evi-
dence of the renl and nctual consideration of 
the mortga1ote mny always be gt\·en by parol. 
Either party 111 always at liberty to show, for 
any purpose except to prevent its operation 
254 
as a valid deed or mortgage, that the consid-
eration was different from that named in 
the instrument. Murray v. Smith, 1 Duer, 
412, and cases cited. '£bis principle ls not 
affected because one of the parties to the 
instrument Is a surety for some third per-
son. Thus, in this case, It seems to me 
plain that parol evidence la admissible to 
show that the consideration for the execu-
tion of this written security for the pay-
ment ot •10,000 was the Indebtedness then 
existing or subsequently to be incurred of 
Mr. Hard, the husband of the mortgagor, to 
Mr. Bork, or to any ftrm of which he was a 
member. The mortgagor must be privy to 
such consideration. The evidence of the real 
consideration does not change the llabillty ot 
the party signing the mor~ge. It shows 
the reasons tor assuming tbi: obl~tion, and 
the character thereof. While the lDSt:rument 
might show a pecuniary consideration for 
lts execution, parol evidence is admissible t.o 
show that the consideration was other than 
pecuniary; and this has been held not to 
violate the general rule that parol evidence 
ls not admlHlble to contradict a writing. 
Case above cited. The same principle ap-
plies to the case of a surety. The considera-
tion, whlle open to explanation, cannot be 
enlarged so as to enlarge the liability beyond 
that which the party has entered Into 1n writ-
ing. The amount of the Indebtedness of her 
husband for which Mrs. Bard's property de-
scribed In the mortgage could be .neld liable 
cannot, in any event, exceed $10,000 and in-
terest properly cast. She has only offered 
her land as security to that extent, and she 
cannot be held beyond It by virtue of any 
parol agreement. She agreed to hold her 
land liable to secure the payment of $10,000 
In sums and at the times mentioned In the 
mortgage, and her land ls not liable to se-
cure the payment of any greater sum or at 
any other times than as she promised. Any 
Indebtedness, therefore, which her land could 
secure, must have been incurred and have 
become due not later than the times Indicat-
ed for the payment ot the moneys set out in 
the mortgage. Within the principle permit-
ting parol evidence as to the consideration 
for which a written Instrument was execut-
ed, it Is entirely competent to sbow that the 
consideration upon which the defendant Mrs. 
Hard executed the mortgage to secure the 
payment of $10,000 was the Indebtedness of 
her husband then existing or thereafter to 
be Incurred In favor of llr. Bork, or In fa-
vor of any ftrm of which be was a member. 
The agreement by which Mra. Hard answers 
for the debt of a third person la the written 
mortgage signed by her. The consideration 
for the written agreement may be proved by 
oral evldellce. This consideration will be a 
matter for proof upon the new trial which 
must be had, and we will not anticipate fur-
ther the questions which may possibly be 
raised on such new trial. 
One other question wW necessarlly be 
Al)MISSl()NS IN PLEADINGS.
[om No. so
passed upon on the new trial, and that is the
question ot the rate of interest. It arises
now. and we think we should decide it The
referee gave judgment for the principal sum
as set out in the mortgage, with interest at
7 per cent. up to the entry of the judgment.
The mortgage contained a provision for the
payment of $10,000, as stated ill the com-
mencement of this opinion. This is not like
the agreement to pay interest on a principal
sum at 7 per cent. until the principal sum is
paid. such as the case of Taylor v. Wing, 84
N. Y. 471, 477. In the present case the
amount of principal was stated, and it was
agreed to be paid in installments oi.‘ $2,500 in
four annual payments, and the sums re1nain-
ing from time to time unpaid were to bear
interest at 7 per cent. This clearly meant
that the interest on the principal sum, which,
by the terms of the mortgage, was not due,
was to be at 7 per cent. Thus the whole
principal sum of $10,000 was to he at an in-
terest of 7 per cent. from the time »ot the
execution of the mortgage until an install-
ment becarne due, and then, when the install-
ment was paid, the interest on the balance
remaining unpaid, but not yet due, was also
to be at the same rate. It an installment
was not paid when due, the contract was vio-
lated, and interest after that upon such in-
stallment could only be recoveredpas dain-
ages. and at the rate of interest authorized
by law. Bennett v. Bates, SH N. Y. 3541
O'Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428. This leaves
the mortgage running at 7 per cent. interest
upon all sums unpaid up to the time when
the legal rate was reduced to 6 per cent.,
and from that time on at the reduced rate.
For the reasons above given the judgment
must be reversed, and there must be a new
trial, with costs to abide the event. All con-
cur.
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paeeed upon on the new trial, and that Is the 
<1uestlon of the rate of Interest. It ruises 
now. and we think we should decide it. The 
refet-ee gave judgment for the principal sum 
as set out 1n the mortgage, with Interest at 
7 per cent. up to the entry or the judgment. 
The mortgage contained a provision for the 
payment of '10,000, as stated 1n the com-
mencement of this opinion. This ls not llke 
the agreement to pay interest on a prlnelpal 
sum nt 7 per cent. until the prlnelpal sum Is 
paid, such as the ease of Taylor v. Wing, 84 
~. Y. 471, 477. In the present ease the 
amount of principal was stated, and It was 
agreed to be paid In installments of $2,500 In 
tour annual payments, and the sums remain-
ing from time to time unpaid were to bear 
interest at 7 per cent. This clearly meant 
that the Interest on the principal sum, which, 
by the terms of the mortgage, was not due, 
wns to be at 7 per cent. Thu11 the whole 
principal sum of •10.000 wus to be at an in-
terest of 7 per cent. from the time .of the 
execution of the mortgage until an Install-
ment bt><>ame due, and then, when the Install-
ment was paid, the Interest on the balance 
remaining unpaid, but not yet due, was also 
to be at the same rate. If an Installment 
was not paid when due, the contract was vio-
lated, and interest after that upon such In-
stallment could only be recovered . as dam-
ages, and at the rate of interest authorized 
by law. Bennett v. Bates, 94 N. Y. 354;· 
O'Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428. This leaves 
the mort1nl11:e running at 7 per cent. Interest 
upon all sums unpaid up to the time when 
the legal rate was reduced to 6 per cent., 
and from tllat time on at the reduced rate. 
For the reasons above given the judgment 
must be reversed, and there must be a new 
trial, with costs to abide the event. .All con-
cur. 
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JOHNSON v. RUSSELL.
(11 N. E. 670, 144 Mass. 409.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Suilolk. May 7, 1887.
Contract, upon an order drawn upon de-
fendant by one John Campbell in favor of
the plaintiff, which was as follows:
“$600. Boston, March 13, 1%.
"Mr. D. W. Russell—Dear Sir: Please pay
to the order of Thomas J. Johnson six hun-
dred dollars, and charge the same to my last
payment. John Campbell.
“Dear Sir: This order is for amount due
on work done and furnished for your house.
“E. A. P. Newcomb.”
When said order was drawn, said Camp-
bell was building a house for defendant, and
Campbell was indebted to plaintiff for mate-
rial used in the construction of said house.
Subsequently to the drawing of this order,
said Campbell brought suit against said Rus-
sell, claiming a balance due him on account
of said building. In his answer filed in that
suit, with other defenses the answer set up
the order above set forth, with others drawn
by said Campbell, alleging that he had
“promised to pay them out of any funds of
the plaintiff in his hands," and claimed that
“the amount of said orders should be de-
ducted from plaintiff's claim." Russell tes-
tified that he had never seen the answer, and
did not know its gontents.
At the trial in the superior court, without
a jury, before Mason, J., the plaintiff offered
in evidence the answer of said Russell, above
mentioned, for the purpose of showing a con-
ditional acceptance of said order. The court
excluded this evidence, and plaintiff except-
ed. Plaintiff also offered to show an agree-
ment made in open court, at the trial of the
said suit of Campbell v. Russell, by the re-
spective attorneys, that the amount ot‘ the
Johnson order, with others, should be do-
ducted from any verdict recovered in favor
of said Campbell, and judgment entered for
the remainder; but it did not appear that
Russell knew anything about said agree-
ment, this action not having been brought at
that time. The court also excluded this evi-
dence. The plaintiff then offered in evidence
the judgment in said suit of Campbell v.
Russell, for the purpose of showing that the
verdict therein against said Russell was suiti-
cient in amount to cover this and the other
orders before mentioned; that execution is-
sue for an amount more than enough to
cover the Johnson order, and was returned
satisfied in full. No other evidence was 011'-
fered by either party as to whether or not
anything was due from defendant to Camp-
bell. This was also excluded by the court,
and defendant excepted. The court found
for defendant, and found specially “that
there was nothing due from the defendant
to Campbell," and plaintiff alleged excep-
tions.
John Herbert and George B. Upham, for
plaintiff. C. T. Gallagher and J. F. Wheeler,
for defendant.
W. ALLE1\', J. Having proved the order.
it lay upon the plaintiff to prove the accept-
ance of it by the defendant, and that there
was something due from him to Campbell.
For the purpose of proving the acceptance,
he offered in evidence the answer of the de-
fendant in a former suit brought against him
by Campbell to recover the payment, in
which the order was set up, and which al-
leged that the defendant had promised to
pay it out of any funds in his hands, and
claimed that the amount of it should be de-
ducted from Campbell's claim. This was re-
jected by the court, solely for the reason, as
was assumed at the argument, that it was a
statement made in the course of pleading.
The rule that the pleadings in a cause are
not evidence on the trial, but allegations
only, is limited to the suit in which they are
pleaded. Outside of that, admissions and
declarations of a party in his pleadings are
competent against him; but they must ap-
pear to be the act of the party, and not mere-
ly of his attorney. When it is his personal
act, as in an answer in chaneery sworn to by
him, it is competent. When it is a pleading,
by attorney, of formal allegations, which
may be presumed to have been made with-
out special instructions from his client, it is
not competent. But particular and specific
allegations of matters of action or defense.
which cannot be presumed to have been
made under the general authority of the at-
torney, but obviously from specific instruc-
tions of the party,'are competent. Dennie v.
Williams, 135 Mass. 28, and cases there cited.
The answer offered in evidence carries with
it the presumption that it was made under
the instructions of the defendant; and the
testimony of the defendant, that he had nev-
er seen the answer, and did not know its con-
tents, without denying that he had given in-
structions for it, does not overcome the pre-
sumption; especially in view of the fact that
the cause proceeded to trial and verdict un-
der the answer. We think that the evidence
should have been admitted.
It is contended for the defendant that the
evidence was immaterial, because the find-
ing of the court that there was nothing due
from the defendant to Campbell made ac-
ceptance of the order immaterial. After the
rejection of the evidence, in the course of the
trial, the plaintiff offered other evidence
which was incompetent, and was properly
excluded, for the purpose of proving that
there was enough due from the defendant to
Campbell to meet the order. There was no
other evidence offered by either party upon
the question whether anything was due from
the defendant to Campbell, and there was no
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JOHNSON v. RUSSELL. 
(11 N. E. 670, 144 Mass. 409.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Mauachuaetts. 
Suffolk. May 7, 1887. 
Contract, upon an order drawn upon de-
fendant by one John Campbell In favor ot 
the plalntltr, which was as follows: 
"$600. Boston, March 13, 1882. 
"Mr. D. W. Russell-Dear Sir: Please pay 
to the order ot Thomas J. Johnson six hun-
dred dollars, and charge the same to my last 
payment. John Campbell. 
"Dear Sir: This order Is tor amount due 
on work done and furnished tor your houi>e. 
"E. A. P. Newcomb." 
When said order was drawn, said Camp-
bell was building a house tor defendant, and 
Campbell was indebted to plalntitr for mate-
rial used in the construction of said house. 
Subsequently to the drawing ot this order, 
said Campbell brought suit against said Rus-
sell, claiming a balance due him on account 
ot said building. In his answer filed ln that 
suit, with other defenses the answer set up 
the order above set forth, with others drawn 
by said Campbell, alleging that he had 
"promised to pay them out ot any funds ot 
the plaintiff In his hands," and claimed that 
"the amount ot said orders should be de-
ducted from plalntltr's claim." Russell tes-
tified that he had never seen the answer, and 
did not know its ~ntents. 
At the trial In the superior court, without 
a jury, before :Mason, J., the plalntltr otrered 
in evidence the answer of said Russell, above 
mentioned, tor the purpose ot showing a con-
ditional acceptance ot said order. The cout't 
excluded this evidence, and plalntltr except-
ed. Plalntltr also otrered to sh<>w an agree-
ment made In open court, at the trial ot the 
said suit ot Campbell v. Russell, by the re-
spective attorneys, that the amount of tbe 
Johnson order, with others, should be de-
ducted from any verdict recovered in ta vor 
of said Campbell, and judgment entered for 
the remainder; but It did not appear that 
Russell knew anything about said agree-
ment, this action not having been brought u.t 
that time. '.rhe court also excluded this evi-
dence. The plalntllr then offered In evidence 
the judgment In said suit of Campbell v. 
Russell, for the purpose of showing that the 
verdict therein against said Russell was sutfl-
clent In amount to cover this and the other 
orders before mentioned; that execution Is-
sue for an amount more than enough to 
cover the Johnson order, and was return~cl 
satisfied in full. No other evidence was ot-
tered by either party as to whether 01· not 
anything was clue from defendant to Camp-
bell. '!'his was also excluded by the court, 
and defendant excepted. The court found 
for defendant, and found specially "that 
there was notWng due from the defendant 
21)6 
to Campbell," and plalntltr alleged excep-
tions. 
John Herbert and George B. Upham, tor 
plalntUl'. C. T. Gallagher and J. F. Wheeler. 
tor defendant. 
W. ALLEN, J. Having proved the order, 
It lay upon the plalntltr to prove the accept-
ance of It by the defendant, and that there 
was something due trom him to Campbell. 
For the purpose of proving the acceptance, 
he otrerecl In evidence the answer ot the de-
fendant in a former suit brought against him 
by Campbell to recover the payment, ln 
which the order was set up, and which al-
leged that the defendant had promised !o 
pay it out ot any funds in his hands, and 
claimed that the amount of It should be de-
ducted from campbell's claim. This was re-
jected by the court, solely tor the reason, M 
was assumed at the argument, that It was a 
statement made in the course of pleading. 
The rule that the pleadings In a eause an! 
not evidence on the trial, but allegations 
only, Is limited to the suit In which they are 
pleaded. Outside of that, admissions and 
declarations of a party in his pleadings are 
competent against him; but they must ap· 
pear to be the act of the party, and not mere-
ly ot his attorney. When it Is his personal 
act, as In an answer in chancery sworn to by 
him, it ls competent. When It ls a pleading, 
by attorney, of formal allegations, which 
may be presumed to have been made with-
out special Instructions from his client, it llJ 
not competent. But particular and specltn? 
allegations of matters ot action or defense. 
which cannot be presumed to have been 
made under the general authority ot the at-
torney, but obviously from specific Instruc-
tions ot the party,-are competent. Dennie v. 
Williams, 135 Mass. 28, and cases there cited. 
The answer otrerecl in evidence carries with 
it the presumption that lt was made under 
the Instructions ot the defendant; and the 
testimony of the defendant, that he had nev-
er seen the answer, and did not know Its con-
tents, without denying that he had given in-
structions tor It, does not overcome the pre-
sumption; especially In view ot the l'nct that 
the cause proceeded to trial and Yerdict un-
der the answer. We think that the eYldence 
should have been admitted. 
It ls contended for the defendant that the 
evidence was Immaterial, because the ttnd-
lng of the court that there was nothing due 
from the defendant to Campbell made ac-
ceptance of the order Immaterial. After th.-
rejection of the evidence, In the course of the 
trial, the plalntltr otrered other eyldence 
which was incompetent, and was proper}~· 
excluded, tor the purpose of proYlng thnt 
there was enough due from the defendant to 
Campbell to meet the order. There was no 
other evidence offered by either party upon 
the question whPther anything wa~ due from 
the defendant to Campbell, and there was no 
ADMISSIONS IN PLEADINGS.
[Case No. 91
evidence before the court that anything was
due. Hence the special finding. Upon this
question the evidence of the answer of the
defendant in the former suit was competent,
and. if it had been considered by the court,
might have led to a diflfercnt finding; and it
would have been before the court but for the
erroneous ruling excluding it. If it should
be ar,':ued that the finding rendered the evi-
dence immaterial for the purpose for which
it was offered, the answer is that it was mate-
rial for that purpose, and competent as evi-
dence in the case until the finding was made;
and the defendant had the right to have it
before the court until then, and to have it
considered by the court on the question of
the finding. The fact that the evidence was
not offered for that particular purpose is not
material. It was offered for a purpose for
which it was competent, and was excluded
for reasons that applied equally to an offer for
the other purpose. It was offered to prove
an acceptance of the order when the plaintiff
was proving that part of his case, and the
ruling excluding it was, in effect, a ruling
that it was not competent for either purpose.
wn.ous,r.v.—17
W'hen the plaintifi reached the other part of
his case, and attempted to prove that there
was something due from the defendant to
Campbell, a renewed otfer of the rejected evi-
dence for the purpose of proving that fact
would have only been askiiig for a reversal
of the former ruling, and, at least, was un-
necessary.
The oh‘er to prove an agreement between
the attorney in the former suit seems to have
been properly excluded. It is not sutlicient-
ly definite and certain to show any admission
by the defendant’s attorney. It appears to
have been an agreement by the pl:1intiff’s
attorney to deduct from any verdict in his
favor the amount of the orders, and to take
judgment only for the balance. It does not
appear that the defendant’s attorney did any-
thing more than to receive the voluntary
promise of the plaintilf’s attorney. It is not
sufficient to prove any admission by defend-
ant’s attorney, much less any by which the
defendant himself should be affected.
The judgment offered was res inter allos,
and was properly excluded. Exceptions sus-
talned.
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ADMlSSJO~S IN PLEADINGS. [Case No. Dl 
evidence before the court that anything was 
due. Hence tbe special finding. Upon this 
question the evidence of the answer of the 
defendant ln the former suit was competent, 
and, it 1t had been considered by the com;t, 
might have led to a dl1rerent finding; and it 
would have been before the court but for the 
erroneous mling excluding it. It lt should 
be argued that the finding rendered the evi-
dence Immaterial for the purpose for which 
It was offered, the answer ls that It was mat(l-
rlal for that purpose, and competent as evi-
dence In the case until the finding was made; 
and the defendant bad the right to have lt 
before the court until then, and to have lt 
considered by the court on the question of 
the finding. The fact that the evidence was 
not offered for that particular purpose Is not 
material It was offered for a purpose for 
which It was competent, and was excluded 
for reasons that applied equally to an offer for 
the other purpose. It was offered to prove 
an acceptance of the order when the plaintiff 
was proving that part of hie case, and the 
ruling excluding It was, In effect, a ruling 
that It was not competent for either purpose. 
WILOUS,BV.-17 
When the plalnttt'f reached the other part of 
hie case, and atte~pted to prove that there 
was something due from the defendant to 
Campbell, a renewed offer of the rejected evi-
dence for the purpose of proving that fact 
would have only been asking for a reversal 
of the former ruling, and, at least, was un-
necessary. 
The offer to prove an agreement between 
the attorney In the former suit seems to have 
been properly excluded. It Is not sufficient. 
ly definite and certain to show any adml881.on 
by the defendant's attorney. It appears to 
have been an agreement by the plaintiff's 
attorney to deduct from any verdict In hie 
favor the amount of the orders, and to take 
judgment only for the balance. It does not 
appear that the defendant's attorney did any-
thing more than to receive the voluntary 
promise of the plaintiff's attorney. It b not 
11ufftclent to prove any admission by defend-
ant's attorney, much less any by which the 
defendant himself should be affected. 
The judgment offered was res Inter alloe, 
and was properly excluded. Exceptions sus-
tained. 
Case N 0. 92]
PROOF.
ULRICH v. ULRICH.
(32 N. E. 606, 136 N. Y. 120.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 29, 1892.
Appeal from superior court of New York
City, general term. See 17 N. Y. Supp. 721.
Action by Charles Ulrich against Edward
Ulrich, as executor of Barbara Ulrich, de-
ceased. Reversed.
Nelson Smith, for appellant. Edward P.
Orrell (Edward W. S. Johnston, of counsel),
for respondent.
GRAY, J. The plaintiff brought this ac-
tion against the executor of his mother’s
will to recover from her estate the value of
services, which he alleged had been render-
ed by himself and his wife to his mother at
her request. A jury rendered a verdict for
the defendant, and the only question which
demands our consideration, upon the plain-
tiff's appeal from a judgment affirming the
defendants recovery, arises upon the eXcep-
tion of the plaintiif to a part of the trial
judge‘s charge. After stating what the
action was for, the trial judge said: "As
a general rule, children are bound to care
for their parents in their old age, and filial
atfection should prompt children to do so.
The consequence is that the presumption of
law is against such a. claim as has been ad-
vanced in this action.” The plaintiff except-
ed to this portion of the charge, and insists
that it was an erroneous instruction to the
jury. The trial judge, it is true, continued
by charging that “if the plaintiff has over-
come the presumption by proof, and has
clearly shown that the services sought to be
recovered for were rendered by himself and
his wife pursuant to his mother's express
promise, ' " " the plaintiff is entitled to
recover." Under the facts of the case, as
they had appeared in the evidence, the
charge relating to the obligations of chil-
dren, and as to the legal presumption, was
such as possibly to convey to the minds of
the jurors an erroneous understanding of the
law. It may well be that the trial judge had
before his own mind the moral aspect of the
case, and did not intend that his observa-
tions should have any other weight with the
jury than as moral reflections; but the na-
ture of the case, the sequence of the re-
marks. and the stage of the case, or the cir-
cumstances under which uttered. were such
as, in my judgment, to require us to grant
a new trial. There is no presumption of law
against the maintenance of such a claim. If
the plaintiit had established to the satis-
faction of the jury the existence of an agree-
ment between his parent and himself. un-
dcr which he and his wife were to attend
upon and to care for her, and she was to
pay for such services, he was entitled to
their verdict. as much as he would be upon
any other valid claim.
A “presumption” has been defined to be a
rule of law that courts and judges shall
draw a particular inference from particular
facts, or from particular evidence, unless and
until the truth of the inference is disprov-
ed. Steph. Dig. Ev. c. 1, art. 1. No pre-
sumption existed here as a presumption of
law. The right to draw any presumption as
to the fact of an agreement having been
made from the other fact of the relationship
between the parties was within the exclusive
province of the jury. Justice v. Lang, 52 N.
Y. 323. There is no rule of law which com-
pels an inference, from the fact of such a
relationship, against the existence of an
agreement by the parent to compensate the
child for services to be rendered. The law
does presume, where there is no proof of a
contract, under which the services were per-
formed, that there was no promise or agree-
ment to pay for them; that is, that they
were gratuitous. That is the general rule.
So far as the relation of parent and child is
concerned, it is quite as competent for the
parent to contract with his adult child for
support and care, and a claim for the com-
pensation due thereunder is quite as valid,
as it would be in any other case between
individuals. The liability of a child to sup-
port its parents, who are infirm, destitute, or
aged, wa created in England and here by
statute. The statute in that respect created
duties unknown to the common law. Reeve.
Dom. Rel. 28-i; 1 Bl. Comm. -1485 Edwards
v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281. Had the trial judge
confined his observations to the suggestion
that filial afifection should prompt children
to take care of their parents in their old age,
I should find no reason for criticising the cor-
rectness of his charge. But the tate of the
case was such as that, with the moral sense
alert, and naturally quick to respond to im-
pressions adverse to the plaintiff's claim, the
jury would readily attach great weight to all
expressions of the judge presiding at the
trial which cast a doubt upon the validity
of the claim. In every case, to determine
whether the error pointed out has been such
as to prejudice the party, the court may con-
sider the nature of the case, and how deli-
cately the scales were balanced between the
parties. Here the plaintiff had shown by the
evidence of his wife that, after the death of
her husband, the testatrix, who was very
aged and feeble. told plaintiff and his wife
to stay on with her, and that she would pay
them for the work they did; that she gave
as :1 reason her helpless condition; that they
remained with her until her death. and dur-
ing that time performed many more or less
important services in nursing and caring for
her; and that she repeatedly said she would
pay them, without mentioning any amount.
Her evidence was more of less corroborated
by that of witnesses who variously testified
to hearing the old woman state that she
made the plaintiff and his wife stay with and
take care of her, and that she would pay
them. or that she would “make it all right
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Case No. 92] J.>ROOF. 
ULRICH "'· ULRICH. 
(32 N. E. 606, 136 N. Y. 120.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 29, 1892. 
Appeal from superior court ot New York 
City, general term. See 17 N. Y. Supp. 721. 
A<•tlon by Charles Ulrich against Edward 
lilrlch, as executor ot Barbara Ulrich, de-
ceased. Reversed. 
Nelson Smith, tor appellant. Edward P. 
Orrell (l~dward W. S. Johnston, ot counsel), 
tor respondent. 
GRAY, J. The plaintiff brought this ac-
tion against the executor of his mother's 
will to recover from her estate the value ot 
services, which be alleged had been render· 
ed by himself and his wlte to his mother at 
her request. A jury rendered a verdict for 
the defendant, and the only question which 
demands our consideration, upon the plaln-
tlfr's appeal from a judgment aill.rmlng the 
defendant's recovery, arises upon the excep-
tion ot the plalntltf to a part ot the trial 
judge's charge. After stating what the 
action was tor, the trial judge said: "As 
a general rule, children are bound to care 
for tl1elr parent.a In their old age, and filial 
atfectlon should prompt children to do ao. 
The consequence ls that the presumption of 
law is 1111:11lnst such a claim as bas been ad-
vanced In this action." The plalntltf except-
ed to this portion of the charge, and Insists 
that it was an erroneous instruction to the 
jury. The trial judge, It ls true, continued 
by <>barging that "if the plalntltf has over-
come the presumption by proof, and has 
clearly shown that the services sought to be 
recovered for were rendered by himself and 
his wife pursuant to his mother's express 
promise, • • • the plaintltf ls entitled to 
recover.'' l.:nder the fact.a ot the case, as 
they had a11peared In the evidence, the 
charge relating to the obligations of chil-
dren, and as to the legal presumption, was 
such as 1Jos11lbly to convey to the minds of 
the jurors an erroneous understanding of the 
law. It may well be that the trial judge had 
before his own mind the moral aspect of the 
case, and did not intend that bis observa-
tions should have any other weight with the 
jury than as moral re1lectlons; but the na-
ture of the case, the sequence of the re-
marks, and the stage of the case, or the clr-
cmnstnnces under which uttered, were such 
as, in my judgment, to require us to grant 
11. new trial. There Is no presumption of law 
against the maintenance of such a claim. If 
the plalntitl' had established to the sntls-
tnctlon ot the jury the exlstf'nce of an agree-
mt>nt betwt><'ll his parent and himself. un-
df'r whi<'h he and bis wlfE: were to attend 
upon and to care for her, and she was to 
pay tor 1n1C'h services, he was entitled to 
their verdict. as much as he would be upon 
any other valid claim. 
A "presumption" has been defined to be a 
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rule of law that court.a and judges shall 
draw a. particular inference from partlcula.r 
facts, or from particular evidence, unless and 
until the truth of the Inference lB disprov-
ed. Steph. Dig. Ev. c. 1, art. 1. No pre-
sumption existed here as a presumption of 
law. The right to draw any presumption as 
to the fact of an agreement havln.g been 
made from the other fact of the relationship 
between the parties was within the exclu81.ve 
province of the jury. Justice v. Lang, 1>2 N. 
Y. 328. There ls no rule of law which com-
pels an inference, from the fact of such a 
relationship, against the existence of an 
agreement by the parent to compensate the 
child for services to be rendered. The law 
does presume, where there ls no proof of a 
contract, under which the eervlces were per-
formed, that there was no promise or agree-
ment to pay for them; that Is, that they 
were gratuitous. That Is t:lle general rule. 
So far as the relation of parent and child ls 
concerned, It ls quite as competent for the 
parent to contract with hla adult child for 
support and care, and a claim for the com-
pensation due thereunder ls quite as valid, 
as It would be In any other case between 
individuals. The llablllty of a child to sup-
port lt.s parents, who are Infirm, destitute, or 
aged, was created in England and here by 
statute. Tbe statute in that respect created 
duties unknown to the common law. Reeve. 
Dom. Rel. 284; 1 Bl. Comm. 418: Edwards 
v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281. Had the trial judge 
conftned his observations to the suggestion 
that filial atfectlon should prompt children 
to take care of their parents in their old age, 
I should find no reason for crltlclslng the cor-
rectness ot his charge. But the state of the 
case was such as that, with the moral sense 
alert, and naturally quick to respond to lm-
pl't'8sions adverse to the plalntlfr's claim, the 
jury would readily attach great weight to all 
expressions of the judge presldlng at the 
trial which C'ast a doubt upon the validity 
of the claim. In every case, to determine 
whether the error pointed out has been such 
as to prejudice the party, the court may con-
sider the nature of the case, and bow dell-
cat~ly the scales were balanced between the 
parties. Here the plalntltr bad shown by the 
evidence of his wife that, after the death of 
her husband, the testatrix, who was very 
aged and feeble, told plalntltf and his wife 
to stay on with her, and that she would pay 
them for the work they did; that she gave 
as a reason her helpless condition; that they 
remained with her until her death, and dur-
ing that time performed many more or Jess 
Important services In nursing and carln~ for 
her; and that she repf'atedly said Rhe would 
pay them, without mentioning any amount. 
Her evidence waR more o' leRs corroborated 
by that of witne1!!1es who vat"iously testified 
to hearing the old woman state that she 
made the plalntltr and his wife stay with and 
take care of her, and that she would pay 
tht>w. or that Rhe would "make It all right 
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL.
[Case No. 92
with them.” In opposition, the defense gave
evidence to show that plaintiff and wife re-
ceived their board and lodging; that the de-
ceased was an active woman, and not de-
pendent upon others for services, or in need
of care; that plaintiff was a shiftless fel-
low, and would occasionally drink to excess;
and that, under the will of deceased, plain-
tiff received an equal interest in her estate
with the other children. When the evidence
was all in, and the case ready to be sent
to the jury for their verdict, while the plain-
tiff's evidence of an agreement that they
should remain and care for the deceased,
and that their services were to be paid for,
was uncontradicted by direct evidence, it
was seriously attacked by evidence of facts
which, if it did not make the agreement ap-
pear an improbable one, yet was of such a
nature as might justify the jury in discred-
iting the evidence for the plaintiff. '
On the one side was positive evidence
which, if believed, entitled plaintiif to a ver-
dict. According to the evidence given for
the plaintiff, there were no rambling expres-
sions of a sense of obligation, or of prom-
ises to make compensation by testamentary
provisions. There was a request to remain,
and an agreement to pay for the work to be
done. On the other side, there was circum-
stantial evidence negativing, or tending to
negative, the making of the alleged agree-
ment, which the jury were at liberty to ae-
cept, and upon which they could base a ver-
dict for the defendant. In that condition of
"things, the just balance of their minds might
be disturbed, and their judgment easily led,
by any suggestion from the trial judge which
seemed to militate against the legality of
pla.intifl!’s claim, and which would seem to
accord with an aversion of the moral sense.
It appears from the record that at the con-
clusion of the evidence but little time was
left, and that the trial judge hastened, as
he said, to “finish the case this evening,”
and he made a very brief charge, in which
he left it to the jury to say whether the
plaintiff had “made out a case which meets
every requirement of the law as he had laid
it down." He had in mind, I do not doubt
at all, that he had previously merely com-
mented upon the obligation from child to
parent, as such exists in nature, and not as
having led them to believe that any rule of
law stood in the way of such a claim in such
cases. But I am constrained to the belief
that prejudice may have been worked to the
plaintiffs case by the observations of the
trial judge. He had observed that it was “a
general rule that children are bound to take
care of their parents in their old age," and
that “the consequence" of that rule, and of
the promptings of filial aifection. was “that
the presumption of law was against such a
claim as had been advanced in this action."
Both statements were incorrect as legal prop-
ositions; for, of course, there is no such gen-
eral rule of law, nor such a presumption.
Coming from the lips of the judge, from
whom they were to take the law applicable
to the case, can we, and should we, say that
they had no influence upon the minds of the
jury, or that, if they did have, the error was
cured by the subsequent instruction to the
effect that, “if the plaintiff had overcome the
presumption by proof,” he might recover?
I think not. This was essentially a case for
decision by a jury upon the evidence be-
fore them, as they believed the facts and
weighed the probabilities. They might well
have understood that there was a rule of
law, which amounted to a presumption,
against the validity of such a contract and
claim, and the plaintiff should therefore have
a new trial, in which a verdict may be reach-
ed without the possible influence of a.n_ er-
roneous idea leading to its formation. The
judgment should be reversed, and a new
trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to
abide the event. All concur, except AN-
DREWS, FINCH, and 0’BRIEN, JJ., dis-
senting.
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PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL. [Case No. 92 
with them." In opposition, the defense gave 
evidence to show that plaintur and wife re-
ceived their board and lodging; that the de-
ceased was an active woman, and not de-
pendent upon others for services, or in need 
of care; that plalnillr was a shiftless fel-
low, and would occasionally drink to excess; 
and that, under the will of deceased, plain-
tiff received an equal interest in her estate 
with the other chlldren. When the evidence 
was all ln, and the case ready to be sent 
to the jury for their verdict, while the plain-
tiff's evidence of an agreement that they 
should remain and care for the deceased, 
and that their services were to be paid for, 
was uncontradlcted by direct evidence, It 
was seriously attacked by evidence of facts 
which, if it did not make the agreement ap-
pear an improbable one, yet was of such a 
nature as might justify the jury In discred-
iting the evidence for the plnlntltr. · 
On the one side was 1>0sitlve evidence 
which, lf belleved, entitled plaintllr to a ver-
dict. According to the evidence given for 
the plaintiff, there were no rambling expres-
sions of a aense of obllga tlon, or of prom-
ises to make compensation by testamentary 
p1·ovlslons. There was a :reciuest to remain, 
and an agreement to pay for the work to be 
-done. On the other side, there was circum-
stantial evidence negativing, or tending to 
negative, the making of the alleged agree-
ment, which the jury were at liberty to ac-
cept, and upon which they could base a ver-
dict for the defendant. In that condition of 
things, the just balance of their minds might 
be disturbed, and their judgment easily led, 
by any suggestion from the trial j.udge which 
seemed to mtUtate against the legality of 
plaintttr•s claim, and which would seem to 
accord with an aversion of the moral sense. 
It appears from the rec01·d that at the con-
·Clusion of the evidence but little time was 
left, and that the trial judge hastened, as 
he said, to "ftnlsh the case this evening," 
.and he made a very brief charge, In which 
he left it to the jury to say whether the 
plaintiff had "made out a case which meets 
every requirement of the law as he bad laid 
ft down." He had in mind, I do not doubt 
at all, that he had previously merely com-
mented upon the obllgatlon from child to 
parent, as such exists In nature, and not as 
having led them to belleve that any rule of 
law stood in the way of such a claim in such 
cases. But I am constrained to the belief 
that prejudice may have been worked to the 
plaintilf's case by the obsen·ations of the 
trial judge. He had observed that it was "a 
general rule that chlldren are bound to take 
care of their parents in their old age," and 
that "the consequence" of that rule, and of 
the promptings of ftllal affection, was "that 
the presumption of law was against such a 
claim as had been advanced ln this action." 
Both statements were Incorrect as legal prop· 
osltlons; for, of course, there ls no such gen-
eral rule of law, nor such a presumption. 
Coming from the lips of the judge, from 
whom they were to take the law appllcable 
to the case, can we, and should we, say that 
they bad no in1luence upon the minds of the 
jury, or that, if they did have; the error was 
cured by the subsequent instruction to the 
elfect that, "If the plaintiff had overcome the 
presumption by proof," he might recover? 
I think not. This was essentially a case for 
de<'islon by a jury upon the evidence be-
fore them, as they believed the facts and 
weighed the probabllltles. They might well 
have understood that there WWI a rule of 
law, which amounted to a presumption, 
against the validity of such a contract and 
claim, and the plaintiff should therefore have 
a new trial, In which a verdict may be reach-
ed without the possible inftuence of an er-
roneoul! idea leading to lts formation. ·The 
judgment should be reversed, and a new 
trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to 
abide the event. All concur, except AN-
DREWS, FINCH. and O'BRIEN, JJ., dis-
senting. 
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PROOF.
HILTON v. BENDER.
(69 N. Y. 75.)
Court of Appeals of New York. March %, 1877.
Marcus T. Hun, for appellant. Amasa J.
Parker, for respondent.
CHURCH, C. J. This is an action of eject-
ment to recover an undivided interest in
premises in the city of Albany, situated on
the corner of South Pearl street and Hudson
avenue. The plaintii! claims as devisee un-
der the will of James Hilton, Sr., who died,
as I infer, in December, 1836, by which he
devised and bequeathed his residuary estate,
real and personal, to Robert Hilton, Jr., a
nephew, and Catherine, his wife, and Rich-
ard Hilton, the plaintiff, who was also a
nephew of the testator. The defendant is a
daughter of Robert Hilton, Jr., and Cath-
erine, his wife, and by descent and a con-
veyance from her brother is, in any event,
entitled to their interest under the will,
which interest is either an undivided one-
half or two-thirds, depending upon the con-
struction of the residuary clause, which will
be hereafter noticed. The defendant how-
ever claims title to the whole premises un-
der a lease for one thousand years, to one
John Hilton, by the corporate authorities of
the city of Albany, dated in March. 1836, up-
on a sale for an assessment, and by him,
through another person, to her; and also
under a like conveyance from the city au-
thorities, 1861, to one Paddock, and by him
to her. The plaintiff was nonsuited at the
trial, but the record does not state upon
what ground the nonsuit was granted. The
general term afiirmed the judgment upon
the ground of a title in the defendant to the
whole premises by adverse possession under
the assessment deed of 1836. This ground
is now abandoned by reason of the recent
decision of this court in Bedell v. Shaw, 59
N. Y. 46, holding that possession, to be ad-
verse so as to ripen into a title when long
enough continued, must be accompanied by
a claim of title in fee, and hence, that a
claim under such a lease is not sutlicient,
and is not in hostility to the title of the
owner. But it is insisted that the defendant
has afiirmatively and conclusively, in law,
established a title to the whole premises by
virtue of the two assessment deeds, and
especially by the first one, dated in 1836.
The deed or lease only from the mayor is
produced. No other paper or proceeding
was proved on the trial. The authority for
making improvements and for levying and
collecting assessments therefor in the city
was derived from sections 4 and 5, chapter
16-1 of the Laws of 1828, which, in sub-
stance, were re-enactments of sections 30
and 31 of chapter 185 of the Laws of 1826.
By those sections it was made lawful for the
mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the
city "to order and direct” certain improve-
ments, including the opening of streets and
the making and repairing of sewers, drains.
etc., and upon the completion of any such
work so ordered, to cause an account of the
expense to be made by the city superintend-
ent or other person or persons, to be ap-
pointed by them, and to apportion the same
under oath among the houses and lots in-
tended to be benefited in proportion to the
advantage which each was deemed to ac-
quire, specifying the owner or occupant,
which apportionment was to be returned to
the mayor, etc., and when returned, they
were to cause public notice to be given of
such apportionment for thirty days, and if
no cause was shown against confirmation,
upon its approval it .was to be filed in the
oifice ot the clerk of the common council,
and then it was to be binding and a lien
upon the lands assessed. The mayor, etc.,
were then authorized to sue for and recover
such assessment, or in case of refusal to
pay, cause a notice of such apportionment
and of the amount forming a part thereof
to be published for three months, requiring
the owners of the respective lots to pay the
assessment, and in default, that such lot or
lots would be sold at public auction, and
they were authorized to sell accordingly.
I have thus briefly abstracted the require-
ment ot the law to show that the legisla-
ture required oflicial action and record evi-
dence ot the principal steps preliminary to a
sale, so that the property rights of the citi-
zen should not be sacrificed, except upon
compliance with these public and formal
acts.
It is well settled that every statute au-
thority in derogation of the common law to
divet the title of one and transfer it to an-
other, must be strictly pursued. It is not a
case for presuming that public oificcrs have
done their duty, but their acts must be
shown and the onus lies on the purchaser.
The recitals in the deed are not evidence
against the owner, but they must be proved
true. Sharpe v. Speir, 4 Hill, 86. The stat-
ute does not declare that the deed shall be
deemed prima facie evidence of the regular-
ity of the proceedings or the sale, and hence
these proceedings must be proved. The
clause that the purchaser shall “hold the
land against the owner and all persons
claiming it," does not obviate the necessity
of such proof. The clause is based upon the
presumption that the statutory requirements
have been complied with and are merely
declaratory in that event of the nature of
the interest which the purchaser is entitled
to enjoy.
In tax sales there is a fundamental condi-
tion to their validity that there should have
been a substantial compliance with the law
in all the proceedings of which the sale was
the culmination. “This would be the gen-
eral rule in all cases in which a man is to
be divested of his freehold by adversary
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Case No. 93] 
HILTON v. BEXDER. 
(69 N. Y. 75.} 
Court of Appeals of New York. March 20, 1877. 
Marcus T. Hun, tor appellant. Amasa J. 
Parker, for respondent. 
CHURCH, C. J. Tbis ls an action of eject· 
meot to recover an undivided Interest lo 
premises lo the city ot Albany, situated on 
the corner of South Pearl street and Hudson 
avenue. The plalotur claims as devlsee un-
der the wfil of James Hilton, Sr., who died, 
as I inter, lo December, 1836, by which he 
devised and bequeathed bis residuary estate, 
real and personal, to Robert Hilton, Jr., a 
nephew, and Catherine, bis wife, and Rich· 
ard Hilton, the plaintiff, who was also a 
nephew of the testator. The defendant Is a 
daughter of Robert Hilton, Jr., and Cath-
erine, hie wife, and by descent and a con-
veyance from her brother le, In any event, 
entitled to their lnterest under the will, 
which Interest ls either an undivided one-
half or two-thirds, depending upon the con-
struction ot the residuary clause, which will 
be hereafter noticed. The defendant how-
ever claims title to the whole premises un-
der a lease tor one thousand years, to one 
John Hilton, by the corporate authorities of 
the city of Albany, dated in March, 1836, up-
on a sale for an assessment, and by him, 
through another person, to her; and also 
under a like conveyance trom the city au-
thorities, 1861, to one Paddock, and by him 
to her. The plaintiff was noneulted at the 
trial, but the record does not state upon 
what ground the nonsuit was granted. The 
general term aftlrmed the judgment upon 
the ground of a title lo the defendant to the 
whole premises by adverse possession under 
the assessment deed of 1836. This ground 
ls now abandoned by reason of the recent 
decision of this court in Bedell v. Shaw, 59 
N. Y. 46, holding that possession, to be ad-
verse so as to ripen into a title when long 
enough continued, must be accompanied by 
a claim of title In fee, and hence, that a 
claim under such a lease ls not eutH.cient, 
and ls not In hostillty to the title of the 
owner. But it Is Insisted that the defendant 
bas affirmatively and conclusively, In law, 
established a title to the whole premises by 
virtue of the two assessment deeds, and 
especially by the first one, dated In 183G. 
The deed or lease only from the mayor ls 
produced. No other paper or proceeding 
was proved on the trial. The authority tor 
making Improvements and for levying and 
collecting assessments therefor lo the city 
was derived from sections 4 and 5, chapter 
16-l of the Laws of 1828, which, In sub-
stancl', were re-enactments of sections 30 
and 31 of cha11ter l&i of the Laws of l82ll. 
By those Sl'ctlons It was made lawful for the 
mayor, ald1>rmen and commonalty of the 
l'lty "to order a.od direct" certain lmprove-
:wo 
ments, Including the opening of streets and' 
the malting and repalrlng of sewers, drains, 
etc., and upon the completion of any such 
work SO ordered, to cause an account Of the 
expense to be made by the city superintend-
ent or other person or persons, to be ap-
pointed by them, and to apportion the same 
under oath among the houses and lots In-
tended to be benefited in proportion to the 
advantage which each was deemed to ac-
quire, specifying the owner or occupant, 
which apportionment was to be returned to 
the mayor, etc., and when returned, they 
were to cause public notice to be given ot 
such apportionment for thirty days, and ff 
no cause was shown against confirmation, 
upon its approval It . was to be filed in the 
omce of the clerk of the common council, 
and then It was to be binding and a llen 
upon the lands assessed. The mayor, etc., 
were then authorized to sue for and recover 
such assessment, or In case of refusal to 
pay, cause a notice of such apportionment 
and of the amount forming a part thereof 
to be published for three months, requiring 
the owners of the respective lots to pay the 
aSBessment, and in default, that such lot or 
lots would be sold at public auction, and 
they were authorized to sell accordingly. 
I have thus briefly abstracted the require-
ments of the law to show that the legisla· 
ture required official action and record evl· 
dence of the principal steps preliminary to a 
sale, so that the property rights of the cltl· 
zen should not be sacrificed, except upon 
compliance with these public and formal 
acts. 
It Is well settled that every statute au-
thority in derogation of the common law to 
divest the title of one and transfer it to an-
other, must be strictly pursued. It Is not a 
case for presuming that i>ubllc otH.cers have 
done their duty, but their acts must be 
shown and the onus Iles on the purchaser. 
The recitals In the deed are not evidence 
against the owner, but they must be proved 
true. Sharpe v. Speir, 4 Hill, 86. The stat-
ute does not declare that the deed shall be 
deemed prlma facle eddence of the regular-
ity of the proceedings or the sale, and hence 
these proceedings must be proved. The 
clause that the purchaser shall "hold the 
land against the owner and all persons 
claiming It," does not obviate the necessity 
of such proof. The clause ls based upon the 
presumption that the statutory requirements 
have been complied with and are merely 
declaratory In that event of the nature ot 
the interest which the purchaser Is entitled 
to enjoy. 
In tax sales there le a fundamental condi-
tion to their validity that there shoulll hal'e 
been a substantial compliance with the law 
In all the proc1>edlngs of whl<.>h the sale w:t.s 
the culmination. "This wonltl be the J::'l'U· 
eral rule lo all <.'88('S In which a mun Is to 
be divested of bis freehold by adn'l"&lry 
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proceedings, but special reasons make it
peculiarly applicable to the case of tax
sales.” Cooley, Tax’n, 324. The proceed-
ings are ex parte. The owner is to be de-
prived of his land. The price usually paid
is trifling, and hence it is peculiarly appro-
priate that strictness in observing the re-
quirements of the law should be exacted.
Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me. 359. These general
rules are now universally applied and do
not require elaboration, and if applied in
this case they would be plainly fatal to the
defense founded upon the assessment deed
of 1836.
It is insisted however by the learned coun-
sel for the defendant, that from the lapse of
time which has intervened since the deed
was given (more than thirty years) and the
alleged possession under it, a conclusive
presumption may be indulged that all the
proceedings were regular and in accordance
with the statute. This position cannot be
sustained. The general rule laid down by
Mr. Greeuleaf in his work on Evidence that
“when an authority is given by law to ex-
ecutors, administrators, guardians, or other
oflicers, to make sales of land upon being
duly licensed by the courts, and they are re-
quired to advertise the sales in a particular
manner and to observe other formalities in
their proceedings, the lapse of sufiicient time
(which in most cases is fixed at thirty years)
raises a conclusive presumption that all the
legal formalities of the sale were observed,”
may be conceded, but this rule does not jus-
tify the position insisted upon in this case.
Greenl. Ev. § 20. The rule does not apply
to records and public documents which are
supposed to remain in the custody of the
otiicers charged with their preservation, and
which must be proved, or their loss ac-
counted for and supplied by secondary evi-
deuce.
The foundation of the proceeding in ques-
tion was the action of the common council
in ordering and directing the improvement,
and equally indispensable was the confirma-
tion, approval and filing of the apportion-
ment which made the assessment “bind-
ing” upon the owners. Without these oili-
cial acts the subsequent proceedings includ-
ing the deed were a nullity. The acts of the
mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the
city of Albany were matters of record.
They had a clerk, and the act specifically
directs the apportionment to be filed in his
oflice. The presumption is that these rec-
ords and documents are in existence, and in
the absence of evidence, if they cannot be
found or their loss or destruction in some
way accounted for or explained, the natural
presumption is that they never did exist.
When the law exacts acts of record, and
provides for perpetuating documentary evi-
deuce, it is unreasonable, because against
the usual course of things, to presume with-
out proof that they once existed and have
been lost. A presumption is an inference of
a fact not known arising from its necessary
or usual connection with others which are
known. To infer a record once existing and
lost, because not found, where the law re-
quires it should be kept, would reverse the
rule and create a presumption of one fact
from another not usually connected with it.
Facts may be shown doubtless from which
the existence of the records and their sub-
sequent loss or destruction might be infer-
red. No such facts were shown in this case.
The casual examination made during the
trial can scarcely be called a search. There
was no evidence, and certainly not suiti-
cieut, that the records are not in existence,
and if not, there were no facts proved to
rebut the presumption arising in that event
that they never did exist. When a person
seeks, by a purchase of valuable property
for a trifling sum at a tax sale, to cut off tho
title of the owner, it behooves him to see to
it that the proceedings have all been in sub-
stantial accordance with the requirements
of law, and that the proper evidence of the
same has been preserved, and there is mani-
fest propriety in applying this rule to a. pur-
chase by one sustaining the relations to the
owner which the evidence tends to show
that John Hilton did.
.Courts will not aid in supplying funda-
mental defects in such a case by presump-
tions. Again it appears, by a recital of the
deed, that the three months’ notice of sale
was published in the Albany Argus, a paper
then and now published in the city of Al-
bany, and no reason was adduced or fact
shown why the notice, as published, might
not be produced.
I‘1'esu1npti0ns of regularity may be in-
dulged as to notices and other intermediate
steps not matters of record; but even then
they are not always conclusive, but often.
depend upon the circumstances proved.
When a purchaser at a tax sale has taken
possession under his deed, and continued
undisturbed for a long period in the peace-
able enjoyment of the property, claiming by
virtue thereof. and the owner is in a posi-
tion to contest the title, and especially if he
is chargeable with knowledge of the claim,
the presumption is very strong, and as to
some facts after thirty years may be con-
clusive in favor of regularity. But if the
purchaser should lie by, before taking pos-
session, until his deed was very old, he
would come with a poor grace into court to
ask for a presumption to supply facts which
he did not venture to put himself in a posi-
tion to establish when it was practicable, if
they existed, to prove them. Cooley, Tax’n,
330. Between these extreme cases will be
found many others partaking more or less
of the elements of each. It is impracticable
to lay down a rule applicable to all cases.
Indeed there is no fixed rule on the subject.
It is clear that the age of the deed, while it
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proceedings, but special reasons make It 
peeullarly applicable to the case of tax 
sales." Cooley, Tax'n, 324. The proceed· 
lngs are ex parte. The owner ls to be de-
p11ved of his land. The price usually paid 
Is trifling, and hence it is peculiarly appro-
priate that strictness in observing the re-
quirements of the law should be exacted. 
Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me. 359. These general 
rules are now universally applied. and do 
not require elaboration, and If applied In 
this case they would be plainly fatal to the 
defense founded upon the assessment deed 
of 1836. 
It ls Insisted however by the learned coun· 
ael for the defendant, that from the lapse of 
time which has intervened since the deed 
was given (more than thirty years) and the 
alleged possession under It, a conclusive 
presumption may be Indulged that all the 
proceedings were regular and in accordance 
with the statute. This position cannot be 
sustained. The general rule laid down by 
lir. Greenleaf in his work on Evidence that 
"when an authority ls given by law to ex-
ecutors, administrators, guardians, or other 
otllcers, to make sales of land upon being 
duly licensed by the courts, and they are re-
quired to advertise the sales in a particular 
manner and to observe other formalltlee In 
tht>lr proceedings, the lapse of sufficient time 
(which In most cases is fixed at thirty years) 
raises a conclusive presumption that all the 
legal formalities of the sale were observed," 
may be conceded, but this rule does not jus-
tify the position insisted upon In this case. 
Greenl. Ev. § 20. The rule does not apply 
to records and public documents which are 
supposed to remain ln the custody of the 
oftlcers charged with their preservation, and 
which must be proved, or their loss ac-
counted for and supplied by secondary evi· 
dence. 
The foundation of the proceeding In ques-
tion was the action of the common councll 
In ordering and directing the Improvement, 
and equally Indispensable was the confirma-
tion, approval and filing of the apportion-
ment which made the assessment "bind-
ing" upon the owners. Without these offi-
cial acts the subsequent proceedings Includ-
ing the deed were a nullity. The acts of the 
mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the 
city of Albany were matters of record. 
They had a clerk, and the act specift('ally 
directs the apportionment to be filed In his 
otllce. The presumption ls that these rec-
ords and documents are In existence, and In 
the absence of evidence, If they cannot be 
found or their loss or destruction in some 
way accounted for or explained, the natural 
presumption le that they never did exist. 
""hen the law exacts acts of record, and 
provides for perpetuating documentary evi-
dence, It ls unreasonable, because against 
the usual course of things, to presume with· 
out proof that they once existed and have 
been lost. A presumption ls an Inference of 
a fact not known arising from Its necessary 
or usual connection with others which are 
known. To infer a record once existing and 
lost, because not found, where the law re-
quires It should be kept, would reverse the 
rule and create a presumption of one fact 
from another not usually connected with It. 
Facts may be shown doubtless from which 
the existence of the records and their sub-
sequent loss or destruction might be infer-
red. No such facts were shown in this case. 
The casual examination made during the 
trial can scarcely be called a search. There 
was no evidence, and certainly not sutll· 
clent, that the records are not In existence, 
and if not, there were no facts proved to 
rebut the presumption arising In that event 
that they never did exist. When a person 
seeks, by a purchase of valuable property 
for a trilling sum at a tax sale, to cut off the 
title of the owner, It behooves him to see to 
It that the proceedings have all been In sub-
stantial accordance with the requirements 
of law, and that the proper evidence of the 
same has been preserved, an41 there la manl· 
fest propriety In applying this rule to a pur-
chase by one sustaining the relations to the 
owner which the evidence tends to show 
that John Hilton did. 
. Courts wlll not aid in supplying funda· 
mental defects In such a case by presump-
tions. Again It appears, by a recital of the 
deed, that the three months' notice of sale 
was published in the Albany Argus, a paper 
then and now published In the city of Al-
bany, and no reason was adduced or fact 
shown why ~he notice, as published, might 
not be produced. 
Presumptions of regularity may be in-
dulged as to notices and other intermediate 
steps not matters of record; but even thrn 
they are not always conclusive, but often. 
depend upon the circumstances pron~d. 
\Vhen a purchaser at a tax sale has taken 
possession under hie deed, and continued 
undisturbed for a long period in the peace· 
able enjoyment of the property, claiming by 
virtue thereof, and the owner is in a posi-
tion to contest the title, and especially if he 
ls chargeable with knowledge of the claim, 
the presumption is very strong, nnll as to 
some facts after thirty years may be con-
clusive In favor of regularity. But If the 
purchaser should lie by, before taking pos-
session, until his deed was very old, he 
would come with a poor grace into court to 
ask for 11 presumption to supply facts which 
he did not venture to put himself In a posi-
tion to establish when It was practicable, if 
they existed, to prove them. Cooley, Tax'n, 
330. Between these extreme cases will be 
found many others partnking more or less 
of the elements of each. It is Impracticable• 
to lay down a rule applicable to all cases. 
Indeed there ls no fixed rule on the subject. 
It ls clear that the age of the deed, while it 
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may be important, is not decisive. In this
case, as we have seen, it could not be found,
as a question of fact, that the preliminary
steps had been taken, or that the record evi-
dence had ever existed, of the facts which
were matters of record, and no evidence
was given as to other facts from which an
inference could be drawn. There was other
evidence bearing in a greater or less degree
upon the character of the possession of John
Hilton and the defendant, which it was
proper to be considered. In the first place
the plaintiff was in no position to contest
the title until the death of Rachel Hilton, the
surviving beneficiary under the will. His in-
terest was a remainder after two lives. It
does not distinctly appear when Rachel Hil-
ton died, but I infer from the evidence that
it was in the neighborhood of 1860, or later,
and the action was commenced in 1871. The
plaintiff was then, and is now, a non-resi-
dent of the state, and there is no evidence
whether he had any knowledge of the
claims now presented or not. There was
evidence also tending to show that at the
time John Hilton bid oif the premises at the
tax sale and received the lease, he was in
possession as a tenant of the owner, and
also as an agent to some extent. This oc-
curred while the owner was living, in the
spring previous to his death. The character
of his possession afterward was somewhat
equivocal from the evidence. There was
evidence that he brought forward his assess-
ment deed when the will was read, but
when that was does not appear. The tes-
tator died in December, 1836, but the will
was not proved until 1839. It is quite prob-
able that he intended to claim the property
by virtue of the tax title, as it was talked of
in the family, and it was in evidence that
the defendant complained of his treatment
of the heirs in this respect, and yet there
was evidence tending to show that he after-
ward supplied the life beneficiaries with
groceries in payment for their interest in
the use of the premises. The executors are
both dead. and it does not appear that they
ever had possession. In 1852, John Hilton
made an assignment for the benefit of cred-
itors, conveying, under general words, with-
out description, all his property, real and
personal, and in 1858 his assignees con-
veyed the premises to a third person for the
nominal consideration of $25, who, for a
like consideration, conveyed them to the
defendant. It does not appear that the as-
signees ever had or claimed possession of
this property during the six years interven-
ing between the assignment and their deed.
There is evidence tending to show that the
defendant has received the rents since 1857,
which implies that she has been in posses-
sion from that time. The deed from the as-
signees was not executed until 1858, and, if
she was in in 1857, it must have been by
virtue of her title under the will as co-ten-
ant with the plaintiff, or, if Rachel Hilton
was then living, possibly under some ar-
rangement with her. The inferences to be
drawn from these facts, bearing upon legal
propositions, involved as to the effect of the
purchases by John Hilton and by the de-
fendant and as to whether the premises
were held under the tax title, and have been
so held continuously since that period, are
to be drawn by the jury. And these facts
have some bearing upon the strengh of pre-
sumptions which may be invoked to supply
facts not capable from lapse of time of posi-
tive proof. Wortbing v. Webster, 45 Me.
270; 71 Am. Dec. 543; Cooley, Tax‘n, 331,
332, and cases cited.
It is not intended to intimate that the tax
sale may not be upheld, but only that there
was an entire failure of proof upon the trial,
and that it is not a case for the application
of a conclusive presumption of regularity.
The assessment deed of 1861 to William S.
Paddock is void. The commissioners to as-
sess the damages and recompense for widen-
ing Hamilton street, although appointed ac-
cording to the statute then in existence
(chapter S6 of the Laws of 184-1), were not
appointed in accordance with section 7 of
article 1 of the constitution. In this respect
the statute is unconstitutional, as this court
decided in Menges v. City of Albany, 56 N.
Y. 37-1. This defect appeared affirmatively
upon the trial, and as it was a substantial
link in the chain of legal requirements nec-
essary to bind the lands of the owners sup-
posed to be benefited, the defect is fatal to
the validity of the entire proceedings. The
question in respect to the title of James Hil-
ton, Sr., was not insisted upon in this court.
The evidence would at least justify a find-
ing of facts by the jury suflicient to estab-
lish a good title. A nonsuit on that ground
would have been erroneous.
As there must be a new trial, it is proper
to determine the extent of the interest of the
plaintiff in the premises under the will of
James Hilton, Sr. The will. after devising
and bequeathing the property of the testa-
tor, to the executors in trust to apply the
income, rents and profits to the support of
the son of the testator, James Hilton, and
his wife, Rachel, and the survivor for life,
contained this clause: “I give, devise and
bequeath the residue and remainder of my
real and personal estate, * ' " to Robert
Hilton, Jr., son of my deceased brother
Robert, and Catherine, his wife, and Rich-
ard, son of my brother Derrick, as tenants
in common, and their heirs forever.” There
is nothing in the language indicative of an
intent to give Robert Hilton, Jr., and his
wife a half interest and the plaintiff the oth-
er half. The devise to Catherine, the wife,
is a specific as to either of the others, and
the language applies to her the same as the
others, and I can see no reason for any dis-
tinction. The devise is to Robert. Catherine
and Richard, as tenants in common. and to
their heirs and assigns forever. It follows
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may be Important, ls not decisive. In this 
case, as we have seen, It eould not be found, 
as a question of fact. that the preliminary 
steps had been taken, or that the record evi-
dence had ever existed, of the facts which 
were matters of record, and no P.vldence 
was given as to other facts from which an 
Inference could be drawn. There was other 
evidence bearing In a greater or less degree 
upon the character of the possession of John 
Hllton and the detendant, which It Wll8 
proper to be considered. In the first place 
the plaintiff was In no position to contest 
the title until the death of Rachel Hilton, the 
surviving beneficiary under the will. His In-
terest was a remainder atter two ll'ves. It 
does not dlstlnetly appear when Raebel Hll-
ton died, but I Infer from the evidence that 
It was In the neighborhood of 1860, or later, 
and the aetlon was commenced In 1871. The 
plaintiff was then, and is now, a non-resi-
dent of the state, and there Is no evidence 
whether he had any knowledge of the 
claims now presented or not. There was 
evidence also tending to show that at the 
time John Hllttn bid on' the premises at the 
tax sale and received the lease, he was In 
poeseBSlon as a tenant of the owner, and 
also as an agent to some extent. This oc-
curred while the owner was living, In the 
spring previous to his death. The character 
of his possession atterward was somewhat 
equivocal from the evidence. There was 
evidence that he brought forward his assess-
ment deed when the will was read, but 
when that was does not appear. The tes-
tator died In December, 1836, but the will 
was not proved until 1839. It ts quite prob-
able that he Intended to claim the property 
by virtue of the tax title, as It was talked of 
In the family, and It Wll8 In evidence that 
the defendant complained of his treatment 
of the heirs In this respect, a.nd yet there 
was evidence tending to show that he after-
ward supplied the life beneficiaries with 
groceries In payment for their Interest In 
the use of the premises. The executors are 
both dead, and It does not appear that they 
ever bad possession. In 1852, John Hilton 
made an assignment for the benefit of cred-
itors, conveying, under general words, with-
out description, all his property, real and 
personal, and In 1858 his assignees eon-
veyed the premises to a third person for the 
nominal consideration ot $25, who, for a 
like consideration, conveyed them to the 
defendant. It does not appear that the as-
SIA'DeeS ever had or claimed vossesslon of 
this property during the six years lnterren-
lng between the assignment and their deed. 
There ls evidence tending to show that the 
defendant has received the rents since 1857, 
whkb Implies that she hns been In posses-
sion from that time. The deed from the as-
signees was not executed until 1858, and, If 
she was In In 1857, It must have been by 
virtue of her title under the will as co-ten-
ant with the plaintiff, or, If Rachel Hilton 
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was then living, possibly under some ar-
rangement with her. The lnferenees to be 
drawn from these facts, bearing upon legal 
propositions, Involved as to the effect of the 
purchases by John Hilton and by the de-
fendant and as to whether the premises 
were held under the tax title, and ha'\'e been 
so held continuously since that period, are 
to be drawn by the jury. And these facts 
have some bearing upon the strength of pre-
sumptions which may be invoked to supply 
facts not capable from lapse ot time of posi-
tive proof. Worthing v. Webster, 45 .Me. 
270; 71 Am. Dec. 543; Cooley, Tax'n, 331, 
332, and cases cited. 
It ls not Intended to Intimate that the tax 
sale may not be upheld, but only that there 
was an entire failure of proof upon the trial, 
and that It Is not a case for the application 
of a eoncluslve presumption of regularity. 
The assessment deed ot 1861 to William S. 
Paddock Is void. The commissioners to as-
sess the damages and recompense for widen-
ing Hamilton street, although appointed ac-
cording to the statute then In existence 
(chapter 86 ot the Laws of lSU), were not 
appointed In aecordance with section 7 of 
article 1 of the constitution. In this respect 
the statute ls unconstitutional, as this court 
decided In .Menges v. City of Albany, 56 N. 
Y. 374. This defect appeared affirmatively 
upon the trial, and as It was a substantial 
link in the chain of legal requirements nec-
essary to bind the lands of the owners sup-
posed to be benefited, the defect Is fatal to 
the validity of the entire proceedings. The 
question In respect to the title of James Hil-
ton, Sr., was not Insisted upon ln this court 
The evidence would at least justify a fiml-
ing ot facts by the jury sufficient to estalr 
llsh a good title. A nonsuit on that ground 
would have been erroneous. 
As there must be a new trial, It Is proper 
to determine the extent of the Interest ot the 
plalntltr In the premises under the will of 
James Hilton. Sr. The will, after devhilng 
and bequeathing the property of the tt>sta-
tor, to the executors in trust to apply the 
Income, rents and profits to the support of 
the son of the testator, James Hilton, and 
bis wife, Raebel, and the survivor for life, 
contained this clause: "I give, devise and 
bequeath the residue and remainder of my 
renl and personal estate, • • • to Robert 
Hilton, Jr., son of my deceased brother 
Robert, and Catherine, his wife, and Rich-
ard, son of my brother Derrick, as tenants 
In common, and their heirs forever." There 
ls nothing In the language Indicative of an 
Intent to give Robert Hilton, Jr., and his 
wife a half Interest and the plaintiff the oth-
er half. The devise to Catherine, the wife, 
ls as specific as to either of the others, and 
the language applies to her the same as the 
others, and I can see no reason for any dis-
tinction. The devise Is to Robert, Cntherlne 
and Richard, as tenants in common. and to 
their heirs and ~signs forever. It follows 
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL. [Case N0. 93
that the p1aintifl's interest under the will is The judgment must be reversed and a
only an undivided third, instead of one-half new trial granted. with costs to abide the
as claimed. It is unnecessary to notice the event. Judgment reversed.
other points. All concur; RAPALLO, J., absent.
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PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL. [Case No. 93 
that the plalntift''s Interest unde1· the wl,11 ls 
only an undJvlde(l third, Instead of one-halt 
as dnlmed. It ls unnecessary to notice the 
other points. 
The judgment must be re\·crsed and a 
new trial granted, with costs to abide the 
event. Judgment reversed. 
All concur; RAP ALLO, J., absent. 
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PROOF .
UNITED STATES v'. ROSS.
(92 U. S. 281.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Oct.,
1875.
Appeal from the court of claims.
Edwin B. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gcn., for the
United States. George Taylor, contra.
Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion"
of the court.
It is incumbent upon a claimant under the
captured or abandoned property act to estab-
lish by sufiicient proof that the property cap-
tured or abandoned came into the hands of
a treasury agent; that it was sold; that the
proceeds of the sale were paid into the treas-
ury of the United States; and that he was
the owner of the property, and entitled to
the proceeds thereof. All this is essential to
show that the United States is a trustee for
him, holding his money. That there is in the
treasury a fund arisen out of the sales of
property captured or abandoned, a fund held
in trust for somebody, and that the claim-
ant's property, after capture or abandon-
ment, came into the hands of a quartermas-
ter of the army or a treasury agent, is not
sufiicient. There must be evidence connect-
ing the receipt of it by the treasury agent
with the payment of the proceeds of sale of
that identical property into the treasury.
VVe do not say that the evidence must be di-
rect. It must, however, be such as the law
recognizes to be a legitimate medium of
proof; and the burden of proof rests upon
the claimant who asserts the connection.
In the present case, the court of claims has
not found as a fact that the claimant's cot-
ton came into the hands of a treasury agent,
that it was sold, and that the proceeds of
that cotton were paid into the treasury. No
connection between the cotton captured and t
the fund now held by the United States has
been established. Certain facts have been
found, and from them it was inferred, as
matter of law, that other facts existed; and
upon the facts thus inferred the court gave
judgment.
claimant owned, in May, 1864, thirty-one
bales of cotton, then in a warehouse in Rome,
Ga. On the 18th of that month, Rome was
captured by the United States forces; and
shortly afterwards the cotton was removed
on government wagons to a warehouse ad-
joining the railroad leading from Rome to
Kingston, and connecting there with a road
leading thence to Chattanooga. Whether it
was the only cotton in that warehouse is not
found; but it is inferrible from the other
facts found that it was not. Subsequently
(but how long afterwards docs not appear)
all of the cotton in that warehouse was ship-
ped on the railroad to Kingston, the road
being then in the possession of the military
authorities. It is next shown that cotton
(some cotton) arrived in Kingston from Rome
before Aug. 19, 186-1, and was forwarded to
Chattanooga; that, on the 19th of August,
forty-two bales were received at Chattanooga
from the quartermaster at Kingston; that
thence they were shipped to Nashville, where
they were received as coming from Kingston,
turned over to the treasury agent, and sold.
l‘he proceeds of sale were paid into the treas-
ury, and no title to these forty-two bales has
been asserted by third persons.
Such were the facts found; and from them
the court deduced, not as a conclusion of
fact, but as a presumption of law, that the
thirty-one bales removed on government
wagons to the warehouse immediately ad-
joining the railroad at Rome, shortly after
May 18, 186-l, were a part of the forty-two
bales received at Nashville on the 2-ith of Au-
gust, four months afterwards, and there tum-
ed over to the treasury agent. It is obvious
that this presumption could have been made
only by piling inference upon inference, and
presumption upon presumption. Because
the thirty-one bales of the claimant were
taken to the warehouse alongside of the rail-
road at Rome in May, 1864, and the cotton
in that warehouse afterwards, at some un-
known time (whether before or after Aug.
19 does not appear), was shipped on the road
to Kingston, it is inferred that the claimant's
cotton was part of the shipment. Because
somebody’s cotton (how much or how little
is not shown) arrived at Kingston from Rome
at some time not known, and was forwarded
to Chattanooga before the 19th of August,
1864, it is inferred that the claimant's thirty-
one bales, presumed to have reached Chat-
tanooga, thus arrived, and were forwarded;
and, because forty-two bales were received
at Chattanooga on that day from the quarter-
master at Kingston, it is inferred that the
claimant's bales were among them. These
seem to us to be nothing more than con-
‘ jectures. They are not legitimate inferences,
even to establish a fact; much less are they
presumptions of law. They are inferences
from inferences; presumptions resting on
the basis of another presumption. Such 9.
' mode of arriving at a conclusion of fact is
We think that in this there was error. The '
generally, if not universally, inadmissible.
No inference of fact or of law is reliable
‘ drawn from premises which are uncertain.
Whenever circumstantial evidence is relied
upon to prove a fact, the circumstances must
be proved, and not themselves presumed.
Starkie, Ev. p. 80, lays down the rule thus:
“In the first place, as the very foundation
of indirect evidence ls the establishment of
one or more facts from which the inference
is sought to be made, the law requires that
the latter should be established by direct
evidence. as if they were the very facts in is-
sue." It is upon this principle that courts
are daily called upon to exclude evidence as
too remote for the consideration of the jury.
The law requires an open. visible connection
between the principal and evidential-_v facts
and the deductions from them, and does not
26-1
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UNITED ST ATES v. ROSS. 
(92 u. s. 281.) 
PROOF. 
I before Aug. 19, 1864, and was forwarded to Chattanooga; that, on the 19th of August, 
I forty-two bales were received at Chattanoogn Supreme Court of the United States. Oct., from the quartermaster at Kingston; that 
1875. I thence they were shipped to Nashville, where 
Appeal from the court of claims. they were received as coming from Kingston, 
Edwin B. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the turned over to the treasury agent, and sold. 
United States. George Taylor, contra. rhe proceeds of sale were paid Into the treas-
Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion · 
of the court. 
It le Incumbent upon a claimant under the 
captured or abandoned property act to estab-
lish by sufficient proof that the property cap-
tured or abandoned came Into the bands of 
a treasury agent; that it was sold; that the 
proceeda of the sale were paid Into the treas-
ury of tbe United States; and that he was 
the owner of the property, and entitled to 
the proceeds thereof. All this ls eBSential to 
show that the United States is a trustee tor 
him, holding bis money. That there ls in the 
treasury a !und arisen out of the sales of 
property captured or abandoned, a fund held 
In trust for somebody, and that the claim-
ant's property, after capture or abandon-
ment, came Into the hands of a quartermas-
ter of the army or a treasury agent, ls not 
su:fll.clent. There must be evidence connect-
ing the receipt of It by the treasury agent 
with the payment of the proceeds of sale of 
that Identical property into the treasury. 
We do not say that the evidence must be di-
rect. It must, however, be such as the law 
recognizes to be a legitimate medium of 
proof; and the burden of proof rests upon 
the claimant who asserts tbe connection. 
In the present C'ase, the court of claims bas 
not found as a fact that the claimant's cot-
ton came into the hands of a treasury agent, 
that lt was sold, and that the proceeds of 
that cotton were paid into the treasury. No 
connection between the cotton captured and 
the fund now held by the United States has 
been established. Certain facts have been 
found, and from them it was inferred, as 
matter of law, that other facts existed; and 
upon the facts thus Inferred the court gave 
Jmlgment. 
We think that in this there was error. The 
claimant owned, ln May, 1864, thirty-one 
bales of cotton, then ln a warehouse In Romt.', 
Ga. On the 18th of that month, Rome was 
captured by the United States forces; and 
11hortly afterwards the cotton was removed 
on ~overnment wagons to a warehouse ad-
joining the railroad leading from Rome to 
Kingston, and connecting there with a road 
leading thence to Chattanooga. Whether it 
was the only cotton ln that warehouse is not 
found; but it Is lnferrible from the other 
fa<•t11 found that lt was not. Subsequently 
(but how Jon~ afterwards does not appear) 
all of the cotton ln that warehouse was ship-
ped on the railroad to Kingston, the road 
being then In the possession of the mllltary 
authorities. It le next shown that cotton 
(some cotton) arrived In Kingston from Rome 
264 
ury, and no title to these forty-two bales bu 
been asserted by third persons. 
Such were the facts found; and from them 
the court deduced, not as a conclusion of 
tact, but as a presumption of law, that the 
thirty-one bales removed on government 
wagons to the warehouse Immediately ad-
joining the railroad at Rome, shortly after 
May 18, 186-i, were a part of the forty-two 
I bales received at Nashville on the 24th of Au-gust, four months afterwards, and there turn-
ed over to the treasury agent. It ts obvious 
that this presumption could have been made 
only by piling Inference upon Inference, and 
presumption upon presumption. Because 
the thirty-one bales of the claimant were 
taken to the warehouse alongside of the rail-
road at Rome In May, 186i, and the cotton 
ln that warehouse afterwards, at some un-
known time (whether before or after Aug. 
19 does not appear), was shipped on the road 
to Kingston, it Is inferred that the claimant's 
cotton was part of the shipment. Because 
somebody's cotton (bow much or bow little 
18 not shown) arrived at Kingston from Rome 
at some time not known, and was forwarded 
to Chattanooga before the 19th of August, 
1864, it Is Inferred that the claimant's thirty-
one bales, presumed to have reached Chat-
tanooga, thus arrived, and were forwarded; 
and, because forty-two bales were received 
at Chattanooga on that day from the quarter-
master at Kingston, It Is Inferred that the 
claimant's bales were among them. These 
i seem to us to be nothing more than con-
. jectures. They are not legitimate lnterences, 
: even to establish a fact; much less are they 
presumptions of law. They are Inferences 
from Inferences; presumptions resting on 
the basis of another presumption. Such a 
mode of arriving at a conclusion ot fact ls 
generally, if not universally, lnadml88lble. 
No Inference of fact or of law ls reliable 
· drawn from premises wbi<.>h are uncertain. 
· Whenever circumstantial evidence 18 relied 
i upon to pro\"e a fact, the clf('umstances must 
1 be proved, and not themselvt.>11 presumed. 
I Starkie, J<}v. p. 80, lays down the rule thus: 
"In the first place, as the very foundation 
: of indirect evidence ls the establishment of 
' one or more facts from which the Inference 
Is sought to be made, the law requires that 
the latter should be established by direct 
evidenC'e. as If they were the very facts In Is-
sue." It Is upon this principle that courts 
are dally <'ailed upon to exdude evidence as 
too remote for the consideration of the jury. 
The law requires an open. visible conne<.>tlon 
between the principal and evidentlary facts 
and the deductions from them, and doe8 not 
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL.
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permit a decision to be made on remote infer-
ences. Best, Ev. 95. A presumption which
the jury is to make is not a circumstance in
proof; and it is not, therefore, a legitimate
foundation for a presumption. There is no
open and visible connection between the fact
out of which the first presumption arises and
the fact sought to be established by the de-
pendent presumption. Douglas v. Mitchell,
35 Pa. St. 440.
The court of claims thought the facts
found by them entitled the claimant to the
legal presumption said by this court to exist
in Crussell’s Case, 1-1 Wall. 1; and therefore
determined, as a conclusion of law, that the
cotton taken from the claimant wa a part of
that transmitted to Nashville, and turned
over to the treasury agent and sold. We
think Crussell’s Case does not justify such a. -
conclusion. Because property was captured
by a military oflicer and sent forward by
him, and because there is an unclaimed fund
in the treasury derived from sales of prop-
erty of the same kind as that captured, be-
cause omnia prcsumuntur rite esse acta, and
ofiicers are presumed to have done their
duty, it is not the law that a court can con-
clude that the property was delivered by the
military ofiicer to a treasury agent, that it
was sold by him, and that the proceeds were
covered into the treasury. The presumption
that public ofiicers have done their duty, like
the presumption of innocence, is undoubtedly
a legal presumption; but it does not supply
proof of a. substantive fact. Best, in his
treatise on Evidence (section 300), says: “The
true principle intended to be asserted by the
rule seems to be, that there is a general -dis-
position in courts of justice to uphold judicial
and other acts rather than to render them in-
operative; and with this view, where there
i general evidence of facts having been le-
gully and regularly done, to dispense with
proof of circumstances, strictly speaking, es-
sential to the validity of those acts, and by
which they were probably accompanied in
most instances, although in others the as-
sumption may rest on grounds of public pol-
icy.” Nowhere is the presumption held to be
a substitute for proof of an independent and
material fact. The language of the opinion
in Crussell‘s Case would perhaps mislead.
were it not read in connection with the find-
ing of facts. The question was, whether
seventy-three bales of cotton of the plaintiffs
had been forwarded, with a much larger
amount, to the oflicer in charge of military
transportation at Nashville, and by him turn-
ed over to the treasury agent. There was no
direct proof that the plaintiffs cotton was in-
cluded in the shipment; but there was proof
that the treasury agent forwarded the cotton
received by him to the supervising agent at
Cincinnati, where a sale was soon after
made, and some of the bales sold were mark-
ed with the plaintiff’s mark. The question,
therefore, whether the military officer who
shipped the large quantity had shipped with
it the cotton of the plaintiff, was not left to
depend upon the presumption that he had
done his duty. There was distinct and in-
dependent proof of it in the fact that some
of the plaintiff's cotton had reached Cincin-
nati, and had been sold there. - The presump-
tion was only confirmatory of what had been
proved by evidence, and in confirmation of
that proof it might be invoked. This is all
that can fairly be deduced from the opinion
of the court as delivered by the chief justice.
No more need be said of the present case.
It i not found as a fact that the identical
cotton captured from the plaintiff ever came
into the hands of a treasury agent, or that it
was sold, and that the proceeds were paid
into the treasury; and the presumption of
law adopted by the court, that the cotton
was a part of that transmitted and sold, was
unwarranted.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded
for a new trial.
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permit a decision to be made on remote lnfer-
~nces. Best, Ev. 95. A presumption which 
the Jury ls to make ls not a circumstance ln 
proof; and It ls not, therefore, a. legitimate 
foundation for a presumption. There ls no 
open and visible connection between the fact 
out of which the first presumption arises and 
the fact sought to be established by tbe de-
pendent presumption. Douglas v. Mitchell, 
~5 Pa. St. 440. 
The court of claims thought the facts 
found by them entitled the claimant to the 
legal presumption said by this court to exist 
In Crussell's Case, 14 Wall. 1; and therefore 
determined, as a conclusion of law, that the 
cotton taken from the claimant was a part of 
that transmitted to Nash¥llle, and turned 
over to the treasury agent and sold. 'Ve 
think Crussell's Case does not justify such a 
conclusion. Because property was captured 
by a mllltary otttcer and sent forward by 
liim, and because there ls an unclaimed fund 
In the treasury derived from sales of prop-
erty of the same kind as that captured, be-
cause omnla presumuntur rite esse acta, and 
ofHcers are presumed to have done their 
duty, It ls not the law that a court <·an con-
clude that the property was delivered by the 
mllltary officer to a treasury agent, that it 
was sold by him, and that the proceeds were 
co¥ered into the treasury. The presumption 
that public officers have done their duty, like 
the presumption of Innocence, ls undoubtedly 
a legal presumption; but It does not supply 
proof of a substantive fact. Best, in his 
treatise on Evidence (section 300), says: ''The 
tme principle intended to be asserted by the 
rule seems to be, that there ls a general ·dis-
position In courts of justice to uphold judicial 
and other acts rather than to render them in-
operative; and with this view, where there 
ls general evidence of facts having been le-
gally and regularly done, to dispense with 
proof of circumstances, strictly speaking, es-
sential to the valtdlty of those acts, and by 
which they were pro~bly accompanied in 
most Instances, although In others the as-
sumption may rest on grounds of public pol-
icy." Nowhere ls the presumption held to be 
a substitute for proof of an independent and 
material fact. The language of the opinion 
In Crussell's Case would perhaps mislead, 
were It not read In connection with the find-
ing of facts. The question was, whether 
seventy-three }>ales of cotton of the plalntltT·s 
had been forwarded, with a much larger 
amount, to the officer In charge of mllltary 
transportation at Nashville, and by him turn-
ed over to the treasury agent. There was no 
direct proof that the plaintiff's cotton was in-
cluded In the shipment; but there was proof 
that the treasury agent forwarded the cotton 
received by him to the supervising agent at 
Cincinnati, where a sale was soon after 
made, and some of the bales sold were mark-
ed with the plaintiff's mark. The question, 
therefore, whether the mllltary officer who 
shipped tlie large quantity had shipped with 
It the cotton of the plalntllT, was not left to 
depend upon the presumption that he had 
done his duty. There was distinct and in-
dependent proof of It In the fact that some 
of the plaintiff's cotton had reached Clncln-
na tl, and had been sold there. · The presump-
tion was only confirmatory of what had been 
proved by evidence, and In confirmation ot' 
that proof It might be Invoked. This ls all 
that can fairly be deduced from the opinion 
of the court as delivered by the chief justice. 
No more need be said of the present case. 
It ls not found as a tact that the ldentlcnl 
cotton captured from the plaintiff e¥er came 
Into the hands of a treasury agent, or that It 
wa1:1 sold, and that the proceeds were pal<l 
Into the treasury; and the presumption or 
law adopted by the court, that the cotton 
was a part of that transmitted and sold, was 
unwarranted. 
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded 
for a new trial. 
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FLETCHER et al. v. FULLER.
(7 Sup. Ct. 667, 120 U. S. 534.)
Supreme Court of the United States. March 7,
1887.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Rhode Island.
Wm. H. Greene and Jas. Tiliinghast, for
plaintiffs in error. Livingston Scott and
Elisha C. Mowry, for defendant in error.
FIELD, J. This is an action of ejectment
to recover possession of twenty-seven twen-
ty-eighths undivided parts of a tract of land,
containing about 14 acres, situated in the
town of Lincoln, formerly Smithville, in the
state of Rhode Island. The plaintiff, a cit-
izen of Connecticut, sues the defendants, cu.-
izens of Rhode Island, in his own right, and
as trustee for others.
The declaration contains several counts, all
of which, except two, are withdrawn. In
these the plaintiff alleges that on the twen-
ty-flfth of October, 1874, he was “seized and
possessed in his demesne, as of fee in his
own right and as trustee,” of twenty-seven
twenty-eighths undivided parts of the tract
of land which is described, and that the de-
fendants on that day and year, with force
and arms, entered thereon, and ejected him
therefrom, and have ever since withheld the
possession, to his damage of $1,000. The
two counts difier merely in the description
of some of the boundary lines of the tract.
The defendants pleaded the general issue
and 20 years‘ possession under the statute
of possessions. Upon these pleas issues
were joined, and the case was tried; the par-
ties stipulating that the plea of the statute
should be held to apply to any period or pe-
riods of 20 years that could be covered by
any other like plea that might have been
filed, and that either party might offer any
evidence and rely upon any matters that
would be admissible under such plea or
pleas, and any proper replications or other
proceedings thereon. The case was tried
three times, resulting the first time in a ver-
dict for the defendants, and at the other
times in a verdict for the plaintiff. The
judgment on the last verdict is brought be
fore us for review by the defendants on a
writ of error. Numerous exceptions were
taken in the progress of the trial to the rul-
ings of the court in the admission and re-
jection of evidence, and to the instructions
given and refused to the jury; but the con-
clusions we have reached with respect to
the instructions given and refused, as to the
presumption of a deed to the ancestors in ti-
tle of the defendants, render it unnecessary
to consider the others.
It appears from the evidence at the trial
that the land in controversy was the west-
erly part of a tract of 33% acres, belonging,
in 1750, to one James Reed, and which, by
early conveyances, became divided into
three parcels, one containing 22% acres, one
5% acres, and the third 6 acres, as shown by
a diagram submitted, by consent of parties,
to the jury, of which the following is a re-
duced copy. [See opposite page.]
A turnpike, running through the tract
northerly and southerly, was opened in 1816.
The 221/4-acre parcel was conveyed to Fran-
cis Richardson, of Attleboro, Massachusetts,
by deed dated April 10, 1750. The land in
controversy is a portion of this parcel lying
west of the turnpike. The five and a half
acre parcel was conveyed to Ezekiel Fuller
by deed dated November 17, 1750. The six-
acre parcel was conveyed to Abigail Fuller,
wife of Ezekiel. and daughter of Francis
Richardson, by deed dated January 21, 1756.
The plaintiff claims to derive title under
the will of Francis Richardson. dated May
26, 1749, and the codicil thereof, dated Au-
gust 10, 1750, which were admitted to pro-
bate in Massachusetts, January 19, 1756. A
copy of the will and codicil, and of the Mas-
sachusetts probate, was produced and given
in evidence, together with a certificate of
their having been filed and recorded in the
probate ofiice in Lincoln on the twenty-sew
enth of August, 1881.
It does not appear that there was any di-
rect evidence that Francis Richardson was
seized of the 22%-acre parcel at the time of
his death. The presumption, in the absence
of any opposing circumstances, is undoubted-
ly that, being the owner at the date of the
codicil, August 10. 1750, he continued such
owner up to the time of his death, which oc-
curred some years afterwards. Whether suf-
ficient opposing circumstances to rebut this
presumption are fotmd in the absence of all
claim to the land for three-quarters of a cen-
tury by the devisee or her husband, or her
heirs, and the continued claim of ownership
by the ancestors in title of the defendants
during that period, is a question to be here-
after considered.
It is stated in the record that there was
evidence tending to show that Abigail Ful-
ler, the devisee, and her husband, entered
into possession of the property devised under
the will and codicil, but what that evidence
was does not appear. Abigail died prior to
1766, leaving her husband surviving her.
He left Smithfield some time in 1761 “for
parts unknown." It appears, also, that in
a deed executed by him on the eleventh of
April, 1761. of the 20-acre lot designated on
the diagram, he recited that such lot was
bounded on the north by “his former land."
TVith the exception of the evidence tending
to show that the devisee and her husband
entered i11to possession of the property de-
vised, and the reference by the husband in
his deed to the tract as his former land, there
was nothing to show that any claim of right
or title to the land had been made by them,
or by their heirs, for nearly three-quarters
of a century, either by the exercise of acts
of ownership over it, such as its occupation
or the use of its products, or by leasing or
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Case No. 9:-,] PR001''. 
FLETCHER et al. v. FULLER. 
(7 Sup. Ct. 667, 120 U. S. 534.) 
Supreme Court of the United Statl.'ll. March 7, 
1887. 
In error to the circuit court of the United 
States for the district of Rhode Island. 
Wm. H. Greene and Jas. Tillinghast, for 
plaintiffs In error. Livingston Scott and 
Elisha C. Mowry, for defendant In error. 
FIELD, J. This is an action of ejectment 
to recover possession of twenty-seven twen-
ty-eighths undivided parts of a tract of land, 
containing about 14 acres, situated In the 
town of Lincoln, formerly Smithville, In the 
state of Rhode Island. The plalntltl', a cit-
izen of Connecticut, sues the defendants, cu-
izens of Rhode Island, In his own right, and 
as trustee for others. 
The declaration contains several counts, all 
of which, except two, are withdrawn. In 
these the plalntltl' alleges that on the twen-
ty-11.ttb of October, 1874, he was "seized and 
possessed in bis demesne, as of fee In his 
own right and as trustee," of twenty-seven 
twenty-eighths undivided parts of the tract 
of land which ls described, and that the de-
fendants on that day and year, with force 
and arms, entered thereon, and ejected him 
therefrom, and have ever since withheld the 
possession, to bis damage of $1,000. The 
two counts dltl'er merely in the description 
of some of the boundary lines of the tract_ 
The defendants pleaded the general Issue 
and 20 years' possession under the statute 
of possessions. Upon these pleas Issues 
were joined, and the case was tried; the par-
ties stipulating that the plea of the statute 
should be held to apply to any period or pe-
riods of 20 years that could be covered by 
any other like plea that might have been 
11.led, and that either party might offer any 
evidence and rely upon any matters that 
would be admissible under such plea or 
pleas, and any proper replications or other 
proceedings thereon. The case was tried 
three times, resulting the first time In a ver-
dict for the defendants, and at the other 
times In a verdict for the plaintiff. The 
judgment on the last verdict Is brought be-
fore us for review by the defendants on a 
wl'lt of error. Numerous exceptions were 
taken In the progress of the trial to the rul-
lni:s of the court In the admission end re-
jection of evidence, and to the l~structlons 
i:tven and refused to the jury; but the con-
clusions we have reached with respect to 
the Instructions given and refused, as to the 
presumption of a deed to the ancestors In ti-
tle of the defendants, render It unnecessary 
to conRider the others. 
It appears from the evidence at the trial 
that the land In controversy was the west-
erly part of a tract of 33% acres, belonging, 
In 1750, to one James Reed, and which, by 
early conveyances, became divided Into 
three parcels, oue containing 2'.?14 acres, one 
266 
51h acres, and the third 6 acres, as shown by 
a diagram submitted, by consent of parties, 
to the jury, of which the following ls a re-
duced copy. [See opposite page.] 
A turnpike, running tln·ouirh the tract 
nortbPrly and southerly, was opened in 1816. 
The 2214-acre parcel was conveyed to Fran-
cis Richardson, of Attleboro, Massachusetts, 
by deed dated April 10, 1750. The land in 
controveray Is a portion of this parcel lying 
west of the turnpike. The five and a half 
acre parcel was conveyed to Ezekiel Fuller 
by deed dated November 17, 1750. The six-
acre parcel wu conveyed to Abigail Fuller, 
wife of Ezekiel. and daughter of Francis 
Richardson, by deed dated January 21, lir'6. 
The plalntltl' claims to derive title under 
the will of 1.<'rancls Richardson, dated :May 
26, 1749, and the codicil thereof, dated Au-
gust 10, 1750, which were admitted to pro-
bate ln Massachusetts, January 19, 1756. A 
copy of the will and codicil, and of the Mas-
sachusetts probate, was produced and given 
In evidence, together with a certificate of 
their having been 11.led and recorded In the 
probate omce In Lincoln on the twenty-sev-
enth of August, 1881. 
It does not appear that there was any di-
rect evidence that Francis Richardson was 
seized of the 2214-acre parcel at the time ot 
his death. The presumption, In the absence 
of any opposing circumstances, is undoubted-
ly that, being the owner at the date of the 
codicil, August 10. 1750, be continued such 
owner up to the time of bis death, which oc-
curred some years afterwards. 'Whether suf-
ficient opposing circumstances to rebut this 
presumption are fotmd In the absence of all 
claim to the land for three-quarters of a cen-
tury by the devlsee or her husband, or her 
heirs, and the continued claim of ownership 
by the ancestors In title of the defendants 
during that period, 111 a question to be here-
after considered. 
It ls stated In the record that there was 
evidence tending to show that Abigail Ful-
ler, the devlsee, and her husband, entered 
Into possession of the property devised under 
the will and codicil, but what that evidence 
was does not appear. Abigail died prior to 
1766, leaving her husband surviving her. 
He lett Smithfield some time In 1761 "for 
parts unknown." It appears, also, that In 
a deed executed by him on the eleventh of 
April, 1761. of the 20-acre lot designated on 
the diagram, he recited that such lot was 
bounded on the north by "hie former land." 
With the exception of the evidence tending 
to show that the devlsee and her huRband 
entered Into possession of the prop1>rty de-
vised, and the reference by the husband In 
his deed to the tract ae bis former land, there 
was nothing to show that any claim of right 
or title to the land had been made by them. 
or by their heirs, for nearly three-quarters 
of a century, either by the exercise of acts 
of ownership over It, such as Its oceupntion 
or the use of Its products, or by leasing or 
l’Rl'lSUl\lPT1ONS IN GENERAL.
[Case No. 95
elling it, or by the payment of taxes, or in
any other way. And, tor over 40 years after
the lapse of the three-quarters of a century,
the only claim of title made by the heirs of
the devisee to any portion of the 221/[acre
lot consisted in the tact that in 1835 they
brought an action against certain persons,
with whom the defendants were not in priv-
ity of title or ancestry, for the recovery of
another portion of the 221/4-acre parcel, which
action was discontinued in 1838 on account
of the poverty and pecuniary inability of the
heirs to carry it on; and in the tact that,
at varying intervals between 1826 and 1851'
(not 1858, as stated in one part of the record),
they had been in the habit, under such claim,
0! cutting wood thereon openly for family
use, and the manufacture of baskets, in
which business some of them were engaged,
and carrying it to their homes; and that on
three occasions. once in 18-10, once in 1845,
and once in 1852, some of them in contempla-
tion ot taking legal proceedings to establish
their title, had gone around and upon the
land, and pointed out its boundaries.
When Ezekiel Fuller departed from Smith-
field, in 1761, he left two children, Francis
and Abigail, without means of support, and,
at a meeting of the town council in Septem-
ber followlng, proceedings were taken to
provide for them. In a resolution reciting
that “Ezekiel is gone, we know not where;"
that his children were then and likely to be
chargeable to the town; that little or noth-
ing of Ezekiel’s estate was to be found to
support them, but that it was assumed there
was some estate belonging to hini.—a person
was appointed to make proper inquiry and
search for it, “to know what land there is
belonging to the family of said Ezekiel, and
secure the same for the support of the chil-
dren." It would seem that the person thus
appointed, reported that there was a piece
of land—a six-acre parce1—which was pos-
sessed by Ezekiel in right of his wife; for
the town council, at a meeting in March,
1776, after reciting that there was nothing
of said Fuller's estate left behind to main-
tain his children but a small piece of land,
and that no provision for their support could
1.?-?~
FULLER.
Lot.
Wu. JENCKS.
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PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL. (Cue No. 9& 
selling it, or by the payment of taxes, or ln 
any other way. And, for over 40 years after 
the lapse of the three-quarters of a century, 
tht- only claim of title made by the heirs of 
the devisee to any portion of the 221A,-acre 
lot consisted in the fact that In 1835 they 
brought an action against certain persons, 
with whom the defendants were not in prlv-
ity ot title or ancestry, for the recovery of 
another portion of the 221/.-acre parcel, which 
action was discontinued in 1838 on account 
of the poverty and pecuniary inability of the 
helrs to carry it oa; and in the tact that. 
at varying Intervals between 1826. and 1857 
(not 1858, as stated m one pa.rt of the record), 
they had been in the habit, under such claim, 
of cutting wood thereon openly for family 
use, and the manufacture of baskets, In 
which business eome of them were engaged, 
and carrying It to their homes; and that on 
three occasions. once In 1840, once in 1845, 
and once ln 1852, some of them in contempla-
tion of taking legal proceedings to establish 
their title, had gone around and upon the 
land, and pointed out its boundaries. 
WY. JENCKS. 
When Ezekiel Fuller depat'ted from Smith-
field, in 1761, he left two children, Francis 
and Abigail, without means of support. and, 
at a meeting of the town council In Septem-
ber following, proceedings were taken to 
provide for them. In a resolution reciting 
that "Ezekiel ls gone, we know not where;" 
that his children were then and likely to be 
chargeable to the town; that little or noth-
ing of Ezekiel's estate was to be found to 
support them, but that it was assumed there 
was some estate belonging to him,-e. person 
was appointed to ou.ke proper Inquiry and 
search for It, ''to know what land there is 
belonging to the family of said Ezekiel, and 
secure the same fo1 the support of the chil-
dren." It would seem that the person thus 
appointed, reported that there was a piece 
of land-a six-acre parcel-which wos pos-
sessed by Ezekiel In right of his wife; for 
the town council, at a meeting In March, 
1776, after reciting that there was nothing 
of said Fuller's estate left behind to main-
tain his children but a small piece of lond. 
and that no provision for their snpport <>onld 
EZEKIEL Fut,LER. 
5l Acre Lot. 
AnroAu, FuJ,LER. 
6 Acre Lot, 
26i 
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be had without the favor and authority of
the general assembly to sell and give a deed
of it, appointed one Edward Mowry to lay
the matter before the assembly, and request
that it would pass an act to enable some
proper person to dispose of the parcel, and
clothe him with authority to give a deed
thereof. Mowry presented a proper petition
to the assembly, which granted the prayer,
and empowered the town treasurer, with the
consent and advice of the town council, to
sell the land, and apply the money received
for the purpose stated; that is, the support
of the children. A sale of the six-acre lot
for £30 was accordingly made by the town
treasurer under the authority thus confer-
red.
Abigail, the wife of Ezekiel, left five chil-
dren surviving her, all of whom died before
their father except Abigail, J r., who was one
of the two supported by the town. The
father, who disappeared from Smithfield in
1761. died in the poor-house in Attleboro,
Massachusetts, in 1800. Abigail, the daugh-
ter, was born December 29, 1757; became of
age, December 29, 1778; and was married
to Benjamin Fuller, December 1, 1779. He
died in 1832, and she died in 1835 intestate.
The plaintiff is the grandson of this Abigail,
and the parties for whom he is trustee are
her other descendants. They all derive
whatever title they have from her.
On the twenty-fourth of May, 1874, a cen-
tury and eighteen years after the probate of
the will of Francis Richardson, all the heirs
of Abigail Fuller, except one. executed a
power of attorney to Theodore C. Fuller, also
one of said heirs, authorizing him to sell to
Nathan Fuller, the plaintiff in this action,
all their title and interest in the tract con-
veyed by James Reed to Francis Richardson
by deed dntcd April 10, 1750. ‘and devised to
Elizabeth Fuller, wife of Ezekiel, by his last
will and testament probated January 19,
1756, to hold the same upon trust to pros-
ecute to final conclusion legal proceedings
necessary to recover possession of the prem-
ises. to employ counsel for that purpose, to
conduct the proceedings, and to make such
compromises of the grantors‘ claims as to
him and his counsel might seem best. The
same grantors, by their attorney, on the
same day, executed a deed of the same tract
of land to Nathan Fuller. reciting a consid-
eration of $10. upon trusts similar to those
contained in the power of attorney. Both
documents were duly acknowledged by the
grantors. The delivery of the deed was made
by the attorney in this way: He and the
grantee went upon the land with three other
persons, and while upon it he delivered the
deed to the grantee. He also took up some
earth in his hands, and passed it to the
grantee. This he had been instructed to do
by his counsel as the form of delivering pos-
session. The parties were about 15 minutes
on the land. There was no evidence of any
notice to or knowledge by the defendants
of these acts, and they testifled that they had
neither. This is the case of the plaintiff,
briefly stated.
The defendants trace their title to the
land in question by continuous claim of title
from a deed of the 221/4-acre parcel. made by
one Jeremiah Richardson, a grandson of the
testator, Francis Richardson, to Stephen
Jeneks, dated April 8, 1768, containing full
covenants of title and warranty, and re-
corded in the records of Smithtield on July
10th following. Jeremiah Richardson was
the son of Francis Richardson, who was a
son of the testator, and is named in the will
as having died. Jeremiah had a brother also
called Francis Richardson, who died prior to
March, 1766. Stephen Jeneks, by deed
dated August 12, 1796. containing full cove-
nants of warranty. to secure several notes.
amounting to $3,000, mortgaged the land in
controversy, with adjoining lands to which
he had acquired title, making in all 50 acres;
of which the 20-acre lot designated on the
diagram was one parcel, which he had pur-
chased in 1763 for £040, and the 6-acre lot,
also designated on the diagram, was an-
other parcel, which he had purchased in 1768
for £45. He died in 1800, leaving a will, by
which he devised his real estate in Smith-
fleld and elsewhere to his children. Stephen
Jeneks, Jr., his son, acquired the interests
of the other heirs, and by deed dated Hay
18, 1804, conveyed the whole, including by
specific description the land in controversy,
to his brother, Jerahmael Jeneks, who was
the grandfather and ancestor in title of the
defendants. Other portions of the 221/,-acre
parcel were conveyed by ancestors in title of
the defendants, by deeds to different par-
ties, containing full covenants of title and
warranty, dated, respectively, April 12, 1841.
December 3, 18-15, and May 21, 1860, and
they entered into possession of the respective
parcels, and inclosed and improved them.
In May, 1864, the father of the defendants,
from whom they derive their title, surveyed
and platted into town lots the remaining por-
tion of that parcel, being the land in con-
troversy. In the partition of the estate of
the grandfather, Jerahmael Jeneks, between
his heirs at law, in 1824, this land had been
taken by him as part of his estate, and plat-
ted as such in the partition plat. He died in
1866.
The land was not inclosed on the line of the
turnpike. In 1838 a fence was put up on the
westerly side by an adjoining owner. On the
southerly side there was at one time a fence
running from the turnpike westerly to the
other side of the ledge hereafter mentioned.
but it disappeared in 1835. On the northerly
line there was only :1 brush-fence until 1867.
when a purchaser of adjoining land erected
one. The land has never been put under
cultivation. Prior to 1858 it was covered
with wood, and every year from 182.9 to 1857
the ancestors of the defendants cut wood up-
on it for family use. In 1857 the father of
268
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
07
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Case No. 95] PROOF. 
be bad without the favor and authority of 
the general aSBembly to sell and give a deed 
of It, appointed one Edward llowry to lay 
the matter before the aSBembly, and request 
that 1t would pasa an act to enable some 
proper person to dlspoee of the parcel, and 
clothe him with autbonty to give a deed 
thereof. Mowry presented a proper petition 
to the a88embly, which granted the prayer, 
and empowered the town treasurer, with the 
consent and advice of the town council, to 
sell the land, and apply the money received 
for the purpose stated; that Is, the support 
of the children. A 11ale of the &ix-acre lot 
for .£80 was accordingly made by the town 
treasurer under the authority thus confer-
red. 
Abigail, the wife of Ezekiel, left ftve chil-
dren surviving her, all of whom died before 
their father except Ablgall, Jr., who was one 
of the two supported by the town. The 
father, who di111lppeared from Smithfield In 
17tll, died In the poor-house In Attleboro, 
!\lasRBchusetts, In 1800. Abigail, the dauirh· 
ter, was born December 29, 1757; became of 
age, Derember 29, 1778; and was married 
to Benjamin Fuller, December l, 1779. He 
died In 1832, and she died In 1835 Intestate. 
The plaintiff Is the grandson of this Ablgull, 
anll the parties for whom he 18 trustee are 
her other descendants. They all derive 
wbnte,·er title they have from her. 
On the twenty-fourth of May, 1874, a cen-
tury and eighteen years after the probate of 
the will of Francis Richardson, all the heirs 
of Abigail Fuller, except one, encuted a 
power of attorney to Theodore C. Fuller, also 
one of said heirs, authorizing him to sell to 
Nathan Fuller, the plalntltr In this action, 
all their title and lntere11t In the tract con-
veyed by James Reed to Francis Richardson 
by d!'i'd datcd April 10, li50, .and devised to 
Elizabeth l<'ullPr, wife of Ezekiel, by his last 
will and tPstument probated January 19, 
1756, to bold the same upon trust to pros-
ecute to final conclusion legal proceedings 
nC<'C'R!!lary to rPCovPr posseRslon of the prem-
lllPR. to employ rouns<:>l for that purpose, to 
<>onduet the pro(•<•P<llngs, and to make such 
c•om1>romlRes of the grantore' claims as to 
him and his coum1el might seem best. 'nle 
same grantore, by their attorney, on the 
RBme day, executed a deed of the same tract 
of land to Nathan Fuller, reciting a consid-
c>rntlon of •to. upon trusts similar to those 
<><>ntalned In the powpr of attorney. Both 
documlc'nts were duly acknowledged by the 
grantors. The delivery of the deed was made 
by the attorney In this way: He and the 
Jtr&DtPe went upon the land with three other 
Jl<'ri<onR, and whll<:> upon It hP delivered the 
d<"<'ll to till' grant<>t>. He also took up some 
earth In his bands, and passed It to the 
grantee. This he bad been Instructed to do 
by his counsel as the form of dellverlng pos-
Sf'sslon. The parties were about 15 minutes 
on the land. Tlwre wae no evidence of any 
notice to or knowledge by the defendants 
268 
of these acts, and they testttled that they had 
neither. This 18 the case of the plaintiff, 
briefly stated. 
The defendants trace their title to the 
land in question by continuous claim of title 
from a deed of the 22%-acre parcel, made by 
one Jeremiah Richardson, a grandson of the 
testator, Francis Richardson, to Stephen 
Jencks, dated April 8, 1768, containing full 
covenants of title and warraney, and re-
corded lo the records of Smlthfteld on Joly 
10th following. Jeremiah Richardson was 
the son of Francis Richardson, who was a 
son of the testator, and ls named In the will 
as having died. Jeremiah had a brother also 
called Francis Richardson, who died prior to 
March, 1706. Stephen Jencks, by deed 
dated August 12, 1796, containing full cove-
nants of warranty. to secure l!E'veral notes. 
amounting to $3,000, mortgaged the land In 
controversy, with adjoining lands to which 
he had acquired title, making In all 50 acres; 
of which the 20-acre lot designated on the 
diagram was one parcel, which he had pur-
chased In 1763 for £MO, and the 6-acre lot, 
also designated pn the diagram, was an-
other parcel, which be had purchased In 1768 
for £46. He died In 1800, leaving a will, by 
which be devised bis real estate In Smltb-
fteld and elsewhPre to bis children. Stephen 
Jen<'ks, Jr., bis son, acquired· the Interests 
of the othf'r heirs, and by deed dated llay 
18, 1804:, conveyed the whole, Including by 
specltl.c description the land in controversy, 
to his brother, Jerahmael Jencks, who was 
the grandfather and ancestor In title of the 
defendants. Other portions of the 22%-ac·re 
parcel were conveyed by ancestors In title of 
the defendants, by deeds to dlft'erent par-
tl<>s, containing full covenants of title and 
warranty, dated, respectively, April 12, 1841, 
December 3, 1845, and May 21, 1860, and 
they entered Into possession of the respective 
parcels, and lnclosf'd and Improved them. 
In May, 184i4, tbe father of the defendants, 
from whom they derive their title, surveyed 
and platted into town lots the remaining por-
tion of that parcel, being the land in con-
troversy. In the partition of the estate of 
the grandfather, Jerabmael Jencks, between 
his heirs at law, In 1824, this land bad been 
taken by him as part of his estate, and plat-
ted as such In the partition plat. He died In 
1866. 
The land was not lnclosed on the line of the 
turnpike. In 1sas a fence wllB put up on the 
westerly side by an adjoining owner. On the 
southerly Ride there was at one time a fence 
running from the turnpike westerly to the 
other side of the ledge hereafter mentioned. 
but It dl.snJ>peared In 18.1.J. On the north<:>rly 
line there was only a brush-fern-e until 1&li. 
wh·~n a purchaser of adjoining land cn'<'ted 
one. The land has never been put umlt-r 
cultivation. Prior to 1858 It wns covered 
with wood, and every year from 1829 to 1857 
the ancestors of the defendants cut wood up-
on It for fumlly use. In 1857 the father of 
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the defendants cut and applied to his use all
the wood of value then remaining. The land
had an extensive ledge of rock running across
its center from north to south, which was
opened by defendants’ ancestors as early as
1835. In 184-5 or 18-L6 large quantities of
stone were quarried and sold by them to
railroad companies; and from that time down
to the trial, with longer or shorter intervals,
never of more than a year or two, the ledge
was worked more or less extensively by the
defendants or their ancestors in title, or their
lessees and tenants, and the stone removed.
There is no evidence that any other person
had ever worked the ledge, or taken stone
ofi the land, or attempted to do so. The fa-
ther of the defendants put up a sign on the
laud, stating that all persons were forbidden
from taking wood or stone from it. In 1360
or 1861 his lessee built a barn and tool-shed
on the land near the ledge, for his use in
quarrying; these structures being in full view
from Broad street, formerly the turnpike.
He also dug a well, from which he obtained
water for his business. The barn, with lofts
for hay. was of sufficient capacity “to accom-
modate, and did accommodate, six or eight
horsa, or more." It remained on the land,
with some additions, until some time in 1869,
when it was removed by the lessee. The
land was assessed for taxes to the ancestors
in title of the defendants, and paid by them,
for 20 years, between 1770 and 1805. The
tax-lists for the other years up to 1805 could
not be found. From 1805 to the time of the
trial, a period of 77 years, the land was as-
sessed to them, and the taxes were paid by
them. The statute of Rhode Island respect-
ing the assessment of taxes. in fo1'ce be-
tween 1798 and 1825, required the assessors
to assess taxes on real estate to persons who
held and occupied it. and the one in force
between 182-'5 and 1855 required them to as-
sess the taxes. to those who held and occupied
it, or to the owners thereof, and the one in
force after 1.855, to the owners thereof. No
taxes were ever assessed to the Fullers, or
paid by them. Neither plaintiff nor defend-
ants, nor their ancestors, ever resided on the
premises, and the land was occupied and pos-
sessed by the ancestors in title of the defend-
ants only in the way mentioned. .
Upon the case thus presented, and we have
not omitted. we think, any material circum-
stance in the statement, the defendants asked
an instruction to the jury as to the presump-
tion they might make of a lost grant to their
ancestor in title. which the court refused.
Its charge was thus: “Of course, gentlemen,
if you find that you can presume a grant, if
you find from the testimony that there was
a lost deed which passed from Abigail Fuller
to Jeremiah Richardson, or to Francis Rich-
ardson, and the property was inherited by
Jeremiah, so that Jeremiah had a good title
to convey to Stephen Jencks, that makes the
title of the defendants here complete. * * *
But, gentlemen, you are to look into the evi-
dence upon this question of a grant, and, if
the evidence in favor of the presumption is
overcome by the evidence against such a
grant, then, of course, you will not presume
one. It is a question of testimony."
The defendants requested the court to in-
struct the jury “that the presumption they
were authorized to make of a lost deed was
not necessarily restricted to what may fairly
be supposed to have occurred, but rather to
what may have occurred and seems requisite
to quiet title in the possessor." This instruc-
tion the court refuscd to give, or to modify
its charge in conformity with it. The de-
fendants now contend that the court thus
errcd, its charge being. in eifect, that. in or-
der to presume a lost deed, the jury must be
satisfied that such a deed had in fact actually
existed. Such seems to us to be the purport
of the charge, and therein there was error.
In such cases, “presumptions," as said by
Sir \Villia1n Grant, “do not always proceed
on a belief that the thing presumed has actu-
ally taken place. Grants are frequently pre-
sumed. as Lord Mansfield says, merely from
a principle, and for the purpose of quieting
the possession. There is as much occasion
for presuming conveyances of legal estates;
as otherwise titles must often be imperfect,
and in many cases unavailable, when from
length of time it has become impossible to
discover in whom the legal estate (if outstand-
ing) is already vested.” Hillary v. Waller,
12 Ves. 239, 252; Eldridge v. Knott, Cowp.
215.
The owners of property, especially if it be
valuable and available, do not often allow it
to remain in the quiet and unquestioned en-
joyment of others. Such a coure is not in
accordance with the ordinary conduct of
men. When, therefore, possession and use
are long continued, they create a presumption
of lawful origin; that is. that they are found-
ed upou such instruments and proceedings as
in law would pass the right to the possession
and use of the property. It may be, in point
of fact. that permission to occupy and use
was given orally, or upon a contract of sale
with promise of a future conveyance, which
parties have subsequently neglected to obtain,
or the conveyance executed may not have
been acknowledged so as to be recorded. or
may have been mislaid or lost. “any cir-
cumstances may prevent the execution of a
deed of conveyance to which the occupant of
la.nd is entitled, or may lead to its loss after
being executed. It is a matter of almost
daily experience that reconveyances of prop-
erty, transferred by the owners upon condi-
tions or trusts. are often delayed after the
conditions are performed or the trusts dis-
charged, simply because of the pressure of
other engagements, and a conviction that
they can be readily obtained at any time.
The death of parties may leave in the ~
hands of executors or heirs papers constitut-
ing muniments of title, of the value of which
the latter may have no knowledge, and there-
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the defendants cut and applied to his uae all 
the wood of value then remaining. The land 
had an extensive ledge of rock running acroes 
its center trom north to eouth, which was 
opened by defendants' ance11tors as early as 
1835. In 1845 or 1846 large quantities of 
stone were quarried and sold by them to 
ralll'Ofld companies; and from that time down 
to the trial, with longer or shorter intervals, 
never of more than a year or two, the ledge 
wns worked more or less extensively by the 
defendants or their ancestors in title, or their 
lessees and tenants, and the stone removed. 
There ls no evidence that any other person 
had ever worked the ledge, or taken stone 
off the land, or attempted to do so. The fa-
ther of the defendants put up a sign on the 
land, stating that all persons were forbidden 
from taking wood or stone from It. In 1860 
or 1861 his lessee built a barn and tool-shed 
on the land near the ledge, for his use In 
quarrying; these structures being in full view 
from Broad street, formerly the turnpike. 
He also dug a well, from which he obtained 
water tor his buslnees. The barn, with lofts 
tor hay, was of suftl.clent capacity "to accom-
modate, and did accommodate, six or eight 
horses, or more." It remained on the land, 
with some additions, until some time in 1869, 
when It was removed by the lee.see. The 
land was assessed for taxes to the ancestors 
in title of the defendants, and paid by them, 
tor 20 years, between 1770 and 1805. The 
tax-llflts tor the other years up to 1805 could 
not be found. From 1800 to the time of the 
trial, a period of 77 years, the land was as-
sessed to them, and the taxes were paid by 
them. The statute of Rhode Island respect-
ing the assessment of taxes, lo force be-
tween 1798 and 1825, required the asse980l'8 
to asseM taxes on re&! estate to persons who 
held and occupied lt, and the one In force 
between 1825 and 1855 required them to as-
lleBIJ the taxes. to those who held and occupied 
It, or to the owners thereof, and the one in 
force after 1855, to the owners thereof. No 
taxes were ever aB!lessed to the F'ullers, or 
paid by them. Neither plalntltr nor defend-
ants, nor thelr ancestors, ever resided on the 
premises, and the land was occupied and pos-
sessed by the ancestors In title of the defend-
ants only in the way mentioned . . 
Upon the case thus presented, and we have 
not omitted. we think, any material cll"<'um-
etance In the statement, the defendants asked 
an Instruction to the jury as to the presump-
tion they might make of a lost grant to their 
ancestor In title. which the court refused. 
Its eharge was thus: "Of course, gentlemen, 
It you flnd that you ean presume a grant, if 
you find from the testimony that there was 
a lost deed which passed from Abigail l!'uller 
to Jeremiah Richardson, or to l•'rnncls Rich-
ardson, and the property was inherited by 
Jeremiah, so that Jeremiah had a good title 
to convey to Stephen ,Jencks, that makes the 
title of the defenduntB here complete. • • • 
But, gentlemen, you are to look into the evl-
dence upon this question of a grant, and, If 
the evidence in favor of the presumption Is 
overcome by the e\'"ldence against such a 
grant, then, of course, you will not presume 
one. It le a question of testimony." 
The defendants requested the court to In-
struct the jury "that the presumption they 
were authorized to make of a lost deed was 
not necessarily restricted to what may fairly 
be supposed to have occurred, but rather to 
what may have occurred and seems requisite 
to quiet title In the possessor." This Instruc-
tion the court refused to give, or to modify 
its chal"ge In conformity with it. The de-
fendants now contend that the court thus 
erred, its charge being, In effect, that, in or-
der to presume a lost deed, the jury must be 
satisfied that such a deed had In tact actually 
existed. Such seems to us to be the purport 
of the charge, and therein there was error. 
In such cases, "presumptions," as said by 
Sir William Grant, "do not always proceed 
on a belief that the thing presumed has actu-
ally taken place. Grants are frequently pre-
sumed, as I..ord. Mansfield says, mel"ely from 
a prlnclple, and for the purpose of quieting 
the possession. There le as much occasion 
for presuming conveyances of legal estates; 
as otherwise titles must often be imperfect, 
and in mlllly cases unavailable, when from 
length of time It has become Impossible to 
discover in whom the legal estate (If outstand-
ing) ls already vested." Hlllary v. Waller. 
12 Vee. 239, 252; Eldridge v. Knott, Cowp. 
215. 
The owners of property, especially it it be 
valuable and avallable, do not often allow it 
to remain · 1n the quiet and unquestioned en-
joyment of others. Such a course ls not in 
accordance with the ordinary conduct of 
men. When, therefore, poseesslon and use 
are long continued, they create a presumption 
of lawful ongtn; that Is, that they are found-
ed upon such Instruments and proceedlng8 as 
In law would puss the right to the possession 
and use of the property. It may be, in point 
of fact, that permission to occupy and use 
was given orally, or upon a contract of sale 
with promise of a future conveyance, which 
parties have snbeequently neglected to obtain, 
or the conveyance execute1i may not have 
been acknowledged so as to be recorded, or 
may have been mislaid or lost. l\lnny cir-
cumstances may prevent the execution of a 
deed of conveyance to which the occupant of 
land ls entitled, or may lead to Its loss after 
being executed. It ls a matter of almost 
dally experience that reconveyances of prop-
el"ty, transfecred by the owners upon condi-
tions or trusts, are often delayed after the 
conditions are pel"formed or the trusts dis-
charged, simply because of the pressure of 
other engagements, and a conviction that 
they can be readlly obtained at any time. 
The death of parties may leave In the 
hands of executors or helr!l papers eonstltut-
lng munlments of title, of the value of which 
the latter way have no knowledge, and there-
269 
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fore for the preservation and record of which
may take no action; and thus the documents
may be deposited in places exposed to decay
and destruction. Should they be lost, wit-
nesses of their execution, or of contracts for
their execution, may not be readily found, or,
if found, time may have so impaired their
recollection of the transactions that they can
only be imperfectly recalled, and of course
imperfectly stated. The law, in tenderness
to the iniirmities of human nature, steps in,
and by reasonable presumptions that acts to
protect one’s rights which might have been
done, and in the ordinary course of things
generally would be done, have been done, in
the particular case under consideration, af-
fords the necessary protection against possi-
ble failure to obtain or preserve the proper
muniments of title, and avoids the necessity
of relying upon the fallible memory of wit-
nesses, when time may have dimmed their
recollection of past transactions, and thus
gives peace and quiet to long and uninter-
rupted possessions.
The rule of presumption, in such cases, as
has been well said, is one of policy, as well
as of convenience, and necessary for the peace
and security of society. “Where one uses an
easement whenever he sees fit, without ask-
ing leave and without objection,” say the
supreme court of Pennyivania, “his adverse
and uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty-one
years is a title which cannot afterwards be
disputed. Such enjoyment, without evidence
to explain how it began, is presumed to have
been in pursuance of a full and unqualified
grant.” Garrett v. Jackson, 20 Pa. St. 335.
The same presumption will arise whether
the grant relate to corporeal or incorporeal
hereditaments. As said by this court in Ri-
card v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 108, speaking by
Mr. Justice Story: “A grant of land may as
well be presumed as a grant of a fishery, or
of a common, or of a way. Presumpiions of
this nature are adopted from the general in-
firmity of human nature, the difiiculty of
preserving muniments of title, and the pub-
lic policy of supporting long and uninter-
rupted possessions. ‘They are founded upon
the consideration that the facts are such as
could not, according to the ordinary course
of human affairs, occur, unless there was a
transmutation of title to, or an admission of
an existing adverse title in, the party in pos-
session.”
It is not necessary, therefore, in the cases
mentioned. for the jury, in order to presume
a conveyance, to believe that a conveyance
was in point of fact executed. It is suffi-
cient if the evidence leads to the conclusion
that the conveyance might have been execut-
ed, and that its existence would be a solu-
tion of the difficulties arising from its non-
cxecution. In Edson v. Munsell, 10 Allen,
557. which was an action for obstructing the
cnjo_vment of an easement, the doctrine of
acquiring such rights by prescription or ad-
verse possession is elaborately considered;
and it is there said that “the fiction of pre-
suming a grant from twenty years’ possession
or use was invented by the English courts in
the eighteenth century to avoid the absurd-
ities of their rule of legal memory, and was
derived by analogy from the limitation pre-
scribed by the statute of 21 Jae. I. c. 21, for
actions of ejectment. It is not founded on a
belief that a grant has actually been made
in the particular case, but on the general
presumption that a man will naturally enjoy
what belongs to him, the difficulty of proof
after lapse of time, and the policy of not dis
turbing long-continued possessions."
In Casey's Lessee v. Inloes, 1 Gill, 503.
which was an action of ejectment, the court
of appeals of Maryland held that, where there
had been a continuous possession of land for
20 years or upwards, by a party, or persons
claiming under him, the court was authorized
to instruct the jury, in the absence of a deed
to such party, to presume that one had been
executed to him. It alo approved the refu-
sal of the court below to instruct the jury
that before they could find a title in the de-
fendants, or any one of them, by presump-
tion of a grant by the plaintiff or those under
whom he claims, they must believe on their
consciences, and find as a fact, that such
grant was actually made. “The granting of
such a prayer,” said the court, “would have
a tendency to mislead the jury, by inducing
them to believe that a presumption of a grant
could not be made unless the jury in point of
fact believed in the execution of the grant;
whereas it is frequently the duty of the jury
to find such presumption as an inference of
law, although in their consciences they may
disbclieve the actual execution of any such
giant.”
In Williams v. Donell, 2 Head, W5, 698,
which was also an action of ejectment, the
supreme court of Tennessee, speaking on the
same point, said: "It is not indispensable,
in order to lay a proper foundation for the
legal presumption of a grant, to establish
the probability of the fact that in reality a.
grant ever issued. It will be a suflicient
ground for the presumption to show that by
legal possibility a grant might have issued,
and, this appearing, it may be assumed, in
the absence of circumstances repelling such
conclusions, that all that might lawfully
have been done to perfect the legal title was
in fact done, and in the form prescribed by
law.”
In accordance with the doctrine thus ex-
plicitly declared, there can be no doubt that
the court below should have instructed the
jury as requested. It would seem from the
instruction given that the deed which the
defendants insisted might be presumed was
one from Ezekiel and Abigail Fuller, or
from Abigail Fuller to .Teremiah Richard-
son. We think. however, that the facts
point with equal directness to a conveyance
from his grandfatlier. The codicll to his
will, by which he devised the property to his
210
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fore for the preserratlon and record of which 
may take no action; and thus the documents 
may be depOBlted In places expOBed to decay 
and destruction. Should they be lost, wit-
nesses of their execution, or of contracts for 
their execution, may not be readily found, or, 
If found, time may have so impaired their 
recollection of the transactions that they can 
only be Imperfectly recalled, and of c<>urse 
Imperfectly stated. The law, In tenderness 
to the Infirmities of human natul"(>, Rtf'ps In, 
and by reasonable presumptions that acts to 
protect one's rights which might have been 
done, and In the ordinary course of things 
generally would be done, have been done, in 
the p8.rtlcular case under consideration, af-
fords the necessary protection against Jl0881-
ble failure to obtain or preserve the proper 
munlments of title, and avoids the necessity 
of relying upon the fallible memory of wit· 
ne88e8, when time may have dimmed their 
recollection of past transactions, and thus 
gives peace and quiet to long and uninter-
rupted possessions. 
The rule of presumption, in such cases, as 
has been well said, 18 one of policy, as well 
as of conyenlence, and necessary for the peace 
and security of 80C'lety. "Where one uses an 
easement whenever he sees flt, without ask-
ing leave and without objection," says the 
supreme court of Pennsylvania, "his adverse 
nnd uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty-one 
yf'ars Is a title which cannot afterwards be 
·disputed. Such enjoyment, without evidence 
to explain how It bei:an, Is presumed to have 
been In pursuance of a full and unqualified 
grant." Garrett v. Jackson, 20 Pa. St. 335. 
The same presumption will arise whether 
the grant relate to corporeal or Incorporeal 
beretlltaments. As said by this court In Ri-
card Y. Williams. 7 Wheat. 108, speaking by 
Mr .. Justice Story: "A grant of land may as 
well be prE>sumed as a grant of a fishery, or 
of a ('ommon, 01· of a wuy. Presumptions of 
this nature are adopted from the general in-
firmity of human nature, the dlfHculty of 
preserving munlments of title, and the pub-
lic policy of supporting long and unlnter· 
rupted possessions. They are foundE>d upon 
the consideration that the facts are such as 
could not, according to the ordinary course 
of human alfall"!I, occur, unless there was a 
transnmtntion of title to, or an admission of 
an existing adverse title In, the 1iarty In pos-
session." 
It ls not necessary, therefore, In the cases 
mentioned, for the jury, In order to presume 
a com·eyance, to believe that a co11YE>yance 
waR In point of fact executed. It ls sufft-
<'i<'nt If the eYlden<'e leads to the conclusion 
that the conveynn<'e might haye been execut-
ed, and that Its exlstE>nce would be a solu-
tion of the dlfft<'ultles arising from its non-
exeeutlon. In Edson v. Munsell, 10 Allen, 
5;;7, which was an action for obstructing the 
enjoyment of an ea8<'ment, the doctrine of 
nc·qulring llU<'h rlithts by pres<'rlptlon or ad· 
verse possession ls elaborately considered; 
210 
and It ls there said that "the flctlon of pre-
suming a grant from twenty years' poeseeston 
or use was Invented by the English courts In 
the eighteenth century to avoid the absurd· 
ftles of tbelr rule of legal memory, and was 
derived by analogy from the limitation pre-
scribed by the statute of 21 Jae. I. c. 21, for 
actions of ejectment. It ls not founded on a 
belief that a grant has actually been made 
In the particular case, but on the general 
presumption that a man will naturally enjoy 
what belongs to him, the dlfHculty of proof 
after lapse of time, and the policy of not dis-
turbing loog-continued poBBeBSlons." 
In Casey's Lessee v. Inloes, 1 GUI, 503, 
whl<'h was an action of ejectment, the court 
of appeals of Maryland held that, where there 
had been a continuous posseMlon of land for 
20 years or upwards, by a party, or persons 
claiming under him, the court was authorized 
to Instruct the jury, In the absence of a deed 
to such p8.rty, to presume that one had been 
executed to him. It also approved the refu-
sal of the court below to Instruct the jury 
that before they could ftnd a title in the de-
fendants, or any one of them, by presump-
tion of a grant by the plaintUf or those under 
whom he claims, they must believe on their 
consciences, and find as a blct, that such 
grant was actually made. "The granting of 
such a prayer," said the court, "would have 
a tendency to mislead the jury, by Inducing 
them to believe that a presumption of a grant 
could not be made unle88 the jury in point of 
fact believed In the execution of the grant; 
whereas It ls frequently the duty of the jury 
to find such presumption as an Inference of 
law, although in their COJlS('lences they may 
disbelieve the actual execution of any such 
grant." 
In Williams v. Donell, 2 Head, 695, 698, 
which was also an action of ejectment, the 
supreme court of Tennessee, speaking on the 
same point, said: '"It ls not indispensable, 
In order to lay a proper foundation for the 
legal presumption of a grant, to establlah 
the probability of the fact that In reality & 
grant ever Issued. It will be & suftlclent 
ground for the presumption to show that by 
legal possibility a grant might have lssut>d, 
and, this appearing, It may be assumed, ln 
the absence of clrcumstan<'es repelllng such 
conclusions, that all that might lawfully 
have been done to perfect the legal title was 
In fact done, and in the form prescribed by 
law." 
In accordance with the doctrine thus ex-
pll<'ltly declared, thlf're <'an be no doubt that 
the court below should l1ave Instructed the 
jury as requested. It would seem from the 
Instruction given that the deed which the 
defendants insisted might be presumed was 
one from Ezekiel and Abigail Fuller, or 
from Abigail Fullf'r to Jeremiah Itlchard-
son. We think. howE>Yer, that the facts 
point with equal dlrf'ctness to 11 conYeyan('C 
from hts grandfatlier. The codicil to hlK 
wlll, by which he devised the property to his 
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL.
[Case No. 95
married daughter, was dated several years
before his death, and there was no evidence
that he was seized of it at that time, except
the presumption arising from his having once
possessed it. It does not appear that either
the devisee or her husband ever exercised
any acts of ownership in any way, or ever
claimed to own it. After he left Smithfleld,
two of his children were supported by the
town; and the agent of the town, appointed
to search for any property belonging to the
father, from the sale of which the children
might be supported, reported that there was
only the six-acre parcel, which’ was held by
him in the right of his wife. He afterwards
went to the poor-house, where he died in
1800. During the 39 years after he left
Smithfield, and notwithstanding his having
been part of that time in the poor-house, no
word appears to have come from him assert-
ing that he had any interest in the property.
It is diflicult to reconcile his conduct or that
of his wife, the devisee, if in truth the testa-
tor continued the owner of the property until .
his death, and it passed under the codicil
to his will. \Vhile Ezekiel Fuller was still
living, and for several years after he had left
Smithtield, Jeremiah Richardson, the tes-
tator's grandson, asserted ownership of the
tract by its sale to Stephen J encks by a deed
with covenants of title and warranty, which
was recorded in the town records. No word
of opposition to this sale, or to the subse-
quent mortgage of the property by the gran-
tee, was ever made, so far as the record dis-
closes. The fact that Jeremiah Richardson
was a minor when his grandfather died does
not militate against the presumption of a
deed to him. Nothing would be more natural
than a deed of gift from the grandfather to
the grandson. It would also seem from the
charge of the court that in the deed from
Jeremiah to Jencks he recited that the prop-
erty had come from his honored grandfather,
or words to that effect.
If, however, the evidence which, as the
record says, tended toshow that the devisee
and her hrusband entered into the posses-
sion of the property devised, and the recital
in his deed of April 11, 1761, of the 20-acre
parcel, that it was bounded on the north by
his former land, can be considered as re-
butting the presumption of suclr a deed by
the testator, then the defendants may fall
back on the presumption of a deed to Jere-
miah Richardson by Ezekiel and Abigail
Fuller, the devlsee, and her husband. There
is nothing in the conduct or language of ei-
ther of these parties which in any way re-
pels such a presumption. Their silence and
non-claim of the property would rather in-
dicate that they had parted with their in-
terest. The minority of Jeremiah at the time
only shows his inability to purchase the prop-
erty; but those under whose charge he was,
could have purchased it for him. and had
the deed executed to him. His orphanage
may have induced such a proceeding. We
do not, therefore, think that his minority at
the time can be urged against the presump-
tion of a deed to h-im.
For the refusal of the court below to give
the instruction requested, the case must go
back for a new trial. We will add, more-
over, that though a. presumption of a deed
is one that may be rebutted by proof of
facts inconsistent with its supposed exist-
ence, yet where no such facts are shown,
and the things done, and the things omitted,
with regard to the property in controversy,
by the respective parties, for long periods of
time after the execution of the supposed
conveyance, can be explained satisfactorily
only upon the hypothesis of its existence,
then the jury may be instructed that it is
their duty to presume such a conveyance,
and thus quiet the possession. How long a
period must elapse after the date of the sup-
_ posed conveyance before it may be pre-
sumcd to have existed has not always been
a matter of easy determination. “In gener-
al,” said this court, speaking by Mr. Justice
Story, “it is the policy of courts of law to
limit the presumption of grants to periods
analogous to those of the statute of limita-
tions in cases where the statute does not
apply. But when the statute applies, it con-
stitutes ordinarily a sutiicient title or de-
fense independently of any presumption of
a grant, and therefore it is not generally
resorted to. But, if the circumstances of the
case justify it, a presumption of a grant may
as well be made in the one case as in the
other; and, when the other circumstances
are very cogent and full, there is no absolute
bar against the presumption of a grant with-
in a period short of the statute of limita-
tions.” Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59, 110.
The general statement of the doctrine, as
we have seen from the authorities cited, is
that the presumption of a. grant is indulged
merely to quiet a long possession which
might otherwise be disturbed by reason of
the inability of the possessor to produce the
muniments of title which were actually giv-
en at the time of the acquisition of the prop-
erty by him or those under whom he claims,
but have been lost, or which he or they were
entitled to have at that time, but had
neglected to obtain, and of which the wit-
nesses have passed away, or _thelr recollec-
tion of the transaction has become dimmed
and imperfect; and hence, as a general rule,
it is only where the possession has been
actual, open, and exclusive for the period
proscribed by the statute of limitations to
bar an action for the recovery of land, that
the presumption of a deed can be invoked.
But the reason for attaching such weight to
a possession of this character is the notoriety
it gives to the claim of the occupant; and,
in countries where land is generally occupied
or cultivated, it is the most effective mode of
asserting ownership. But, as Mr. Justice
Story observes in delivering the opinion of
this court in Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch, 2-iii:
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PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL. [Case No. 9a 
married daughter, was dated several years 
~fore his death, and there was no evidence 
that he was seized of It at that time, except 
the presumption a1·islng from bis having once 
possessed it. It does not appear that either 
the devlsee or her husband ever exercised 
any acts of ownersbip In any way, or ever 
claimed to own it. .After he left 8mithfteld, 
two of his children were supported by the 
town; and the agent of the town, appointed 
to sea.rcll' for any property belonging to the 
father, from the sale of which the children 
might be supported, reported that there was 
only the six-acre parcel, which' was held by 
him in the right of his wife. Ile afterwards 
went to the poor·bonse, where be died in 
1800. During the 39 years after he left 
Smithfield, and notwithstanding his ho.vlng 
been part of that time In the poor-house, no 
word appears to have come from him assert-
ing that he had any interest In the property. 
It ls difficult to reconcile hie conduct or that 
of his wife, the devisee, If In truth the testa-
tor continued the owner of the property until 
his death, and It paRsed under the codicil 
to his will. While E?..eklel Fuller was still 
living, and for several years after he had left 
Smithfield, Jeremiah Richardson, the tes-
tator's grandson, asserted ownership of the 
tract by Its sale to Stephen Jencks by a deed 
with covenants of title and warrnnty, which 
was recorded In the town records. ~o word 
of opposition to tb~s sale, or to the subse-
quent mortgage of the property by the gran-
tee, was ever madl', so far as the record dis-
closes. The fact that Jl'r<>mlah Richardson 
was a minor when his grnmltath<>r died does 
not militate against the prl'sumption of a 
deed to him. Nothing would be more natuml 
tbnn a deed of gift from the grandfather to 
the grandson. It would also seem from the 
charge of the court that In the deed from 
Jeremiah to Jencks be rl'clted that the prop-
erty bad come from bis honored grandfather, 
or words to that effect. 
It, however, the evidencl' wbleh, as the 
record says, tended to· show that the devlsee 
and her husband entered Into the posses-
sion of the property d(>vl11ed, nnd the recital 
in hie deed of April 11, liGl, of the 20-acre 
parel?l, that It was boumkcl on the north by 
his former land, can be considered as re-
butting the presumption of 1meh· a <leed by 
the tPstntor, then the dPfPmlauts may fnll 
ba<'k on the presumption of a dee<l to .Jere-
miah Ri<'hardson by Ezekiel and Abigail 
Fuller, the devlsee, and her husband. There 
Is nothing In the condu<'t or language of el· 
ther of these partleR whif'h In auy way r<>-
J:X>ls RU<'h a prrsnmption. Tlwit• sllrn<'e and 
non-claim of the property would rather In-
dicate that they hod ported with their ln-
tt>rest. The minority of Je1·emioh at the time 
only shows his Inability to pnr<'hn11e thr prop-
erty; but those under whose ehnrge he was. 
could ban~ pur<'l11111ed It for him. and hnd 
the dt>ed executed to him. Hi~ orphnnnge 
may have Induced 1mch a proceeding. 'Ye 
do not, therefore, think that his minority at 
the time can be urged agalnst the presump-
tion of a deed to him. 
For the refusal of the court below to give 
the Instruction requested, the case must go 
back for a new trial. We will add, more-
over, that though a presumption of a deed 
le one that may be rebutted by proof of 
facts inconsistent with its supposed exist-
ence, yet where no such facts are shown, 
and the things done, and the things omitted, 
with regard to the property In controversy, 
by the respective parties, for long periods of 
time after the execution of the supposed 
conveyance, can be explained satisfactorily 
only upon the hypothesis ot its existence, 
then the jury may be Instructed that It Is 
their duty to presume such a conveyance, 
and thus quiet the possession. How long a 
period must elapse after the date of the sup-
posed conveyance before it may be pre-
sumed to have existed has not always been 
a matter of easy determination. "In gener-
al," said this court, speaking by Mr. Justice 
Story, "It ls the policy of courts of law to 
limit the presumption of grants to periods 
analogous to those of the statute of limita-
tions in cases where the statute does not 
apply. But when the statute applies, it con-
stitutes ordinarily a sufficient title or de-
fense lndep<>ndently of any presumption of 
a grant, and therefore It ls not generally 
resorted to. But, It the circumstances ot the 
case justify it, a presumption of a grant may 
ns well be made In the one case as In the 
other; and, when the other circumstances 
are very cogent and full, there Is no absolute 
bar against the presumption of a grant with-
in a pPrlod short of the statute ot limita-
tions." Ricard v. Wllllams, 7 Wheat. 59, 110. 
The general statement of the doctrine, as 
we have seen from the authorities cited, Is 
that the presumption ot a grant ls indulged 
merely to quiet a long possession which 
might otherwise be disturbed by reason of 
the Inability of the poRsessor to produce the 
munlments of title which were actually giv-
en at the time of the acquisition of the prop-
erty by him or those under whom Ile claims, 
but have been lost, or which he 01· they wen• 
entitled to have at thnt time, but bad 
neglected to obtain, and of which the wit-
nesses ha>e passed away, or their recollel'-
tlon of the transaction has be<>ome dimmed 
and Imperfect; and ln•nc<', ns a general rule, 
It Is only wh<'re the llOSses.<1ion has been 
a<>tual. open, nnd exdnsl\·e for the pPrlod 
prescrlbell by the statute of limitations to 
har an action for the reeovery of lnnd, that 
the presumption of n deed can be Invoked. 
But the reason for attaching stwh weight to 
a posseRslon of this character Is the notorietr 
It gh'e~ to th<' claim of the occupant; and. 
In <'Otmtries where land ls gen<'rnlly occupied 
or cultivated, It is the most effective motle of 
asserting ownership. But, as Mr. Justice 
Story oh11erve!l In delivering the opinion or 
this court In Grren v. Liter, 8 Cr:mch, 2411: 
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“In the simplicity of ancient times there
were no means of ascertaining titles but by
the visible seizin, and, indeed, there was no
other mode between subjects of passing
title but livery of the land itself by the sym-
bolical delivery of turf and twig. The mo-
ment that a tenant was thus seized he had
a perfect investiture, and, if ousted, could
maintain his action for the realty, although
he had not been long enoughl in possession
even to touch the esplees. The very object
of the rule, therefore, was notoriety; to pre-
vent frauds upon the land, and upon the
other tenants.” There may be acts equally
notorious, and therefore equally evincive of
ownership, which, taken in connection with
a long possession, even if that possession has
been subject to occasional intrusion, are as
fully suggestive of rightful origin as an un-
interrupted possession. Where any propri-
etary right is exercised for a long period,
which, if not founded upon a lawful origin,
would in the usual course of things be re-
sisted by parties interested, and no such re-
sistance is made, a presumption may be in-
dulged that the proprietary right had a law-
ful origin. The principle is thus stated by
Mr. Justice Stephen, of the high court of jus-
tice of England, in his Digest of the Law
of Evidence, using the term “grant" in a
general sense, as indicating a conveyance of
real property, whether corporeal or incor-
poreal: “When it has been shown that any
person has, for a long period of time, ex-
ercised any proprietary right which might
have had a lawful origin by grant or license
from the crown, or from a private person,
and the exercise of which might and natural-
ly would have been prevented by the persons
interested, if it had not had a lawful origin,
there is a presumption that such righ-t had a
lawful origin, and that it was created by a
proper instrument which has been lost.” Ar-
ticle 100.
This presumption may therefore, in some
instances, be properly invoked where a pro-
prietary right has long been exercised. ai-
though the exclusive possession of the whole
property to which the right is asserted may
have been occasionally interrupted during
the period necessary to create a title by ad-
verse possession, if in addition to the actual
possession, there were other open acts of
ownership. If the interruptions did not im-
pair the uses to which the possessor sub-
jected the property, and for which it was
chiefly valuable, they should not necessarily
be held to defeat the presumption of the
rightful origin of his claim to which the
facts would otherwise lead. It is a matter
which, under proper instructions, may be
left to the jury.
In the present case, acts of ownership over
the property in controversy by the ances-
tors in title of the defendants, so far as they
could be manifested by written transfers of
it. either as conveyances of title or by way
of security, were exercied from 1768 for
more than a century. The first conveyance,
from which the defendants trace their title.
was duly recorded in the land records of the
town soon after its execution in that year.
The assessment of taxes on the property to
those ancestors, and their payment of the
taxes for 20 years between 1770 and 1805,
and the assessment of taxes to them or to
the defendants for 77 years after 1805, and
the payment of the taxes by them, such a-
sessment being required to be made, under
the laws of the state, to occupants or own-
ers of the land. are circumstances of great
significance, taken in connection with their
constantly asserted ownership. In Ewing
v. Burnet this court speaks of the uninter-
rupted payment of taxes on a lot for 2-i con-
secutive years as “powerful evidence of
claim of right to the whole 1ot." 11 Pet. 5-1.
Here, as seen, the taxes were uninterrupted-
ly paid by the defendants or their ancestors
in title for a much longer period.
In St. Louis Public -Schools v. Risle_v's
Heirs the supreme court of Missouri said:
“Payment of taxes has been admitted in
questions of adverse possession, and may
have an important bearing, as it is not usual
for one owning realty to neglect paying tax-
es for a period which would be sufficient to
constitute a bar under the statute of lim-
itations, or for one to pay taxes having no
claim or color of title.” 40 Mo. 370.
In Davis v. Easley, which was an action
of ejectment, the supreme court of Illinois
held that receipts for taxes paid by the
plaintiff were admissible, and said: "The
payment of taxes indicated that the plaintifl!
claimed title to the whole tract. It like-
wise tended to explain the character and ex-
tent of his possession.” 13 Ill. 201.
In this case the ancestors of the defend-
ants entered upon the land under claim of
title, and opened and worked the ledge of
rock running through it as early as 1835,
and from 1846 they or their tenants or les-
sees continued, with occasional intervals, to
work that ledge to the time of trial, in 1882.
a period of 36 years; and it does not appear
that during that time any one ever inter-
fered with their work, or complained of it.
To constitute an adverse possession, it-was
not necessary that they should have actual-
ly occupied or inclosed the land. It was suf-
ticient that they subjected it to such uses
as it was susceptible of, to _the exclusion of
others. Ellicott v. 'Pearl, 10 Pet. 4-12. That
subjection might be shown by the quarry-
ing of the ledge and the removal of the
stone without disturbance or complaint from
any quarter. The exclusive working of the
quarry, under claim of title to the whole
tract by virtue of conveyances in which it
was described, might operate in law to carry
the possession over the whole; and the pay-
ment of taxes thereon might authorize the
jury to infer a continuous possession of the
whole, notwithstanding any_ temporary and
occasional intrusion by others upon a differ-
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Case No. 95] PROOF. 
"In the simplicity of ancient times there 
were no means of ascertaining titles but by 
the visible seizin, and, Indeed, there was no 
other mode between subjects of pll88lng 
title but livery of the land Itself by the sym-
bolical delivery of turf and twig. The mo-
ment that a tenant was thus seized he had 
a perfect Investiture. and, If ousted, could 
maintain his action for the realty, although 
he had not been long enough In possession 
even to touch the esplees. The very object 
of the rule, therefore, was notoriety; to pre-
\"ent frauds upon the land, and upon the 
other tenants." There may be acts equally 
notorious, and therefore equally evlnclve of 
ownership, which, taken In connection with 
a long possession, even If that possession has 
been subject to occasional Intrusion, are as 
fully suggestl\"e of rightful origin as an un-
interrupted posseSBlon. Where any propri-
etary right ls exerdsed for a long period, 
wblC'h, If not founded upon a lawful origin, 
would In the usual course of things be re-
sisted by parties Interested, and no such re-
sistance ls made, a presumption may be in-
dulged that the proprietary right had a law-
ful origin. The principle ls thus stated by 
Mr. Justice Stephen, of the high court of jus-
tice of England, In bis Digest of the Law 
of Evidence, using the term "grant" In a 
general sense, as Indicating a conveyance of 
real property, whether corporeal or Incor-
poreal: "When It has been shown that any 
person has, for a long period of time, ex-
ercised any proprietary right which might 
have had a lawful origin by grant or license 
from the crown, or from a private person, 
and the exercise of which might and natural-
ly would have been prevented by the persons 
Interested, If It nad not had a lawful origin, 
tbere ls a presumption that such right had a 
lawful origin, and that It was created by a 
proper Instrument which has been lost." Ar-
ticle 100. 
This presumption may therefore, In some 
Instances, be properly invoked where a pro-
prietary right has long been exercised, al-
though the exclusive possession of the whole 
property to which the right ls asserted may 
have been occasionally Interrupted during 
the period necessary to create a title by ad-
verse possession, if In addition to the actual 
possession, there were other open acts of 
ownership. If the Interruptions did not Im-
pair the uses to which the posseMor sub-
jected the property, and for which lt was 
chle11.y valuable, they should not necessarily 
be held to defeat the presumption of the 
rightful origin of his claim to which the 
facts would otherwise lead. It ls a matter 
which, under proper Instructions, may be 
left to the jury. 
In the present case. acts of ownership over 
the property In controversy by the ances-
tors In title of the defendants, so far as they 
could be manifested by written transfers of 
It. either ns C'onYeynnces of title or by way 
of security, were exercised from 1768 for 
Z72 
more than a century. The ftnt conveyance, 
from which the defendants trace their Utle. 
was duly recorded In the land records of the 
town soon after Its execution In that year. 
The all8eBBment of taxes on the property to 
those ancestors, and their payment of the 
taxes for 20 years between 1770 and 1805, 
and the asseBBment of taxes to them or to 
the defendants for 77 years after 180j, and 
the payment of the taxes by them, such as-
sessment being required to be made, under 
the la wa of the state, to occupants or own-
ers of the land, are circumstances of great 
significance, taken In connection with their 
constantly asserted ownership. In Ewing 
v. Burnet this court speaks of the uninter-
rupted payment of taxes on a lot for 24 con-
secutive years as "powerful evidence of 
claim of right to the whole lot." 11 Pet M. 
Here, as seen, the taxes were uninterrupted-
ly paid by the defendants or their ancestol'B 
In title for a much longer period. 
In St. Louts Public ·Schools v. Rlsley•s 
Heirs the supreme court of Missouri said: 
"Payment of taxes has been admitted in 
questions of adverse possession, and may 
have an Important bearing, 88 it is not usual 
for one owning realty to neglect paying tax-
es for a period which would be sufticlent to 
constitute a bar under the statute of lim-
itations, or for one to pay taxes having no 
claim or color of title." 40 Mo. 370. 
In Davis v. Easley, which was an action 
of ejectment, the supreme court of Illlnolll 
held that receipts tor taxes paid by the 
plalntltr were admissible, and said: "The 
payment of taxes Indicated that the plalntUf 
claimed title to the whole tract. It like-
wise tended to explain the character and ex-
tent of his possession." 13. Ill. 201. 
In this case the ancestors of the defend-
ants entered upon the land under claim of 
title, and opened and worked the ledge of 
rock running through it 88 early as 183S, 
and from 1846 they or their tenants or les-
sees continued, with occasional intervals, to 
work that ledge to the time of trial, In 1882. 
a period of 36 years; and It does not appear 
that during that time any one ever inter-
fered with their work, or complained ot Jt. 
To constitute an adverse possession, It-was 
not necessary that they should have actual-
ly occupied or lnclosed the land. It was suf-
ficient that they subjected It to such uses 
as It was susceptible of, to .the exclusion of 
others. Ellicott v. ·Pearl, 10 Pet. 442. That 
subjection might be shown by the quarry-
ing of the ledge and the removal of the 
stone without disturbance or complaint from 
any quarter. The exclusive work.Ing of the 
quarry, under claim of title to the whole 
traC't by virtue of conveyances In which It 
was described, might operate In law to carry 
the possession over the whole; and the pay-
ment of taxes thereon might authorize the 
jury to Infer a continuous possession of the 
whole. notwithstanding any, temporary and 
occasional Intrusion by others upon a differ-
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENER AL.
[Case No. 95
ent part of the tract, which did not interfere
with the work.
The entry of the plaintiff with the attorney
of his co-heirs, in 1874, and the delivery of
the deed to him with a handful of earth, if
weight and consideration are to be given to
that proceeding under the circumstances in
which it was made, would only reduce the
period of undisturbed possession to 28 years.
The cutting of wood on a difierent portion of
the land by the Fullers for family use, or
the manufacture of baskets, at occasional
intervals during a portion of this period.
though competent for the consideration of
the jury, was not necessarily an interruption
to the peaceable occupation of the land, so
far as quarrying of the ledge and the remov-
al of the stone were concerned, to which
uses the defendants and their ancestors in
title subjected it, and which appear to have
constituted its principal value. Nor did it
necessarily change the legal effect of the
possession for quarrying the ledge with the
attendant claim to the whole tract.
In Webb v. Richardson, the supreme court
of Vermont, in speaking of interruptions in
the actual occupancy of real property as af-
fecting the claim of continuous possession,
said: “To constitute a continuous possession,
it is not necessary that the occupant should
be actually upon the premises continually.
The mere fact that time intervenes between
successive acts of occupancy does not nec-
essarily destroy the continuity of the pos-
session. The kind and frequency of the acts
of occupancy necessary to constitute a con-
tinuous possession depend somewhnt on the
condition of the property, and the uses to
which it is adapted in reference to the cir-
cumstances and situation of the possessor,
and partly on his intention. If, in the in-
termediate time between the different acts
of occupancy, there is no existing intention
to continue the possession. or to return to
the enjoyment of the premises, the posses-
sion, if it has not ripened into a title, ter-
minates, and cannot afterwards be connect-
WILGUS,EV.——18
ed with a subsequent occupation so as to be
made available towards gaining title; while
such continual intention might, and general-
ly would, preserve the possession unbroken."
42 Vt. 465-473. That was an action of tres-
pass for cutting timber on the land of the
plaintiff, who was in possession at the time,
and offered testimony to prove that his pos-
session was earlier than the dei’endaut’s,
and also that he had acquired the land by 15
years’ adverse possession. The defendant
did not show a chain of title back to the
original proprietor of the land, but showed
that his grantors entered into possession in
1835, and cut timber and claimed to own the
land; and it was held that the question
whether this entry interrupted the plaintiffs
possession should have been submitted to
the jury under proper instructions, in con-
nection with the plaintiff's evidence of con-
tinuous possession under those through
Whom he claimed. and that it was error to
refuse to submit it.
Our conclusion is that the claim to the
land in controversy by the defendants and
their ancestors in title for over a century,
with the payment of taxes thereon, and acts
of ownership suited to the condition of the
property, and its actual use for 36 or 28
years, it matters not which, would justify a
presumption of a deed to the original ances-
tor, Jeremiah Richardson, to quiet the pos-
session of the defendants claiming under
him, and the jury should have been permit-
ted to presume such a. deed without finding
from the testimony that there was in point
of fact a deed which was lost. If the exe-
cution of a deed was established, nothing
further would be required than proof of its
contents; there would be no occasion for the
exercise of any presumption on the subject.
It is only where there is uncertainty on this
point that the presumption is indulged to
quiet the possession.
The judgment of the court below must be
reversed, and the cause remanded for a new
trial.
273
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
07
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
PRESUMPTIONS L.~ GENElUL. [Case No. 95 
ent part of the tract, which did not Interfere 
with the work. 
The entry of the plaintiff with the attorney 
of his co-heirs, In 1874, and the delivery of 
the deed to him with a handful of earth, If 
weight and consideration are to be given to 
tbat proceeding under the circumstances In 
which It was made, would only reduce the 
period of undisturbed possession to 28 years. 
The cutting of wood on a different portion of 
the land by the Fullers for family use, or 
the manufacture of baskets, at occasional 
Intervals during a portion of this period, 
though competent for the consideration of 
the jury, was not necessarily an interruption 
to the peaceable occupation of the land, so 
far as quarrying of the ledge and the remov-
al of the stone were concerne<I, to which 
uses the defendants and their ancestors In 
title subjected It, and which appear to have 
constituted Its principal value. Nor did It 
necessarily change the legal effect of the 
possession for quarrying the ledge with the 
attendant claim to the whole tract. 
In Webb v. Rl~hardson, the supreme court 
of Vermont, In speaking of Interruptions In 
the actual occupancy of real property as af-
fecting the claim of continuous possession, 
Bald: "To constitute a continuous possession, 
It ls not necessary that the occupant should 
be actually upon the premises continually. 
The mere fact that time Intervenes between 
succeMlve acts of occupancy does not nec-
esaarlly destroy the continuity of the pos-
session. The kind and frequency of the acts 
of occupancy necessary to constitute a con-
tinuous posse88fon depend somewhat on the 
condition of the property, and the uses to 
wblch It Is adapted In reference to the cir-
cumstances and situation of the possessor, 
and partly on his Intention. If, In the In-
termediate time between the dll'ferent acts 
of occupancy, there ls no existing Intention 
to continue the possession, or to return to 
the enjoyment of the premises, the posses-
sion. If It has not ripened Into a title, ter-
minates, and cannot afterwards be conneet-
WILGUS,Bv.-18 
ed with a subsequent occupation so as to be 
made available towards gaining title; while 
such continual Intention might, and general-
ly would, preserve the possession unbroken." 
42 Vt. 465-473. That was an action of tres-
pass for cutting timber on the land of the 
plaintiff, who was In possession at tbe time, 
and offered testimony to prove that his pos-
session was earlier than the defendant's, 
and also that he had acquired the land by 15 
years' adverse possession. The defendant 
did not show a chain of title back to thft 
original proprietor of tbe land, but showed 
that bis grantors entered into possession in 
1&%, and cut timber and claimed to own the 
land; and It was held that the question 
whether this entry Interrupted the plaintiff's 
possession should have been submitted to 
the jury under proper Instructions, in con-
nection with the plalntll'f's evidence of con· 
tlnuous possession under those through 
'\\'hom be claimed, and that It was error to 
refuse to submit It. 
Our conclusion ls that the claim to the 
land In controversy by the defendants and 
their ancestors In title for over a century, 
with the payment of taxes thereon, and acts 
of ownership suited to the condition of the 
property, and Its actual use for 36 or 28 
years, it matters not which, would justify a. 
presumption of a deed to the original ances-
tor, Jeremiah Richardson, to quiet the pos-
session of the defendants claiming under 
him, and the jury should have been permit-
ted to presume such a deed without finding 
from the testimony that there was In point 
of fact a deed which was lost. If the exe-
cution of a deed was established, nothing 
further would be required than proof of Its 
contents; there would be no occasion for the 
exercise of any presumption on the subject. 
It Is only where there Is uncertainty on this 
point that the presumption Is Indulged to 
quiet the possession. 
The judgment of the court below must be 
reversed, and the cause remanded for a new 
trial. 
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NASHUA & L. R. CORP. v. BOSTON & L.
R. CORP. et al.
(10 Sup. or. 1004. 136 U. s. 356.)
Supreme Court of the United States. May 19,
1890.
Appeal from the circuitcourt of the Unit-
.ed States for the district of Massachusetts.
Francis A. Brooks and E. J . Phelps. for
appellant. J. H.Benton,Jr., for appellees.
FIELD. J. This is u suit in egult_y to
compel the defendantthe Boston & Lowell
Railroad Corporation to account for va-
rious sums of money alleged to have been
received by it, and used for its benefit. to
which the complainant was entitled, and
also to charge the defendant Hosford
personally with the amount diverted by
him to that corporation. The contro-
versy relates to certain transactions
growing out of a ioint tratiic contract be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant cor-
porations. The plaintiff. the Nashua &
Lowell Railroad Corporatlomis alleged in
the bill to have been duly established as a
corporation under the laws ofNew Hamp-
shire, and to be a citizen oi that state. It
will be convenient hereafter in this opin-
ion to designate it as the “Nashua. Corpo-
ration." On the lst of February, 1857, it
owned and operated a railroad extending
from i\'ashua.in New Hampshire, to Low-
ell, in Massachusetts, a distance of 13
miles,ofwhich 5 miles were in New Hamp-
shire. and 8 miles in Massachusetts. The
suit was brought not only against the
Boston & Lowell Railroad Corporation,
alleged in thehill to be a corporation duly
established by the laws of Massachusetts
and a citizen of that state, but against
Hocum Hosford,its ti-easurer.and Charles
E. A. Bartlett, of the city of Lowell, also
citizens of that state; but as to Bartlett
it has been dismissed. On the lst of Feb-
ruary, 1857, this corporation. which for
convenience \ve shall call the “Lowell
Corporation,” owned and operated a rail-
road extending from Boston to Lowell,
Mass., a distance of 26 miles, with a branch
to the town of \\'oburn a mile and a half
in length. On the 1st of February, 1857,
the two corporations entered into a con-
tract in writing with each other “ for the
promotion of their mutual interest
through a more ctficient and economical
joint operation and management of their
roads, and for the better security of their
respective investments, as well as for the
convenience and interest of the public,”
that their roads. with their branches,
should be “ worked and managed as one
road, "under certain conditions and stipu-
lations which were stated at length. The
contract recited that a large portion of
the business of the two roads wasjoint
business passing over the roads and
through the branches of both parties.
making desirable a common policy, and
unanimity of management, and that, in
the transaction of their business. there
was a mutual interest, both us to the
mode of transaction, and to the tariff up-
on the same, as well as in all other mat-
ters reiating thereto, and that the two
corporations, by operating under a com-
mon management, would thereby be en-
abled to do business with greater facility.
greater regularity, and at a greater sav-
ing of expense.
The Nashua Corporation had at this
time leases oi the Stony Brook Railroad.
extending from its line at North Chelms-
ford to Groton Junction, about 14 miles
in Massachusetts, and of the Wilton Rail-
road.extending from Nashua to Wilton,
about 13 miles in New Hampshire. The
contract was originally for three years,
but by a supplemental agreement of Octo-
ber 1, 1858, it was extended to ‘.'0years.
Among other things it provided that the
roads of the parties should be “operated
and managed by one agent. to be chosen
by the concurrent vote of u. majority of
the directors of each party, and who
might be removed by a like vote, or by
the unanimous vote of either board, ” and
that the respective boards of directors
should “by such concurrent action exer-
cise the same control over the manage-
ment as is usual with boards of railroad
directors in ordinary cases ; ” that the cor-
porations should each surrender to the
joint management thus constituted “the
entire control of their respective roads,
shops. depots, furniture,machinery, tools,
or other property necessary for the proper
maintenance and working of the joint
roads.” reserving only certain specified
property necessary for the operation of
the roads, consisting principally of real
estate; that the contracts of the Nashua
Corporation with the Wilton and Stony
Brook roads should be assumed by the
joint management. and carried out, and
that the contract with the Wilton road,
which was to expire on the lst of April,
1858. might be renewed during the contin-
uance of thejoint management; that the
Nashua Corporation should within the
year 1857, at its o\vn cost, erect a freight
depot, with the necessary approaches and
furniture, in the city of Lowell, upon its
site at Western avenue. which during the
continuance of the agreement might be
used for the accommodation oi the joint
business; that the Lowell Corporation
should complete within the year 1857, at
its own separate cost. the new passenger
depot at Causeway street in Boston. then
under construction, together with the
tracks. bridges, and all necessary fixtures
connected with the extension into that
city, and at its separate expense make
such alterations in the existing Boston
passenger depot as had been designed by
the Lowell Corporation for converting it
into a freight depot. and also without
charge to the Nashua Corporation. com-
plete at the earliest practicable time the
crossing over the Fitchburg Railroad,and
the connection with the Grand Junction
that the road-bed. bridges.
superstructures, depots. buildings. and
fixtures of each road should be kept as
near as might be in like relative repair
from their then state and condition, and
that all casualties and damages to the
same,except fire risks on buililings.should
be at the common risk, and charged in
the current joint account, and. in case of
the destruction by fire of any buildings.
or injury to the same, that the owners
Railroad :
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Case No. 96] PROOF. 
NASHUA & r~. R. CORP. v. BOSTON & L. 
R. CORP. et al. 
(10 Sup. Ct. 1004, 136 U. S. 356.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. :May 19, 
1800. 
APl'l'al from the circuit court of the Unit;. 
.ed Stutes for the district of Massachusetts. 
Francis A. Brooks and E. J. Phelps, for 
appellant. ,1. H. Benton, Jr., for appellees. 
FIELD. J. This ls a suit In equity to 
compt·I the defendant the Boston & LOwell 
R11ilro111l Corporation to account for va-
rlouK 1111mH of money alleged to have been 
rect•tn!d hy it, and u11ed for its benefit, to 
which the complainant was entitled, and 
also to charge the defendant Hosfo1'd 
personally with tbe amount diverted by 
him to tlJ11t corporation. The contro-
versy relates to certain trausactlons 
growlnK out of R Joint traffic contract be· 
twet•n the plaintur and the defendant cor-
porations. The plalntltt, the Nashua & 
Lowell Railroad Corporation, is alleged In 
the bill to have been duly established as a 
corporation under the laws of New Hamp-
shire, and to be a citizen of that state. I~ 
will be convenient hereafter lo this opin-
ion to designate It as the "Nashua Corpo-
ration." On the let of February, 1857, It 
owned and operated a i·aill'oad extending 
from !'\ashua. In New Hampshire, to Low-
ell, In Massachusetts, a distance of 13 
miles, of which o miles wel'e In New Hamp. 
shire. and 8 miles In Massachusetts. The 
suit w&!I brought not only agaim1t the 
Boston & Lowell Railroad Corporation, 
alleged In the hill to be a corporation duly 
established by the Jaws of Massachusetts 
and a cltizeu of that state, but against 
Hocum Hosford, Its treasurer, and Charles 
E. A. Bartlett, of the c.'lty of Lowell, alHo 
citizens of that state; but as to Bartlett 
It haH been dlsmh~sed. On the 1Ht of Feb-
ruary, 11:<:>7, this corporation. which for 
convenlenc.'e we shall call the "Low1.>ll 
Corporation," owned and operated a rail-
road extendlnK from Boston to Lowell, 
Ma1u1., a distance of 26 miles, with a branch 
to the town of Woburn a mile and a half 
In leugth. On the let of .February, 1857, 
the h\·o cori111ratlons entered Into a con-
tract in writing with each other "for the 
promotion of· their mutual Interest 
through a more ctfklent and economical joint operation aml management of their 
roadR, and for the better security of their 
resp1'<'ttve investments, as well as for the 
conv1.>nlence n.nd tnteret1t of the public," 
that their roads, with their branches, 
sbo uld be " \\ orke<J and managed as one 
roud, "under certain conditions and stipu-
lations which we1't' Htatell at length. The 
contract recited thnt a lnrKe portion of 
the business of the two roads was Joint 
business paHslng ovPr the roads and 
through the brancht>s of both parties, 
making desirable a common policy, and 
unanim!ty of nrnnagement, and that, in 
the tl'ansactlon of their bm1ine!.l1:1, there 
'WllH a mutual interest, both llH to the 
mode of trammctlon, and to the tariff up-
on the same, as well aR in all other mat-
ters relating thereto, and that the two 
corpor11tlons, by operating under a cow-
274 
mon manar;ement, would thereby be en-
abled to do business with greater facllity, 
greater regularity, and at a greater sav-
ing of expense. 
The Nashua Corporation had at thi1 
time lenses of the Stony Brook Hallroad, 
extending from Its line at North UbelmR-
ford to Groton Junction, about 14 mtll'8 
In Massachusetts, and of the Wilton Rail-
road, extending from Nashua to Wilton, 
about 18 miles In New Hampshire. The 
contract was originally for three years, 
but by a supplPmental agreement of Octo-
ber 1, 1H58, It was extended to !.!Cl years. 
Among other things It provided that the 
roads of the parties should be "operated 
and managed by one agent. to be chosen 
by the com~urrent vote of a majority of 
the directors ol each party, an<l who 
might be removed by a like vote, or by 
the unanimous vote of either board," and 
that the respective boards of directore 
ehoulcl "by such concunent action exer-
cise the same control over the manage-
ment as ls usual with boards of railroad 
directors In ordinary cases;" that the cor-
porations should each surrender to the 
Joint management thus eonstltuted "the 
entire control of their respective roads, 
shops, depots, furniture, machinery, tools, 
or other property necessary for the proper 
maintenance and working of the Joint 
roads. " reserving only certain specified 
property Del"el!Mary for the operation Of 
the roads, consisting principally of real 
estate; that the contracts of the Nashua 
Corporation with the Wilton and Stony 
Brook roads should be assumecl by the 
Joint management, and rarrled out, and 
that the contract wtth the Wilton road, 
which wns to expire on the lRt of A11rll, 
1808. might be renewed during the contin-
uance of the Joint mnnagement; that the 
Nashua Corporation should within the 
year 1857. at Its own c.'ost, erect a frel1tht 
depot, with the necessary approachee and 
furniture. lo the city of Lowell, upon It.a 
site at West<.'rn Bvenue, which during tha 
continuance of the agreement might be 
ueed for the accommodation of the Joint 
buslneRs; that the Lowell Corporation 
should complete within the year 1807, at 
its own separate cost, the new passenger 
depot at Causeway street in Boston. then 
under construction, together wtt.h the 
tracks, bridires, and all necessary fixtures 
connected with the extension Into that 
city, and at Its 11eparate PxpensP make 
such alterations In the existing Boston 
paseenger depot as bad been de11igned by 
the Lowell Corporation lor converting lt 
into a freight depot. end also without 
charge to the Nashua Corporation, com-
plete at the earliest practicable time the 
crossing over the Fitchburg Railroad, and 
the connection with the Grand Junction 
Railroad; that the road-bed. bridges. 
superstructures, depots. buildings. and 
fixtures of each road should be kept Rs 
11e11r as might be In like relative repair 
from their then state aud condition, and 
that all casualties aud damages to the 
same, except fire risks on buildings, should 
be at the common rl11k, and char&ed In 
the <'UM't'nt Joint account, and. In case of 
the deetrul'tlon hy fire of any buildings. 
or injury to the same, that the ownent 
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL.
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should rebuild or replace them at his own
cost: that the income and expense ac-
counts of the joint roads should be made
up. as nearly as conveniently might be, by
estimate to the close of each month, and
the net balance should be divided and paid
over, on account, to the respective treas-
urers of the two corporations,-31 per
cent. to the Nashua Corporation, and 69
per cent. to the Lowell Corporation,—sub-
ject to a final adjustment at the semi-an-
nual closing of accounts, and that on the
lst days of April and October in each year
the said accounts should be accurately
closed and balanced by settlement with
each party, covering and adjusting all
previous payments on account,—the Na-
shua Corporation receiving as its propor-
tion. 31 per cent. of the said joint net in-
come, and the Lowell Corporation receiv-
ing as its proportion 69 per cent. thereof;
that each corporation might separately,
and on its own account, declare such divi-
dends upon its own stock, and payable
from its own separate funds, as it might
deem expedient; it being distinctly pro-
vided that “the interest upon the debts of
either party must also be paid out oi such
separate share, and not from the common
fund.” As thus seen, the contract pro-
vided that the two roads and their
branches should be operated as a single
road by a common agent to be appointed
by the directors of both companies, and
removable by them, or by the unanimous
action of either; that the roads and prop-
erty oi each party should be kept in a
like relative condition and repair as they
then were at their joint expense: that the
Nashua Corporation should in 1857 erect
at its own expense a freight depot, with
necessary approaches, in the city of Low-
ell, and the Lowell Corporation, in the
same _vear, at its expense, complete a pas-
senger depot, with necessary approaches,
in the city of Boston, and alter the existing
passenger depot there, also at its own
expense, into a freight depot; that the in-
terest upon the debts contracted by either
party should be paid out of its own share,
and not from the common fund; and that
the net income should be divided in the
proportion of 31 per cent. to the plaintiff,
the Nashua Corporation, and of 69 per
cent. to the defendant the Lowell Corpo-
ra tion, payments on account of such divis-
ion to be made upon monthly estimates,
and final settlement and adjustment to be
had semi-annually. The contract did not
provide that the property of either corpo-
ration should be improved, or other prop-
erty be acquired by either, at the joint
expense of both.
Under this contract, and during its con-
tinuance, the two corporations united
their business and conducted it with
marked success. By leases from other
companies and the acquisition of branch
roads a large mileage was added to their
lilies, and a correspondingly increased busi-
ness was transacted by them. In 1874 the
Nashua Corporation reported toits stock-
holders that the two corporations then
operated under their joint management
135 miles,—more than double the mileage
at the time the contract was entered into.
It is stated that 33 miles of this distance
were added by the acquisition of the Salem
& Lowell and the Lowell & Lawrence
roads in 1858, and 16 miles of it by the pur-
chase oi the Lexington & Arlington road,
in 1869. (‘ontracts were made forbusiness
with connecting lines to such an extent
that the two roads, during the late years
oi their joint operation, transported an-
nually in the neighborhood of 300,000 tons
oi freight and 200,000 passengers. The net
income resulting from this extended busi-
ness was satisfactorily apportioned pur-
suant to the contract, 31 per cent. going
to the Nashua Corporation, and 69 per
cent. going to the Lowell Corporation, ex-
cept as they were affected by two transac-
tions of which the Nashua Corporation
complains. One oi these transactions was
the alleged illegal appropriation by the
Lowell Corporation of $181,962 for a pas-
senger depot at Boston erected by that
corporation forits own benefit, and which.
complainant contends, it was entitled to
receive as its share of the net earnings of
the joint management. 'l‘he other trans-
action was the alleged illegal appropria-
tion of $26,124 for interest on the amount
expended by the Lowell Corporation in
buying a controlling interest in the stock
of two other railroad companies,—the
L0\7V(il & Lawrence Company and the
Salem 8: Lowell Company,—wl1ich the
complainant contends it was also entitled
to receive as its share of the net earnings
of the joint management. It is to compel
an accounting for these sums, and their
payment to the complainant, that the
present suit is brought. .
Before passing, however, upon the valid-
ity of these claims a question raised as to
thejurisdiction of the circuit court must
be considered. Its jurisdiction was as-
sumed upon the diverse citizenship of the
parties, and. upon the allegations of the
bill, rightfully assumed. Although a cor-
poration is not a. citizen of a state, within
the meaning of many provisions of the
national constitution, it is settled that,
where rights of property or of action are
sought to be enforced, it will be treated as
a citizen of the state where created, within
the clause extending the judicial power of
the United States to controversies between
citizens of different states. The plaintiff
was created a corporation by the legisla-
ture of New Hampshire in June, 1835. It
is, therefore, to be treated as a citizen of
that state. Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13
Wail. 270, 283. But it also appears that
in April, 1836, the legislature of Massa-
chusetts constituted the same persons a
corporation of that state, who had been
thus incorporated in New Hampshire, giv-
ing to them the same name, and authoriz-
ing the new corporation to build that
portion of the railroad between Nashua,
in New Hampshire, and Lowell, in Massa-
chusetts, lying within the latter state. It
also appears that in April, 1838, the legis-
ature of Massachusetts passed an act to
unite the two corpprations,—the one
created by New Hampshire, and the one
created by Ma.ssachusetts,—the first sec-
tion oi which was as follows: “The stock-
holders oi the Nashua & Lowell Railroad
Corporation, incorporated by the legisla-
. ture of the state of New Hampshire in the
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PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAI ... [Case No. 96 
should rebuild or replacC' them at hie own 
coat: that the lnl'ome and expense ac-
counts of the joint roads should be made 
up. ns nearly as conveniently might be, by 
t>etimate to the close of each month, aud 
the net balance should be divided and puld 
over, on account, to the retipective treas-
urers of 'the two corporations,-31 per 
cent. to the Nashua Corporation, and 69 
per cent. to the Lowell Corporutlon,-sub-
Ject to a ftnal adjustment at the semi-an-
nual elostng of accounts, and that on thft 
lst duys of April and OctolJer in each year 
the satll accounts should be nccumtely 
closed and balanced by sr:ttlement with 
each part:v, covering and adjusting all 
previous payments on account,-the Na · 
shua Corpora ti on recei vlng as Its propor-
tion. 31 per cent. of the Raifl Joint net In-
come, and the Lowell Corporation receiv-
ing as ltR proportion 69 per cent. thereof; 
that each corporation might separately, 
and on its own account, declare l!!uch dh·l-
dends upon Its own stock, anll payable 
from Its own sepurate funds, as It might 
deem expedient; It being distinctly pro-
vided that "the Interest upon the debts of 
either party must also be paid out of such 
Reparate share, and not from the common 
fund." Ae thus seen, the contract pro-
vided that the two roads and their 
branches should be operatert as a single 
road by a common agent to be appolnt11d 
by the directors of both companies, and 
removable by them, or by the unanimous 
action of either; that the roadH and pro]>-
erty of each party should be kept In a 
like relative condition and repair AH they 
then were at their joint expense : that the 
:\'ashua Corporation shoulll in 1S57 erect 
at Its own expense a freight depot, with 
neceHSary approache11, In the 1•ity of Low-
ell, and the Lowell Corporation, in the 
Mame year, at tts expense. complete a JUls-
senger depot, with necet1Hary approttchet1, 
In the city of Boston, and alter the existing 
passenger depot there, also at Its own 
expense. Into a freight de}lot; that the In-
terest upon the debbi contracte1\ by either 
party should be paid out or Its own 11JJare, 
11nd not from the l'ommon fund; and that 
th(' nE>t Income Hhould be dh·ided In the 
proportion of 31 per ernt. to the plaintiff, 
the NaHhua Corporation, and of 69 per 
cent. to the aefemlant the Lowell Corpo-
ra tlon, payments on account of such divis-
ion to be made upon monthly estimates, 
and ftnal settlement and adjustment to be 
bad 11emi·annuallv. The contract did not 
provide that the propr.rty of either corpo-
ration should be impro,·ed, or other prop-
erty be acquired by either, at the joint 
expense of both. 
l'nder this contract, and during Its con-
tinuance, the two corporations united 
their business and conducted It with 
marked socces11. Dy leases from other 
companies and tire acquisition of branch 
roads a large mileage was adrled to their 
lines, and acorrespondln~ly Increased busi-
ness wu transacted by them. In 1S74 the 
N1111hua Corporation reported to its st"ck-
holderR that the two co"rporatlons then 
operated under their Joint management 
135 mlles,- more than double the mileage 
l\t the time the con truct wnH entel'('rt Into. 
It Is stated that aa miles of thiH distance 
were adderl by the acqul1dtio11 of the Salem 
& Lowell and the J,owell & Lawrence 
roads In 1858, and 16 miles of It by the pur-
cha11e of the Lt>xtngton & Arlington road, 
In 1Sli9. Contracts were made for business 
with connecting llneH to such an extent 
that th~ two roadR, !luring the lute years 
of their joint operation, tran11ported an-
nually In tl\e neighborhood of 300,000 tone 
or freight and 200,000 passengers. The net 
lnrome reRultlng from this extenderl busi-
ness was satisfactorily apportioned pur-
snant to the ce>ntract, 31 per cent. going 
to the Nashua Corporation, and 69 per 
cent. going to the Lowell Corporation, ex-
cept as they were RffPCtell by two tranRac-
tlons of which the Nashua. Corporation 
complains. One of these transactions was 
the Rlleged Illegal appro11rlatlon by the 
Lowell Corporation of $181 ,962 for a. pas-
seDJ~er <lepot at Boston erected by that 
corporation for Its own beneftt, and which, 
complainant eontenrlH, it was entitled to 
receive as Its share of the net earnings of 
the joint managemE>nt. 'fhe other trans-
action was the alleged Illegal Rpproprla· 
tlon of $26.124 for interest on the amount 
expenrled by the Lowell Corporation In 
buying a controlling Interest In the stock 
of two other railroad companles,-the 
Low1ll & Lawrence Company and the 
Salem & Lowell l'ompany ,-which the 
com11lalnent contendH It waH also entitled 
to receive as Its share of the net earnings 
of the Joint management. It ls to compel 
an accounting for these sums, and their 
payment to the complainant, that the 
present suit Is brought. . 
Before pas11lng, however, upon the valid-
ity of these claims a question raised a11 to 
the Jurisdiction of the circuit court must 
be considered. Its jnrlttdlctton waH as-
sumed upon the diverse cltizem1hlp of the 
partlt>R, and. upon the allegations of the 
hlll. rtl{htfully oRRumed. Althouith a t'or-
11oratlon ls not a eltl:i:en of a state, within 
the meaning of many pr<H'islons of the 
nutlonal ronstltutlon, It le eettlt>d that, 
where rights of property or of action are 
sought to be enforced, It will be treated as 
a citizen of the statewher11 created, within 
tht> rlnuRe extending the judicial power of 
the Fnlted States to controversies between 
citizens of different states. 'L'he plaintiff 
\\'as crt•ntrd a corporation by the le1dsln-
tnre or New Hampshire In June, 1835. It 
is, therefore, to be treated as a citizen of 
that state. RRilway Co. v. Whitton, 18 
Wall . :nu, 283. But It also npJ)(>BrS that 
in April, 18::16, the Jeghllatnre of M11sH11.-
clmsetts constituted the same persons a 
corporation of that state, who had been 
thui1 Incorporated In New Hamp!!hlre,gh·· 
Ing to them the same name, and authoriz-
ing the new corporation to build that 
portion of the ratlroad between No11hua, 
In New Hampshire, a.nil Lowell . In MRssa.-
ch11Reth1, lying within the latt<>r state. It 
also appears that In April, l:S:JX, the legls-
ature of Massachusetts paR11ed an act to 
unite the two corpprntlons,-the one 
created by New HampHhlre, and the one 
crpatcd by Massnchusetts,-the first Sf!C-
tlon ofwhleh was as follows: "The stock-
holders of the NaRhua & Lowell Rnllronll 
' ('orportttlon, Incorporated by the Jegilda-
ture of the state of New HampRhlre In the 
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year one thousand eight hundred and
thirty-five, are hereby constituted stock-
holders of the Nashua & Lowell Railroad
Corporation, incorporated by the legisla-
ture of this commonwealth in the year one
thousand eight hundred and thirty-six;
and the said two corporations are hereby
united into one corporation, by the name
of the ‘ Nashua 8.: Lowell Railroad Corpo-
ration;’ and all the tolls, ‘franchises,
rights, powers, privileges, and property
granted. or to be granted. acquired or to
be acquired, under the authority of the
said states, shall be held and enjoyed by
all the said stockholders in proportion to
their number of shares in either or both
of said corporations." There were other
provisions, designed to enable the two
corporations to conduct their business as
one corporation. The act, however, de-
clared that lt should not take effect until
the legislature oi New Hampshire had
passed asimllaract unitingthe said stock-
holders in to one corporation. nor until the
acts had been accepted by the stockhold-
ers at a meeting called for that purpose.
In June of the same year, 1838, the legis-
lature of New Hampshire passed an act
authorizing the two corpora tions to unite,
and providing in such case that “all the
toll, franchises, rights, powers, privileges,
and property” of the two corporations
should be held and enjoyed by the stock-
holders in each and both in proportion to
their number of shares therein, and that
all property owned, acquired. or enjoyed
by either oi the corporations should be
. taken and accounted to be the joint prop-
erty of the stockholders oi the two corpo-
rations. and that the two corporations
should be one: the act to he in force when
accepted by the stockholders of the corpo-
rations at a meeting called for that pur-
pose. It does not appear, so far as dis-
closed by’ the record, except in the allega-
tions oi the defendant, that there was any
formal acceptance of this act by the stock-
holders of the two corporations. but it
would seem that the corporations acted
upon its supposed acceptance; for the
defendants pleaded to the jurisdiction oi
the court on the ground that. by the legis-
lation mentioned, the complainant was
not a corporuton oi New Hampshire, and
consequently a citizen oi that state, but
was a corporation oi Massachusetts, and
thus a citizen of that state.
In thebill as originally filed, the Nashua.
Corporation was the only complainant.
By a subsequent amendment, three per-
sons. citizens oi New Hampshire, stock-
holders oi that corporation, were united
as complainants. To the bill as thus
amended the defendants pleaded us fol-
lows: “That this court ought not to take
further cognizance of or sustain the said
bill oi complaint, because they say that
they, the said defendants. at the time of
filing said bill, were, and still are, all,
each. and every one, citizens of the state
of Massachusetts, and that said plaintiffs,
at the time of filing said hill, were not,
and still are not, all, each, and every one,
citizens of another state, but that the said
Nashua & Lowell Railroad Corporation,
one oi said plaintiffs, at the time of filing
said bill, was, and still is, a corporation
duly established and existing under and
by virtue of the laws oi the state of Mas-
sachusetts. and a citizen of said state of
Massachusetts, and at the time of filing
said bill was not, and still is not. a corpo-
ration established and existing by the
laws of the state oi New Hampshire, and
a citizen of said state of New Hampshire.
All of which matters and things these de-
fendants do aver to be true,and are ready
to verify. Wherefore they plead the same
to the whole oi said amended bill, and
pray the judgment of this honorablecourt
whether they should be compelled to make
any other or further answer to said bill. "
This plea. was argued upon an agreement
as to the facts. This plea was overruled,
the court stating in its opinion that it
seemed “that the defendant corporation
might go into New Hampshire,and there
sue the plaintiff as a New Hampshire cor-
poration, in the federal court. although it
could not bring such suit in the district of
Massachusetts against the New Hamp-
shire corporation. becausc no service upon
the New Hampshire corporation as such
could be got in this district,ii for no other
reason;“ and adding that “ii the defend-
ant could sue the plaintiff in the federal
court for New Hampshire. notwithstand-
ing the iact of the plaintiff being chartered
under the lawsof both states. there would
seem to be no good reason why the plain-
tiff, claiming under its New Hampshire
charter, should not be allowed to sue the
defendant in the federal court for Massa-
chusetts, as it would be impossible for the
defendant in such case to deny the title of
the plaintiff as predicated upon the New
Hampshire charter. or to deprive the
plaintiff of the benefit of its New Hamp-
shire citizenship thus -acquired. ” 8 Fed.
Rep. 458. A more satisfactory answer
would, perhaps, have been that. what-
ever effect may be attributed to the legis-
lation of Massachusetts in creating a new
corporation by the same name with that
of the complainant, or in allowing aunion
of its business and property with that of
the complainant, it did not change the ex-
istence oi the complainant as a corpora-
tion oi New Hampshire, nor its character
as a citizen of that state, for the enforce-
ment of its rights of action in thenational
courts against citizens of other states. In-
deed, no other stu te could by its legisla-
tion change this character of that corpo-
ration, however great the rights and priv-
ileges bestowed upon lt. 'l‘he new corpo-
ration created by Mussachusetts, though
bearing the same name, composed of the
same stockholders, and designed to ac-
complish the same purposes, is not the
same corporation with the one in New
Hampshire. Identity oi the name, powers,
and purposes does not create an identity
of origin or existence, any more than any
other statutes alike in‘ language. passed
by different legislative bodies, can properly
be said to owe their existence to both. To
each statute, and to the corporation cre-
ated by it,there can be but one legislative
pa ternlty '
But on this point we will hereafter speak
more at large. At present it is sufficient
to say that the decision of the court over-
ruling the plea in abatement upon the
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yee.r one thousand eight hundred and 
thirty-five, are hereby constituted stock-
holders of the Ne.shoe. & Lowell Railroad 
Corporation, Incorporated by the ley:IF1la-
ture of thlscom.monwPalth In the year one 
thousand eight hundred and thirty-six; 
and the said two corporations are hereby 
united Into one corporation, by the name 
of the' Nashua & Lowell Railroad Corpo-
ration;' and all the tolls,' franchises, 
rights, powers, prlvllegel'I, and pror>erty 
granted, or to be gr1mted, acquired or to 
bP acquired, under the authority of the 
881d states, shall be heM and enjoyed by 
all the said stocKholdere In r>ropm·tion to 
their number of shares In either ur both 
of said corporutlons." There were other 
provisions, designed to enable the two 
corporations to conduct their business a• 
one corporation. The act, however, de-
clared that It should not take er:eet until 
the legislature of New Hampshire he.d 
passed ashullara.ct unltingthe ea.Id stock-
holders Into one corporation. nor until the 
acts had been accepted by the stockhold-
ers at a meeting called for that purpose. 
In .June of the s1tme year, 1838, the legis-
lature of "iew Hampshire passed an act 
authorizing thetwocorporatlons to unite, 
and provldluic In such cRBe that "all the 
toll, franchlse11, rie;hts, powers, prl vlleges, 
nnd property" of the two corporations 
should be held and enjoyed by the stock-
holders In each and both In proportion to 
their number of shares therein, and that 
all property owned, acquired. or enjoyed 
by either of the corporations should be 
. taken and accounted tn be the Joint prop-
erty of the etoclcholders of the two corpo-
rations, and that the two corporations 
should be one; the act to be In force when 
accepted by the stockholders of the corpo-
rations at a meeting called for th11t pur-
pose. It does not appear, eo far ae dis-
closed b;v" the record, except In the allega-
tions ol the defendant, that there was any 
formal acceptance or this act by the stock-
holdArs of the two corporations. but it 
would seem that the corporations acted 
upon Its supposed acceptance; for thP 
<JefendantR pleaded to the Jurisdiction of 
the court on the ground that. by the legis-
lation mentioned, the complainant was 
not a corporuton of New Hampshire, and 
consequently a citizen of that state, but 
was a corporation of Massachusetts, and 
thus a citizen of that stab~. 
In the bill as originally tiled, the Nai;ihua. 
Corporation was the only complainant. 
By a snbeequent amendment, three per-
sons. cltlzen11 of New Hampshire, stock-
holders of that corporation, were united 
ae complainants. To the bill as thus 
amended the defendants pleaded ue fol-
lows: "That this court ought not to take 
furthrr COJtnlznnce of or sustain the said 
bill of complaint, because they say that 
they. the said defendants, at the time of 
filing said bill, werP., and still are, all, 
each. nnd every one, citizens ol the state 
of 1'htf!Httchmwttll. and that sa.lrl plaintiffs, 
at the time of filing said hill, were not, 
nnrl Htill are not, all, each, and every one, 
citizens ol another state, but that the said 
Nashua & Lowell Hullrond Corporation, 
one of i;iald plaintiffs, at the time of filing 
111dd bill, was, and still is, a corporution 
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duly established and existing under and 
by virtue of the Jaws of the state of Mas-
sachusetts, e.nd a citizen of Hald state of 
Ma1umchusetts, and at the time of filing 
Raid bill WM not, and still Is not, a corpo-
ra tlon established and existing bv the 
le.we of the state of New Ham11~hlre, and 
a citizen of said state of New Hampshire. 
All of which matters 11.nd things these de-
fendun U! do aver to be true, and are ready 
to Yerlfy. Wherefore th~y plf>ad the same 
to the whole of said amended blll, amt 
pray the judgment of this honorablecourt 
whethPr they 11hould be compelled to •11Rke 
any other or further an11wer to said bill." 
Thie plea was ar~ued upon an agreement 
as to the facts. This plea was overruled. 
the court stating In its opinion thnt it 
seemed "that the defendant corpora tlon 
might go Into New Hampshire, and there 
eue the plalntltt as a New Hampshire cor-
poration, In the federal court. although It 
could not bring such suit In the district of 
MassacbusettH against the New Hnmg-
ehire corporation. because no service upon 
the New Hampshire corpor11tlon as such 
could be got In this dlstrtct, If for no other 
reason; .. aud adding that "If the dpfend-
ant could sue the plu.lntlH In the federnl 
court for New Hampshire. notwlthstnud-
lng the fa.ct of the plaintiff being chartert>d 
under the laws of both eta.tee. there would 
seem to be no good reason wh,v the plain-
tiff, chl.lrnlng under Its New Hampshire 
charter, should not be allowed to sue the 
defen,lnnt In the feder11l court for MaR8a-
chnsetts, as It would be lmpoRRlble for the 
defendant In sueh ca11e to deny the title of 
the plaintiff us predkated upon the New 
HampRhlre charter. or to deprive the 
plaintiff of the benefit of Its New Hamp-
Rhlre citizenship thus ·acquired." Ii Fed. 
Rep. 458. A more satisfactory answer 
would. perhaps, have been that. whe.t-
e\'"er effect may be attributed to the legis-
lation of Ma1:1sachusetts In creating a new 
corporation by the same name with that 
of the com!Jlalnant, or In allo\\·lng a union 
of Its huslness and property with thut of 
the complalne.nt, It did not change the ex-
istence of the complainant as a corpor&-
tlon of New Hampshire, nor Its character 
ae a citizen of that 11tate, for the enforce-
ment of ltR rlghtfl of action In the national 
conrts agalm1t citizens of other states. In-
deed, no other etute could by Its legisla-
tion change thl11 character of that corpo-
ration, however great the rights and priv-
ileges bestowed upon lt. 1'he new corpo-
ra tlon created by Mussacllut1E'tts, though 
bearing the 1:1ame name. composed of the 
same stockboltlers, and designed to ac-
com11llt1h the 11ame purposes, le not the 
same corporation with the one In New 
Hampshire. Identity of the name, powers, 
and purpoeeH does not create an Identity 
of origin or existence, auy more than any 
other Rtatutee alike In• lang-uugp. passed 
by dlfferen t leglsln ti ve bod !es, cu n properly 
he Sllld to owe their existence to both. To 
each statute, and to the l'Orporatlou cre--
ated by it, there can be but one Jegitilati'"e 
paternity · 
But on this point we will herraftrr Rpeak 
more at large. At present it is sufficient 
to say that the dccli;lon of the court over-
ruling tbe plea ln abatement upon the 
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facts agreed upon disposed of thcquestion
of jurisdiction in the court below. It is
true the defendants, in their answers, sub-
sequently filed, also made the same objec-
tion. Formerly the objection to the juris-
diction, from a denial of the com plainaut‘s
averment of citizenship, could only be
raised by a plea in abatement or by de-
murrer, and not by answer. De Sobry v.
Nicholson, 3 Wall. 420, 423; Sheppard v.
Graves, 14 How. 504, 509; Wickliffe v. Ow-
ings, 17 How. 47. This rule is modified by
the act of March 3, 1875, determining the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the
United States. 18 St. p. 472, § 5. That
statute provides that if, in any suit com-
menced in one of such courts, “it shall ap-
pear to the satisfaction of said circuit
court, at any time after such suit has been
brought or removed thereto, that such
suit does not really and substantially in-
volve a dispute or controversy properly
within the jurisdiction of said circuit court.
or that the parties to said suit have been
improperly or collusively made or joined,
either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the
purpose of creatinga case cognizable or re-
movable under this act, the said circuit
court shall proceed no further therein, but
shall dismiss the suit, or remand it to the
court from which it was removed, as jus-
tice may require, and shall make such or-
der as to costs as shall be just. " By this
statute the time at which such objec-
tion may be raised is not thus restricted.
but may be taken at any time after suit
brought in thecases mentioned. The prin-
cipal object of the statute was to relieve
the national courts from the necessity of
passing upon cases where it was plain
that no question was involved within
their jurisdiction, and thus free them from
a consideration of controversies of a friv-
olous and questionable character, and to
prevent fraudulent and collusive attempts
to invoke the jurisdiction of those courts,
as had frequently been the practice, by col-
orable transfers of property or choses in
action from a citizen of one state to a citi-
zen of another, to enable the latter to go
into those courts; the original owner still
retaining an interest in the property or
choses in action transferred, or taking a
contract fora retransfer of the same to
himself after the termination of the litiga-
tion. ln such cases it is undoubtedly the
duty of the court below, of its own mo-
tion. to deny its jurisdiction, and of this
court, on appeal or writ of error, to see
that that jurisdiction has in no respect
been thus imposed upon. Morris v. Gil-
mer, 129 U. S. 315, 326, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289;
Farmington v. Piiishury,]1-4 U. S. 13:4, 143,
5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 807. If the question of
jurisdiction could be raised in the answers
of the defendants after the decision upon
the issue on the plea in abatement, not-
withstanding the decisions cited and the
thirty-ninth equity rule of this court,
the result in this case,though not perhaps
in all cases. would be the same. Replica-
tions were duly flied to the answers, the
effect of which was to deny the allega-
tions respecting the acceptance of the acts
having for their object the union of the
two corporations, and those allegations
were entirely unsupported by the evidence
or by anything in the record; and neither
in the final decree of the court. nor in its
opinion, was any allusion made to the
subject. The only evidence bearing upon
the question is found in thelegislation of the
two states, New Hampshire and Massachu-
setts; and itis plain, as already stated, that
no legislation of Massachusetts could pos-
sibly affect the existence of the complain-
ant as a corporation of New Hampshire,
or its character as a citizen of that state.
The act of New Hampshire of 1838, while
in terms authorizing the two corporations
to unite, did not confer any new franchise
or right upon either of them. All that it
did was to permit the funding or conver-
sion of the separateinterests of each stock-
holder in each corporation into a common
or joint or undivided interest in both, and
to declare that, after the two corpora tions
were united, all property owned by either
should be considered the joint property of
the stockholders of both. There is nothing
in these provisions looking to any aban-
donment of its corporate character as a
creation of New Hampshire, or its citizen-
ship of that state.
There are many decisions, both of the
federal and state courts, which establish
the rule that, however closely two corpo-
rations of different states may unite their
interests, and though even the stockhold-
ers of the one may become the stockhold~
ers of the other, and their business be con-
ducted by the same directors, the separate
identity of each as a corporation of the
state by which it was created, and as a
citizen‘ of that state. is not thereby lost.
In Farnum v. Canal Corp., 1 Sum. 46,1 we
have an instance of this kind. It there ap-
peared that iu January, 1823, the legisla-
ture of Massachusetts created a corpora-
tion hy the name of t-he Blackstone Canal
Company for the purpose of constructing
a certain canal in that state. It also ap-
peared that in June of that year the legis-
lature of Rbode Island incorporated a
company by the same name,—the Black-
stone Canal Company,—and authorized it
to construct a certain canal within the
limits of that state. In May.]827, the leg-
islature of Rhode Island declared that the
stockholders of the Massachusetts compa-
ny should be stockholders in the Rhode
island company, as if they had originally
subscribed thereto, if both corporations
should agree thereto, and that the books
and proceedings of the original and asso-
ciated stockholders should be deemed the
books Oi both; and the court held that,
though the two corporations were created
in adjacent states by the same name, to
construct a canal in each of the states, re-
spectively, and afterwards, by subsequent
acts,.were permitted to unite thelrinter-
ests, their separate corporate existence
was not merged, and that the legislature
only created a unity of stock and interest.
in giving its decision the court, by Mr.
Justice Sronv, said: “Although, in virtue
of these several acts, the corporations
[one of Rhode island, and one of Massa-
chusetts] acquired a unity of interests, it
by no means follows that they ceased to
1 Fed. Gas. No. 4,675.
277
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
08
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL [Cue No. 9& 
facts agreed upon dtspuee<l of thcqueetton 
of jurisdiction In the court below. It le 
true the defendants, In their answers, tcub-
sequently filed, also made the same objec-
tion. Formerly the objection to the jurle-
dktion, from a denial of the complainant's 
aYerment of citizenship, could only be 
raised by a phia. In abatement or by de-
murrer, and not by answer. De Sobry v. 
Nichoh1on, 3 Wall. 420, 423; Rheppard v. 
Graves, 14 How. 504, 509; Wickliffe v. Ow-
in&'R, 17 How. 47. ThlH rule ts modified IJy 
the act of March 8, 1875, determining the 
Jurisdiction of the circuit C'ourts of the 
Gnlted States. 18 St. p. 472, § 5. That 
statute provlrles that if, In any suit com-
menced In one of such t~ourtH, "It shall aP-
pear to the satisfaction of said circuit 
court, at any time after such suit has been 
brou~ht or removed thereto, that such 
suit does not really a11d sub11tantlally In-
volve a dispute or contron•r1:1y properly 
within the jurtslllctlon of said circuit court, 
or that the parties to said suit have been 
Improperly or colluslvely made or jolJJed, 
either as plaintiffs or defeullants, for the 
purpoRe of creating a. case cognlzableorre-
mo\•able under this a.ct, the so.Id circuit 
court shall proceed no further therein, but 
shall dllnnlss the suit, or remand It to the 
court from which It was removed, as ju11-
tlce mav require, and shall make such or-
der u to costs as shall be Just." By this 
statute the time at which s11:ch objec-
tion may be raised Is not thus restricted, 
but may be taken at any time after sutt 
brought In the cases mentioned. The prin-
cipal objt!Ct of the 11tat11te was to relieve 
the national courts from the necessity of 
pasRlng upon cases where it was plain 
that no •1uestlon WM involved within 
their Jurisdiction, and thus free them from 
a consideration of contro\'el'llles of a friv-
olous and questionable character, and to 
prevent fraudulent and collusive attempts 
to Invoke the Jurisdiction of those courts, 
u had frequently been the practke, bycol-
orallle trani;fers of property or choses In 
action from a cltb;en of one state to a citi-
zen or another, to enable the latter to tzo 
Into those courts; the original owner still 
retaining an Interest In the property or 
cho- In action transferred, or taking a 
contract for a retransfer of the samt- to 
himself after the termination of the litiga-
tion. In such cases It Is undoubtedly the 
dut.y of the court below, of ltH own mo-
tion, to deny Its jurisdiction, and or tbls 
court, on appenl or writ of error, to Sl'e 
that that jurisdiction has In no resp<•ct 
been thus lmpoRcd upon. Morris v. Gil-
mer, 129 U.S. 315, 326, D Sup. Ct. Uep. 2811; 
Farmington v. Pllb1hury, 114 U. 8 . 131-l, 143, 
5 Sup. <.:t. Rep. 807. If the question of jurisdiction ~ould be raised In thP ant1we1'8 
of the defendants after the cleclRiun upon 
the ls1rne on the plea In abatnnent, not-
withstanding the decisions cltrd and the 
thirty-ninth equity rule of this court, 
the reHult In thl11 cnse, though not perhnf)l:I 
In all cases. would be the 1mme. Replica-
tions were duly tiled to the anRwers, the 
enect of which was to deny the allega. 
tions respecting the acceptance of the acts 
having for their object the union of the 
two l'orporatlons, a.nil those allegations 
were entirely unsupported hy the evidence 
or by anything In the record; and neither 
in the final decrCP or the court, nor In its 
opinion, was any allusion made to the 
subject. The only evidence bearing upon 
the question Is found In the ley;lsla tton of the 
two states, New Hampshire and Ma88achu-
setts; and ltls plain, as already stated, that 
no legl11latlon of Massachusetts could pos-
sibly affect the existence of the complain-
ant as a corporation of New Hampshire, 
or its <'liaracter aR a citizen of that state, 
The act of New Hampshire of 1888, while 
In terms authorizing the twocorporatlon11 
to unite, did not confer any new franchise 
or right upon either of them. All that It 
!lid was to permit the funding or conver-
sion of the separate interests of each stock-
holder lneach corporation Into a common 
or joint or undivided Interest In both, and 
to declare that, after the two corporations 
were united, all property owned by either 
should be considered the Joint property of 
the stockholders or both. There is nothing 
In the1:1e provisions looking to any aban-
donment of Its corporate chnrnetur as a 
creation of New Hampshire, or its citizen-
ship or that Htate. 
'!'here are mnny decisions, both of the 
federal and state courts, which establlHh 
the rule that, howe\·er closely two corpo-
rations of different states may unite their 
interests, and thon11:h even the stockhold-
erR of the one may become the Rtockhold . 
ere of the other, and their business be con-
ducted by the same directors, the Reparate 
Iden tlty of each as a corporation of the · 
state by which It was created, and as a 
citizen· nf t)lat state. ls not the....,t-y hJst. 
Jn Farnum v. Canal Corp., 1 ~um. 46,1 we 
l1ave an Instance of this kind. It there ap-
peared that In January, 1823, the leg1sla· 
ture of Mal!llachusette created a corpora-
tion by the name of the Blackstone Canal 
Company for the purpose of constructing 
a certain <'anal In that Rtate. It also ap-
pearert that In June of that year the legis-
lature of Rhode Island Incorporated a 
company by the same name,-tbe Black-
stone Canal Company,-and authorized It 
to construct a certain canal within the 
limits of tba t state. In May .1827, the Jeg-
bdature of Rhode IRiand declared that the 
Htockholder& of the MnRsachusctts compa-
ny should be Rtockholders In the Uhode 
Island company, as If they bad originally 
snbHcrlbed thereto, If both corporations 
should agree thereto, and that the books 
and procet-dlngH of the original and asso-
ciated stockholders should be deemed the 
books or both; and the court held that, 
though the two corporations were created 
in adjacent HtateR by the same name, to 
construct a canal In each of the stutes, re-
spectlvPly, and afterwards, by subsequent 
uct~. :were permitted to unite their inter-
ests, tbf'!r separate corporate existence 
was not merged, anll thnt the leJ,:"lslature 
only C't'l•ntl•d a unity of stock and intereflt. 
Jn giving ltR decision the court, by Mr. 
Justice S1·m1v, 1mld: "Although, In virtue 
of theHe Heverul 11cts, the corporations 
[one of Rhode lHland, and one of l\1asst1-
chusett1:1] uc4uirl'tl a unity of Interests, It 
by no m~ans follows that they ceased tu 
1 Fed. Cas. No. 4,675. 
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exist as distinct and different corpora-
tions. Their powers, their rights. their
privileges. their duties. remained distinct
and several, as before, according to their
respective acts of incorporation. Neither
could exercise the rights, powers. or privi-
leges conferred on the other. There was
no corporate identity. Neither was
merged in the other. If it were otherwise,
which became merged? '1‘heacts of incor-
poration create no merger, and neither is
poin ted out as survivor or successor. We
must treat the case, then, as one oi dis-
tinct corporations acting within the
sphere of their respective charters for pur-
poses of common interest, and not as a
case where all the powers of both were
concentrated in one. The union was of
interests and stocks, and not a surrender
of personal identity or corporate existence
by either corporation." In Muller v.
Dows. 94 U. S. 4-I-i,the bill averred that. of
the three complainants, two were citizens
and residents of the state of New York,
and one a citizen and resident of the state
of Missouri. The two original defendants
were corporations, namely, the Chicago 8:
Southwestern Railway Company. and the
Chicago. Rock Island & Pacific Railroad
Company; and they were alleged to be
citizens of the state of Iowa. It was con-
tended that the Chicago & Southwestern
Railway Company could not claim to be a
corporation created by the laws of Iowa,
because it was formed by a consolidation
of the Iowa company with another of the
same name chartered by the laws of Mis-
souri ; the consolidation having been al-
lowed by the statutes of each state.
Hence it was argued that the corporation
was created by the laws of Iowa and of
Missouri; and. as one of the plaintiffs was
a citizen of Missouri,it was urged that the
circuit court had no jurisdiction. But
the court replied, speaking by Mr. Justice
STRONG! “ We cannot assent to this infer-
ence. It is true the provisions of the stat-
utes of Iowa respecting railroad consoli-
dation oi roads within the state with oth-
ers outside of the state, were that any
railroad company organized under the
laws of the state, or that might thus be
orga.nized.shouid have power to intersect,
loin. and unite their railroads constructed
or to be constructed in the state, or in any
adjoining state, at such point on the state
line, or at any other poin t, as might be mut-
ually agreed upon by said companies. and
such railroads were authorized ‘to merge
and consolidate the stock of the respective
companies. making one joint-stock com-
pany of the railroads thus connected.’
The Missouri statutes contained similar
provisions, and with these laws in iorce
the consolidation of the Chicago and
Southwestern Railways was effected. ‘ The
two companies became one, but in the
state of Iowa that one was an Iowa cor-
poration. existing under the laws of that
state alone. The laws of Missouri had no
operation in Iowa." 'l‘he case oi St. Louis,
A. & '1‘. H.R.Co. v. Indianapolis 8:. St. L. R.
Co., which was before the circuit court of
the United States for the district oi’ indi-
ana, and is reported in 9 Biss. 144,9 and
2 Fed. C-as. No. 12,237.
which came béfore this court under the
title oi Pennsylvania R. Co. v.St.Louis,A.
& T. I-i. R. Co., and is reported in I18 U. S.
290. 6 Sup. (‘t. Rep. I094,bears a. strong re-
semblance to the one now before the court.
In the bill the plaintitf was alleged to be a.
corporation created under the laws of Illi-
nois, and the defendants were alleged to
be corporations created under the laws
oi Indiana and of Pennsylvania. To the
bill a plea was interposed in which it was
alleged that. under various acts of the leg-
islatures of Illinois and Indiana, two cor-
porations were created,—one the plaintiff,
the St. Louis. Alton & Terre Haute Rail-
road Company, and the other the same
company in name in Indiana; that they
had been consolidated by those states,
and were so inseparably connected to-
gether that the plaintiff was really a cor-
poration as well of Indiana asof Illinois;
and that. as some of the defendants were
corporations of the state of Indiana. the
court could not take jurisdiction of the
case. But the court held that the fact
that the two corporations created by dif-
ferent states had been consolidated under
the laws of those states. and that the rail-
road was operated by virtue of that con-
solidation us one entire line of road. did
not prevent one oi those corporations
from bringing suit in the federal court, as
a corporation of the state where it was
created. against the corporation with
which it was consolidated, which was cre-
ated by the other state. Said the court,
speaking by J udge DRUMMONDZ “If the de-
fendant corporation. though consolidated
with another of a different state. can be
sued in the federal court in the state of its
creation, as a citizen thereof, (referring to
the cases of Railway Co. v. Whitton. 13
Wall. 270, and Muller v.Dows,94 U. S. 4-14.)
why can it not sue as a citizen of the state
which created it‘! I can see no difference
in principle. It seems to me that when
the plaintiff comes into the federal court,
if a corporation of another state, it is
clothed with all the attributes of citizen-
ship which the laws of that state confer,
and the shareholders of that corporation
must be conclusively regarded as citizens
of the state which created thecorporation,
precisely the same as if it were a defend-
ant. So I do not see why, if the plaintiff
in this case alleges, as ii: does, that it is a.
corporation created by the laws of Illi-
nois, it cannot institute a suit in the cir-
cuit court of the United States of Indiana.
against a corporation of that state. "
The case turned upon the point whether
the plaintiff corporation of Illinois had
become also an Indiana corporation. so
as to lose its existence or identity and
citizenship as an Illinois corporation. ‘The
court held in the negative, that it still re-
mained an Illinois corporation, with all
its rights of action as such in the United
States courts. When the case came to
this court the decision of the court below
was affirmed, but it would seem that
when it was considered here the plea to
the jurisdiction filed in the court below
had been withdrawn. The question of ju-
risdiction was, however, examined by the
court of its own motion. “It does not
seem, ” said the court, “to admit of ques-
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exiRt aR distinct anll dtrfPrent corpora-
tions. ThPlr powers, their rlghtR, their 
pri \'llegeR, their dutlPs, remained distinct 
and several, as before, according to their 
rPRpectlve acts of lnrorporatlon. Neither 
could exerch1e the rlght11, powers. or privi-
leges conferred on the other. There was 
no corporate identity. Neither WllB 
merg-etl In the other. If It were otherwise, 
which be<:ame merged? 'l'heacts of Incor-
poration create no merger, and neither Is 
pointed out as survivor or succes110r. We 
must treat the case, then, as one of dis-
tinct corporatlon11 acting within the 
sphere of their respective charters for pur-
poses of common Interest, and not as a. 
ca11e where all the powers of both were 
- concentrated in one. The union was of 
Interests and stocks, and not a l!urrender 
of personal Identity or corporate existence 
hy either corporation. " In Muller v. 
Dows, 94 U.S. 444, the blll averred that, of 
the three complalmmts, two were citizens 
and resldentR of the state of New York, 
and one a citizen and resident of the state 
of .Misf!oorl. The two original dPfendants 
were corporations, namely, the Chicago & 
Southwestern Railway Company, and the 
Chlcairo, Rock l11land &: Pacific Railroad 
Company: and they were alleged to be 
citizens of the state of Iowa. It was con-
tended that the Chicago & Southwestern 
Railway Company could not claim to be a 
corporation created by the laws of Iowa, 
because It was formed by a consoli<latlon 
of the Iowa company with another of the 
same name chartered by the laws of Mlt1-
sourl; the consolidation having been al-
lowed by the statutes of each state. 
Hence It "·as ari.rued tba t the corpora tlon 
was rreated by the laws of Iowa and of 
Mls1muri; and. as one of theplalntlffR was 
a citizen of Missouri, It waR urged that the 
circuit court had no jurisdiction. But 
the court replied, apeaklng by Mr. Justlre 
8TRO:SG: "We cannot assent to this infer-
ence. It Is true the provisions of the stat-
u t~ of Iowa. resptoetlng railroad consoll-
da tlon of roads within the state with oth-
ers outJ!lde of the state, were that any 
railroad company organized under the 
laws of the state, or that might thus be 
organized, should have powerto Intersect, 
join , and unite their railroads constructed 
or to be conRtructed In the state, or in any 
adjoining state, u. t such point on the st& te 
line, or at any otherpolut, as might he mut-
ually agreed upon by said companleR. and 
such railroads were authorized 'to merge 
and consolidate the stock of the respective 
companies, making one joint-stock com-
pany of the railroads thus connected.' 
The Missouri statutes contained similar 
provisions, and with these laws In force 
the consolidation of the Chicago and 
8outhwestern Railways was effe<>ted. The 
two companies became one, but In the 
state of Iowa that one was an Iowa cor-
pol'ntlon, existing under thA laws of that 
statP alone. The laws of l\Ilssvm·l bad no 
operution In Iowa." 1'be case of St. Louis, 
A. & 'J' . H. R. Co. v. Indianapolis & 8t. L. R. 
Co., which waR before the circuit court of 
the TJnited Sta tcH for the di~trict of Tndl-
ana, Hnd Is reported In D Biss. 144,~ and 
2 Fed. Cns. No. 12,237. 
:.ms 
which came before this court under the 
tltle of Pennsylvania R. C'o. v. St. Lou!R, A. 
& T. H. R. Co .• and ls reported In 11S LT. S. 
290, 6 8up. ('t. Rep. 10&4, bears a strong re-
sembl1:1m·eto the one now before the court. 
In the bill the plaintiff was alleged to be a 
corporation creutecl under the laws of Illi-
nois, and the defendants were alleged to 
be corporations created under the laws 
of Indiana. and of Pennsylvania. To the 
blll a plea was Interposed In which It wa.e 
alleged that. uuder various acts of the leg-
islatures of Illinois and Indiana, two cor-
porations wPre created,-one the plaintiff, 
the St. Louis, Alton lie Terre Haute Rail-
road C'om1Jany, and the other the same 
company In name In Indiana; that they 
had been consolidated by those states, 
and were so Inseparably connected to-
~ether that the plalntln was really a cor-
poration as wull of Indiana as of Illinol11; 
a.nd that, as some of the defendants were 
corporations of the state of Indiana. tbe 
court could not take jurisdiction of the 
case. But the court held that the fact 
that the two corporations created by dif-
ferent states bad been consolidated under 
the laws of those states, 111111 that the rail-
road wae operated by virtue of that con-
solidation as one entire line of road. did 
not prevPnt one of those corporatlon11 
from bringing suit In the federal court, as 
a corporation of the state where it wa.e 
created. against the corporation with 
which It was consolidated, which was cre-
ated by the other state. Said the court, 
speaking by J odJ[fl DRUMMOND: .. If the dt>-
fendant corporation, though consollda ted 
with another of a different state, can be 
sued in the federal court in the state of its 
creation, as a citizen thereof, (referring to 
the cases of Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 
Wall.270, and Muller v.Dows,94 U.S. 444,) 
why can It not sue as a citizen of the state 
which created lt 0! I can see no difference 
in principle. It seems to me that when 
the plaintiff comes into the federal court, 
If a corporation of another state, It ls 
clothed with all the attributes of citizen-
ship which the laws of that state confer. 
and the shareholders of that corpor11tlon 
muRt be conclusively regarded as clth:Pne 
of the state whlrhcreated thecorporation, 
precisely the same as If It were a defend-
ant. So I do not see why, If the plaintiff 
In this case alleges, as H does, that it Is a 
corporation created by the laws of llli-
nols, It cannot Institute a suit in the cir-
cuit court of the United Sttttes of Indian& 
a~alnst a corporation of that state." 
'l'he case turned upon the point whether 
the plaintiH corporation of llllnols had 
become also an Indiana corporation, so 
al! to lose Its existPnce or Identity and 
citizenship as an Illinois corporation. 'l'he 
court heill In the negative, that It stlll re-
mained an Illlnols corporation, with ttll 
Its rights of action as such In the United 
8tates courts. When the case came to 
this court the decision of the court IJPlow 
was affirmed, but It would seem that 
when It was considered here the plea to 
the jurl11dlction filed In the court 1.Jelow 
had been withdrawn. Tl1e question of ju-
risdiction was, however, examined by the 
rourt of Its own motion. " It does not 
seem, " said the court, ··to admit of quee-
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tion that a corporation of one state, own-
ing property and doing business in an-
other state by permission of the latter,
does not thereby become a citizen of this
state also; and so a corporation of illi-
nois, authorized by its laws to build a
railroad across the state from the Missis-
sippi river to its eastern boundary, may,
by the permission of the state of Indiana,
extend its road a few miles within the lim-
its of the latter, or indeed through the en-
tire state, and may use and operate the
line as one road by the permission of the
state, without thereby becoming a cor-
poration or a citizen of the state of Indi-
ana. Nor does it seem to us that an act
of the legislature conferring upon this cor-
poration of Illinois, by its Illinois corpo-
rate name,such powers to enable it to use
and control that part of the road within
the state of Indiana as have been conferred
on it by the state which created it, consti-
tutes it a corporation of Indiana.” And
again: “In a case where the corporation
already exists,even if adopted by the law
of another state, and invested with full
corporate powers, it does not thereby be-
come such new corporation of another
state until it does some act which signifies
its acceptance of this legislation, and its
purpose to be governed by it. We think
what has occurred bet-ween the state of
Indiana and this Illinois corporation falls
short of this.”
Many cases might be cited from thestate
courts illustrative and confirmatory of the
doctrine of this case. In Racine & M. R.
('0. v. Farmers’ Loan & 'I‘rust (‘-o., 49 Ill.
331, it appeared that in April, 1852, the leg-
islature of Wisconsin incorporated the
Racine, J anesville & Mississippi Railroad
Company. and that the legislature of Illi-
nois, in Febru:1r,\', 1853, incorporated the
Rockton & Freeport Railroad Company,-
hoth companies authorized to construct
-railways: that in February, 1854, these
two companies entered into an agreement
,t-o fully merge and consolidate their capi-
tal stock, powers, privileges, immunities,
and franchises. In February, 1855, both
the legislature of Illinois and the legisla-
ture of Wisconsinchanged the name of the
two companies to that oi the Racine &
Mississippi Railroad Company. It also
appeared that in 1851 the Savannah Bra uch
iiailroad Company was organized under
the general railroad law of Illinois, and
that in January, 1856, this company en-
tered into articles oi‘ agreement with the
Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company
by which its stock was consolidated with
that of the latterr-ompany; that a major-
ity in interest of the stockholders of the
Savannah Company ratified the articles;
and that in 1857 the legislature of Illinois
changed the name of that company to the
Racine& Mississippi Railroad Company.
Thus the names of three railroad com-
panies. creuted by three different states,
were changed to the same name, and were
allowed to be consolidated together and
act as one company. The supreme court
of Illinois held that this consolidation did
not convert them into one company in
fact. Said the court: “Our view of the
effect of the consolidation contract be-
tween the Rockton Company [oi Illinois]
and the Wisconsin company, which we
hold to have been legally made, is briefly
this: While it created a community of
stock and of interest between the two
companies, it did not convert them into
one company in the same way and to the
same degree that mightfollow aconsolida-
tion of two companies within the same
state. Neither Illinois nor Wisconsin, in
authorizing the consolidation, can have in-
tended to abandon all jurisdiction over its
own corporation created by itself. In-
deed, neither state could take jurisdiction
over the property or proceedings of the
corporation beyond its own limits; and,
as is said by the court in Railroad Co. v.
Wheeler, 1 Black, 297, a corporation ‘can
have no existence beyond the limits oi the
state or sovereignty which brings it into
life, and endows it with its faculties and
powers.”’ In Bridge Co. v. Adams Co.,
88 Ill. 619, the plaintiff was a consoli-
dated corporation, so called, created by
the laws of Illinois and Missouri for
bridging the Mississippi river between
those states. Tl.e plaintiff, a bridge com-
pany, to avoid taxation in Illinois,cla.imed
to be a corporation of both states, and
not of either alone. The court in its opin-
ion said: “It is said by appellants. this
corporation, although it derived some of
its powers, and in part its corporate ex-
istence, from this state, [Illinois,] derived
an equal part from the sovereign state of
Missouri, and therefore they are not a cor-
poration created under the laws of either
state. To this it is answered, and we
think satisfactorily, that the legislatures
of this state and of Missouri cannot act
jointly, nor can any legislation of the last-
named state have the least effect in creat-
ing a corporation in this state. Hence
the corporate existence of appellants, con-
sidered as a. corporation of this state,
must spring from the legislation of the
state which by its own vigor performs the
act. The states of Illinois and Missouri
have no power to unite in passing any
legislative act. It is impossible, in the
very nature of their organizations, that
they can do so. They cannot so fusethem-
selves into a single sovereignty, and as
such create a body politic which shall be
a corporation of the two states without
beinga corporation of each state or of
either state." In Railroad Co. v. Auditor
General, 53 Mich. 91, 18 N. W. Rep. 586, it
appeared that the general railroad law of
Michigan made roads that lie partly with-
in and partly without the state taxable
on so much of their gross receipts as cor-
responded to the ratio oi theirlocalto their
entire length. A local company was con-
solidated with a foreign one that controlled
a number of other consolidated roads,
and several leased lines besides: and in
considering the effect of the consolidation
the court. said, speaking by Chief Justice
Coou-:Y: “It is familiar law that each
corporation has its existence and domi-
cile, so far as the term can be applica-
ble to the artificial person, wi°.hin the
territory of the sovereign creating it.
' * * It comesinto existence there by an
exercise of sovereignty will; and, though
it may be allowed to exercise corporate
functions within another sovereignty, it
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tlon that a corporation of one state, own-
ing property and doing busluesR In an-
other state by permission of the latter, 
does not thereby become a citli:en of this 
state nlso; aud so ft corporfttlon of Illi-
nois, authorizel.I by its laws to build a. 
railroad across the state from the Missis-
sippi river to its eastern boundary, may, 
by the permission of the state of Indiana, 
extend Its road a few miles within the llm-
11:8 of the latter, or Indeed through the en-
tire state, and may use and operate the 
line aR one road by the permission of the 
state, without thereby becoming a cor-
poration or a citizen of the state of Indi-
ana. Nor doeR it seem to us that an act 
of the legislature conferring upon this cor-
poration of Illinois, by its Illinois corpo-
rate name, such powers to enable It to use 
and control thu.t pa1·t of the roftd within 
the state of Indiana as have been ~oolerred 
on it l)y the state which created It, consti-
tutes it a corporation of I111.liana." And 
again: "In a case where the corporation 
already exlsts,evl'n If adopted by the law 
of another state, and invested with full 
corporate powers, It doe8 not thereby be-
come such new corporation of another 
state nntll it does some act which signifies 
its acceptance of this legislation, and Its 
purpose to be gonirned hy It. We think 
what bas occurred between the state of 
lndlftna and this Illinois corporation falls 
short of this." 
Many cases might be cited from the state 
courts lllnRtrativeand confirmatoryof the 
doctrine of tbis case. In Racine & M. R. 
Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 49 Ill. 
331, It appearecl that in April, 1852, the leg-
islature of Wl11eonsln Incorporated the 
Racine, Janesville & Mississippi Rallroacl 
Company, and that the legislature of 1111-
nols, In February, 1S53, Incorporated the 
Rockton & Freeport Railroad Company,-
hoth companies authorized to construct 
-railways: that In February, 1854, thet:tA 
two companies entered into an agreement 
to fully merge and consolidate their capi-
tal stock, powers, privileges, Immunities, 
and franchisee. In February, ll:i55, both 
the lelllelature of llllnols and the le11:lsla-
ture of Wisconsin changed the name of the 
two companlPB to that of the Racine & 
Missl881ppl Railroad Company. It also 
appeare<l that In 1851 the Savannah Branch 
Railroad Company was organized under 
the general rt\llroad Jaw of llllnols, and 
that in January, 1856, this com1mny en-
tered Into articles of agreement with the 
Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company 
by which its stock was consolidated with 
that of the latterrompany; that a. major-
ity in interest of the stockhohlers of the 
Sa\•anna.h Company ratified the article£; 
and that In 1857 the legislature of Illinois 
changed the name of that company to the 
Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company. 
Thus thfl names of three railroad com-
panies. created by three different states, 
were cha.nKed to the same name, and were 
allow0(1 to be consolidated together and 
act l\S one company. The suprem11 court 
of Illinois held that thh1 consolidation did 
not convert them Into one company in 
fact. Said the court: "Our view of the 
effect of the consolidation contr11ct be-
tween the Rockton Company [of lllinols] 
and the Wisconsin company, which we 
hold to have been legally made, Is hrlefty 
this: While it created a community of 
stock and of Interest between the two 
companies, It did not com·ert them Into 
one company in the same wa~ and to the 
same degree that mlghtfollow a consolida-
tion of two companies within the 1mme 
state. Neither Illinois nor WisconRin, in 
authorizlngtheconsolldatlon,ca.n have in-
tended to abandon all jurisdiction over its 
own corpOl'atlon created by itself. In-
deed, neither state could take Jurisdiction 
over the property or proceedln11:e of the 
corporation beyond Its own Umite; and, 
as is said uy the court In Railroad Co. v. 
Wheeler, 1 Black, 29i, a corporation 'can 
have no existence beyond the limits of the 
state or sovereignty which btinge it into 
life, and endows it with its faculties and 
powers.'" In Bridge Co. v. Adame Co., 
88 Ill. 619, thA plalntlft waR 11 cousoll-
da.tefl corporation, so called, created by 
the laws of Illlnoi11 and Missouri for 
bridging the l\fisslSBlppl river between 
those states. Tl.e plaintiff, a bridge com-
pany, to a void taxation In Illinois, claimed 
to be a corporation of both states, and 
not of either alone. The court In its opin-
ion said: "It is ea.Id by appellants. this 
corporation, althouJrh It derived some of 
its powers, and In p1ut Its corporate ex-
istence, from this state, [Illlnols,] derh·ed 
a.n equal part from the so\·ereign Htate of 
Mls1murl, and the1·efore they a.re not a cor-
poration created under the laws of either 
state. To this It Is answered, aml we 
think satisfactorily, that the legislatures 
of this state and of MlsRourl cannot act 
Jointly, nor can any legislation of. the last-
named state have the least effect m creat-
ing a corporation In this state. Hence 
the corporate existence of appellants, con-
sidered as a corporation of thi11 state, 
must spring from the leglsla.tlon of the 
state which by Its own vigor performs the 
a.ct. The states of Illinois and Missouri 
have no power to unite in passing any 
legh1h1th·e act. lt le lmpoSBlble, In the 
very nnture of their organizations. that 
they can do so. They<'annot so fuse them-
selves Into a single sovereignty, and as 
such create a body politic which shall be 
a corporation of the two states without 
being a corporation of ea.ch state or of 
.elthf'r state." In Railroad Co. v. Auditor 
General, 5a Mich. !ll, 18 N. W. Rep. 0811, it 
appeared that the general railroad law of 
Michigan made roads that lie partly with-
in and partly without the state taxable 
on so much of their gross receipts as cor-
responded to the ratio of thelrlocaltothelr 
entire length. A local company was con-
solidated with a foreign onethatcontr•Jllecl 
a number of other consolidated roads, 
and s1weral leased lines besides: and in 
considering the effect of the ronsolldatlon 
the court 11ald, speaking by Chief Justice 
CooL~;y: "It is familiar law that each 
corporation haR Its existence and domi-
cile, so far as the te1·111 can be appllcu-
ble to the artificial person, w~hin the 
terl'itory of the sovereign creating it. 
• * * It eomes into existence there l.Jy an 
exercise of sovereignty will: and, though 
it may be allowed to exercise corporate 
functions within another sovereignty, It 
2i9 
Case N 0. 96]
PROOF.
is impossible to conceive of one joint act,
performed simultaneously by two sov-
reign states, which shall bring a single
corporation into being, except it be by
compact or treaty. There may be sepa-
rate consent given for the consolidation
of corporations separately created; but,
when thetwo unite, they severally bring to
the new entity the powers and privileges
already possessed, and the consolidated
company simply exercises in each jurisdic-
tion the powers the corporation there
chartered had possessed, and succeeds
there to its privileges. ”
it would seem clear, from the decisions
we have cited, as well as on general prin-
ciples, that the plaintiff in this case must
be considered simply in its character as a.
corporation created by the laws of New
Hampshire, and as such a citizen of that
state, and so en titled to go into the cir-
cuit court oi‘ the United States, and bring
its bill against a citizen of anyotherstate,
and that its union or consolidation with
another corporation of the same name,
organized under the laws of Massachu-
setts, did not extinguish or modify its char-
acter as a citizen of New Hampshire, or
give it any such additional citizenship in
Massachusetts as to defeat its right to go
into the circuit court of the United States
in that district. If the position taken by
defendants could be maintained,then they
could sue in the federal court in New
Hampshire the New Hampshire corpora-
tion, while that corporation could not en-
force its claims in the federal court of
Massachusetts against the Massachusetts
corporation. From the cases we have cit-
ed, it is evident that by the general law
railroad corporations created by two or
more states, though joined in their inter-
ests, in the operation of their roads, in
the issue oi their stock,and in the division
of their profits, so as practically to be a
single corporation, do not lose their iden-
it_v, and that each one has its existence
and its standing in the courts oi’ the coun-
try only by virtue ol the legislation oi the
state by which it is created. 'l‘he union
of name, of ofl-lcers, of business. and of
property does not change their distinctive
character as separate corporations
We turn now to a. consideration of the
claims put forth by the plaintiff for a res-
toration to it of moneys appropriated to
the use and for the benefit of the defendant
corporation. As seen by the provisions of
the joint trafiic contract given above, the
Lowell Corporation was to complete the
construction of a passenger station, with
all necessary approaches, in the city of
Boston.in 1857, at its own expense, and to
alter the passenger depot then existing
thereinto a freight depot, also at its own
expense, and the Nashua Corporation was
at its own expense to erect a freight depot
at the city of Lowell for the accommoda-
tion of the joint business: and in case of
destruction of buildings belonging to either
party, or damage to them by fire, they
were to he rebuilt or replaced by the own-
er. As observed by counsel. it would ap-
pear that, when entered into, it was not
the intent of thecontract that eitherparty
should be charged for improvements. ad-
ditions, or even restorations in the real es-
tate or terminal facilities of the other.
But, with the increase of business under
the joint management, it became evident,
if the business was to be retained, that
larger terminal facilities at Boston were
necessary; and the character and extent
of the needed improvements were the sub-
ject of frequent consideration among the
directors of the two companies. In the
mean time the construction of another
passenger station there was commenced
by the Lowell Company; and, at a meet-
ing of the directors of the Nashua Corpo-
ration on the 23d of July, 1872, it was
voted as follows: “That theexpenditures
made and to be made by the Boston &
Lowell Railroad Corporation for land and
building in Boston for a new station,
and the expenditures made and to be
made by said corporation for the building
and completing the Mystic River Railroad,
and for the improvements in Winchester
ior a new station and land for railway
purposes, to the amount of $20,000, are to
be treated in the management of the busi-
ness. under the ioint business contract ex-
isting between suid corporation and the
Nashua & Lowell Railroad Corporation,
as follows, viz.: The said Boston &Lowell.
Railroad Corporation are to be paid the
interest upon such expenditures made and
to be made at the rate of seven per cent.
per annum, at the end of each six months.
out of the receipts of the joint corpora-
tions under said contract, and which is to
be charged as a part of the expenses of
operating said railways under said con-
tract; and the cashier of said two corpo-
rations, and treasurer of the Boston &
Lowell Railroad Corporation, is hereby
directed to make up an interest account
upon such expenditures to April 1,1872,
and pay the amount found due to the
Boston & Lowell Railroad Corporation
out of theioint receipts oi said two cor-
porations.” Under the authority of this
vote, there was deducted from the net
earnings of the joint management the in-
tercst on the expenditures incurred in the
construction of the passenger station in
the city of Boston at the rate of 7per
cent.; the same being treated as operat-
ing expcnses of the road. The amount of
the net earnings thus diverted from the
Nashua Company, being 31 per cent. oi
the interest on the whole expenditure in-
curred, is alleged to have been $181,962;
and the right to thus appropriate those
earnings depends upon the sufficiency of
that authority.
. The question thus presented is not free
from difficulty. As a general rule, we
should not hesitate to say that the direct-
ors of the Nashua Company could not au-
thorize.\vithout the previous approval of
its stockholders. the construction of apas-
senger station at a city in a state foreign
to that in which it was created. and to
which its own road did not extend, or the
payment of any portion of the cost of the
contruction. Such expenditures would not
be considered as falling within the ordi-
nary scope of their powers. See Railway
Co. v. Allerton, LS Wall. 233; Davis v.
Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 258, and cases
there cited, pa1'ticularl_\' (‘olnmn v. Rail-
way Co.,10 Beav. l, and Bagshaw v. Rail-
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le Impossible to conceive of one Joint act, 
performed simultaneously by two eov-
1·<>lgn states, which shall bring a single 
corporation Into being, except It be by 
compact or treaty. There may be eepa-
ra te consent given for the consolidation 
of eorpomtlons separately created; but, 
when thetwounlte, they severally bring to 
the new entity the poweN and privileges 
alrt•ady possessed, and the consolidated 
company shnply exercises In each jurisdic-
tion the powers the corporation there 
chartered bad pos!leffsed, and succeeds 
thel'e to Its prlvtlegeR. " 
It would seem clear, from the decisions 
we have cited, as well ae on genera.I prin-
ciples, that the plalntlft In thib case must 
be consldenid simply In Its character as a. 
corporation created by the laws of New 
Hampshire, and as Ruch a citizen of that 
atate, and so entitlt"d to go Into the cir-
cuit court of the United States, and bring 
Its blll against a citizen of any otherstate, 
and that Its union or consulldntlon with 
another corporation of the same name, 
o~anlzed under the laws of MaBBachu-
eette, did not extinguish or modify Its char-
acter as a. citizen of New Hampshire, or 
give It any such additional citizenship In 
MaHRnchueetts as to defeat Its rlg:ht to go 
Into the circuit court of the United 8tates 
In that district. If the position taken by 
defendants could be maintained, then they 
could sue In the fe<leral court In New 
Hampshire the New Hampshire corpore.-
tlon, while that corporation could not en-
force ltR claims in the federal court of 
Massachusetts against the Massachusetts 
corporation. From the cases we have cit-
ed, it Is evident that by the general law 
railroad corporations created by two or 
more states, though Joined in their inter-
ests, In the operation of their roads, in 
the Issue of their stock, and In the dh-ielon 
of their profits, so as practically to be a 
single corporation, do not lose their iden-
lty, and that ea.ch one bas its existence 
and its standing In the courts of the coun-
try only by virtue or the legislation of the 
11tnte hy which It Is created. The union 
of name, of offlcers, of business, and of 
property does not change their distinctive 
chnracter as separate corporatlonR · 
\Ve turn now to a conRlderatlon of the 
claims put forth lly the J>laintlff for a res-
toration to It of moneys appropriated to 
the u11e and for the benefit of the defendant 
corporation. As seen by the provlldons of 
the Joint traffic contra.ct given above, the 
Lowell Corporation was to complete the 
construction of a passenger station, with 
all nec<'SHary apvruaches. lu the city of 
Bo11ton, In 18a7, at its own tlXpense, aml to 
alter the pnHsenger depot then existing 
therelnto a freight depot, also at its own 
es1>t'nMe, and the Nashua Cor}lorntion wal!I 
at ltH own expense to erect a freight depot 
at the city of Lowell for the accommoda-
tion of the joint lnuliness; and in ca He of 
det1tructlon of buildings belonging to either 
pnrty, or damage to them by fire, thf'y 
Wert' to be rebuilt or replaced by the own-
er. As observed by counsel, It would ap-
pear that, when ent~red Into, It was not 
the Intent of thecontrnct that either party 
8hould be ch11rgPcl for impro\'ementM, ad-
d I tlons, or even reHtora tlons In the reul es-
:!SO 
ta.te or terminal facilities of the other. 
Bnt, with the lncreaee of bnsiness under 
the Joint m1magement, It became evident, 
tf the busluettB was to be retained, that 
larger terminal factlltlf'B a.t Boston were 
necessary ; and th" character and extent 
of the needed Improvements were the sub-ject of frequent consideration among the 
directors of the two companies. In the 
mean time the construction of another 
paBBenger station there was commf'nced 
by the Lowell Company; and, at a meet-
ing of the directors of the Nashua Corpo-
ration on the 23d of July, 1872, it was 
voted as follows: "'rhat tllellxpendituree 
made and to he made by the Boston 4: 
Lowell Rullrottd Corporation for land and 
building In Boston for a new station, 
u.nd the expf'ndltures mnde 'lnd to be 
made b) Maid corporation for the building 
and comi>letlng the Mystic River Railroad, 
and for the improvements In Winrhester 
for a new station and land for railway 
purposes, to the amount or f20,000, are to 
be treated In the management of the busi-
ness, under the Joint b11slnesH contract ex-
isting between suld corporation and the 
Nashua &: Lowell Railroad Corporation, 
as follows, vis.: 1.'hesaid Boston &Lowell 
Rntlroad Corporation are to be paid the 
Interest upon such expenditures made and 
to be made at the rate of seven per ceut. 
per annum, at the end of each six months. 
out of the receipts of the joint corpora-
tions under said contract, and which Is to 
be charged as a part of the expenses of 
operating said railways under said con-
tract; and the cashier of said two corpo-
rations, and treasurer of the Boston & 
Lowell Railroad Corporation, ts hereby 
directed to make up 11.n Interest account 
upon such expenditures to April 1, 1~2. 
and pay the amonnt found due to the 
Boston & Lowell Railroad Corporation 
out of the joint receipts of said two cor-
porations. " Under the authority of this 
vote, there was deducted from the net 
earnings of the Joint management the in-
terest on the expenditures Incurred In the 
construction of the p8"8enger station In 
the city of Boston at the rate of 7 per 
cent.; the same being treR ted as operat-
ing expenses of the road. The amunnt of 
the net earnings thus diverted from the 
Nashua Company, being Bl per cent. of 
the Interest on the whole expenditure in-
cnrred, is alle,;ed to have been $181,962; 
and the right to thus appropriate those 
earnings depends upon the sufficiency 'of 
that authority. 
, The question thus presented Is not free 
from dllftculty. As a genernl rnlP, we 
should not hesitate to say that the direct-
ors of the Nashua Company could not au-
thorize, without the previous approval of 
its sto(·kholders, the construction of apas-
sen2er 11tatlon at a. city In a state foreign 
tu that In which it was created, and to 
which ltM own road did not extend. or the 
payment or any portion of the cost of tile 
contructlon. Huch ex1>endltt1reH would not 
be:: conHldered as f1dllng within the ordi-
nary sc<>pe of their powers. See Railway 
Co. v. Allerton, 18 Wall. 233; Davie v. 
Railroad Cu .. 131 l\faRs. 2:18, and eases 
there cited, parti<'ularly ('olnum v. Rail-
way Cu.,10 Bea.v. l, and BagHIUlW v. Rall-
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL.
[Case N o. 96
way Co.,7 Hare, 114. But the fact that
the increased iacilities provided at Boston
were necessary to enable thejoint manage-
ment to retain its extended business, in
which the Nashua Company was oi course
directly interested,changes the position oi
the directors oi that company with refer-
ence to such expenditures, and brings
them within the general scope of the di-
" rectors’ powers. Such is the conclusion oi
a majority of the court. and therefore the
.suit cannot be maintained for the restora-
tion to the complainant oi moneys thus
expended, which otherwise would have
gone to it as net earnings of the joint
management. But the purchase oi the
controlling interest in the stock oi the
Lowell 8: Lawrence and oi the Salem &
Lowell Railroad Companies stands upon
a diflerent footing. That we a matter
solely for the Lowell Corporation. The
purchase was never authorized by any
rote oi the directors of the Nashua Com-
pany. At the time those roads were un-
der lease to the Lowell Corporation, and
had been taken into the joint account,und
the net earnings divided between the two
corporations in the same ratio as were
the earnings of their own roads. This
gave to the Nashua Corporation all the
benefits that could possibly arise irom the
ownership by the Lowell Corporation oi a
controlling interest in their capital stock.
The additional burden oi the purchase
could in no way, therefore, be cast upon
the Nashua Corporation without the con-
sent oi its stockholders: and no such con-
sent was given either by them, nor, as al-
ready said, was any given byits directors.
The pretense ior the purchase was that
the leases were invalid, and that other
parties might otherwise obtain control of
those roads, and thus injuriously affect
the business of the joint nianagenimt.
The charter oi the complainant did not
extend to the purchase ofeontrolllng inter-
ests in the railroads of other states under
the apprehension that such roads might
become business competitors. The com-
plainant is thereiore entitled to an account-
ing by the Lowell Company ior the net
earnings of the joint management which
were appropriated towards the interest
on the sums expended in the purchase oi
the stock of those companies, and to the
payment oi the amount found due to it
upon such accountinl.':. The decree oi the
court below will he reversed, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings in
accordance. with this opinion; and it is so
ordered.
BLATCHFORD, J.. did not sit in this
case, or tuke any part in its decision.
FULLER.C.J.,and GRAY and LAMAR,
JJ=, dissent on the question of jurisdiction.
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way Co., 7 Hare, 114. But the fact that 
the Increased facutties provided at Boston 
were necesearyto enabl~ theJolntmanage-
n1ent to retain Its extended buslneBS, lo 
which the Nashua Company was of course 
directly interested, changes the position of 
the directors of that company with- refer-
ence to such expendlturul!I, and brings 
them within the general scope of the di-
. rectors' powers. Such 1111 tne conclusion of 
a majority of the court, and therefore the 
,suit cannot be maintained for the restora-
tion tu the complainant of moneys thus 
expended, which otherwh1e would have 
gone to It as net earnings of the joint 
management. But the pun·ha.se of the 
controlllng interest In the stock of the 
Lowell & Lawrence and of the Salem & 
I.uwell Railroad Companies stands upon 
a different footing. That was a matter 
solely for the Lowell Corporation. The 
purchase was never autliorlzed by any 
,·ote of the directorl!I of the Nashua Com-
pany. At the time thutte roadtt were un-
der lease to the Lowell Corporation, and 
had been taken into tbe Joint account, und 
the net earnings divided between the two 
corporations In the same ratio as were 
the earnlmrs of their own roadR. This 
gu veto the Nashna Corpora tlon all the 
IJeneftts that could po881bly arise from the 
ownerlllhip by the Lowell Corporation of a 
euntrolllng interest in their capital stock. 
The add I tlonal burden of tht1 purch1111e 
could in no way, therefore, be cast upon 
the Nashua Corporation without the con-
sent of its stockholders: and no Much con-
sent was given either by them, nor, as al-
ready said, was any given bylts directors. 
The pretense for the purchase was that 
the lea.Pee wera invalid, and that other 
parties might otherwise obtain control of 
those roatls, and thus injuriously affect 
the business of the joint managem~nt. 
The charter of the complainant did not 
exteud to the purchase ofeoutrolllng Inter-
ests in the rallroad11 of other t1tate11 under 
the apprehension that such roads might 
become buelnese competitors. The com-
plainant le therefore entitled to nn account-
ln!J by the Lowell Company for the net 
earnings of the Joint management which 
were appropriated towards the interest 
on the sums expended in the purchMe of 
the stock of those companlel!I, and to the 
11ayment or the amouut fouml due to it 
upon such accountln11:. Thf! <lPCree of the 
court below will he revenoed, and the 
cause remanded for further (lroceedlnge In 
accordencP. with thit1 opinion; am.I it i<J so 
ordered. 
BLATCHFORD, J., did not Rlt in this 
case, or tuke any part In itt1 decision. 
FULLER,C.J.,and GRAY and LAMAR, 
JJ.,diseeoton the question of Juriedic.-tlon. 
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MILLER v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS et al.
(24 N. E. 228, 123 Ind. 196.)
Supreme Court of Indiana. April 1, 1890.
Appeal from circuit court. Hendricks
county; Jonx V. HADLEY, Judge.
Action by Catherine A. Miller against
the city of Indianapolis and another.
There was judgment for defendants, and
plaintiff appeals.
Wm. Watson Woollen and Wm. E. Nib-
lack, for appellant. Wm. L. Taylor, Den-
lny & Elliott, and A. L. Mason, for appel-
ees.
COFFEY, J. A controversy arosein this
case, in the circuit court, as to whether it
was an action to quiet title, or an action
to obtain an injunction. Acting upon the
theory that it was an action to obtain an
injunction, the circuit court refused the
request of the appellant for a trial by jury.
and also overruled the application of the
appellant for anew trial as of right. The
complaint in the cause, omitting the cap-
tion and the description of theland in con-
troversy,is as follows: “Catherine A. Mil-
ler, plaintiff.-complains of the city of lu-
dianapolis, Leander A. Fulmer, and George
W. Seibert, defendants. and says that she
is the owner of the following described
real estate; ' “ " that said defend-
ants have unlawfully, wrongfully, illegal-
ly, and forcibly taken possession of the
same, and, without having condemned the
same, are threatening to do great and ir-
reparahle damage to the same, in this:
that they are threatening to cut down the
trees and vines that have been placed
thereupon and have been grown thereon
by the plaintiff, and are threatening to
plow the land and grade the same, and
arc threatening to make a street over and
upon it; and this she avers they are do-
ing without leave or license from her, and
with full notice that she is the owner
thereof, and under a claim that said real
estate is a public street in said city. She
therefore prays that, as against said de-
fendants, her title be quieted to said real
estate, and that said defendants may be
forever enjoined from further trespassing
thereon, and damaging the same. "
It is conceded by both parties, in their
briefs and in the argument of his cause.
that every pleading must proceed upon
some single definite theory, which must
be determined by its general scope and
character, and that the prayer for relief
does not determine the character of the
pleading, nor assign to it any particular
iheory. Bank v.Ro0t,107 Ind.224. 8 N. E.
Rep. 105; Houck v. Graham, 106 Ind. 195,
6 N. E. Rep. 594. This complaint is desti-
tute of some of the allegations found in
an ordinary complaint to quiet title. In-
deed, there is no pretense that any one or
all of the defendants make any claim to
the title to the land in controversy.
While it is true that cities, by their com-
mon councils. have the control of the
streets and alleys within their territorial
limitsfit cannot becorrectly said that they
own such streets and alleys. A grant or
dedication of a street is a grant or dedica-
tion to the public. and not to the city. In
the case of Conner v. New Albany, l Blackf.
45, it was said by this court: “That which
is granted to New Albany cannot be ‘pub-
lic.’ in the unqualified sense of the word;
nor can that which is granted to the pub-
lic be in any sense the exclusive property
of New Albany. A grant of a public street
of highway. through either town or coun-
try, cannot be considered otherwise than
as a grant to the public." See, also, City
of Evansville v. Evans. 37 Ind. 229.
The complaint, however, does contain
all the necessary allegations for an injunc-
tion in cases of threatened irreparable in-
jury. High, Inj. §§ 701. 702. It is to he
gathered from the complaint that the city
of Indianapolis claims that the strip of
ground in controversy is a public street,
and that. acting upon that claim, the
other defendants in this action were pro-
ceeding to cut down the trees and vines
growing thereon, plow up and grade the
same as a street, to the irreparable injury
of the plaintiff. In such case the only ade-
quate remedy of the appellant was by in-
junction. In no other case would the
charge that appellees were about to do the
appellant irreparable injury find an ap-
propriate place. We are of the opinion
that this complaint must be regarded as
a complaint to enjoin the nppellees from
the commission of the threatened injury
therein set forth, and that it proceeds up-
on the theory that the appellant had no
other adequate remedy. It follows that
the circuit court did not errln refusing the
request of the appellant for a jury trial,
as the trial of actions for injunctions be-
longs exclusively to the court. Nor did
the court err in overruling the application
of the appellant for a new trial as of right,
as such right does not extend to actions
for injunctive relief. Liggett v. Hlnkley,
120 ind. 387, 22 N. E.Rep. 266. The defense
relied upon by the appellees was that the
strip of ground in controversy had been
dedicated to the public as a street, by com-
missioners appolnted by the Marion coun-
ty civil circuit court, in a partition suit
pending in that court in the year 1868. A
certified copy of the record and proceeding
in that cause was read in evidence on the
trial of this cause, over the objection of
the appellant.
It is not seriously contended that the
court had no power to order the land in-
volved in that suit laid off in lots, blocks,
streets, and alleys, but, as the plat prepared
by the commissioners to plat the land
and make partition of the same is not set
out in this record, it is earnestlycontcnded
that the decree in partition is void for un-
certainty. It appears by the record read
in evidence that Susan L. Davidson and
the appellantin this causeinstituted, in the
Marion circuit court in the year 1868, a
partition suit against Noah N. Davidson
and others, in which it was alleged that
the plaintiffs therein and the said Noah
N. Davidson were the. owners and tenants
in common of a certain described tract of
land, including the land in controversy,
each of said parties owning an undivided
one-third thereof. During the pendency
of the action the appellant intermarried
with one Miller, which fact was suggested
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l!ILLER v. CITY OF I~DIANAPOLIS et al. 
(24 N. E. 228, 123 Ind. 196.) 
Supreme Court of Indiana. April 1, 1890. 
Appeal from circuit court, Hendricks 
county; Jon:s V. BADI.EY, .JndgP. 
Action by Catherine A. '.\tiller against 
the city of Indianapolis and nnother. 
There was Judgment for defoudants, and 
plaintiff uppe11.ls. 
Wm. Watson Woollen and Wm. E. ~'/b­
lack, for appellant. ll"m. L. Taylor, Den-
ny & EJ/iott, and A. L. Mnson, for appel-
lees. 
COFFEY, J. A controversy aro11eln this 
ctu1e, In the drcult court, as to whether It 
was an action to quiet title, or an action 
to obtain an Injunction. Acting upon the 
theory that It was an action to obtain 11.n 
Injunction, the circuit court refused the 
requestnfthe appellant for a trial by Jury. 
and also overruled the application of the 
appellant for anew trial a.s of right. The 
complaint In the cause, omitting the cap-
tion and thedeecriptlon of the land In con-
troveniy,ls as follows: "Catherine A. Mil-
ler, plalntlff •. complalns of the city of lu-
dlunnpolls, Leander A. Fulmer, and George 
W. Seibert, defenrlants. and says that she 
Is the owner of the following described 
real estate; • • • that said defend-
1m ts have unlawfully, wrongfully, tllegal-
ly. and forcibly taken possession of the 
same, and, without having condemned the 
same, are threatening to do great and lr-
reparahle damage to the same, In this: 
that they are threatening to cut down the 
trees and vines that have been placed 
thereupon nnd have been grown thereon 
by the plaintiff. and are threatening to 
plow the land and grade the 1mme, and 
are threatening to make a. street over and 
upon It; and this she avers they are do-
ing without leave or license from her, and 
with full notice that she ls the owner 
thereof, and under u claim that said real 
estate IK a public street In said city. She 
therefore prays that, as against satd de-
fendants, her title be quieted to said real 
estate, and that ea.Id defendants may be 
forever enjoined from further trespassing 
thereon, and uamaglng the same." 
It Is conceded by both parties, In their 
briefs and In the argument of hlt1 cause, 
that every pleading must proceed upon 
some sln~le definite tl1eory, which must 
be determined b_v its general scope and 
charRcter, and that the prayer for relief 
does not determine the character of the 
pleading, nor assign to It any particular 
1 heory. Bank v. Root, 107 Ind. 224. 8 N. E. 
Rep. 105; Houck v. Graham, 106 Ind. 195, 
6 N. E . Rep. 594. Thie complaint Is dewti-
tute or some of the allegntloni,i found In 
an ordinary comvlalnt to quiet title. In-
deed, there Is no pretense that any one or 
all of the defendants make any claim to 
the title to the lanrl In contl"Oversy. 
While it Is true that cities, by their com-
mon councils. have the control of the 
streets and allevs within their territorial 
limlt11,.,t cannot"becorr~tlysnld thatthey 
own such streets and alleys. A grant or 
dedication of a street le a i!trant or dellicu-
282 
tion to the public, and not to the city. ln 
the case of Conner v. New Albany, I Blackf. 
45, It was said by this court: "'!'hat which 
le granted to New Albany cannot be 'pub-
lic,' in the unqualified Hl'llflP of the word; 
nor can that which is granted to the pub-
lic be In any sense the exclusive property 
of New Alba.ny. A grant of a public1:1treet 
of high way. through either town or coun-
try, cannot be considered otherwise than 
as a grant to the public." See, also, City 
of EvanHvllle v. Evans, 37 Ind. 229. 
The complnint, however, does contain 
all the nece1111ary allegations for an injunc--
tlon in cases of threatened Irreparable in-
jury. High, Inj. §§ iOl. i02. It le to be 
gathered from the complaint that the city 
of Indianapolis claims that the strip of 
ground In controversy le tt publtc street, 
and that, acting upon that claim, the 
other defendantH tu this 11.ctlon were pro-
cee<llna- to cut down the trees and vines 
growh.1g thereon, plow up and grade the 
same as a street, to the lrrcparnble injury 
of the plaintiff. In such case the only ade-
quate remedy of the appellant was by In-
junction. In no other case would the 
cha.rgc thatappelleeR were about to do the 
appellant Irreparable Injury find an ap-
propriate place. We are of the opinion 
thRt this complaint must be regarded as 
a complaint to enjoin the nppellees from 
the commission of the threatened injury 
therein set forth, and thR.t tt proceeds up-
on the theory tbat the appellant had no 
other adequate remedy. It follows that 
the clreult court did not err In refuslnar; the 
request of the appellant for a jury trial, 
as the trial of actions for Injunctions be-
longs exclusively to the court. Nor did 
the court err tn overruling the application 
of the appellant for a new trial as of right. 
as such riitht does not extPnd to R<·tiomt 
for lnjunctl ve relief. Liggett v. HlnklPy, 
120 Ind. 3S7, 22 N. E. Rep. 206. The defense 
relied upon by the a)Jpelleee was that the 
strip of ground in controversy had been 
dedicated to the public Rs a street, bycnm-
mlesiouers appointed by the Marlon coun-
ty cl\·11 circuit court, In a partition suit 
pending In that court In the year 1!'168. A 
certified copy of the record and proceeding 
In that cause was read In o\'ldence on the 
trial of this cause, over the objection of 
the appellunt. 
It iR not seriously contended that the 
court had 110 power to order the land In-
volved In that suit laid off In lots, blocks. 
streets, and alleys, but, as t.heplatprepared 
by the commlHsioners to plat the land 
and make partition of the same le not set 
out in this record, It Is earnr11tlycontcnded 
that the decree In partition is void for un-
certaint~·. It appears by the l't'Cord read 
in e\·lden<>e that SllBRn L. DaYl<lson and 
the appellant In this cause lnstitutetl, In the 
Marton circuit court In the year 1868, a 
partition suit against Noah N. Da\"ldtmn 
and others, in which it was alleged that 
the plaintiffs therein nnd the said NoRh 
N. Davidson were the ownrrs and tenants 
In common of a certain lle11eribcd tract of 
land, Including the lan<t In controversy. 
each of s11ld parties owning an undivided 
one-third thereof. During the pendency 
of the action the appellant Intermarried 
with one Miiier, which fact was suggested 
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to the court, and the said Miller was made
a party plaintiff with his wife, the appel-
lant herein. Upon a trial of the cause,
and after the court had entered an inter-
locutory decree ior partition, and had ap-
pointed commissioners to make partition,
the record recites that “it is further or-
dered, with the assent of all the parties,
that the commissioners be directed to lay
off said premises in to lots, blocks, streets.
and alleys, to facilitate such partition."
At a subsequent day in the term, being the
81st day of December. 1868, the commis-
sioners reported to the court that, after
being duly sworn, and having received a
copy of the order of the court, they pro-
ceeded. with the assistance oi a surveyor,
and laid off the land described in the order
into lots, blocks, streets, and alleys, and
that they had made a plat thereof, which
they then reported to the court for ap-
proval. At the close of this report the fol-
lowing record entry was made: “ Where-
by it appears to the court that the said
commissioners have laid ofi the said prem-
ises into lots, blocks, streets, and alleys,
and it is now agreed to by the said par-
ties that said premises should helald off
into lots. blocks, streets, and alleys, the
same is hereby confirmed; and the said
plat is ordered to be recordedin the record-
er’s office oi Marion county. Indiana, and
thereupon shall have the same validity in
law as if made by a legal proprietor oi
such land of full age.” On the same day
the said commissioners filed their report of
partition. in which they reported that they
had set off and partitioned to the said
Noah N. Davidson, blocks 3, 4, 7, 19, and
20.in Davidson’s third addition to the city
of Indianapolis; to Catherine A. Miller,
(this appellant,) blocks 5, 6, 8, and 15,
(hon1estead.) in the same addition; and
to Susan L. Davidson, blocks 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 16, 17. and 18, in Davidson’s third addi-
tion to the city of Indianapolis. This re-
port was approved by the court, and a
judgment of partition was entered of rec-
ord accordingly. ’l.‘he court having juris-
diction oi the subject-matter, and of the
persons of the parties to this suit, it can-
not be reasonably contended that its judg-
ments and decrees in the premises are void,
unless they are so uncertain that it is im-
possible to ascertain therefrom what land
was set off and partitioned to each of the
parties. Douhtiess it would have been
much better to set out in the record the
plat prepared by the commissioners, divid-
ing the land into lots, blocks, streets, and
alleys, as that would have relieved the rec-
ord from any uncertainty,and would have
rendered the controversy we are now con-
sidering impossible; but still, if the record
furnishes the means by which it can be
definitely ascertained what the share as-
signed to each of the parties in the partition
thus made is. we do not think it is void.
Itis nottheofiice of a description to identi-
fy property. but its office is to furnish the
means of identification. Boyd v. Doty, 8
Ind. 370; Peck v. Sims, 120 lnd. 345. :22 N.
E. Rep. 313. For the means of identifying
the property set off to the respective par-
ties to this suit, we are referred, by the rec-
ord, to the plat prepared by the commis-
sioners,under the orderoi the court to lay
the land off into lots, blocks. streets, and
alleys, and we are to look for that plat in
the recorder’s ofiice of Marion county,
where the same is ordered to be recorded.
Ii, when iound and properly identificd,the
property set off to each can be ascertained,
we know oi no reason why it should not.
be as effectual as if copied into the record
oi the partition proceedings. The office of
a description has been iulfllled. and the
means oi identification are at hand. It
is plain, therefore, that the record of the
proceedings in partition now before us is
_to be considered and construed in connec-
tion with the plat prepared by the com-
missioners, ii that plat can be found and
identified, for such plat is, in fact, a. plat
of the proceedings in that case. _
Over the objection oi the appellant, the
appellees read in evidence, on the trial of
this cause, what purported to be a certi-
fied copy of the record oi the plat above re-
ferred to, as taken and copied from one oi’.
the plat-books in the recorder’s ofiice oi
Marion county. It is contended by the
appellant that, as this plat is a part of
the proceeding in the partition suit, it
should have appeared in the record in that
cause, and should have been recorded in
the deed record, under the provisions
of the act oi March 5, 1859, iound on
page 760, 1 Rev. St. 12576, and that there
was no law in force authorizing its record
in the plat-book oi the recorder’s office.
When this evidence was offered by the ap-
pellees,it was objected to bythe appellant
upon the grounds—Fiz-st, that the record
and certificate show that it is a certified
copy oi the plat-book oi Marion county,
Ind.; second, that there is no law in this
state which authorizes the recording ol' a
plat in the plat-book; third, that under
the lawin this state there is no such thing
known as a plat-book to be kept by the
recorder; fourth, that the statutes oi this
state require that when a plat is made it
shall be recorded in the record of deeds oi
the county, and this does not purport to
be from such record; fifth, that it was im-
material, irrelevant, and incompetent, and
that there is no issue in the case under
which it is admissible.
An examination oi this plat discloses the
fact that it embraces the same land de-
scribed in the partition proceeding set out
above. It divides the land into lots,
blocks, streets, and alleys, and purports
to have been signed and acknowledged by
the commissioners appointed by the court
to divide the same, and make partition.
It refers to the partition case by title and
number, and designates it as "Davidson's
Third Addition to the City of Indianapo-
lis,” and bears date the 31st day of Decem-
ber, 1868. the date on which the record in the
partition proceeding informs us that it
was acknowledged and approved by the
court. It was recorded in plat book No.
3, in the office of the recorder of Marion
county, on the 9th day of January, 1869.
There is little room ior doubt that the
paper before us is a copy of the plat made
by the commissioners in the partition suit
to which the appellant was a party. The
serious question is as to whether it comes
to us in the shape oi lcgitiniatc evidence.
Our attention has not been called to any
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to the court, and the 11ald ~filler was made 
a party plalntlrf with hl11 wife, the appel-
lant herein. Upon a trial of the <'ause, 
and after the court had entered an inter-
locutory decree for partition, and had ap-
pointed commlaisiuners to make partition, 
the record recites that" It is further or-
dered, with the a11sent or nil the parties, 
that the commlssloner11 be tllrected to lay 
off said premlseH into lots, blocks, streets, 
and alleys, to facllltate such partition." 
At a subse1111ent day In the term, being the 
31st day of December, JH68, the commis-
sioners reported t.o the court that, after 
being duly sworn, and having received a. 
copy of the order or the court, they pro-
ceeded. with the ll8slstnn ce or n. sur,·eyor, 
and laid on the land described in the order 
Into lots, blocks, streetR, and alleys, and 
that the.v had made a pint thereof, which 
they then reported to the court for ap-
proval. At the close of thl11 report th(' fol-
lowlnjl' record entry was made: "Where-
by It appears to the court that the 11ald 
commissioners hnve laid on the said prem-
ises Into lots, blocks, streets, and alleys, 
aml It le now agreed to by the sal<1 par-
tieR that !!Rid premlseR should be laid Oft 
into lots, blocks. streets, and alleys, tho 
11ame le hereby confirmed; and the said 
plat ls ordered to be rec01·ded In the record-
er's otflce of Marlou county, Indiana, and 
thereupon sl1111l have the same validity In 
law aR if made by a legal proprietor of 
such land of full age." On the same day 
the 1mld t•ommlssloners Hied their report of 
partition, In which they reported that they 
hRd set orf and partitioned to the said 
Noah N. Davidson, blocks 3, 4, 7, 19, and 
20.fn DRvld11on'ethlrd addition to the city 
of Indlannpolls; to Catherine A. Miller, 
(this appellant,) blocks 5, 6, 8, and 15, 
(homestend,) In the 11nme a1dttlon; and 
to Susan L. Davidson, blocks 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 16, 17. and 18, In David1mn's third addi-
tion to the city of Indianapolis. Thie re-
port was appro,·ed by the court, and a 
Judgment of partition was entered of mc-
ord accordlnglv. 'l'he court having Juris-
diction of the subject-mutter, and of the 
person11 of the parties to this eult, It can-
not be reuonablycontended that its judg-
ments and decrees In the premises are void, 
unless they are so uncertain that It Is lm-
po88lble to asce1·taln ther_:efrom what land 
wae set ott and partitioned to each of the 
parttee. Doubtlees It would have been 
much better to set out In the record the 
plat prepan:-d hy the com1l'llBBlone:ni, divid-
ing tbe land into lote, blocks, streets, and 
alleys, RB that would ha ,.e n:-lleved the rec-
ord from any uncertainty, and would have 
rendered the controv~rsy we are now con-
sidering impossible; but still, If the record 
fornlshee the means by which tt can be· 
definitely ascertained what the share ns-
Bigned to each of the parties In thepartlt!on 
thue made ts. we do not think It Is void. 
It iR not the otHce of a description to Identi-
fy property. but its office le to furnish the 
mennH of Identification. Boyd v. Doty,~ 
Ind. 370; Peck v. Sims, 120 lnd. :>ta. :?~ N. 
E. Rep. 313. For the means of ldentlfylug 
the property set off to the respective par-
ties to this suit, we are referred, by the rec-
ord, to the plat prepared by the commis-
sioners, under the order of the cuu1·t to Jay 
the land off into lots, blocks, streets, and 
alleys, and we are to look for that pint In 
the recorder's office of Marlon county, 
where the same le ordered to be l"('{'Ol'ded. 
If, when found and properly Identified, the 
property set off to each can be ascerta.lnt>d, 
we know of no reason why it should not 
be as effectual as lf copied Into the record 
or the partl ti on procPedlngs. The office of 
a descrlptlou has been fulfilled, and the 
means of l<lentlftcatlon are at hand. It 
ts plnln, therefore, that the record of the 
proceedln~e In partition now before us Is 
.to be considered and construed In connec-
tion with the plat prepared by the com-
missioners, If that plat can be found und 
identlfif'(J, for such plut Is, in Ju.ct, a plat 
of the proceedings tn that caHe. . 
Over the objection or the appellant, the 
appelleee rea<l In evidence, on the trial of 
this cause, whet purported to be a certi-
fied copyof the record of th('I plateboYe J'&. 
ferred to, us taken and copied from one or 
the plttt-booke In the recorder's office of 
Marion county. It ts contended by tile 
appellant tba.t, as this plat 18 a part of 
the proceeding in the partition suit, It 
should hu·e appeared In the record In that 
cause, and should have been recorded In 
the deed record, under the pro,·i8ions 
of the a.ct of March 5, 1&19, fouud on 
pa.ge 760, 1 Rev. St. 1!!76, and that there 
was no law In force authorizing its record 
In the plat-book of the recorder's office. 
When this evidence was offered by the up-
pelleee, It was objected to by the appellant 
upon the p:rounlle-F/rst, that the recor1I 
and certifieate Rhow that it i8 a cprtlfled 
copy of the plat-book of Marlon county, 
Ind.; second, that there 18 nu law lu this 
state which authorizes the re~orrling of a. 
plat In the plat-book; third, that under 
the law In this state tlif're Is no such thing 
known as a plat-b0ok to be kept by the 
recorder; fo11rth, that the statutes of this 
state require that when a plat le ma1le it 
shall be recorded In the l'\!Cord of deed~ of 
the county, and this does not purport to 
be from such record; fltih, tba.t It was lru-
materlal, Irrelevant, and tncom1>etent, and 
that there Is no leeue In the rnee under 
which it ls admissible. 
Au examination orthls plat dlsrloees the 
fa.ct that it embraces the ea.me land de-
scribed In the partition proceeding set out 
above. It divides the land Into lote, 
blocks, streets, and alleys, and J>Ur1>orts 
to have been signed and acknowledged by 
the commissioners ap)>olnted by the court 
to di vlde the same, and make pttrtltlon. 
It refers to the partition case by title and 
number, and designates it as "Davld11on'e 
Third Addition to t.he City of Indianapo-
lis," and benrR date the 31st day or Decem-
ber, 1868, thedate on which the record in the 
partition proceeding Informs us that it 
was acknowledged and approved hy the 
court. It was recorded In plat hook No. 
3, In the omce of the recorder of Murion 
r.ounty, on the 9th day of Junuary, 1869. 
There Is little room for doubt that the 
paper bcfure us Is a copy of the plat made 
by the comrnh1sloners In the partition suit 
to which the appellant WaB a. party. The 
serious question ls as to whetllP.r It comes 
to us In the shape of ll'gltlmate evidence. 
Our ttttentlon bes not been called to any 
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express statutory provision authorizing
what is known as a “plat-hook. ” While
the law not only authorizes, but abso-
lutely requires. that plats of towns and
cities, and additions thereto, shall be re-
corded,it seems to be silent as to the name
of records in which they shall be so re-
corded. We must take notice, however, oi
the fact. as part of the current history of
the public business of the state, that books
known as “plat-books” areand have been
for many years kept by the county record-
ers in the various counties of the state, in
which are recorded the plats of the towns
and cities, and the additions thereto, and
‘that such books are kept as public records.
In procuring such records, the county re-
corders no doubt acted upon the correct
presumption that, where the law required
that a. particular class of instruments
should be recorded, and madeno provision
for any specific book in which they should
be so recorded, it was their duty to
procure suitable records for that purpose.
Indeed, frequent reference is made to such
records in the statutes of the state. and
they have frequently been recognized by
legislative enactment as legal public rec-
ords. With this knowledge before it, the
legislature enacted section 3253, Rev. St.
18b1, which provides that “the acknowl-
edgments oi all plats of towns and cities,
and of all additions thereto, heretofore
taken and certified by any officer provided
for in section 3374. are hereby legalized;
and the recording of such plats and addi-
tions as have heretofore been acknowl-
edged before and certified by any officer
provided for in said section is hereby de-
clared to be valid and effectual in law to
all intent and purposes.” In view of these
facts, and in view of the statute above
quoted, we are constrained to hold that
the plat-book from which the plat before
us was copied is a legal public record, in
which the plat prepared by the commis-
sioners in the partition suit before us was
properly recorded. To hold otherwise
would be to adjudge that most, if not all,
of the plats prepared in the last 30 or
40 years have never been properly re-
corded, and would tend to great confusion
and much inconvenience. We are of the
opinion that the certified copy of the plat
before us was properly admitted in evi-
dence. provided there was an issue in the
cause under which it was admissible.
The only pleading filed by the appellees
was ageueral denial, and whether the plat
was admissible in evidence under that
plea depends upon what fact it tended to
prove. The appella.nt’s right to recover
in the action rested upon the assumption
that she was the owner of the strip of
land in controversyat thetime of the com-
mencement oi her suit. Whatever tended
to prove that she was not such owner was
admissible undera denial of the allegation
that she was the owner. We think the
plat read in evidence, when taken in con-
nection with the other evidence in the
cause, tended to show that she was not
such owner. Pom. Rem. §§ 666-673. The
land in controversy consists of a strip 60
feet wide, extending east and westthrough
the entire width of the tract of land de-
scribed in the partition proceeding above
set out. Its length is 1012 feet, and its
width is 60 feet. As shown by the plat be-
fore us, it is bounded on the north byatier
of blocks,numbered, respectively, 12, 13, 14,
and 15, the last being the homestead and
one of the blocks assigned to appellant in
the partition proceeding. It is bounded
on the south by blocks numbered 6, 6. 7, 8,
9, 10, and 11. The first lots above named
front south on this strip, and the last
named front north on the strip. It is not
named on the plat asa. street. but it inter-
sects Preston street on the west, and is
marked with the figures “60" at each end.
Upon the trial of the cause the appellant
proposed to prove. by competent oral tes-
timony, that in laying oi'.f this addition to
the city of Indianapolis it was not the in-
tention of the commissioners who platted
the same to dcdicdte this strip to the pub-
lic as a. street, to which offered testimony
the court sustained an objection, and the
appellant excepted. At the time this evi-
dence was offered by the appellant it was
in proof that all the property abutting on
this strip had passed into the hands of
third parties, either by way of direct con-
veyance, or by means of mortgages exe-
cuted by the parties to whom the blocks
had been assigned in the partition suit.
In these several conveyances and mort-
gages the land is described by blocks, as
it is described in the plat prepared by the
commissioners to plat the same, and as it
is described in the report ofpartition made
by said commissioners. The city of Indi-
anapolis, actingupon the assumption that
this strip had been dedicated to the public
as a. street, had accepted it as such, and
was proceeding to grade and improve it.
It is not contended by the appellant
that this strip of land is either alot. block,
or alley. It is neither a. lot, block. street,
nor alley. It is a strip of land left by the
commissioners appointed to make parti-
tion. wholly undivided. in their report
to the court the commisioners reported
that they had divided the land intended
for partition into lots,blocks,streets, and
alleys, and in their report of partition
they informed the court that they had as-
signed to each of the parties interested in
said land his or hersharein the same, in sev-
eralty. No person examining these pro-
ceedings would be led to believe that any
portion of the land described therein was
left undivided, but, on the contrary, when
examining the plat in connection with
the report oi the commissioners in parti-
tion, and the judgment of the court there-
on,would beled to the belief that the strip
in controversy was intended as a 60-foot
street, furnishing an outlet for the blocks
abutting thereon. If the strip had been
designated “ Miami Street,” or a street by
any other name, it would not be contend-
ed that the appellant could not show by
parol testimony that it was not intended
to dedicate it as a. public street. Marking
a street upon a plat of an addition to a
town or city, and selling lots with refer-
ence thcreto, constitutes a dedication.
Faust v. City of Huntington, 91 Ind. 493;
City oi.’ Evansville v. Page. 23 Ind. 525;
City ofLognnsport v. Dunn, S Ind. 378;
City of Indianapolis v. Kingsbury,l01 Ind.
200. As to whether a plat contains an ex-
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express statutory prorlslon authorizing 
what i1t known as a "plat-hook." While 
the law not only authorizes, but abso-
lutely requires. that plats of towns and 
cities, and additions thereto, shall be re-
corded, It seems to be sllent a.s to the name 
of records In which they shall be so re-
corded. We must take notice, however, of 
the fact, as part of the current history of 
thepubltc business of the state, that l>ooks 
known 8S "plat-books" areand have been 
for many years kept by the county record-
ers In the various counties of the state, in 
which are recorded the plats of the towns 
and cities, and the additions thereto, and 
'that Huch books are kept 8S public records. 
In J>rocurlng such records, the county re-
corders no doubt acted upon the correct 
presumption that, where the law required 
that n particular class of Instruments 
should be recorded, and made no provision 
for any speclttc book In which they s'1ould 
be so recorded, It waa their duty to 
proc11re suitable records for that purpose. 
Indeed, frequent reference Is ma<le to such 
records In. the statutes of the state, and 
they have frequently been recognized by 
legt1'1atl\"e enactment as legal publlc rec-
ords. With this knowledge before it, the 
legislature enacted section 3253, Rev. St. 
l~l, which provides that "the acknowl-
edgments of all plate of towns and cities, 
and of all additions thereto, heretofore 
taken and certlfle<l hy any officer provld~d 
for In section 3374, are hereby legalized; 
and the rt'Cording of such plats and addi-
tions as have heretofore been acknowl-
edged hefore and certified by any officer 
provided for lo said section ls hereby de-
clared to be valld and effectual In law to 
all intent and purposes." In view of these 
fa.eta, anr\ In view of the statute abo'\'e 
quoted, we are construined to hol<l that 
the plat-book from which the plat before 
us was copied Is a legal public ree6rd, in 
which the plat prepared by the commis-
sioners lo the partition suit before us was 
properly recorded. To bold otherwise 
would be to adjudge that moflt, if not all, 
of the plats prepared In the last 30 or 
40 years have ne\"er been properly re-
corded, an<l would tend to great confusion 
and much ineonvenhmce. We are of the 
opinion that the certlfled copy of the plat 
before us was properly admitted in evi-
dence, provided tllere was an lRBue in the 
cause under which it was admissible. 
The only pleading flied by the appellees 
was a general denial, anti wbethe1· the plat 
was admissible in evidence under that 
plea depends upon what fact it tended to 
prove. The appellant's right to recover 
In the action rl-sted upon the assumption 
that she was the owner of the strip of 
land In controversy at the time of the com-
mencement ot her suit. Whatever tended 
to prove that. shewas not suchownerwas 
admissible uHdera denial of the allegation 
that Rhe was the owuer. We think the 
plat read lo evidence, when taken lu con-
nf'Ction with the other evidence In the 
cauHe, tended to show that she was not 
tmch owner. Porn. Rem. §§ 6~73. The 
land in contro\"ersy consists of a strip GO 
feet wide, extending east and westtbrough 
the entire width of the tract of land de-
sc1·ibed In the partition proceeding aborn 
2~ 
set out. Its length Is lOU? feet, and Its 
width Is 60 feet. As shown by the plat be-
fore us, tt is bounded on the north by a tier 
of blocks,nombere<l,respectively,12, 13, 14, 
aod 15, the last being the homestead and 
one of the blocks assigned to appellant in 
the partition procePdlng. It ls bounded 
on the south by blocks numbered 5, 6, 7, 8, 
ll, 10, and 11. The first lots ahove named 
front south on this strip, and the last 
named front north on the strip. It le not 
named on the plat as a street, but It lnter-
sects Preston st:reet on the west, and le 
marked with the figures "60" at each end. 
Upon the trial of the cause the appellant 
proposed to prove, by competent oral tes-
timony, that In laying oft this addition to 
the city of Indianapolis It was not the In-
tention of the commissioners who platted 
the same to de1Uclfte this strip to the pub-
lic as a street, to which offered testimony 
the court sustalne<l an objection, and the 
appellant excepted. At the time this evi-
dence wa11 offered by the appellant It was 
In proof that all the property abutting on 
this strip bad passed Into the hands of 
third parties, either by way of direct con-
veyance, or hy mee.ns of mortgages exe-
cuted by the parties to whom the blocks 
had been assigned in the partition suit. 
In these se\"eral conveyances and mort-
gages the land is described by blocks, as 
it is described In the plat prepared by the 
commissioners to plat the same, and as It 
ts described In the report of partition made 
by said commissioners. The city of Indi-
anapolis, acting upon the assumption that 
this strip had been <ledlca.ted to the public 
as a .street, bad accepted it as sueh, and 
was proceeding to grRde and improve It. 
It le not contended by the appellant 
that tblsetrlp of land is either a lot, block, 
or alley. It IR neither a lot, block, street, 
nor alley. It. ls a strip of land left by the 
commlRsloners appointed to make parti-
tion, wholly undivided. ln their report 
to the court the commissioners reported 
that they had divided the land Intended 
for partition into lots, blocks, streets, and 
alleys, and in their report of partition 
they Informed the court that they had as-
sl!(ned to each of the parties Interested lo 
sold land hlsorhersbareln the same, In sev-
eralty. No person examlnlnar these pro-
ceedings wo•lld be led to believe that any 
portion of the land described therein was 
left undh·lded, but, on the contrary, when 
examining the plat in connection wltb 
the report of the commissioners In parti-
tion, and the Judgment of the court there-
on, would be led to the belief that the strip 
In controversy was intended as a 60-fout 
street, furnlshlnar an outlet for the blocks 
abutting thereon. If the strip had been 
deslgna ted "Mia.mi Street," or a street by 
any other name, tt would not be contend-
ed that the appellant could not show by 
parol testimony that it was not Intended 
to <ledicutu It as a public street. Marking 
e. 11tn>et upon a plat of an addlth>n to a 
town or city, and selling lots with refer-
ence thereto, constltutt..'8 a dedication. 
Faust v. City of Huntington, 91 Ind. 49.1; 
City of Evansvllle v. Page, 23 Ind. 525; 
City of Logansport v. Dunn, 8 Ind. 878; 
City of lntllanapollsv. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 
200. As to whether a plat contains au ex-
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press dedication oi a strip oi ground to
the public, as a street, is a matter oi law
ior the court. Hanson v. Eastman, 21
Minn. 509; Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis. 118;
Sanborn v. Railway Co., 16 Wis. 19. In
City oi Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, supra,
it was said by this court: “But the in-
tention to which courts give heed is not
an intention hidden in the mind oi the
land-owner, but an intention manifested
by his acts. It is the intention which finds
expression in conduct. and not that which
is secreted in the heart of the owner, that
the law regards. Acts indicate the inten-
tion, and upon the intention. clearly ex-
pressed by open acts and visible conduct,
the public and individual citizens may
act. ” “The question whether a person in-
tends to make a dedication oi ground to
the public ior a street or other purpose
must be determined irom his acts and
statements explana tory thereoi, in connec-
tion with all the circumstances that sur-
round and throw light upon the subject.
and not from what he may subsequently
testify as to his real intention in relation
to the matter." City oi Uolumbus v.
Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Lamar Co. v. Clements.
49 'l‘ex. 347; City oi Denver v. Clements, 3
Colo. 487. An implied dedication may be
rebutted by parol testimony, but where
the dedication is express, evidenced by a
recorded plat, the intent, as expressed in
such plat,cannot becontradicted by parol.
City oi Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, supra,
and authorities there cited. When the
plat before us is construed in connection
with the partition proceedings oi which it
constitutes a part, as the same is ex-
plained by the report oi the commission-
ers in partition and the judgment oi the
court thereon,no other reasonable con-
clusion can be drawn than that the strip
oi land in controversy was intended as a.
60-loot street. ior the benefit oi the block
abutting thereon, and as iurnishlng a
means oi ingress and egress to the same.
Relying on this dedication, the property
adjoining this strip has passed into the
hands oi third parties, and the city oi In-
dianapolis, accepting such dedication, is
proceeding to improve the strip as u.
street. To permit the appellant to say,
now, that this strip was left by the com-
missioners asundivided land, and was not
intended as a. street, would be obviously
unjust to those who purchased the prop-
erty on the ialth oi the plat and the pur-
tition proceeding. We do not think the
court erred in reiusing to admit this oi-
iered testimony. We find no error in the
record for which the judgment should be
reversed. Judgment -affirmed.
ELLIOTT, J.. took no part in the decis-
ion oi this cause.
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pl"E'Ss dl'dlcatlon of a strip of &:round to 
tlu~ public, as a Btreet, Is a. ma ttP.r of la.w 
for the court. Haueon v. Eastman, 21 
.Minn. 509; Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis. 118; 
8anborn v. Railway Co., 16 Wis. 19. In 
City of lndlunapolb• v. Kingsbury, supra, 
It wa11 said by this court: "But the In-
tention to whil-h courts give heed le not 
an lntentlCln IJldden In the mind of the 
land-owner, hut an Intention manlfeflted 
by his acts. It Is the In ten ti on which finds 
expre88lon in conduct. and not that which 
Is secreted In the heart of the o°"'ner, that 
the law regards. Acts indicate the Inten-
tion, and upon the Intention. clearly ex-
pressed by open acts and visible conduct, 
the public and individual citizens may 
act." "The question whether a per11on In-
tends to make a dedication of ground to 
the public for a street or other purpo110 
must be determined from hie acts and 
ete.tementsexplana tory thereof, In connec-
tion with all the circumstn.nces that sur-
round and throw light upon the subjel't. 
and not !rom what he may subeequ,.ntly 
testify as to his real Intention In relation 
to thl' matter.•• City of Columbuf! v. 
Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Lamar Co. v. l'lementll, 
4\l Tex. 347; City of Denver v. Clements, 3 
Colo. 487. An implied dedication muy be 
rebutted by parol testimony, but where 
the dedication le express, evidenced by a 
recorded plat, the intent, as expressed in 
such plat, cannot hecontradlctecl by p111·01. 
City of IndlanapollR v. Kingsbury, euprn, 
and authorities there clt~l. When the 
plat before us Is construed in connection 
with the partition proceedings of which It 
constitutes a part, af! the same IR ex-
plained by the report of the comml11Hlon-
cre in partition and the judgment of the 
court thereon, no other reasonable con-
clusion can be drawn than that the strip 
of land In controversy was intended us a 
60-foot st1-eet, for the benefit of the block 
abutting thereon. and as furniBhlng a 
means of lngrt'f!S and ei.treSS to the same. 
Relying on thlR dedlcntlon, the property 
adjoining this strip bas passed into the 
h11.nd11 of thircl parties, and the city of In-
dianapolis, accepting such dedication, ls 
proceeding to improve the strip as .1.1. 
street. To permit the appcllaut to say, 
now, that this stl1p was left by the com-
misslonetR asundl~lded land, and was not 
intended as a street, would ht' obviously 
unjust to those who purchased the prop-
erty on the faith of the plat and the pur-
titlon proceeding. We do not think the 
court erred In refusing to admit this of-
fered testimony. We find no error in the 
record for which the judgment should be 
reversed. Judgment ·afflrmed. 
ELLIOTT, J., took no part in the decis-
ion of this cauee. 
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BURTON v. TI’I'l‘E, City Trcnsurer.
(45 N. W. 88, 80 Mich. 218.)
‘Supreme Court of Michigan. April 18, 1890.
On petition for mandamus.
Act Mich. ]R89. No. 205, provides that the
oiiicers having the custody of any county,
city, or town records shall furnish proper
and reasonable facilities for the inspection
and examination of the records and files in
their offices, and for making memoranda
-or transcripts therefrom, to all persons
having occasion to make examination of
them for any lawful purpose.
Hemjv A. Chaney, ior relator. John W.
McGra £11, for respondent.
MORSE, J. The respondent is city treas-
urer oi Detroit. The relator is engaged in
the abstract business in said city. We
held, upon application oi the relator for
mandamus, (see Burton v. Tuite, -H N. W.
Rep. 282,) thatcertain records in said treas-
urer’s office were public records, and that
relator had a right to examinethem, and to
make memoranda ortranscripts therefrom
under Act No. 205, Pub. Acts 1889, subject
to such proper and reasonable regulations
as the treasurer might make consistent
with the public use of such records. Our
order in the case, as made and entered in
the journal on the 8th day of January, 1890,
-commanded the said Tuite not only to al-_
low the relator to inspect and examine the
particular records involved in that case,
but also to generally furnish to him and
his subordinates reasonable and proper fa-
cilities ior the inspection and examination
-of the records and files in his office, and for
making memoranda. and transcripts there-
from in compliance with said above-named
act of the legislature. In the opinion. as
well as in the order, oi this court we meant
to so express our views and commands as
that there should be no mistake or misun-
derstanding as to the rights and duties of
the respective parties to this controversy.
But we are now called upon to enforce our
order. January 13, 1890. a petition was
filed in this court by the relator showing
the proper service of our writ of peremp-
tory mandamus upon respondent, and set-
ting forth that, not withstanding our order
and command therein contained, the re-
spondent had since said service refused to
allow relator to have access to or look at
certain other public records in said ofiice
of the city treasurer, to-wit: One book
containing the record of the certificates of
tax-sales that have been canceled; one
book containing a list of such lots as have
been sold to the city of Detroit, or to indi- 1
viduals, for special city taxes, and have 3
been from time to time redeemed; and a »
book containing a list of such lots or par-
cels of land in the city of Detroit as have
been heretofore sold to said city for de|in- ,
286
quent city taxes, said sales being after-
wards assigned by the city to individuals.
Upon this petition, January 15, 1890, we
issued an order to the said Thomas P.
Tuite. to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt and disobedience
of the said writ of mandamus of dateJan-
uary 8, 1890. Respondent answered this
order on the 28th day oi January, 1890. de-
nying that the above-named books were
public records. or that the relator had any
right to examine them under the statute,
or our decision and order above stated.
The books in question were denominated
by the respondent as “ Stub Receipt Books. ”
and it was insisted in said answer that the
same were not public records, but mere
memoranda for the convenience of the
office, and that all the data contained
therein is entered in the “ Record Books,”
which are accessible to relator. It was,
however, admitted upon the argument
that the transferring of the data upon
these stub books to the record books
might be delayed for days or weeks, at the
pleasure of the respondent. After hearing
both parties by counsel upon the petition
and answer, we directed certain interrog-
atories to be served upon t-he respondent,
to be answered by him under oath, and
that other proofs be taken touching the
truth of the matters involved in the peti-
tion and answer, as well as the nature and
character and use oi said books. The an-
swers to said interrogatories and other
testimony taken have been returned to us.
We do not intend to again go into the dis-
cussion of the questions that were settled
by us in the first opinion filed in this case.
We are satisfied that thebooks referred to,
by whatever name they are called, are pub-
lic records in the treasure-r's office. in the
full sense of the statute, and under the
opinion above referred to; that the re-
. spondent is guilty of contempt and dis-
obedience of the order of this court in re-
fusing to the relator the privilege of exam-
: ining them. and making transcripts there-
of. We think. however. that this disobe-
dience has occurred, not so much from a
willful disregard of our command. as from
bad advice. Under the circumstances. we
are not disposed to impose a heavy penal-
ty, but we hope that our orders will here-
after be strictly complied with, and with-
out delay or attempted evasion, as the fine
in this case will not stand as a precedent
in any future case of disobedience of the
mandates or decrees of this court. An or-
der will be entered adjudging the said
Thomas P. Tuite guilty of contempt and
disobedience of our aforesaid writ of man-
rluums, and that he pay to the people of
the state of Michigan a fine of $25, with
the costs of this proceeding to be taxed by
the clerk of this court; such payment to
be made to said clerk within 10 days
after a. copy of such order shall be served
upon him. The other justices concurred.
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BC'RTON v. TrITE, City Treasurer. 
(43 N. W. 88, 80 Mich. 218.) 
·supreme Court of Michigan. April 18, 1890. 
On pl'titton for mandamus. 
Act Mich. 188\J, No. 205, provides that the 
officers hal'ing the custody of any county, 
city, or town records shall furnish proper 
and reasonable faclllttes for the lnR11ectlon 
and examination of the records and tlle11 in 
their offices, and for making memoranda 
-0r tranHcrl11ts therefrom, to all persons 
having occasion to make examination of 
them for any lawful purpose. 
Henr,l· A. Chaney, for relator. John W. 
McGrath, for reoJpondent. 
quent city tuxe11, said sales being after-
wards aSRlgned by the city to lndll'lduals. 
'Cpon this petition, .January lo, 1800, we 
hu111ed an order to the eald Thomas P. 
Tuite. to show cause why he should not 
be punished for contempt and disobedience 
of the said writ of mandamus of dateJan-
uary 8, 1890. Respondent answered thla 
order on the 28th day or January, 1890,de-
nylng that the above-named books were 
public records, or that the relator had any 
right to examine them under the statute, 
or our decision and order above stated. 
The books In question were denominated 
by the re11pondent as" Mtub Receipt Books." 
and It was lnslste<l In said answer that the 
same were not public records, but mere 
memoranda for the convenience of the 
office, and that all the data contained 
MOR8E, J. The reapondentlllclty treas- therein ts entered In the" Record Books," 
urer of Detroit. The relator Is engaged In which are acceRRible to relator. It was, 
the abstract business In said city. We however, admitted urmu the argument. 
held, upon application of the relator for that the transferring of the data upon 
mandamus, tsee Burton v. Tuite, 44 N. W. thet1e stub books to the record book11 
Rep. 282,) that certain i-ecurds In said treRB- might be ctelayed for days or weeks, at the 
urer's office were public records, and that pleat1ure of the respondent. After hearing 
relator had a rlghtto examine them, and to both parties by coum1el upon the petition 
make memoranda ortranl!C.'rlptstherefrom and answer, we directed certain lnterrog-
under Act :So. 205, Puh. Acts 1889, HUbject atorlet1 to he served upon the respondent, 
to such proper and rt'Monable regulations to be anl'wered by him under oath, and 
as the treal'urer might make consistent that other proofs be taken touching the 
with the public uRe or such records. Our truth of the matters lnvolt'ed In the petl-
ordt•r in the case, as made and entered In tlon and answer, as well as the nature and 
the journal on the 8th day of January, 1890, character and use of said books. The an-
·commanded the said Tuite not only to al-. ewers to said Interrogatories and other 
low the relator to inspect and examine the testimony taken ha\·e been returned to us. 
partl('ular records Involved In that case, We do not Intend to again go Into the dlR-
but also to generally furnish to him and cus11lon of the questions that were settled 
hie Rubordlnates reasonable and proper fa- by us In the first opinion flied in this caRe. 
cllltl£>B for the Inspection and examination We are satisfied that the books referred to, 
-of the records and flies In his office, and for by whatever name they are called, are pub-
ruaklng memoranda and transcripts there- Uc records In the treasurer's otllce. 1n the 
from in compliance with said above-named full sense of the statute, and under tbe 
Rct of the legislature. In the opinion, as opinion above refern>d to; that the re-
well as In the order, of this court we meant spondent la guilty of ('Ontempt and dl&-
"to so expre.ss our views and commandR as obedience of the order of thl11 court in re-
that there should be no mlRta.ke or mlsun- fueln1r to the relator the privilege or exam-
<lerstanding as to the rights and duties of tnlng th<'m, "ncl making transcripts there-
the respective parties tu this controverRy. of. We think, howe,·er, that this dleobe-
But we are now called upon to enforce our dlence has occurred, not so much from a 
order. January 13, 18110, a petition was willful dlRregarcl of our command, as from 
filed In this court by the relator showing bad advice. Under the circumstances. we 
the proper service of our writ of peremp. are not disposed to Impose a heavy penal-
tory mand11m11s upon respondent, and set- ty, but we hope that our orders wlll bere-
tlng forth that, notwithstanding our order after be strictly complied with, and with· 
and command therein contained, the re- out rlelay 01· attempted evasion, as the tine 
11pondent had since said serYke refused to in this c811e wtll not stand as a precedent 
allow rela.tor to have acl'ees to or look A.t In any future cnRe of disobedience of the 
certain other public records in said office mandatet1 or decrees of this court. An or-
of the <'ity treasun>r, to-wit: One book rler will be entered adjudging the said 
containing the record of the certificates of Thoml\8 P. Tuite guilty of contempt and 
tax-sales "that ha Ye been canceled; one dli;iobedlence of our aforesaid writ of man-
book containing o. U11t of such lots as ha¥e dam.is, and that be pay to the peo11le of 
bet>n 11old to the city of Detroit, or to Inell- the Rtate of Mkhlgnn a fine of $25, with 
vlduale, for spedal city taxes, and haYe the coRtH of thlR proceeding to be taxed by 
b('('n from time to time red~med ; and a tne clerk of thl11 court; such payment to 
hook contalnlnp; a list of such lots or par- be made to said clerk within 10 days 
~els of land In the city of Detroit as have after a copy of snch order shall be served 
bt:en heretofore i;iold to 11ald cltl' for dello- , upon him. '!'he other Justices concurred. 
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BLALOCK v. MILAND.
(13 S. E. 551, 87 Ga. 573.)
July 13, 1891.
Rsconmxo Dm-:n—G|r1'-—L0ss or DEED—-SECON'D-
new Evim:xci~:—No'r|vs T0 PRODUCE-DELIVERY
—DB(.‘l.ARATlONS or DONOR—1.\'STRUC'l‘lONS.
1. A deed saying nothing of delivery in the
attestation clause is nevertheless prepared for
record it attested by two witnesses, one of whom
was the clerk of the superior court, who signed
the attestation in his oflrlcial character.
2. In order for the heir of a deceased donee to
set up adeed of gift made to her by her father it is
not necessary that it should appear that the donee
or her heir ever had possession of the premises,
or that either of them ever had actual custody of
the deed.
3. When it appears that an original deed of
gift by a father to his daughter was never in the
actual custody of the daughter; that the father
is dead; and that the deed was not among the
papers left by him,—the loss of the original is
sufflciently accounted for to admit a copy taken
from the record.
4. The donor, after making a deed of gilt,
having sold and conveyed the premises to other
persons, there is no presumption that the deed of
gift, which was adverse to their title, ever went
into their possession; and consequently, whether
a notice to one of them was properly directed, or
a subpoena duces tecum to the other was prop-
erly served, is immaterial, there being no dili-
gence to inquire of them incumbent upon the
party now claiming under the deod of gilt.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
5. Declarations of a vendor, now deceased,
made at the time of conveying to his rcndee,
that n previous deed of gift executed by the ven-
dor to his daughter had never been delivered, and
that he had destroyed the same, are not admissi-
ble in evidence in favor of the vendee against
the heir of the dauehter claiming under the deed
of gift; nor are declarations of a third person,
now deceased, that he knew the deed had not
been delivered, and that the donor destroyed it.
6. A written declaration, made by the donor,
and recorded in the record of deeds, to the effect
that he had not delivered to his daughter the
deed of gift, and that he revoked and an-
nulled the dccd, is not admissible in evidence in
favor of his vendce of the premises, the same be-
ing made several years after the deed ot gift was
executed and recorded.
7. It is not incumbent upon the court to spoo-
ify in his charge to the jury what facts and cir-
cumstances would negative the presumption that
a duly recorded deed was delivered, orto go over
the various facts and circumstances in the evi-
deuce tending to negative that presumption, there
being no request to do so, and the court referring
the jury in general terms to the evidence on the
subject. _
8. The evidence warranted the verdict.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
E1-rurirum superior court, Pikc county;
James S. Buyntnn, Judge.
S. N. Woodward, for plnintifl in error.
Claude Worrill and B. F. McLaughlin, for
defendant in error.
PER CURIAM. Judgment aflirmed.
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ORAL EVIDENCE ACCOMP.AYYING WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. (Case No. 99 
BLALOCK T. l:III..AXD. 
(13 S. E. 551, 87 Ga. 573.) 
Supreme Court of Georgia. July 13, 1891. 
RECORDIXO DRED-GIFT-Loss OP DEED-SECOND-
ARY EvmEXCE-NOTICI! TO PKODCCE-DELIVERY 
-DEcl.ARATIONs oF Doxoa-lxsTRUCTIO:ss. 
1. A deed saying nothing of delivery in the 
attestation clau~ is nevertheless prepared for 
record iC attested by two witnesses, one of whom 
was the clerk of the superior court, who signed 
the attestation in his oftlcial character. 
2. In ordtlr for the heir uf a deceased donee to 
set up a deed of gift made to her by her father it is 
notnec~arythat it should appearthat thedonee 
or her heir ever had possession of the premises, 
or that either of them ever had actual custody of 
the deed. 
3. When ft appears that an original deed of 
gift bf a father to his daugnter was never in the 
actua custody of the dau~hter; thnt the father 
is dead; and that the deed wwi not among the 
papers left by him,-the loss of the original is 
softlclently accounted for to admit a copy taken 
from the record. 
4. The donor, after making a deed of gift, 
having sold and conveyed the premises to other 
persons, there is no presumption that the deed of 
!Oft. which was adverse to their title, ever went 
foto thelrpoasession; and consequently, whether 
a notioe to one of tnem was properly directed, or 
a subpoona duce8 tecum to the other was prop-
erly served, is immaterial, there being no dili-
gence to inquire of them incumbent upon the 
party now claiming under the deed of gilt. 
5. Declarations of a vendor, now deceased, 
mooe at the tim~ of conveying to his \"endee, 
that a previous deed of gift executed by the ven· 
dor to bis daughter had never been delivered, and 
that be had destroyed the same, are not admissi-
ble In evidence in favor of the vendee against 
the heir of the dau5"hterclaiming under the deed 
of gift; nor are declarations of a third person, 
now deceased that he knew the tlecd had not 
been delive;;d, and that the donor de.'\troyetl it. 
6. A written declaration, made by the donor, 
and recorded in the record of deeds, to the ell'ect 
that be had not delivered to his daughter the 
deed of gift, and that he revoked and an-
nulled the deed, is not admissiblA in evidence in 
favor of his vendee of the premises, the same be-
ing made several years after the deed of gift was 
executed and recorded. 
7. It is not incumbent upon the court to spec-
ify in his charge to the jury what fact\I and cir-
cumstances would negative the presumption that 
a duly recorded deed was delivered, or to go over 
the various facts and circumstances in the evi-
dence tending to negative that presumption, there 
being no request to do so, and the court.referring 
the jury in general terms to the evidence on the 
11ubjeot. 
8. The evidence warranted the verdict.. 
(Syil.abus "Ill/ the Cou1-t.) 
Error from superior court, Plkl' coon ty; 
James 8. Buynt1•n, Judge. 
S. N. Woodward, for plalntln In error. 
('laude Wor1·lll and B. F. McLaughlin, for 
defendant in error. 
PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed . 
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VVEAVER V. SHIPLEY et al.
(27 N. E. 146, 127 Ind. 526.)
Supreme Court of Indiana. March 31, 1891.
Appeal iroin circuit court. Tippecanoe
county; D. P. VINTHN, Judge.
Jay H. Adams and Cam-otli & Stuart.
ior appellant. Wallace & Baird, ior ap-
pellees.
MILLER, J. The appellees commenced
this action to enjoin the appellant, Elmore
Weaver, and one Bahlah W. Weaver. from
iuterierlng with certain premises which it
was alleged the appellees and one Under-
hill had leased lrom said Bahlah W. Weav-
er. The defendants answered by a general
denial. There was a trial by the court,and
finding against the appellant, Elmore
We-aver, and judgment rendered against
him enjoining him irom interfering with
theleased premises, and ior $100 damages
and in in vor oi Bahlah W. Weaver ior his
costs. The appellant, Elmore Weaver,
assigns error as iollows: (1) Because the
court erred in overruling his separate de-'
murrer to the amended complaint; (2) be-
cause the court erred in its conclusions oi
la w, and each oi them; (3) because the
court erred in overruling his written mo-
tion ior a new trial; (4) because the court
erred in overruling his motion to modify
the judgment: (5) because the court erred
in overruling his motion in arrest oi judg-
ment; (6) because theamended complaint
does not state iactssutiicient to constitute
a cause oi action against him.
The material allegations oi the com-
plaint, omitting descriptions and i'ormal
parts, are that on the 1st day oi March,
1883. the plaintiiis and defendant Underhill
were desirous oi procuring ground upon
which to erect a tile-mill ior the manufact-
ure oi tile, and from which to obtain clay
to be used in such manufacture; that on
that day they applied to the deiendant
Bahlah W. Weaver, who was the owner oi
the real estate, to lease the same ior that
purpose; that, on said day the plaintiiis
and Underhill, and the defendant Bahlah
W. Weaver, entered into' an agreement,
whereby said Bahlah agreed to and did
lease to them ior the term oi 10 years, ior
the purposes aioresaid, three several tracts
oi real estate lying adjoining and contigu-
ous to each other, ior which they were to
pay him as rent $75 per yea:-,in tile, at the
market price; that, at and prior to the
making oi said lease, the plaintiiis and
said Weaver went upon and over the three
tracts oi land so leased, and mutually
pointed out and agreed upon the location
oi the same; that it was agreed as a part
oi the contract that the plaintiffs were to
have all the clay suitable ior tile upon the
three-cornered tract which they might use
during the terms oi the lease, and, ii they
needed it, all the clay on all the tracts oi
land, but they were to use and occupy no
more of the land or clay than they needed
ior use during the term oi the lease; that
alter they had agreed upon the terms oi
said lease and had pointed out and
agreed upon and located by actual view
the three tracts oi land, they attempted to
reduce said contract oi lease to writing,
and attempted to describe therein the said
land leased tothein,and that they did sign
and execute a written agreement oi lease
in which they attempted to describe, and
thought they had sufiiclently described,
each oi the tracts oi land so pointed out,
located, agreed upon, and leased as afore-
said, which written contract is in the
words and figures ioilowing, to-wit:
“March the first, 1883. Articles oi agree»
ment made and entered into between B.
W. Weaver and James Shipley, Allen
Shipley, and William Uuderhill, to-wit:
B. W. Weaver agrees to rent to the par-
ties oi the second part ground to seta
tile-mill and shedding and kiln, not to
exceed (-ii acres of ground, it being in
the north-west corner oi the north-east
quarter oi the south-east quarter oi sec-
tion l27,i town (24,) range (3) west; also
a strip oi land ten ieet wide, on the west
side oi the east line running north and
south, ior the purpose oi making tile, it
being east side oi the north- west quarter
oi the south~east quarter section (27,)
town (24,) range (3) west; also a. three
cornered piece in the north-east corner oi
the last-described land; and to have all
the clay they want ior tile in the three-
cornered piece, keeping south line parallel
with thecongressional survey oi the land;
and also one house and stable and garden
and smoke-house, the last-described prop-
crty in the south-westcorner oi the south-
east quarter section (27,) town (2-i,l range
(3) west. This lease is to run ten years
irom date. The parties oi thesecond part
agree to pay the party oi the first part
seventy-five dollars annually in tile, at
the market price oi such tile at the kiln as
the party oi the first part may choose.
ii the parties oi the second part, iailing to
pay the amount, iorieit all rights to the
above-named premises, and the parties oi
the second part want a way out to the
east road oi the woods pasture, they must
hang a good and substantial gate, and
keep the same shut. B. W. \V1=:.4vr;u.
Jsmas Suirurcv. ALLEN J. Si-llPl.EY. WM.
UNDERBILL." That immediately alter the
making oi said contract, and the execu-
tion oi said lease, and in pursuance there-
oi, they entered upon and took possession
oi all said real estate pointed out, and re-
lying upon said contract, and their abili-
ty to hold all oi said lauds ior the term
agreed upon, they, with the knowledge
and consent oi said Weaver, proceeded to
and did erect various buildings ni a per-
manent nature, particularly described,
and also constructed a barb-wire ience
around the tract, costing in the aggregate
in the neighborhood oi $2,700; that alter
the erection oi said mill and other build-
ings. and during the year 1883, the plain-
tihs began to make, and ever since have
made and sold, large quantities oi tile,
and with the knowledge and consent oi
said Bahlah W. Weaver they entered up-
on the three-cornered tract, and have ever
since continued to take clay thereironi.
and use the same in the construction oi
tile, with the knowledge aml consent oi
Bahlah W. Weaver and Elmore Weaver;
that they have only removed the clay
from a hali acre oi said three-cornered
piece; that last i'allBahlah W.ior the first
time intimated that the plaintiiis had no
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Case No. lOOJ PROOF. 
WEA VER v. SHIPLEY et al. 
(27 N. E. 146, 127 Ind. 526.l 
Supreme Court of Indiana. March 31, 1891. 
Appeal from C'lrcult court. Tippecanoe 
county; D. P. V1NTO:'f, Judge. 
Jay H. Ad11ms amt Caffroth & Swart, 
for appellant. Wallace & Bulrd; for ap-
pellooR. 
MILLER, J. The appelleeii commenced 
this action to enjoin the appellant, Elmore 
Weaver, and one Bahlab W. Weaver. from 
interfering with certain premll!es wbkh It 
was alleged the appellef's and one Under-
btll hact leased from11aid Bahlah W. Weav-
er. The defendants am1wered b,y a p:eueral 
denial. There was a trial by the court, and 
flntllng against the appPIJant, Elmore 
Wea \•er, a11<l judgment rentll'red against 
him enjoining him from Interfering with 
the leRMed premlHes, and for $100 damageR. 
and In fn,·or of Bahlah W. Weaver for his 
costs. '.rhe apµellant, Elmore Weftver, 
aHs!p:ns error as follows: (I l Beca11ee the 
court erred In overruling bis se(Jarate de-· 
murrer to the amended complaint; (2) be-
en use the court erred In Its concl1111lons of 
law. and each of them; (3) because the 
conrt erred In overruling bis written mo-
tion for a new trial; (4) because the court 
erred In o\·errullmr hie motion to modify 
the judgment: (5) because the court erl'P.d 
In overn1Ung his motion In arrest of Jndg-
ment; (6) because thenmencled complaint 
does not state factesutflclent to constitute 
a cause of action against blm. 
The material allegations of the com-
plaint, omitting descriptions and formal 
part11, are thut on the 1st c!uy of Murch, 
18."!lJ, the plftlntlffs und defendttnt Uuderhlll 
were desirous of procurlnir ground upon 
which to erect a tile-mill for the manufact-
ure of tile, and from which to obtain clay 
to be used In such manufacture; that on 
that day they applied to the ddendant 
Buhlah W. Weaver, who was the owner of 
the real estate, to lease the same for thit.t 
purpose; that, on said day the plulntlffs 
and Underhill, and the defendant Bahlab 
W. Weuver, entered into.an agreement, 
whereby said Bahlah agreed to and did 
lease to them for the term of 10 yeo1·H, for 
tl1epurposes aforesaid, three several tr11ctlt 
uf real estatf' lying adjoining and contigu-
ous to each other, for which they were to 
pay him BR rent$75 per yetir,ln tile, at the 
market price; tba t, at and prior to the 
making of said lense, the plaintiffs and 
s1dd Weaver went upon and over the three 
tracts nf land so leased, and mutually 
pol11te1J out and agreed upon the location 
of the smue; that it was agreed as a purt 
of the contract that the plolntlffs were to 
have all the clay suitable for tile upon the 
three-cornered tract which they might use 
during the terms of the lease, and, U they 
needed it., all the cloy on all the tracts of 
land, but they were to uHe and occupy 110 
more of the lun<l or clay than they neP.ded 
for Ul!P- d1Jring the term of the lease; that 
after tlwy hud agrc.>ell u1mn the terms of 
eoM lease and had pointed out 11.nd 
sgree1I upon and loc11ted by actual vif"W 
the three tracb1 of land, they attempted to 
reduce salll contract of lease to writing, 
and attempted to detjCrlbe therein tba said 
288 
land leaRed to them, and that they dtd sign 
and execute a written agreement of lease 
lu which the) attempted to dPScrlbe, amt 
thou,,;ht they bud sufficiently described, 
eucb of the tr11cts of land eo pointed out, 
located, agreed upon, and leMed as afore-
said, which written contract le in the 
words a11d figures following, to-wit: 
"l\lltrch the first, 1883. Articles of agree . 
ment made and entered Into between B. 
W. Weaver and James Shipley, Allen 
Shipley, and Wtlll11m Underhill, to-\vlt: 
B. W. Weaver agreeH to rent to the par-
ties of the second part gronnd to set a 
tile-mill and shedding and kiln, not to 
exceed (41 acres of ground, It being In 
the north-west corner of the north-eaAt 
quarttir of the south-east quarter of sec-
tion 127,) town (24,) range (3) west; also 
a strip of land ten feet wide, on the west 
side of the east line runnh1g north and 
south, for the purpose of maklnK tile. it 
being east side of the north- weHt quarter 
of the south-east ttuarter section (~,) 
town (24,) range (3) west; ttleo a three-
cornered piece In the north-east t:orner of 
the last-described land; und to huve all 
the clay they want for tlle In the three-
cornered piece, keeping south line parallel 
with the congressional sur,•ey oft he land; 
and also one house and stable and 1rar:len 
and smoke-house, the last-described prop-
erty In the south-west('orner or the south-
east quarter icectlon 127, I town (24,) ran11:e 
(3) wtlBt. This leaHe ls to run ten years 
from date. The parties of thesecond part 
agree to pay the party or the first part 
seventy.five dollars annually In tile, at 
the market price of such tile at the kiln as 
the party of the first part may choose. 
If the parties or the second vart, falling to 
pay the smo•mt, forfeit all rights to the 
above-named premh1ee, sod the pnrtlet! of 
the second part want a way out to tht't 
east road of tbewoods pasture, they mu11t 
hanK a KOOd and substantial gate, and 
keep the 11ame shut. B. W. WEAVER. 
JAMES ~HIPLEY. ALI.F:N J. SHIPl.EY. WM. 
UNDERBll,L." That lmmerllately after the 
making of said contract, and the execu-
tion of said lease, and ln pursuance there-
of, they entered upon and took poBSesaion 
or all said real estate pointed out, and re-
lying upon said contract, and their 11hlll-
ty to hold all of said lands for the term 
ap:reed Dpon, they, with the knowledl(e 
and consent of said Weaver, proceeded to 
and did erect vorlouR buildings of a per-
manent nature, particularly described, 
and ulso constructed a barb-wire fence 
around the tract, costing In the aggregate 
In the neighborhood of $2,700; that after 
the erection of said mill and other build· 
luge, and during the yenr 1883, the plnln· 
tlfts began to make, aud eorf'r 11ince have 
made and sold, large quantities of tile. 
ancl with the knowledge and consent or 
said Bablah W. Weaver they entered up-
on the three-cornered truct, and have e\"er 
tilnce continued to take clay therefrom, 
and use the same In tht1 construction of 
tile, with the knowledp:e anrl consent or 
Bahlnh W. Weaver and Elmore Weaver; 
that they have only remu,·ed the clay 
from a. half acre of 11sld three~ornen.>d 
piece; that last. fallBahlah W.for the first 
time Intimated that tbe plaintiffs bad no 
ORAL EVIDENCE ACCOMPANYING YVRITTEN DOCUMENTS. [Case N0. 100
right to remove clay from the so-called
three-cornered piece of land, but they con-
tinued without molestation to remove
clay therefrom until the close of the tile
season; that Elmore Weaver claims to
have purchased, in February, 188', from
Bahlah W.. twenty acres of land.covering
and including the so-called three-cornered
tract of land, and since that time he and
the defendant Bahlah have forbidden the
plaintiffs from removing clay therefrom:
that Underhill has sold and assigned his
interest in the contract and lease to the
plaintiffs; that Elmore Weaver, who is
the son of Bahlah W.. had full knowl-
edge of the making of the contract and
lease at the time of the execution thereof,
and oi the exact location of said three-
cornered tract, and knew where the same
was located and agreed upon by the par-
ties. and had full knowledge of the im-
provements. and that they had made the
same on the faith of said contract and
lease, and full knowledge of the fact. that
it was absolutely necessary for them to
have this tract in order to carry on their
tile business. at the time he purchased the
land; that theplaintiffs had no otherpluce
from which to obtain clay for their tile-
miil. and that they cannot in that neigh-
borhood procure any other place from
which to obtain the same.and that unless
they can obtain said clay their contract of
lease will become wholly valueless, and
their tilc-mill and improvements will be
wholly lost; that their lease has six years
to run, and there is an abundance oi clay
in the three-cornered piece to last during
the time it has to run; that the defend-
ant Elmore Weaver forbade the plaintiffs .
from en tering on said three-cornered piece
of land, or removing clay therefrom, and
tore down the gate and in-ial|.r,c-way
which the plaintiffs had constructed for the
purpose of driving to said tract of land.
and set fire to the bridize; and that he
now threatens that he will, by force and
violence. keep theplaintiffs nwayfrom said
tract, and from removing clay therefrom;
and that the defendants Weaver and
Weaver are, by force and threats of per-
sonnl violence, preventing the plaintiffs
from entering upon or removin,z4-lay from
said tract, and will continue to do so un
less enjoined by this court, to their irrep-
arable damage; that the plaintiffs have
fully complied with all the agreements
and stipulations on their part. and have
promptly and fully paid their rent as
stipulated for in said lease. and that they
have been damaged in the sum of $2.000.
't1;he prayer is for damages and an injunc-
on. '
The objection to the sufficiency of the
complaint pointed out by the appellant is
that the description oi the land leased
from Bahlah W. Weaver. as set out in the
written lease. is so indefinite and uncer-
tain as to render the contract void. More
fully stated. the position of the appellant
is (1) that the lease is void because there
is no description of the land proposed to
be leased, and that this defect cannot be
supplied by parolevidence; andin support
of their position they cite Iiingman v.
Kelly. T Ind. 717; Howell v. Zerbce. 26 lml.
21-i; Pulse v. Miller, 81 Ind. 191; Baldwin
wu.ous,sv.-19
v. Kerlln. 46 lnd. 426; Miller v. Campbell,
52 lnd. 125. And (2) that. the lessee hav-
ing taken possession by virtue of the writ-
ten agreement. he becomes a tenant by
virtue of his acts, and such tenancy is
from year to year. Railsback v. Walke,
81 Ind. 409; Friedhoff v. Smith, 13 Neb.
5. 12 N. W. Rep. 520; Vinz v. Beatty. 61
\\'is.6-15, 21 N. W. Rep. 787. (3) That as
to the “ three-cornered" tract, the lease he-
ing void, the right to take clay was a
mere license, not assignable and revocable
at pleasure. Armstrong v. Lawson. 73
Ind. 498. The authorities cited establish
the proposition that a lease or contract
for the conveyance of land must, to be en-
forced, contain a. description of the land;
that where the description. so far as it
goes, is consistent, but does not appear
to be complete, it may he completed by
extrinsic parol evidence, provided a new
description is not introduced into the
body of the contract: but that courts
never permit parol evidence to be given
first to describe the land, and then to ap-
ply the descriptiou. nor to contradict the
written ap;reement. but only in aid of it.
Baldwin v. Kerlin. supra. Tested by this
rule, the description of the "three-cor-
nered" tract of land seems to he so defi-
cient as to require an entirely new descrip-
tion to identify the land. and this cannot
be furnished by parol evidence. as it
would be substantially the making of a
new contract by parol. which is forbidden
by the statute of frauds. If this suit was
an action to enforce a contract entirely
executory in its character, the authorities
cltcd would be conclusive against the ap-
pellees. ltremains, therefore, to inquire as
to the effect of the partial performance
set out in the complaint, and proven on
the trial. The complaint proceeds upon
the theory that the parties made a parol
contract for the lease of the lands for the
period of 10 years; that the land to be
let was identified and pointed out, and
all the terms and stipulations of the con-
tract fully understood and agreed to, and
that afterwards the parties undertook to
reduce their agreement to writing. but
failed to sufficiently describe the land, and
that. therefore, the contract, resting part-
ly in writing and partly by parol, was in
law a. parol contract. (Pulse v. Miller, 81
lnd.li)l; Board v. Shipley, 77 lnrl. 553:)
and as such parol contract it was taken
out of the operation of the statute of
frauds by part performance. The right,
in n proper case, to enforce such a con-
tract. is impliedly admitted in Railshack
v. \\‘alke, 81 ind. 409. In Pom. Spec. Peri.
§ 101, it is said: “ As the statute speaks of
lands, or any in".crest in or concerning
them, contracts to lease are both included
within its terms. and are capable of being
partperformed so as to he taken out of the
operation of the statute." The case of
Fery v. Pfeifi'cr,18 Wis. is much in
point. where an agreement for a lease was
taken out of the operation oi the statute
by partial performance. Also Seaman v.
Ascherman, (\\'is.) 8 N. W. Rep. 818; Wal-
lace v.Scog;.'.'in, (()r.)21 Pac. Rep. 558: Mor-
rison v. Herrick,12l() Ill. 631. 22 N. E. liep.
537; Martin \'. Patterson. (S. L‘-.) 2 S. E.
Rep.85i). lnthelanguagcofBmu<snms,.l..
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ORAL E\'IDEYCE ACCOMPANYING WRITTEY DOCUMEYTS. (Case No. 100 
right to remove clay from the Po-called 
three-cornered piece of land, but they con-
tinued without molestation lo remove 
clav therefrom until the cloHe of tht> tile 
sea'eon; that Elmo're Weavet claims to 
have purchased, In February, 18N7, from 
Bahlah W •• twenty acres of land,coverlog 
and Including the so-called three-cornered 
tract of land, and since that time be and 
the defendant Ba blah have forbidden the 
plalotlftH from removing t'lay therefrom: 
that Underhill hllH sold und aMHlgne<l hie 
lnterePt In the contract and leaKe to the 
plaintiffs; that Elmore Weaver, who le 
the eon of Bablab W., had full knowl-
edge of tba mRklng of the contract and 
lease at the lime of the execution thl'reof, 
and of the exact location of said three-
cornered tract, and knew whe~ the same 
wae located and agreed upon tiy tht' par-
tle11, and bad full k11owledge of the Im-
provements, and thRt they bad mude the 
same on the faith of said contract and 
Jeaee, and foll knowled3e of the fact that 
Jt was ab1mlotely net.·e11eary fur them to 
have this tract In order to carry on their 
tile business, at the time he purchased the 
land; that the plaintiffs bad no other place 
from which to obtain clay for their tlle-
mlll, and that they cannot In that neigh-
borhood procure any other place from 
which to obtain the same.and that unless 
they can obtain said '!lay their contract of 
lease will become wholly valueless, and 
their tlle-mlll and Improvements will be 
wholly Jost; that thl'tr leiu1e has six years 
to run, and there le an alrnndance or cllly 
In the three-cornered piece to lBRt during I 
the time It bas to ran; that the defend-
ant Elmore Weaver forbade the r>laintlfffl . 
from l'nterlng on said th~-cornere1l piece 
of land, or 1·emovlnp: cl11y thert-from, nnd 
tore down the gate and brh11.r:t•-wey 
which the plaintiffs hnd couetl'nl'tl'd for the 
p111•pose of driving to Hald tract of laud, 
and set ftre to the bridite: and that be I 
now threate1111 that he will, by force and 
violPnce, keep the plalntlftH 11 wny from ea id 
tract, and from removing clay tJ1ert-from; 
and that the defendants Wea,·er 11ncl 
Weaver are, by force and threats or per-
sonal violence, preventing the plalt1tiff11 
from entering upon or removin~.day from 
said tract, and will continue to do so un 
leea enjoined by this court, to their lrrep. 
arable dama11:c; that the plnlntlff11 have 
fully complied with all the 11~1·c.-111eut11 I 
and stlpulatiun11 on their part, and huvP 
l'ro:nptly and fully Jl~ill tlwlr rent as 
11tlpoluted for In said lease, and th11t they 
have been damaged In the sum of $~.OllO. 
'.rhe prayer le for dumagee and an Injunc-
tion. · 
The objection to the eufflclency of the 
complRtnt pointed out by the appellant bi 
tba t the description of the laud leaHed 
from Bablab W. Weaver, as set out in the 
written lease, ts so lndt•ftnlte and un~~r­
tain as to render th~ contract void. More 
fully titated, the position of the uppellant 
le (1) that the lease le void because there 
Is no description of the land provoee<l to 
be leased, and that lhls dt>fPct cannot be 
llltJlplled by parol evl!lence; and In eo11port 
of their position thPy cite Dingman v. 
Kelly, 7 Ind. 717; Howell v. Zerbt'e, 26 Jud. 
214; l>ulse v. Miller, 81 Ind. UH; Baldwin 
W1L6U8,BV.-19 
v. Kerlin, 46 Ind. 426; Millt•r v. Campbell, 
6~ Ind. 12;;. And (2) that, the Jessee hav-
lnir; takt>n pOllaeBsion by virtue of the writ-
ten agreement, be becomes a tenant by 
virtue of bis acts, and each ten!lncy la 
from year to year. Ralh1back v. Walke, 
81 Ind. 409; 1''riedboft v. Hmltb, 18 Neb. 
5, 12 N. W. Rep. b20; Vinz v. Beatty, 61 
WIH. 645, 21 N. w. Rep,. 7t(7. (8) 'J'hat llB 
to the .. three-coruered ' tral't, the leas~ be-
lnir; void, the right to take clay was a 
mere Ucenee, not RHSigoable und revocnhle 
at pleasure. Armstrong v. I.111 w1to11, 78 
Ind. 498. The authorities chel1 establish 
the proposition that a lease or contract 
tor the convey•mce of land m1111t, to be en-
forced, conhlin a description of the land; 
that where the desc11ption, so far ae it 
p:oee, le consistent, bot dc>eti not appear 
to be complt>te, It may be completed by 
extrinsic parol evidence, l>rovlded a new 
dP.Scrlptton ts not Introduced Into the 
body of the contract: but that courts 
ne\·er permit parol e\·hlence to bP. given 
flret to deecrthe the land, and ther to 111>-
ply the deserlptlon, nor to contradict the 
written agreement, but only In nld of it. 
.Baldwin v. Kerlin. supra. Teste.l by this 
rule, the description of the "three-cor-
nered" tract of land Ret'mB to be so defi-
cient as to require an entirely new descrir>· 
tlon to Jdentlfy the land. and this cannot 
be fornh1hed by pawl evidence, as It 
would be substantially the making of !l 
new c11t1tl'act by parol, which Is forbidden 
by the Htatnte •>f fraudH. lf this suit wus 
an action to enforce a contract entirely 
executory In Its character, the authorltie• 
cited would be conclusive ag;alnet the ap-
pellees. It remains, therefore, to inquire as 
to the effect of the partial performance 
set out In the comtllalnt, and proven on 
the trial. The complaint proceeds upon 
the thPory thnt the purtles made a parol 
contract for the leaYe or the landfl for tlte 
period of 10 yearfl; that the lanll to be 
let was Identified and pointed out, and 
1111 the terms and etl1111latione of tbP. con-
tract fully understood 1:tnd agreed to, and 
that afterwards the parties undertook to 
re1luce their agreement to writing, bot 
failed to sufficiently deeerlbe thP. land, and 
thut, therefore, the contract, resting part· 
ly In writing an•l partly by parol, was In 
law a p11rol contract, (Pulse v. Miller, 81 
lnd. 191; Board v. Sbtpley, 77 lnrl. 003;) 
und us such pal'ol cunt1·act It w11e taken 
out of the operation of the statute of 
frnud11 liy part pel'lormnnce. 'l'he right, 
In a proper case, to t>nloree such a con-
tlw~t. ill lmr,lle<lly 1ulmltt<•1l In Railsback 
v. \\'1tlke, 81 Ind. 400. In Porn. 81,ec. Perr. 
§ 101, it le sui<l: "AK thP Htatute Kpeaks of 
hmde, or any In ~ere1<t In or concerning 
them, <'Ontructe tu lcnee are both lnrlmled 
within Its terms, and are capnl>le of bdng 
part 11t-rformed RO DH to he tukE'n out of the 
operdtlon of the statute." The "ase of 
Ft-ry v. Plelfft>r, 18 Wis. 535. Is much In 
polo t, where an agreement for a leaum was 
taken out of the operation of the statute 
l.Jy partial performunce. Aleo St-aman v. 
AHl'11erman, (Wis.) 8 N. W. Rep. 818: Wal-
lace v.Scogi.rin, (Or. ) 21 Pac. Hep. 058: Mor-
rison v. Ht-rrkk, 1:10 111. 631, :l'.l N. E . Hep. 
537; !\iurtin v. Patterson, (R lJ.) 2 S. E. 
Rep. 859. In the languuge of B1mKllHIRE, .J •• 
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in Swales v. Jackson, 26 N. E. Rep. 62,
(this term,) the appellees having “entered
into possession oi the real estate under
the contract, and having made lasting
and valuable improvements, it would be
inequitable and afraud to withhold the
title.” Inl \\'ood,Landl. & Ten. § 20U,it is '
said that “a. court of equity will decree a
specific performance of such contracts.not-
withstanding the statute of frauds. when
there has been such a part performance oi
the agreement that to refuse it would
work a fraud upon the party seeking its
specific execution. "
The only infirmity in the written lease
is its failure to suiiiclently describe the
leased premises.
out and agreed upon at and prior to the
after the appeliees took possession of the
same, and made lasting and valuable im-
provements. such as they would not have
made had they not relied upon the agree-
ment to hold the same for the full period
of 10 years. The agreement as to the
boundaries of the leased land, and its oc-
cupancy for four years. with the knowl-
edge and consent of the landlord,is anim-
portant element in the partial perform-
ance reiied upon; ior it furnishes clean-and
satisiactory evidence in favor of the appel-
iees. upon the only propmitlon not estab-
lished by the written instrument. The
misdescription oi the leased property
would not have furnished the tenants
with a defense, if they had been sued by
the landlord for rent for the time they oc-
cupied the property. Whipple v Shewal- .
ter, 91 Ind. 114. The practical location of
the boundaries of the leased premises.
coupled with the subsequent possession oi
the same by the tenants, by and with the
landlord's knowledge and consent, is a
suflicient location oi the property. Jack-
son v. Perrine. 35 N. J. La w, 137; Lush v.
Druse.-1 Wend. 313; Pierce v. Minturn, 1
Cal. 470; Richards \'. Snider, ll Or. 197. 3
Pac. Rep.177. While the rules oi construc-
tion to be applied in identifying bound- .
aries in a lease are the same as those ap-
plicable to grants in fee. it is common. cs-
pecialiy in the leasing oi farm lands, to use
less accuracy in the description of the prem-
ises, than in deeds conveying the fee; and
where the parties themselves put a prac-
tical construction on theconti-act.and the
premises are taken possession oiand occu-
pied under the lease by the consent of
both parties, it should be suiiicient to
take the contract out oi the operation of
the statute, where the only infirmity in
290
We areiniormed by the i
complaint that the premises were pointed i
the contract is the insufliciency of the de~
scription of the land. The court did not
err in overruling the demurrer to the com-
plaint.
The court made a special finding of the
facts and conclusions of law; bu t. as the
record fails to show that it was at the re-
quest oi either oi the parties, it is to be
treated as a general finding, (Hasl-elinan
v. Allen. 42 Ind. 257; 1 Work. Pr.§ 804;)
and consequently the court did not err in
its concin.~"=ions of law.
The only otherpoints urged in their brief
by counsel for the appellant are that the
court erred in admitting illegal evidence.
The first relates to the action of the court
in permitting the appellees to read in evi-
dence the exhibit purporting to be a copy
. of the written lease without first showing
making of the contract, and that soon '
the loss oi’ the original. It appears that
orhzinaliy but one copy was executed. but
afterwards the parties met. and drew oi!
a copy of the original, and all the parties
signed it, and the copy so made was de-
livered to the appellees. being the one
given in evidence. The new paper thus
made was. to all intents and purposes. a
duplicate, and was delivered to the appel-
lees to subserve the purposes of an original
instrument. At all events, it was a writ-
ten instrument signed by Bahlah W.
Weaver. and admissible against him and
his privies in estate.
Objection is also made to the action oi
the court in permitting witnesses to state
what the parties to the lease said to each
other prior to the execution oi the written
agreement which led to its execution. The
portion oi’ the record where these ques-
tions and answers are set out has not
been pointed out: but, if they had been.
we are unable to see how the court could
have held the complaint good. and thcn
‘ prevented the plaintiffs from introducing
the only class oievidence by which it could
be proven.
Lastly. it is said that evidence should
not have been received showing that there
was no clay in the neighborhood suitable
for making tile. except in one oi the tracts
leased. No objection is pointed out, ex-
cept that it was immaterial. The evi-
dence tended (i‘.l'l.‘L'U_Y to establish one of
the material allegations oi the complaint,
and was not only competent, but impor-
tant, to show the condition the appellees
were left in by the interference oi the ap-
pellant, and also to fix the damages they
were entitled to recover because of the'in-
teriercnce with lheirleuscd premises. he
lind no error in the record. Therefore the
judgment is aiiirmed.
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Case No. 100] PROOF. 
in Swalea v •• Jack1mn, 26 N. E. Rep. 62, 
(thlll term,) the a(JpPllees ha\"lng "eutered 
Into possession of the l"eal eHtRte undPr 
tlie contract, and having mn1IP laHtlng 
and valuahlo lmpron•o1l'11ts, It would be 
lnequitnhlP and ll fraud to wlthhold the 
title." Iul Wood,Landl. & Ten.§ 21.10,lt ls 
said that" a court of equity will ck>eree a 
specific pel"formanceof such cont1·nl·ti~. not-
wlthetundlug the Rtu.tute of frauds, when 
there hos bt'(•n such a pnrt performunce of 
the agreement that to refuse it would 
work a fraucl 11111111 the party 11eekln.K' lt11 
spe<:ltic execution." 
The onl~· Infirmity In the written lease 
le Its fnilu1·A to 11utficlentl.v describe the 
lea!led premiee11. \Ve are Informed U;\' thP 
complaint that the premhiee were pointed 
out anrl agreed upon at and prior to the 
maklni.c or the contract, and that ~oon 
after the np11ellt>ee took poeeeeRion of the 
same, oml made lasting and Yaluahle Im-
provements, such as tht'y would not have 
macle hacl they not relied upon the agree. 
ment to hold the same for the full pe1·lod 
of 10 yenl'fl. '!'he agreement ae to the 
boundaries or the lea,.ed land, and Its oc-
cupancy for four years, with the know). 
edge and const'ot or the landlord, le an Im-
portant element In the part.Jal perform-
ance relied upon: for It furnishes clear and 
satleractor.v evidence In favor of the a11vel-
leet1, upon the onl:v propnllitlon not eetub-
llRhecl liy the written Instrument. The 
mlsclt'Rcri11t.ion of the leased property 
would not have furnished the tl'nnnts 
Nitb a defense, if they had been sued by 
the lanrllord for rent for the time they oe-
cuplert l he 11ruperty. Whipple v 8hewal-
ter, IH lmJ. 114. Tbe practical location or I 
the boundaries of th11 leused premises, 
coupled with the suh,;equent 11ulll!eKsion of 
the same by the tf'nunts, by and with the 
luncllorcl'R knowledge and consent, Is a 
eutltclent JocRtlon or the propnty. J11ck-
eon v. Perrine, 35 N. J. Law, 13i; Lmih \", 
Druee, 4 Wend. 313; Pierce v. Minturn, 1 
Cal. 470; Uicburclw \', 8uider, 11 Or. Hl7, 3 
Puc. Rep. Iii. W hlle the rules of construc-
tion to be applied in Iden tlfyln;;i: bound-
aries In a lease are the same ue those a11-
plll•able to grants In fee. It le common, es-
pecially In the leu11lng of farm lands, to use 
lees accuracy In the description or the prem-
ises, than In dee<li! conveying the f~; nnd 
where the parties themseh·e11 put u prac-
tical construl·tlon on thecontract.aud the 
premlweR are taken p"esession or and 1wcu-
pled uncler the lease by the conHent of 
both parties, it should be sufficient to 
take the contract out of the operation of 
the statute, where the only Infirmity In 
200 
the con tract le the lnsufficlPucy of the dtc"-
scrlr1tlon of thl' land. The court ctld not 
err In overrullni: tbe demurrer to the com-
plaint. 
'l'he court macle a speelal ftndln~ of the 
facts and conclusions of htw: hut, as the 
record falls to show that It. WHH ut tne re-
quest of el th er of the pu rtle11, It i11 tu be 
trenterl as a j{eneral fincllng, ( HnH,;eJman 
v. Allen. 42 Ind. 257; 1 Work, Pr.§ 804;) 
and conHequently the court did not err In 
ft& COUCIU>llOllFI of law. 
'!'he onl,\· utberpolnte urged In their brief 
by counsel for the appellant are that the 
rourt erred In admitting illpgul evidence. 
The first relates to the Hction of the court 
In permitting the a11r1elleP.e to read in evi-
dence the exhibit p11r11ortln1r to be n eop.; 
of the wrlJ:ten lease without first shuwin1' 
the losri of the original. It a11pe11re lhat 
orhrinally but one copy WAR executed, but 
Rfterwar•lR the partiPs met, and rlrew off 
a cop~· of the original, and all the parties 
signed It, and the copy so made w ae de-
ll vered to th1• appellees, helr.K the one 
given In e\"l<lence. The uew paper thus 
made was, tu all intents and pnrposee, a 
duplicate, and was delivered to the appel-
lees to eubserve the 1mrposes of an original 
Instrument. At u.11 events, It wue a writ-
ten Instrument ehine<l by BahlRb W. 
Wea\'Pr, and a!lmls11ible against him and 
hli! privies In estate. 
Objeetton Is nl"o made to the action of 
the court Jn r>ermlttlng wltnellReR to 11tate 
what the parties to the lease saltl to each 
other prior to the execution of the writ tPn 
al(l'l'Clllent which led to Its execution. l'he 
portion or the recorrl where theMe quea-
t1nne aml answers are set out has not 
bePn pointed out: but, If they bad been, 
we are unable to see how the court could 
have held the complaint good, nnd then 
Jlreveutetl the plalntUfe from lntroducln,; 
the only chteR of evidence by which It could 
be proven. 
Lastly, It le said that evidence should 
not have been recel\"ecl showing that there 
WllB no clay In the nelghborhoocJ Rultable 
for making tile, l'xcept in one of the trftcts 
lt>tuied. No ohjectlon Is pointed out, ex-
cept that it was Immaterial. Tb11 evl-
dt"11ce tended cl:r<'<"ll.Y to l'Rtal>llsh uue of 
the 11111teriHI alh•gation11 or the complaint, 
and was not only cumpeten t, bat lmrmr-
1 tunt, to ;ihow tlm condition the appellees 
were lt>ft In b;r the luterferPnre of lhe R!I· 
pellaor., and ab10 to fix the rtumageH they 
were entitled to recover becHuse of the'in-
terferl•nct' wl th lht'ir lensed prc.:miiseH. "e 
tlnd no error In the recurll. Therefore the 
judgment le nffirmed. 
‘ATTESTED DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVED BY W.lTNESS. [Case N0. 101
RICHMOND & D. R. CO. v. JONES.
(9 South. 276, 92 Ala. 218.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. April 16, 1891.
Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson
county; JAMES B. HEAD, Judge.
Action by I). W. Jones against the Rich-
mon.l & llanville Railroad Company for
personal injuries alleged to have been
caused by defendant's negligence. There
were three counts in the complaint. The
first count sought to recover on the
ground that the injuries were caused by
reason oi defects in the condition of the
ways. works, machinery, or plant con-
nected with or used in the e|npl..»y oi de-
fendant. In the second count of the coin-
plaint the plaintiff based his right of re-
covery on the alleged negligence of the em-
ployes oi the defendant who had charge ‘
and control of the train by which plaiu- ‘
tiff was injured. and at the time of the ac-
cident. The third count was for failure of
the fireman on defendant's engine to
transmit plaintiff’s signal to the engineer.
The defendant pleaded the general issue,
and by special plea pleaded a written con-
tract of employment entered into between
the plainliff and the defendant on Febru-
ary l7, l&~9ll,—not quitetwo months before
the accident,-one of the terms of which
was in words as follows: “Rule 23. 'I‘he
conditions of employment by the compa-
ny are that the regularcompensation paid
for the services of elnployes shall cover all
risks incurred and liability to accident from
any cause whatever while in the service
of this company. If an employe is disa-
bled by accident or other cause, the right
toclaim compensation for injuries will not
be recognized. Allowances, when made in
such cases, will be as a gratuity, justified
by the circumstances of the case, and pre-
vious good conduct of the party. The
fact of remaining in the serviceol the com-
pany will be considered acceptance of
these conditions. All ofiicers employing
men to work for this company will have
these conditions distinctly understood and
agreed by each employe before he enters
the service of the company.” A demurrer
to the plea was sustained. There was
judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant
appeals.
James Weatlzerly, for appellant.
man & Harsh, for appellee.
COLEMAN, J. The suit was brought by
appellee to recover damages for personal
injury. For defense to the action by way
of special plea the defendant set up rule
No. 21!, \\'hich will be found in the state-
ment of the facts of the case. To this plea
a demurrer was sustained. In the case of
Railroad Co. v. Orr, lAla.l 8 South. Rep.
1:61), it is declared that “railroads cannot
stipulate for immunity from liability for
their own wrongful negligence. A rule
which imposes upon an employe to look
after and be responslblefor his own safety
contravenes the law itself which fixes the
liability of railroads for negligence caus-
ing injury or death to their evnployes."
The demurrer was properly sustained.
It is the duty of railroads to keep them-
selves reasonably abreast with improved
methods so as to lessen the danger attend-
B0 W-
ant on the service, and, while they are not
required to adopt every new invention,
it is their duty to adopt such as are in or-
dinary use by prudently-conducted roads
engaged in like business and surrounded
by like circumstances. Railway Co v.
Propst, 83 Ala. 518. 3 South. Rep. T64.
There have been such ad vaneemeuts in sci-
ence for the control of steam, and im-
provements in the machinery and appli-
ances used by railroads for the better se-
curity of life, limb, and property, it would
be inexcusable to continue the use of old
methods, macliinery, and appliances
known to be attended with more or less
danger, when the danger could be reason-
ably avoided by the adoption of the new-
er, and which are in general used by well-
regulated railroads. Not that it is re-
quired of them to adopt every new inven-
tion useful in the business. although it
may serve to lessen danger; but it is their
duty to discontinue old methods which are
insecure, and to adopt such improve-
ments and advancements as are in or-
dinnry use by prudently-conducted roads
engaged in like business and surrounded
by like circumstances. Railroad Co. v. Al-
len, TS Ala. 494. Applying this principle in
the case of Railway Co. v. Propst, 83 Ala.
526. 3 South. Rep. 764, the court field that,
“lithe draw-heads and bumpers used by
defendant were such as were employed by
many well-conducted roads, this would
repel all imputation of negligence founded
on their mere structure, although other
roads. even a majority oi them, adopted
a different pattern. Witnesses who have
sufficient knowledge of the subject may
testify to the general rules of railroads
on the subject. ” The same general princi-
ple is declared in the case of Railroad Co.
v. Hall, 87 Ala. 722, 6 South. Rep. 277. Un-
der these rules. we think it was proper to
inquire whether thedraw-heads used by de-
fendant when the injury occurred were
such as were usually used on well-re;.>,ulat-
ed railroads. The witnesses were shown
to be experts, and were competent to give
such testimony. It may be laid down
generally that objections to evidence,
which do not partlcularize or define the
grounds of objection, may be overruled.
Tile court is not bound to cast about for
the grounds upon which, in the minds of
counsel, they are rested. Dryer v. Lewis,
57 Ala. 551: Steele v. Tutwiler, Id. 113;
Oil Co. v. Perry. 55 Ala. 164, 4 South. Rep.
35. The rule is equally well established
that a general objection to 9Vl(]0l1('0,8 part
of which is legal, may be overruled. Fon-
ville v. State, (Ala.l 8 Soutl1.Rep.6R\'; Gid-
dens v. Bolling. (Ala.) 9 South. Rep. 274,
(present term :) Warren v. Wagner. 75
Ala. 18-“; Chambers v. Ringstafi, 69 Ala.
140. Most of the objections to the evi-
dence come under one or the other of these
principles, and there was no available er-
ror in overruling them.
Defendant's counsel. having the paper,
Exhibit A. in his hands, handed it to
plaintiff while on cross-examination as a
witness, and asked him ii he signed it.
Plaintlff’s counsel requested to see the
paper. which request defendnnt’s counsel
refused,saying he had not ofl'el'rd it in evi-
dence. The court stated that it should be
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ATTESTED DOCUME.NTS TO BE PUOVED BY WITNESS. [Case No. 101 
RICHMOND & D. R. CO. v. JONES. 
(9 South. 276, 92 Ala. 218.) 
Supreme Court of Alabama. April 16, 1891. 
ApJ>f'nl h'om circuit court, Jefterson 
count;·; JAMEi!' B. H~:AD, Judiie. 
Action by D. W. Jones against the Rlch-
monJ & J>anvllle Railroad Company for 
penmnal Injuries alle~e<l to have been 
cause<! by derendan t'tt negligence. There 
were tbree counts In the complaint. 'l'he 
tlnit connt songht to n.>co\·er on the 
ground that the lnjurlts were cRused by 
reason of defects in thH con<lltlon of the 
wa,\"K, works, machinery, or plant con-
nected with or used in the empL,y of de-
fendant. In the second count of the com-
plaint the plaintiff based his right of re-
covery on the alleged negligence of the em-
ployet1 of the defendant who bud chnrge 
and control of the train by which plaln-
tllf was lnjurt'd, and at the time of tile ac-
cident. The third count was for failure of 
the fireman on defendant's engine to 
transmit pl11lntllf's signal to the engh;eer. 
'l'he defendant plearled the general issm'!, 
and by special plea pleaded a wrlttP.n con-
tract of employment entered Into hetwt•en 
the plaint lff an<l the defenllaut on Febru-
ary 17, 1~90,-uot quite two month11 before 
the a.ccldent,-one of the terms of which 
was In wor<ls as follow11: "Rule 2.'J. Tile 
coru.litlons of employment by the compa-
ny are that the regulorcompeosatlun paid 
for the services of employee shall cover all 
risks incurred and llablllty to accident from 
any cause whatever while to the service 
of this company. If nu employe Is disa-
bled by acchlent or other cause, the right 
toclalm compensation lor Injuries wlll nut 
be recoJ(nlzed. Allowances, when mad .. In 
such casP.B, will be as a gratuity, justified 
by the circumstances uf the case, uud pre-
vious lE'OOd cond11ct of the purty. '!'be 
fact of remaining lu the service or the com-
pany wlll be com1hleretl acceptance of 
these conditions. All officers employing 
men to work for this company will have 
theRe conditions distinctly understood and 
agreed by each employe before he enterH 
the service of the company." A demurrer 
to the plea was sustained. There was 
judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant 
appeals. 
James H-·eat/Jerly, for appellant. Bow-
mau & Hal'Bl1, for a11pellee. 
COLEMAN, J. 1'he suit was bron11:ht hy 
appellee to recover damages for l'ersonul 
Injury. For deh.>nse to the uctlon by way 
or speclal plt>a the <lelendant set up 1·ule 
No. 2:1, whl<·h will be found In thA stute-
ment of the facts of the case. To this plea 
a rlemurrer was sustained. In thl:' case of 
RniJroad Co. v. Orr, !Ala.) 8 South. Rep. 
360, ft h1 drclarerl that "rallroach1 cannot 
stipulate for immunity from iiablllty for 
their own wrougful TIPJdll(encP. A rul11 
which lmpm1es upon an e111ploye to look 
after and he respon11lblefor his own safety 
contravenes the law Itself which flz:ps the 
Jlahillty uf railroads for nejtllgence co us. 
inst Injury or death to their e•uployes." 
'l'he demurrer was lJropP.rl:v 1<U!ltttinerl. 
It Is the duty of rallroa<111 tu lteep them-
seh·t>a reusouably abreast with lmprnvp<) 
methods BO as to lessen thednnger attend-
ant on the service, and, while they nre not 
l'PqufrPd to adopt evP.ry new Invention, 
Jt le their duty to ndopt such aK are In or-
dinary use by prudently-conducted roads 
engaged In like buslnese and surronnaed 
by like clrcumstunces. Hallway Co v. 
Propst, 83 Ala. fil8, 8 South. Hep. i64. 
There have been such adnmcements In sc:i-
ence for the control uf steam, and Im· 
provements in the tna('hlnery and appll-
ancPH used by railroads for the better se-
curity of life, limb, and property, It would 
be liiexcusable to continue the use or old 
methodK, machlner~· . an<l appllnnces 
known to be attended with more or less 
danger, when the dunger could be reason-
111.Jly avoided by ~he adoption of the new-
er, and which are In ge11eral used hy "ell-
regnlated railroads. Not that It IH re-
qulre1I of them to adopt every new ln-reu-
tlon u<ieful In the business. nlthough It 
may serve to lessen danger; hut It 111 their 
duty to discontinue old methcds which are 
Insecure, and to adopt such lmprove-
mP.nte and advancements as ure in or-
dlnnry use by prudently-conducted roads 
en1oru~erl In like buslne11s and surrounded 
by like clrcnmstanres. Railroad Co.\', Al-
len, 71' Ala. 494. Apply Ing this principle In 
the casf' of Railway Co. v. Propst, k3 Aln. 
626, 3 8outh. Rep. 764, the court lleld that, 
"If the drow-head11 aud bumpers usPd by 
defendant were such as were employed by 
many wPll·con<lucted roads, this would 
repel nil Imputation of negligence rounded 
on their mere structure, although other 
roudM. even a majority of them, adopted 
a rlllfereot pnttem. WltueHses who ha\•e 
11uffklent kuowledgt- of the subject may 
testify to the general rules of rnllroa<ls 
un the subjrct." 'l'hH same generol princi-
ple IH tler·lured in the case of Rallro.od Co. 
\". Hnll, 1'7 Ala. 722, 6 South. lfop.<ri7. Un-
der tht>se rules. we think It wn'! proper to 
Inquire whether thedraw-hearls UHt'lJ by 1le-
fentla11t when the Injury occmrred were 
such "11 were usually used on well-re~ulot­
ed rallro11<1s. The witnesses were shown 
to be experts, and WP.re comptitent to irlve 
1<11ch testimony. It may be laid duwn 
generally that objections to el"idence, 
wllich do not particularize or define the 
Jl:l'ounrls of ohjectlou, muy be overruled. 
The cuurt Is not bound to cast about for 
the grounds upon which, in the minllt.1 of 
rounsel, they are rested. Dryer v. Lewis, 
5i Alo. 551; St~le v. Tutwiler, II.I. 113; 
Oil Co. v. PP.rry, "5 Ala. 164, 4 8outh. Rep. 
63:i. The rule Is equally well established 
that 0 Jl;P.nerol Objection to evidence, R r111rt 
of which is lea;al, may he overrule1l. .F'on-
t'llle v. 8tnte, (Ala. I S 8outh. Rer1. 6R'I; Gld-
drns v. l3olllng, (Alo.) 9 South. HPJJ. 274, 
(present term;) Warren v. Wagner, 75 
Ala. l8i'I; Chambers v. Ulngstaff, 69 Ala. 
HO. Most of the objections to the evi-
dence come under oue or the oth~r uf these 
principles, 11nd thP.re was oo avalluble er-
rur lo ovPrruling them. 
DefP.ndunt's counsel. ha'f'lnic the paper, 
Exhibit A. In bis hands, handed It to 
plaintiff while 011 cro11s-examl11atloo us a 
witnt>s1<, and asked him If he slgnecl It. 
Plnlntlff'e couni>el requeHterl to 1we the 
poper. which rec1uest derenclnnt'" eounisel 
l'r'fllMf'tl, 11ayl11i;r; he hacl nut offert•d It In t•vl-
deuce. The court stated that It should be 
2Dl 
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shown to plaintiff's counsel when the pa-
per was offered in evidence. Plaintiff then
answered that it was his signature. The
defendant afterwards offered the paper in
evidence, to which the plaintiff objected,
on the grounds that there was an attest-
ing witness. and the execution of the pa-
per had not been properly proven. Up-
posing counsel have the right to object to
improper questions to witnesses, and the
rules of practice require them to specify
the grounds of objection. Any advantage
1aken,b_v which a party is deprived oi the
exercise of this right in the trial of a case
without neglect or fault on his part,
should not he used to his prejudice. If de-
fendant did not purpose to introduce the
paper in evidence, the question to the wit-
ness was improper. If it was the inten-
tion to offer it in evidence, then it should
have been submitted to opposing counsel,
so that, if he wished to object. the objec-
tions.-ould be made in proper form. The
ruling of the court sustaining the objec-
tion to the introduction of the paper is
supported also on other principles. The
case of Elierson v. State, 69 Ala. 3, after
stating the general rule that the attest-
ing witness should be called to prove the
execution oi an instrument, declares that
the rule extends to every private writing
which the parties may have chosen to
cause to be attested. ’l‘he witness is con-
sidered as the person selected and referred
to for the purpose oi proving the fact of
execution, and the facts and circumstan-
ces attendlnc; it; citing 1 Greenl. Ev. § 569.
So long as the evidence oi the subscribing
witness can be produced. it_ is the hcst—
the primary and only—evidence of execu-
tion. 'l‘he udmissions or declarations of
the parties themselves to the instrument
(not made in open court. or in writing,
for the purpose of a trial. when they are
the parties litigant) are not admissible for
this purpose. Russell v. Walker, 73 Ala.
317. it is contended that Exhibit A was
not offered in evidence as a contract
binding upon plaintiff. but merely to es-
tablish the existence of rule '20. and notice
to plaintiff, and for this purpose it was
admissible. The proposition contended
292
for necessarily must be that, the rule be-
ing incorporated in the contract as a part
of it, its existence and materiality as evi-
dence against the plaintifl may be estab-
lished by offering in evidence the contract
without legal proof oi its execution. The
reasoning is not sound. To establish the
existence of the rule and notice thereof the
defendant was forced to rely upon an un-
proven contract. lf the contract is ex-
cluded because its existence is not proven,
it cannot be said that admissions which
alone appear in the contract have been
proven. If plaintiff had not admitted his
signature. the paper would not have been
offered in evidence. The admission having
been improperly obtained. and the execu-
tion of the paper not proven, it was not
admissible for any purpose.
'1‘here is evidence that the running-
board upon which the evidence tends to
show the plaintiff was standing when in-
jured “was put there for the switchmen
to ride on. ” If this evidence is true, and it
was placed there to assist switchmen in
the performance of their duties. and they
were expected to use it for that purpose.
and the plaintiff in the discharge of his
duty as switchnlan was upon the run-
ning-hoard, rule No.20 could not be in-
voked to defeat plaintiffs action,so far as
the rule prohibits switchnicn from going
between the cars to couple or nncouple
them. l-lissong v. Railroad Co., (Ala.) 8
South. Rep. 776: Railroad Co. v. Walters,
(Ala.l Id. 357.
The evidence tended to show that it was
the duty of flrcmcn to receive signals from
switchmen, and transmit them to the en-
gineer. lf the injury to plaintiff was
caused by negligence of the fireman in
transmitting the signals to the engineer,
given to him for that plil‘D0se by the
plaintiff in the discharge of his duty as a
switchman,such injury is clearly within
the provision of the enlpioye's act.
There was no error in the charges given
by the court. and those asked for by the
defendant, which were refused, were not in
accord with the principles oi law herein de-
clared. and were properly refused.
Affirmed.
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Case No. 101] PHOOF. 
shown to plaintiff's counsel when the pa-
J)E'r was offered lu evldeure. l'lalutltt then 
anMwered that It was hill Rl~nature. 'l'he 
derendant nfterw11rd11 offered the paper lo 
evidence, tu whh;h the plaintiff olJJl'CtPcJ , 
on the grounrl11 that there was an uttcst-
lnp: wltneea, and the execution of the ru1-
per had not been properly provPn. Op-
1>osi11g counsel have the ri,11.ht to object to 
Improper questions to wltne>.1eeH, und the 
rules of pra('tfce require them to tipecify 
the grom11IH of objection. Any adva'1tage 
taken, by which a party le deprived of the 
exercise or th\," right In the trial of a case 
without neglect or fault on his part, 
should not be utit!d to hl11 prejudice. If de-
fenllaut did not purpm1e to Introduce the 
paper In evidence, the question to the wit· 
ness was lrupropPr. If It wa11 the Inten-
tion to offer It In ev:llence, then It shoulrl 
have been submitted to opposing counsel, 
so that, If he wh1he1J tu object, the objec-
tion ':ould be ma Ile In proper form. The 
ruling or the court eustnlnln1ot the objec-
tion to the Introduction of the paper le 
supportell also on other prlncl11le11. The 
C&He or Ellerson v. State, 69 Ala. 3, after 
stating the ~eneral rnlfl th11t the attest-
ing witness Hhould be callt>d to pro\·e thP. 
execution or au Instrument, declares thut 
the rule extends to every private writing 
which the parties may have choMen to 
cnuee to he attetited. 'l'he witness Is con-
sidered as the p~rson Helected and refe1•1·ed 
to for the pur11ui;e of prm•lnJt the fitct of 
execution, and the fucte und clrenmetan-
ct>B attendln~ It; citing 1 Greenl. Ev.§ !'>69. 
So long as the evidence of the 11ubMcrihing 
wltneMs can b~ produced. It Is the lwHt...:.. 
tbe primary and ouly-e,·ldenc~e of execu-
tion. 'l'he 11dml11slonl!I or del'laratlonH of 
the parties themselves to the Instrument 
(not made in open court, or In writing, 
for the p11rp0He of a trial, when they are 
the parties lltil!l'unt) are not nllmlMSible for 
thlH purpose. RUH1-4ell v. Wttlker, 73 .Ala. 
317. Jt ls contended that Exhibit A wa1-1 
not offered In e\·ldence as a contract 
binding upon plaintiff, but merely to es-
tabllHh the existence of rule 20. and notice 
to plnlntla, and for this purpoHe It wa11 
admll!lslble. The proposition contended 
202 
for necessarily must be thnt, the rule 00. 
ln1r Incorporated In the contract as a part 
of It, Its existence and mnterlallty as C't'I· 
dence ai:calnst the 11lalntur may be estab-
llshPd hy offering In evidence the contract 
without legal 1n·oor of Its execution. 'J'he 
rea1mnlng is nut sound. To establish the 
existence of the rule and notice the1"eof the 
defendant was forced to rely upon nn un-
proven contract. Ir the cuntrnct lit ex-
cluded because Its exlstenr.e le not proven, 
It cannot be said that aclmlel!lone which 
alone appear In the contract have been 
proYen. If pl11lntlff hod not admitted his 
elgnnture, the paper would not have bt.<en 
offered In evidence. Thendmlsslon having 
been lmpropt'rly obtained, and the execu-
tion or the paper not pro\'eD, it WBH not 
admissible for any purpoMe. 
1'here la e-rldenrt- that the runnlng-
bonrd upon which the evidence tendl! to 
show tlu~ plalutlft wall 11tandlng when In-
jured" was put there fur the 11wltchme11 
to ride on. " If thl11 evlchince ls true, and It 
wuR placed there to a11Slst switchmen In 
the performance of their duties, and they 
\\'~re t>xpected to use It for that purpose, 
Rn<l the plaintiff In the discharge of hl11 
duty aH switchman was upon the run· 
nlng-honrd, rule No. 20 could not be In-
voked to defeat plal11tlff'11 t1ctlon,so far a" 
the rule prohibits switchmen from going 
between the care to couple or uncouple 
them. Hll!eong v. Railroad Co., (Ala.) 8 
8outb. Rep. 776; Railroad C'o. v. Walters, 
(Alo.) Id. 357. 
The evidence tendNI to show thaL It wa11 
the duty of firemen to receh·e 11ig11alH from 
11wltchmen, aml tr1rnsmlt them to the eu-
glm!t'r. If the Injury to plulntlft WBB 
cauHed by negligence of the fireman In 
transmitting the alp;nale to the engineer, 
given to him for that pnrpuse hy the 
plaintiff In the dlHchorge of hie duty as a 
l!Wltchman, such Injury le clearly within 
the provltilon of the e111ploye'e act. 
There was nu error In the charge!! given 
by the court, and thm1e asked for by tho 
deren<lnnt, which were rerueed, were not In 
ft('cord with the (ll'lncipleH of law herein de-
clnrecl, and were properly refused. 
Atfi rm ed. 
AT'l‘ES'l‘ED DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVED BY WITNESS.
[Case No. 102
STEBBINS v. DUNCAN et al.
(2 Sup. Ct. 313, 108 U. S.
Supreme Court of the United States. March 5,
1883.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the Northern district of Illinois.
Geo. O. Ide and John W. Ross, for plaintiff
in error. Thomas Dent, for defendants in er-
ror.
Mr. Justice WOODS, delivered the opinion
of the. court.
This was an action of ejectment, originally
brought by William B. Morris, in the circuit
court of the United States for the Northern
district of Illinois, against Howard Stebblns,
the plaintiff in error, for the recovery of a
quarter section of land, originally situate in
Madison county, Ill., but, when the suit was
begim, situate in Stark county. Before the
flnal trial of the cause. to-wit, on January
22, 1879, the death of the plaintiif was sug-
gested, and the devisees named in the last
will were made parties, as appears by the fol-
lowing entry upon the record of the court:
“Now come the parties by their attorneys,
and Thomas Dent, Esq., the attorney of the
plaintiff, suggests to the court the death of
William B. Morris. and that Maria L. Dun-
can, Harriet B. Cooledge, and Helen Cooledge
are the devisees of said deceased; and, on mo-
tion of the plaintiffs attorney, it is ordered
by the court that said devisees, Maria L.
Duncan, Harriet B. Cooledge, and Helen
(foolcdge, be made plaintiffs herein.”
The defendant pleaded the general issue.
The cause was tried by a jury, who returned
a verdict for the plaintiffs. upon which judg-
ment was rendered in their favor for the
lands in controversy. To reverse that judg-
ment, the defendant in the circuit court has
brought the case here upon writ of error. A
bill of exceptions was taken upon the trial,
from which the following statement of the
case is made:
Disregarding the order in which the testi-
mony was introduced. and arranging it
chronologically. the plaintiffs below. to prove
title in themselves. offered the following evi-
deuce:
(1) An exempllfication of a patent from the
United States to one John J. Dunbar for the
lands in controversy; (2) a certified copy of
a deed for the same lands from John J. Dun-
bar to William Prout, dated January 6, 1818,
said copy being certified to have been made
February 3, 1875; (3) a certified copy of a
deed for the same lands from William Prout
to Joseph Duncan. dated Hay 2, 183-l, and
recorded in said county October 29, 1838; (4)
certified copy of a decree in chancery in the
United States circuit court for the district of
Illinois, dated June 9. 1846. rendered in a
cause wherein the United States were com-
plainants and the widow and heirs of Joseph
Duncan defendants. and of the proceedings
under said decree by which the premises in
controversy in this suit were sold to the Unit-
ed States; (5) certified copy of the deed to
the United States under said decree for the
same premises. made by William Thomas,
commissioner, dated August 12, 18-16, and re-
corded January 17, 1848; (6) certified copy
of a deed for the same premises, dated De-
cember 28, 1847, and recorded June 5, 1848, to
William W. Corcoran, executed by R. H. Gil-
lett, solicitor of the treasury, in behalf of the
United States; (7) certified copy of a deed for
the same premises, dated December 20, 1867,
and recorded March 12, 1868, from William
‘V. Corcoran to William B‘. Morris; (8) certi-
fled copy of the will of William B. Morris and
of the probate thereof, from which it appear-
ed that Maria L. Duncan, Harriet B. Cool-
edge, and Helen L. Cooledge, the plaintiffs,
were his residuary legatees.
To sustain the title, which the plaintiffs
contended that they derived through these
documents, they offered other evidence, which
will be noticed hereafter, but they offered no
evidence of the death of ivilliam B. Morris,
the original plaintiff. since the certified copy
of his will and of the probate thereof, and the
letters testamentary issued thereon.
The defendant Stebbins. to show title in
his lessor, offered in evidence the following
title papers:
(1) An exemplification of a patent by the
United States to John J. Dunbar, dated Janu-
ary 6. 1818, for the lands in controversy; (2)
a certified copy from the recorder's ofiice in
Stark county, 111., in which county the land
is situate, of a deed, dated January 6, 1818,
from John J. Dunbar to John Frank, convey-
ing said land in fee, and recorded in said -
county June 18. 1870; (3) other title deeds,
by which the title passed from the heirs of
John Frank to Benson S. Scott; (-1) the stipu-
lation of plaintiffs that Stebbins, the defend-
ant, was in possession of the land in contro-
versy at the commencement of the suit under
said Benson S. Scott as his tenant only, and,
at no time, under any other claim.
No exceptions were taken by the plaintiifs
to the introduction of these title papers by
the defendant.
’i‘hc real contest in the case was between
the title of the plaintiffs deduced through the
deed of Dunbar to Prout, and their subse-
quent muniments of title put in evidence. and
the title of defendant derived through the
deed of Dunbar to Frank, and the subsequent
conveyances put in evidence by him.
The defendant was in possession of the
premises sued for. His evidence, which was
not excepted to, gave him a prima facie title,
and. unless the plaintiffs showed abettertitlc,
they should not have recovered the lands
in controversy. It is, therefore, only neces-
sary to consider the title which the plaintiffs
claim to have shown in themselves. The er-
rors assigned all relate to the admission by
the court below of the evidence offered by the
plaintiffs to sustain their title, and the charge
of the court to the Jury upon the eifect of
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A'fTESTED DOCUME:'iTS TO DE PIWVED BY WITNESS. [Case No. 102 
STEBBI:\S T. DUXOAN et nl. 
(2 8111>. Ct. 313, 108 U. S. 32.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. March 5, 
'1883. 
In error to the circuit court of the United 
States for the Northt>rn district of llllnols. 
Geo. O. Ide and John W. Ross, for plalntltT 
111 error. Thomas Dent, tor defendants In er-
ror. 
Mr .. Justice WOODS, dell'\"ered the opinion 
of the <"ourt. 
This was an action of ejectment, originally 
brouirht by William B. Morrie, In the circuit 
<·om"t of the United Stntes for the Northern 
dist11ct of Illinois, against Howard 8tebblns, 
the plalntUr In eITor, for tbe recovery of a 
quarter section of land, originally situate in 
Madison county, Ill., but, wllen the suit was 
begun, situate In Stru·k county. Before the 
final trial of the cause. to-wit, on January 
22, 1879, the death of the plnlntitr was sug-
gested, and the devlsees named hr the last 
wlll were made parties, as appPnrii by the fol-
lowing entry upon the record of the eout't: 
"Now rome the parties by their attorneys, 
and Thomm! Dent, l~sq., the attorney of the 
plaintiff, suggPsh1 to the <'ourt the death of 
William B. Morris, and that Marla L. Dun-
can, Harriet B. Cooledge, and Helen Cooll:'dge 
are the de,·leees of said de1·1>11sed; and, on mo-
tion of the plaintiff's attorney, It ls onlered 
by the court that said devleees, :'Ilaria L. 
Dun<'an, Harriet B. Cooledge, and Heleu 
CoolPdge, be made plalntlfl's herein." 
The defendant pleade1l the general Issue. 
The cause was tried by 11 jury, wl,lo returned 
a verdict for the plalntlffi,.;. upon which judg-
ment was rendered In their favor for the 
lands In contro'\"ersy. To reverse that judg-
ment, the defendant lu the circuit court bus 
brought the case here upon writ of eft'or. A 
hill of exceptions was taken upon the triul, 
from whkh the following stntement of the 
ease Is made: 
Disregarding the order In which tile testi-
mony was lntrodnc•ed, and arranging It 
<'hronologlcully. thP 11lalutlfl's below. to pro\'e 
title In themeeh·es. otfel'e<l the folluwlng evi-
dence: 
(1) An exempllfi<'atlon or 11 patent from the 
United Stutes to one John J. Dunbar for tile 
lands In c•ontroversy; (2) a certified copy of 
a deed for the same lands from .Tchn J. Dun-
bar to William Prout. clatt>d Jnnuury 6, 1818, 
Mid copy being certlli••tl to have been matle 
J<'ebruary 3, 1875; (3) a certified copy of a 
deed for the same lands from William Prout 
to Joseph Dunc·an. dnted :\Illy 2, lS:H, and 
recorded In said county October 29, 18:!8; (-1) 
certified copy of a decree In chan<·ery In the 
lJnlted 8tates circuit court for the district of 
Illinois, dated June 9. 18-lf). 1·pndered in a 
cauRe wherein the United Stutes were com-
plainants and the widow and heirs of Joseph 
Duncan defendantP., and or the proceedlng-s 
under said decree by which the premises Ju 
conh'Overey In this suit were sold to the Unit-
ed States; (5) certified copy of the deed to 
the United Stutes under said decree for the 
same prl'mlses. made by 'Vllllam Thomas, 
commissioner, duted August 12, 18-16, and re-
corded January 17, 18-18; (6) certified copy 
of a deed for the same premises, dated De-
cember 28, 1847, and recorded June 5, 18-18, to 
Wllllam W. Corcoran, executed by R. H. Gil-
lett, solicitor of the treasury, In behalf of the 
United States; (7) certified copy or a deed for 
the same premises, dated December 20, 1867, 
and recorded March 12, 1868, from "\Vllllam 
W. Corcoran to Wllllam B: Yorrls; (8) certi-
fied copy of the will of Wllllam B. Morrie and 
of the probate thereof, from which It appear-
ed that Marla L. Duncan, Harriet B. Cool-
edge, and Helen L. Cooledge, the plalntltrs, 
were his residuary legatees. 
To sustain the title, which the plalntltTs 
contended that they derived through these 
documents, they ottered other evidence, which 
wlll be noticed hereafter, but they ottered no 
evidence of the death of ·wmlnm B. '.\!orris, 
the original plnlntlll', sh)('e tht> certified copy 
ot hie will and of the probate thereof, and the 
lettPrs testamentary Issued thereon. 
The defendant Stebbins. to show title ln 
hls lessor, oft'ered In evidence the following 
title papers: 
(1) An exempllftc·ntlon of a patent by the 
United StatPs to .John .J. Dunbar, elated .Janu-
ary fl. 1818, f01· the ltmds In controversy; (2) 
a eel'tified CO(IY from the recorder's office In 
Stark county, Ill., ln whkh county the laml 
ls situate, of a deetl, dated January 6, 1818, 
from .John J. Dunbnr to John Frank, convey-
ing said l:md In fee, and recorded In said 
<'ounty .June 18, 1870; (3) other title deeds, 
by which the title passed from the heirs of 
John Frank to Benson S. Scott; (-1) the stipu-
lation of plaintiffs that Stebbins, the defend-
ant, was In possession of the land In contro-
versy at the commencement of the suit under 
salcl Benson S. Scott as hie tenant only, and, 
at no time, under any other claim. 
No exceptions were taken by the plaintiffs 
to the Introduction of these title papers by 
the defendant. 
'fltl' 1·e11! <·ontest In the case was between 
the title of the plalntllt'11 deduced through the 
deed of Dunbar to Prout, and their subse-
quent muulments of title put In e'\"lden<'e, and 
thP title of defendant derived through the 
<lt•Ptl of Dunbar to F'rank, and the subsequent 
eonveyancee put In evidence by him. 
The defendant was In possession of the 
prt>mlees sued for. His evidence, which wns 
nut excepted to, gave him a prime faele title, 
and. unl-e:;s the plnlntl1Isshowed 11 better title, 
th<·~· should not h11ve recovered the lands 
in t•ontroversy. It Is, therefore, only neces-
t~ary to consider the title which the plalntlfl'e 
clnim to ha'\"e shown In themselves. The er-
rors nssigned all relate to the admission by 
the court below of the el"ldence offered by the 
)llalntiffs to sustain their title, and the charge 
of the court to the ju1·y upon the effect ot 
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that evidence. These assignments of error 1 We have been referred to no decision of the
we hall now proceed to consider.
The court admitted as evidence tending to
prove the death of \Villian1 B. Morris, the
original plaintiff, the duly-certified copy of
his will, and of the probate thereof in the
probate court of the county of Suffolk, in the
state of Massachusetts, and of the letters tes-
tamentary issued thereon, and the court char-
ged the jury, in effect, that this evidence, un-
contradicted, was suflicient to show the death
of Morris. The admission of this evidence
and the charge of the court thereon are as-
signed for error.
Wliether the evidence objected to was or
was not competent and suflicient to prove
the death of Morris, it was clearly compe-
tent, the death of Morris being proved, to
show title in the plaintiffs. The objection
to its admissibility must, therefore, fall, if
there was other evidence to show prima
facie the death of Morris. We think that
the suggestion in the record of the death of
Morris, and the order of the court making
his devisees parties, was sutiicient for this
purpose.
Section 10 of chapter 1 of the Revised Stat-
utes of Illinois, p. ‘J4 (Hurd, 1830), provides
that “when there is but one plaintiff, peti-
tioner, or complainant in an action, proceed-
ing, or complaint in law or equity, and he
shall die before final judgment or decree,
such action, proceeding, or complaint shall
not, on that account, abate if the cause of
action survive to the heir, devisee, executor,
or administrator of such decedent; but an_v
of such to whom the cause of action shall
survive may, by suggesting such death upon
the record, be substituted as plaintiff, peti-
tioner, or complainant, and prosecute the
same as in other cases."
The Suggestion of the death of Morris, the
sole plaintiff, was made in this case, as the
record shows, by counsel for the devisees,
both parties being present, and the court-
made the order, '\vith0ut objection, that the
devisees be made plaintiffs in the case. We
think that this suggestion, made without ob-
jection, and the order of the court thereon,
settles prima facie, for the purposes of this
ease, the fact of the death of the original
plaintiff. The statute provides upon whose
suggestion of the death of a sole party plain-
tiff the court shall make his heir or devisee,
etc., plaintiff in his stead. It certainly can-
not be the fair construction of the statute
that a party may stand by and see the sug-
gestion of the death of the opposing party
entered of record, and his heir or devisee
substituted in his stead, and upon tlnal trial
require further proof of the death. at least
without some notice of his purpose to, raise
that particular issue. The death of the
plaintiff, after the order of the court, may be
considered as settled between the parties for
that ease, unless some motion is made or is-
sue ralsed on the part of the defendant by
which the fact of the death is controverted.
supreme court of Illinois where a different
rule has been announced.
Hillikcn v. Martin, 66 Ill. 17, cited by coun-
sel for defendant, the court merely decided
that where a party plaintiff had died and
his heirs were substituted in his place, they
must prove that the person under whom they
claimed was seized of the title and that
they were his heirs. But the report of the
case clearly shows that the point now under
consideration was neither decided nor touch-
ed. We think, therefore, that the ruling and
charge of the court below did not prejudice
the defendant.
The next assignment of error relates to the
admission in evidence by the court of the
certified copy of the deed from Dunbar to
Prout, and the testimony offered by the
plaintiff to sustain such copy. The deed pur-
ported to be a conveyance, with covenants of
general warranty, by Dunbar to Prout, of the
land in controversy, for the consideration of
$80. it recited that Dunbar was the pat-
entee thereof, and set out the patent in full.
The following is a copy of the in testimonium
clause of the deed, of the signatures of the
grantor and witnesses, the acknowledgment.
atiidavlt of the grantor of his identity, his
receipt for the purchase money, memoran-
dum of registration. and certificate of the re-
corder of deeds for Madison county, Ill.:
“In witness of all the foregoing I have here-
unto affixed my hand and seal, at Washing-
ton city, in the county of Washington and
District of Columbia, this sixth day of Jan-
uary, one thousand eight hundred and eight-
een. John J. Dunbar. [Seal.]
"Signed, sealed, and delivered in til: pres-
ence of
"Samuel N. Smallwood.
“Joseph Cassin."
“District of Columbia, County of , 5a.;
"Be it remembered that on this sixth day
of January. 1818, the above-named John J.
Dunbarr, who has signed, sealed, and deliv-
ered the above instrument of writing. per-
sonally came and appeared before us, the un-
dersigned justiees of the peace, and acknowl-
edged, in due form of law, the same to be
his free act and deed, for the purposes there-
in set forth, and also gave his consent that
the same should he recorded whenever it
might be deemed necessary. In witness of
all which the'said has hereunto affix-
ed his name and has undersigned the same.
his
"John X J. Dunbarr.
mark.
"Acknowledged before
“Samuel N. Smaliwood.
“Joseph Cassin.”
“I, John J. Dunbarr, do declare upon oath
that I am the same person intended and
named in the above deed, dated the sixth
day of January, 1818, and more particularly
in the patent therein recited at length, and
In the case of
29-1
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
08
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Case No. 10..l] PHOOF. 
that evidence. These aeslgnments of error 
we shall now proceed to consider. 
The court udmltted as evidence tending to 
l>rove the death of William B. Morris, the 
01·iginnl plaintilt', the duly-certified copy of 
his will, and or the probate thereat In the 
probate court or the county or Sult'olk, In the 
state or Maesnchusetts, and of the letters tes-
tamentary Issued thereon, and the court char-
ged the jury, In elt'ect, that this evidence, un-
contmdlcted, was sufftclent to show the den th 
of Morris. The admission of this evidence 
and the charge of the court thereon are as-
signed for error. · 
Whether the evidence objected to was or 
was not competent and suWclent to prove 
the death of llorrls, It was clearly compe-
tent, the death of Morris being proved, to 
show title In the plalntltrs. The objection : 
to Its admissibility must, therefore, fall, It I 
there was other evidence to show primn 
tacle the death of llorrls. We think that 
the suggestion In the ri>cord of the dt>uth of 
Morris, and the order of the court muklng 
his devlsees parties, was sumclent for this 
purpose. 
Section 10 of chapter 1 of the Revised Stat- , 
utes of llllnols, p. V4 (Hurd, 18SO), provides 
that "when there Is but one plaintiff, peti-
tioner, or complalnnnt In an action, proceed-
ing, or complaint In law or equity, and he 
shall die before tlnal judgment or decree, 
such action, proceeding, or complaint shall , 
not, on that account, abate if the cause ot 
action survive to the heir, devlsee, executor, 
or administrator of such dt.-cedent; but any 
of such to whom the cause of action shall 
survive may, by suggesting such death upon 
the record, be substituted as plalntUr, peti-
tioner, or complainant, and prosecute the 
same as In other cases." 
The suggestion of the death of Morris, the 
sole plalntllt', was made In this case, as the 
record shows, by counsel for the devlsees, 
both parties being present, and the court 
made the order, "without objection, that tllc , 
devlsees be made plaintiffs In the case. We ' 
think that this suggestion, made without ob-
jection, and the order of the court thereon, 
settles prlma facle, for the purposes of this 
ease, the fact of the death of the original 
plaiutllt'. The statute provides upon whose 
suggestion of the death of a sole party plain-
tiff the court shall make his heir or devlsee, 
E>tc., pin intltr In his stead. It certainly can-
not be the f11lr com~truction of the statute 
that a party may stand by and see the sug-
gestion of the death of the oppoi-;lug party 
entered of record, and bis heir 01· devlsee 
substituted In his sti>nd, ancl upon tlnnl trial 
require further proof of the death. ut l!'nst 
without some notice of bis purpose to. rnlse 
that particular lsime. The death of the 
plaintiff, after the order of' the court, mny be 
eonshlered as settlc>d between the parties for 
that ease, unless some motion Is mnlle or Is-
sue raised on the part of the defendant by 
which the tact of the death Is controverted. 
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We have been referred to no declslon of the 
supreme court of Illinois where a dltrerent 
rule has been announced. In the case of · 
Milliken v. llartln, 66 Ill. 17, cited by coun-
sel for defendant, the court merely decided 
that where a party plaintiff bad died and 
his heirs were substituted In his pince, they 
must pl'Ove that the person under whom they 
claimed was seized of the title and that 
they were his heirs. But the rE>port of the 
case clearly shows that the point now under 
consideration was neither deelded nor touch-
ed. We think, therefore, that the ruling and 
charge of the court below did not prejudice 
the defendant. 
The next aBBlgnment of error relates to the 
admlBBlon In evidence by the court of the 
ce111tled copy of the deed from Dunmr to 
Prout, and the testimony olrered by the 
plaintiff to sustain such copy. The deed pur-
ported to be a conveyance, with covenants of 
general warranty, by Dun'!Jar to Prout, of the 
land In controversy, for the consideration of 
~~- It recited that Dunbar was the p&t-
entee thereof, and set out the patent In full. 
The following Is a copy of the In testlmonlum 
clause of the deed, of the signatures of the 
grantor and witnesses, the acknowledgm<'nt. 
affidavit of the grantor of his Identity, his 
receipt for the purchase money, memoran-
dum of registration, and certificate of the re-
corder of dee<is for Madison county, Ill.: 
"In wltnees of all the foregoing I have bere-
unto atHxcd my hand and seal, at Washing-
ton city, In the county of Washington and 
District of Columbia, this sixth day of Jan-
uary, one thousand eight hundred and eight-
een. John J. Dunbar. [Seal.} 
"Signed, sealed, and delivered In th-: pree-
ence of 
"Sumuel :S. Smallwood. 
"Joseph Cassin." 
"DlstrlC:t of Columbia, County of --, a.: 
"Be It remembered that on this sixth day 
of January, 1818, the above-named John J. 
Dunbarr, who has signed, sealed, and deliv-
ered the above Instrument of writing. per-
sonally came and appeared before us, the un-
dersl~ed justices of the peace, and acknowl-
edged, In due form of law, the same to be 
bis free act and deed, for the purposes there-
in set forth, and also gave bis consent that 
the same should be recorded whenever lt 
might be d('(>med ne<•es1<ary. In wltneM of 
all which the · said -- has hereunto atHx-
ed his name and has undersigned the same. 
· his 
"John X J. Dunbe.rr. 
mark. 
"Acknowledged before 
"Samuel N. Smallwood. 
"Joseph Cassin." 
"I, John J. Dunbarr, do declare upon oath 
that I am the same person Intended and 
numcd In the nbo'l'f' deed, (ffttt>d the 11lxth 
day of January, lSlS, und more particularly 
In the patent therein rl'Clted at length, aud 
A'1"l'ES'i‘ED DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVED BY WITNESS.
[Case No. 103
further, that I was duly placed in possession
of the patent for the land conveyed in the
above deed, by receiving the same from the
general land-otiice.
h's
“John Ill J . Dunbarr.
mark.
“Sworn and subscribed to before me this
seventh day ot January, 1818.
“Samuel N. Smailwood."
“Received, this sixth day of January, 1818,
from William Prout, the sum of $80, being
the consideration money expressed in the
above deed.
his
“John X J. Dunbarr.
mark.
“Witness: Joseph Cassin.
“Recorded June 23, 1818."
"State of Illinois, Madison County, ss.:
“I, John D. Heisel, clerk of the circuit
court, and ex oflicio recorder of deeds within
and for Madison county, in the state of Il-
linois, do hereby certify the above and fore-
going to be a true, perfect, and complete
copy of an instrument of writing or deed of
conveyance now appearing of record at my
office in book E, pages 154, 155, and 156. In
witness whereof I have hereunto set my
hand and afiixed the seal of our said court,
at oftice in the city of Edwardsviile, this
third day of February, A. D.’ one thousand
eight hundred and seventy-five.
“[Seai.] John D. Heisel, Clerk."
The defendant below objected to the in-
troduction of said certified copy in evidence,
because the original deed was not so certified
and proven as to make a certified copy from
the record competent evidence, under the
laws of Illinois.
The court, without passing at that time up-
on the objection, and not then admitting said
writing in evidence as a certified copy, per-
mitted the plaintiifs, at their request, to
make the following proofs:
"And thereupon,” as the bill of exceptions
states, “the plaintiifs proved, to-wit:
"41) By Mr. Dent, one of the plaintiffs’
counsel, that said counsel had had in their
possession, prior to the great fire of October
8 and 9, 1871, in Chicago, an original deed
corresponding substantially in contents to
the writing offered in evidence, except that
there was not attached to it the ofiicial cer-
tificate, dated February 3, 1875; that he had
not compared said offered copy with said orig-
inal, but he believed from recollection that
it corresponded with the original, and that
he had not made said alleged copy ; that said
original deed had been sent to said counsel
in behalf of Wm. B. Morris, the then plain-
tifl, for use in this suit, and had been offered
in evidence on the first trial; that said orig-
inal deed had been burned up in the Chicago
fire oi’ October 8 and 9, 1871; further, that
said original deed had been sent to Wash-
ington, and attached as an exhibit to the
original depositions of E. J. Middleton and
George Collard, hereinafter mentioned, and
had subsequently been detached therefrom
by leave of the court, and returned to Wash-
ington for use in taking the depositions of
Henrietta Boone.
“(2) The plaintiffs further oiiered to read
in evidence a copy of the original depositions
of E. J. Middleton and George Collard, tak-
en de bene esse on September 21, 1870, at
Washington, D. 0., to which the defendant
below objected. It was admitted that the
depositions had been correctly copied by an
attorney in the cause from the original dep-
ositions on flle in the case; that the original
depositions, with the other files and records
of the court, were burned up in the fire
at Chicago of October, 1871; that no order
of the court had ever been made authorizing
the filing of said copy as a substitute for
the original depositions, and that no pro-
ceedings under any statute had been had
for the purpose of restoring said original,
but that after said fire the plaintiffs‘ coun-
sel had procured said copy from the coun-
sel of defendant, and, with his consent, had
placed it on file in this cause as a copy of
the original depositions.
“The court thereupon overruled each of
said objections to the reading of said copy
of the depositions, and permitted the con-
tents of said copy to be read in evidence,
which was done; to which decision of the
court the defendant then and there except-
ed.
“The contents of said copy so read were as
follows: ‘That said Middleton and Collard
had carefully examined the signatures of
Samuel N. Smnllwood on said original deed
purporting to be his in three different places,
and aver the said signatures to be the gen-
uine handwriting of said Samuel N. Small-
wood; and that said original deed is an-
nexed to their depositions as Exhibit A; that
the_v were personally acquainted with Sam-
uel N. Smallwood in his life-time, and knew
his handwriting, having often seen him
write, and they have no hesitation in declar-
ing said signatures to be his genuine signa-
tures.’ ”
The piaintifls also offered in evidence the
deposition of William W. Corcoran, who tes-
tified that in 1847 he purchased the lands in
controversy from the United States at public
sale and paid the purchase money for them
into the treasury of the United States. and
that, at the time of the purchase, he had no
notice of any adverse claim.
The plaintiffs further read in evidence a
certified copy of a commission from Presi-
dent Monroe, attested by Richard Rush, act-
ing secretary of state, and the seal of the
United States, dated April 30, 1817, appoint-
ing Joseph Cassin, justice of the peace in the
county of Washington, in the District of Co-
lumbia, until the end of the next session oi’
the United States senate, and no longer;
also a certified copy of a like commission,
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further, that I was duly placed In possession 
of the patent for the land conveyed In the 
above deed, by receiving the same from the 
general land-otllce. 
his 
"John X J. Dunbarr. 
mark. 
"Sworn and subscribed to before me this 
seventh day of January, 1818. 
"Samuel N. Smallwood." 
"Received, this sixth day of January, 1818, 
from William Prout, the sum of $80, being 
the consideration money expressed In the 
above deed. 
his 
"John X J. Dunbarr. 
mark. 
"Witness: Joseph Cassin. 
"Recorded June 23, 1818." 
'"State of Illinois, Madison County, 111.: 
"I, John D. Helsel, clerk of the circuit 
court, and ex otllcio recorder of deeds within 
and for Madison county, In the state of Il-
Unols, do hereby certify the above and fore-
going to be a true, perfect, and complete 
copy of an Instrument of writing or deed of 
conveyance now appearing of record at my 
otllce In book E, pages lM, loo, and 156. In 
witness whereof I have hereunto set my 
hand and afllxed the seal of our said court, 
at office In the city of Edwardsville, this 
third day of February, A. D .. one thousand 
eight hundred and seventy-five. 
"[Seal.] John D. Helsel, Clerk." 
The defendant below objected to the In-
troduction of said certilled copy in evidence, 
because the original deed was not so certified 
and proven as to make a certified copy from 
the record competent evidence, under the 
laws of Illinois. 
The court, without passing nt that time up-
on the objection, and not then admitting said 
writing In evidence as a certified copy, per-
mitted the plaintUfs, at their request, to 
make the following proofs: 
"And thereupon," as the bill of exceptions 
states, "the plalntll!'s proved, to-wit: 
"(l) By Mr. Dent, one of the plaintiffs' 
counsel, that said counsel had had In their 
pa88esslon, prior to the great fl.re of October 
8 and 9, 1871, In Chicago, au original deed 
corresponding substantially In contents to 
the writing otrered In evidence, except that 
there was not attached to it the official cer-
tificate, dated February 3, 18i5; that he bad 
not compared said ottered copy with snid orlg-
loal, but he believed from recollection that 
It corresponded with the original, and that 
he had not made said alleged copy; that said 
original deed had been sent to said counsel 
In behalf of Wm. B. Morris, the then plain-
tiff, for use in this suit, and had been offered 
In evidence on the first trial; thnt said orig-
inal deed had been burned up in the Chicago 
fire of October 8 and 9, 18il; further, that 
ruitl original deed had been sent to Wash-
ington, and attached as an exhibit to the 
original depositions of E. J. Middleton and 
Ueorge Collard, hereinafter mentioned, and 
had sul.lsequently been detached therefrom 
by leave of the court, and retumed to Wash-
ington for use in taking the depositions of 
Henrietta Boone. 
"(2) The plalntlft's further oO'ered to read 
in evidence a copy of the original depositions 
ot E. J. Middleton and l~eorge Collarll, tak-
en de bene esse on September 21, 1870, at 
Washington, D. C., to which the defendant 
lle.low objected. It was admitted that the 
depositions had been correctly copied by an 
attorney in the cause from the original dtlp-
ositlons on file In the case; that the original 
depositions, with the other files and records 
ot the court, were burned up In the fire 
nt Chicago ot October, 1871; that no order 
ot the court bad ever been made authorizing 
the fl.ling of said copy as a substitute for 
the original depositions, and that no pro-
ceedings under any statute had been had 
for the purpose of restoring said original, 
but that after said fit·e the plalntl!Ts' coun-
sel had procured said copy from the coun-
sel of dt>fenda.nt, and, with his consent, bad 
placed it on file In this cause as a copy of 
the original depositions. 
"The court thereupon overruled each of 
said objections to the reading of said copy 
ot the depositions, and permitted the con-
tents of said copy to be rend In evldenctl, 
which was done; to which decision ot the 
court the defendant then and there except-
ed. 
"The contents ot said copy so read were as 
follows: 'That said Middleton and Collard 
bad carefully examined the signatures of 
Samuel N. Smallwood on snld original deed 
purporting to be his In three different places, 
and aver the said signatures to be the gen-
uine handwriting of said Samuel N. Small· 
wood; and that said original deed ls an-
nt-xed to their depositions as Exhibit A; that 
they were per!'IOnally acquainted with Sam-
uel N. Smallwood In his Ute-time, and knew 
his handwriting, having often seen him 
write, and they have no hesitation In declar· 
Ing said signatures to be his genuine signa-
tures.'" 
The plalntltf!I also ol!'ered in evidence the 
deposition of William W. Corcoran, who tes-
tified that in 1847 be purcbuse<l the lands in 
controversy from the United Rtntes at public 
sale and paid the purchase mont-y tor them 
into the treasury of the United Stntc>s, and 
that. at the time of the purchase, he had no 
notice of any adverse claim. 
The plaintiffs further read In evldPnce a 
certified copy of a commission from Presi-
dent Monroe, attested by Richard Rush, act-
ing secretary of state, and the seal of the 
United States, dated April 30, 1817, appoint-
ing Joseph Cassin, justice of the pence In the 
county of Washington, in the District of Co-
lumbia, until the end of the next session o! 
the United States senate, and no longer; 
also a certlfl.ed copy of a like commission, 
2W 
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dated September 1, 1817 , appointing Samuel
N. Smallwood a justice of the peace of said
county until the end of said session, and no
longer.
The plaintiifs also olfered in evidence the
deposition of Anthony Hyde, who testified
that he was the business agent in Washing-
ton Clty of W. W. Corcoran; that he knew
of the purchase of the land in question by
said Corcoran in 1847, and of the payment
by him of over $22,000 into the treasury of
the United States for this and other lands;
that from February, 1848, up to the time
when his testimony was taken, February 24,
1875, he had attended to all matters touch-
ing the tract of land in suit, such as the
payment of taxes and the appointment of
agents, up to the time of the conveyance
thereof by Corcoran to William B. Morris;
that he sent the original deed from Dunbar
to Prout, attached to the uapositions of E.
J . Middleton and George Collard, to the coun-
sel of plaintiffs below in Chicago, on Octo-
ber 11, 1870; that said deed was afterwards
returned to obtain a deposition oi‘. one Mrs.
II. H. Boone as to Joseph Cassin’s signature,
and was afterwards forwarded, attached_ to
a deposition of Mrs. Boone, to the clerk of
the United States circuit court at Chicago,
on or about January 26, 1871.
Hyde further testifies that he had paid
the taxes on said lands for Mr. Corcoran
from 1847 to 1864, mainly through agents
who lived in Illinois, but that he himself
had for a year or two paid the taxes direct-
ly to the county oflicers.
Assuming, for the present, that the evi-
dence ofl.’ered to support the deed from Dun-
bar to Pront was competent and properly
admitted, the question is presented whether
the deed itself, thus supported. was admis-
sible. We are of the opinion that it was.
The existence of the original deed and its
destruction in the flre at Chicago, in October,
1871, was distinctly proved by the testimony
of Dent, counsel for» plaintitl’s. He testified
that it had been sent to the counsel in Chi-
cago of the original plaintiff in the case; that
it had been oifered in evidence on the first
trial of the case, and had been burned with
the other papers and records of the court in
the fire mentioned. It was therefore compe-
tent for the piaintiifs to prove its contents.
Thus, in Riggs v. Taylor, 4 Wheat. -LS6, this
court said:
“Tile general rule of evidence is, if a par-
ty intend to use a deed or any other instru-
ment in evidence he ought to produce the
original if he has it in his possession, or if
the original is lost or destroyed secondary
evidence, which is the best the nature of
the case allows, will, in that case, be admit-
ted. ’l‘he party, -after proving any of these
circumstances to account for the absence of
the original, may read a counterpart, or if
there is no counterpart an examined copy,
or if there should not be an examined copy
he may give parol evidence of its contents."
In the present case it does not appear that
there was in existence any counterpart or
examined copy of the destroyed deed. The
only resource left to the plaintltfs was to
prove the contents of the original by a wit-
ness who knew its content. This was done
by the deposition of Dent. He testified that
the original deed corresponded substantially
in contents to the certified copy offered in
evidence, except that there was not attached
to it the otiicial certificate of the court, dat-
ed February 3, 1875. This evidence made
the copy competent for the purposes of the
trial.
Having thus established the fact of the
original deed and its contents, the plaintiffs
below were in the same position as if the
original deed was in their possession and
they had ofiered it in evidence. It remain-
ed for them to prove its execution.
It has been held by the supreme court of
Illinois, that, under the act of February 19,
1819, for establishing a recorder's oflice, and
which was substantially the same as the act
of 1807, which was in force when the deed
from Dunbar to Yrout was executed, a deed
is valid as between the parties to it without
being acknowledged. Semple v. Miles, 2
Scam. 315. See, also, McConnell v. Reed, Id.
371.
Having established b_v proof the fact that
the deed had existed and had been destroy-
ed, and that the copy oifered in evidence was
a copy of the original, it only remained t0
prove the signing and sealing of the deed by
the grantor.
As the witnesses to the deed were shown
to be dead, the method pointed out by law to
establish the execution of the deed was by
proof of the handwriting of the witnesses to
the deed. Clark v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319;
Cook v. \Voodrow, 5 Crunch, 13. And when
there was more than one witness, proof of
the handwriting of one was suflicient. 1
Greenl. Ev. § 575; Adams v. Kerr, 1 Bos. &
P. 360: 3 Prcst. Abst. Tit. 72. T3.
By the depositions of Middleton and Col ‘
lard, which the court admitted in evidence,
the handwriting of Samuel .\'. Smallwood,
one of the subscribing witnesses of the deed,
was fully proven. His signature also to the
acknowledgment of the deed as one of the
justices of the peace before whom the ac-
knowledgment was taken, and his signature
to the jurat of an oath of identity indorsed
on the deed, subscribed and sworn to be-
fore him by Dunbar, were proven by the
same testimony. The genuineness of the
handwriting of Smallwood as a witness to
the deed was placed beyond all doubt by the
depositions of these witnesses. If, therefore,
the evidence by which this proof was made
was competent and admissible, the execu-
tion of the deed from Dunbar to Pl‘0llt was
established, and the deed itself was prop-
erly admitted in evidence.
We are next to consider the question
whether the copies of the depositions of
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dated September 1, 1817, ap1>0lntlng Samuel 
N. Smallwood a Justice of the peace of said 
county until the end of llllld seSBlon, and no 
longer. 
The plaintUrs also oll'ered In evidence the 
deposition of Anthony Hyde, who testlfle4 
that he was the business agent In Washing-
ton City of W. W. Corcoran; that he knew 
ot the purchase of the land In question by 
Raid Corcoran In 18-!i, and of the payment 
by blm of over $22,UOO Into the treasury of 
the United States tor this and other lands; 
that from February, 1848, up to the time 
when his testimony was taken, February 24, 
1875, he bad attended to all matters touch-
ing the tract of land In suit, such as the 
payment of taxes and the a1,pol11tment of 
agents, up to the time of the conveyance 
thereof by Corcoran to Willlaw B. ~!orris; 
that he sent the original deed from Dunbar 
to Prout, atta<'hed to the u !positions of E. 
J. Middleton and George Collard, to the coun-
sel of plalntltl's below in Chicago. on Octo-
ber 11, 1870; that said deed was afterwards 
returned to obtain a. deposition of one ~Irs. 
II. H. Boone 88 to Joseph Casein's signature, 
and was afterwards forwarded, attached to 
a deposition of Mrs. Boone, to the derk· of 
the L'nlted States circuit court at Chicago, 
on or about January 26, 1871. 
Hyde further testifies that be bad paid 
the taxes on said lands tor Mr. Corcoran 
from 1847 to 1864, mainly through agents 
who lived in Illinois, but that he himself 
had for a year or two paid the taxes direct-
ly to the county oftlcers. 
Assuming, for the present, that the evi-
dence otrert'<l to supt>0rt the deed from Dun-
bar to Prout was eompetent and properly 
admitted, the question Is presented whether 
the det-d itself, thus supt1orted. wns admis-
sible. We a.re· of the opinion that It was. 
The existence of the ol'iglnal deed nnd Its 
destruction In the fire at Chicago, In ()<otober, 
1871, was distinctly provPd by the tPstimony 
of Dent, counsel for- plulntltl's. lie testified 
that it had been sent to the counsel in Chl-
<"ago of the original pl11lntll1' in the caSP; that 
It had been otrered In e\"ldence on the first 
tlial of the case, and bad been burned \Vlth 
the other papers and re<•ords of the <•ourt in 
the fl.re meutloned. It wns therefor!' rompe-
tent for the plnlntltrs to pro"re its contents. 
Thus, in Riggs v. Taylor, 4 Wheat. 480, this 
court said: 
"'l'he general· rule of evidt'nee ls, It a par-
ty Intend to use a deed or any other tm1tru-
ment in evldPnce be ougoht to produce the 
orlglnnl if he bns It In hl11 posst>i<slon, or If 
the original IR lost or de8troyPd secondary 
t>videll<'P, which li-i the bt'st the nature of 
the c1111e allows, will, In that case, be admit-
ted. 'rlw party, .eftl'r p1·ovlng any or thr11e 
clrcumstnm•es to 11t•count for the absence of 
the original, may read a counterpart, or If 
there Is no countervart an examined copy, 
or It there should not be an examlne<l copy 
be may give parol evidence ot Its contents." 
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In the present ease It does not appear that 
there was in exlstenc-e any counterpart or 
examined copy of the destroyed deed. The 
only re110urce left to the plalntttrs was to 
proT'e the contents of the original by a wit-
ness who knew its contents. This was done 
by the deposltlon of Dent. He testified that 
the original deed corresponded substantially 
In contents to the certified copy otrered in 
evltlence, except that there was not attached 
to It the olflclal certificate of the court, dat-
ed l•'ebrunry 3, 1875. This evidence made 
the copy competent for the purposes of the 
trial. 
Ho.vlnir thus established the fact of the 
original dt>ed and Its contents, the plalntltrs 
below were in the same position 88 If the 
original deed was In their po88e88ion and 
they bad otrered It in evidence. It remain-
ed for them to prove its execution. 
It has been held by the supreme court of 
llllnQls, that, under the act of February 19, 
1819, for establishing a recorder's oftlee, and 
which wu substantially the same as the act 
of 1807, which was In force when the deed 
from Dunbar to !'rout was executed, a deed 
ls valid as between the parties to it without 
being acknowledged. Semple v. Miles, 2 
Scam. 315. See, also, McConnell v. Ueed, Id. 
371. 
Having established by proof the fact that 
the deed had ~xlsted and had been dt>stroy-
ed, and that the copy otrered In evlden<-e was 
a copy of tht> original, It only remained to 
prove the signing and seallng of the deed by 
the grantor. 
As the wltneSBes to the deed were shown 
to be dead, the method pointed out by law to 
establish the execution of the det-d was by 
proof of the handwriting of the wltnes!M.'8 to 
the deed. Clark v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319; 
Cook v. Woodrow, IS Cmnch, 13. And when 
there was more than one wltneBB, proof of 
the handwriting of one was BUftl<'lent. 1 
Greenl. Ev. § ri7:i; Adams v. Kerr, 1 Bos. & 
P. 360: 8 Prl'st. Abst. Tit. 72. 78. 
By the depositions of Middleton and Col 
lnrd, which the court admitted In evldenC(>, · 
the handwriting of Samuel X. Smallwood, .. 
one of the subll('rlblng wltne11ses of the deed, 
was fully proven. His signature also to the 
acknowledgment of the deed as one of the 
justl<•es of the peace before whom the D<'· 
knowledgment was taken, and bis signature 
to the jurat of an oath of Identity lndortll'd 
on the deed, subscribed and sworn to be-
fore him by Dunbar, were proT'en by the 
same testimony. The genuineness of the 
handwriting of Smallwood as a wltne88 to 
the deed was placed beyond all doubt by tbe 
clPJJOBltions of these witneAAes. If, therefore, 
the evidence by whkh tbl11 proof was made 
was <'ompet<>nt and admissible, the exe<'U-
tlon of the deed from Dunbar to Prout was 
e!<tablild1ed, and the deed Itself was proir 
erly admitted In evidence. 
We are next to consider tbe question 
whether the copies of the depositions ot 
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Middleton and Collard, by which the hand- , which were admitted by counsel for defend-
writing of Smallwood was proven, were prop-
erly admitted in evidence. 'l‘his evidence
was objected to by the defendant, and his
objection was overruled, to which he ex-
cepted.
The admission of the parties, as appears
by the bill of exceptions. showed the exist-
ence of the original depositions; that they
had been destroyed with the other records
of the court in the flre of October, 1871; that
the copies were correct copies of the orig-
inal depositions, and had been furnished by
counsel for defendant. and with his consent
had been placed on tile in the cause as cor-
rect copies of the original. The objection
made to the introduction of the copies was
that the death of the witnesses was not
shown, nor was it proven that they were in-
competent to testify, and that their deposi- ,
tions could not be retaken; therefore proof
of what they had testlfled in their deposi-
tions was not admissible.
The rule invoked to exclude copies of the
depositions is that in the absence of evi-
dence that the witness who testified in a
former trial is dead or incapable of testify-
ing, or that his deposition cannot be retaken,
it is not competent to show what his testi-
mony in the former trial was;
cannot be proved except after proof of the
death of the witness whose testimony it con-
tained. Stout v. Cook. 47 ill. 530; Aulger v.
Smith, 34 Ill. 537.
But if the witnesses had lived in another
state, and more thana hundred miles distant
from the place of trial, proof of the contents of
their deposition would have been admissible.
Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wail. 125. Therefore.
to have made the objection tenable, it should
have also been put upon the ground that
the witnesses were not shown to reside in
another state and more than a hundred miles
from the place of trial. This it did not do.
When a party excepts to the admission of
testimony he is bound to state his objection
specifically, and in a proceeding for error
he is confined to the objection so taken. Bur-
tton v. Drlggs, ubi supra. The original dep-
ositions were taken in the city of Washing-
ton. It is, therefore, probable that the wit-
nesses resided there. If the copy of the
depositions had been objected to because it
was not shown that the witnesses resided
out of the district, and more than a hun-
dred miles from the place where the court
was held, the plaintiffs below might have
supplied proof of that fact. The objection,
as it was made, was not broad enough and
specific enough, and was, therefore, properly
overruled and the evidence admitted.
But we think the rule relied on by de-
fendant to exclude copies of the deposition
does not apply to the case in hand. The
plaintiffs did not offer oral evidence of the
contents of the depositions, but offered copies
and that ‘
when the deposition of a witness which was 5
read upon a former trial is lost, its contents .
ant to be true copies. It was, therefore, not
necessary to retake the depositions or to
prove the death of the witnesses, or their
incapacity to testify. The copy of the deposi-
tion was, by consent, substituted for the
original, which was provcn to have been
destroyed, and, being admitted to be a true
copy, spoke for itself. It was, therefore,
properly received in evidence.
It was further objected to the admission in
evidence of the proof relating to the deed
of John J. Dunbar to Prout, that as the tes-
timony to establish its execution was the
proof of the handwriting of subscribing wit-
nesscs, it was necessary to prove the identity
of the grantor in the deed; that is to say,
that the John J. Dunbar by whom the deed
purported to be executed was the same John
J. Dunbar named in the patent for the lands
in controversy. In any case slight proof of
identity is suflicient. Nelson v. Whittall. 1
Barn. & Aid. 19; Warren v. Anderson, 8 Scott,
384; 1 Selw. N. P. (18th Ed.) 538, note 7. But
the proof of identity in this case was ample.
In tracing titles identity of names is prima
facie evidence of identity of persons. Brown
v. Metz, 33 lll. 339; Gates v. Loftus, 3 A.
K. Marsh, 202; (iitt v. Watson, 18 .\io. 27-};
Balbie v. Donaldson, 2 Grant (l‘a.) 450;
Rogue v. Bigelow, 29 Vt. 179; Chamblee v.
Tarbox, 27 Tex. 139. See, also, Sewell v.
Evans, -1 Adol. & E. 626; Roden v. Ryde,
Id. 629. There was no evidence that more
than one John J. Dunbar lived at the date
of the deed in Matthias county, Virginia,
which the deed recites was the residence of
the grantor, nor in the District of Columbia,
where the deed was executed, and there was
no other proof to rebut the prima facie pre-
suniption raised by the identity of names in
the patent and deed. But, besides the iden-
tity of names. there was other evidence
showing the identity of persons. The pat-
ent and the decd bore date the same day,
and the patent was cited in haec verba in
the deed. These circumstances tend strongly
to show that the party by whom the deed
was executed must have had possession of
the patent. The deed recites that the patent
was delivered to the grantor, John J. Dunbar,
and the affidavit of John J. Dunbar, sworn
to and subscribed on January 7, 1818, before
Smallwood, a justice of the peace, and one
of the subscribing witnesses to the deed,
whose signature to the jurat is shown to be
genuine, to the effect that he was the same
John J. Dunbar to whom the patent was
issued, was lndorsed upon the deed.
After a lapse of 61 years, this evidence is
not only admissible to prove the identity of
the grantee in the patent with the grantor in
the deed, but. nncontradicted, is conclusive.
\Ve are, therefore, of opinion that the deed
from John J. Dunbar to William Prout,
which formed a link in the title of the plain-
tiffs, was sutficientiy proveu, and was prop-
erly admitted in evidence by the circuit
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Middleton and Collard, by wblch the hand- , which were admitted by counsel for defend· 
writing o! Smallwood was proven, were prop- ant to be true copies. It was, therefore. not 
~rly admitted ln evidence. 'fhls evidence nece8811ry to retake the deposltlou or to 
wu objected to by the defendant, and his prove the death of the witnesses, or their 
objection was overruled, to whlch he ex- Incapacity to testlty. The copy of the deposl· 
eepted. tlon was, by consent, substituted for the 
The admission of the partles, as appears original, wblch was proven to have been 
by the bill of exceptions, showed the exist- destroyed, and, being admitted to be a true 
ence of the original deposlttons; that they copy, spoke for Itself. It was, -therefore, 
had been destroyed with the other records 1 properly rec·elved ln evidence. 
of the court in the flre of October, 1871; that I It was further objected to the admission In 
the copies were correct copies of the orig- 1 evidence of the proof relating to the deed 
lnal depositions, and had been furnished by I of John J. Dunbar to Prout, that as the tee-
counsel for defendant, and with his consent tlmony to establish Its execution was the 
had been placed on file ln the cause as cor- proof of the handwriting of subscribing wlt-
rect coplt'S of the original. The objeetlon nesses, It was necessary to prove the Identity 
made to the introduction of the cople11 was of the grantor ln the deed; that Is to eay, 
that the death of the \\0 ltneBRes waa not that tile John J. Dunbar by whom the deed 
ahown, nor wu It proven that they were ln- purported to be executed was the same John 
competent to testify, and that their deposl- : .J. Dunbar named In the patent for the lands 
tlons could not be retaken; therefore proof I In controversy. In any case slight proof of 
of what they had testlfted ln their depoBI· , Identity ls sutnclent. Nelson v. Whittall, 1 
tloDH was not admissible. I Bam. & Aid. 19; Warren v. Anderson, 8 Scott, 
The rule Invoked to exclude copies of the ; 384; 1 Selw. N. P. (18th Ed.) 538, note 7. But 
depositions ls that In the absen<'f' of evl· : the proof of Identity ln this case was ample. 
dence that the wltne88 who teRtlJled In a In tracing titles lllentlty of names ls prlma 
former trial la dead or incapable of testify- facle evidence of tdentlty of persons. Brown 
Ing, or that his deposition cannot be retaken, v. Metz, 33 Ill. 3."J9; Cates v. Loftus, 8 A. 
1t ls not competent to show what his testl· K. Marsh, 202; Gitt v. Watson, 18 ~Io. 2i4; 
mony In the former trial was; and that · Balble v. Donaldson, 2 Grant (Pa.) 400; 
when tlte deposition of a witness which wnH ! Bogue v. Bigelow, 29 Vt. 179; Ohamblee v. 
read upon a former trial la lost, Its contt>ntR . Tarbox, 27 Tex. 139. See, also, Sewell v. 
cannot be proved except after proof of the I Evans, 4 AdoL & E. 626; Roden v. Ryde, 
death of the wltne11s wbol!t' testimony It con- I Id. 629. There was no evidence that more 
talned. Stout v. Cook. 47 lll. 530; Aulger v. I than one John J. Dunbar lived at the date 
Smith, 34 Ill. M7. of the deed ln Matthias rounty, Virginia, 
But It the witnesses had llvt>d In another which the deed re<>ites was the residence of 
atate, and more than a hundred miles distant the gmntor, nor In the District of Columbia, 
from the place of trial, proof of the contents of where the deed was executed, and there was 
their deposition would have been admissible. no othl'r proof to rebut the prlma facle pre-
Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 12.;. Therefon>, • suniptlon raised by the Identity of names ln 
to have made the objection tenable, It sbouht I tbe patent and deed. But, besides the Iden· 
have also been put upon the ground that i tlty of names, there was other evidence 
the wltneuea were not shown to rl>Rhte In !' showing the Identity of persons. The pat-
another state and more than a hundred miles ent and the deed bore date the eame day, 
from the place of trial. This It did not do. and the patent was cited In hl!OO verba In 
When a party excepts to the ndmhu!lon of the deed. These circumstances tend strongly 
tet1tlmony be la bound to state his objection to show that the party by whom the deed 
.specl.dcally, and In a proceeding for error was executed must have had poBBesslon of 
he 18 confined to the objection so taken. Bur· the patent. The deed recites that the patent 
.ton v. Driggs, ubl supra. The original dep- was delivered to the grantor, John J. Dunbar, 
o&ltlons were taken In the city of Washing- and the aflldavlt of John J. Dunbar, sworn 
ton. It la, therefore, probable that the wit- to and subscribed on January 7, 1818, b<>fore 
nt'flllt>R relllded there. If the copy ot the Smallwood, a justice of the peace, and one 
depositions had been objected to beeause It of the subscribing witnesses to the deed, 
waa not shown that the wltneBHes resided who11e signature to the jurat Is shown to be 
out of the district, and mol'f' than a bun- genuine, to the effect that he W88 the same 
dred miles from the pla<>e where the court John J. Dunbar to whom the patent was 
WIUI held, the plalntl!rs below might have Issued, WllS lndor11ed Upon the deed. 
supplied proof of that fact. The ohje<.'tlon, After a lapse of 61 years, this evidence Is 
as It was made, was not broad enough and not only admissible to prove the Identity of 
lpeclftc enough, and was, thert>fore, properly the grantee ln the patent with the grantor In 
overrnled and the evlden<"c admitted. the del'd, but, unC'ontradic'tecl, ls conclusive. 
But we think the rule relied on by de- We are, therefore, of opinion that the deed 
fendant to exclude copies of the deposition from John J. Dunbar to William Prout, 
does not apply to the case In han<l. The which formed a link ln the tltl<' of the plain· 
plaintiffs did not otrer oral evhlPnce of the tltrs, was sufflC'lently pro'\"en, and was prop-
contentB of the depositions, but olfered copies erly admitted In evidence by the circuit 
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court. The other muniments of title put in
evidence b_v the plaintiffs were admitted
without objection, and established prima
faeie their title to the lands in controversy.
But it will be remembered that the defend-
ant below had also shown a prima facle
title to the lands in question; that both par-
ties traced title through the patent of the
United States issued to Dunbar, and through
deeds apparently executed by him on the
same day, to-wit, January 6, 1818,—one to
William Prout, under which the plaintiffs
claimed, and the other to John Frank, under
which the defendant claimed.
The question, therefore,still remains, which
is the superior title? According to the juris-
prudence of Illinois, this must be settled by
the fact, which of the two deeds, apparently
executed by Dunbar, was first recorded.
Section 15 of the act approved January 31,
1827 (Purple, Real Est. St. -180), provided as
follows:
“All grants, bargains, sales, etc., of or con-
cerning any lands, whether executed within
or without the state, shall be recorded in the
recorder’s oflice in the county where such
lands are lying, and being within 12 months
after the execution of such writings, and ev-
ery such writing that shall, at any time after
the publication hereof, remain more than 12
months after the making of such writing,
and shall not be proved and recorded as
aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraudulent and
void against any subsequent bona fide pur-
chaser or mortgagee for valuable considera-
tion, unless such deed, conveyance, or other
writing be recorded as aforesaid, before the
proving and recording of the deed, mortgage,
or other writing under which any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee shall claim.”
This act remains substantially in force.
Hurd, Rev. St. p. 271, § 30.
By an act, approved July 21, 1837 (Purple,
Real Est. St. 496, -197). it was provided that
the recording of any deed, " * " whether
executed within or without the state, by the
recorder of the county in which the lands
intended to be affected are situated, shall
b'e deemed and taken to be notice to subse-
quent purchasers and creditors from the date
of such recording. whether said writings
shall have been acknowledged or proven in
conformity with the laws of the state or not,
and that the provisions of the act shall ap-
ply as well to writings heretofore as those
hereafter admitted to record. This law is
still in force. See Hurd. Rev. St. 1880. p.
271, § 31.
It was held by the supreme court of Illi-
nois. in Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 445, that an in-
strument atfecting or relating to real estate
may be recorded, though not proven or ac-
knowledged, and the record will operate as
constructive notice to subsequent purchasers
and creditors. See, also, Choteau v. Jones,
11 Ill. 320; Martin v. Dryden, l (-lilman, 213.
And in (‘aheen v. Breckenridge, 48 Ill. 9-l.
the court declared that, “as a general rule,
when the same person has executed two
deeds for the same land. the first deed re-
corded will hold the title."
The evidence shows that the deed of Dun-
bar to Frank, under which the defendant
claimed title, was not recorded until June 18.
1870. The plaintiffs contended that the deed
from Dunbar to Prout, under which they
claimed, was recorded on June 23, 1818, and
it was shown that the deed from Prout to
Duncan was recorded October 29, 1838, and
the deed of Glllett to Corcoran, June 5, 1848.
and the deed of Corcoran to Morris, March
12, 1868. If, therefore, the contention of the
plaintiffs that the deed of Dunbar to Prout
was recorded June 23, 1818, is sustained by
competent proof, their title must prevail.
But it is insisted for defendant that there
was no competent proof of the registration
of the deed of Dunbar to Prout. The proof
relied on was the testimony of Dent, that the
certified copy from the records of the county
of Madison was a copy of the original deed;
the certificate of the‘ recorder that the certi-
tied copy was a copy of a deed which appear-
ed of record in his office; and the certified
copy of a memorandum at the foot of the
record of the deed as follows: “Recorded
June %, 1818." Conceding that the certified
copy of the deed from the records of Madi-
son county wouid not be proof of the con-
tents of the original deed, because such orig-
inal deed had not been so acknowledged and
certified as to make a certified copy com-
petent evidence. yet the fact that such a rec-
ord of the deed existed, was, by the law of
Illinois, as we have seen, notice to subse-
quent purchasers. A certified copy from the
record was, therefore, a proof that such a
deed and memorandum were of record in the
proper oflice. For it is a settled rule of evi-
dence that every document of a public na-
ture which there would be an inconvenience
in removing, and which the party has the
right to inspect, may be proved by a duly-
authenticated copy. Saxton v. Nimms, 14
Mass. 320; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. 109;
Dunning v. Roome. 6 Wend. 651; Dudley v.
Grayson, 6 T. B. Mon. 259: Bishop v. Co-ne,
3 N. H. 513; 1 Greenl. Ev. § -184.
The memorandum at the foot of the record
was the usual record evidence, competent
and conclusive, that the deed had been re-
corded at the date mentioned. It was evi-
dence of the date of the registration of the
deed, because it was the duty of the recorder.
by the nature of his office and without spe-
cial stntutory direction. to note when the
record was made. 1 Grecnl. Ev. § 483. But
we think it may be fairly inferred from sec-
tion 10 of the act of September 17, 1807.
which was in force when it is claimed that
the deed from Dunbar to Prout was record-
ed, that it was the duty of the recorder to
note the time when deeds left with him for
record were recorded. He was specifically
required to note the date when the deed was
received, and was liable to a penalty of $300
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court. The othE>r monlments of title put In I when the same person has executed two-
evidence by the plalnturs were admitted deeds for the •me land, the first deed re-
without objection, and established prlma corded will hold the title.'' 
tacle their title to the lands In contro¥ersy. The evidence shows that the deed of Dun-
But It will be remembered that the defend-
ant below had also shown a prlma facle 
title to the lands In question; that both par-
ties traced title through the patent of the 
United States Issued to Dunbar, and through 
deeds apparently executed by him on the 
same day, to-wit, January 6, 1818,-one to 
William Prout, under which the plalntllfs 
claimed, and the other to John Frank, under 
which the defendant claimed. 
The question, therefore, still remains, which 
ls the superior title? According to the juris-
prudence of Illinois, this must be settled by 
the fact, which of the two deeds, apparently 
executed by Dunbar, was flrat recorded. 
Set·tlon I!> of the act approved January 31, 
1827 (Purple, Real Est. St. 480), provided a11 
follows: 
"All grants, barJ:Blns, sales, etc., of or con-
cerning any lands, whether executed within 
or without the state, shall be recorded In the 
recorder's oftlce In the county where such 
lands are lying, and being within 12 months 
after the execution of such wrltlngs, and ev-
ery such writing that shall, at any time after 
the publication hereof, remain more than 12 
months after the making of such writing, 
and shall not be proved and recorded as 
aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraudulent and 
void against any subsequent bona dde pur-
chaser or mortgagee for valuable considera-
tion, unless such deed, conveyance, or other 
writing be recorded as aforesaid, before the 
proving and recording of the deed, mortgage, 
or other writing under which any subsequent 
purehaser or mortgagee shall claim." 
This act remains substantially In force. 
Burd, Rev. St. p. 271, § 30. 
By an act, approved July 21, 18!~7 (Purple, 
Real Est. St. 49<i, 497), It was provided that 
the re<'ordlng of any deed, • • • whether 
executed within or without the state, by the 
recorder of the county In which the lands 
Intended to be affected are situated, shall 
be deemed and taken to be notice to subse-
quent purchasers and creditors from the date 
of such recording, whether Mid writings 
shall have been a<"knowledged or proven in 
conformity with the laws of the state or not, 
and that the provisions of the acl shall ap-
ply as well to writings hPretofore as those 
hPreafter admitted to re<"ord. This law is 
11tlll In force. See Hurd. Rev. St. 1880, p. 
271. § 31. 
It was held by the supreme court of llll· 
nois, In Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 445, that an In-
strument alfectlng or relating to real estate 
may be re<'orded, though not proven or ac-
knowlpdged, and the record wlll operate as 
constru<'tlve notice to subsequent purchasPrs 
and <'retlltors. See, also, Choteau v. Jones, 
11 111. 320; Martin v. Dryden, 1 Gilman, 213. 
And In CabPPD v. BrE><"kenrldgP. 48 Ill. 9-l, 
the <"ourt declan.>d that, "as a general rule, 
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bar to Fmnk, under which the defendant 
claimed title, was not recorded until June 18~ 
1870. The plalntllfs contended that the deed 
from Dunbar to Prout, under which they 
claimed, was recorded on June 23, 1818, and 
It was shown that the deed trom Prout to 
Duncan was recorded October 29, 1838, and 
the deed of Glllett to Corcoran, June 5, lst8, 
and the deed of Corcoran to Morris. March 
12, 1868. If, therefore, the contention ot the 
plaintiffs that the deed of Dunbar to Prout 
was recorded .June 23, 1818, 18 sustained by 
competent proof, their title mUBt prevail. 
But It ls Insisted for defendant that there 
was no competent proof of the registration 
of the deed of Dunba.r to Prout. The proo! 
relied on was the testimony of Dent, that tbe 
certlfted copy from the records of the counQ' 
of Madison was a copy of the original deeQ; 
the certlO.cate of the' recorder that the certl-
0.ed copy was a copy of a deed which appear-
ed of record In bis ofllce; and the certlfted 
copy of a memorandum at the toot of the 
record of the deed as follows: "Recorded 
June 23, 1818." Coneedlng that the certified 
copy of the deed from the records of Madi-
son county would not be proof of the con-
tents of the original deed, because such orig-
inal deed bad not been so acknowledged and 
certified as to make a certifted copy com-
petent evidence, yet the fact that such a rec-
ord of the deed existed, was, by the law of 
Illinois, as we have seen, notice to subse-
quent purchasers. A certifted copy from th& 
record was, therefore, a proof that such a 
deed and memorandum were of record in the 
proper oftlce. For It Is a settled rule of evi-
dence that every document of a public na-
ture which there would be an Inconvenience 
In removing, and which the party bas the 
right to Inspect, may be proved by a duly-
authenticated copy. Saxton v. Nlmms, 14 
:Mass. SID; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. 109; 
Dunning v. Roome, 6 Wend. 6.'il; Dudley T. 
Grayson, 6 T. B. Mon. 2.19: BlshOlll v. Cone, 
3 N. H. 513; 1 Green!. Ev. S 484. 
The memorandum at the foot of the I'l'COrd 
was the usual record evidence, competent 
and conclusive, that the deed had been re-
corded at the date mentioned. It was evi-
dence of the date of the registration of the 
deed, because It was the duty of the recorder. 
by the nature of his ofllce and without spe-
cial statutory direction, to note when the 
record was made. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 483. But 
we think it may be fairly interred from sec-
tion 10 of the act of September 17, 1807. 
which was In force when It Is claimed thllt 
the deed from Dunbar to Prout was record-
ed, that It was the duty of the recorder to 
note the time when deeds left with him for 
record were recorded. He was spcclO.rolly 
required to note the date when the deed was 
received, and was liable to a penalty of $3()() 
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tor recording any deed in writing “before an-
other first brouzht into his oflice to be re-
corded." 1 Adams & D. Real Est. St. 63.
The making of a memorandum of the date
of record was, therefore, an otflcial act,
which naturally fell within the line of l1is
statutory duties, and a certified copy of it
would be competent evidence to prove the
lnemorandum and the date of the registra-
tion of the deed.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the fact
that the deed of Dunbar to Prout was re-
corded on June 23, 1818, was proved by com-
petent evidence, and that it therefore fol-
lows that the title of the plaintiffs was bet-
ter and superior to that of defendants. who
claimed under a deed for the same lands not
recorded until June 18, 1870, more than 50
years after its date, and long after innocent
purchasers had bought the lands and paid a
valuable consideration for them.
The plaintiff in error contends that the act
of 1837, supra, cannot apply in this case, be-
cause at its date the lands in question were
no longer within the limits of Madison coun-
ty, but in the county of Putnam. But the act
expressly declares that it shall apply to writ-
ings theretofore as well as those thereafter
admitted to record. The deed of Dunbar to
Prout was recorded under the act of 1807,
supra, which required it to be recorded in
the county where the lands conveyed were
situated. It was so recorded. No law of
Illinois since passed has required any other
registration of deeds by the parties thereto.
or has changed the effect of the original reg-
istration. See act of February 27, 1841; 1
Adams & D. Real Est. St. 93, 94.
The view we have taken of the case ren-
ders it unnecessary to notice certain ques-
tions of local practice argued by counsel.
We find no error in the record of the cir-
cuit court. Its judgment must therefore be
afiirnied. - -
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for recording any deed In writing "before an-
other first broUKht Into hie omce to be re-
corded." 1 Adams & D. Real Est. St. 63. 
The making of a memorandum of the date 
of record was, therefore, an official act, 
which naturally fell within the line of hls 
statutory duties, and a certlfted copy of It 
would be competent evidence to prove the 
memorandum and the date of the registra-
tion of the deed. 
We are of opinion, therefore, that the fact 
that the deed of Dunbar to Prout was re-
corded on June 23, 1818, was proved by com-
petent evidence, and that It therefore fol-
lows that the title of the plaintiffs was bet-
ter and superior to that of defendants, who 
claimed under a deed for the same lands not 
recorded until June 18, 1870, more than r.o 
years after lt8 date, and long after Innocent 
purchasers had bought the lands and paid a 
valuable consideration for them. 
The plalntur In error contends that the act 
of 1837, supra, cannot apply in this case, be-
cause at its date the lands In question wer~ 
no longer within the limits of Madison couri-
ty, but In the county of Putnam. But the flct 
expressly declares that it shall apply to writ-
ings theretofore as well as those therea!te1· 
admitted to record. The. deed of Dunbar to 
Prout was recorded under the act of 1807, 
supra, which required It to be recorded In 
the county where the lands conveyed were 
situated. It was so recorded. No law of 
Illinois since passed has required any other 
registration of deeds by the parties thereto, 
or has changed the effect of the original reg-
istration. See act of February 27, 1841; 1 
Adams & D. Real Est. St. 93, 94. 
The view we have taken of the case ren-
del'B lt unnecessary to notice certain ques-
tions of local practice argued by counsel. 
We find no error In the record of the cir-
cuit court. Its judgment must therefore be 
affirmed.. 
(Jase No. 103]
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GARRETT v. HANSHIT E et ux.
(42 N. E. 256.)
i
Supreme Court of Ohio. Nov. 26. 189-'3.
Error to circuit court, Rlchland county.
Action by W. II. Garrett against W. S.
Hanshue and another. Defendants had judg-
ment, which was affirmed by the circuit court,
and plaintii! brings error. Reversed.
The action in the common pleas was brought
by W. H. Garrett, plaintiff, against W. S.
Hanshue and Barbara iianshue, his wife, de-
fendants, to recover damages for breach of
covenants of title to certain lands in Iowa,
conveyed by them to one Mattie Shcphard by
deed of general warranty, and by her con-
veyed to the plaintiff by like deed. By written
assignment on the back of her deed to plain-
tiff, Mattie Shephard assigned and transferred
to him her right of action against Hanshue
and wife for breach of warranty as to the
title of the Iowa lands, and this assignment
was set out in the petition. The defendants,
among other things, denied the conveyance
from Mattie Shephard to plaintiff, and also de-
nied the assignment of the cause of action,
and failure of title to the iowa lands. Plain-
tiff had an abstract of the title of the lands in
1l\1e$ti°I1- fllld, for the purposes of the trial,
the attorneys of record of said defendants
placed upon said abstract the following writ-
ten agreement: "lt is hereby agreed that the
within abstract shows the true condition of
the title of the lands therein abstracted. Catn-
mings & McBride.” Upon the trial of the
case to a jury, the plaintiff, having proved by
.\Iattie Shephard, the grantor in the deed to
plaintiff, that she executed and delivered said
deed to him, ofl‘ered to introduce said deed in
evidence, to which defendants, by their coun-
sel, objected. upon the ground that. before the
deed could be received in evidence. its execu-
tion should be proved by at least one of the
subscribing witnesses, unless it should appear
L.-at the evidence of such witness could not
be procured. The court sustained the objec-
tion, and plaintiff excepted, and the deed was
ruled out. Plaintiff also offered to introduce I
said abstract in evidence to show the state of
the title to said lands, and to prove that de-
fendants had no title to the lands at the time
of their conveyance to Mattie Shephard. De-
fendants, by their counsel. objected to the in-
troduction of said abstract as evidence upon
the ground that, aside from the said agree-
ment of counsel, it was incompetent, and that
such agreement did not make it competent
when objected to on the trial. The court sus-
tained the objection, to which plaintiff except-
ed. The court instructed the jury to return a
verdict for defemlants, which was done. A
motion for a new trial was flied, assigning,
among other things. the ruling out of said deed
and abstract by the court. Said motion was
overruled. and judgment entered on the ver- 1
dict, to all of which plainiiii’ excepted. The
circuit court aiiirmed the judgment of the com-
mon pleas, and thereupon plaintiff filed his pe-
tition in this court to reverse both judgments
below.
S. C. Parker and D. Dirlam. for plaintiff in
error. Cummings & .\IcBride and Lewis
Brucker, for defendants in error.
BURKET, J . (after stating the facts). As far
back as we have been able to trace the mat-
ter, both in England and this country, it has
been uniformly held that the execution of a
deed or other written instrument having one or
more attesting witnesses must, as to rights be-
tween the parties or their privies, be estab-
lished by the testimony of at least one of the
subscribing witnesses, and that other proof of
execution is incompetent, unless it be first
shown that the evidence of such witness can-
not be had. Starkie. in his work on Evidence
(page 320), states the rules as follows: “If
the deed or instrument produced purports to
have been attested by one or more witnesses.
whose names are subscribed, the party must.
call at least one of the witnesses; and, in
cases where the instrument labors under any
doubt or suspicion, he ought to call them all.
The law requires the testimony of the sub-
scribing witness, because the parties them-
selves, by selecting him as the witness, have
mutually agreed to rest upon his testimony in
proof of the execution of the instrument, and
of the circumstances which then took place,
and because he knows those facts which are
probably unknown to others. So rigid is this
rule that it is not superseded, in the case of a.
deed, by proof of any admission or acknowl-
edgment of the execution by the party himself.
whether the action be brought against the
obligor himself’, or against his assignees after
his bankruptcy; nor by proof of an admission
of the execution, made by the defendant in his
answer to a bill in equity. The rule applies,
whether the question be between the parties
10 the deed or strangers, whether the deed be
the foundation of the action or but collateral,
or whether it still exist as a deed or has been
canceled, and although the issue be directed
by a court of equity to try the date, and not
the existence of a deed. Upon an indictment
against an apprentice for a fmudulent enlist-
ment, it was held that the indentures must be
proved in the regular way. And the same
rule applies to all written agreements and oth-
er instruments attested by a witness; as, for
instance, a notice to quit in ejectment, in
winch case it was held that proof of service
of the notice upon the tenant, and that it was
read over to him without his making any ob-
jection, was not suiiicicnt." Greeuleaf, in his
‘ work on ltlvidence (section 569), states the rule
as follows: “The instrument, being thus pro-
duced and freed from suspicion, must be prov-
ed by the subscribing witnesses, if there be
any, or at least by one of them. Various lea-
sons have been assigned for this rule, but that
upon which it seems best founded is that a.
fact may be known to the subscribing witness,
not within the knowledge or recollection of the
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Case No. 10:1) PROOF. 
GARRETT T. HA.NSHI:'E et ux. 
(42 N. E. 236.) 
Supreme Court of Ohio. Nov. 26. 189:>. 
Error to circuit court, Richland county. 
Action by W. H. Garrett against W. B. 
Hanshue and another. Defendants had jmlg-
ment, which was atftrmed by the circuit court, 
and plaJntur brings error. Re"ersed. 
The aetlon In the common 11leas was brought 
by w. H. Garrett, plalntllf, agalll8t w. s. 
Hanshue and Barbara Hanshue, his wife, de-
fendants, to recover damages for breach of 
(!()Venants of title to certain lands In Iowa, 
ronveyed by them to one Mattie Shephard by 
deed of general warranty, and by her con-
veyed to the plalntttr by like deed. By written 
a11slgnm<'nt on tbe back of her deed to plaln-
1llf, Mattie Shephard assigned and transferred 
to hlm her right of action against Hanshue 
and wife for breach of warranty as to the 
title of the Iowa lands, and this assignment 
was set out In the petition. The defetulnnts, 
among other things, denied the conveyance 
from Mattie 8hepbard to platntllf, and also de-
nied the al!Klgnwent of the cause of action, 
and failure of title to the Iowa lands. Plain· 
tiff had an abstract of the title of the lands In 
question, and, for the pu1110ses of the trial, 
the attorneys of rerord of said defendants 
placed upon 81lld abstract the following wlit-
ten agreement: "It Is hereby agreed that the 
within abstract shows the true condition of 
the title of the lands tberetn abstracted. Cum-
mings & McBride." Upon the trial of the 
case to a jury, the plalntllr, having proved by 
llatUe Shephard, the grantor In the deed to 
plalntUr, that she executed and delivered said 
deed to him, oft.'ered to Introduce said deed In 
evidence, to which defendants, by their coun-
sel, objected, upon the ground that, before the 
deed could be rt><'elved In evhJenC'P, Its PXl'C'll-
tlon should be proved by at least one of the 
sulflcrlblng witnesses, unless It should appear 
,~at the evidence of such witness could not 
be procured. The court sustained the objec-
tion, and plafntltr excepted, and the deed was 
ruled out. Plalntlfr also olTt>red to lntrodul'e 
said absb"&ct In evidence to show t11e state of 
the title to said lands, and to pro"e thnt de-
fendants had no title to the lnn<ls at the time 
of their conveyance to l\lnttl<> ~ht>phard. De-
fendants, by their counsel. objected to the In-
troduction of said abstract as evlden<'e upon 
the ground thut, ai:ltle from the said agree-
ment of coullllel, It was Incompetent, and that 
such agre<>ment did not make It competent 
when ohjectt>d to on the trial. The court f!Ull-
talned the objection, to whll'b plnlntllr except-
ed. Tht! court lustnll'ted the jury to return a 
verdict for def Pmlunts, which wns done. A 
motion tor a m•w trial was flied, al'lslgnl11g, 
among other things. the ruling out of said d<>ed 
and ab~tml't br the court. Said motion was 
overruled. and judgment Pntered on the ver-
dkt, to all of whkh 1ilal11lllT <>xcepted. The 
drc·ult court affirmed the judgment of the com-
300 
mon pleas, and thereupon plaintiff flied Ws pe-
tition In this court to reverse both judgments 
below. 
S. c. Parker and D. Dirlam, for plnlntllf In 
error. Cummings & McBride and Lewis 
Brucker, for defendants In error. 
BPltKET, J. (after stating the facts). As far 
back as we have been able to trace the mat-
ter, both In England and this country, It ha8 
been uniformly held that the execution of a 
deed or other written Instrument having one or 
more attesting witnesses must, as to rights be-
tween the parties or their privies, be estab-
ll11hed by the testimony of at least ooe of the 
subMcrlblng witnesses, and that other proof of 
execution Is Incompetent, unless tt be first 
shown that the e"ldence of such witness can-
not be lwd. Starkie, In bis work on Evidence 
(page 3:!()), states the rules as follows: "If 
the deed or Instrument produced purports to 
have been attested by one or more witnesses. 
whose names are subecrlbed, the party must 
call at least one of the witnesses; and, In 
cas<>s where the Instrument labors under any 
doubt or suspicion, be ought to call them all 
The law J'e(1ulres the testimony ot the sub-
scribing witness, because the partlee them-
selves, by selecting him as the witness, have 
mutually agreed to rest upon his testimony in 
11roof of the excc·ntlon of the Instrument, and 
of the clrcumstanres which then took place, 
and bec'Uu.se he knows those facts which are 
probably unknown to others. So rigid ts this 
rule that it 18 not superseded, in the case of a 
deed, by proof of any adml1111lon or acknowl-
edgment of the e:J:ecutlon by the party himself. 
whether the action be brought against the 
oblbcor himself, or against his assignees after 
his bankruptcy; nor by proof of an admission 
of the execution, made by the defendant In bis 
answer to a bill In equity. The rule applies, 
whether the question be between the parties 
to the d<>t'd or strangers, whether the deed be 
the foundation of the action or but collateral, 
or whether It still exist ns a deed or has been 
l'anet-led, and although the ls!!Ue be directed 
by a court of equity to try the date, and not 
tbe exlstence of a deed. Upon an Indictment 
agn.lust nu app1·entlre for a fraudulent enlist· 
ment, It was held that the Indentures must be 
proved In the regular way. And the same 
mle applies to all written agreements and oth-
er Instruments attested by a witness; as, for 
lmrtauce, a notke to quit In ejectmeut, in 
which case It was held tlwt proof of service 
of the notice upon the tenant, and that It was 
l'end over to him without his making any ob-
jectlou, was not sufficient." Greenleaf, in his 
work on ·E'fldeuc•e (Rf.'<•tlon 569), states the rule 
ns follows: "TI1e lnstrnnwnt, being thtll! pro-
dUC'ed and ft•l!<'ll from suspicion, must he prov-
ed by the 11ub1wrlblng witnesses, If there IM" 
any, or at lenst hy one of them. Yarlous 1•..!fl· 
sons have IJN>n &!!Signed tor this rule, but that 
upon which It seems best founded Is that a 
fnct may be known to the s11bl!<·1ihloir wltn<'llll, 
not within the knowledge or re<.'Ollectlon of tlte 
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obligor, and that he is entitled to avail himself
of all the knowledge of the subscribing wit-
ness relative to the transaction. The party
to whose execution he is :1 witness is consid-
ered as invoking him, as the person to whom
he refers, to prove what passed at the time of
attestation." Wharton, in his work on Evi-
dence (section 723), states the rule as follows:
"By the strict rule of the English common law,
when there are subscribing witnesses to an in-
strument, such witnesses should be called to
prove its execution, or their absence should be
duly accounted for. The statutes allowing
parties to be witnesses do not of themselves
abrogate this rule." This rule was recognized
and followed by this court in Zerby v. Wilson,
3 Ohio, 43, and also in Warner v. Railroad
Co., 31 Ohio St. 269, and the same rule is found
in Swan, Just. p. 154.
It is said that this rule is founded upon the
reason that a fact may be known to the sub-
scribing witness not within the knowledge or
recollection of the obligor, and that he is en-
titled to avail himself of all the knowledge
of the subscribing witness relative to the
transaction. This is the reason given by Le
Blane, J., in Call v. Dunning, 4 East, 54, and
followed by many Judges since without ques-
tion or investigation as to its soundness. That
this reason is unsound is clear from the con-
sideration that the competency of evidence
does not depend upon the fact of either knowl-
edge or recollection of a particular witness.
\Vhere two witnesses have equal means of
knowledge of a particular fact, both are equal-
ly competent as witnesses, although one may
have imperfectly comprehended the fact, and
but faintly recollects the transaction, while
the other may be clear as to the fact, and
perfect in his recollection. The want of com-
prehension and recollection will go as to the
weight, but not as to the competency, of the
evidence. Another reason given for the rule
is because the parties themselves, by se-
leeting the witnesses, have mutually agreed to
rest upon their testimony in proof of the
execution of the instrument, and of the cir-
cumstances which then took place, and be-
cause they know those facts which are proba-
bly unknown to others. This supposed mu-
tual agreement is a pure fiction, and rarely,
if ever, exists in fact. If in any case it has
a real existence, and can be shown, it may
perhaps be enforced; but the mere fiction is
entitled to no weight and to no respect. The
fact that such witness may know facts which
are unknown to others does not go to the com-
petency of the evidence of another witness as
to facts actually within his knowledge. It is
also said that the party to whose execution
he is a witness is considered as invoking him,
as the person to whom he refers to prove
what passed at the time of attestation. This
is also a pure fiction, but may have been well
enough when parties were debarred from tes-
tifying. The execution of written instruments
does not involve a sacred ceremony, hut a
business transaction, and should, like any oth-
er fact, be proven by the best evidence of
which it is capable; that is, by evidence
which dues not presuppose the existence of
other evidence of a higher character. As
this rule had its origin when parties to ac-
tions were not permitted to testify, when
deeds were not required to be acknowledged
before an ofilcer, and when the execution of
such instruments was attempted to be proven
by the admissions of the grantors, there was
some reason for holding that the direct evi-
dence of the subscribing witnesses was better
and of a. higher character than the admissions
of the grantor, whether made orally or in a
written answer in chancery. The oral ad-
missions were evidence only upon the pre—
sumption that a man would not admit that
which was against his interest; but often the
establishment of the instrument was for his
interest, and then, of course, he should not
be permitted to prove it by his admission.
The same was true of an admission in an an-
swer in chancery, with this additional objec-
tion: that he should not be permitted to prove
a fact by an admission in his answer in
chaucery which he could not be allowed to
prove by his evidence in court. He could not
by his answer do indirectly that which he
could not do directly by his sworn evidence
upon the trial. But as parties to actions can
now testify, and deeds are required to be ae-
knowledged before an ofllcer, this reason of
the rule has ceased. True, in Hodnett v.
Smith, 2 Sweeney, 401, 10 Abb. Prac. (N. S.)
86, and 41 How. Prac. 190, it was held that the
statutes allowing parties to be witnesses do
not of themselves abrogate this rule. That
decision was by the superior court of the
city of New York, and the cases there cited
and relied upon are decisions of the courts of
common pleas of the state of New York, and
those courts followed the old rule without
question. Not being by a court of last resort,
the case is not of controlling weight here.
The question was not examined on principle,
and, if it had been, a different conclusion
should have been reached. While a statute
making a party to an action a competent wit-
ness does not of itself make that part of his
evidence competent which was before incom-
petent, yet if the evidence was in its nature
competent before the statute, and was made
unavailable by reason of the incompetency of
the witness. when such ineompetency is re-
moved by statute, the evidence thereby be-
comes available, and may be introduced
through such newly-enfranchiscd witness. As
to the execution of an instrument, it was
said that the subscribing witnesses should be
first called, because they not only saw, but
participated in, the transaction, and had their
‘ attention thereby specially called to the sub-
i
1
ject, while‘ mere bystanders, with equal op-
portunity to see and hear, would not so fully
l.ll1(i(.‘l'.\itlll(1 the matter as those who actually
took part in the transaction; and although
the grantor saw the transaction. and par-
ticipated therein, and was in fact the prin-
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ATTESTED DOCUME~ns TO BE PUOVED UY WlT.YESS. [Case No. 103 
obllgor, and that he le entitled to avail himself 
ot all the knowledge ot the subscribing wit-
ness relative to the transaction. The party 
to whose execution be ls 11 wltnPss le consid-
ered as Invoking him, as the perKOn to whom 
he refers, to prove what paseed at tile time ot 
attestation." Wharton, In bis work on Evi-
dence (aectlon 723), states the rule as follows: 
"By the strict rule ot the English common Ja.w, 
when there are subscribing witnesses to an in-
strument, such witnesses should be called to 
prove Its execution, or their absence should be 
duly accounted tor. The statutes allowing 
parties to be witnesses do not ot themselves 
abrogate this rule." This rule was recognized 
and followed by this court In Zerby v. Wilson, 
3 Ohio, 43, and also In Warner v. Railroad 
Co .. 31 Ohio St. 269, and the same rule ls found 
In Swan. Just. p. lG-!. 
It Is said that this rule Is founded upon the 
reason thllt a tact may be known to the sub-
scribing witness not within the knowledge or 
recollectlon ot the obllgor, and that he Is en-
titled to a\'all himself of all the knowledi:e 
ot the mbscrlblng witness relative to the 
transaction. This 18 the renson glYen by Le 
Blanc, J ., In Call v. Dunning, 4 Bnst, Gel, and 
followed by many judges since without ques-
tion or Investigation as to Its soundness. That 
this re880n ls unsound 18 clear from the con-
aldera tlon that the competency of evidence 
does not depend upon the tact of either knowl-
edge or recollectlon ot a pnrtlcular witness. 
"'here two wltnesRes have equal means of 
knowledge ot a pnrtkular fact, both are equal-
ly competent as witnesses, although one may 
have imperfectly comprehen<ll'd the tact, and 
but faintly recollects the transaction, while 
the other may be clear as to the tact, and 
P<'rfect in bis recollection. The want ot com-
prehension and recollection wlll go as to the 
weight, but not as to the C'ompeti>ncy, ot the 
evldl'nce. Another reason glnm for the rule 
ls because the parties themsel'l"es, by se-
lecting the witnesses, ha \'e mutually agreed to 
rest upon their testimony In proof of the 
execution ot the Instrument, and ot the cir-
cumstances which then took place, and bf!-
cause they know those tacts which a;.<) proba-
bly unknown to others. This supposed mu· 
tunl agreement Is a pure fiction, and 1·arel), 
If ever, exists In tact. If In any cnse It has 
11 real existence, and can be shown, It may 
perhaps be enforced; but the mere fiction ls 
entitled to no weight nnd to no respect. The 
tact that such witness way know facts which 
are unknown to others does not go to the com-
petency ot the evidence of another wltne>s as 
to facts actually within his knowledge. It Is 
also Sllld that the pnrty to whose exe<"utlon 
he Is a witness Is con:;;ldered as Invoking him, 
as the person to whom be refe1'8 to prove 
what passed at the time of attestation. This 
Is also a pure fiction, but may have been well 
enough when parties were tlebarrecl from tes-
tifying. The execution of written Instruments 
<loes not involve a sacred ceremony, hut 11 
businel8 transaction, and shoultl, like any oth-
er tact, be proven by the best evidence of 
which it Is capable; that ls, by evidence 
which tloes not presuppose the existence of 
other eYldence of a higher character. As 
this rule hall Its origin when parties to ac-
tions were not permitted to testify, when 
deeds were not re<]ulred to be ack~owledged 
before an officer, and when the execution of 
such instruments was attempted to be proven 
bY the admlssiollS of the grantors, there was 
some reason for boltllng that the dil'ect eYl-
dence ot the sub~crlblng wltnes8('8 was better 
and ot a higher character than the admissions 
ot the grantor, whether made orally or in a 
written answer In chancery. The oral atl-
mlsslons were evidence only upon the pre-
sumption tba.t a mnn would not admit that 
which was against bis Interest; but often the 
establishment of the Instrument wns tor bis 
lnte1·est, and then, ot course, be should not 
be permitted to pro,•e it by bis admission. 
The same was true ot an admission In an an-
swer In chancery, with this adclltlonnl objec-
tion: that he should not be pe1·mltted to prove 
a tact by an admission In his answer In 
chnn<.-ery which he could not be allowed to 
prove by his evlclenee In court. He could not 
by his answer do Indirectly that which he 
could not do directly by his sworn evidence 
upon the trial. But as parties to al'tlons can 
now testify, nnd deeds are t•equlred to be ac-
knowledged before an officer, this reason of 
the rule bas ceased. True, in ll<><lnett v. 
Smith, 2 Sweeney, 401, 10 Abb. PJ'llc. (~. S.) 
86, and 41 Ifow. P1·ac. 100, It was held tlmt the 
statutes allowing parties to be witnesses do 
not of themselves abrogate this rule. That 
decision was by the superior court o! the 
city ot New York, and the cn~es there dted 
and relied upon a.re dt>eislons ot the courts of 
common tilens ot the stnte ot New York, and 
those courts followed the old rule without 
que~tlon. ::'\ot helng by a comt of last resort, 
the case 18 not ot controlllng weight here. 
The q11e11tlon was not examined on prlnl'lple, 
and, It it had bePn, a different conclusion 
should haYe been reached. While a statute 
making a party to an action a competent wit-
ness does not ot itself make that part ot bis 
evide:;ce competent which was !)('fore Incom-
petent, yet If the e\'ldem•e was In Its na tur<: 
competent before the statute, and wns made 
unan1llahle by reason of the lncompetenl'y ot 
the wltnes11. when such Incompetency Is re-
moved by statute, the e\'ldence thereby be-
comes a\'alL'tble, and mny be Introduced 
throu~h such newly-enfranchl!-'.ed witness. As 
to the exC<:utlon of an lnst1'Ument, It was 
Mid that the subscribing witnesses should be 
first l·nlled, because they not only snw, but 
pnrtlclpated In, the transa<'tlon, and had their 
attention thereby specially called to the sub-
ject, while· mere bystanders, with equal op-
portunity to see and bear, would not so fully 
untler;,tund the matter as those who actually 
took part In the trnnsnl'tlon; and although 
the grantor saw the tra111<nctlon, and par-
tklpnted therein, and was in fact the prln-
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cipal actor, and had full information, yet, as
he was an incompetent witness, it was held
that the testimony of the subscribing wit-
nesses was the best evidence of the fact of
execution. On principle, it was not the evi-
dence of the grantor that was incompetent,
but it was the witness that was incompetent.
By removing the incompetency of the wit-
ness, his evidence, which in its nature was al-
ways competent, bccame available to prove
the fact of execution, and his evidence in such
case is as good and of as high a character as
that of the subscribing witnesses. True, he
may be interested, but that goes only to the
weight, and not to the character or compe-
tency, of the evidence. By section 310 of the
Code, adopted in 1853, parties to actions be-
came competent witnesses, but it was pro-
vided that their interest might be shown to
affect their credibility. Later the credibility
part of the section was removed, and ever
since that parties to actions are competent
witnesses upon an equality with other wit-
ncsses, the credibility of all alike to be de-
termined by the jury in view of all the cir-
cumstances. As the evidence of tliosc who
were present and participated in the execu-
tion of the instrument was regarded as the
best evidence of its execution, and the incom-
petency of the grantor as a witness being
now removed by statute, it inevitably follows .
that he is now, equally with the subscribing
witnesses, competent to establish the execu-
tion of the instrument.
The rule requiring the execution of a deed
to be proven by the subscribing witness
would exclude the ofllcer before whom the
deed was acknowledged, when we all know
that such ofiicer sees and knows all that the
witnesses do, and most likely much more.
The witnesses are usually hurriedly called 5
in, and give but slight attention to the mat-
ter, while the officer usually prepares the
deed and acknowledgment, shows the par-
ties where to affix their signatures, sees
them sign the deed, and hears them ac-
knowledge it; and a rule which requires
such oflicer, and the party who signed the in-
strument, to stand aside until the testimony
of the subscribing witness is first taken as
to its execution, cannot be sound in this day,
when all persons are equally competent to
testify to any fact within their knowledge,
unless otherwise provided by statute, as in 1
the case of wills. In Warner v. Railroad
Co., 31 Ohio St. 269, the grantor being dead .
at the time of the trial, it was proposed
to establish the execution of the instrument
by proving his signature, and his admission
that he had executed the instrument, witn-
out first calling the subscribing witnesses or
accounting for their absence. This the court .
held could not be done. The testimony of
the subscribing witnesses, who saw the par-
ty sign his name to the instrument, was
better evidence and of a higher character
than the testimony as to his handwriting or
admissions. The case was therefore cor-
rectly decided, and the rule as to the sub-
scribing witness was not necessary to sus-
tain the decision. While the rule as to the
testimony of the subscribing witnesses was
in full force in this state, this court held,
in the case of Simmons v. State, 7 Ohio, 116,
that the rule did not apply in a prosecution
for forgery wherein the signer of the forged
instrument was a competent witness. Wood,
J.,'used the following language: “In a case
arising between the parties to such an in-
strument having a subscribing witness, and
where the obligor, being interested, is ex-
cluded from testifying, the rule is a good
one which requires such witness to prove its
execution. ' * * When the obligor is
competent, he mut be the best witness of
which the case will admit, and the subscrib-
ing witness, in such case, need not be call-
ed." As early as the case of Grey v. Smith-
yes, 4 Burrows, 2273, it was held that the
rule did not apply to third persons in a col-
lateral proceeding having no privity with
the grantor in the deed. The same was aft-
erwards held in Ayers v. Hewitt, 19 Me. 286.
There are some other exceptions to the rule,
as is shown by the notes to section 569 of
Greenleaf on Evidence. In Maryland the
rule was regarded so narrow that it was
changed by statute as early as 1825. We
think that the statutes requiring deeds to be
acknowledged before an oiiicer, and per-
mitting parties to testify, have so enlarged
the rules as to the manner of proving the
execution of a written instrument having
, subscribing witnesses as to abrogate the old
rule, and to permit such execution to be
proven alike by the grantor, the subscribing
witnesses, or the otlirer before whom the ac-
. knowledgment was taken.
Whether or not the court erred in not per-
-’ mitting the abstract to be received in evi-
dence depends upon the question as to
whether the attorney of record has power to
bind his client by agreement in writing be-
fore the trial, as to a matter of evidence. to
facilitate the preparation for trial, or to save
expense or shorten the trial. and whether
what was written on the abstract made it
Cculpclent evidence on the trial. Rev. St.
5 5238, provides that either party may ex-
hibit to the other or to his attorney, at any
time before the trial, any paper or docu-
ment material to the action, and request an
admission in writing of its genuineness;
and, if the adverse party or his attorney
‘ fail to give the admission, such party shall
. pay the cost of proving the genuineness of
‘ such paper or document. This section clear-
; ly recognizes the authority of the attorney
: to bind his client in such cases. ln practice.
' it is a daily occurrence for attorneys to en-
‘ ter into written stipulations as to matters
of evidence, and the uniform current of au-
, thorities, both in England and this country.
is in favor of the power so to do. In 1 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law, p. 954, we find the follow-
ing: “An attorney at law has authority, by
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clpal actor, and bad full Information, 7et, a. 
he was an Incompetent witness, It was held 
that the testimony of the subscl'iblng wit-
nesses wns the best evidence of the fact of 
execution. On principle, It was not the evi-
dence of the grantor that wa.s Incompetent, 
but it was the witness that was incompetent. 
By removing the Incompetency of the wit-
ness, his evidence, which in Its nature was al-
ways competent, became available to prove 
the fact of execution, and his evidence 1n such 
case 18 as good and of as high a character as 
that ot. the subscribing wltneBSes. True, he 
may be interested, but that goes only to the 
weight, and not to the character or compe-
tency, of the evidence. By section 310 of the 
Code, adopted in 18.53, parties to actions be-
came competent wltne88e8, but It was pro-
vided that their Interest might be shown to 
alrect their credlblllty. Later the credlblllty 
part of the section waa removed, and ever 
since that parties to actions are competent 
witnesses upon an equality with other wit· 
Dl.'8ses, the credlblllty ot all alike to be de-
termined by the jury In view of all the cir-
cumstances. As the evidence of thos(' who 
were present and participated In the execu· 
tlon of the Instrument was regarded as the 
best evidence of Its execution, and the Incom-
petency of the grantor 88 a witness being 
now removed by statute, It Inevitably follows . 
that he ls now, equally with the subscribing 
witnesses, competent to establish the execu-
tion of the lnstl'Ument. 
rectly decided, and the rule as to the sub-
scribing witness was not necessary to sus-
tain the deelslon. While the rule u to the 
testimony of the subecrlbl11g witnesses waa 
1n full force In this .state, tbls court held, 
In the case of Simmons v. State, 7 Ohio, 116, 
that the rule did not apply In a prosecution 
for forgery wherein the signer of the forged 
Instrument was a competent wltneBB. Wood, 
J.,°used the following language: "In a case 
arlsl11g between the parties to such an in-
strument having a subscribing wltneSB, and 
where the obllgor, being Interested, ls ex-
cluded from testifying, the rule ls a good 
one which requires such witness to prove Its 
execution. • • • When the obllgor ls 
comJJetent, he must be the best witness of 
which the case wlll admit, and the subscrib-
ing witness, In such case, need not be call· 
ed." As early 88 the case of Grey v. Smith· 
yee, 4 Burrows, 2273, It was held that the 
rule did not apply to third persons In a col· 
lateral proceeding having no prlvity with 
the grantor in the deed. The same was aft· 
crwards held In Ayers v. Hewitt, 19 Me. 286. 
'!'here are some other exceptions to the rule, 
as ls shown by the notes to section 569 of 
'1reenleaf on Evidence. In Maryland the 
rule was regarded eo narrow that It was 
changed by statute as early as 1825. We 
think that the statutes requiring deeds to be 
Acknowledged before an otD.cer, and per-
mitting parties to testify, have so P-nlnl"ged 
the rules as to the manner of proving the 
execution of a written Instrument having 
1 subscribing witnesses as to abrogate the old 
rule, and to permit such execution to be 
, proven alike by the grantor, the subscribing 
witnesses, or the otfirer before whom the ac-
knowledgment was taken. 
The rule requiring the execution of a deed 
to be proven by the subscribing witness 
would exclude the oftlcer before whom the 
deed was acknowledged. when we all know 
that such ofticer sees and knows all that the 
witnesses do, and most likely much more. 
The witnesses are usually hurriedly called 
tn, and gtve but slight attention to the mat-
ter, whlle the oftict>r usually prepares the 
deed and acknowledgment, shows the par-
ties where to affix their signatures, sees 
them sign the deed, and hears them ac-
knowledge It; and a rule which requires 
such offi.cer, and the party who signed the In-
strument, to stand aside until the testimony 
of the subS<'rlhlng witness ls ftrst taken as 
to Its execution, <·annot be sound In this day, 
when all persons are equally competent to 
testify to any fact within their knowledge, 
unleBB otherwise provided by statute, as In 
the case of wills. In 'Varner v. Railroad 
Co., 31 Ohio St. 200, the grantor being dead 
at the time of the trial, It was proposed 
to establish the execution of the Instrument 
by proving his signature, and his admission 
that he hnd exe<'uted the Instrument, wit.b-
out first calling the subscribing witnesses or 
accounting tor their absence. This the court ' 
held could not be <lone. The testimony of 
the subscribing wltnc11ses, who saw the par-
ty elgn his name to the instrument, wae 
better evidence and of a higher chnracter 
than the testimony as to his handwriting or 
admissions. The case waa the1·efore cor-
302 
Whether or not the court erred In not per· 
mlttlng the abstract to be received 1n evi-
dence depends upon the question as to 
whether the attorney of record bas power to 
bind his client by agreement In writing be-
fore the trial, as to a matter of evidence. to 
facilitate the preparation for trial, or to eave 
expense or shorten the trial, and whether 
what was written on the abstract made It 
CPIHpl'tcut e\'ldence on the trial Rev. St. 
I 52~. provides that either party may ex-
hibit to the other or to his attorney, at any 
time before the trial, any paper or do<'U· 
ment material to the action, and reouest an 
admission ln writing of Its genuineness; 
and, lf the adverse pnrty or hls attorney 
fall to give the admission, such party shall 
pny the cost of proving the genuineness of 
such paper or document. Thle section cleal'-
ly recosnlzes the authority of the attorney 
to bind his client In such cases. In practice. 
It ls a dally occurrence for attorneys to en· 
ter into written stipulations as to matters 
of evldenct:, and the unltorm current ot au-
' thorlties, both In England and this country, 
ls In favor of the power so to do. In 1 Am. 
& Eng. Enc. Luw, p. 9:>!, we find the follow-
ing: "An attorney at law has autllority, by 
ATTESTED DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVED BY WiTNESS.
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virtue of his employment as such, to do on
behalf of his client all acts, in or out of
court, necessary or incidental to the pros-
ecution or management of the suit,
which aifect the remedy only, and not the
cause of action. This includes the right to
demand and receive payment in money of
the client's debts; and part payments are
within his power to receive as well as pay-
ments in full. As long as he appears as
attorney on record, bona tide payments to
him discharge the debt. no matter what pri-
vate instructions he may have received from
his client. He may also sue out an alias
execution. He may receive livery of seisin
of land taken under an extent; may waive
objections to evidence, and enter into stip-
ulations for the admission of facts or con-
duct of the trial. and for release of bail;
may waive notices, and give extensions of
time to file papers, and confess judgment;
and may open a default which he has taken
(whether improperly or not), and vacate the
judgment entirely, even though (it has been ‘
held) his client has instructed him to the
contrary." The authorities cited in support ‘
of the power here in question fully sustain
the text. Among others, the following are
cited: Lacoste v. Robert, 11 La. Ann. 33;
Stcph. Dig. Ev. 46; Moulton v. Bowker, 115
Mass. 36; Lewis v. Sumner, 13 Metc. (.\Iass.)
269; Elton v. Larkins, 1 Moody & R. 196;
Young v. Wright, 1 Camp. 139. In Ish v.
Crane, 13 Ohio St. 574. the case was sub-
mitted to the district court upon an agreed
statement of facts, signed by the attorneys V
of record, and the case was reserved to this
court;
fore the hearing, counsel for defendant in er-
ror attempted to revoke, withdraw, and an-
nul the agreed statement of facts, to which
the attorney for plaintiff in error objected.
This court refused to permit the withdrawal
of the agreed tatement, and, in deciding the
point, used the following language: “It has
long been the practice in this state. as well
as in the courts of other states, for counsel ‘
to mutually agree upon a state of facts, and
to reduce the agreement to writing, and ille
it in the case, instead of being to the trouble
and expense of taking proof by depositions,
or otherwise, to show the facts. And when
such agreement is reduced to writing. and
signed by the parties or their counsel, and
flied in the case, I think the general under-
standing. both of the bar and court. has
been that the same was to be regarded, un-
til set aside by the court, as a special ver-
dict of a jury, expressing the result of the
proof made by both parties, and so belong-
ing to both parties that neither party could
withdraw the same. It is not doubted that,
in case of an agreed statement having been
so made and filed by mistake, or misappre-
and ‘
and after such reservation, and be- -
1 hension of the existing state of facts by
‘ one of the parties, he might. consistently
with fair practice, upon notice to the ad-
‘ verse party or his counsel, apply to the
! court for leave, on the ground of such mis-
take or misapprehension, to withdraw from
the flies such agreed statement, or such part
thereof as was, in fact. untrue, and had
been so assented to by mistake or misap-
prehension; and upon the merits of such
motion being sustained by proof. satisfac-
tory to the court, it is not doubted the court
might grant such relief as the party should
show himself justly entitled to.” In view
of these authorities. we are of opinion, and
so hold, that an attorney of record has am-
ple power to do on behalf of his client all
acts, in or out of court. necessary or 1n-
cidental to the prosecution, management, or
defense of the action, and which aifect only
the remedy, and not the right, and that this
includes the power to waive objections to
evidence, and enter into stipulations for the
admission of facts on the trial. In case the
court should, on motion, allow such agreeu
, statement to be withdrawn, ample time
‘ should be given for the preparation of the
. case on other testimony, so as not to take
. either party by surprise. The spirit is the
same as that of section 5286. Rev. St., which
requires exceptions to depositions to he
heard and disposed of before the commence-
ment of the trial.
The abstract which was ruled out is found
in the bill of exceptions, and seems to sus-
tain the contention of the plaintiff. It was
therefore material, and, if the agreement
was suflicient, it should have been received
'. in evidence. The agreement states that the
abstract shows the true condition of the ti-
tle of the lands therein described, and it
appears that the lands therein described are
the lands in question; but the agreement
fails to state that the abstract may be used
as evidence on the trial. But this was not
necessary. Whatever is true may, if rele-'
vant, be received in evidence. The truth of
the abstract being admitted, plaintiff had :1.
right to use it as evidence, without the fur-
‘ ther agreement of defendant that he might
do so.
It follows that the court of common pleas
f erred in ruling out the deed and abstract,
. and in overruling the motion for a new trial,
i and that the circuit court erred in aflirming
i the judgment of the common pleas. Both
‘ judgments are therefore reversed, and the
cause remanded to the court of common
pleas for a new trial. Reversed and re-
mnnded.
i SPEAR, J., dissents, on the ground that
‘ the facts do not warrant the judgment of re-
‘, versal on the second ground.
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ATTESTED DOCUME~TS TO BE PROVED BY W1TNESS. (Case No. 1oa 
henslon of the existing state of tacts by 
one of tl1e parties, he might, consistently 
with fair practice, upon nqtlce to the ad-
verse party or his coum1el, apply to the 
court for leave. on the .irround of such mis-
take or misapprehension, to wlthdmw from 
the Illes such agreed statement, or such part 
thereof as was, In fact, untrue, and had 
been so assented to by mistake or misap-
prehension; and upon the merits of such 
motion being sustained by p1'00f, Ratlstac-
tory to the court, It Is not doubted the court 
might grant such relief as the party should 
show himself Justly entitled to." In view 
of the11e authorities, we are of opinion, and 
so hold, that an attorney of record has am-
ple vower to do on behalf of his client all 
nets, In or out of court, necessar;v or 111-
ctdental to the prosecution, management, or 
defense of the action, and which affect only 
the remedy, and not the right, and that this 
includes the power to waive objections to 
evidence, and enter Into stipulations for the 
admission of facts on the trial In case the 
court should, on motion, allow such agreeu 
statement to be withdrawn, ample time 
should be given for the preparation ot the 
case on other testimony, so as not to tnke 
either party by surprise. The spirit Is the 
same as that of section 5286, Rev. St., which 
requires exceptions to depositions to be 
heard and disposed of before the commence-
ment of the trial. 
The abstract which was ruled out Is round 
In the bill of exceptions, and seems to sus-
tain the contention of the plaintiff. It was 
therefore material, and, It the agreement 
was sufficient, It should have been received 
In evidence. The agreement states that the 
abstract shows the true condltlon of the ti-
virtue ot his employment as such, to do on 
behalt of his client all acts, ln or out ot 
<!Ourt, necessary or Incidental to the pros-
ecution or management of the sult, and 
which affect the remedy only, and not the 
enuse of action. This includes the right to 
demand and receive payment In money of 
the client's debts; and part payments are 
within his power to receive as well as pay-
ments In full. As long as he appears as 
attorney on reco1·d, bona llde payments to 
him dlsl'lmrge the debt, no matter what pri-
vate lnstruclions he may have received from 
his client. He may also sue out an alias 
execution. He may receive livery ot seisin 
of land taken under an extent; mny waive 
objections to evidence, and enter Into stip-
ulations for the admission of facts or con-
dnct of the trial, and for relP.ase of ball; 
may waive notices, and give extensions of 
time to file papers, and confess judgment; 
and mny open a detault which he has taken 
(whether Improperly or not), and vacate the 
judgment entirely, even though (It has been 
held) his client has instructed him to the 
contrary." The authorities clted In support 
ot the power here In question fully sustain 
the text. Among others, the following are 
cited: Lacoste v. Robert, 11 La. Ann. 33; 
Steph. Dig. Ev. 40; l\loulton v. Bowker, 115 
Mass. 36; Lewis v. Sumner, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 
269; Elton v. Larkins, 1 Moody & R. 196; 
Young v. Wright, 1 Camp. 139. In lsh v. 
Crane, 13 Ohio St. 574, the case was sub-
mitted to the district court upon an agreed 
statement of facts, signed by the attorneys 
of record, and the case was reserved to this 
court; and after such reservation. and be-
fore the hearing, counsel for defendant In er-
ror attempted to revoke, withdraw, and an-
nul the agreed statement of tacts, to which 
the attorney for plalntl1l' In error objected. 
This court refused to permit thP. wlthdrnwal 
of the agreed statement, and, in deelcllng the 
point, used the following language: "It has 
long been the practice in this state, as well 
as In the courts of other states, for counsel 
to mutually agree upon a state of facts, and 
to reduce the a~eement to wrltlng, and file 
It In the case, Instead of being to the trouble 
and expense of taking proof by depositions, 
or otherwise, to show the facts. And when 
such agreement ls reduced to writing, and 
signed by the parties or their coum1el, and 
!lied In the case, I think the general under-
standing, both ot the bnr and court. has 
been that the same was to be regarded, un-
til set aside by the court, ns a special ver-
dict of a Jury, expressing the result of the 
proof made by both parties, and so belong-
ing to both parties that neither party could ' 
withdraw the same. It Is not doubted thut, 1 
ln case ot an agreed statement having been 
so made and filed by mistake, or mlsappre-
' tie ot the lands therein described, and tt 
appears that the lands therein described are 
the lands In question; but the agreement 
falls to state that the abstract may be used 
as evidence on the trial. But this was not 
necesf'ary. Whatever Is true may, If rele-: 
Yant, be received In evidence. The truth of 
the abstract being allmltted, plnlntltr had a 
right to use It as evidence, without the fur-
th.er agreement of defendant that he might 
do so. 
It follows that tlle court ot common pleas 
' er1·ed In ruling out the deed and abstract, 
, and in overruling the motion for a new trial, 
1 and that the circuit court erred In affirming 
1 the judgment of the common plens. Both 
jmlirments are therefore reYersed, and the 
cause remanded to the court of common 
pleas for a new trial. Reversed and re-
manded. 
SPEAR, J., dissents, on the ground that 
the facts clo not warrant the judgment of re-
versal on the second ground. 
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APPLEGATE et al. v. LEXING'l'ON & CAR-
TER COUNTIES MIN. CO. et al.
(6 Sup. Ct. 742, 117 U. S. 255.)
Supreme Court of the United States. _\iarch 15,
1886.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Kentucky.
The suit was in the nature of an action of
ejectmeut to recover possession of a tract
of land formerly in Mason county, but now
in Grceuup, Carter and Boyd counties, in
Kentucky. The plaintiffs in error were the
plaintiffs in the circuit court. They alleged
in their petition that they were the lineal
heirs of Carey L. Clark, who died seized oi’
a tract of 8,334 acres, part of a tract of 18,-
000acres granted by patent from the common-
wealth of Virginia, dated April 21, 1792, to
Charles Fleming, from whom their ancestor,
Carey L. Clark, derived title by a regular
chain of conveyances; that the plaintiifs
were the owners and entitled to the posses-
sion of the land sued for; and that the de-
fendants had unlawfully entered upon and
unlawfully withheld possession of the same.
The defendants, by their answers, denied
these allegations, and averred that they were
seized of the premises by paramount title.
The answers were traversed by the plain-
tiffs’ reply.
There was a jury trial. The plaintiffs, to
sustain the issue on their part. olfered in evi-
dence the following documents as links in
their chain of title: (1) A copy, duly cer-
tified, from the land-oiiice of the state of
Kentucky, of the patent from the state of
Virginia. to Charles Fleming, for the tract
of land of which the land in controversy was
originally a part. (2) A copy of the will of
Charles Fleming, devising a moiety of said
tract of land to William Fleming, John Ber-
nard, Jr., and Richard Bernard. as trustees.
(3) A copy of a deed from Samuel Sackett
and wife to Joseph Conkling and others,
dated August 29, 1795, for the particular land
in controversy in this case, together with cer-
tain other tracts that had been patented by
the state of Virginia to Charles Fleming.
(4) A copy of a mortgage f l'\?lll Joseph Cank-
ling and others, the grantees above na med. to
Samuel Sackett. the grantor above named.
conveying the same lands as above, and
dated August ‘.20, 1705. (5) A copy of a deed
from \Villiam Fleming and the Bernards,
trustees as above under the will of (‘harles -
Fleming, to John Bryan, conveying to Bryan
the lands devised to them by the will of
Fleming, and dated December 31, 1796. (6)
The original of the deed last named. (7)
A copy of a deed from Jolm Bryan and wife
to Samuel Sackett, (latcd January 28, 1707,
conveying the same land conveyed to Bryan
by deed last above named. (8) The original
of the deed last above named. (0) The orig-
inal of a deed from Charles Fleming. dated
August 8, 178-L, to John and William Bryan,
conveying to them 13,300 acres of the land
that had been patented to said Charles Flem-
ing, and being part of the 18,000 acre tract.
of which tract the land in controversy is
also a part. (10) A certified copy from the
Mason county circuit court of the record in
the case of Carey L. Clark v. Joseph Couk-
ling and others, in which Clark, as the as-
siznee of the above-mentioned mortgage of
Joseph Conkling and others to Samuel Sack-
ett, brought suit to foreclose the same.
The court admitted in evidence the first
four of the documents above mentioned. All
the others were rejected, namely. the original
and a copy of the deed from William Flem-
ing and the Bernards to John Bryan, the
original and the copy of the deed from Bry-
an to Sackett, the original of the deed from
Charles Fleming to John and William Bryan,
and the copy of the record from the Mason
county circuit court in the case of Clark v.
Conkling and others. The court having ex-
cluded these documents, the plaintiffs were
unable to trace title to themselves for the
premises in controversy. Thereupoli the
jury, under the instruction of the court, re
turned a verdict for the defendants. upon
which the court rendered judgment, and the
plalntitfs sued out this writ of error.
Mr. Justice WOODS, after stating the facts
in the foregoing language, delivered the opin-
ion of the court.
We shall first consider the exclusion of the
original deed from Fleming and the Bernards
to John Bryan, and the original deed from
John Bryan to'Samuel Sackett. We are of
opinion that they should have been admit-
ted in evidence. They have been certified
to and inspected by this court. Their ap-
pearance affords strong evidence of their
genuineness and antiquity. and they are free
from any badge that would excite suspicion
of fraud or forgery. In support of their gen-
uineness it was shown that a short time be-
fore the trial in the circuit court they were
discovered by one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys
in the ofliee oi.’ the clerk of the circuit court
of Greenup county. Kentucky. among the
original papers of a suit in that court
brought by one James Hughes v. Heirs oi‘
Thomas Shore, on July 15, 1816. to quiet his
title to 16.000 acres of laud in Gleenup coun-
ty, part of the lands conveyed by the deed oi’
\Villiam Fleming and the Bernards to John
Bryan. The deeds and the original papers in
that suit were produced by a clerk of the
Greenup circuit court in obedience to a sub-
pcrna duces tecum. The record of this case
was admissible against poisons, not parties
or privies, to prove the collateral fact of the.
antiquity of the original deeds offered in evi-
dence and to account for their custody. Barr
v. (lratz,4Wheat. 220. The bill of Hughes
averred that he derived title under the patent
to Charles Fleming. and by virtue of the de-
vise in his will to \Villiam Fleming and the
Bernards, and the deeds of William Fleming
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Case No. 104) PJWOF. 
APPLEGATE et al. •· LEXIXGTOX & CAR-
TER COUNTIES MIN. CO. et al 
l6 Sup. Ct. 742, 117 U. S. 255.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. ll.arch 15, 
1886. 
In error to the circuit court of the United 
States for the district of Kentucky. 
The suit was in the nature of an action of 
ejectment to recover possession of a tract 
of land formerly ln Mason county, but now 
In Greenup, Carter and Boyd counties, In 
Kentu<'ky. The plaintiffs In error were the 
plaintiffs In the circuit court. They alleged 
In their petition that they were the lineal 
heirs of Carey L. Clark, who died seized of 
a tract of 8,334 acres, part of a tract of 18,-
000 acres granted by patent ti-om the <'Owmon-
wealth of Virginia, dated April 21, 1792, to 
Charles Fleming, from whom their an('elltor, 
Carey L. Clark, derived title by a regular 
chain of conveyances; that the plalntltrs 
were the owners and entitled to the posses-
sion of the land sued for; and that the de-
fendants had unlawfully entered upon and 
unlawfully withheld poBBesslon ot the same. 
The defendants, by their answers, denied 
these allegations, and averred that they were 
seized of the premises by paramount title. 
The answers were traversed by the plaln-
titfs' reply. 
There was a jury trial. The plalntHrs, to 
sustain the issue on their part. offered In evi-
dence the following documents as links In 
their chain of title: (1) A copy, duly cer· 
titled, from the land-oftlce of the state of 
Kentucky, of the patent from the state of 
Virginia. to Charles Fleming, tor the tract 
ot land of which the land In contro>ersy was 
originally a part. (2) A copy of the will of 
Charles Fleming, devising a moiety of said 
tract of land to Wllllnm Fleming, John IJ(>r-
nard, Jr., and Richard Bernard, as trustees. 
(3) A copy of a deed from Samuel Sackett 
and wife to Jol*'ph Conkling and others, 
dated August 29, 1793, for the particular land 
In contt-o,·ersy In this cn11e, together with cer-
tain other tracts that had been patented by 
the state of Virginia to Charles l<~lemlng. 
(4) A copy of a mortgage fl'.,111 .Joseph Conk-
ling and others, the gTantees above named, to 
Samuel Hn<'kett, the grantor above named, 
conveying the same lands as above, and 
dnted August 2!1, 1 W:>. (ii) A <'OPY of a d~ed 
from. William Fleming and the Bernards, 
trustees as aboYe under the will of < 'harles 
Fleming, to John Bryan, con>eylng to Bryan 
the lands devised to them by the will of 
I•'leming, and dated December 31, 1796. (6) 
The original of the deed last named. (7) 
A copy of a deed from John Bryan and wife 
to Samuel Sackett, dat<'d .lnnuary ~. 1707, 
conveying the same land conveyed to Bryan 
by deed Inst ahove namt>d. (8) The- original 
of the deed last above named. (H) Tile orig-
inal of a deed from Charles Flt•mlng. dated 
August 8, 1784, to John and Wllllaw Bryan, 
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conveying to them 13,000 acres ot the land 
that had been patented to said Charles Flem· 
tug, and being part of the 18,000 a.ere tract. 
ot whi('b tract the land to controversy iB 
also a part. (10) A certified copy from the 
Mason county circuit court of the record lo 
the case of Carey L. Clark v. Joseph Conk-
ling and others, in which Clnrk, as the as-
signee of the above-mentioned mortgage Of 
Joseph Conkling and others to Samuel Sack· 
ett, brought suit to foreclose the same. 
ThE" court admitted lo evidence the first 
four of the documents above mentioned. AU 
the others were rejected, namely, the orlglnal 
and a copy of the deed from William Flem-
ing and the Bernards to John Bryan, the 
original and the copy of the deed from Bry· 
an to Sackett, the original of the deed from 
Charles Fleming to John and William Bryan, 
and the copy of the record from the .llason 
county circuit court In the CIUle of Clark v. 
Conkling and others. The court having ex· 
eluded these docume.nts, the plaintiffs were 
unable to tmce title to themselves for the 
premises ln controversy. Thereupon the 
jury, under the lnstru<'tlon ot the t'<>Urt, n>-
turned a verdict for the defendants. upon 
wll'lch the court rendered Judgment, and tht> 
plaintiffs sued out this writ of error. 
Hr. Justice WOODS, after stating tfle fa<'tB 
ln the foregoing language, delivered the opin-
ion of the court. 
We shall first consider the exclusion of the 
original deed from Fleming and the Bernarda 
to John Bryan, and the original deed trom 
John Bryan to ·Samuel Sackett. We are of 
opinion that they should have been admit-
ted to evidence. They have been certllled 
to and Inspected by thlR court. Their ap-
pearance alrorda stron1r e-videnc.>e of their' 
genuineness and antiquity, and they are trPe 
from any badge that would ex<'lte susp:<·'on 
of fraud or forgery. In support of their gen-
uineneBS It was shown that a short time be-
fore the trial In the circuit court they were 
discovered by one of the plalnturs' attorneys 
ln the oftlce of the clerk of the circuit court 
of Greenup county, Kentucky, among tht-
orlglnal papers of a suit in that court 
brought 'by one James HughPs v. Ht•lrs or 
Thomas Shore, on July 13, 1816. to quiet his 
tltle to 16.000 8<'re!.I of land in Greenup roun-
ty, part of the lnnds c•mveyed by the deed of 
Wllllam l<'lemlng and the Bernnrds to John 
Bryan. The deeds a'nd the original papers In 
that suit were produced by a clerk of the 
Greenup clrC'uit rourt In obedience to a aub-
pa>na duces teC'um. The record of this CBIM' 
was admissible against persons, not }>artles 
or privh•s, to prove the collah!ral f1t<'t of the . 
antiquity of the original deeds offered in evl-
dt>nce and to account for their custody. Barr 
v. Gratz. 4 Wheat. :..>20. The bill of Hughes 
awrred that he derived title under the patent 
to Charles Fleming, and by virtue of the d~ 
vise In his will to Wllllam Fleming and tht> 
Bernards, and the deeds of William ~'lemlng 
ANCIENT DEEDS, DOCUME.\".l‘.:', ETC.
[Case No. 104
and the Bernards to John Bryan and of John
Bryan to Samuel Sackett. The complainant
Hughes oflfered by his bill “to produce said
patent and deeds showing the deduction of ti-
tle in proper time, or whenever the court
should require it.” The two deeds mentioned in
the billof complaint filed by Hughes correspond
with and appear to be the two original deeds,
namely, the deed from William Fleming and
the Bernards to John Bryan, and the deed
from John Bryan to Samuel Sackett, offered
in evidence by the plaintiffs in this case,
which were found among the other papers
in the case of Hughes v. Heirs of Shore.
These deeds were necessary exhibits and
evidence in the case to entitle Hughes to the
relief prayed for.
the files of the highest court of the county
where the lands were situate, from the cus-
tody of an officer charged by law with their
care and safe-keeping, where they had been
placed for a. necessary and proper use, and
from which they could not be withdrawn
without the order and consent of the court.
Their custody was therefore accounted for,
and was shown to be proper and beyond sus-
piclon.
It further appeared that upon the trial of
the case of Hughes v. Shore's Heirs, on July
8, 1825, the patent to Charles Fleming from
the commonwealth of Virginia. for 16,191
acres of land, the will of Charles Fleming.
and the said deed of William Fleming and
the Bernards, trustees, to John Bryan, were
oflered in evidence. The latter was rejected,
"because.” as the bill of exceptions states,
“the certificate and seal of the mayor of
Philadelphia” was “not suflicient to author-
ize it to be read, and because the same could
not be read as a recorded deed, not having
been recorded within the time prescribed
by law;" and “because, by rejecting this
deed, complainants’ chain of title was bro-
ken, and they could not further progress
with their evidence, the court rendered a de-
cree dismissing their bill." It is therefore
made clear by the evidence ofl'ered that at
least as early as the year 1825 the deed of
William Fleming and the Bernards to John
Bryan was on file in the circuit court of
Greenup county, and it may be safely in-
{erred that the other documents mentioned
by Hughes as his muniments of title were
also on file in the same court at the same
time. and that all the deeds remained in
the custody of the court down to the time
when they were produced by the clerk under
the subpozna duces tecum issued in this
case, a period of 55 years.
Another circumstance relied on to show the
genulneness of the original deeds was that
each bore, indorsed thereon, a certificate ap-
parently ancient and genuine, one with the
signature of the recording ofilcer, and the
other without signature, to the effect that the
deeds had been recorded in the year 1816. In
the case of Stebbins v. Duncan. 108 U. S. 50,
S. G. 2 Sup. Gt. 313. it was held that a cer-
wn.oos,nv.—20
tifled copy of a memorandum made at the foot
of the record of a deed “recorded June 23,
1818,” and without signature, was competent
and conclusive evidence that the deed had
been recorded at the date mentioned. In
view, therefore, of the habit of recorders
of deeds, which is universal, and matter of
common knowledge, to indorse upon the
deeds themselves the fact and date of their
registration, the certificates appearing on the
deeds in question were competent and suf-
ficient evidence of the fact that the deeds had
been put upon record during the year men-
tioned in the certificates. We think this evi-
dence, supported by an inspection of the
‘ deeds, was suflicient to justify their admis-
They were produced from ‘
sion as ancient deeds, without direct proof of
their execution. The rule is that an ancient
deed may be admitted in evidence, without
direct proof of its execution, if it appears to
be of the age of at least 30 years, when it is
found in proper custody, and either posses-
sion under it is shown, or some other cor-
roborative evidence of its authenticity freeing
it from all just grounds of suspicion.
Thus, in Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 220, a
deed from Craig to Michael Gratz, dated July
16, 1784, was offered in evidence, but was not
proved by the subscribing witnesses, nor
their absence accounted for. Its admission
was alleged as error; but this court said that,
as the deed was more than 30 years old, and
was proved to have been in the possession of
the lessors of the plaintiff, and actually as-
serted by them as the ground of their title
in a prior chancery suit, it was, in the lan-
guage of the books, sufilciently accounted for,
and on this ground, as well as because it was
a part of the evidence in support of the de-
cree in that suit, it was admissible without
the regular proof of its execution. So, in Car-
uthers v. Eldridge, 12 Grat. 670, it was com
tended by the plaintiff in error that in no case
could a paper be admitted in evidence as an
ancient deed, without proof of its execution,
until it was first shown that 30 years‘ quiet
and continued possession of the land had
been held under the deed. But the court held,
in substance, that an ancient deed may be
introduced in evidence without proof of its
execution, though possession may not have
been held for 30 years in accordance there-
with, if such account be given of the deed as
may be reasonably expected under all the
circumstances of the case, and as will afford
the presumption that it is genuine. In liar-
lan v. Howard, 79 Ky. 373, the court of ap-
peals states the rule in relation to the proof
of ancient deeds thus: “The genuineness of
such instruments may be shown by other
facts as well as that of possession; and when
proof of possession cannot be had, it is with-
in the very essence of the rule to admit the
instrument, when no evidence justifying sus-
picion of its genuineness is shown, and it is
found in the custody of those legally entitled
to it." See. also. Vin. Abr. “I~1vidence,” A,
B, 5, “Ancient Deeds," 7; Com. Dig. “Evi-
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A~CIENT DEEDS, DOCUME~'r.:5, ETC. [Case No. 104 
llDd the Bernarda to John Bcyan and of John 
Bcyan t.o Samuel Sackett. The complalnant 
Hughes offered by his bill "to produce said 
patent and deedB showing the deduction of ti-
tle In proper time, or whenever the court 
should require It." The two deeds mentioned In 
the bill of complaint filed by Hughes correspond 
with and appear to be the two original deeds, 
Wl.Dlely, the deed from William l<~lemlng aud 
the Bernards to John Bryan, and the deed 
from John Bcyan to Samuel Sackett, oft'ered 
ln evidence by the plalnturs In this case, 
which were found among the other papers 
In the case ot Hughes v. Heirs of Shore. 
These deeds were necessary exhibits aud 
evidence In the case to entitle Hughes to the 
rellet prayed tor. They were produced from 
the ft.lea of the highest court ot the county 
wbere the lands were situate, from the cus-
tody ot an otllcer charged by law with their 
care and ate-keeping, where they had been 
placed for a nece88&cy and proper use, and 
from which they could not be withdrawn 
without the order and consent of the court. 
Their custody was therefore accounted for, 
and was shown to be proper and beyond sus-
picion. 
It further appeared that upon the trial of 
the case of Hughes v. Shore's Heirs, on July 
8, 1825, the patent to Charles Fleming from 
the commonwealth of Virginia tor 16,191 
acres of land, the will of Charles Fleming, 
and the said deed of William li'lemlng and 
the Bernards, trustees, to John Bryan, were 
oft'ered In evidence. The latter was rejected, 
"because," aa the blll of exceptions states, 
"the certlftcate and seal of the mayor of 
Philadelphia" was "not autllclent to author-
ize It to be read, and because the same could 
not be read as a recorded deed, not having 
been recorded within the time pre11Crlbed 
by law;" and "because. by rejecting this 
deed, complainants' chsln of title was bro-
ken, and they could not further progreas 
with their evidence, the court rendered a de-
cree dlsmlaslng their bill." It ls therefore 
made clear by the evidence offered thet at 
least as early as the year 18~ the deed of 
William li'lemlng and the Bernards to John 
Bryan was on file In the circuit court of 
Greenup oounty, and It may be safely In-
ferred that the other documPnts mPntioned 
by Hughes as his munlments ot title were 
also on file In the same court at the same 
time. and that all the deeds remalned In 
the custody of the court down to the time 
when they were produced by the clerk under 
the subpcpna du<'ee tecum Issued In this 
case, a period of 55 years. 
Another circumstance relied on to show the 
genuineness of the original deeds was that 
each bore, lndorsed thereon, a certlftcute ap-
parentl:y ancient and genuine, one with the 
signature of the recording otDcer, and the 
other without signature, to the etrect that the 
dPeds had been recorded In the year 1816. In 
the <"ase of StebblDB v. Dunran. 108 U. S. 00, 
8. O. 2 Sup. Ct. 313, It was held that a cer-
w11.0u1.Bv.-20 
tl1led oopy of n memorandum made at the foot 
of the record of a det'd ''recorded June 23, 
1818," and without signature, was competent 
and conclusive evidence that the deed had 
been recorded at the date mentioned. In 
view, therefore, of the habit of recorders 
of deeds, which ls universal, and matter of 
common knowledge, to lndorae upon the 
deeds themselves the fact and date of their 
registration, the certificates appearing on the 
deeds In question were competent and suf-
ficient evidence of the fact that the deeds had 
been put upon reoord during the year men-
tioned In the certificates. We think this evi-
dence, supported by an Inspection of the 
deeds, was StltDclent to justify their admis-
sion as ancient deeds, without dJrect proof of 
their execution. The role 18 that an ancient 
deed may be admitted In evidence, without 
direct proof of lta execution, It It appears to 
be of the age of at least 30 yt'Brs, when It Is 
found In proper custody, and either posses-
sion under It la shown, or some other cor-
roborative evidence of Its authenticity freeing 
It from all Just grounds of suspicion. 
Thus, In Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 220, a 
deed from Craig to Michael Gratz, dated July 
16, 1784, was offered In evidence, but was not 
proved by the aobecrlblng witnesses, nor 
their absence accounted for. Its admission 
W8.8 alleged as error; but this court said that, 
as the deed was more than 30 years old, and 
waa proved to have been In the poesesslon of 
the lessors of the plalntUr, and actually as-
serted by them as the ground of their title 
In a prior chancery suit, It was, In the lan-
guage of the books, sutDclently accounted for, 
and on this ground, as well as because It waa 
a pal't of the evidence In snp110rt of the de-
cree In that suit, It was adml88lble without 
the regular proof of Its execution. So, In Car-
uthers v. Eldridge, 12 Grat. 670, It was con-
tended by the plalntlft' In error that In no case 
conld a paper be admitted In evlden<'e as an 
ancient deed, without proof of lta execution, 
until It wu first shown that 30 years' quiet 
and continued possession of the land had 
been held under the deed. But the court held, 
In substance, that an ancient deed may be 
lntrodu<>ed In evidence without proof of Its 
exe<'tttlon, though possession may not have 
lx>en held for 30 years In accordance there-
with, lf such n<><>ount be given of the deed as 
may be rea111>0ably experted under nil the 
clrcumstanC"eS of the case, and as will nft'ord 
the pre11umptlon that It la genuine. In Ilnr-
lnn v. Howanl, 79 ICy. 373, the court of ap-
peals states the rule In relation to the proof 
ot ancient deed!! thus: "The genuineness of 
suC'h lni;;trument11 may be 11hown by other 
facts as wPll as that of po!1Messlon; and when 
proof of POK!olPS!!IOn <>annot be bad, it ls with-
in the Yery ei;sen<>e of the rule to admit the 
Instrument, when no evidence justifying sus-
picion of lt11 gpnulneness Is shown, and It ls 
found In the custody of those legally entitled 
to It." See, also. Vin. Abr. "Evidence," A, 
B, 5, ''.Ancient Deeds," 7; Com. Dig. ''Evl-
30:> 
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deuce,” B, 2; 1 Greenl. Ev. Q 144, and note
1; Starkie, Ev. 524; Phil. Ev. (Cow. & H.
Notes, 3d Ed.) pt. 2, note 197, p. 368 et seq.;
Doe v. Passingham, 13 E. C. L. 309; In re
Parkyn’s Will, 6 Dow, 202; Winn v. Patter-
son,9Pet. 663; Jackson v. Laroway, 3 Johns.
Cas. 283; Hewlett v. Cock, 7 Wend. 371. In
the case last cited, Judge Nelson, afterwards
a justice of this court, said that there was
some confusion in the cases in England and
New York as to the preliminary proof neces-
sary to authorize an ancient deed to be read
in evidence; that possession accompanying
the deed was always sutiicient without other
proof, but it was not indispensable. He ap-
proved the decision in Jackson v. Laroway,
ubi supra, which he said had been recognized
as law in Jackson v. Luquere, 5 Cow. 221,
and had undoubtedly in its favor the weight
of English authority. These authorities sus-
tain the rule as we have stated it.
The deeds in question, when offered in evi-
dence, purported to be over S0 years old, and
their appearance tended to prove their an-
tiquity and their genuineness. The testimony
offered in support of them proved their ex-
istence as far back as the year 1816, and that
in that year they had been placed upon the
public record of deeds. where, if properly ac-
knowledged, they would have been entitled
to registration. In the same year in which
they were recorded they were mentioned and
referred to in the bill flied by Hughes v.
Shore's Heirs as muniments of his title, and
he offered to produce them when required.
There is no reason to doubt that they remain-
ed in the rightful custody of the clerk in
whose oflice they had become file papers, un-
til, after a lapse of at least 55 years, they
were found, and produced upon the trial of
the present case by the oflicer to whose cus-
tody they belonged.
But the proof of the genuineness of both
deeds was greatly strengthened by evidence
which applied directly to one only of the two,
namely, the original deed from John Bryan
to Samuel Sackett, dated January %, 1797.
This consisted of the record of a partition
made October 18, 1810, on the application of
James Hughes, by commissioners. under au-
thority of a general act of the legislature
of Kentucky approved December 19, 1796,
Hughes claimed the undivided half of the 18,-
000 acres conveyed to Charles Fleming bythe
governor of Virginia, by patent dated April
21,1792; and alleged as muniments of his title
the said patent, and the ‘deed of John Bryan
to Samuel Sackett. On the strength of the
title shown by Hughes the commissioners di-
vided the 18,000 acres, and set oft and con-
veyed to him the one-half thereof in several-
ty, and, in their deed of conveyance, referred
to the patent to Charles Fleming. and the
deed of Bryan to Sackett, as links in the title
of Hughes. The partition thus made is shown
to have been recognized by successive con-
veyances of parts of the land set off to
Hughes, and by possession held thereunder.
The testimony therefore shows that as early
as the year 1810 the deed of Bryan to Sack-
ett was in existence; that it was recognized
as a genuine deed by public otlicers whose
duty it was to scrutinize it, and was made
by them the basis of their ofliciai action; and
that possession has been held of a portion of
the land described therein by persons who
trace title through it to the patent to Charles
Fleming. These two deeds under considera-
tion are shown by the record to have a com-
mon history, and to have been relied on as
links in the same chain of title. Testimony,
therefore, which is directly applicable to one
only tends to support the other. The facts.
therefore, which We have just stated in refer-
ence to the deed from Bryan to Sackett tend
to show also the genuineness of the deed from
Fleming and the Bernards to Bryan. We
are therefore of opinion that the genuineness
of both deeds was proven, and that the court
erred in excluding them from the jury.
The ofier in evidence of the original deed
from Charles Fleming to John and Wifliam
Bryan, dated August 8, 179-1, stands upon sub-
stantially the same ground as the two deeds
already considered. The bill of exceptions
states that the plaintifls offered in support of
the competency of this deed the same evi-
dence as was offered in support of the two
last-mentioned deeds; that it was found at
the same time and place, and produced from
the same custody. In further support thereof
the plaintifls produced the clerk of the Mason
counr.y court, having with him Deed Book B,
containing deeds recorded in the clerk's otiice
of that court, beginning February-22, 1794.
and the two or three years next ensuing, and
offered to show that there was recorded in
that book a deed identical in terms with the
aforesaid original deed. They also offered
and read in evidence a copy of the deed, duly
certified from the clerk's oflice of the Mason
county circuit court. with a copy of the cer-
tificate thereto appended showing that the
original deed was recorded in the year 1794.
It follows, from what we have said in rela-
tion to the admissibility of the other original
deeds. that this one, also, should have been
received in evidence, and that the circuit
court erred in excluding it.
It remains to consider the exclusion by
the circuit court of the transcript of the
record in the case of Clark v. Coukiing.
This was a suit brought by Clark in the
district court held at Washington, in Mason
county, Kentucky, on June 13, 1798, as the
assignee of the mortgage from Conkling to
Sackett, to foreclose the same, and the record
was offered only to show the orders and de-
crees of the court in respect to the mortgag-
ed premises situated within its jurisdiction,
and not to prove any personal decree against
the defendants. It appears from the record
in this case that a. subpoena having been is-
sued and returned, with the indorsement
that the defendants were not inhabitants
of the commonwealth, the court made the
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dence," B, 2; 1 Greenl. Ev. I 144, and note 
1; Starkie, Ev. 524; Phll. Ev. (Cow. & B. 
Notes, 3d Ed.) pt. 2, note 197, p. 368 et seq.; 
Doe v. Passlngham, 13 E. C. L. 309; In re 
Parkyu's Will, 6 Dow, 202; Winn v. Patter-
son, 9Pet. 663; Jackson v. Laroway, 3 Johns. 
Cas. 283; Hewlett v. Cock, 7 Wend. 371. In 
the case last cited, Judge Nelson, afterwards 
a justice of this court, said that there was 
some confusion In the cases In England and 
New York as to the preliminary r>roof neces-
sary to authorize an ancient deed to be read 
in evidence; that poBSession accompanying 
the deed was always sumclent without other 
proof, but It was not Indispensable. He ap-
proved the decision In Jackson v. Laroway, 
ubi supra, which he said had been recognized 
as law In Jackson v. Luquere, fi Cow. 221, 
and had undoubtedly In Its favor the weight 
of English authority. These authorltles sus-
tain the rule as we have stated it. 
The deeds in question, when oft'ered In evi-
dence, purported to be over 80 years old, and 
their appearance tended to prove their an-
tiquity and their genulneneae. The testimony 
oft'ered in support of them proved their ex-
istence a11 far back as the year 1816, and that 
In that year they had been placed upon the 
public record of deeds, where, If properly ac-
knowledged, they would have been entitled 
to registration. In the same year in which 
they were recorded they were mentioned and 
referred to In the bill filed by Hughes v. 
Shore's Heirs as munlmente of bis title, and 
be oft'ered to produce them when required. 
There le no reason to doubt that they remain-
ed In the rightful custody or the clerk In 
whose oftlce they bad become file papers, un- . 
tll, after a lapse of at least 55 years, they 
were found, and produced upon the trial of 
the present case by the oftlcer to whose cus-
tody they belonged. 
But the proof of the genulneneSB of both 
deeds wu greatly strengthened by evidence 
which applied directly to one only of the two, 
namely, the original deed from John Bryan 
to Samuel Sackett, dated January 28, 1797. 
This consisted of the record of a partition 
made October 18, 1810, on the ap1>1lcatlon of 
James Bugbee, by commissioners, und1>r au-
thority of a general net of 1hE' legislature 
of Kt>11tucky !lpproved December 19, 1796, 
Hughes claimed the undivided half of the 18,-
000 &('res conveyed to Charles l•'lemlng by the 
governor of Virginia, by patent dated April 
21, 1792; and alleged asmunlments of hlstltle 
the said patent, and the deed of John Bryan 
to Samuel Sackett. On the etrength of the 
title shown by Hughes the commissioners di-
vided the 18,000 acres, and set oft' and con-
veyed to him the one-half thereof In se\·eral-
ty, and, In their deed of ('Onveyance, referred 
to the patent to CharlE'B Fleming, and the 
deed of Bl'ynn to Rackett, as links In the title 
of Hughes. The partition thus made Is shown 
co b1tve been recognized by successive con-
ve~-anres of parts of the land set oft' to 
Hughes, and by possession held thereunder. 
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The testimony therefore shows that as early 
as the year 1810 the deed of Bryan to Sack-
ett was In existence; that It was recognized 
as a genuine deed by public oftlcers whose 
duty It was to scrutinize It, and was made 
by them the basis of their oftlclal action; and 
that possession has been held of a portion of 
the land described therein by persons who 
trace title through It to the patent to Charles 
Fleming. These two deeds under considera-
tion are shown by the record to have a com-
mon history, and to have been relied on as 
links In the same chain of title. Testimony, 
therefore, which is directly applicable to one 
only tends to support the other. The facts, 
therefore, which we have just stated In refer-
ence to the deed from Bryan to Sackett tend 
to show also the genuineness of the deed from 
Fleming and the Bernards to Bryan. We 
are therefore of opinion that the genuineness 
of both deeds was proven, and that the court 
erred In excluding them from the jury. 
The otrer In evidence of the original deed 
from Charles Fleming to John and William 
Bryan, dated August 8, 1794, stands upon sub-
stantially the same ground as the two deeds 
already considered. The bill of exceptlona 
states that the plalntlft's offered In support of 
the competency of this deed the same evi-
dence ae was oft'ered In support of the two 
last-mentioned deeds; that It was found at 
the same time and place, and produced from 
the same custody. In further support thereof 
the plalntlft's produced the clerk of the Mason 
couni:y court, having with him DE'ed Book B, 
containing deeds recorded In the clerk's oftlce 
of that court, beginning February. 22, 1794, 
and the two or three years next ensuing, and 
oft'ered to show that there was recorded In 
that book a deed Identical In terms with the 
aforesaid original deed. They also oft'ered 
and read In evidence a copy of the deed, duly 
certified from the clerk's oftlce of the Mason 
county circuit court, with a copy of the cer-
tificate thereto appended showing that the 
original deed was recorded In the year 1791. 
It follows, from what we have said in rela-
tion to the adml88lblllty of the other original 
deeds, that this one, also, should have been 
received In evidence, and that the circuit 
court erred in excluding It. 
It remain~ to consider . the exclusion by 
the circuit court of the transcript of the 
record In the ease of Clark T. Conkling. 
This was a suit brought by Clark In the 
district court held at Washington, In Mason 
county, Kentucky, on June 13, 1798, as the 
assignee of the mortgage from Conkling to 
Sackett, to foreclose the same, and the record 
was otrered only to show the orders and de-
crees of the ('OUrt In respect to the mortgag-
ed premises situated within Its jurisdiction, 
and not to pl'l'Ve any personal de<>ree against 
the defendants. It appears from the record 
In this case that a subpcena having been I~ 
sued and returned, with the lndorsE>ment 
that the def~ndants were not lnhnbltnut~ 
of the commonwealth, the court made the 
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following order at its November term, 1798:
“The defendants, not having entered their
appearance agreeably to an act of assembly
and rules of this court, and it appearing to
the satisfaction of the court that they are
not inhabitants of this commonwealth, on
the motion of the complainant, by his at-
torney, it is ordered that the defendants
appear here on the third day of our next
term, and answer the complainants’ bill;
and that a copy of this order be inserted in
the Kentucky Gazette or Herald for two
months, successively, another posted at the
door of the court-house of Mason county;
and that this order be published some Sun-
day at the door of the Baptist meeting-house
in \\'ashingtoli." ln J une, 1799, the bill was
taken as confessed, and an interlocutory
decree made requiring the defendants to
pay the money due on the mortgage. The
money not having been paid, a decree of
sale was made at the February term, 1800.
The commissioners to make the sale report-
ed on July 19, 1802, that after public notice
they had sold the lands at public sale to
Carey L. Clark, the complainant. After-
wards a final decree was made, foreclosing
the defendants of their equity of redemption
in the premises.
The defendants objected to the introduc-
tion of the record, and the objection was
sustained, and the defendants now insist
that the exclusion of the record was right—
First, because the court did not have au-
thority of law to hear and determine the
subject-matter of the suit, nor of suits of
the class to which it belonged; and, second,
because the record exhibits no proof of the
publication or posting of the notice to the
defendants, as required by the laws of Ken-
tucky.
We think the first objection is answered
by reference to the statute laws of Ken-
tucky in force at the time. Section 8 of the
act of the general assembly of Kentucky ap-
proved December 19, 1795, “to establish
district court in this commonwealth,” pro-
vided as follows: “The jurisdiction of the
said district courts, respectively, shall be
over all persons, and in all causes, matters,
and things at common law or in chancery,
arising within their districts," excepting
actions of assault and battery, or suits for
slander, and subjects of controversy of less
than £50 in value. 1 Littell, Laws Ky. 293.
Section 4 of the act approved December 19,
1796, directing the method of proceeding
in courts of equity against absent debtors
and other absent defendants, provides for
constructive service by publication “in all
cases whatever when a suit is or shall be
pending in any court of chancery, concern-
ing any matter or thing whatever, against
any absent defendant or defendants." 1 St.
Laws (M. 8: B.) 93. These provisions of
the statute law are ample to confer juris-
diction on the court where the property in
controversy is within its territorial jurisdic-
tion, and are so clear as to require no dis-
cussion of the question; for, as was said in
G1-ignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 338, “the
power to hear and determine a cause is
jurisdiction. If the law confers the power
to render a judgment or decree, then the
court has jurisdiction."
But it is objected to the record that it does
not show publication and posting of notice
to the defendants, as required by the order
of the court and by law. The law is found
in section 2 of the act of December 19, 1796,
ubi supra, and is as follows: “The court
shall also appoint some day in the succeed-
ing term, for the absent defendant or de-
fendants to enter his, her, or their appear-
ance to the suit, and give security for per-
forming the decree, a copy of which order
shall be forthwith published in the Ken-
tucky Gazette or Herald, and continued for
two months successively, and shall also be
published on some Sunday, immediately aft-
er divine service, in such church or meet-
ing-house as the court shall direct, and
another copy shall be posted at the front
door of the said court-house."
The plaintiifs in the present case oflered
evidence outside the record to prove the fact
that the order was published in the Ken-
tucky Gazette, as required by the statute,
by calling the assistant librarian of the pub-
lic library at Lexington, “having with him,"
as the bill of exceptions states, “printed
newspapers which appeared to be of great
age, and which purported to be the original
files of the newspaper called the Kentucky
Gazette, published weekly, and plaintiffs
showed, in nine successive issues of said
newspaper, weekly publications, beginning
with December 12, 1798. and ending with
February 7, 1799, of" the order of the court
above mentioned. But no proof was of-
fered to show the publication of the order
at the church or meeting-house, or the post-
ing of it at the front door of the court-
house. After the lapse of more than 80
years proof not of record of these facts was
clearly impossible. The fact, therefore. that
after the lapse of so long a time the plain-
tiflfs were able to show that the order of
the court had been obeyed, by its publication
in a newspaper, was persuasive evidence
that the other requirements of the order had
also been performed.
But the record contained no proof of the
publication and posting of the notice as re-
quired by the statute, and it is insisted by
the defendants in this case that the record
itself must show the publication and posting
of the notice a required by law, otherwise
the jurisdiction of the court does not ap-
pear, and its decree is absolutely void.
While it must be conceded that, in order to
give the court jurisdiction over the persons
of the defendants, all the steps pointed out
by the statute to effect constructive service
on non-residents were necessary, yet it does
not follow that the evidence that the steps
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following order at its November term, 1798: 
"The defenclauts, not having entered their 
appearance agreeably to qn act of assembly 
and mies ot this court, nnd It appearing to 
the satisfaction ot the court that they are 
not inhabitants ot this commonwealth, on 
the motion ot the complainant, by his at-
torney, It is ordered that the defendants 
appear here on the third day of our next 
t~rm, and answer the complainants' bill; 
and that a copy of this order be inserted in 
the Kentudi:y Gazette or Herald for two 
mo::iths, successh·ely, another posted at the 
door of the court-house of Mason county; 
and that tbls order be published some Sun-
dny at the door ot the Baptist meeting-house 
in Washington." In June, 1799, the blll was 
tak-m aa C·)nfeesed, and an Interlocutory 
decree made requiring the derendauts to 
pay the money due on the mortgage. The 
money not having been paid, a decree ot 
sale was made at the l<'ebruary term, 1800. 
The commissioners to make the sale report-
ed on July 19, 1802, that after public notice 
they had sold the lands at public sale to 
Carey L. Clark, the complainant. After-
wards a final decree was made, foreclosing 
the defendants of their equity of redemption 
in the premises. 
The defendants objected to the introduc-
tion of the record, and the objection was 
sustained, and the defendants now insist 
that the exclusion of the record was right-
Flrst, because the court did not have au-
thority of law to hear and determine the 
subJ~t-matter of the suit, nor of suits of 
the claSB to which It t-elonged; and, second, 
because the record exhibits no proof of the 
publication or posting of the notice to the 
defendants, as required by the laws of Ken-
tucky. 
We think the first objection Is answered 
by reference to the statute laws of Ken-
tucky In force at the time. Section 8 of the 
act of the general assembly of Kentucky ap-
proved December 19, 1795, "to establish 
district courts In this commonwealth," pro-
vided as follows: "The jurisdiction of the 
said district courts, respectively, shall be 
over all persoDs, and In all causes, matters, 
and things at common law or In chancery, 
arising within their districts," excepting 
actions of assault and battery, or suits for 
slander, and subjects of controversy of less 
than £50 In value. 1 Littell, Laws Ky. 298. 
Section 4 of the a.ct approved December 19, 
1796, directing the method of proceeding 
in courts of equity against absent debtors 
and other absent defendants, provides for 
constructive service by publication "In all 
cases whatever when a smt is or shall be 
pending ln any court of chancery, concern-
ing any matter or thing whatever, against 
any absent defendant or defendants." 1 St. 
Laws (:\{, & B.) 113. These provisions of 
the statute law are ample to confer juris-
diction on the court where the property In 
controvers7 Is within its tenltorlal jurlsdlc-
tlon, and are so clear as to require no dis-
cussion of the question; for, as was said In 
Grlgnon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 3a8, "the 
power to bear and determine a cause ls 
jurisdiction. It the law confers the power 
to render a judgment or decree, then the 
court has jurisdiction." 
But lt ls objected to the record that It does 
not show publlcatlon and posting of notice 
to the defendants, as required by the order 
of the court and by law. The law is found 
in section 2 of the act of December 19, 1796, 
ubi supra, antl ls as follows: "The court 
shall also appoint some day In the succeed-
ing term, for the absent defendant or de-
fendants to enter his, her, or their appear-
ance to the suit, and give security for per-
forming the decree, a copy of which order 
shall be forthwith published In the Ken-
tucky Gazette or Herald, and continued for 
two months successively, and shall also be 
published on some Sunday, immediately aft-
er divine service, in such church or meet-
ing-house as the court shall direct, a.ud 
another copy shall be posted at the front 
door of the said court-house." 
'£he plalnturs In the present .case o!rered 
evidence outside the record to prove the fact 
that the order was published In the Ken-
tucky Gazette, as required by the . statute, 
by calllng the assistant llbrarlan of tbe pub-
lic library at Lexington, "having with him," 
u the bill of exceptions states, "printed 
newspapers which appeared to be of l.(rf'at 
age, and which purported to be the original 
fl.lee of the newspaper called the Kentucky 
Gazette, published weekly, and plalntl!ra 
showed, In nine successive ls~ueff of 68.ld 
newspaper, weekly publlca.tlons, beginning 
with De<'cwber 12, 1708. and ending with 
February 7, 1799, of" the order of the court 
above mentioned. But no proof was of-
fered to show the publlcatlol\ of the order 
at the church or meeting-house, or the post-
ing of it at the front door of the court-
house. After the lapse of more than 80 
years proof not of record of these facts was 
clearly Impossible. The fact, therefore, that 
aftH the lap~e of so long a time the plaln-
tl!rs were able to show tbat the orller of 
the court had been obeyed, by Its publlcath•n 
in a newspaper, was persuasive evidence 
that the other requirements of the order had 
also been performed. 
But the record contained no proof ot the 
publication and posting of the notice as re-
quired by the statute, and It ls Insisted by 
the defendants In this C'S.Se that the record 
itself must show the publl<'atlon and posting 
of the notice as required by law, otherwise 
the jurisdiction of the court does not ap-
pear, and its decree 1s absolutely void. 
While it must be conceded that, In order to 
give the court jurisdiction over the persons 
of the dl.'fendants, all the steps pointed out 
by the statute to elT'ect constructl'\"e service 
on non-residents were necessary, yet It does 
not follow that the evidence that tbe steps 
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were taken must appear in the record, un-
less, indeed, the statute expressly or by im-
plication requires it. The court which made
the decree in the case of Clark v. Conkling
was a court of general jurisdiction. There-
fore every presumption not inconsistent
with the record is to be indulged in favor
of its jurisdiction. Kempe's Lessee v. Ken-
nedy, 5 Cranch, 173; Voorhees v. Bank of
U. S., 10 Pet. 4-19; Grignon v. Astor, 2 How.
319; Harvey v. Tyler. 2 \Vall. 32$. It is
to be presumed that the court. before mak-
ing its decree, took care to see that its order
for constructive service, on which its right
to make the decree depended, had been obey-
ed. That this presumption is authorized
will appear by the following cases:
In Harvey v. Tyler, ubi supra, the court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, said: "The
jurisdiction which is now exercised by the
common-law courts in this country is, in a
very large proportion, dependent upon spe-
cial statutes conferring it. " * ' In all
cases where the new powers thus conferred
are to be brought into action in the usual
form of common-law or chancery proceed-
ings, we apprehend there can be little doubt
that the same presumptions as to the juris-
diction of the court and the conclusiveness
of its action will be made as in cases falling
more strictly within the usual powers of the
court.”
In Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 461, the validity
of a. partition of lands made b_v a circuit
court of the state of Indiana was attacked.
This court, speaking by Mr. Justice Field,
said: “All that” the statute “designates as
necessary to authorize the court to act is
that there should he an application for par-
tition by one or more joint proprietors, after
giving notice of the intended application in
a public newspaper for at least four wccks.
When application is made, the court must
consider whether it is by a proper party,
whether it is sufficient in form and sub-
stance, and whether the requisite notice has
been given, as prescribed. Its order made
thereon is an adjudication in these matters."
The case of Voorhees v. Bank of U. S.. 10 Pct. 4-19, was an action of ejectment. and 5
the case turned on the validity of a. sale of
the premises in controversy under a judg-
ment of the court of common pleas of Ha1nil-
ton county, Ohio, in a case of foreign attach-
ment. The sale was attacked on the fol-
lowing among other grounds: (1) Because
the statute authorizing the proceeding by
foreign attachment required that an afiidavit
should be made and filed with the clcrk
before the writ issued, and no such aifidavit
was found in the record; (2) because the
statute dircctcd three months’ notice to be
given, by publication in a newspaper, of
the issuing of the attachment,Vbcfore judg-
ment should be entered, and also required .
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15 days’ notice of sale to be given, neither
of which appeared by the record to have
been done; (3) because the statute required
that the defendant should be put. in default
at each of the three terms preceding the
judgment, and the default entered of record,
but no entry was made of the default at the
last of the three terms. But. the court over-
ruled the objections, and sustained the val-
idity of the judgment and the sale. It said:
“But the provisions of the law do not pre-
scribe what shall be deemed evidence that
such acts have been done, or direct that their
performance shall appear on the record.
The thirteenth section of the attachment
law, which gives to the conveyances of the
auditors the same effect as a deed from the
defendant in the attachment, contains no
other limitation than that it shall be ‘in
virtue of the authority herein granted.’ This
leaves the question open to the application of
those general principles of law by which
the validity of sales made under judicial
process must be tested, in the ascertainment
of which we do not think it necessary to
examine the record in the attachment, for
evidence that the acts alleged to have been
omitted appear therein to have been done."
The result of the authorities and what we
decide is that where a court of general juris-
diction is authorized in a proceeding, either
statutory or at law or in equity, to bring
in, by publication or other substituted ser-
vice, non-resident defendants interested in
or liaving a lien upon property lying within
its territorial jurisdiction, but is not requir-
ed to place the proof of service upon the rec-
ord, and the court orders such substituted
service, it will he presumed in favor of the
jurisdiction, that service was made as or-
dered, although no evidence thereof appears
of record, and the judgment of the court,
so far as it afifects such property, will be
valid. The case of Galpin v. Page, 18 ‘Wall.
350. citcd by counsel for defendant, is not
in conflict with this proposition. The judg-
ment set up on one side and attacked on the
other in that case was rendered on service
by publication. The law permitted service
to be made by publication only where cer-
tain facts were made to appear to the satis-
faction of the court. and the court by a
precedent order. which must necessarily ap-
pear of record. authorized service to be
made by publication. But the record showed
no such order. and the publication, there-
fore, was the unauthorizcd act of the party.
and appeared aflirmativcly to be invalid and
iiicffcctual, See, also. Pennoyer v. .\‘eff. 95
Ii. S. T27. 734.
It results from the views We have c.\'prc.=s-
ed that the judgment of the circuit court
of Kentucky must be reversed, and the cause
remanded, with directions to grant a new
trial.
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were taken must appear In the record, un- 15 days' notice of sale to be given, neither 
lcs.<J, Indeed, the statute expressly or by lru- of which appeared by the record to have 
plication requires It. The court which made bt>en done; (3) because the statute required 
the decree ID the case of Clark v. Conkling that the defendant should be put lu default 
was a court of general Jurisdiction. There- at each of the three terms precelling the 
fore every presumption not Inconsistent Judgment, and the default entered of record, 
with the record ls to be Indulged In favor but no entry was made of the default at the 
<Jf Its jurisdiction. Kempe's Lessee v. Ken- last of the three terms. But the court over-
nedy, 5 Cranch, 173; Voorhees v. Bank of ruled the objections, and sustained the val-
U. S., 10 Pet. 449; G1·lgnon v. Astor, 2 llow. ldlty of the Judgment and the sale. It said: 
319; Ha1-vey v. Tyle1·, 2 Wall. 328. It I~ "But the provisions of the law do not pre-
to be presumed that the comt, before mak- scribe what shall be deemed evidence that 
ing Its decree, took care to see that Its order such acts have been done, or direct that their 
for const1·uctlve service, on which Its right performance shall appear on the record. 
h make the decree depended, had been obey- The thirteenth section of the attachment 
ed. 'l'hat this presumption ls authorized law, which gives to the conveyances of the 
will appear by the following cases: auditors the same effect as a deed from the 
In Harvey v. Tyler, ubl supra, the court. defendant In the attachment, rontalns no 
speaking by Mr. Justice l\Illler, said: "'Ihe other limitation than that It shall be 1D 
Jurisdiction wi1lch ls now exercised by the virtue of the authority herein granted.' This 
common-law courts In this country ls, In a leaves the question open to the application of 
very large proportion, dependent upon spe- those general principles of law by which 
clal statutes conferring tt. • • • In all the validity of sales made under Judicial 
cases where the new powers thus confet.Ted process must be tested, In the ascertainment 
are to be brought Into action In the usual , of which we do not think It necessary to 
form of common-law or chancery proceed- I examine the record In the attachment, for 
lngs, we apprehend there can be little doubt I' evidenee that the acts alleged to have been 
that the same presumptions as to tbe Juris- omlttetl appear therein to have been done." 
diction of the court and thr. conclusiveness I The result of the authorities and what w& 
of 113 action wlll be made as In cases falling decide Is that where a court of general juris-
more strictly within the usual powers of the ! diction Is authorized In a proceeding, either 
court." · statutory or at law or In equity, to bring 
In Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 461, the validity In, by publication or other substituted ser-
of a partition of lands made by a circuit vice, non-resident defendnnts Interested In 
court of the state of Indiana was attacked. or having a lien upon property lying within 
This court, speaking by l\lr. Justice l•'leld, Its territorial .Jurisdiction, but ls not requlr-
sald: "All that" the statute "designates as ed to place the proof of service upon the rce-
necessal"y to authorize the court to act ls ord, and the court orders such substituted 
that tbere should be an application for par- service, It wlll be presumed In favor of th& 
tltlon by one or more Joint proprietors, after julisdlctlon, that service was made as or-
glvlng notice of tbe Intended appllc•atlon In 1 dered, although no evidence thereof appears 
a public newspaper for at least four wec>ks. I of reeord, and the Judgmt>nt of the court, 
When application ls made, tbe court must 1 so far as It affects such property, will be 
consider whether It ls by a proper party, , valid. The case of Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 
whether It ls sutlklent In form and sub- 350. cltt>d hy counsel for defendant, ls not 
stance, and whether the requisite notice bas In confilc•t with this proposition. The Judg-
been given, as prescribed. Its order made ment l!'E't up on one side and attacked on the 
thereon Is a.n adjudication In these mattP.rs." ot!ler lu thut case was rendered on service> 
The case of Voorhees v. Bank of U. S., 10 by publication. The law permitted service 
Pet. 449, was an action of eJe<'tment, and to be m:1de by publlcntton onl1 where cer-
the case turned on the validity of a sale of : taln fa('ts were made to appear to the sat111-
the premises In contron~rsy under a judg- I faction of the court, and the rourt by n 
ment of the court of common pleas of Hamil- I precedent order, whlell must nc>cesi.<arlly ap. 
ton county, Ohio, In a case of foreign attach- J pear of l"(>('Ord, authorized setTlee to bf. 
ment. The sale was attaC>ked on the fol- made by publl<"atlon. But the record showl'd 
lowing among other grounds: (1) Because no such order, and the publlC>ntion, tllet"e-
the statute authorizing the proceedln11: by fore, wns the> unauthorlz<>d net of the 1mrty. 
foreign attachment required that an affidavit and appenrt>d affinnatlwlr to be lnvalld and 
Khould be made and filed with thE' clerk ln<'fTec•tnnl, ~ee, also, Pennorer v. Xetr, 9.'l 
hefore the writ Issued, and no Emch nflldnvlt T~. S. 727. 73-1. 
w11s round In the record; (2) because the It results from the views we have ex11r~-
1<t::itute dlrectl'd three month11' notlrc> to be ed. that the judgm~nt of the circuit ronrt 
gl>en, by publication In a newspaper, of or Kentucky must be reversed, and the eam•e 
the Issuing of the attnc·hment, ·before juclg- rc>n111ncled, with dlruetlons to grant a new 
ment should be entered, and also required trial. 
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NITCHE et al. Y. EARLE.
(19 N. E. 749, 117 Ind. 270.)
Jan. 29. 1889.
Appeal from circuit court, Lake county; E.
C. Field, Judge.
Action by John G. Earle against J. A.
Nitche and others. Nitche appeals. Const.
Ind. art. 4, 5 19, requires that “every act
shall embrace but one subject, and matters
properly connected therewith, which subject
shall be expressed in the title. * * '” By
Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § 1065, which is included
in the article entitled “E_1ectment," and the
section preceding which provides for a new
trial of right. “if the application for a new
trial is made after the close of the term at
which the judgment is rendered, the party
obtaining a new trial shall give the opposite
party 10 days’ notice thereof before the term
next succeeding the granting of the applica-
tion.”
Supreme Court of Indiana.
J. Kopelke, for appellant.
for appellee.
C. F. Gritiin,
OLDS, J. This action was commenced by
appellee against appellant on the 2d day of
March, 1881, in the Lake circuit court, to
recover the possession of, and quiet title to,
a tract of land in Lake county, Ind. Issues
were formed, and the cause tried by the
court at the November term, 1881, and judg-
ment rendered for appeilee upon a special
finding of facts. From that judgment ap-
pellant Nltche appealed to this court, and
the cause was reversed. Nitche v. Earle, SS
Ind. 375. Under the direction of this court,
the court below, at the September term, 1883,
entered judgment for appellant upon the
special flnding of facts. At the February
term, 1884, the plaintiff obtained n new trial
as of right. At the April tcrm, 1884, appel-
lant appeared to the action, and moved the
court to vacate the order granting the new
trial for the insufiiciency of the bond, which
motion was overruled; and at the September
term. 1884, appellant moved to vacate the
order granting a new trial for failure of the
plaintiff below. the appellee, to give notice
thereof, which motion was overruled, to
which ruling appellant excepts. Another
trial was had at the February term, 1&86,
and judgment rendered in favor of appeilee.
Motion was made by appellant and his co-
defendants for new trial, and the motion
overruled, and excepted to by appellant. The
errors assigned are that the court erred in
overruling the motion of appellant to vacate
the order granting the appeilee a new trial.
for the reason that no notice was given there-
of. and the overruling of the motion for new
trial.
There was no error in overruling appel-
iant’s motion to vacate the order granting a
new trial. In the case of Stanley v. Holli-
da_v, 113 Ind. 525, 16 N. E. 513, this court
has placed a construction on section 1065,
Rev. St. 1881, and the court in that case
says: “The intention of the legislature in
requiring that ‘the party obtaining a.~ new
trial shall give the opposite party ten days’
notice thereof before the term next succeed-
ing the granting of the application,’ as we
construe such requirement in connection
with the other provisions of the statute 1'e-
lating to new trials as of right, was to pre-
vent either party from forcing the opposite
party into trial at or during the term at
which the new trial was granted, or before
the term next succeeding. This provision of
section 1065 was rendered necessary, we sup-
pose, to prevent the plaintifl in such a case
from forcing defendants into trial during the
term at which the new trial was granted,
under the provisions of section 516, Rev. St.
1881.” Under this authority the action of
the court was right in granting the new
trial, and overruling appellant's motion to
vacate for failure of notice.
Several questions are presented upon the
overruling of the motion for new trial. The
first is admission by the court in evidence,
over objection of appellant, of a certified
copy of the record of a patent by the state
of Indiana to George Earle for the real es-
tate described in the complaint. which rec-
ord of patent was certified to by James H.
Rice, auditor of state. It is urged that it is
shown on the face of the record not to be
the copy of any record; that for all it shows
on the. face of it it may be the original pat-
ent; that it has the signatures of the gov-
ernor and secretary of state, and nowhere
has a certificate of the secretary of state
that he recorded it, and counsel insist that,
unless the instrument shows, by oflicial en-
tries or certificates by officers who made it,
that it is a record, it is no record; that a.
volunteer statement by the present keeper,
giving his opinion about it, will not make it
a record; that by the original law these rec-
ords were to be kept in the office of the sec-
retary of state; that the certificate of the
auditor of state should show how he came
by the book.
The instrument offered and admitted in
evidence was a ccrtiiicd copy of letters pat-
ent to George Earle for the land in question
in this case, the auditor of tate certifying
the same to be “a full, true, and complete
copy of the record of letters patent executed
and issued on the 12th day of January, 1857,
by the state of Indiana to George Earle, for
the lands therein described. as the same ap-
pears on page 379 of the Record of Swamp
Lands, Vol. 33, Range West, now on file in
my ofiice, and of which record I am the legal
custodian,” properly signed by the auditor
of state, and scal attached. By section 5628,
Rev. St. 1881, all records pertaining to
swamp lands were transferred from the of-
fice of the secretary of state to the office of
the auditor of state. Section 462 prescribes
the manner in which all copies of records in
public oflices shall be certified, and makes
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l\'"ITCHE et al. T. EARLE. 
(19 X. E. 749, 117 Ind. 270.) 
~npl't'mt> C-Onrt of Indiana. .Tnn. :m. 1889. 
Appeal from circuit court, Lake county; E. 
0. Field, Judgt.. 
Action by John G. Earle against J. A. 
Nltche and others. Nltche appeals. Con~t. 
Ind. art. 4, § 19, requires that "every net 
shall embrace but one subject, and mnttt>rs 
properly connected therewith, which suhjt-ct 
shall be expressed In the title. • • •" By 
Rev. St. Ind. 1881, § lOC,;i, which is lnclmh•d 
In the article entitled "Ejectment," and the 
section precPding which provides ror a new 
trial of right. "If the a1lt1llcatlon for a new 
trial le made after the <·lose of the term at 
which the judgment Is rendered, the Jlarty 
obtaining a new trial t1hall gl\·e the oppoMlte 
party 10 days' notice thereof before the tPrm 
nE>xt succeN11ng the granting of the applica-
tion." 
J. Kopelke, for appellant. C. F. Griffin, 
for appellee. 
OI,DS, J. Thie action wns commen<'e<l by 
appellee against appellant on the 2d day of 
March, 1881, In the Lake circuit court, to 
recover the possession of, and quiet title to, 
a tract of land In Lake county, Ind. Issues 
were formed, and the cause tried by the 
court at the November term, 1881, nnd judg-
ment rendered for appcllee upon a special 
llndlng of facts. From that judgment ap-
pellant Nltche appealed to this court, and 
the cause was reversed. Nltche v. Earle, 88 
Ind. 375. T1nder th!' <tlrl'<>tlon of this court, 
the c•ourt helow, at the ~eptemlwr term, 18S3, 
f'IltPrecl juclgment for apprllnnt upon the 
t1peclal finding of fn<·ts. At the .l!'ebruary 
t<•rm, 18S4, the plaintiff obtn lnro a new trial 
ns of right. At the .April term, 1884, nppel-
lnnt appeared to the action, and moved the 
court to vacate the order granting the new 
trial for the insufficiency of the bond, which 
motion was overruled; and at the September 
term, 1884, appellant moved to vacate the 
order granting a new trial for failure of the 
plalntltf below. the appellee, to give notl<•e 
thereof, which motion was overruled, to 
which ruling appellant excepts. Another 
trial was had at the February term, 1886, 
and judgment rendered In favor of nppellee. 
Motion was made by a1ipellnnt and his co-
defendants for new trial, and the motion 
ovprruled, and excPpted to by appellnnt. The 
errors assigned are that the court e1·re1l In 
oYerrullng the motion of appellant to vnente 
the order granting the nppellee a new trial. 
for the reason that no notice was given thne-
of, and the overruling of the motion for new 
trial. 
There was no error In oYerrullng ap)lel-
lnnt's motion to '\"Dente the orcler gruutlug a 
new trial. In the ruse of Stanley v. Holli-
day, 113 Ind. 525, 16 N. E. 513, this court 
has placed a construction on section loo:;, 
Rev. St. 1881, and the court In that case 
says: "The Intention of the legislature ln 
requiring thnt 'the perty obtaining a.· new 
trial shall give the opposite party ten days' 
noti<'I' thereof befQrn the term next succeed-
ing the granting of the application,' as we 
consh·ue such requirement lo connection 
with the other p1-0¥isions of the statute re-
lating to new trials as of right, was to pre-
vent either party from forcing the opposite 
party into trial at or during the term at 
which the new trial was granted, or before 
the term next succeeding. This provision. of 
section 1065 was rendered necessary, we sup-
pose, to prevent the plalntlfl'. in such a case 
from forcing defendants Into trial during the 
term at which the new trial was granted, • 
under the provisions of section 516, Rev. St. 
1881." Under this authority the action of 
the court was right ln grnntlng the new 
trial, and overruling appellant's motion to 
vacate for failure of notice. 
Several questions are presented upon the 
ove1·rullng of the motlon for new trial. The 
first Is admission by the court In evidence, 
over objection of appellant, of a certified 
copy of the record of a patent by the state 
of Indiana to George Enrle for the real es-
tate described In the compllllnt, which rec-
ord of patent was c0 rtlfled to by James H. 
Hice, auditor of state. It Is urged that it is 
shown on the face of the record not to be 
the copy of any record; that for all It shows 
on the face of It It may be the original pat· 
ent; that It has the signnturee of the gov-
ernor and secretory of state, nod nowhere 
has a certificate of the secretary of state 
that be recorded It, and counsel Insist that, 
unless the instrument shows, by official en-
tries or certificates by officers who made It, 
that It ls a record, It le no record; that & 
volunteer statement by the present keeper, 
giving his opinion about It, will not make lt 
a record; that by the original law these rec-
ords were to be kept In the office of the sec-
retary of state; that the certificate of the 
auditor of state should show how he come 
by the book. 
The Instrument olTered and nrlmltted In 
evl<len<'e was a <"l'rtltil'cl copy of letters pat-
ent to George Earle for the land In question 
In this case, the auditor of state certifying 
the same to be "a full, true, and complete 
copy of the record of letters patent executed 
nod Issued on the 12th day of January, 1&>7, 
by the state of Indiana to George Enrle, for 
the lands therein described, as the same ap-
pears on page 379 of the Re<'ord of Swamp 
Lends, Vol 33, Itange West, now on file In 
my office, and of which record I nm the legal 
custodian,'' properly signed by the auditor 
of state, and seal atta<'hecl. By s:>etion :>628, 
Rev. St. 1881, nil records pPrtnlnlng to 
swamp lands were tnmsfen·ed from the of-
fice of the secretary of state to the office of 
the auditor of state. SPetlon 462 prescribes 
the manner In whlC'l• nil copll'!I or records In 
public offices shall be cc1·tlficd, nnd makes 
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them admissible in evidence. The statute
makes the auditor of state the proper custo-
dian of the record of letters patent which
were formerly recorded by the secretary ot
state, and kept in his oflice, and this copy
of the record was properly authenticated.
Section 4, Gavin & H. St. 607, made it the
duty of the secretary of state to record these
letters patent in books to be kept in his
oflice. Thus it was first provided by stat-
ute and made the duty of the secretary of
state to record the letters patent in a book
in his office, and afterwards this record was
by statute transferred to the oflice of the
auditor of state. Courts take knowledge ot
the public statutes of the state, and, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the pre-
sumption ot law is that the otlicers discharge
their duties; and the presumption in this case
would be that the secretary of state record;
ed the patent, and that the record book con-
taining the same had been by him turned
over to the auditor ot state. Evans v.
Browne, 30 Ind. 514; Ward v. State, 48 Ind.
289: Evans v. Ashley, 22 Ind. 15.
The next question presented is that the ap-
pellant called one Johannes Kopelke as a
witness, and offered to prove that he had
examined the book from which the auditor
of state took his copy oi’ the pretended rec-
ord ot the Earle patent; that it contained no
ofiicial certificate, and was not on the out-
side designated as a record book. The issue
of patents was required by statute to be re-
corded. The statute providing for the rec-
ord simply made it the duty of the secretary
of state to record them “in books to be kept
in his otlice.” It does not require the book
to be designated on the outside as a “Record
of Patents." or to have any indorsement
whatever on the same, or that the secretary
ot state shall attach any certificate to the
same. So the evidence excluded was im-
proper, and the ruling of the court was cor-
rect.
Appellant also offered to prove by A. D.
Palmer, a witness on his behalf, who had
also purchased the same tract of land of the
state. and obtained a patent therefor, May
2, 1866, and through whom appellant claim-
ed title, that before he purchased the land
in controversy of the state he made search
at the state and county oflices, and could find
no previous conveyance of record. It also
appears in the record that appeliee offered in
evidence the deposition of Erasmus B. Gol-
lins, who testifled in said deposition that
he was the same Collins who was secretary
of state of the state of Indiana, and signed
said letters patent to Earle, and that he re-
corded it in volume 33. Record of Swamp
Lands in the State of Indiana, on page 379,
and that said record was made January 12.
1857: also the deposition of James H. Rice.
the auditor of state, to show that said record
had been transferred to the oflice of the
auditor of state. and was in his possession at
the time of making the certificate; which
depositions were objected to by counsel for
appellant, on the ground that it was an at-
tempt by said depositions to prove matters of
record by parol evidence, and the Objection
was sustained, and the depositions excluded.
The evidence of Palmer was to show the
absence ot a record in the ofiice of the secre-
tary of state which the deposition sought to
show was made and was in said oflice at the
time and long before the making of the pat-
ent to Palmer. It parol evidence was prop-
er to show there was no such record made or
kept in the ofiice of the secretary of state at
a certain time, then certainly evidence to
show that such record was in tact made and
was in the oflice at that time was proper.
A party must be consistent. It he objects
and secures a ruling against his adversary
excluding evidence on a particular subject.
he cannot be heard to complain when the
court applies the same rule, and excludes
evidence offered by him to establish the op-
posite ot what his adversary had attempted
to prove by the evidence which was ex-
cluded on his objection. In the case ot Din-
widdie v. State, 103 Ind. 101, 2 N. E. 290,
this court says: “It is settled by the ad-
judications of this court that a. party cannot
make available for the reversal ot a judg-
ment the exclusion of evidence, where, upon
his objection, like evidence was excluded
when offered by the other party.” Hinton
v. Whittaker, 101 Ind. 344. And this doc-
trine applies with full force to the objection
raised by appellant to the exclusion of the
testimony of Palmer. The law did not re-
quire these patent to be recorded in the
recorder’s oflice. It is so decided in case ot
Mason v. Cooksey, 51 Ind. 519. and is rec-
ognized as the law by this court in the for-
mer decision of this case.
It is contended that the law providing for
the recording of letters patent in the office
01' the secretary of state is unconstitutional,
for the reason that it does not come within
the provisions of section 19, art. 4. Const.
We think otherwise. The title to the orig-
inal act to which this was supplemental wa
entitled “An act to regulate the sale of
swamp lands donated by the United States
to the state of Indiana, and to provide for
the draining and reclaiming ther0<_>1', in R0-
cordancé with the condition of said gfilflf-"
The title is broad enough to cover all things
done in connection with the sale, and in con-
nection with the 9Xe(~_“flQn of the patent.
The statute provides that me secretary oi’
state, one of the oih<-91-8 who signs it, shall
record it in his 0ffice_ H ‘S 01-deretl recorded
in connection with the mak-mg of the patent,
and the title is broad emugh go cover the
provisions of the act re “mng the record.
_ It is claimed that as in appeliee never
had possession of ti] e ate, it is in-
cumbent on him, to Q “recovery.
to show a COInp]e -
United States dQ“f§ fiham Qt flnig tlle0rv is
not tenable in this Q Q him-
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Case :N' o. 105] PROOF. 
them admleslble In evidence. The et.atute 
makes the auditor ot state the proper custo-
dian ot the record ot letters patent wWch 
were formerly recorded by the secretary ot 
state, and kept In hi.a offtce, and thle copy 
ot the record wae properly authentl<'nted. 
Section 4, Gavin & H. St. 607, made it the 
dnty or the secretary ot state to re<'ord tht'ee 
letters patent In books to be kept In hie 
office. Thus It was drat provided by stat· 
ute and made the duty ot the secretary ot 
state to record the lettel'H patent In a book 
In his offtce, and afterwards thle record was 
by statute transferred to the oftlce ot the 
auditor of state. Court.a take knowledge of 
the public statutes of the state, and, In the 
• absence of evidence to the contrary, the pre-
enmptlon of law Is that the oftlcers discharge 
their duties; and the presumption In thl.8 case 
would be that the secretary of state recordi 
ed the patent, and that the re<'Ord book con· 
talnlng the same had been by him turned 
over to the auditor of state. Evans v. 
Browne, 30 Ind. 514; Ward v. State, 48 Ind. 
289; Evans v. Ashley, 22 Ind. 15. 
The next question presented Is that the ap-
pellant <'&lied one Johannes Kopelke as a 
wltneRfl, and offered to proYe that he had 
examined the book from which the auditor 
of state took hie copy of the pretended rec-
ord of the Earle patent; that It contained no 
oftlclal certlft<'ate, and was not on the out-
side designated as a record book. The Issue 
of patents was required by statute to be re-
corded. The Ktatute providing for the rec-
ord simply made It the duty of the secretary 
of state to record them "In books to be kept 
In his offtce." It does not require the book 
to be designated on the outside as a ''Re<'Ord 
of Patents," or to have any lndorsement 
whatever on the same, or that the secretary 
of state shall attach any certificate to the 
same. So the evidence excluded was Im· 
proper, and the ruling of the court wae cor-
rect. 
Appellant also oft'ered to prove by A. D. 
Palmer, a witness on his behalf, who bad 
also purchased the same tract of land of the 
state, and obtained a patent therefor, May 
2, 1866, and through whom appellant claim· 
. ed title, that before he purchased the land 
In controversy of the state he made search 
at the state and county oftlces, and <'ould flnd 
no previous conveyance of re<'ord. It also 
appears In the record that appellee offered In 
evidence the deposition ot Erasmus B. Col· 
llns, who testlfled In said deposition that 
he was the same Collins who was secretary 
of state of the state ot Indiana, and signed 
said letterR patent to Earle, and that he re-
corded It In volume 33, Record of Swamp 
I.ands In the State of Indiana, on page 379, 
and that said record was made January 12, 
1857; also the depoeltlon of Jamee H. Rice, 
the auditor ot state, to show that said record 
had been trnnsrerred to the offtce of the 
auditor of state, and was In his possession at 
the time of making the certificate; which 
310 
depositions were objected to by counsel for 
appellant, on the ground that It was an at· 
tempt by said deposltloDS to prove matters of 
record by parol evidence, and the ·objection 
was sustained, and the depositions excluded. 
The evidence of Palmer was to show the 
absence of a record In the oftl'Ce of the secre-
tary of st.ate which the deposition sought to 
show was made and was In said oftlce at the 
time and long before the making of the pat· 
ent to Palmer. It parol evidence was prop-
er to show there waa no such record made or 
kept In the offtce of the secretary ot state at 
a certain time, then certainly evidence to 
show that such record was in fact made and 
was In the offtce at that time was proper. 
A party must be conslstent. It he objects 
and secures a rullnc against bis adnrsary 
excluding evidence on a particular subject, 
he cannot be heard to complain when the 
' court applies the same rule, and excludes 
evlden<>e offt-red by him to establish the op-
posite of what his adversary hnd attempted 
to prove by the evidence which was ex-
cluded on hl.8 objection. In the case of Din· 
wlddle v. Statt-. 103 Ind. 101, 2 N. E. 290, 
this court says: "It Is settled by the ad· 
judlcatlons of this court that a party cannot 
make available for the reversal of a judg-
ment the exc.>luslon of evidence, where, upon 
his objection, like evidence wae excluded 
when offered by the other party." Hinton 
v. Whittaker, 101 Ind. 344. And this doc-
trine applies with full force to the objection 
raJeed by appellant to the exclll81on of the 
testimony of Palmer. TJ>e law did not re-
quire these patents to be recorded In the 
recorder's oftlce. It Is so dedded In case of 
Mason v. Cooksey, 51 Ind. 519, and le rec-
ognized as the law by this court In the for-
mer decision of this case. 
It Is contended that the law providing for 
the recording of letters patent In the ofHce 
ot the Se<'retary of state le unconstitutional, 
tor the reason that It doe& not come within 
the provisions of section 19, art. 4, Const. 
We think otherwise. The title to the orig-
inal act to which this was supplemental was 
entitled "An act to regulate the sale of 
swamp lands donated by the United Statee 
to the state of Indiana, and to provide for 
the draining and reclaiming thefe9f, in ac-
<'Ordan<'~ with the condition of said grant." 
The title Is broad enough to cover all thingtJ 
done in connection with the sale, and In con· 
nectlon with the execution of the patent. 
1 The statute provides that tbe secretary of 
state, one of the ofti<'el'8 wbo sbtns It, shall 
record It In his omce. It ls ordered recorded 
In connection with the making of the patent, 
and the title ls broad enougb to cover the 
provisions ot the act r ul.rl g tbe record. 
· It le claimed that l'Q n pe\lee never 
had possession of th• as tbe aPtate It la lo-
t t hi erea\es"' cum 1en on m. to e to a recovery, 
to show a. coml>I~te nt\tle hill) \e from the 
United States do-wn <'ha\n of ~111 tbe<>l'Y Is 
not tenable l.n this <! to him. ·.1.f tblB state 
nae. Court!! o 
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PROVED BY CERTIFIED COPIES. [Case N0. 105
take knowledge of the acts of congress grant-
ing to this state swamp land, which, taken
in connection with.the patent from the state,
makes :1 complete chain of title. In addi-
tion to this, it is a well-settled principle that,
when plaintiff and defendant claim through
a common source of title, it is suflicient for
the plaintiff to deduce his title from the com-
mon source of title. In this case both plain-
tiff and defendant claim title from the state
of Indiana, and it was only incumbent on
the plaintiff to show that he had the better
title from the state. Smith v. Lindsey, 89
M0. 76, 1 S. W. 88; Miller v. Hardin, 64 Mo.
545; Miller v. Surls, 19 Ga. 331; Barnard v.
Whipple, 29 Vt. 401.
The evidence supports the finding of the
court. YVe find no error for which the cause
ought to be reversed.
Judgment aflirmed, with cots.
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PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PROVED BY CERTIFIED COPIES. (Case No. 105 
take knowledge of the acts of congress grant-
ing to this state swamp land, which, taken 
In connection with. the patent from the state, 
makes a complete chain or title. In addi-
tion to this, It ls a well-settled principle that, 
when plalntltf and defendant claim through 
a common source of title, it is sufficient for 
the plaintlft' to deduce his title from the com-
mon source of title. In this case both plaln-
wr and defendant claim title from the state 
of Indiana, and It was only Incumbent on 
the pla1nU1f to show that he had the better 
title from the state. Smith v. Lindsey, 89 
Mo. 76, 1 S. W. 88; Mlller v. Hardin, 64 l1o. 
545; Miller v. Surls, 19 Ga. 331; Barnard v. 
Whipple, 29 Vt. 401. 
The evidence supports the finding of the 
court. ·we find no error for which the cause 
ought to be reverRerl. 
Judgment a11lrmed, with costs. 
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Case No. 106]
PROOF.
UNITED STATES v. BELL et al.
(4 Sup. Ct. 498, 111 U. S. 477.)
Supreme Court of the United States. April 21,
1884.
In error to the district court of the United
States for the Nortiiern district of Missis-
sippi.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for plaintiff in er-
ror.
Chas. F. Benjamin and Richard McAllis-
ter, for defendants in error.
WAITE, C. J. This was a suit upon the
bond of a purser in the navy, and at the
trial a transcript from the books and pro-
ceedings of the treasury department was of-
fered in evidence, authenticated in the fol-
lowing form:
“Treasury Department, Fourth Auditor-‘s Of-
lice, Washington, D. C., Feb. 11, 1881.
"Pursuant to section 886 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States. I, (“harles
Beardsley, fourth auditor of the treasury de-
partment, do hereby certify that thc annex-
ed is a transcript of the books and proceed-
ings of the treasury department, in account
with Miles H. Morris, late paymaster in the
United States navy, under bond of April 9,
1858. Charles Beardsley, Auditor.”
"Be it remembered that Chas. Beardsley,
I<lsq., who certified the annexed transcript,
is now, and was at the time of doing so,
fourth auditor of the treasury of the United
States, and that full faith and credit are due
to his official attestations.
“In testimony whereof, I, John Sherman,
secretary of the treasury of the United
States, have hereunto subscribed my name
and caused to be aiiixed the seal of this de-
partment, at the city of Washington, this
eleventh day of February, in the year of our
Lord 1881.
“[Sea.l of Department] John Sherman,
“Secretary of the Treasury."
An objection to the admission of the evi-
dence on the ground that the “transcript
was not certified as required by law," was
sustained by the court, and that is assigned
312
for error here. In our opinion the certifi-
cate was sufiicient. Section 886 of the Re-
vised Statutes provides that “when suit is
brought in any case of delinquency of a rev-
enue officer, or other person accountable for
public money, a transcript from the b00ks
and proceedings of the treasury department,
certified by the register and authenticated
under the seal of the department, or, when
the suit involves the accounts of the war
and navy departments, certified by the au-
ditors respectively charged with the exam-
ination of those accounts and authenticat-
ed under the seal of the treasury depart-
ment, shali be admitted as evidence, and the
court trying the cause shall be authorized to
grant judgment and award execution accord-
ingly." This suit involved the accounts of
the navy department. The fourth auditor
is charged by law with the duty of exam-
ining all accounts accruing in that depart-
ment. Rev. St. § 277, subd. 5. He has cer-
tiiied under his hand that the paper offered
in evidence “is a transcript of the books
and proceedings of the treasury department
in account with" the purser whose bond is
in suit, and the secretary of the treasury
has certified, under the seal of the depart-
ment, to the oflicial character of the auditor,
“and that full faith and credit are due to his
oflicial attestations." What more need be
done to authenticate the transcript under
the seal of the department we are at a loss
to determine. The certificate of the proper
auditor is attached, and his certificate at-
tested by the secretary of the treasury un-
der the seal of the department. The form
of the certificates and the mode of aflixing
the seal correspond exactly with what ap-
pears in Smith v. U. S., 5 Pet. 292. where it
was held, more than half a century ago,
that the seal affixed in this way was suffi-
cient for the purposes of evidence under :1-
statute. of which section 880 is a. re-enact-
ment. The transcript is certified by the au-
ditor, and authenticated under the seal of
the treasury department, aflixed by the sec-
retary, its lawful custodian.
The judgment is reversed. and the cause
remanded. with instructions to set aside the
verdict and grant a new trial.
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<Me No. 106] PROOF. 
UNITED STATES"· BELL et aL 
(4 Sup. Ct. 498, 111 U. S. 477.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. April 21, 
1884. 
Io error to the district court of the l'nlted 
States for the :Sorthern dllltrlct of lllAAIR-
slppl. 
Asst. Atty. Geo. Maury, for plalntltr in er-
ror. 
Chas. F. Benjamin and Richard McAllis-
ter, for deft>ndants lo error. 
WAITE, C. J. This was a suit upon the 
bond of a purser In the navy, and at the 
trial a transcript from the books and pro-
ceedings of the treasury departmt>nt was of-
fered In evidence, authenticated lo the fol-
lowing form: 
"Treasury Department, Fourth Antlltnr"M Of· 
ftce, Washington, D. C., Feb. 11, 18.~1. 
"Pursuant to sectloo 886 of the Revised 
Statutes of the United States, I, <'harles 
Beardsley, fourth auditor of the tremmry de-
partment, do hereby <.>ertlfy that thc annex-
ed Is a transcript of the books and proceed-
ings of the treasury department, in account 
with Miles H. Morris, late paymaster In the 
United States navy, under bond of April 9, 
1858. Charles Beardsley, Auditor." 
"Be It rPml•mbered that Chas. JWnrdMley, 
Esq., who certified the annexed trauMcrlpt, 
Is now, and was at the time of doing so, 
fourth auditor of the treasury of the United 
States, and that full faith and credit are due 
to his otftclal attestations. 
"In testimony whereof, I, John Sherman, 
secretary of the treasury of the UnJted 
States, have hereunto subscribed my name 
and caused to be amxed the seal of this de-
partment, at the city of Washington, this 
eleventh day of February, In the year of our 
Lord 1881. 
"[Seal of Department.] John Sherman, 
"Secretary of the Treasury." 
An objection to the admission of the evi-
dence on the ground that the ''transcript 
was not certified as required by law;• was 
sustained by the court, and that ls a881pied 
312 
for error here. In our oplnJon the certifi-
cate was suftlclent. Section 886 of the Re--
vised Statutes provides that "when suit 111 
brought In any case of delinquency of a rev-
enue omcer, or other person accountable for 
public money, a tranB<'rlpt from the bookll 
and prO<.'l'edlngs of the treasury department, 
certlfll'd by the register and authentl<'llted 
under the seal of the department, or, when 
the suit Involves the accounts of the war 
and navy departments, certified by the au-
ditors re11pt'(>tlvely <•barged with the exam-
ination of thot1e ac<"ounts and authenticat-
ed under the seal or the treasury depart-
ment, shall be admitted as e"rldence, and the 
court trying the cauAe shall be authorized to 
grant judgment and award execution accord-
ingly." Tblll suit in\·olved the accounts of 
the navy department. The fourth auditor 
Is <"barged by law wlth the duty of exam-
ining all accounts accruing In that depart-
ment. Rev. St. I 277, subd. G. He has cer-
tllled under his hand that the paper otrered 
In evlden<"e "Is a transcript of the books 
and prOl·t't'dlngs of the trea1mry department 
In account with" the purser whose bond 18 
In suit, and the secretary of the treasury 
has certified, under the seal of the de11art-
ment, to the oftlclal character of the auditor, 
"and that full faith and credit are due to bis 
otftclal attestations." What more need be 
done to autbentl<"ate the trans<"rlpt under 
the seal of the department we are at a 1088 
to determine. The certificate of the proper 
auditor la attached, and his certificate at-
tested by the secretary of the treasury un-
der the seal of the department. The form 
of the certlficates and the mode of aftlxlng 
the seal correspond exactly with what ap-
pears in Smith v. U. S., 5 Pet. 292, where It 
was held, more than halt a century ago, 
that the aeal aftlxed in thlll way was suftl-
clent tor the purposes of evidence under a · 
Atatute, of which section 8811 ls a re-enact-
ment. The transcript Is et>rtltted by the au-
ditor, and authenticated under the seal ot 
the treasury department, amxed by the sec-
retary, its lawful custodian. 
The judgment 18 reversed, and the cause 
remanded, with Instructions to set aside the 
nrdlct and grant a new trlaL 
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ALEXANDER v. PENNSYLVANIA CO.
(30 N. E. 69, 48 Ohio St. 623.)
Supreme Court of Ohio. Dec. 8. 1891.
Error to circuit court, Mahoning coun-
t .
yThis action was brought in the court of
common pleas of Mahouing county by
Alexander, the plaintiff in error, to rc-
cover against the defendant in error, the
Pennsylvania Company, damages for in-
juries sustained by him while in its cm-
ployment. He recovered a judgment in
that court, which was reversed by the cir-
cuit court oi Mahoning county in proceed-
ings instituted for that purpose by the
defendant in error. whereupon this pro-
-ceeding \vas brought to obtain a reversal
of the judgment of the circuit court, and
to afiirm that of the court of common
pleas. Atiirmed.
Jones, Anderson & Terrell,forplaintil‘f in
error. Thomas W. Sanderson and J. R.
Carey, for defendant in error.
BRADBURY, J. The record discloses that
the plaintiff in error, a boy ofabout 16 years
ofagc, was in the service of the defendant as
one of a gang of men engaged in relaying
the track of u branch of defendant's rail-
road. That his work mainly consisted in
carrying water for the other members of
the gang; occasionally, however, he as-
sisted in the. work they were doing. That
on the day he was injured a train oi cars,
loaded with cinders for bnllastlng the
track, was waiting to be unloaded; and
that, as he was climbing on one of the
cars. or perhaps had gotten on it, to help
unload the cinders, the train was started
forward, by reason of which he was
thrown from the car, under its wheels, re-
ceiving. besides other lcsser injuries. one
necessitating the amputation of a leg be-
tween the ankle and knee. The foreman
of the gang discharged and employed
men. had immediate control of them
while at work, and of the work being
done. Undoubtedly, according to the law
of this state, he was such a representa-
tive of the company as would render it
liable to one of the gang oi men antler his
control. who should be injured by his neg-
ligence. Atthis point there is a conflict
in the testimony respecting the conduct of
the plaintiff in error and the foreman, and
the immediate circumstances under which
the plaintiff went upon the cur and the
train put in motion; but there is evidence
from which the jury could find that the
foreman ordered the plaintiff to assist in
unloading the cinders; that, in obedience
to this order, he attempted to climb upon
a car: that he did so in a reasonably
careful manner; and that the foreman
carelessly, even recklessly, ordered the
train to be moved forward beiore the
plaintiff had secured himself a safe footing
upon the car he was attempting to board,
thereby throwing him from it, and under
its wheels, causing the injury of which he
complains; thus giving to the plaintiff,
according to the law of Ohio, a right of
action against the railroad company.
swer.
The real questions in contention be-
tween the parties in this court arise out of
the fact that the accident occurred in the
state of Peniisylvaniu. Tliedelcmlant in
error (also defendant in the court of com-
mon pleas) interposed in the last-named
court, among other defenses, the follow-
ing: “For a second defense it says that
said plaintiff entered into its employ
within the state of Pennsylvania, and
was employed to serve the defendant
within the said state of Pennsylvania,
and with reference to the laws of said
state of Penus_vl\'ania. lt sa_vs.iu|-thcr,
that under the ia\vs of said state of Penn-
sylvania, within which said contract was
made. and where said plaintiff was act-
ing as an employe of the defendant, the
plaintiff and all the other empioyes, in-
cluding said gang boss named in plain-
tiff’s petition, engaged upon and about
the train in the unloading of the same, are
held to be fellow-employes, and for the
negligence of either resulting in injury to
the other the common master, to-wit,
the defendant, is held not to be liable to
the other. Wherefore this defendant
asks to be dismissed, withits costs.” The
sufficiency of this defense is denied by
counsel for plaintiff in error in a forcible
and ingenious argument. in which they
specially criticise the averment, “are held
to be fellow-employee," etc. It is true,
there is no directaverment that any of the
courts of Pennsylvania. so held. but the
liberal rules applicable to the construc-
tion of pleadings in this staterequire us to
infer that the pleader so intended. No
objection. by motion or otherwise, was
made to the form of this defense in the
court of common pleas, or, so far as the
record discloses, at any stage in the prog-
ress of the case, until made by counsel in
their briei filed in this court. Under this
defense a number of the decisions of tho
supreme court of Pennsylvania werein-
troduced in evidence to establish the rule
of law attempted to be set up by this an-
Wliether upon motion, made at
the proper time, the defense should have
been made more certain and definite, we
need not inquire; for at this late stage
in the proceedings. after a strongly con-
tested trial. maiuiyhad upon the issues
made by the very defense, and the reply
denyingits truth, the defense should re-
ceive the most favorable construction its
language will permit; and when the
plender has averred, as in this defense,
that " under the laws of the state of Penn
sylvania " ' * the plaintiff and the
‘gang boss’ * ' " are hcld to be fel-
low-servants,” it is entirely reasonable to
infer that the alleged holding was by the
courts of that. state, having authority to
declare and announce the rules of law
operative therein.
The record of the proceedings in the cir-
cuit court is ambiguous. One of the as-
signments of error made in that court by
the defendant in error here was that the
court oi common pleas erred in overruling
its motion for a new trial. and one of
the grounds for a new trial stated is that
the motion was that the verdict was con-
trary to the weight of the evidence; so
that the circuit court had beiore it for de-
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ALEXANDER T. PEN~SYLV ANIA CO. 
(30 N. E. 00, 48 Ohio St. 623.) 
Suprem~ Court of Ohio. Dec. 8, 1891. 
Error to circuit court, Mahoning coun-
ty. 
ThfR dctlon wo11 brought In the court of 
~ommon pleaH of Mohoulog r.ounty by 
Alexanrler, tho plaintiff In error, to re· 
~over aJr;alnet the deft•ndont lu error, thP 
Pennsylvania Company, damagee for ln-
jnrieti sustained by him while lo lte em-
ployment. He rt>covered a JncJgment In 
that court, which w11R rever11t>d by the clr-
eult court of Mahoning eotrnty lo proceed-
ings tnetltuted for thut 1mrpose by the 
defendant In error, whel't'upon this pro-
-eeedlng was brouarht to obtain a reversal 
of the juditment of the circuit court, and 
to amrm that of the court of common 
pleas. Atllrmerl. 
Jone11, Anderson & Terl'Pll, forpJalntlff lo 
-error. Thoma11 W. Mandt>rson and J. R. 
-Cuniy, for defentlant In error. 
BRADBURY, J. The record dl11clm1e11 that 
tbP plaintiff In error, a boy of about 16yeHrs 
of age, waeln tht>eervlceofthedefendantaa 
-0ne of a aang of men enaraged In relayln~ 
the track of a hranch of defendant's 1·all-
road. 'l'bat hie work mainly consisted In 
-earrylog water for the other members of 
the gnog; occa~lonnlly, howevPr, ht' n11-
.slete1l In the work they were doing. That 
on the day be was Injured a train of cars, 
loaded with clntlere for ballaRtlog the 
track, wa11 waiting to be unloaded: and 
tbat, 011 he was cllmblnJr; on onfl of the 
-care. or pt>rhape had p.ottt'n on It, to help 
nnload tbe cinders, tbe train wns started 
forward, by reason of which he was 
tbro\\·n from the car, under Its wheels, l'f'-
<"elvlng. ht>Mldes other lesser lnj11rlee, one 
oecee.iltatlng the amputation of ft leg be-
tween the ankle and knee. The foreman 
of tbe gang discharged ftnd emJ>lnyetl 
men. had Immediate control of thern 
while at work, and of the work being 
41one. Undoubtedly, accorctlnrr to the law 
4>f thlR state, he was suc.-h a rPpreHenta-
tlve of the company ae would render It 
liable to one of the gang of men nuder his 
-eontrol. who should he Injured by hl11 neg-
ligence. At thlK point there le a confiict 
In the testimony reMpeetlug the conduct of 
the plalntln In error ancl tht' foreman, and 
the Immediate clrcum11tances under which 
the plaintiff Wl'nt npon the cnr and the 
t1·ain put In motion; bot there le evidence 
from which the jury conld find that the 
foremno unle1·ed the plalntln to a&Rlst In 
unloading the cloder.i; th1t t, lo obedleuce 
to this order, he attempted to climb upon 
a cor: that be did eo In a rf'asonably 
careful manner; and that the forenum 
~arele•IY, even reckle1tely, ordered the 
train to be moved forward before the 
plalntlft bad secured hlnu•elf a safe footlnir; 
upon tbe car be wait attf'mptlog to board, 
thert>by throwing him from It, and under 
lta wheellt, cauelnK the l11jury of wblch he 
~omplalns; thu11 giving to the plalottrr, 
according tu the law of Oblo, a right of 
action against the railroad compttny. 
The real qnHtlons In contention be-
twet>n the parties lo this conrt arise out of 
the fact that the accident ocenrred In the 
Rtate of Peonsylvaola. 'J'he defendant In 
error (also defendant tu thP court of t'om-
mon pleas) lntprposed lo the laRt·namPrl 
court. among other dE'feDflPB, the follow-
Ing: "For a second defen!Ce It s11yR that 
88ld plalntlft entered Into Its t>mploy 
within thE' Htate or PennHylvanla, 11nd 
wae employed to eer\•e the dt>fendant 
within thE' 1t11hl Rtate of Pennsylvanht, 
and with l'flferent'e to the lawe of eald 
l!ltRte or Penns~·h·anla. lt 11ays, further, 
thttt under the law11 of said state of Penn· 
eylvanla, within whic'h said contract was 
madP, and where said plaintiff was act-
ing as an employe of the defendant, the 
plaintiff nml HJI the othPr employee, In-
cluding 1mld gnug boR11 named In plaln-
tln's petition, enir;aired upon flllll about 
the train la the unloadlnar of the same, are 
held to be fellow-employeR, and for the 
negligence of either rei,iultlng In Injury to 
the othl'r the common master, to.wit, 
the defendant, le heltl not to be llal1le to 
the other. Wher1>fore this defen.dant 
aeka to hl' dlemleet>d, with ltfl costs." The 
Hofflclenes of thle 1Jt>ferwe le denied by 
connsel for plalnttn In error lo a forcible 
and lngenloue arirument, In which tbPy 
Rpeclally crltkll!e the avermt>nt, "are held 
to be fellow·en.ployes," etc. It le true, 
there is nu dlreet a vermPnt that any of thE' 
courts of Pe11011yl\'anla 1110 held. but tbe 
llheral roles applicable to 1 he com1tr11c· 
tlon of plea1ll11gt1 In this statt>requlre UK to 
lnfPr that the pleader eo lntendecl. No 
objection, by motion or otherwise, was 
made to thei form of this defense In the 
r.ourt of common pleas, or, eo far ae the 
record dl1tclo11ee, at any stn~e In the pro~­
ress of the case, until made by couni;,el In 
their b1'1el filed In tbl11 t'ourt. Uncler this 
defenRe a number of the declRlonR of the 
fllur1rt>me court or PenneylYa11t11 werf' In-
troduced lo evidence to eHtabllsh the rule 
of law attempted to be set up by th:" tlll-
·awer. Wheth~r upon motion, ma1le at 
the prop,..r time, the defense shouid have 
b~en madP more certain and definite, we 
neert not Inquire; for Ht thl11 late stage 
In the procet>rlln~R, after R etroniz:ly con-
tested trlal, mainly bud upon tbu Issues 
mudt> by the very dt>fl:!nRe, and the rf'ply 
df'nylng ltR tr1Jth, the clefenRe should re-
cPh•e the most favorahle constr11ctlon itl!I 
Janiruage will permit; and when the 
pleu!lt>r haR aYerred, as In this deff'n11e, 
that" unlll'r the lu ws of thti state of Penn 
eylvanla • • • the plaintiff and tho 
•gang boss' • • • are hold to bf' fel-
low-sP.rvan ts," It la entirely reasonable to 
Infer that the alleged holding was by the 
courts of that state, httvlng authority to 
declare and announce the rules of la vr 
operative therein. 
The record of the proceedings In the cir· 
cult court le amblguone. One of the 1111-
el;tnwente of error mttdo In that court by 
the defendant In error hE"re was that the 
coo1't of common pleas erred In o\•erruling 
Its motion for a new trial, und ooe of 
the p:round!I for a new trial stated Is that 
the motion was that the \°erdlc.-t wne con-
trary to the weli.r:ht of tile e\•ltlence; so 
that the circuit court had liefore It for de· 
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cision that question; and, had it reversed
the judgment of the court of common
pleas on that ground, this court would
not have reversed its action,and the same
result would have followed from a gener-
al judgment of reversal,--tiiat is,one spec-
ifying no particular ground for the action
of the court,—f0r in that case, as thccourt
might have reversed the judgment on the
ground that it was contrary to the evi-
deuce, this court cannot say that was not
the ground oi its action. Titus v. Lewis,
33 Ohio St. 304. in the case at bar, how-
ever, there is an attempt to state in the
journal entry of the circuit court the
grounds of its action in reversing thejudg-
ment of the court of common pleas. as fol-
lows: " I-‘irst. The court finds from exam-
ination of record and bill of exceptions
that it was notcontroverted in the trial
in the court below but that there were
ofiicers of the Pennsylvania Company su-
perior in authority to Frank Kennan,
who had the right and authority to con-
tract and supervise his action in conduct-
ing the work, and controlling the men
during the work in which the plaintiff be-
low was engaged at the time he received
the injury. Second. The court holds as
conclusion of law that the determination
of this case must be governed by the law
in the state of Pennsylvania. Third. The
court further finds as a conclusion of la w,
from the reports of the decisions of the
suprenlecourt oi Pennsylvania, contained
in the record, that said Frank Kennan
was a fellow-servant andco-employe with
said Alexander at the time he received his
injury; and, therefore. that plaintiff in
error is not liable for the alleged negligent
acts oi said Kennun, which caused the in-
jury to defendant in error. To all of
which holdings defendant in error except-
ed. " This is not, in the correct and legal
sense of the term, a finding oi the facts
in the case, and a statement of them sep-
arately from the conclusions of law ar-
rived at by the court, although it closely
resembles it in form; for it is not within
the province oi the circuit court, in a pro-
ceeding in error before it, to find from the
evidence contained in the bill oi excep-
tions the facts, and state them separately
from its conclusions of law. Senff v. Pyle,
46 Ohio St. 102. 24 N. E. Rep. 590: Young
v. Pennsylvania (‘0., 46 Ohio St. 558, 2-l N.
E. Rep. 595. Neither does it give as the
ground of the reversal any one of the er-
rors assigned in that court. Whatlt real-
ly does disclose is that the circuit court,
being oi opinion that the law of Penn-
sylvania should govern the case, the ver-
dict of the jury was against the weight of
the evidence, because from aconsideration
of the whole evidence it appeared that
the plaintiff in error was a fellow-servant
of the “gang boss,” by whose negligence
he was injured; and that in such case the
law oi Pennsylvania would not permit a.
recovery to be had against the railroad
company, in whose service both were at
the time engaged. It may be considered,
therefore, as fairly shown by the record,
that the circuit court would not have re-
versed thc judgment oi the court of com-
mon pleas if it had not held the case to be
governed by the law of that state. it
therefore becomes material to inquire if
the circuit court was right in this respect.
The first branch of the inquiry concerns
the method by which the law of Pennsyl-
vania is to be determined. Is it to be
found as matter of fact by the jury from
the evidence. or judicially declared by the
court? That it is a fact to be determined
by the jury is, we think, a well-cstab-
lished principle of law. Ingraham v.
Hurt, 11 Ohio, 255; Bank v. Baker. 15
Ohio St.68; Williams v. Finlay, 40 Ohio
St. 342. it does not follow from this.
however, that where, as in the case at
bar, numerous decisions of the several
courts of a state are introduced in evi-
dence to a jury as proof oi the law of such
state, the jury should be required to
search through them, and elucidate and an-
nounce the doctrine they establish. Thisis
often a most difficult and delicate duty for
courts and judges of the greatest skill,
learning, and experience to undertake.
To submit its performance to a body of
men inexperienced in the examination
and construction of judicial decisions, and
not familiar with the general doctrines
pertaining to the subject. would be to
submit the rights of parties involved in
the controversy to be determined by a
method little. if any, more certain than
the cast of a die. In such case it becomes
the duty of the court, as in the case of
any other documentary evidence requiring
construction, to construe the decisions.
the rulings oi the trial court in this re-
spect being subject to review by other
courts having jurisdiction in error, thus
securing as much certaintyin ascertaining
the law of another state or country as
the nature of the subject will admit. Di
Sora v. Phillipps. 10 H. L. Cas.62-i; Bremer
v. Freeman. 10 Moore, P. (‘-. 306; State v.
Jackson, 2 Dev. 563: Cobb v. Transporta-
tion Co..87 Mo.9U; Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass.
253: 'l‘homp.'l‘rials,§ 1054. The record dis-
closes that thecontract by which the plain-
tiff in error was employed was made in
the state of Pennsylvania: that his
services wcreto be rendered wholly within
that state, and that he was injured there-
in. if the right ofa servant to recover
damages from his master on account of
an injury received through the negligence
of a superior servant of the same master
arises out of contract, then the case of
Knowlton v. Railway Co., 19 Ohio St. 260,
is decisive of the cuse at bar. 'l‘he sylla-
bus of that case reads: “The defendant is
a common carrier of passengers, incorpo-
rated by the laws oi New York. and was
sued as such common carrier on account
of injuries received by the plaintiff whilst '
. being carried as a passenger from
||n8
point to another on deiendant’s road, and
wholly within said state. The injury was
l charged to have been occasioned by de-
fendant's negligence. The pleadings show
the plaintiff was being carried gratuitous-
ly at the time of the accident, under acou-
tract by which plaintiff assumed all risks
of accident and injury arising from negli-
‘ gencc, etc., and such contract is valid by
the laws of New York. Held, that the va-
lidity of the stipulation exempting the de-
icndunt from liabiiity l'or negligence must
be determined by the laws oi New York,
31-1:
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cfaion that question; and, had it reveraed 
the judgment of the court of comruon 
pleas on that gronof), this court woultJ 
not have reversed Its actlon,und the same 
result would havt> followed from a gener-
al Judgment of reversRl,·-that is, one spec-
ifying no particular ~round for the action 
of thA court,-for in that cuee, as thecourt 
might have re,·ereed the Judgment on the 
ground that it was contrary to the evl-
dt-nce, this court cannot suy thllt wao;i not 
the ~rouu11 of Its action. Titus v. Lewis, 
a:~ Ot1io 8t. 304. lo the cao;ie at bar, 110w-
ever, there ls an attempt to state In the 
journal entry of the circuit court the 
grounds of its al·tlon lo J'e\'erslng thejurli;t-
ment of the con rt of common pleas, ae fol-
lows: "FirHt. 'file court finds from exam-
ination of recorll and bill of exceptions 
that It was uot contt·o\·erterl In the trial 
In the court helow but that there were 
otflcere of the Pt>nnsylvaoia Company a;u-
perior In nutho1·ity to F1·1tnk Kennan, 
who hal) the right and authority to con-
tr1tct 11nd supervise hia ttctlon In conduct-
ing the work, and r.ontrolllog the mE'n 
during the work In which the plain tiff be-
low wee engaged ot thP. time he received 
the Injury. Second. 'fbe court holds as 
conelusloo of law thftt ~he dt!termlnatlon 
of this case must be governed by the law 
In the Plate of Pennsylvania. Third. The 
court further ftndR as a conclusion of law, 
from the reports of the del'lslone of the 
supreme court of Pennsylvania, contained 
In the record, that said Frank Kennan 
w aH a fellow-een·nut end co-employe with 
eaifl Alexander at the tlmt> he received hie 
fujnr.v: and, therefore, that plaintiff In 
error le not liable for tho alleged ne11:llgE>nt 
aets of said Kennan, whleh caused the In-jury to defendant In error. To all of 
which holdings defendant lo error ncept-
ed. " This le not, In the correct and legal 
eenHP of the term, a .flnrtlng or the facts 
in the case, and a statement of them sep-
arately from the conclusions of law ar-
rh·ed at b,v the court, although It cl111wly 
resembles It In form; for It Is not within 
the province of the clrl·ult court, In a pro-
ceeding In error before It, to find from the 
e\"ldence contained In the bill of excep-
tions the facts, and state them eepar1ttel.v 
from lte conclusfonM of law. Heon v. P~·Je, 
46 Ohiu St. 102. 24 N. E. Rep. 595: Young 
v. Pennsylvania Co., 46 Ohio 8t. 5fi8, :.!4 N. 
E. Rep. 595. Neither does it alve ae the 
Krotmd of the re\'erHal any one of the er-
rorM aHslicned In that court. What It real-
ly does disclose la that tl>e circuit court, 
bel11~ or opl11lo11 thut the law of Peon-
1o1ylvnnia should govern the case, the ver-
dict of the Jury was against the weight of 
the evidence, because from a consideration 
or the whole e\"ldence it appeared thut 
the plaintiff In errm· wuH a fellow 0 F1ervant 
of the "gang hmis." by who11e negligence 
lie wee Injured; and that In eurh c1111e the 
Ju w or Pennsylvania would not permit a 
recovery to be had aiialust the railroad 
company, In whose service both wne at 
the time en11:aged. It may be considered, 
th1c-refore, 11s fairly shown hy the reeord, 
that the circuit conrt would not have re-
veri;ed the jud~rut•nt of the court of com-
mon pleHe If It h11d uot hPld the raHe to IJe 
governed by the law of that 11tute. lt 
au 
therefore becomes material to inquire If 
the circuit court wfts right lo this ref!pect. 
The first brunch of the Inquiry coucerns 
the metholl by which the law of Peum~yl­
vanlu la to be determined. Is It to be 
found aK matter of fact by the ~ury from 
the evidence, or judicially declared by the 
court? That It 111 a tact to be determined 
by the jury Is, we think, a well-eetab-
lh1hect principle of law. Ingraham v. 
H11rt, 11 Ohio, 255; Bank v. Baker. 15 
Ohio St. 68; Wllllume v. Finlay, 40 Oblo 
!St. 342. It does nut follow from this. 
however, that where, ae tn the case at 
bar, numerous declrdone of the several 
courts of a state are Introduced Jn evi-
dence to a jury as proof of the law of s11ch 
state, the jury should be required to 
search through them, and elucidate nnd an-
nounce the doctrine theyE>FJtablleh. Thh1ls 
often a moetlllfficult and delicate duty fur 
courts and judges of the greate11t skill, 
learning, aml experit-nce to undertake. 
'l'o submit Its performunce to a body of 
men inexperienced in the examination 
and construction of judicial decisions, aud 
not familiar wltl1 the general doctrines 
pertaining to the e11bject. would be to 
submit the rlghtH of parties lnvol\"ed In 
the c01:rrove1'lly to be detl'rmlned hy a 
method little. If any, moro certain than 
the cal:lt of a die. In Huch case It becowea 
the duty of the court, as lu the caRe of 
any other documentary evldPnce requi"log 
eonetructlon, to construe the decisions. 
the rulings of the trial court In thlR re-
epE>ct being subject to review hy other 
courts having jurisdiction In error, tlaue 
securln~ aFJ much certainty In ascertalulng 
the lftw of unuther state or couutry aR 
the nature o( the subject will admit. DI 
Sora v. Phillippe. 10 H. L. C1ta. 624; Bremer 
v. Freem1rn. 10 Moore, P. C. 306; State v. 
Jackson, 2 Dev. fi63: Cobb v. 'l'r1tm1porta-
tlon Co .• 87Mo. 90; Kline v. Baker, 119 !\foBR. 
:!5H; 'J'homp. 'l'rluls, § 1054. The reeord dle-
cloeE's that the eon tract by which the plain· 
tiff lo eri-or wa11 employell was made In 
the state of Pennsylvania; that hie 
services were to be rendered wholly within 
that state, and that he waa lnJured there-
in. If the right of a servant to recover 
damages from hla master on account of 
an lnjnry recP.h·ed through the negligence 
of a 1mperlor eerv1tnt of the same mt1eter 
arhies out of contract, thPn the <'ao;ie of 
Knowlton v. RAiiway Co., 19 Ohio St. 269, 
ls der.1.-lve of the cm1e at hnr. The sylla-
huFJ of that ca11e reads: .. Tht> llefe11d1tnt le 
a commou carrier or pa11Bengel's, incorpo-
rated by the lawe of New York. and was 
sne!I as each com 1111111 carrier on accouo t 
or loJurlee recel\•ed by the plaintiff whilst 
being carried a11 a pa11senger from one 
point to another on deleudant's ro1td, aud 
wholly within said et ate. 'rhe lujury was 
chnrged to hn ve been occ1:1slooed by de-
fend1tnt'H negllgAnce. The pleadings show 
tllE' plalntlH w1:1e heing carried gratultnua-
ly n t the time or the nccldcn t, under a con-
tr1tr t by which plnlotlft a11eurued all risks 
of R<'cident ami Injury arising from negll-
gf!nce, etc., and such contract 111 valid Lly 
the laws ol New York. Held, that the va-
lidity of the stipulation exempting the de-
fend11nt from liabl!lty for neicllgt>nce mnst 
be determined by the laws ol New York, 
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PROVED BY CERTIFIED COPIES. [Case N0. 107
within whose jurisdiction the contract
was made and to be executed; and as the
plaintiff. under his contrar-.t, could have
no right of action in the courts of New
York. so his action cannot be maintained
in this state."
in Railway Co. v. Ranney, 87 Ohio St.
665, l\IcIi.v1l1xs. J., said, lpage 669:) “The
principles of law in relation to the lla-
bility of a master for an injury to his serv-
ant while engaged in the performance of
duties under his employment have been
so frequently considered and declared by
this court, and upon such varied state-
ments of fact, that one might be justified
in assuming that the law upon this sub-
ject. in all its bearings, has been fully set-
tled. The respective rights and duties of
employer and employe sound in contract.
The employer implicitly engages to use
reasonable care and diligence to secure the
safety of the empioye, and, among other
things, to exercise reasonable care in the
selection of prudent fellow-servants. He
also engages that every one placed in au-
thority over the servant, with power to
control and direct him in the performance
of his duties, will exercise reasonable care
in providing for his safety. whether such
superior be a fellow-servant or not, in the
ordinary sense." There is strong ground
to contend that Judge 1\IC]I.VAlNl') slates
the rule correctly. But however that:
may be, and whether the action of the
plaintiff i_n error sounds in contract or
tort, in either case we think ii: is to be
governed by the law of Pennsylvania. If
the acts of the parties impose no obliga-
tionson the one hand and confer no rights
upon the other. where they occur, no good
reason is apparent why they should
spring into active existence the moment
the parties pass into another jurisdiction,
where, if they had occurred therein, such
relative rights and obligations would
have resulted. An act should be judged
by the law ofthe jurisdiction where it was
committed. The party acting or omit-
ting to act must be-presumed to have been
guided by the law in force at the time and
1 place. and to which he owed obedience.
If his conduct. according to that law,
violated no right of another, no cause oi’
action arose. for actions at law are pro-
vided to redress violated rights. Nor is it
material that the rules of Pennsylvania
law that deny relief to plaintiff in error
result from the adjudications of thecourts
of that state, instead of being legislative
enactments. The rules of law established
by judicial decisions are as binding as leg-
islative enactments until modified or over-
turned by other decisions or legislative en-
actments binding within that jurisdiction.
In theory it may be true that there is no
common law of Ohio or oi Pennsylvania:
that the common law is one and the same
in every state acknowledging its obliga-
tions; and that the decisions of one state
are but evidence of it, not binding upon
the courts of any other state; but. as
matter oi fact, we know that, in the ap-
plication of the rules of the common law
to the affairs oi men, there ls. unfortu-
nately, in the several states, a wide di-
vergence: and that it necessarily follows
that acts and transactions sufficient in
one stale to create a cause of action will
not produce that result in another, and
in the administration of justice mere
theory must be made to yield to the truth
as established by facts and experience.
Other questions were urged upon our cou-
slderation by counsel in argument, some
or all of which may be material upon the
retrial of the action. but they are not pre-
sented by the record in such manner as to
authorize their consideration at this time,
and will not be noticed. Judgment af-
firmed.
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within whose Jurlsdktlon the con tract 
was made ttnd to be ex~uted; anc1 ae the 
plalntlH, under hl11 cuutrar.t, could have 
no r1ght or action In the courtY or New 
York, 110 his action cannot be maintained. 
lo thl11 state." 
In Railway Co. v. Ranney, 87 Ohio St. 
665, MclLVAINE, J., salfl, I page 6611:) "The 
prlnclpltl8 of law In relation to the lla-
blll ty of a master for an Injury to blt1 serv-
ant while enp;AJl:f'd In the perfornumre of 
duties unller his tim11lo.rment have bl'<!o 
so fre11fll'Dtly ronslllered and declared by 
this court, an1l upon such varied state. 
men ts of fact, that one might be Justiflad 
In t1111mmlng that the law upon this sub· ject, In all lt.8 bearine;s, has L>een fully set-
tled. The re11pectlve rle;hts and dutlee of 
employer aud emr1Ioye sound In contract. 
1'he <'mployer Implicitly engages to u11e 
reasunable cure and diligence to secure the 
1111fety or tho employe, and, among other 
thln11:s, to exercl11t1 reasonable care In the 
selec·tlon of prudent fellow-servuots. He 
also engages that every one plat!ed In au-
thority over the 11ervunt, with power to 
control and direct him In the performanr.e 
of his dutiee, will exercl11e ren1mnable rare 
In providing for bis safety. w ht!tlier such 
11npertor be a fellow-servant or not, In the 
ordinary sense." 'l'here le strona~ ground 
to contend that Judge l\kJl.VAINt~ l'llatet1 
the rule con-ectly. But however that 
may be, nnd whether tne action of the 
plaintiff In error sounds In rontract or 
tort, In either cuee we think It le to be 
governed by the law of Pennsylvania. If 
the acts of the parties Impose no obliga-
tions on the one hancl and confer no rights 
upon the other, where thPY occur, no good 
reason Is apparent why they should 
sprln11: Into active existence the moment 
the partlt!B pass into another jurisdiction, 
where, tr they hail occurred therein, such 
relative rlgbte and obllgatlooe would 
have resulted. .o\n act should be judged 
by the luw of the jurlfldlctlon where It wae 
com111ltte1l. 'l'ne p11rty ac·ttng or omit-
ting to act mu11t hPpresumc>d to havebPen 
~uirled h~ the law In force nt the time and 
place, end to which he owed obrlllenrE'. 
If hie conduct, uccordlnJ.t to that law, 
violated no right of another, no com'le of 
action aro11e, tor ectlon11 at law are pro-
ylfted to redress violated ri~hte. Nor Is It 
materh1l that the rules of Peno11ylvanla 
law that deny relief to plalntift In error 
refilmlt from the 11djudlcatlo11s of thecourte 
of that state, Instead or being IP~IHlatlve 
enactments. 'l'he rulee of law established 
by judicial declslooe are as bhullng ae leg-
islative enactmenteuntll mod!Oed or over-
turned by other dechlloos or leglelatlvE' en-
act.meuts binding within that jurietllctlou. 
Io theory It llll\Y he true that there 111 no 
common law of Ohio or of Penneylvanla: 
that the common law Is oue nncl the same 
In t.>very eta te acknowled~ing Its oblll(R· 
tions; and that the decisions of one !!ltate 
are but evidence of It, not binding upon 
the courts of any other etate; but, ae 
matter or fact, we know tbat, lo the BP· 
pllcu tion of the rulee of the com mou law 
to the atfalr11 of men, there le, unfortu-
nately, in the tteveral states, a wide dl-
ver11:ence; and that It nect!esarlly follows 
that ucte nod transactions sufficient In 
one etate tu crente a ca11ee of action will 
not produce that reeult In another, and 
In the altmlnlstra11oo of justice mere 
theory muttt be made to yield to the truth 
as established by facts and expE'rle11ce. 
Other QUP.l!tlnn11 were urged upon our ~on· 
eldl'ratloo lJy counsel In argument, eome 
or all of which may be material upon tbe 
retrial of the action. but they are not pre-
sented by the record In such manner a11 to 
authorize their cun111deratlon at thle time, 
and wlll not be noticed. Judgment af-
firmed. 
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\‘\'ISE.\I.\N v. NORTHERN PAC. R. CO.
(26 Pac. 272, 20 Or. -125.)
Supreme Court of Oregon. March 31, 1891.
Appealfrom circuit court. Multnoniah
county; E. D. Si].-\TTi.'CK, Judge.
On March 19,1890,theplaintiff,J.J. Wise-
man, commenced an action in the circuit
court of the state of Oregon for the coun-
ty of Multnomah against the defendant.
to recover the sum of $398.72, the value of
certain household goods claimed to have
been lost by defendant in transit. The
complaint alleges that on or about the 8th
day of April. 1889, at Nunica, Mich., the
plaintiff delivered to the Detroit. Grand
1-la-vcn & Milwaukee Iinilway (‘onipany a
shipment of six boxes, one trunk, one roll of
carpet, and two barrels containing house-
hold goods, the property of the plaintiff,
for transportation to Salem, Or.: that
said shipment was in duetime delivered in
good order to the defendant as a connect-
ing carrier: and t‘hat one of said boxes
and one of said barrels, with their entire
contents, were destroyed. and never de-
livered to plaintiff, w hich household goods
so destroyed were of the value of $373.05.
The defendant, in its answer to the com-
plaint, admits the shipment by plaintiff,
and the delivery to the Detroit, Grand
Haven & Milwaukee Railway (_‘ompany,
of the household goods in question, and
that the same was in due time received by
defendant from the Detroit. Grand Haven
& iililwaukee Railway Company, a. con-
necting carrier; admits that one of the
boxes and one of the barrels, with the con-
tents, were destroyed, but denies any
knowledge as to the contents or value
thereof. For a further and separate an-
swer and defense, defendant alleged that
the shipment of freight mentioned in the
complaint consisted of household goods,
and that the same was shipped by plain-
tiff, and received and accepted by the De-
troit. Grand Haven & Milwaukecliailway
Company, as well as the defendant, a con-
necting line. under a. contract with plain-
tiff that, if for any cause there should be
a total loss of said freight. and a liability
on the part of the common carrier receiv-
ing the same. or over whose line the same
was being or was transported, the total
liability therefor. ifany there should he,
would be the sum of five dollars per hun-
dred pounds weight of said freight, and
the same was rcceitcd and accepted by dc-
fendant and shipped by plaintiff on said
condition. The defendant, further an-
swering. and as a separate defense,allegcd
that at the date of shipment by plaintiff,
to-wit, April 8, 1889. in order to obtain
the benefit of the reduced rate of freight
charges from the ordinary tariff rate
charged therefor, the plaintiff and the ile-
troit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway
Company contracted and agreed in writ-
ing that. in consideration of such reduced
rates, the plaintiff, in case of any damage
or loss lio said goods arising by damage
by fire while at stations or in transit.
would and did release said company, and
each and every other company over whose
lines said goods might pass to destina-
tion, from any and all damage occurring
to said goods; that said plaintiff was
given and obtained the benefit of said rc-
duccd ra tcs, and executed said contract
of release accordingly. The reply denies
the new matter alleged in theanswer. On
the trial the plaintiff gave evidence tend-
ing to prove the issues on his part, and
then rested. Defendant then gave evi-
dence tending to prove the execution by
plaintiff of the release and contract men-
tioned ln theanswer; that it wasexecnled
in duplicate, one copy being attached to
the bill of lading, and the other was by
the agent of the Detroit, Grand Haven &.
Milwaukee Railway, at Nunlca, l\lich., for-
warded to the traffic manager of that
road. at Chicago, Ill. Defendant then
called Alfred Watts, who was then clerk
of the Northern Pacific Railroad, at Port-
land, Or., who testifled that he was clerk
in the ofiice of Mr. Fulton, general freight.
agent of the defendant at Portland; that
he had telegraphed to the claim agent of
the defendant at St. Paul to ascertain if a
release had been made on the plaintiff's
shipment of goods from Nunica, and, if
so, to send the original release that was
signed by Mr. Wiseman; that the claim
agent at St. Paul telegraphed back that
the files in the office of the traffic manager
at Chicago had been searched, and the re-
lease could not be found; that the release
never was in his office at Portland, and
the parties who handled the way-bill of
plaintiff's goodssaid there was no release
attached to it when it reached its destina-
tion. The defendant then offcred the dep-
osition of the agent at Nunlca to prove
the contents of the release. but the court
refused to admit secondary evidence of its
contents, to which ruling defendant duly
excepted, and assigns the same as error
on this appeal.
Dolph, Bellirrger-, Mallory & Simon. for
appellant. J. N. Teal and Sanderson Reed,
for respondent.
BEAN, J., (after stating the facts as
above.) By section 691, Hill’s Code, it is
provided that “ there shall be no evidence of
the contents of a writing, other than thc
writing itself, except in the following
cases: *' " ' (2) When the original can-
not be produced by the party by whom
the evidence is offered. in a reasonable
time, witlr proper diligence. and its ab-
sence is not owing to his neglect or de-
fault." This section is a declaration of the
common-law rule. The theory upon which
secondary evidence of the contents of a
writing is admitted is that the original
writing cannot be produced by the party
by whom the evidence is offered. within a
reasonable time, by the exercise of reason-
able diligence. The question is always one
of diligence in the effort to procure the
original. No precise rule has been or can
be laid down as to what shall be consid-
ered a reasonable effort, but the party al-
leging the loss or destruction of the docu-
ment is expected to show “that he has in
good faith exhausted, in a. reasonable de-
gree, all the sources of information and
means of discovery which the nature of the
case would naturally suggest, and which
were accessible to him." 1 Greenl. Ev.
§ 558; Simpson v. Dali, 3 Wall. 460; John-
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Wlf:E'.\I.\.X v. NORTHim~ PAC. R. CO. 
<:!U Pac. 272, 20 Or. 420.) 
Supreme Court of Oregon. March 31, 1891. 
Ap1>eal from rirr.ult court, Multnomah 
-county; E. D. R11ATT1:cK, Judjl;e. 
to said i:omls; that said plaintiff WH 
1rlvcn an1l obtained the benl'flt Qf said re-
d m·ed ra tt•s, a ud executed said cootruct 
or relce1Je accordlnll'l.V. The reply denle1:1 
the new matter ulleged in theunswer. On 
the trial the plalntlft gave evlclenctl tend-
ing to prove the l8Hoes on his part, and 
then rested. Defendant then gave evi-
dence tending to pr1n·e the execution by 
plaintiff of the release and contraet 1J1e11-
tlo11ed In the answer; that It was~xeculed 
In duplicate, one copy being attached to 
the blll of lading, and the other w1111 by 
the agent of the Uetrolt, Grand Haven & 
Milwaukee Railway, ut. Nunlca, Mich., for-
warded to the traftlc manager of that 
road, at Chicago, Ill. Defendant then 
called AlfrPd Watts. who was then clerk 
of the Northern Pacific Railroad, at Port-
land, Or., who tei;itlHed that be wae t'lerk 
In the oftlce of Mr. Fulton, general freight 
agent of the defendant at Portland; that 
he had telegraphed to the elalm agtmt of 
the defendant at St. Paul to aseertuln ff a. 
re:ease had been made on the plaiutlff'i-
shlpment of goodR from Nunlca, and, U 
110, to send the original release that was 
signed by Mr. Wl11eman; that tbe clal.m 
a~nt at St. Paul telf'graphed back that 
the files in the oftice of the tr11.fftc manager 
at Chlcaaco bad bt:en searched, and the re-
lease could not be found; that ~he release 
never wae In his offtce l\t Portland, and 
the partlP& who handled the way-bill of 
plaintiff's good11 ·sald there wae no relea.;e 
attached to It wheu It reached Its destina-
tion. The defendant then offered the- dep. 
011ltlon of the ugent at Nonie& to prove 
the contents of the l"f'lease. hut the court 
refust-d to admit sec:ondary evidence of Its 
contents, to which ruling defendant duly 
excepted, and asslacns the same as error 
on this appeal. 
f)(l/ph, Bellinxer, .\lallory ct Simun, for 
appellant. J. N. Teal and &adersoa Reed, 
for respondent. 
BEAN, J., (after 11taUng the facts a11 
11bove.) By hectlon 691, Hiii's Cocle, It IM 
pro\•l<led that "there shall be no evidence of 
the contents of a writing, other than the 
writing ltt1elf, except in the following 
citses: • • • (2) When the original can-
not be produced by the party by whom 
the evldPnee le offered. In a reonsonable 
time, with· proper diligence, and Its ab-
st-nce le not owing to 11111 neglect or de-
fault." This sP.Ctlon Is a cleclaratlon of the 
common-law rule. 'l'he theory upon which 
eeron<lury evidence of the cuntentH of a 
writing Is admitted Is that tile original 
writing cannot be prod u~ed by the party 
bv whom the evidence Is olferc1l, within a 
reasonable time, by the exercise of reosou-
able 1lillgence. The lJlll'stion is always one-
of tJlllgence In the effort to procure the 
orlginnl. No precise rule baas beeu or can 
be laid demo as to what shall be cousid-
ere<I a rt'asonnble 1·ftort, hut the pl\rty al-
le1rlng the 101111 01· <lestrnctlon bf the docu-
ment ls e:iq1cctetl to show "that he baa lo 
good fuitl1 exhaustPd, In a ree1mnohle de· 
gree, all the suurce11 of lnformution and 
means of discovery which the nature of the 
On l\larcb 19, l~!IO, the11lnlnt1n, J .J. Wlsl'-
mnn, commencf'<l an ncttoo In the circuit 
court of the state of On>gon for the coun-
ty of Multnomah &jtalnst the defendant, 
to recover the sum or f39~.i2, the value of 
certain household goo<l1:1 claimed to have 
b<'l'n lost by defendant In transit. The 
complaint alleJl;eK thuton or about the 13th 
day of April. l~. at Nunica, Mkb., the 
plaintiff dellnired to the Detroit, Grand 
Htweu & Milwaukee Rnllwuy Company a 
shipment of 11l:x boxes, one trunk, one roll or 
carpet, and two burrPls containing hou11e-
bold goods, the propl'rty of the plulntlff, 
for tran11portt1 tlon to Ralern, Or.: thn t 
sul<1 shipment "'as In due time delivered In 
good order to the defendant as a t'onneet-
lng ~urrler: ancl t11at one of said boxes 
and one of sahl barrels, with their entire : 
contents, were dt-stroyed, and never de· · 
livered to plaintiff,\\ hlcb household 11:oods 
so destroyed were of the value of $3i3.05. 
The defendant, In Its am1wer to the cnm-
plulot, admits the Mhlpment by plaintiff. 
and the delivery to the Detroit, Grund 
Ha\·en & Milwaukee Railway <.'ompnny, 
of the household goods In queRtlon, and 
that the same wos In due time received by 
df'fendant from the Detroit. Grencl Haven 
& Milwaukee Rullw11y Company, a con-
11ec:ting t'&rrler; admit& that one of the 
boxes und one of the barrels, with the t'on-
ten tlJ, were de11troyed, but denies uny 
knowledge as to the contents or nllne 
thereof. J.<'or a further and separate an-
swer and defense, defendant alleged that 
the 11h\pwe11t of freight mentioned In the 
complaint conelste<l of bousebold guo<ls, 
and tbot the same woe shipped by plain-
tiff, and received and m·repte<l by the De-
troit, Grtmd Hu,·en & MllwaukecRallwoy 
Company, ae well es the dl•fendRnt. a ron-
nectlng line, umler a contract with plulo-
tttt that, If for any cuuse there Rhould be ' 
a total loes uf said freight, and a liability 
on the part of the rommon carrier re.!eh·-
lng thP. same, or over whose line the same 
was being or was transported, the total 
liability thert'for. If any there should be, 
would be the snm of fh·e dollars per hnn-
drf'd 1>000111:1 velght of eald f1·t-lgbt, und 
the same wue receii-ed and &l'CelJtt-<l by de-
fendant and l'hlppe«l by plulntiff on 11uld 
condition. 'l'he flefendant, further un-
swerlng. and as a separate defense, nlle&eed 
that at the dote of shipment by plnl11tlft, 
to-wit, April 8, 1889, In order to obtain 
the benefit of the reduced rate of freight 
charges from the ordinary tariff rote 
charged therPfor, the plaintiff and the De-
troit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway 
Company contracted and agreed In writ-
ing that, in con11i<leratlon of such reduced 
rate11, thP plaintiff, In cuse of any dumage , 
01· loss to eald goods arising by damage 
by fire while nt stutiong or In transit. 
would an1I dlcl release 1:111ld company, end 
each and every other com1>any o\·er whose 
lines ealJ goods might pn111J to deetlne-
tlon, from any und all dumage occurring 
· case would naturally sugi;est, and wblcb I were lll'CesMlhle tu hl111." 1 Greenl. Ev. I § 6li8; l:ihnp11on v. Dall, 3 Wall. 460; John· 
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son v. Arnwine, 42 N. J. Law, 451; Kelsey
v. Hanmer, 18 Conn. 310. Thus, in Mar-
iner v. Saunders, 5 Gilman, 117. the court
say: “From the nature of the subject
there is some dlfiiculty in laying down a
general rule defining the extent nnd vig-
ilance of the search which a party must
make before the court may conclude that;
the paper is destroyed or lost. " As a gen-
eral rule, however, we may say that when,
from the ownership, nature, or ohject of
a pa per, it has properly a particular place of
deposit, or where. from the evidence, it is
shown to have been in a. particular place,
or in particularhands, then that placemust
be searched by the witness proving the
loss, or the person produced into whose
hands it has been traced. The extent of
the search to he made in such place or by
such person mustdcpend in a great degree
upon the circumstances. Ordlnarilyit is
not sufiiclent that the paper is not found
in its usual place of deposit, but all papers
in the office or place should be examined.
()n the whole, the court must be satisfied
that the paper is destroyed. and cannot
he found. it is true the party need not
search every possible place where it might
he found, for then the search might be in-
terminable, bu he in ust search every place
where there a reasonable probability
that it may be found.” This rule is found-
ed on reason and justice, and to require
any less degree ofdillgence would be to de-
feat the object oi’ reducing agreements to
writing. As was said in Rankin v. Crow.
19 Ill. 629: “The party wishing to avail
himself of the benefit of such secondary ev-
idence should be required to make at least
the same effort that is expected the party
would make if he were to lose the benefit
of the evidence if the instrument were not
found.” The degree of diligence which
shall be considered necessary, in any case,
will depend upon the character and im-
portance of the document, and the pur-
poses for which it is expected to he used,
and the place where a paper of that kind
may naturally be supposed to be found.
If the document be a valuable and impor-
tant one, which the owner would be likely
to preserve, a more diligent search will be
required than if the document is of little
or no value. The purposes for which it is
proposed to use it on the trial will also
have an important bearing in determining
the degree of diligence required. if the
cause of action or defense -is founded on
the supposed writing, the party offering
the evidence will be required to show a
greater degree of diligence in the attempt
to produce the original than if it is de-
sired to be used as evidence in some collat-
eral matter. The proof of search and
proof of loss required is always propor-
tionate to the character and value of the
pa per supposed to be lost. Insurance Co.
v. Rosenagle, T7 Pa. St. 514. The exist-
ence and contents of the supposed con-
tract, as well as the claim of defendant
based upon it, is denied by the plaintiff in
the case at bar. 'I‘he~ issue thus being
joined, its execution and contents were
ver_v material to defendant in establishing
its defense. Indeed,defendant seeks to ex-
empt itself from liability solely by reason
of this contract. It admits having rc-
ceived, as a common carrier, plaintiffs
goods. and that while in its possession
they were destroyed, but it seeks to es-
cape liability by virtue of this contract.
it then became of the utmost importance
to both plaintiff and defendant that the
original contract, if such a contract was
made at all, he produced on the trial, so
that there might he no controvers-_v as to
its contents, and that the court might de-
clareits legal effect to the jury. Before
defendant should be permitted to give sec-
ondury evidence of its contents it should
prove that it had exercised the utmost dil-
igence to procure the original, (Smith v.
Cox,9 Or. 327,) and this it failed to do.
No competent evidence whatever was of-
fered to prove any search in the office of
the traffic manager at Chicago, where it
was shown the document was most likely
to be found. All that the witness Watts
said about the supposed search was clear-
ly hearsay and incompetent evidence.
Lawrence v. Fulton, 19 Cal.6S3. It did
not in any way tend to prove that any
effort had been made in the Chicago office
to find the original paper. The testi-
mony of the traffic manager. or some per-
son in his office, having the custody of
such papers, should have been had, or
some proper effort made to obtain it,
showing what efiort,if any,ha.d been made
to find the original.
Indeed, counsel for defendant did not
seriously contend that it had brought
itself within the rule concerning the ad-
mission of secondary evidence, if proof of
the loss of the original is required, but he
claimed that all that was necessary for
defendant. to do was to show that the
original was in the possession of a person
outside of this state, and that no further
proof was required; that, when it showed
that the original contract was in Chicago,
it was entitled to give secondary evidence
of its contents without further proof; and
in support of his position cites the follow-
ing authorities: Burton v. Driggs, 20
Wall. 134; Gordon v. Scaring. 8 Cal. 49;
Beattie v. Hilliard,55 N. H. 428; Brown
v.Woods, 19 lilo.-175; Shepard v.Giddings,
22 Conn. 282: Ralph v. Brown. 3 Watts &
S. 395; Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 232.
The broad doctrine is stated in these au-
thorities that,if hooks or papers necessary
as evidcncein a court in one state be in
the possession of a person living in anoth-
er state. secondar Y evidence, without fur-
ther showing, may be given to prove the
contents of such papers. As we have al-
ready said, in effect, each case must. large-
ly depend on its own particular circum-
stances as to what showing is sufficient in
order to admit secondary evidence of the '
contents of a writing, and the language
used in the cases above cited must be in-
terpreted in the light of the facts of each
case. None of these cases 20 so far as to
hold that; wherea defendant relies upon
the contents of a \\ riting to exempt him-
self from liability, and both the execution
and contents of the supposed writing are
denied, and the alleged writing is shown
to be in the possession of a person outside
of the state, secondary evidence of the con-
tents of such writing is admissible unless
an effort is made to produce it. And, be-
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son v. Arnwine, 42 N. J. Law, 451; Kelsey 
v. Hanmer, 18 Conn. 810. Thus. In .Mar-
iner v. 8aunders, fl Gilman, 117. the court 
say: "From the nature of the subject 
there ls surue difficulty In laying down a 
general rnle defining the extent nnd vlg· 
Hance of the search which a party must 
make before the court may conclude that 
the paper Is tlestru~·ed or lost." As a gen-
eral rule. howe\'l'r, we mfty say that when. 
from the u \vnerMhlp, nature. or ohjl'Ct of 
o po per, it has proprrlyapartlcnlar(Jlm·eof 
clepo1:1lt, or where. 1rum the evillencl', It iK 
shown to hn.t"l' been in a particular place, 
ur In particnlarhnnds, then thnt place m nst 
be Bl'Brt'hed by the witness proving the 
loss, or the person i1roduced into whose 
ha111Js it has hl·en tracl'd. The extent of 
the t<earch to he made In 1rnch place or by 
11uch person must depend in a great degree 
upon the clrcumHtunces. Ordinarily It Is 
not sufficient that the paper Is nut found 
In Its usual place of depuRit, but all papers 
In the offire or place should he examined. 
On the whole, the court must l>e satisfied 
that the paper Is destroyed. and cannot 
he fouud. It is true the party need not 
st>arch every possible place where It might 
he fouud. for then the search might be ln-
terrulmtblP, llut he must search et"eryphtce 
where there I( a 1·t•vt1unbble probability 
that It may l>e found." This rule ls found-
ed on reason and jnstlce, nod to rPqulre 
any let111 degree of diligence would be to de-
feat the object of reducing agreements to 
\Vrltlng. As was said In R1rnkln v. Crow. 
111 Jll. 629: "The party wiRhlng to avail 
himself of tne benefit of each secondary ev-
idence should he required to make at least 
the same effort that ts expected the party 
would mnke If he werl' to loRI' the benefit 
of the evlclence If the instrument were not 
found." Thi'! clegree of dillgPnce which 
shall be conslclered nece11Rary, In any rnse, 
will de11encl uimn the churucter nncl Im-
portance of the document, and the pur-
poHeH r01· which It Is exvet·tpd to he Oiled. 
und the plat•e where a vapn of thut kind 
may naturally be suppuHed to be found. 
If the document be a valuablf' and lmpor· 
tant one, which the owner would l>e likely 
to preserve, a more diligent senrch will be 
required than If the document Is of little 
or uu value. The purposes for which It Is 
proposed to use It on the trial will also 
have ar1 Important bearing In cleterminlng 
the dl'gl'ee of dlllirenc1• requh·ed. If the 
ca use of action or tl<:"fense .Is founclc•d on 
the supposed writing, the party offering 
the evldt>uce will he required to show a 
greater degree of cllllp:cnce In the u tt1•111pt 
to i1rodnce the original than If It Is de-
sired to be used 011 evidence In some collat-
eral mattf'r. The proof of Sl'ltrch and 
proof of los!l required Is always propor-
tiono te to the charncter nnd value of the 
paper 1mppot1ed to be lost. Insurance Co. 
v. Rm1en11gle, i7 Pa. St. 514. 'l'he exilit· 
ence and rontents of the l!UppoRecl t•on-
tract, ae well as the claim or clefen!lnnt 
b1uied upon It, Is deulc<l l>y the pluintiH in 
the rase at bar. 'rhe· lssne thus being joined, its execution and contents wer~ 
t'ery material to <lelenclnnt to establ111hl11g 
lt11 defense. Indeed.defendunt seeks tu ex· 
empt Itself from liability Holely by 1·emmn 
or this contract. It admits having re-
celvt>d, as a common carrier, pht.lntift'tt 
~oodH, and that while In ittf possession 
they were destroyed, but It seeks to es-
cape liability by virtue of this contract. 
Jt then became of the utmost lmportanre 
to both plaintiff and defendant that the 
orlgluul t·ontract, If each a contruct was 
mudo u t all, be produced on the trlul, 1:10 
that there ml~ht he nu contro\·e1·sy as to 
ltK t•untents, aud that the court ml~ht cle· 
C'lnre Its legal cHect to the Jury. Before 
dt>fenilant should be permlttl'd to glt'e sec. 
• ondury evldt>nce of Its contents it shonlcl 
pro\'e that It bud exerclstid tbeutmost dil-
igence to prncure the oril!'inal, (Kmlth v. 
Cox, 9 Or. :127,) and this It failed to do. 
No competent e\•ldence whatever was of-
fered to prove nn.v H«'orch In the office of 
the tra fHc manager n t Chlcuiru, where It 
was shown tue document wos most likely 
to bA found. All that tire witness WattK 
said about the supposed search was cll'ar-
ly hearsay and iocompptent e\•ideuce. 
Lawrence v . .Fulton, 19 Cal. 683. It did 
not In any way tend to prove thu.t any 
eHort lla<l been made In the Chicago offtce 
to find the orl11:lnal paper. The teKti-
mony of the trnlflc mnnagt•r, or 11ome r1er-
sort In his otHee, having the custody of 
such papers, 15hould ha \'e been bud, ur 
Home pruper effort matle to obtain It, 
showlnlo\ what eHort,if any.had been macle 
to flncl the original. 
Indet>d, couu11el for dl'fenclant did not 
seriously contend that It bod brought 
Itself within the rule concerning thl'I ad-
mi11Rion of secondary evlclence, If 11roof of 
the loss of the original Is r·equlre1l, but he 
clnlmed that all thut wa11 ne<·e;;Rary for 
dt'ff'11dant to clo wal! to show that the 
orlglnul was In the pos11es11lon of a person 
out11lde of thls state, and that no fu1·ther 
proof was required; that, when It showl'd 
that the orli.tlnnl contract was In Chkag;o, 
It wuK entitled to give 11eco11dary evidence 
of Its contents without further JJroof; and 
In support :1f his puRltlon cites the follow-
ing authorltlei<: Burton v. Drh?g!l, 20 
Wall. 1:~; Gordon v. Scoring. H Cal. 49; 
Beattle v. Hilliard, 55 N. H. 4:.'8; Brown 
v.Woods, 19 .Mo.475; Shcparcl v.Glchllngs, 
22 Conn. 2S2: Ralph v. Brown. 3 W1.tttH & 
H. :J9a; Gordon v. TWl'l'cly, 74 Ala. 232. 
The broad doctrine Is stn ted In these au-
thorities that, If hook11 or papers ncceHsary 
UH e\•ldence In a court In one state be In 
the poH11eselon of a persun llvln~ In anoth-
er state, 11econdary e\·ld1•m·e. without fur-
ther showing, mny l>e given to pro\'e the 
contents of surh papers. AiJ we hn\'e al-
ready snld, In effect, each cnse mm;t lttrge-
ly clepend on Its own purticular circum-
stance!! os to what showing IH sulflcient In 
Order to admit Se<•uniJury e\'iUt'llCe O( the 
contents of a wrltinic. anil the language 
uRed In thf> col'ieR nl10\·e cited must be in-
tl'rprl'tecl In the light of the facts of each 
case. None of thti11e t•111w11 '1:0 so far as tu 
hold that where a d<'f1·11clont relies upon 
the cuntentH or a "rltlng to l'xempt him-
self from liability, and both the execution 
and contents of the snppoi;ecl writing are 
denied, and the ullegecl writing Is shown 
i:o be In the p11Hse1111lon of u 11erson outHlde 
of the 11ta tP., secnndu ry evlclt•nce of the con-
tPnts of ~uch writing h• uclmlt11ilble m1leKs 
an effort is mude tu prod nee It. AnJ, be-
317 
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sides. the doctrine stated in these authori-
ties is denied by authorities of equal
weigllt. and even by some of the same
courts. '.i‘hns,in Turner v. Yates,16 How.
14, it was held that proof that an in-
voice of goods was in London was not
a sufficient showing to admit secondary
evidence of its contents, in the circuit
court of the United States for the district
of Maryland, the court saying: “Ii the
paper was in the hands of the consignees
in London,secondary evidence was not
admissible: if as parties, they were enti-
tled to notice to produce the paper; if as
third persons, their depositions should
have been taken, or some proper attempt
made to obtain it." To the same effect
are Hoyt v. McNeil, 13 Minn. 394, (Gil.
362;) Dickinson v. Breeden, 25 Ill. 186; Mc-
818
Gregor v. Montgomery, 4 Pa. St. 237;
Whnrt. Ev.§ 130. The rule laid down in
ihe authorities just cited, we think, is
founded on reason and justice, and im-
poses no hardship on the defendant. By
defendant’s own showing the last known
place of deposit of the contract it claims
plaintiff executed was in the office of the
tratiic manager in Chicago, and the law
provides an easyand simple method of
taking the deposition of a witness resid-
. in); out of the state. and his deposition
should have been taken or some proper
effort made to obtain it. The fact that
the person to whose possession the paper
was traced resided out of the state did not
excuse defendant from a diligent effort
to procure it. Judgment of the court be-
low is therefore affirmed.
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sides, thP doctrine stated In theae autborl· 
tlt'S le lll'nled l.Jy 1rnthoritlee of equal 
weight, end even by some of the- snme 
courts. Th1111, lo Tnrn•!r v. Yates, 16 How. 
14, It was held th1tt proof that un in-
voice of ~oocle wus in London was not 
a safflclent showing to admit secondary 
el-ldt>m•e of Its contents, In the circuit 
con rt of the l'nltt-d Sb1tes for the district 
of Maryland, the court saying: "If the 
paper was In the hands of the contd~nees 
In London, secondary e\·ldence was not 
admh1l'lble: If as parties, tht>y were entl·. 
tied to notice to prod ace the paper; if as 
thir1l persons, their dcposltlonl!I should 
have l.Jet>n tekeu, 01· some prop~r attempt 
made to obtain it." To the same effect 
ere Hoyt v. McNeil, IS Minn. ll94, (GU. 
362;) Dickinson v. Breeden, 2i> Ill. 186; Mc-
818 
Gregor v. Montgomery, 4 Pa. St. 237; 
\Vhart. Ev. § mo. The rule laid dtJwn lo 
I he authorities Jast cited, we think, le 
rounded on renson and Justice, nod Im· 
poses no hardship on the defendant. lly 
defonllant'e uwn showing the last known 
plactt of deposit or the COD tract It claims 
plaintiff executed was In the office of the 
tratttc manager in Chicago, and the law 
provides an easy and simple. method of 
takin11: the depu1dtion of a wltnes.,, resid-
inlo( out of the state, and his depo11itloo 
should ha\"e be1m taken or some proper 
erturt made to obtain It. The fact that 
the. person to whoKe possession the paper 
was traced resided out of tile state did not 
~xcuse defendant f1·om a dlliu;ent Pffurt 
to procure It. JudgmPnt of the court 00-
low iB therefore aftirmed. 
SECONDARY EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN CASES.
[Case No. 109
ISLEY v. BOON et al.
(13 S. E. 795, 109 N. C. 555.)
Supreme Court‘ of North Carolina. Nov. 10,
1891.
Appeal from superior court, Alamance.‘
county; Edwin T. Boykin, Judge.
This was an action by Christian lsley
against John Boon and others to try title to
land. There was judgment for defendants.
and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
On the trial it became material for the
plaintiff to produce in evidence the record of
a special proceeding, and the following is so
much of the case stated on appeal for this
court in respect thereto as need be reported:
“The plaintiff then introduced the letters
of administration issued to E. S. Parker up-
on the estate of Samuel Adams, deceased,
issued by the clerk of the superior court of
Alamance county, under his oflicial seal of
the 8th day of November, 1875. The plaintiff
then proposed to show a sale of the laud in
controversy, by E. S. Parker, administrator
of Samuel Adams, deceased, on the 3d day
of April, 1876, (under special proceeding
taken by him in the superior court of Ala-
mance county, for the purpose of creating
assets for the payment of debt of his intes-
tate,) to John Ireland, the last and highest
bidder, and a deed made on the 5th of Janu-
ary, 1881, to the heirs at law of the said John
Ireland, who had theretofore died intestate,
after having paid the whole of the purchase
money for said land to the administrator,
Parker. To establish such special proceed- ,
ings the plaintiff put in evidence two sum-
monses issued by the clerk of the superior
court of Aiamance county under his ofliciai
seal, bearing date of November 27, 1875, en-
titled ‘E. S. Parker, as administrator of Sam-
uel Adams, against John Adams, John Boon
and wife, Robena, Jacob Hicks and wife, ,-
Piety,' commanding the sheriilf to summon
the defendants to appear at the office of the
clerk of the superior court of said county
within twenty-one days after the service of
summons on them, to answer the complaint
to be therein tiled, one of which summonses
was directed to the sheriff of Alamance coun-
ty, and was returned by the sherifl? of said
county as served upon John Boon and wife,
Robena, on the 2-lth of January, 1876. The
other was directed to the sheriff of Forsyth
county, and was returned by the sherit! of
said county on the 2-ith of January, 1876, as y
served on Jacob Hicks and wife, Piety; also
the petition of I}. S. Parker, administrator of
Samuel Adams, deceased, against John
Adams, John Boon and wife, Robena. Jacob
Hicks and wife, Piety, flied in said court,
praying for a license to sell the real estate 1
described in the petition, the same being the
land in controversy in this action, as the
property of Samuel Adams, deceased, to cre- '
ate assets for the payment of the debts of his
intestate, subject to the right of the dower of
the widow of said deceased, which said peti-
tion was verified before the clerk of said
court on the 20th day of January, 1876.
, Plaintiff also introduced an order directing
publication to be made in the Alamance
Gleaner, a paper published in Alamance
county, for six weeks.
“The plaintiff introduced A. Tate, and
showed by him that he was the clerk of the
superior court of Alamance county from 1878
to the first Monday in December, 1890, who
testitied that the two summonses, together
with the_ petition of E. S. Parker, administra-
tor of Samuel Adams, deceased, and the or-
der of publication, which were introduced
by the plaintlflf, were (records) found by him
in the oflice of the superior court of Ala-
mance county. He also proved that W. A.
Albright was his immediate predecessor in
the clerk’s oflice of said county, and that he
well knew his handwriting, and that the
signature to the two summonses, and also to
the verification to the petition and the sig-
nature to the order for publication, were his
handwriting. Witness also testlfled that the
case of E. S. Parker, administrator of Samuel
Adams, deceased, against John Adams, John
Boon and wife, Robena, Jacob Hicks and
wife, Piety, appeared in the summons docket
of said superior court; and, further, that he
had made diligent search in his ottice for the
order of sale, the report of sale, the decree
confirming the sale by E. S. Parker as admin-
istrator to John Ireland, or any other papers
or records belonging to said case in said
oiiice, but was unable to find such. Witness
testilied that he found no other entry of the
case upon docket or records than the state-
ment of the case and the issuing of the sum-
monses. He stated that he found no minutes,
or memorandum, or order upon said records.
“The plaintiff then introduced E. S. Parker,
the administrator of Samuel Adams, deceas-
ed, and, after exhibiting a written notice to
the defendants that the plaintiif would offer
parol evidence of the existence of the rec-
ords and orders and proceedings in the spe-
cial proceeding for the sale of the laud of
the said Samuel Adams, deceased, and the
loss or destruction of said records, and of the
plaintiff's purpose to show the contents
thereof by parol, proposed to prove by him
the issuing of the summonses hereinbefore
mentioned and the fact of the tiling by him-
self, in the ofiice of the clerk of the superior
court, of the petition, hereinbefore mention-
ed, for the sale of land to make assets, and
an order for publication, and that the said pe-
tition and order were in his handwriting, and
signed by him as attorney and petitioner,
and were the original papers they purported
to be. Plaintiif further proposed to prove by
said witness the existence oi’ an order atl-
judging that publication had been made for
the defendant John Adams. a non-resident,
and of a decree of the said court in the said
special proceeding directing him, as the ad-
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SECONDAUY EVIDENCE I~ CElnAIN CASES. [Case No. 109 
ISLEY v. BOON et al. I 
(13 S. E. 79C>, 109 N. O. 555.) 
Supreme Court· of North Carolina. Nov. 10, ! 
the widow of said deceased, which said peti-
tion was verlfied before the clerk of said 
court on the 20th day of January, 18i6. 
l'lnlntlff also lntrodnl'ed an order directing 
publication to be made In the Alamance 
Gleaner, a paper publi11hed in Alamance 
county, for six weeks. 
1891. i 
Appeal from superior court, Alamance , 
county; Edwin T. Boykin, Judge. 
This was an action by Christian Isley 
ugalnst John Boon and others to try title to 
land. There was Judgment for defendants. 
and plalntltr appeals. Reversed. 
On the trial It became material for the 
plalntlfr to produce in evldtmce the record of 
a special p1·o<'eedlng, and the following Is so 
much of the case stated on appeal for this 
court In respect thereto as need be repo1ted: 
'"rhe plalntltr then Introduced the letters 
of administration Issued to E. S. Plll'ker up-
on the estate of Samuel Adame, deceased, 
Issued by the clerk of the superior court of 
Alamance county, wider his otttclal seal of 
the 8th day of November, 1875. The plalntitr 
then proposed to show a sale of the land in 
controversy, by 1'J. 8. Parker, administrator 
of Samuel Adams, deceased, on the 3d day 
ot AprU, 18i6, (under special proceeding 
taken by him in the superior court of Ala-
mance county, for the purpos1: of creating 
assets for the payment of debts of his Intes-
tate,) to John Ireland, the last and highest 
bidder, and a deed made on the 5th of Janu-
ary, 1881, to the heirs at law of the said John 
Ireland, who had theretofore died intestate, 
after ha\·lng paid the whole of the purchase 
money for said land to the administrator, 
Parker. To establish such special proceed-
lnge the plalntltr put In evidence two sum-
monses l118ued by the clerk of the superior 
court of Alamance county under hie otnclal 
seal, bearing date of November 27, 1875, en-
titled 'E. S. Parker, as administrator of Sam-
uel Adame, against John Adame, John Boon 
and wlte, Robena, Jacob Hicks and wife, 
Piety,' commanding the eherltr to summon 
the defendants to appear at the office of the 
clerk of the superior court of said county 
within twenty-one days after the service of 
summons on them, to answer the complaint 
to be therein flied, one of whleh 11ummonses 
was directed to the sheriff of Alaman<'e coun-
ty, and was returned by the sheriff of said 
county as served upon John Boon and wife, 
Robena, on the 24th of January, 1876. The 
other wa.s directed to the sheriff of Forsyth 
county, and was returned by the sheriff of 
said county on the 24th of January, 1876, as 
served on Jacob Hicks and wife, Piety; also 
the petition of E. S. Parker, administrator of 
Samuel Adams, deceased, against John 
Adams, John Boon and wife, Holwnu. Jacob 
Hicks and wife, Piety, tlled In 11ald court, 
praying for a license to sell the renl estate 
descrilwd In the petition, the same being the 
land In controversy in this action, as the 
property of Samuel Adnms, deceused, to cre-
ate assets for the payment of the dehts of bis 
Intestate, subject to the right of the dower of 
"The plaintiff Introduced A. Tate, and 
showed by him that he was the clerk of the 
superior court of Alamance county from 1878 
to the drst Monday in December, 1890, who 
testified that the two summonses, together 
with the_ petition of E. S. Porker, administra-
tor of Samuel Adams, deceased, and the or-
der of publication, which were Introduced 
by the plalntltr, were (records) found by him 
In the office of the superior court of Alu-
mauce county. He also proved that W. A. 
Albright was his Immediate predecessor In 
the clerk's otllce of said county, and that he 
well knew his handwriting, and that the 
signature to the two summonses, and al110 to 
the verlflcatlon to the petition and the sig-
nature to the order for publication, were his 
handwriting. Witness also testified that the 
case of E. 8. Parker, administrator of Samuel 
Adams, deceased, against John Adams, John 
Boon and wife, Robena, Jacob Hicks and 
wife, Piety, appeared In the summons docket 
of sald superior court; and, further, that he 
had made diligent search in his office for the 
order of sale, the report of sale, the decree 
confirming the sale by E. S. Parker as admin-
istrator to John Ireland, or any other papers 
or records belonging to Bald case In aid 
otnce, but was unable to find such. Witness 
testified that he found no other entry of the 
case upon docket or records than the state-
ment of the case and the Issuing of tile sum-
monses. He stated that he found no minutes, 
or memorandum, or order upon said records. 
"The plalntltr then introduced E. S. Parker, 
the administrator of Samuel Adams, deceas-
ed, and, after exhibiting a written notice to 
the defendants that the plaintiff would offer 
parol evidence of the existence of the rec-
ords and orders and proceedings In the spe-
cial proceeding for the sale of the laud of 
the said Samuel Adams, deceased, and the 
loss or destruction of said reeords, and of the 
plalntllI's purpose to show the contents 
thereof by parol, proposed to prove by him 
tht> 1~1mlng ot the summonses be1-einbefore 
mt>ntioned and the fact of the filing hy him-
self, in the otnce of the clerk of the supel"lor 
court, of the petition, herelnbefore mention-
ed, for the sale of land to make as11ets, and 
' an order for publication, and that the said pe-
tition and order were in his handwriting, and 
signed by him as attorney and petltlont>r, 
and were the original pnpers they purportt>d 
to be. Plaintiff further proposed to prove by 
snld witness the existence of an order ad-
judging that publication had been made for 
' the defendant .John Adnms. u non-resilient, 
and of a decree or the 11nid court In the 11altl 
special proceeding directing him, as the ad-
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ministrator of Samuel Adams, to sell the
land described in his petition at public auc-
tion at the court-house in Graham, to the
highest bidder, for cash, after duly adver-
tising the same, and that the proceeds of the
sale be assets in his hands for the payment
ot debts; it being adjudged that there was
no personal estate of said intestate with
which to pay debts; also that he made said
sale, after due advertisement, on the 3d day
of April. 1876, at the court-house in Graham,
when and where John Ireland became the
purchaser at the price of $-'>0.‘."»il, and paid the ‘
purchase money down, and that he made no
report ot’ said sale to the court; also a de-
cree ot the court made, confirming said re-
port aud sale, and directing the said admin-
istrator to make title in fee to the purchaser;
and further proposed to prove by said wit-
ness that, the said John Ireland having died
soon thereafter, after having paid for said
land, he made and executed a title deed to .
the heirs at law of the said John Ireland, de-
ceased, being the grantors named in the said
administi-ator’s deed, which deed was made
on the 5th ot January, 1881. And plaintiff
further proposed to prove by said Parker -
that he afterwards saw on several occasions
said special proceeding, petition, and other
orders. order of sale, report of sale, and de-
cree contirming said sale, etc., in the clerk‘s
otfice as records ot said court, and knew that
all of said orders did exist and were on file
in said otlice, and that diligent search has
been made since in said oflice for them. Up-
on objection by the defendants to the pro-
posed evidence of the witness E. S. Parker,
as hereinbefore set forth, the court sustained
the said objection, and refused the proposed
evidence, to which ruling of the court the
plaintifl’ excepted. The plaintlfi’ then pro-
posed to introduce in evidence the deed ex-
ecuted by E. S. Parker, administrator of
Samuel Adams, to J. R. Ireland. W. Ii‘. Ire-
land, Samuel Ireland, \V. S. Caffey and wife,
Caroline, C. Isley and wife, Louisa. i’or the
land in controversy, bearing date 5th day of
January, 1831, which deed has been duly
proven and registered, and insisted upon the
title derived from said deed. as well as re-
citals containcd therein, as evidence of the
existence of the record and other proceed-
ings recited in said deed under the law and
the maxim, ‘omnia praesumuntur rite esse
at-ta.’ The court, upon objection of the de-
fendants, refuscd to admit the evidence offer-
ed. and the plalntifl! excepted. Upon the in-
320
tlmatiou of the court the plaintiff submitted
to a nonsuit and appealed."
L. M. Scott, for appellant. J. A. Long, W.
P. Bynum, Jr., and Batchelor & Devereux.
for appellees.
‘.\II€l{lli.\[0I\', C. J. The evidence proposed
and i'e_iected on the trial must be accepted
for the present purpose as true, because it
was material; and, it it had been submitted
to the jury, they might have believed and so
treated it. The facts showed that material
parts of the record of the special proceeding
referred to had been lost or destroyed. The
clerk of the court. the proper custodian of
the record, made diligent search in his office
tor such parts oi‘ it as were alleged to have
been lost, and he was unable to find them.
It must be taken that he made such search
where, regularly, they ought to be, and gen-
erally through his otiice, where he might
hope to find them. He failed to find them. it
they ever existed. They were lost or de-
stroyed. It is not suggested that they were
not, nor did the court found its opinion upon
such supposition. Then, it the parts of the
record specified were lost or destroyed. it
was clearly competent to prove on the trial
by secondary evidence such loss or destruc-
tion. and also what the nature, meaning. and
purport of such lost parts were. It has been
so expressly decided. In .\Iobley v. \Vatts,
98 N. C. 28-l, 3 S. E. 677, Justice Davis said:
“If the record i lost. and is ancient, its ex-
istence and contents may sometimes be pre-
sumed; but, whether it be ancient or re
cent. after proof of the loss its contents may
be proved, like any other document, by sec-
ondary evidence, wliere the case does not
from its nature disclose the existence oi‘
other and better evidence." This case. it
seems to us, plainly comes within what is
said and decided in the case just cited. ln-
decd. it is well settled that where the record
is lost, that it existed, and its purpose and
contents, may be proven, on the trial of any
action where it becomes material, by second-
ary evidence. The loss or destruction of the
record should, however, be made to appear
clearly before receiving such secondary evi-
dence. Stanly v. Massingill, 63 N. C. £1.18;
Yonnt v. .\iiller, 91 N. C. 331; Hare v. Hollo-
man, 94 N. C. 1-i. There is error. The judg-
ment of nonsuit must be set aside, and the
case disposed of according to law. To that
end let this opinion be certified to the supe-
rior court. It is so ordered.
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mlnlstrntor of Samuel Adams, to sell the 
land desc•ribed In his petition at public auc-
tion at the court-house In Graham, to the 
highest bidder, tor casb, after duly adver-
tising the some, and that the proceeds of the 
sale be 11ssets In bis hands for the payment 
of debts; It being adjudged that there was 
no personal estate of said Intestate with 
which to pay debts; also that he made 1111ld 
sale, after due advertisement, on the 3d day 
oC April. 1870, at the court-house ln Oraham, 
when u111I wht>re John lrelnn<l bt'l·uwe the 
put'l·bu11c•r nt tht> prl<'e of $:"10.r10, and paid the 
purchase money down, and that be made no 
rt>port of said sale to the court; also a de-
c1-ee of the court made, con11.rmlng said re-
port and sale, and directing the said admin-
istrator to make title ln ree to the purchnse1·; 
and further proposed to prove by said wit-
ness that, the said .Tohn Ireland having died 
aoon thereafter, after having paid for said 
land, be made and executed a title deed to 
the beh·s at law of the said John Ireland, de-
ceOBed, being the grnntors named In the said 
admlnlstl'Stor's deed, which deed was made 
on the 5th of January, 1881. And plalntur 
further proposed to prove by said Parker 
that be afterwords saw on several ocenslons 
said special procet'<llng, petition, and other 
orders. order of sale, report of sale, and de-
cree coulirmlng said sale, etc., In the clerk's 
otftce OJI records of said court, and knew that 
all of said orders did exist and were on 11.le 
In snld oft\ce, and that diligent search bas 
been made since In said otftce for them. Up-
on objection by the defendants to the pro-
posed evidence of the witness I<~. S. Parker, 
ns berelnbt'fore set forth, the <'OUrt 11ustalned 
the said obje<'tlon, and refused the proposed 
evidence, to which ruling of thr c·ourt the 
11lalntllf eX<'l'llted. The plnlntllf then pro-
posed to lntrodu<'e fn e\"ldenee the deed ex-
ecuted by K S. Parker, admlnlstrntor of 
Samuel Adams, to J. R. Ireland, W. F. Ire-
land, Samuel Ireland, W. S. Cnft't>y an<l wife, 
Caroline, C. Isley and wife, I.<mhm. tor the 
land In controYersy, bearing date 5th <lny of 
Janu11ry, 18.'il, which dN>d hos been duly 
proven and rt>glstered, and Insisted upon the 
title derived from said deed. u!I well as re-
citals contained then•ln, a11 evldenl'e of the 
exlsten<'e of the reeord an<l other prO<'Ped-
lngs re<'ltt•d In said deed umler the law and 
the maxim, •omnla prresumuntur rite esse 
1wtn.' The court, upon objec•tlon of the de-
fendants, refused to admit the evidence offer-
ed, and the plalntllr excepted. Upon the ln-
:l20 
tlmatlon of the court the plalntltr submitted 
to a nonsuit and appealed.·• 
L. ll. Scott, for appellant. J. A. Long, W. 
P. Hynum, Jr., and Bat<'helor & Devert>ux. 
for nppellt"e8. 
:\UmHDION', 0. J. The evlclence propo11ed 
and rejectt>d on the trial must be accepted 
for the pre11ent purpose ae true, because It 
, was material; and, If It had been submitted 
to the Jury, they might have believed and so 
treutt'd It. The facts showed that muterlal 
pu rts of the record of the special proceeding 
referred to had been lost or destroyed. The 
clerk of the court, the proper custodian of 
the record, made diligent search In his oftke 
for su<'h 11arts or It as were al11>ged to hove 
been 1011t, and he was unable to find them. 
It must be taken that be made such search 
where, regularly, they ought to be, and gen-
erally through hls otftce, where he might 
hope to find them. Ile tailed to 11.nd them, If 
th<•y ever existed. They were lost or de-
stroyed. It ls not suggested that they were 
not, nor did the court found Its opinion upon 
such supposition. Then, If the parts of the 
record sp<'<'ltted were lost or destroyed, It 
was clearly competent to prove on the trial 
by s('(•ondary evldt>nce such 1068 or destru<'-
tlon. and also what the nature, meaning. and 
purport of SU<'b lost parts were. It has been 
so expressly <leclded. In :\Iobley v. Watts, 
08 :S. C. 281, 3 S. E. 677, Justice Davis said: 
"If the record ls lost, and le ancient, Its ex-
istence and contents may sometimes be pre-
sumed; but, whether It be ancient or re-
cent, after proof of the loss Its contents IWl1 
be proved, like any other document, by sec-
ondary evidence, where the c•ase does not 
from Its nature disclose the existence of 
other and better evidence." This case, It 
seems to us, plainly <'onie11 within what ls 
Mid and de<•lded In the <'m;e just cited. In-
deed, It Is well settil>d that where the record 
ls lost, that It existed, and Its purpose and 
contents, may be proven, on the trial of any 
a<'tlon "'here It becomes material, by seeond-
ary evldenct>. The loss or destruction ot tilt> 
record shoulcl. how<'ver, be made to appear 
<'lt'arly before re<'Clvlng su<'h secondary evl-
denee. ~tnnly v. Musiodnglll, u.'i N. C. ;,;-.._<;; 
Yount v. lllller, 91 X. C. :{:Jl; Hare v. Hollo-
man. 94 :S. C. H. There ls error. The Judg-
ment of nonsuit must be set aside, and tht> 
case dl~posed of R<'<'Ordlni;: to law. To that 
end let this opinion be certified to the supe-
rior court. It ls so ordered. 
DEGREES OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
[Case No. 110
GOODRICH v. WESTON.
(102 Mass. 362.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
\Vorcester. Oct. Term, 1869.
(J. H. B. Snow, for plaintiffs. G. A. Tor-
rey, for defendant.
\\"I'}I.LS, J’. The defendant, by giving no-
tice to produce the original letters written by
him to the plaintiffs, had entitle.d himself to
prove their contents by secondary evidence.
He produced copies, made by his wife from
his letter book, into which the originals
had been first copied by a machine press;
and testified that he had compared these
copies with those in the letter book, and that
they were correct. He also testlfied that he
deposited the originals in the postofiice, di-
rected to the plaintiffs. The offer to send
for the letter book, and produce it in court, if
deired, must be taken at least to relieve the
defendant from any suspicion that the letter
book was improperly kept back. The objec-
tion to the admissibility of the copies stands,
therefore, strictly upon the legal ground stat-
ed, namely, “that they were not copies of
the originals, and that the letter book itself
would be the best evidence."
Whenever a copy of a record or document
is itself made original or primary evidence,
the rule is clear and well settled that it must
be a copy made directly from or compared
with the original. If the first copy be lost,
or in the hands of the opposite party, so
long as another may be obtained from the
same source, no ground can be laid for re-
sorting to evidence of an inferior or second-
ary character. The admission of a transcript
wn.oL's,nv.-21
from the record of a deed or other private
writing, for the record of which provision is
made by law, is not an exception to, but only
a modification of, the same rule. But when
the source of original evidence is exhausted,
and resort is properly had to secondary proof,
the contents of private writings may be prov-
ed like any other fact, by indirect evidence.
The admissibility of evidence oflfered for this
purpose must depend upon its legitimate ten-
dency to prove the facts sought to be proved,
and not upon the comparative weight or
value of one or another form of proof. The
jury will judge of its weight, and may give
due consideration to the fact that a less sat-
isfactory form of proof is offered while a
more satisfactory one exists and is withheld,
or not produced when it might have been
readily obtained. But there are no degrees
of legal distinction in this class of evidence.
Although there has been much diversity of
practice, and the decisions are tar from uni-
form, more frequently turning upon special
circumstances and facts than upon a general
principal. the tendency of authority is, as
we think, towards the establishment of the
rule here stated. 2 Phil. Ev. (4th Am. Ed.)
568; 1 Green]. Ev. §§ 8-L. 582; Stetson v.
Gulliver, 2 Cush. 494; Robertson v. Lynch,
18 Johns. 451; Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. 663;
Brown v. Woodman, 6 Car. & P. 206; Doe v.
Ross, 7 Mees. & W. 102.
In this case the letter book. it produced,
would have been only secondary evidence.
We are satisfied that the copies, admitted by
the court below, were suflicientiy verified to
justify their admission as competent evi-
dence of the contents of the original letters.
Exceptions overruled.
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• DEGREES OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE. [Case No. 110 
GOODRICH v. WESTON. 
(102 M888. 362.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Ma1181lchusetta. 
W orceeter. Oct. Term, 1869. 
O. H. B. 8now, ,for plaintltrs. G. A. Tor-
rey, tor defendant. 
WELLS, J. The defendant, by giving no-
tice to produce the original letters written by 
him to the plalntUfs, hnd entitled hlmselC to 
prove their contents by secondary evidence. 
He produced copies, made by hie wife from 
his letter book, Into which the originals 
had been 11rst copied by a machine press; 
and testlfted thnt he had compared these 
copies with those in the letter book, and that 
they were correct. He also tesUfted that he 
deposited the originals ID the postotllce, di· 
rected to the plalnUtrs. The otrer to send 
for the letter book, and produce It In court, 1f 
desired, must be taken at least to relieve the 
defendant from any suspicion tllat the letter 
book was Improperly kept back. The objec-
tion to the admlBBlblllty of the copies stands, 
therefore, strictly upon the legal ground stat-
ed, namely, "that they were not copies of 
the orbdnale, and that the letter book lteelf 
would be the beet evidence." 
Whenever a copy of a record or document 
le Itself made original or primary evidence, 
the rule Is clear and well settled that It mUttt 
be a copy made directly from or compared 
with the original. It the ftrst copy be lost, 
or In the hands of the opposite party, so 
long aa another may be obtained from the 
same source, no irround can be laid for re-
sorting to evidence of an Inferior or seC'ond-
ary cbamcter. The admlBBton of a transcript 
WJLGCB,KV.-21 
from the record of a deed or other private 
wrltlng, tor the record of which pro'flelon ls 
made by law, la not an exception to, but only 
a modification of, the same rule. But when 
the source of original evidence 18 exhausted, 
and resort 18 properly had to secondary proof, 
the contents of private writings may be prov-
ed like any other fact, by Indirect evidence. 
The admissibility of evidence offered for thla 
purpose must depend upon Its legitimate ten-
dency to prove the facts sought to be proved, 
and not upon the comparative weight or 
value of one or another form of proof. The 
jury will judge of Its weight, and may give 
due consideration to the fact that a less sat-
isfactory form of proof la oitered while a 
more satisfactory one exists and Is withheld, 
or not produced when It might have been 
readily obtained. But there are no degree11 
of legal distinction In this class of evidence. 
Although there has been much diversity of 
practice, and the declslona are far from uni-
form, more frequently turning upon special 
circumstances and facts than upon a general 
prln<'lpal, the tendency of authority Is, ae 
we think, towards the establishment of the 
rule here statccl. 2 Phil. Ev. (4th Am. Ed.) 
568; 1 Greenl. Ev. H &l. 582; Stetson v. 
Gulliver, 2 Cush. 404; Robertson v. Lynch, 
18 Johns. 4iil; Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. 663; 
Brown v. Woodman, 6 Car. & P. 206; Doe v. 
Ro88, 7 Mees. & W . 10'.l. 
In this case the letter book. If produced, 
would have been only secondary evidence. 
We are eatlafled that the copies, admitted by 
the court below, were eutDclently verified to 
justify their a(lmtsslon ae competent evl-
dcuce of the CO'ltente of the original letters. 
Exceptions overruled. 
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Case No. 111]
PROOF.
FORD et al. v. CUNNINGHAM et al. (No.
12,044.)
(25 Pac. -103. 87 Cal. 209.)
Supreme Court of California. Dec. 20, 1890.
Department 1. Appeal from superior
court, Santa Cruz county; F. J. i\IcCann,
Judge.
J. M. Lesser, Spalsbury & Burke, and
Garber,B0alt& Blshop,fora_opellants. A.
S. Kittridp,-c, for respondents.
PER CURIAM. The only question liti-
gated in the court below was whether
the barley was sold by the plaintiffs to
the defendant Cunningliani, or to the firm
of Cunningham & Co., of which he was a
member. The appellants contend that
the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings, but we think there was sufficient
evidence on behalf of the defendants to
create a. substantial conflict, and under
the well-established rule we should not in-
terfere with the findings of fact.
The plaintiffs, to establish their case
against the copartnership, relied mainly
on documentary evidence, some of which
they claimed was in possession of the de-
fendants, who were asked at the trial to
produce the same. Mr. Morey, one of the
plaintiffs, was permitted by the court to
state the contents of certain bills and let-
ters which he claimed had been addressed
and sent to Cunningham & Co. Objec-
tion was made by the defendants to the
introduction of oral testimony as to the
contents of the bills and letters, and the
objection was overruled. We think the
court erred in its ruling. The witness
322
stated that he had no personal knowledge
that the communications addressed to
Cunningham & (lo. were mailed. except
that copies thereof appeared in the plain-
tiffs‘ copy-book, and that it was a general
custom of his firm to placeietters in a box
in the store, from which they were taken
to the post-office. No foundation, there-
fore, was laid for the introduction of the
evidence. Assuming that secondary evi-
dence could under such circumstances be
introduced, the press copies were the best
evidence next to the originals themselves.
The ruling was on a material matter, be-
cause the defendants testifled that they
never received the communica tions referred
go. Braiisford v. Williams, 74 Amer. Dec.
62.
Mr. Middleton, one of the defendants,
was called as a witness. and identified the
ledger of the copartnership, showing the
account of Ford & Co. with Cunningham
& Uo. from September 1, 18%. to the date
of trial. It was admitted by the plain-
tiffs that the entries therein were original
entries, but they objected to the introduc-
tion of the same as evidence on theground
that it was irrelevant, immaterial, and
incompetent. The objection was sus-
tained by the court. to which ruling the
defendants excepted. There was no item
of barley in the account offered. The rul-
ing, we think, was error. The witness
had stated that the ledger showed the
true state of account between plaintiffs
and defendants, and that the items had
been entered by him at the time of the sev-
eral transactions therein mentioned. Lah-
dis v. 'l‘nrner, 14 Cal. 573. Judgment and
order reversed, and cause remanded for
a new trial.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
08
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
• 
Case No. 111] PROOF. 
FORD et al. v. CUXNINGHAM et al. (No. 
12,044.) 
(25 Pac. 403, 87 Cal. 209.) 
Supreme Court of California. Dec. 20, 1890. 
Department 1. Appeal from lilUflerlor 
rourt, Santa Cruz county; F. J. Mcl'unn, 
Judge. 
J. M. Lel!Rer, Spall1bury & Bnrke, and 
Garber, Boa It & BIHhop, for appellants. A. 
S. KittrtdgP., for respondeotll. 
PER CURIAM. The only 11ue11tlon liti-
gated in the court below was whether 
the bar)ey was sold by the plnlntiffH to 
the defendant Cunningham, or to the fl rm 
of Cunningham & Co., of which be was a 
member. The appellants contend that 
the evidence is insutficlent to snprwrt the 
findlng11, but we think there was Rutflclcnt 
evidence on behalf of the derendauts to 
create a subRtnntlal conflict, and under 
the well-eMtahllshed rule we should not In-
terfere with the findings of fart. 
The plaintiffs, to eHtal.Jlh1h tht:ir ca11e 
against the copartnershlp, relied mainly 
on documentary evidence, some of which 
they claimed was In posice!lslon of the de-
fendants, who were al'lkej at tbe trlnl to 
;1roduce the same. Mr. Morey, one of the 
plaintiffs, was permittPd by the court to 
Rtate tbe contents of certain bills and let-
tPrH which he claimed had been addrt>s11ed 
aml sent to Cunningham & Co. Objec-
tion wns made by the defendantR to tbe 
m trolluction of oral testimony as to the 
.~onte>nb1 of the bills and l~tters, and the 
ubjet•tlun was overruled. We think tbe 
eourt erred in Its ruling. The witness 
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etated that be had no penonal knowledge 
that the comu1uuicatlons addressed to 
Cunningham & Co. were malled, except 
thut copies thereof app~ared in the platn-
tlfft1' co11.v-book, and that It was a general 
custom of his flrm to µlace letters in a bo:c 
in the sto1·e, from which they were taken 
to tbe post-otflce. No founlla.tlon, there-
fore, was laid for the introduction of the 
evldem:e. Ast1umlng that secondal'y evi-
dence could unller such clrcumi;1tances be 
Introduced, the i1retts copies were the betit 
e\•l<lence next tQ the 01·lglot1ls themselveH. 
The ruling was on a material matter, be-
cause the defendants testified that they 
neverrecelverl tbecomruunic11tlons referred 
to. Brailsford v. Williams, 74 Amer. Dec. 
562. 
Mr. l\Ilddleton, one of the defendant.s. 
was called as a. wltm~ss, ancl identlfled the 
ledgt!r of the copartuershlp, showing the 
nccuunt of Ford & Co. with Cunningham 
& Oo. from Septl'mber 1, 18"14, to the date 
of trial. It wus admitted by the plain-
tiffs that the entries therein were original 
en triPB, hut they objl'Cted to the introllue-
tlon of the same as evldencl'on theground 
that it wus irrelevant, lmmateria!, and 
incompetent. 'fhe objection was sus-
tained by the court. to which ruling tbe 
defendants excepted. There was no item 
of barley In the account offered. The rul-
ing, we think, was error. The witness 
had stA.ted that the ledger showed the 
true state of account betwePn plaintiffR 
and defendants, and that the Items bad 
been entered by him at the time of the sn-
eral transnctlons therein mentior.ed. Lan-
dis v. 'l'nrner, 14 Cal. 1">78. Judgment and 
order reversed, and cause remanded for 
a new trial. 
DEGREES OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
[Case No. 112
CORNETT v. WILLIAMS.
(20 Wall. 226.)
Supreme Court of the United States.
1873.
Error to the circuit court of the United
States for the Western district of Texas.
C. S. West, G. F. Moore, and John Han-
cock, i'or plaintiff in error. A. J. Hamilton,
J. A. Buchanan, and Mr. Jackson, for de-
fendant in error.
Oct.,
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opin-
ion of the court.
There was no error in admitting in evi-
dence the two depositions of H. H. Williams.
The objections that he was a party to the
record, and interested in the event of the
suit, were obviated by the third section of
the act of July 2, 1864. 13 Stat. 351. He
was thus placed upon a footing of equality
with all other witnesses, and it was compe-
tent for him to testify in the case orally or
by deposition. The depositions were taken
and certified in conformity to the thirtieth
section of the act of 1789. 1 Stat. 89. If the
deponent was not satisfied with his first
deposition, he had the right to give a second
one. No order of the court was necessary in
either case. The only objections insisted up-
on are that the statute does not authorize a
party to testify by deposition if h_e can oral-
ly, and that if he can by deposition, the right
was exhausted by the first one, and that
the second one was taken without authority
of law. Both objections are without founda-
tion. The statute is remedial and to be con-
strued liberally. We are aware of no case
in which it has been held that where a wit-
ness has given one deposition in an action
at law, he cannot for that reason give un-
other without the sanction of the court.
Such a proposition has the support of nei-
ther principle nor authority.
The instruction given to the jury touch-
ing the trust deeds executed by W. H. and
J. H. Williams to Wildbahn, the notes they
were given to secure, and the sale by Cor-
nett of the slaves, which was in part the
consideration of the notes, was well war-
ranted by thc state of the evidence and was
correct. It was objected to only upon the
ground that the evidence did not tend to
prove that the slaves were removed from
Missouri to Texas for the purpose of selling
them in the latter state, and that hence the
instruction, even if correct as matter of law,
was, with reference to the case, an abstrac-
tion, and must necessarily have had the ef-
fect of confusing and misleading the minds
of the jury. An examination of the record
has satisfied us that the evidence was abun-
dantly suiflcient to raise the question of in-
tent in the removal of the slaves, and to
make it the duty of the court to say to the
Jury what was said upon the subject. It is
not objected that the rule of law was not
-1-orroctly stated.
. accomplished.
What was done in the suit between Cor-
nett and J. H. and W. H. Williams in no
wise affected the rights of H. H. Williams in
this action. The marshal seized the prem-
ises, and Cornett gave a replevin bond pur-
suant to the statute of Texas. While the
property was in the hands of the marshal it
was in the custody of the law. When Cor-
nett gave the bond the premises passed from
the custody of the law into his possession,
and they were in his possession when this
suit was instituted. The bond was given to
enable him to eifect that result, and it was
The bond took the place of
the property and represented it. The prem-
ises were as much in his possession as if
no litigation was pending and he had ac-
quired possession in some other way. The
3 defendant in error, having declined to be-
‘ come a party to that suit, everything done
in it was, so far as he was concerned, res
inter alios acta.
The secondary proof of the judgment in
favor of H. H. Williams, against Samuel M.
Williams, was properly admitted. The origi-
nal record was destroyed by fire in the year
1862. The proof in question consisted of a
copy of a copy of the judgment, the latter
duly certified by the clerk of the court by
whom the judgment was rendered. It was
proved that the certified copy had been de-
stroyed. The judgment in question was re-
covered upon a prior judgment in favor of
the same plaintlfl against the same defend-
ant. There was evidence tending to show
that a certified copy of the latter existed,
but it was not positive. There-was no proof
of the existence of such a copy of the judg-
ment sought to be proved. There was a dis-
crepancy as to a single word in the copy
offered in evidence. It set forth that the
clerk had assessed the damages at “forty-
three thousand nine hundred and sixty-six
dollars and thirty-four cents, and that it
was, therefore, considered by the court that
the plaintiff recover of the defendant the
sum of forty-three thousand nine hundred
and thirty-six dollars and thirty-four cents,"
&c. It was satisfactorily proved aliunde
that thirty, instead of sixty, was correct, the
latter being a mistake of the copyist.
The principle established by this court as
to secondary evidence in cases like this is,
that it must be the best the party has it in
his power to produce. The rule is to be so
applied as to promote the ends of justice and
guard against fraud, surprise, and imposi-
tion.1 The copy here in question was prop-
erly admittedfl This court has not yet gone
the length of the English adjudications,
which hold, without qualification, that 'there
are no degrees in secondary evidencefi
The act of congress of March 3, 18T1,4 pro-
1 Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 59;;
1 Greenl. Ev. § 84. and note.
2 \Vinn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. 676.
I Doe d. Gilbert v. Ross, 7 Mees. & W. 106.
4 16 Stat. 47-i, c. 111.
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Case N 0. 112]
PROOF.
vides for putting in a permanent form proof
of the contents of judicial records lost or
destroyed, such proof to take the place of
the original records for all purposes. The
statute of Texas upon the subject of proof
in cases of lost records,“ has also been re-
ferred to in this connection. There is noth-
lug in either the act of congress or the stat-
ute in conflict with the action of the court
we have been considering.
The most important question in the case
relates to the proceedings of the county
court of Galveston county, touching the sale
and conveyance of the premises in contro-
versy by the administrator of Samuel M.
Williams to H. H. Williams. The plaintiffs
in error insist that those proceedings were
coram non judice and void. The defendant
in error maintains that they were regular
and valid, and that if there be any error or
defect, the court having had jurisdiction, its
proceedings could not be collaterally assail-
ed upon the trial of this cause in the court
below. This renders it necessary to exam-
ine the case in this aspect. The record shows
the following facts: On the 28th of June,
1850, H. H. \Villiams recovered in the dis-
trict court of the United States held at Gai-
veston, against Samuel M. Williams, then
living, a judgment for $26,736. And on the
12th of July, 1858. another Judgment for the
sum of $43,936.34. The second judgment was
founded upon the first one, and was for the
principal and interest due upon the latter.
At the January term, 1866, of the Galveston
county court, H. H. Williams. by his coun-
sel, applied for an order that the administra-
tor of Samuel M. Williams be cited to ap-
pear and show cause why "he should not
make application to the court for an order
to sell enough of the property of said es-
tate to pay a judgment obtained by the said
Henry Williams against the said Samuel M.
Williams, to the amount of $40,000; which
said judgment was allowed and approved as
a valid claim against said estate, in October,
1859, with eight per cent. interest per an-
num,” &c.
The administrator appeared at the same
term, and answered that the plaintiff recov-
ered the judgment first hereinbefore mention-
ed; that it was presented for allowance
against the estate with the usual aflidavit
and allowed; that he could not say whether
it was approved by the chief justice of Gal-
veston county; that it had never been paid,
and that the reason he had taken no meas-
ures to pay it was that the plaintiff had told
him that, being against his brother, he did
not intend to enforce it. The court there-
upon, at the same term, made an order as
follows:
"On this day came on to be heard in this
cause the motion of Henry Williams, by his
agent, J. H. Williams, asking that the ad-
ministrator be required to sell sufficient prop-
-'- Pasch. Dig. art. 4969.
erty of the estate to pay a certain judgment
obtained by the said Henry in the United
States district court, on the 28th day of June,
A. D. 1850, for the sum of twenty-six thou-
sand seven hundred and thirty-six dollars,
with interest from date of rendition; and it
appearing to the court that this claim has
been duly allowed, and that the administrator
has no funds in hand whatever to pay the
same, it is ordered that he make sale of suiti-
cient property in pursuance of the prayer of
the motion. And the administrator having
designated the following piece of property, it
is ordered that he shall make public sale of
one league of land, situated,” &.c.
The premises in controversy were then de-
scribed, the mode and time of advertising,
and the place and terms of the sale were
prescribed and the administrator was directed
“to make due report of his action in the
premises to the court.” On the 15th of
March, 1866, the administrator reported that,
pursuant to the order of the court, after due
notice according to law, he had offered the
premises for sale at public auction, at the
time and place required by law, and that
they were struck off and sold to Henry H.
Williams, for the sum of $6().00O, on a credit
of twelve months, secured by a vendor’s lien;
that Williams was the highest and best bid-
der. and that the price was a reasonable one.
At the March term the court confirmed the
report and ordered the administrator to make
a deed to the purchaser, upon his complying
with the terms of the sale. On the 15th of
April, 1866, the administrator gave a receipt
to the purchaser for $60,600, being the amount
of the purchase-money with ten per cent. in-
terest, and by the same instrument released
his vendor-‘s lien. On the same day the ad-
ministrator executed a deed of conveyance
to the said H. H. Williams. It recites all
the proceedings touching the sale upon which
it was founded.
On the 2d of January, 1868, the administra-
tor executed to Henry Williams another deed
for the same premises. It recites more fully
the proceedings relative to the sale, and sets
out that there were certain clerical errors of
dates in the former deed, and that this deed
was made to correct them.
The titles adverse to the plaintiff, developed
upon the trial in the court below, were all
derived flim heirs-at-law of Samuel Wil-
liams. The premises were liable under a
paramount lien for the debts of the ancestor.‘
The plaintiff's claim was of that character.
Hence, if the sale and conveyance to him by
the administrator were valid, they were con-
clusive in his favor. He could recover. how-
ever, only upon the strength of his own title.
The weakness of the title of his adversaries
could not avail him.
Most of the objections to the sale by the
administrator taken in the brief of the plain-
tiffs in error, were not insisted upon in the
9 PllS('ll. Dig. art. 1373.
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DEGREES OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
[Case No. 112
argument at the bar, and are of such a char-
acter as to require no observations from the
court. One was pressed upon our attention
with earnestness and ability, and to that one
our remarks will be confined.
A statute of Texas requires all claims‘
against the estate of a decedent to be pre- .
sented to his legal representative and to be
allowed by such representative, and to be ap-
proved by the probate judge. Until so ai-
lowed and approved they have no legal va-
lidity and cannot be recognized as debts
against the estate. If disallowed, or not ap-
proved, they must be sued upon within three
months. if sued without a refusal to allow
or approve, there can be no recovery. The
absence of such fact is fatal to the action.T
The order of sale sets forth that the claim
had been allowed by the administrator, but
is silent as to its approval by the judge.
The plaintiffs in error argued that this omis- -I
sion rendered the order a nullity.
The application of the judgment-creditor
and the answer of the administrator gave
the judge jurisdiction over the parties and the
real estate of the deceasedfl Jurisdiction is
the power to hear and determine.
the order of sale required the exercise of this
power. It was the business and duty of the
court to ascertain and decide whether the T
facts were such as called for that action. .
The question always arises in such proceed-
ings—-and must be determined—whether, up-
on the case as presented, affirmative or nega-
tive action is proper. The power to review
and reverse the decision so made is clearly
appellate in its character, and can be exer-
cised only by an appellate tribunal in a pro-
ceeding had directly for that purpose. It
cannot and ought not to be done by another
court, in another case, where the subject is
presented incidentally, and a reversal sought
in such collateral proceeding. The settled
rule of law is that jurisdiction having at-
inched in the original ease, everything done
within the power of that jurisdiction, when
collaterally questioned, ‘is to be held conclu-
sive of the rights of the parties, unless im-
peached for fraud. Every intendment is
made to support the proceeding. It is re-
garded as if it were regular in all things and
irreversible for error. In the absence of
fraud no question can be collaterally enter-
TPasch. Dig. arts. 1309. 1311; Danzey v.
S\vinnc_v. 7 Tex. 625; Martin v. Harrison, 2
Tex. -156.
5 Pasch. Dig. art. 1305.
tained as to anything lying within the juris-
dictional sphere of the original case. Inti-
nite confusion and mischiefs would ensue if
the rule were otherwise. These remarks ap-
ply to the order of sale here in question.
The county court had the power to make it
and did make it. It is presumed to have
been properly made. and the question of its
propriety was not open to examination upon
the trial in the circuit court. These proposi-
tions are sustained by a long and unbroken
line of adjudications in this court. The last
one was the case of .\IcNltt v. Turner."
They are not in conflict with the adjudica-
tions of Texas upon the subject.
The statute of Texas does not require the
evidence upon which the judgment of the
court proceeded to be set forth in the record.
Such a tatement can do no good, and its
omission does no harm.
As regards public oiilcers, “acts done which
presuppose the existence of other acts to
make them legally operative, are presumptive
proofs of the latter." 1° “Facts presumed are
as effectually establihed as facts proved,
where no presumption is allowed." In the
To make I case of Ward's Lessee v. Bari-ows,11 a sale
‘ for taxes came under examination.
T held that certain acts of the county auditor
It was
were presumptive proofs that he had admin-
istered to the collector the oath prescribed
by law touching the ‘delinquent list. The
sale was sustained. Here the judge who
made the order of sale was the judge to ap-
' prove the claim. The order was presump-
tive proof of the requisite approval. Such
approval was necessarily implied, and what is
implied in a record, pleading, will, deed, or
contract, is as effectual as what is express-
ed.1=
The proceedings touching the sale were
properly admitted in evidence, and the in-
struction given to the jury upon the subject
was correct.
The last assignment of error relates to
fraud in obtaining the order of sale.
It seems to us that the evidence disclosed
in the record was hardly suflicient to raise
any question upon that subject. However
that may be, the instruction given to the jury
1 was unexceptionable, and the plaintiffs in
. error have no right to complain.
Judgment affirmed.
9 16 Wall. 366.
10 Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 70.
11 2 Ohio St. 2-17.
12 U. S. v. Babbit, 1 Black, 61.
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Case No. 113]
PROOF.
LEESER v. BOEKHOFF.
(38 Mo. App. 445.)
Court of Appeals of Missouri. Dec. 24, 1889.
Christian & Wind, for appellant. Lubke
& Muench, for respondent.
BRIGGS, J’. On the twenty-third day of
February, 1887, the defendant in this case
instituted an attachment suit against one
Caroline Gruhner. In the attachment suit,
Boekhofl claimed that Mrs. (lruhner was in-
debted to him, and that she had fraudulent-
ly conveyed her property for the purpose of
defrauding her creditors. ilnder the writ
of attachment Boekhoff caused a stock of
groceries to be seized as the property of
Mrs. Grulmer, and the goods were subse-
quently sold by the oiiicer. and the proceeds,
after deducting costs. were applied to the
discharge of Boekhoi'f’s debt.
The plaintiff in the present suit claims that
the stock of goods so levied on and sold he-
longed to him, and he asked a Judgment
against the defendant for damages for the
unlawful conversion of his property. The
defendant, in his answer, denied that the
plaintiff was the owner of the ;;oods, and
he averred that the plaintiff claimed to be
the owner of the property through a fraud-
ulent purchase from Caroline Gruhner. The
defendant attacked this sale, and alleged its
invalidity as to him, for two reasons: First.
The pretended purchase was fraudulent in
fact, and was contrived to defraud the cred-
itors of Hrs. Gruhner. Second. The sale
was inoperative and void as to the defend-
ant, for the reason that there was no such
change of possession as would satisfy the
interpretation placed by the supreme court
on the first clause of section 250-'3, Rev. St.
1879. That portion of the statute referred
to reads as follows: “Every sale made by
a vendor of goods and chattels in his Dos-
session or under his control, unless the same
be accompanied by delivery in a reasonable
time. regard being had to the situation of
the property, and be followed by an actual
and continued change of the possession of
the things sold, shall be held to be fraud-
ulent and void, as against the creditors of
the vendor," etc. The case was submitted
to a jury, and the plaintifl obtained a ver-
dict for five hundred dollars, and the court
entered judgment accordingly. The suit
was originally againt the defendant and
the Haase Fish Company, but, at the con-
clusion of the testimony, the plaintiff dis-
missed as to the fish company. The de-
fendant in due time moved the court to
grant him a. new trial, and, his motion hav-
ing been overruled, he has prosecuted this
appeal.
The defendant assigns numerous errors,
and he presents many arguments why the
judgment ought to be reversed. He com-
plains chiefly of the action of the court in
refusing to take the case from the jury. He
also complains of the instructions, and the
admission and rejection of evidence.
The case has been here before. Leeser v.
Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223. When the case
was before this court on the former appeal,
the plaintiff had obtained a joint judgment
against the defendant and the Haase Fish
(‘ompany as joint trespassers. The dismiss-
al of the case as to the iish company elimi-
nates from the case all questions as to the
fact of a joint trespass, and the joint liabili-
ty of the original defendants therefor. On
the former appeal the defendant urged, as
he does now, that the court ought. to have
declared as a matter of law that the sale
of the goods by Caroline Gruhner to the
plaintiff was invalid for the reason that the
evidence did not show such a change of pos-
session as the law contemplated and requir-
ed. The opinion of the court on the former
hearing contains a full recital of all substan-
tial facts, showing the extent to which this
possession was open, notorious, and unequiv-
ocal. This obviates the necessity of a re-
statement of the evidence by us, as our ex-
amination of the present record leads us to
the conclusion that on the last trial the evi-
dence bearing on this issue was not substan-
tially diflferent from that contained in the
former record. There were some addition-
al facts shown ou the last trial by both par-
ties, which had a tendency to strengthen
their respective theories, but this additional
evidence was merely cumulative, and is not
of such a character as to authorize us to
hold that there has been a material change
in the evidence. However, we are justified
in saying that the plaintiff’s evidence on
the last trial was as satisfactory as that
passed on by this court on the former hear-
ing. .
On the former hearing Judge Thompson
disposed of the objection now urged by the
defendant as follows: “We have already re-
cited the substantial facts showing the ex-
tent to which the change of possession was
open, notorious, and unequivocal, within the
meaning of the statute. Certainly, several
acts of possession were done by the plaintiff
of an unequivocal character. He took pos-
sesion by his own agent, who had not pre-
viously been in the employ of his vendor.
He also began the purchase of goods in his
own name, having the goods billed to him,
and hanging the bills on a hook openly in
the store, and also informed them that he
had succeeded to the business. The fact
that he did not do the other things which
he might have done,-—change the sign, the
name on the wagons. and the revenue ii-
censes, and the other circumstances of an
equivocal character. already detaiied,—were
matters for the consideration of the jury.
but were not of such a character that we
can separate them from the things which
were done, tending to apprise the communi-
ty of the change of possession, which the
statute requires." From this it appears that
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LEEBER v. BOEKHOFll'. 
(38 Mo. App. 445.) 
Court of Appeals of Milsouri. Dec. 24, 1889. 
Christian & Wind, for appellant. Lubke 
& Muench, for respondent. 
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this court expressly held that the plaintiff’s
evidence, bearing upon the circumstances at-
tending the purchase, and the subsequent
acts of‘ the parties looking to u change of
possession, were suflicient to carry the case
to the jury, and it must now be held that
the conclusion, arrived at by them, must be
the law in this case. What was there de-
cided is not now open for discussion, and
must be held to be res adjudicata. This
question involved the only substantial de-
fense made by the defendant, and, unless
the court has committed error in the in-
structions, or has admitted or rejected evi-
dence which was prejudicial to the defend-
ant‘s case, the judgment will have to be af-
firmed.
On the trial the plaintiff asked, and the
court gave, the following instructions, to
wit:
“.\'un1ber 1. The court instructs the jury
that in this state a debtor, even though in-
solvent, has the right to prefer one creditor
over another; and if the jury believe, from
the evidence, that the sole purpose of plant-
tiif in making the purchase in question was
to secure payment or satisfaction of a debt,
then due him from Caroline Gruhner, then
the transaction is not aifected by the fact
that said Caroline Gruhner may have also
been indebted to other creditors, or that the
necessary effect of such purchase and sale
may have been to hinder or delay such other
creditors, provided the property so transfer-
red and delivered to plaintiff, upon a fair val-
uation thereof at the time of the delivery,
did not exceed the debt actually owing from
.\Irs. Gruhner to him at said time.
“l\'uu1ber 2. The court further instructs
you that if you find the facts called for by
the preceding instruction, and also believe,
from the evidence, that within a reasonable
time after the execution of the bill of sale
read in evidence, regard being had to the
situation of the property therein conveyed,
the plaintiff took actual, exclusive, open, no-
torious, and unequivocal possession of said
property, and as called for in the instruc-
tion given for defendant, and thereafter con-
tinued ln such possession to the date of the
levy in question, and if you further find,
from the evidence, that the defendant Bock-
hofl' caused said property to be taken, or aid-
ed and abetted in the taking thereof, and to
bring about the loss thereof to plaintiff, then
your verdict should be for the plaintiflf.”
The court, on its own motion, gave the fol-
lowing instruction, to wit:
“The court instructs the jury that, if you
believe and find from the evidence that the
sale from Caroline Gruhner to the plaintiff
was not accompanied by delivery, and fol-
lowed by a change of possession within a
reasonable time, as stated and called for by
the other instructions of the court. then said
sale is void as against the defendant Bock-
hoff, even though you may find from the evi-
dence that afterwards, and before the levy,
such change of possession was made. And
if you find and believe from the evidence
that such delivery and change of possession
was not made within a reasonable time after
said sale, as called for in the other instruc-
tions of the court, you should find for the
defendant." '
The defendant asked the court to instruct
as follows:
“Number 1. Unless the jury are satisfied
from the evidence that Charles Lceser had
actual possession of the goods in question;
that the change in possession was visible,
continuous, and exclusive as against Caro-
line, such change of possession as to indicate
to the public (purchasers) at large that Caro-
line Gruhner no longer had possession of or
control over said goods, then said sale was
fraudulent and void as against creditors,
even though the jury believe from the evi-
dence the sale from Caroline Gruhner to
Charles Leeser was made in good faith and
for a valuable consideration.”
This instruction the court gave after strik-
ing out the word “public" and inserting
“purchasers." '
“Number 2. The court instructs the jury
that, to render the sale valid, it was neces-
sary that it should be accompanied by de-
livery within a reasonable time, regard being
had to the situation of the property, and to
be followed by an open, notorious, visible.
and unequivocal change of possession, such
as to indicate to persons visiting su_ch store,
at sight, that the ownership had changed.
And if the jury find that such delivery and
change was not made, they must find a ver-
dict for the defendant, notwithstanding they
may believe and find from the evidence that
the sale was bona fide.”
This instruction the court gave, after strik-
ing out the words “at sight,” and also strik-
ing all the second part and inserting in lieu
thereof the following:
“And if theijury find from the evidence
that such delivery and change of possession
was not made within a. reasonable time aft-
er the sale by Caroline Gruhner to the plain-
tiff, regard being had to the situation and
character of the property, and not the more
convenience of the purchaser, then you must
find a verdict for the defendant, even though
you may also believe and find from the evi-
dence that the sale was made in good faith."
The defendant also asked the court to in-
struct the jury that unless the sale was ac-
companied by delivery, and followed by a
change of possession on or before the day
after the sale, then it was not done within a
reasonable time; which instruction the court
refused to give.
We can see no substantial objection to the
instructions. Every phase of the case was
presented to the jury in a way that was
quite favorable to the defendant, and the in-
structions are in harmony with the adjudi-
cations in this state. The defendant's in-
structions, as asked, were calculated to mis-
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this court expressly held that the plalnwr's 
evidence, bearing upon the circumstances at-
ten~ the purchase, and the subsequent 
acts of the parties look.lng to a change of 
possession, were sumclent to carry the case 
to the jury, and lt must now be held that 
the conclusion, arrived at by them, must be 
the law ln this case. What was there de-
cided ls not now open for discussion, and 
must be held to be res adJudlcata. This 
question involved the only substantial de-
fense made by the defendant, and, unleBB 
the court has committed error ln the in-
structions, or has admitted or rejected evi-
dence which was pn>Judlclal to the defend-
ant•s <'&se, the judgment will have to be af-
firmed. 
On the trial the plaintiff asked, and the 
court gave, the following lnstructlons, to 
wit: 
"Xumber 1. The court instructs the jury 
that in this state a debtor, even though in-
solvent, has the right to prefer one creditor 
over another; and it the jury believe, from 
the evidence, that the sole purpose of plam-
wr in making the purchase in question was 
to secure payment or satisfaction of a debt, 
then due him from Caroline Gruhner, then 
the transactl<>n is not affected by the fact 
that said Caroline Gruhner may have also 
been indebted to other creditors, or that the 
necessary effect of such purchase and sale 
may have been to hinder or delay such other 
creditors, provided the property so transfer-
red and dellvered to plaintiff, upon a fair val-
uation thereof at tbe time of the delivery, 
did not exceed the debt actually owing froin 
llrs. Gruhner to him at said time. 
"Number 2. The coort further Instructs 
you that it you tlnd the facts called tor by 
the preceding instruction, and also believe, 
from the evidence, that within a reasonable 
time after the execution of the blll of sale 
read in evidence, regard being had to the 
situation of the property therein conveyed, 
the plaintiff took actual, exclusive, open, no-
torious, and unequivocal possession of said 
property, and as called for in the lnstn1c-
tlon given for defendant, and thereafter eon-
tlnued in such posaesslon to the date of the 
le>y In question, and if you further find, 
from the evidence, that the defendant Boek-
hotr caused said property to be taken, or aid-
ed and abetted In the taking thereof, and to 
bring about the loss thereof t<> plaintiff, then 
;your verdict should be for the plaintiff." 
The court, on Its own motion, gave the fol-
lowing Instruction, to wit: 
"The court instructs the jury that, lt you 
believe and tlnd from the evidence that the 
Bille from Caroline Gruhner to the plaintur 
was not accompanied by delivery, and fol-
lowed by a change of possession within a 
reasonable tlm<', as stnted and called for by 
the other instructions of the court, then said 
sale ls void as against the defendant Boek-
hotr, even though you may find from the evl· 
dence that afterwards, and before the lev;y, 
such change of possession was made. And 
it you find and believe from the evidence 
that such dellvery and change of possession 
was not made within a reasonable tlme after 
said sale, as called tor In the other Instruc-
tions of the court, you should find tor tbe 
defendant:• 
The defendant asked the court to instruct 
as foll<>ws: 
"~umber L Unless the jury are satisfied 
from the evidence that Charles Leeser lu1.1t 
actual possesalon of the goods in question; 
that the change In possession was visibl.-, 
continuous, and exclusive as against Caro-
llne, such change of poSBesslon as to Indicate 
to the public (purchasers) at large that Caro-
line Gruhner no l<>nger had poSBesslon of or 
control over said goods, then said sale was 
fraudulent and void as against creditors, 
even though the jury belleve from the evi-
dence the sale from Caroltne Gruhner to 
Charles J..eeser was made In good faith lind 
tor a valuable consideration." 
This instruction the court gave after strlk-
lllg out the word ''public" and inserting 
"purchasers." · 
"Number 2. The court instructs the jury 
that, to render the Bale valld, it was neces-
sary that it should be accompanied by de-
llveey withln a reasonable time., regard being 
had to the situation of the propert;y, and to 
be followed by an <>Pen, notorloUB, visiblr., 
and unequivocal change of possession, such 
as to indicate to persons visiting su.ch store, 
at sight, that the ownership had changed. 
And If the jury find that such dellYl"l"Y and 
change was n<>t made, they mUBt find a ver-
dict for the defendant, notwithstanding they 
may believe and find from the evidence that 
the sale was bona fide." 
Thl8 Instruction the court gave, after strik-
ing out the wordR "at Right," and also strik-
ing all the se<'ond pa.1·t and inserting In lleu 
thereof the following: 
"And lf the · jury find from the evidence 
that such delivery and change of possession 
was not made within a reasonable time aft-
er the sale by Caroline Gruhner to the plaln-
tllT, regard being had to the situation and 
character of the property, and not the mere 
eonvenlence ot the purchaser, then yoo muat 
find a verdict fo1· the defendant, e\·en thougl'l 
you may al..llo beHeve and find from the evi-
dence that the sale was made In good faith." 
The defendant also asked the court to in-
struct the jury that unless the sale was ac· 
companied by delivery, and followed by a 
change of possession on or before the day 
after the sale, then it was not done within a 
reasonable time; which instruction the court 
refused to give. 
We can see no substantial objection to the 
instructions. Every phase of the case was 
presented to the jury In a way that was 
quite favorable to the defendant, and the In-
structions are in harmony with the ndJudt-
catlons In this state. The defendant"s in-
structions, as asked, were calculated to mis-
327 
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lead the jury, and the court was justified in
refusing them.
The defendant asserts, as a matter of law,
that a failure by a purchaser to take posses-
sion of property purchased within twenty-
four hours will vitiate the sale, and that the
trial court erred in refusing to so instruct
the jury. The statute requires the posses-
sion to follow the purchase within a reason-
able time. It is generally for the jury to de
termine what time would or would not be
reasonable. It is impossible to formulate a
detinite rule on the subject. The question
in each case must be determined by the cir-
cumstances attending the sale, and the char-
acter and situation of the property.
The defendant also assigns for error the
refusal of the court to discharge the jury
when notified of improper conduct on the
part of one of the jurors. Whether this ac-
tion of the court was prejudicial to the de-
fendant or not, we cannot stop to inquire.
for the reason that the record fails to show
that the defendant excepted to the action of
the court. Under well-established rules of
appellate practice, we are prohibited from
passing on the question.
The court permitted a witness, who had
examined the account between the plaintiff
and Mrs. Gruhner, to state the balance due
the plaintiff. The defendant objected to this
evidence for the reason that the books were
not produced. It appeared that the otficer
levying _the attachment in the suit of the
defendant against Mrs. Gruhner had seized
the book and carried them away. It has
been held that a witness who has inspected
the accounts between parties may be per-
mitted to testify as to a general balance, but
will not be allowed to give evidence of the
particular contents of the books. 1 Greenl.
Ev. (14th Ed.) 5 93. But, aside from this,
the defendant was not prejudiced by this
evidence, for the reason that the plaintiif
and Mrs. Gruhner both testifled to the
amount of the indebtedness. and there was
no countervailing evidence tending to prove
that .\lrs. Gruhner was not indebted to the
plaintiff in the amount claimed. We do not
gather from the record that this fact was
seriously controverted by the defendant on
the trial of the case.
The next assignment of error relates to a
claim of exemption made by Hrs. Gruhner
in the attachment suit. It appears from the
defendant's otfer of proof that some time
after the goods had been seized under the at-
tachment Mrs. Gruhner filed a claim of ex-
emption with the sheriff, in which she de-
manded a return of the property to her. The
defendant offered this paper in evidence, and,
on the plalntitfs objection, it was excluded.
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The authorities cited by the defendant in
support of this assignment are to the effect
that admissions and declarations of parties,
while in possession of property, are to be
regarded as verbal acts, and are received as
explanatory of the nature of their posses-
sion. This rule cannot be applied to the
act of .\lrs. Gruhner in claimin a right of
exemption in the property hel under the
attachment, for the simple reason that she
was not at the time in possession of the
property. This assignment will have to be
ruled likewise against the defendant.
And, lastly, the defendant complains of
the action of the court in excluding the tes-
timony of the plaintiff and Mrs. Gruhner at
the former trial, which had been preserved
in a bill of exceptions. We do not under-
stand upon what principle this evidence
could be held admissible. Such evidence
must be placed in the category of hearsay
testimony. If the testimony of a deceased
witness is thus preserved, it may be read in
evidence. This forms the exception to the
general rule. Coughlin v. Haeussler, 50 Mo.
126. All the witnesses in this case were
alive and present in court In the case of
Bogie v. Nolan, 96 Mo. 85, 9 S. W. 1-1, the
deposition of one of the parties was read
in evidence, although the parties were pres-
ent in court. The trial court permitted it
to be read as an admission of the party,
and the supreme court sustained the ruling,
and in doing so expressly overruled the case
of Priest v. Way, 87 Mo. 16. There is quite
a dilference between the evidence of a party
as preserved in a deposition and that con-
tained in a bill of exceptions. The deposi-
tion is signed by the party, and duly au-
thenticated by an officer, and from it can be
ascertained with certainty the extent and
character of any declaration or admission;
but this cannot be said of a bill of excep-
tions. We know of no rule of law which
would authorize the testimony of a party or
witness contained in a bill of exceptions to
be received as independent.evidence, except
in cases coming within the exception stated.
It has been held that an abandoned pleading,
signed by an attorney professing to repre-
sent the party, may be read in evidence as
an admission or declaration of the client.
Dowsclot v. Rawlings. 58 Mo. 75. But it is
only prima facie admissible. The evidence
of the attorney that the party did not em-
ploy him in the case renders the pleading
incoinpet-.-nt evidence. Anderson v. Mt-Pike.
86 Mo. 293. We will have to rule this as-
signment against thc defendant.
The judgment of the trial court will be
afllrmed.
All the judges concur.
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Case No. 113] PROOF. 
lead the jury, and the court was justified in 
retuetng them. 
The defendant asserts, as a matter of law, 
that a failure by a purchaser to take po884!8-
sloo of property purC'hased within twenty-
four hours will vitiate the sale, and that tha 
trial court erred in fefuslng to so Instruct 
the jury. The statute requires the poi,;ses-
slon to follow the purchase within a reason-
able time. It ls generally for the Jury to de 
termlne what time would or would uot be 
reasonable. It ls imposslble to formulate a 
detlolte rule on the subject. The question 
in each e&St' must be determined by the cir-
cumstances attending the sale, and the char-
acter and situation of the property. 
The defendant also assigns for error the 
refusal of the court to discharge the jury 
when notified of Improper conduct on the 
part of one of the jurors. Whether this ac-
tion of the court was prejudicial to the de-
fendant or not, we cannot stop to inquire, 1 
for the reason that the record falls to show 
that the defendant excepted to the action of 
the court. Under well-established rules of 
appellate practice, we are prohibited from 
passlng on the question. 
The court permitted a witness, who had 
examined the account between the plalntltr 
and Mrs. Gruhner. to state the balan<'e due 
the plalntltr. The def~ndant objected to this I 
evidence for the reason that the books were 
not produced. It appeared that the offtcer 
levying the attachment In the suit of the 
defendant against Mrs. Gruhner bad seized 
the books and carried them away. It has 
been held that a witness who has Inspected 
the accounts between parties may be per-
mitted to testify as to a general balance, but 
wtll not be allowed to give evidence ot the 
particular contents of the books. 1 Greenl. 
Ev. (14th Ed.) § 93. But, aside from tWs, 
the defendant was not prejudiced by this 
evidence, for the reason that the plaintiff 
and ~Ire. Gruhner both testified to the 
amount of the indebtedness. and there was 
no countervailing evidence tending to prove 
that ~lrs. Gruhner was not Indebted to the 
plaiutlfl In the amount claimed. We do not 
gather from the record that this fact was 
seriously controverted by the defendant on 
the trial of the case. 
The next assignment of error relates to a 
claim of exemption made by Mrs. Grubner 
ln the attachment suit. It appears from the 
defendant's offer of proof that some time 
after the goods had been seized under the at-
tuchment Mrs. Gruhner tiled a claim of ex-
emption with the sherllf, In which she de-
manded a return of the property to her. The 
dl'femlant offered this paper in evidence, and, 
on the plaintiff's objection, It was excluded. 
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The authorltle& cited by the defendant In 
su1>port of this assignment are to the eftect 
that admissions and de<>laratlons of parties, 
while lo possession of property, are to be 
regarded as verbal actB, and are received as 
explanatory of the nature of their posses-
sion. This rule cannot be applied to the 
act of Yrs. Gruhner In clalmln' a right of 
exemption ln the property held under the 
attachment, for the simple reason that she 
was not nt the time In possession of the 
pro1K'rty. '!'his asidgnment will have to be 
ruled llkewl1!1e' against tile defendant. 
And, lastly, thl! defendant complulns of 
the act:lon of the rourt In excluding the tes-
timony •lt the plnlntiff and lire. Gruhne1· nt 
the form<>r trial, which had been preserved 
lu a bill of excl!ptlons. We do not under-
stand upon what prln<'lple tWs evidence 
<~mid be held admlsslbll'. Such evidence 
must be placed ln the <:11tegory of heareay 
t•~1:1tlmony. If the testimony of a deceased 
witness 111 thus preserved, It may be read In 
el"ldence. ·.rhls forms the exception to the 
general rule. Coughlin v. Haet1Psler, 50 llo. 
126. All tbe 'Nltne!lt'es In thb1 case were 
alive and present In coun. In the case or 
Bogle v. Xolan, 96 Mo. 85, 9 S. W. 14, the 
deposition or one of the parties was read 
In evidence, although the parties were pres-
ent lo court. The trial court permitted It 
to be read as an admission of the party, 
and tile supreme court sustained the ruling, 
and ln doing so expressly overrull'd the case 
of Priest v. Way, 87 Yo. 16. There ls quite 
a difference between the evidence of a party 
as preserved In a deposition and that con-
tained ln a bill of exceptions. The deposi-
tion ls signed by the party, and duly au-
thenticated by an offtcer, and from It can be 
as(-ertalued with certainty the extent and 
character or any declaration or admission; 
but this cannot be said of a bill of excep-
tions. We know of no rule of law which 
would authorize the testimony of a party or 
witness contalned In a bill of exceptions to 
be received as Independent. evidence, except 
in cases coming within the exception stated. 
It has been held that an abandonl'd pleading, 
signed by an attorney professing to repre-
sent the party, may be read In evidence as 
an admission or declaration or the client. 
Dowsl'lot v. Rawlings, 58 Mo. 7o. But It ls 
only prima fa<'le admissible. The evidence 
of the attorney that the party did not em-
ploy him In the c·ase renders the pleadlnit 
ineompet-"nt evidence. Audenmn v. ll<'Pike. 
SG Mo. :.'ll:l. We wlll have to rule thl11 as-
signment •tgalnst the defendant. 
'l'he judgment of the trlul court will be 
nftlrme<l. 
All tile Judges concur. 
ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS.
[Case No. 114
BARNES et nl. v. PA(,‘K\V(,)OD et al.
(38 Pac. 857, 10 \\'ash. 50.)
Nov. 10, 1894.
Appeal from superior court, Kittitas coun-
ty; Carroll B. Graves, Judge.
Action by S. W. Barnes and another. par-
ties doing business as Barnes & 1\icCandless,
against S. T. Packwood and others. There
was a judgment for defendants, and plain-
tiffs appeal. Reversed.
Ralph Kauffman, for appellants. Pruyn &
Ready, for respondents.
Supreme Court of Washington.
DUNBAR, O. J. This is an action on a
promissory note. The note sued upon is as
follows: ".$i,50J.00. Ellensburgh, Wash.,
Qct. 8, 188%. One year after date, without
grace, at 12 o’cl0ck m., we, or either of us,
promise to pay to the order of Barnes & Mc-
Candless, for the use of the Agricultural
Fair Association, fifteen hundred dollars, U.
S. gold coin, value received, with interest
from date at the rate of one per ccnt. per
month, interest payable when due, and, if
not so paid, to become a part of the princi-
pal. and to bear like interest until paid.
And further agreeing that if the same be not
paid when due, and suit be brought to col-
lect the same, or any portion thereof, to pay
ten per cent. on the amount due as attor-
ney's fee for collection. S. T. Packwood.
Walter A. Bull. J. M. Shelton. A. B. Whit-
son. Thomas Haley. S. R. Geddis.”
The defendants, answering the complaint,
alleged that the note was signed in its pres-
ent form through mistake; that the agree-
ment and intention was that the note should
be signed by the signers thereof as trustees
of an association known as the “Agricultural
i~‘air Association"; that they were not to be
held individually responsible; that it was
with this understanding that they signed it,
and that it was the understanding of Barnes
& McCandless, the plaintiffs, that it was so
signed; that on the day the promissory note
-set out in the complaint was executed there
was a meeting of the board of trustees of
said corporation, at which meeting the de-
fendants were present, and at said meeting
41 resolution was passed to borrow from said
Barnes 8: Mcflandless, for and on behalf of
said corporation, the said sum of $1,500, and
that the money was borrowed and the con-
tract entered into in accordance with said
-agreement and resolution; alleging that the
-defendants received no beneiit from said
money; that it was turned over to the associ-
ation, and that no consideration passed be-
tween the defendants and said Barnes &
McCandless for said note. The plaintiffs ob-
iected to any testimony being heard under
this answer, for the reason that it did not
state facts sllifieient to constitute a defense
to the complaint. The court, however, over-
ruled the objection, and the case went to
trial. Plaintiffs oifered the note in evidence,
proved its execution, and rested their case.
The defendants’ testimony was in accord-
ance with the allegations of the answer, so
that the question arises here. was the testi-
mony for the defense sutiicient to overcome
the presumption arising from the execution
of the note, the execution of which was ad-
mitted? The case was tried by the court.
and a judgment rendered for costs for the
defendants. It was contended by the appel-
lants that the court erred in allowing the de-
fendants to amend their answer at the trial,
and in not giving judgment for the plaintiifs
on the pleadings, inasmuch as three answers
had already been flied in the cause, and that
it was a clear abuse of the court's discretion
to permit the filing of the fourth; that even
that was insuiiicient, as it contains no alle-
gation of a mutual mistake and such an alle-
gation is necessary.
We think the answer substantially contains
the allegation of mutual mistake, although
not in so many words; and, the court hav-
ing such a large discretion under our law and
practice in matters of amendments, we do
not think we would be justified in reversing
the case for this reason. There is no allega-
tion of fraud in the answer. The general
rule laid down by the text writers is that
parol evidence is not admissible to contra-
dict, quaiify, extend, or vary written instru-
ments, but that their interpretation must
depend upon their own terms. But, to re-
lieve parties from the distress of accident or
mistake or fraud, courts of equity will ad-
mit parol evidence to qualify and correct,
and, necessarily, sometimes, to even defeat,
the terms of written instruments. “One of
the most common classes of cases," says Mr.
Story in his Equity Jurisprudence (volume 1.
5 152), “in which relief is sought in equity
on account of a mistake of facts is that of
written agreements, either executory or ex-
ecuted. Sometimes by mistake the written
agreement contains iess than the parties in-
tended, sometimes it contains more, and some-
times it simply varies from their intent by
expressing something different in substance
from the truth of that intent. In all such
cases, if the mistake is clearly made out by
proofs entirely satisfactory, equity will re-
form the contract so as to make it conforma-
ble to the precise intent of the parties. But
if the proofs are doubtful and unsatisfactory,
and the mistake is not made entirely plain,
equity will withhold relief, upon the ground
that the written paper ought to be treated as
a full and correct expression of the intent
until the contrary is established beyond rea-
sonable controvers_v." It would certainly be
a dangerous doctrine to announce that the
terms of a written instrument should be
varied, and its effect changed or destroyed,
by any slight testimony, or mere preponder-
ance of testi-mony. The very object of re-
ducing agreements to writing is to prevent
trouble arising from the defects of memory.
All the agreements which have been talked
329
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OR.\.I, E\'IDEXCE TO VAH.Y OH EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS. [Case No. 114 
BAR::\E!ol et al. v. PACKWOOD l't al. 
(:J8 Poe. 8.')7, 10 Wash. 50.) 
Supreme Court of Washington. Nov. 10, 1894. 
A1>peal from superior court, Kittitas coun-
ey; Ca!-'?oll B. Graves, Judge. 
Action by S. W. Barnes and another, par-
ties doing business as Barnes & McCandless, 
against S. T. Packwood and others. There 
was a judgment for defendants, and plain-
tiffs appeal. Reversed. 
Ralph Kauffman, for appellants. Pruyn & 
Ready, for respondents. 
DU:SBAR, C. J. This Is an action on a 
ttromlssory nob•. The note sued upon fa as 
follows: .. $1,r.14.>.>.00. Ellensburgh, Wash., 
pct. 8, 188~. One year after date, without 
~. at 12 o'clock m., we, or either of us, 
promise to pay to the order of Barnes & Mc-
Candl~. for the use of tht> Agricultural 
Fair Association, fttteen hundred dollars, U. 
.S. gold coin, value received, with Interest 
Crom date at the rate of one per cent. per 
month, Interest payable when due, and, If 
not so paid, to become a part of the prtncl-
val. and to bear like Interest until paid. 
And further agreeing that It the s1ime be not 
paid when due, and suit be brought to col-
lect the same, or any portion thereof, to pay 
ten per cent. on the amount due as attor-
ney's fee for collection. S. T • . Packwood. 
Walter A. Bull. J. M. Shelton. A. B. Whlt-
90n. Thomas Haley. S. R. Geddl~." 
The defendants, answering the complaint, 
allt>ged that the note was slgnPd In Its Preti· 
~nt form through mistake; that the agree-
ment and Intention was that the note should 
be signed by the signers thereof as truste!'R 
of an association known as the "Agricultural 
Jt'alr Association"; that they were not to be 
held Individually respon1dble; that It was 
with this understanding that they signed It, 
.and that It wes the understanding of Barnc>s 
.& McCandless, the plaintiffs, that It was so 
'lllgncd; that on the day the promissory note 
11et out In the complaint was executed there 
was a meeting of the board of trustees or 
1lald corporation, at which meeting the de-
fendants were present, and at said meeting 
.a resolution was passed to borrow from said 
Bamea & McCandless, for and on behalf of 
:said corporation, the said sum of $1,r>OO, and 
that the money was borrowed and the con-
tract entered Into In accordance with said 
·agreement and resolution; allPglng that the 
-defendants received no benPfit from said 
money; that It was turned over to the assocl-
:atlon, and that no consideration passed be-
tween the defendants and Mid Barnes & 
McCandless for said note. The plaintiffs ob-
jected to any testimony being hE>nrd under 
this answer, for the reason that It dl<1 not 
state facts sufficient to constitute a dt>fense 
to the complalnt. The court, however, over-
ruled the objection, and the case went to 
trla1. PlalntUra offered the note In evidence, 
proved Its execution, and rested their case. 
The defE>ndants' testimony was In accord· 
ance with the all<>irattons of the answer, so 
that the question arises ht>re, was the testi-
mony for the defense sufftrlt>nt to overcome 
the presumption arising from the execution 
of the note, the execution of which was ad-
mlttt>d? The case was tried by the court, 
and a judgment rendered tor costs for the 
defendants. It was contended by the appel-
lants that the court erred In allowlng tlle de-
fendants to amend their answer at the trial, 
and In not giving judgment for the plalntltrs 
on the pleadings, Inasmuch as three answers 
had already bet>n tlled In the cause, and that 
It wes a clear abuse of the court's discretion 
to permit the filing of the fourth; that even 
that was lnsuftlclent. as ft <'ontalns no allt>-
gatlon of a mutual mistake and such an alle-
gation ls necessary. 
We think the answer substantially contains 
the allegatlon of mutual mistake, although 
not In so many words; and, the court hav-
ing such a large discretion under our law and 
practice In matters of amendments, we do 
not think we would be justified In reversing 
the case for this reason. There Is no allega-
tion of fraud In the answer. The general 
rule laid down by the text writers ls that 
parol evidence ls not admissible to contra-
dict, quallty, extend, or vary wrlttPn Instru-
ments, but that their interpretation must 
depend upon their own terms. But, to re-
lieve parties from the distress of accident or 
mistake or fraud, courts of equity wlll ad-
mit parol e11ldent-e to qualify and correct, 
and, necessarily, sometimes, to even defeat. 
the terms of written Instruments. "One of 
thP most common classes of cases," says Mr. 
Story In bis Equity Jurisprudence (volume 1. 
I 152), "In wblch relief ls sought In equity 
on account of a mistake of facts Is that of 
written agreements, either executory or ex· 
ecuted. Sometimes by mistake the written 
agreement contains less than the parties In· 
tended, sometimes ft contains more, and some· 
times ft simply varies from their Intent by 
expressing something different In substance 
from the truth of that Intent. In all such 
cases, ft the mistake ls clearly made out by 
proofs entirely satisfactory, equity will re-
form the contract so as to mnke It conforma· 
ble to the precise intent of the parties. But 
If the proors are doubtful and unsatisfactory, 
and the mistake Is not made entirely plain, 
equity wlll withhold rellef, upon the ground 
that the written paper ought to be trented as 
a full and correct expression of the Intent 
until the contral'y Is established bt>yond rea-
sonable controver11y." It would certnlnly be 
a dangerous doetrlne to announce that the 
terms of n written Instrument should be 
varied, and Its elft>ct changed or destroyed, 
by any slight tei<tlmony, or mere prE>ponder· 
nnce of testimony. The vPry object of re-
ducing nJ:l'<>emcnts to writing ls to prevl'nt 
trouble arising from the defects of memory. 
All the agreements which have been talked 
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about by the parties leading up to the final
agreement are presumed to be merged in the
writing; and the object of this precaution
would be destroyed, and it would have a
tendency to encourage perjury, if upon slight
testimony the sacredness of the written in-
strument could be destroyed. And such is al-'
most the uniform holding of the courts. In
Townsend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 339, Lord
Eldon says that those producing evidence of
a mistake undertake a case of great dith-
culty, and that the evidence must be irre-
fragable. In Sable v. Maloney, -18 Wis. 331.
4 N. W. 479, the court held that a written in-
strument would not be reformed on the
ground of alleged mistake unless the party
complaining move promptly after discovery
of the mistake. and not then without clear
proof. Said the court: “If the proofs are
doubtful and unsatisfactory, and the mistake
is not made entirely plain, equity will with-
hold relief upon the ground that the written
paper ought to be treated as the full and cor-
rect expression of the intent, unless the con-
trary ls established beyond reasonable con-
troversy. The parties to the deed, who ap-
pear to be equally credible, are in direct con-
flict, and there was no other direct evidence
nor any surrounding circumstances in cor-
roboration of the testimony of the grantor of
the deed.” So in the case at bar. The tes-
timony of the defendants and the plaintiffs .
is in direct conflict. It matters not that there
are four defendants and two plaintiffs. Even
the burden of proof does not depend upon the
number of witnesses who testify on the re-
spective sides of the case. It was held in
Mead v. Insurance Co., 64 N. Y. 453, that, to
justify the court in changing language of the
written instrument souglit to be reformed
(except in case of fraud). it must be establish-
ed that both parties agreed to something dif-
ferent from what is expressed in the writ-
ing, and the proof upon this point should be
so clear and convincing as to leave no room
for doubt. In Stiles v. Willis, 66 Md. 552, 8
Atl. 353, it was held that where application
is made to a court of equity to have a mort-
gage deed reformed, by having a personal
covenant inserted therein, as to one of the
parties, alleged to have been omitted by mis-
take of the draughtsman. the proof must be
of such a character as to leave no doubt what-
ever in the mind of the court that mistake
has intervened, and that the instrument is
variant from the actual contract of the par-
ties; that it is not enough to show the inten-
tion of one of the parties to the instrument
only, but the proof must establish incontro-
vertibly that the error in the instrument al-
leged was common to both parties. In other
words, it must be conclusively established
that both parties understood the contract as
it is alleged it ought to have been expressed,
and as in fact it was, but for the mistake
alleged in reducing it to writing. This case
is on a dead levcl with the case at bar, and,
with the other cases above quoted, seems to
us to go to the extent of holding that the
mistake must be established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. In Stockbridge Iron Co. v.
Hudson Iron Co., 102 Mass. 45, the court said:
“By the common law, parties who execute
written instruments are bound by them, and
parol evidence is not admissible to add to
or diminish or vary their terms. The rule is
of great practical importance for the protec-
tion of the interests of the citizen, and it
is the more so since parties and interested
witnesses are permitted to testify. The writ-
ing must be regarded, prima facie, as a
solemn and deliberate admission of both par-
ties as to what the terms of the contract ac-
tually were"; citing Babcock v. Smith, 2.!
Pick. 61, where the court held that “the pow-
er of rectifying and reforming solemn writ-
ten contracts is one which by courts of gen-
eral chancery jurisdiction is exercised very
sparingly, and only upon the clearest and
most satisfactory proof of the intention o'f
the parties." And it is also asserted in Stock-
bridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., supra.
that “the ordinary rule of evidence in civil
actions, that a fact must be proved by a pre-
ponderance of evidence, does not apply to-
such a case as this. The proof that both
parties intended to have the precise agree
ment set forth inserted in the deed. and omit-
ted to do so by mistake, must be made be-
yond a reasonable doubt."
The logic of the cases cited. even where it
is not so specifically expressed. is that the
proof of a mistake must be beyond a reason-
able doubt. But we might still go be_vond
the question of mere preponderance, and yet
not go to the extent of requiring the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. That a mere
preponderance of the testimony will not be
sutiicient to overcome the presumption that
the parties have expi-osscd their agreement
in the contract has been decided by this
court in Voorhies v. I-Icnnessy, 7 Wash. ‘.2-i3.
3-it Pac. 931. In that case there -was an
attempt to prove by parol evidence that an
absolute bill of sale was given as a chattel
mortgage; and the court, in speaking of the
testimony in that case. says: “In such cases
the solemnity of the writing is not to be
overcome by a mere preponderance of evi-
dence. The writing itself stands as the clear-
ly-stated and deliberately ascertained inten-
tion of the parties, which must be enforced
unless it is shown by clear, positive. and
convincing evidence that the mutual inten-
tion was something else, and that it was
with such different intention understood by
both parties that the instrument was deliv-
ered and accepted. This is the rule in eq-
uity, where cases of this kind are most fre-
quently heard; and when submitted to a
jury the same rule applies." The rule is
laid down in Jones on Mortgages (section
3255) that one who alleges that his deed in
absolute form was intended as a mortgage
only is required to make strict proof of the
fact; that the proof must be clear, unequiv-
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about by the parties leadtug up to the tlnal 
agreement are presumed to be merged In thl• 
wrlttug; and the object o~ this precaution 
would be destroyed. and It would have a 
tendency to encourage perjury, It upon slight 
testimony the sacredness ot the written ln-
strun1ent could be destroyed. And such ls al-"' 
most the uniform holding of the courts. In 
Townsend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 339, Lord 
Eldon says that thoee producing evidence ot 
a mistake undertake a case of great dlftl-
culty, and that the evidence must be lrre-
fragable. In Sable v. Maloney, 48 Wis. 331. 
4 N. W. 479, the court held that a written tu-
strument would not be reformed on thl' 
ground of alleged mistake unless the party 
complaining move promptly after dlS<.'OVery 
of the mistake, and not then without clear 
proof. Said the court: "It the proofs are 
doubtful and unsatisfactory, and the mistake 
Is not made entirely platu, equity wW with-
hold relief upon the ground that the written 
paper ought to be treated as the full and cor-
rect expression of the intent, unless the con-
trary ls established beyond reasonable con-
troversy. The parties to the deed, who ap-
pear to be equally credible, are In direct con-
1llct, and there was no other direct evidence 
nor any surrounding circumstances In cor-
roboration of the testimony of the grantor of 
the deed." So In the case at bar. The tes-
timony of the defendants and the plalnturs 
ls In direct conflict. It matters not that there 
are tour defendants and two plaintiffs. 1'~ven 
the burden of proof does not depend upon the 
number of witnesses who testUy on the re-
spective sides of the case. It was held In 
Mead v. Insurance Co., 64 N. Y. 453, that, to 
Justify the court tn changing language of the 
written Instrument sought to be reformed 
(except tu case of fraud), It must be establish-
ed that both parties agreed to something dif-
ferent from what is expressed in the writ-
tug, and the proof upon this point should be 
so clear and convtuclng as to leave no room 
for doubt In Stiles v. Wlllls, 66 Md. 552, 8 
Atl 3:i3, It was held that where application 
Is made to a court of equity to have a mort-
gage deed reformed, by having a personal 
covenant Inserted therein, as to one of the 
parties, alleged to have been omitted by mis-
take of the draughtsman, the proof must be 
of such a character as to leave no doubt what-
ever In the mind of the court that mistake 
has tutervened, and that the Instrument ls 
variant from the actual contract of the par-
ties; that It Is not enough to show the Inten-
tion of one of the parties to the Instrument 
only, but the proof must establish tucontro-
vertibly that the error In the Instrument al-
leged was common to both parties. In other 
words, it must be conclusively established 
that both parties understood the contract as 
lt ls alleged It ought to have been expressed, 
and as In fact It was, but for the mistake 
alleged in rc>duclng It to writing. This case 
is on a dead level with the case at bar, and, 
with the otl.lcr cases above quoted, seems to 
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us to go to the extent of holding that the 
mistake must be established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt In StOl'kbrldge lron Co. v. 
Hudson Iron Co., 102 Mass. 45, the court said: 
"By the common law, parties who execute 
written lnstrumt>nts are bound by them, and 
parol evidence Is not admissible to add to 
or diminish or vary their terms. The rule ls 
of great practical Importance for the protec-
tion of the Interests ot the citizen, and It 
ls the more so since parties and interested 
witnesses are permitted to testify. The writ-
ing must be regarded, prlma facle, as a 
solemn and deliberate admission of both par-
ties as to what the terms of the contract ac-
tually were·•; citing Babcock v. Smith, 2Z 
Pick. 61, where the court held that "the pow-
er of rectifying and reforming solemn writ-
ten contracts ls one which by courts of gen-
eral chancery jurisdiction ls exercised very 
sparingly, and only upon the l'leare11t and 
most B:ltlsfactory proof of the Intention df 
the parties." And It ls also asserted tu Stock-
bridge Iron Co. v. Hud11<>n Iron Co., supra. 
that "the ordinary rule of evidence tn civil 
actions, that a fact must be proved by a pre-
ponderance of e'\"ldence, does not a11ply te> 
such a case as this. The proof tll:1t both 
parties Intended to have the predst• agree-
ment set forth Inserted tu the dePd. nm! omit-
ted to do so by mistake, must be mnde be-
yond a reasonable doubt." 
The logic of thl' eases cited. eYen wht•re It 
ls not so spel'lftcally expressed. Is that tht> 
proof of a mistake must be bt>yond a ren1mn-
able doubt. But we might still go beyond 
the question of mere preponderance, and yet 
not go to the extent of requiring the proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. That a mt>rl' 
prP1mnderance of the testimony will not be 
sulfil'lent to overcome tile presumption that 
the partlt>s have expreAAt'll their agreement 
in the contract has been decided by this 
com1: tu Voorhlt>S v. Hennessy, 7 Wash. :!4'J. 
34 Pac. 931. In that case there was an 
attempt to prove by parol evidence that an 
absolute bill of sale was given as a chattel 
mortgage; and the court, In speaking of th~ 
testimony In that <'IHI!'. says: "In such cases 
the solt>mnlty of the writing ls not to be 
overcome by a met'l' 1m~ponderance of evi-
dence. The writing lt:;t>lf stands as the clear-
ly-stated and dellberntt'IY ascertained Inten-
tion ot the parties, which must be enforced 
unless It Is shown by clear, positive, and 
<'om·lnclng evidence that the mutual tuten-
tlon was something else, and that It was 
with such different intention understood by 
both parties that the Instrument was deliv-
ered and accepted. This ls the rule In eq-
uity, where <"ases of this kind are most fre-
quently heard; and when submitted to a 
jury the same rule applies."' The role Is 
laid down In Jone,; on Mortgages (~ctlon 
3:lu) thut one who allc>~t'S that his deed lo 
absolute form was tutcuded as a mortgagP 
only ls required to make strict proof of tht.> 
fact; that the proof must be clear, unequl.v· 
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ocal, and convincing; that the fact that
the grantor understood the transaction to
be a mortgage is not alone sufiicient to prove
it to be so. but if the evidence is doubtful
and unsatisfactory—if it fails to overcome
the strong presumption arising from the
terms of the absolute deed by testimony en-
tirely clear and‘ convincing beyond reason-
able controversy—the deed must have effect
in accordance with its terms; that the un-
supported testimony of the plaintiff. contra-
dicted by the defendant, is insufficient to
convert an absolute deed into a mortgage.
Here it will be observed that it is the un-
supported testimony ot the defendants. con-
tradicting that of the plaintitfs, which is
relied upon to relieve the defendants from
the obligation imposed by the written in-
strument. In Purington v. Akhurst, 74 Ill.
490, it was decided that where a bill of sale
is made of vessels for one-halt interest there-
in it will require evidence of the clearest
character to show that it was intended only
as a mortgage to secure a loan or advances.
To the same effect is Sewell v. Price's
Adm‘r, 32 Ala. 97. “To show by parol that
a deed absolute in form is a mortgage. the
evidence must be clear and convincing.“
Mt-Cormick v. Herndon, 67 Wis. 6-18, 31 N.
W’. 303. “The rulc in cases of this kind,”
said the court in Cadman v. Peter, 118 U. S.
73, 6 Sup. Gt. 957, “is well settled. It the
conveyance was in fee. under covenant of
warranty, and there is no dcfcasance, ei-
ther in the conveyance or collateral paper,
parol evidence to show that it was intended
to secure a debt, and to operate ‘only as a
mortgage, must be clear, unequivocal, and
convincing, or the presumption that the in-
strument is what it purports to be must pre-
vail." See, also, Howiand v. Blake, 97 U.
S. 624; Coyle v. Davis, 116 U. S. 108. 6 Sup.
Gt. 314; Tilden v. Streeter, 45 Mich. 533,
8 N. W. 502. It a mere preponderance of
the testimony were all that was required to
destroy the force of a written instrument,
there would be very little use in reducing
an agreement to writing; for the preponder-
ance of testimony is required in any case
to establish tho affirmative propositions as-
serted. So that it must be seen that it any
effect at all is given to a written instrument
the rule of me1'e preponderance cannot at-
tach.
In this case it had been several years from
the time the note was given until the action
was tried, and the testimony of the defend-
ants satisfies us that their recollection of
events which transpired at the meeting tes-
tified of could not be very definite or certain.
Neither is the testimony of the defendants
entirely harmonious. It is testified by the
defendants that a resolution was passed by
the board of trustees authorizing the borrow-
ing of the money in question from Barnes &
.\i<-(Iandless; that the trustees were called to-
gcther for that purpose, and at the instance
of Barnes, who was present when the reso-
lution was passed. This resolution is not
even brought to bear in this case, but de-
pends also upon the memories of the wit-
nesses, for the records of the society had
been burned between the time of the alleged
passage oi.’ the resolution and the bringing
of the action. One of the witnesses testified.
in relation to the matter, that they all went
down to the oflice of Barnes & McCandless
and signed the note. Others are not certain
where the note was signed, but think prob-
ably it was there, and are not able to re-
member who was present at the time of the
signing. They all say that it was the un-
derstanding that they were not to be held
liable as individuals, but as trustees, but the
utterances which brought about the under-
standing are drnggedv out of the witnesses
by direct and leading questions. Referring
to the testimony of Waiter A. Bull, for in-
stance, when asked whcther there was any
talk about individual liability: “A. I think
there was. Q. What was said about that?
A. We wonldn’t sign only for the corpora-
tion. Q. What did Barnes say about that?
A. All right. Q. How much money do you
remember was to be loaned? A. $1,500. Q.
You have heard the note in controversy there
read? A. Yes. Q. Did you sign this note?
A. Yes. Q. How did you come to sign this
note? A. I signed the note for the associa-
tion. Q. Was this note given in pursuance
of the arrangement “had there with Mr.
Barnes? A. Yes. Q. Now, who drew up
this note? A. I don't know. Q. Where did
you sign the note? A. I think it was in Mr.
Barnes’ otiice. Q. When you signed it.
whom did you intend to bind? A. The fair
association. Q. Anybody else? A. No. Q.
Did you intend to bind yourself‘? A. No.
Q. Did you get any part of this money? A.
No. Q. Any benefit directly or indirectly
from it? A. N0. Q. What was done with
the money? A. I don't know. 1 think it
was used for the fair association.” So that
it seems the memory of the witness ls so
faulty about the tr'ansaction that he is not
even certain what use the money was put to
for which he made himself responsible; and
it is not sufllcient that his intention was, at
the time he signed the note, that he should
not be bound individually; but to escape the
responsibility of the individual note which he
signed, under the plea of a mistake, it must
not only plainly appear that it was his in-
tention that he should not be bound, but ll’
must as plainly appear that it was the in-
tention of Barnes & McCandiess. During the
testimony given by Tliomas Haley the fol-
lowing questions were answered: “Q. Do
you remember any resolution being passed
there? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember Wllu
drew it up? A. I don’t remember who drew
it up. I don't remember who was secretary.
Q. Now, what else occurred there at that
nicctiiig? \\'ns there any agreement madc-
between the president and .\ir. Barnes? A.
Yes, sir. Q. State what that agreement was.
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ocal, and convincing; that the fact that 
the grantor understood the transaction to 
be a mortgage Is not alone sufiiclent to prove 
It to be so, bnt If the evidence ls douhtfuJ 
and unsatisfactory-If It falls to overcome 
the strong presumption arising from the 
terms of the absolute deed by testimony en-
tirely clear and convincing beyond reaaron-
able controversy-the deed must have etrect 
In accordance with Its terms; that the un-
supported testimony of the plalntltr, contra-
dicted by the defendant, Is lnsutftclent to 
convert an absolute deed Jnto a mort:;ai:c. 
Here It wfll be obserred that It Is the un-
supported testimony of the defendants, con-
tradicting that or the plnlntllrs, which Is 
relied upon to relieve the detendant1;1 trow 
the obllgatlon Imposed by the written In-
strument. In Purington v. Akhurst, 74 Ill. 
400, It was decided thnt where a bfll ot sale 
ls made ot vessels for one-halt Interest there-
in It will require evidence of the clearest 
character to show that It was Intended only 
as a mortgage to secure a loan or advances. 
To the same effect 1.8 Sewell v. Price's 
Adm'r, 32 Ala. 97. ''To show by parol thn.t 
a deed absolute In form Is a mortgage. th<> 
evidence must be clear and convlnl'lng." 
McCormick v. Herndon, 67 Wis. 6-18, 31 N. 
W. 303. "The rule In cases of this kind," 
said the court In Cadman v. Peter, 118 U. S. 
73, 6 Sup. Ct. 957, "ts well settled. If the 
conveyance was In fee, under covenant ot 
warranty, and there ls no deten11ance, ei-
ther In the conveyance or collateral pa}l<'r, 
parol evidence to show that It was Intended 
to secure a debt, and to operate "only as n 
mortgage, must be clear, unt>qulvocnl, and 
convincing, or the presumi;>tlon that the ln-
tstrument la what It purports to be must pre-
vail." See, also, Howland v. Blake, 97 U. 
8. 624; Coyle v. Davia, 116 U. 8. 108. 6 Sup. 
Ct. 314; Tilden v. Streeter, 45 Mich. 533, 
8 N. W. 002. If a mere preponderance ot 
the testimony were all that was required to 
destroy the force of a written lnstrnment, 
there would be very little use In reducing 
an agreement to writing; for the pre11omler-
ance of testimony Is required IB any case 
t.o establish the afilrmatlve propositions as-
aerted. So that It muat be seen that it any 
eifect at all Is given to a written Instrument 
the rule of mere preponderance cannot at-
tach. 
In this case It had been several years from 
the tiwe the note was given until the action 
was tried, and the testimony of the defend-
ants satisfies us that their recollection ot 
events which transpired at the meeting tes· 
tlfled of could not be very deOnlte or certain. 
Neither la the testimony ot the defendants 
entirely harmonious. It Is testified by the 
defendants that a resolution was po11Sed by 
the board of trustees authorizing the b01·row-
lng of the money In question from Barnes & 
McCandless; that the trustees were called to-
gether for that purpose, and at the Instance 
of Barnee, who was present when the reso-
lutlon was passed. This resolution ls not 
even brought to bear In this case, but de-
pends also upon the memories ot the wtt-
nesses, for the records of the society bad 
been burned befween the time of the alleged 
passage ot the resolution and the bringing 
of the action. One of the witnesses testified. 
in relation to the matter, that they all went 
down to the ofilce ot Barnes & l\lcCandless 
and signed the note. Others are not certalu 
where the note was signed, but think prob-
ably It was there, and are not able to re-
member who was present at the time of the 
signing. They all say that It was the un-
derstanding that they were not to be held 
liable as individuals, but as trustees, but tile 
utterances which brought about the unde1·-
stnndlng are draggOO. out ot the wltnesges 
by direct and leading questions. Referring 
to the testimony of Walter A. Bull, tor In-
stance, when asked whether there was any 
talk about Individual llablllty: "A. I thlnli 
there was. Q. What was said about that? 
A. We wouldn't sign only for the corpora-
tion. Q. What did Barnes say about that? 
A. All right. Q. How much money do you 
remember was to be loaned? A. $1,500. Q. 
You have heard the no~e In controversy there 
read? A. Yes. Q. Did yon sign this note? 
A. Yes. Q. How did you come to sign this 
note? A. I signed the note for the aasocla-
tlon. Q. Was this note given In pursuance 
of the a1Tnngement 0 had there with Mr. 
Barnes? A. Yes. Q. :Sow, who drew up 
this note? A. I don't know. Q. Where did 
you sign the note? A.. I think It was In Mr. 
Barnes' otflce. Q. When you signed It, 
whom did you lnti>.nd to bind? A.. '.l'he fall· 
association. Q. Anybody else? A. No. Q. 
Did you Intend to bind yourselM A.. No. 
Q. Did you get any part ot this money? A. 
No. Q. Any benefit directly or Indirectly 
from It? A. No. Q. What was done with 
the money? A. I don't know. I think It 
was used tor the fair association." So that 
It seems the memory of the witness ts so 
faulty about the transaction that he Is not 
even <'ertaln what use the money was put to 
for which he made himself N>sponslble; 1LD1l 
lt Is not suftlclent that bis intention was, at 
the time he signed the note, that be should 
not be bound Individually; but to escape the 
responsibility ot the Individual note which he 
signed, under the plea of a mistake, It must 
not only plainly appear that it was his In-
tention that he should not be bound, but It 
must as plainly appear that It was the lu-
tentlon ot Barnes & McCandless. During the 
testimony given by Thomas Haley the fol-
lowing questions were answered: "Q. Do 
you remember any resolution being passed 
there? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember who 
drew It up? A. I don't remember who drew 
It up. I don't remember who was secretary. 
Q. Xow, what else occurred there at that 
ml>ctl11g·1 \Yas there any agreement mad<-
between the 1n·esldent nnd llr. Barnes? A. 
Yes, sir. Q. State what that agreement was. 
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A. .\Ir. Barnes was to loan the association
money, if the board of trustees would sign
the note. Q. Sign the note how? A. As an
association. Q. Was anything said about
personal liability? A. No, sir. Q. Was there
any talk there about the members of the
board not wanting to be personally liable?
A. There was talk about the members say-
ing they wouldn't be personally liable."
This testimony contradicts itself. for if there
was nothing said about personal liability
there could not have been anything said
about the members of the board being per-
sonally liable. The witness testities, how-
ever, that Hr. Barnes was to loan the asso-
ciation money if the. l)oard of trustees would
sign the note as an association. So it stands
to reason, if this question of personal re-
sponsibility had been called to the minds of
the defendants at that time, and the_v had
refused to sign individually, but had espe-
cially agreed to sign as trustees, that they
would have carried that agreement out by
signing as trustees, instead of signing as
individuals.
from the testimony of A. B. \Vhitson: “Q.
You can state how you know this meeting
was called for the purpose of passing this
resolution. (0bjected to.) Q. Did you hear
.\lr. Barnes talk about this matter? A. No,
sir. Q. Did he say anything at the meeting
about it‘! A. I don't remember what he said
at this meeting. It was discussed at this
meeting. Q. He was present at it?
Q. Now, what was said there, in his pres-
ence, about why the resolution had to be
passed‘! (Ubjected to. Sustained.) Q. Now,
state what transpired at this meeting. A.
We passed this resolution that we would
borrow this money of Barnes & McCandiess.
Q. What were the contents of that resolu-
tion? Do you remember? A. I don't re-
member its contents exactly. Q. What was
the substance of it? A. Well, the resolu-
tion was passed that we should borrow the
money from him. Q. Do you know who pro
pared that resolution? A'. The secretary. Q.
Now, was there any agreement entered into
there between the trustees for the corpora-
tion and Mr. Barnes‘! A. There was. Q.
State what that agreement was. State what
Mr. Barnes did. A. 1 don‘t know what .\lr.
Barnes said, but it was mutually understood.
ttlbjected to “mutually understood.") The
Court: You can state what the effect was of
what was said. State in substance. A.
'l‘here was a mutual understanding that we
were to sign this note and get the money
from Mr. Barnes. Q. IIow were you to sign
it? A. Sign it as trustees of the association."
So it will be seen from this testimony that
the witness, instead of stating the facts from
which a conclusion could be drawn by the
jury or by the court, simply stated the con-
clusions, thereby making himself a judge of
what state of facts would warrant Barnes
in coating to the conclusion that he should
look to the trustees instead of to the indi-
The following excerpt is taken 1
viduals who signed the note. Continuing:
"Q. Was there anything said there about the
individual liability of the trustees? A. Yes,
sir. Q. What was said? A. I remember it
was spoken of whether we would be ludi-
vidually liable in this or not. Q. Wa that
spoken of by the trustees? A. It was, in
open meeting. Q. Was Mr. Barnes there?
A. Yes. Q. Did Mr. Barnes say anything in
answer to that? A. I don't remember as he
did." In answer to the question. "How did
you come to sign this note sued upon here as
individuals?" theanswerwas: “I didn‘tsign
it as an individual. I signed it as trustee,
is my understanding. Q. Did any one ad-
vise you that this was the way to bind a
corporation. and make a statement to that
etfect? tubjected to. Overruled.) A. Idon't
know as 1 had any advice on the subject.
Q. Who drew up this note? A. I don‘t
know.” So that, so far as \Vhitson’s testi-
mony ls concerned. it is simply conclusive
of what his understanding was at the time
the note was signed, without proving or
tending to prove in any way the understand-
ing of the plaintiffs.
The testimony of Mc(‘andless, on the other
hand is to the effect that he was present at
the time of the drawing up and signing of
the promissory note in suit. He testifies
that the president of the association came to
the plaintiifs to know if they would loan the
‘ association some money, and the plaintiffs
A. Yes. ‘
told him they would not loan it a dollar.
“He then said, ‘Will you loan it to us indi-
vidually?’ I told him we‘ would, and he
went in and came back, and we drew up a
= note, and he took it and had it signed. Q.
When you say you would loan it to them
individually. to what individuals did you re-
fer‘! A. Well, during the conversation he
mentioned the individuals who would sign
the note, if we would let them have the
money,—.\Ir. Packwood, Mr. Bull, Mr. Haley,
Mr. Whitson, Mr. Geddis, and himself,—and
we told him we would loan those gentlemen
the money. Q. And you told him you would
not loan the association a dollar? A. Yes.
sir; that we would not loan it a dollar."
This testimony is objected to by the respond-
ents on the alleged ground that it does not
refer to the same transaction. The witness
states that it was on the same day—the day
prior to the signing of this note—that this
conversation occurred, and it is certainly as
near the transaction as is the testimony of
the defendants: for, according to their testi-
mony, the resolution and agreement spoken
of here were made from one to three days
before the signing of the note. The posi-
tive testimony of Mr. Barnes is that, when
asked by the president of the association to
loan said association money, he told him that
he would not loan the fair association any-
thing at all: “That we would not loan it
a dollar. But then he said he could get an
individual note, and named over certain par
ties he thought would sign the note, and
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Case No. 114] PROOF. 
A. lir. Barnes "·ns to loon the aSBoclatlon 
money, lf the board of trustt'et! would slgn 
the note. Q. Slgn the note how? A. As nn 
aiu10<'1atlon. Q. Waa anything said about 
pt>nil<>nal liability? A. No, slr. Q. Was there 
any talk there about the members of the 
board not wanting to be personally Un ble? 
A. There was talk about the meml>Prs say-
ing they wouldn't be pet·sonally llable." 
'l'hls testimony contradicts Itself, for lf tbere 
was nothing eald about personal liability 
there could not have been anything 11ald 
about the membeni of the board being per-
sonally liable. The wltnese testlfiPS. how-
ever, that :Mr. Barnes was to loan the asso-
ciation money lf the board of trustees would 
sign the note as an nssoclatlon. So It standa 
to rea1mu, If this qoastlon of penional rP-
11pouslblllty bad bet>n ('Riled to the minds of 
the defendants at that time, and tbt-y had 
refused to sign Individually, but bad eepe-
elally agreed to slim as trustees, that they 
would have cnrrled that agreement out by 
signing as trustee>&, Instead of signing as 
lndh·iduals. The following exeerpt ls taken 
from the testimony of A. B. Whitson: "Q. 
You can stat<' bow you lmow thl11 meeting 
Wal' called for the purpose Of paMlng thl!! 
resolution. (Objected to.) Q. Did you bear 
:Ur. BuruPs talk about this matter? A. No, 
sir. Q. Did he say anything at the meeting 
nbout It? A. I clon't remembPr what be said 
at this meeting. It was dlseu11sed at this 
meeting. Q. He was present at It? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what was said there, In bl11 pres-
eu~. about why the resolution bad to hP 
passed 1 (Objected to. Sustained.) Q. Now, 
atate what transpired at this meeting. A. 
We pai;sed this reROlutlon that we would 
borrow tllfe money of Barnes & .McCandless. 
(J. What were the contents of that resolu-
tion? Do you remember? A. I don't re-
membt>r its contents exactly. Q. What was 
the sub11tance of ft? A. Well, the reeolu-
tlon was p:u~.<ied that we should borrow the 
money from him. Q. Do you know who pre-
pared that resolution? A~ 1.'he secretary. Q. 
Now, was there any agreement entered Into 
there between the trustees for the corpora-
tion and Mr. Barnes? A. There was. Q. 
State whnt that agreement was. State what 
Mr. Blll'llt>ll did. A. 1 don't know what :Mr. 
Barnes snit.I, but It was mutually undt•rstoocl. 
lObjected to "mutually understood.") The 
Court: You can state what the etrect was of 
what was said. State in substan<·e. A. 
There W88 a mutual understanding that we 
were to sign this note and get the money 
from Mr. Barnes. Q. How were you to sl~ 
it? A. Sign 1t as trustet•s of the a1111oclatlon." 
So it will be 11een from this te11tlmony that 
t11e witness, instead of stating the facts from 
which a conclusion could be drawn by the 
Jury or by the court, simply stated the con-
clusion11, thert>by making hlm11elf a judge of 
what state of facts would warrant Harnes 
In coming to the conclusion that he 11hould 
look to the tl'llstees instead of to the lndf· 
332 
vlduals who signed the note. Continuing: 
"Q. Was there anything said there about the 
Individual Jlablllty of the trustees? A. Y~'ll. 
sir. Q. Wlmt was eald? A. I remember It 
wag 11poken of whether we would be lndl-
vldunlly llnble tu this or not. Q. Wu that 
f.1Poken of by the trustees? A. It was. In 
'open ml'l•tlng. Q. Was ~Ir. Barnes there? 
A. Yes. (,l. Did Mr. Barnes say anything In 
answer to that? A. I don't remember as be 
dl<l." In Rnswer to the question, "How did 
you come to sign this note sued upon here aa 
Individuals?" tbean11werwas: "I dldn'tslgn 
It as an Individual. I signed It as trustl.'<', 
ls my understanding. Q. Did any one ad-
vlee you that this was the way to bind a 
corporation, and make a statement tQ thnt 
eff .. ct? \Objected to. Overruled.) A. I don't 
know as 1 had any advice on the subj1•<'t. 
Q. Who drew up thl8 note? A. I don't 
know." So that, so far as Wbltson's test!· 
mony ls roncerned, It ls simply con<'lusl\"e 
of what his underst:mdlng was at the tlml' 
the note was signed, without proving or 
tending to prove In any way the understand-
ing of the lJlalntltrs. 
The testimony of ::\lc<'andless, on the other 
hand ls to the effect that he was present at 
the time of the drawing up and signing of 
the promissory note ln suit. He testifies 
that the president of the association came to 
the plain titre to know If they would loan the 
88110cl11tlon some mont>y, and the plalntl.ll's 
told him they would not loan It a dollar. 
1 "He then snld, 'Wlll you loan It to us lndl-
vldually ?' I told him we· would, and be 
went ln abd came back, and we drew up a 
' note, and he took It and had It signed. Q. 
·wht>n you eay you would loan It to th~w 
Individually, to what lndlvlduals did you re-
fer? A. Well, during the conversation ht> 
mentioned the Individuals who would sign 
the note, If we would let them have the 
money,-llr. Packwood, .Mr. Bull, Mr. Haley, 
Mr. Whitson, .Mr. Geddis, and hlmself,-and 
we told him we would loan those gentlemen 
the money. Q. And you told him you would 
not loan the 8880Cl11tlon a dollar? A. Yes. 
slr; that we would not loan It a dollar." 
This testimony Is objected to by the respond-
ents on the alleged ground that It does not 
refer to the same transaction. The wltne1111 
states that lt was on the sume day-the day 
prior to the signing of this note-that this 
conversation occurred, and It ls certainly as 
near the transaction as 18 the testimony of 
the dt>fE>n<tants; for, according to tht>lr testl· 
mony, the resolution and agreement f.1POken 
of here were made from one to thn>e days 
befot·e the signing of the note. The posi-
tive testimony of Mr. Barnes ls that, when 
asked by the pre1ddent of the association to 
loan snld a88oclatlon money, be told him that 
be would not loan the fair aseoclatlon any. 
thing at all: "That we would not loan It 
a dollar. But thl•n he !18.ld he couhl lilet an 
lndlvhlual note, and named ovPr c<'rtnln par 
ties he thought would sign the note, and 
ORAL EVlDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS. [Case No. 114
asked if he could get the money if those
parties would go on the note [mentioning
the names of the parties who now appear
on the note]. I told him, while we were all
there together, if he would get a note signed
by those parties individually we would let
him have the money. I made out the note
myself, and he took it, and afterwards
brought it back with those names on there.
Q. Did you pay out the money on the note?
A. I did." The witness also testified that
he knew of the financial condition of the as-
sociation; that there was a mortgage on its
property for $2,500, and he knew that it
would not be a safe investment to loan it
money. This witness testifies, besides, that
the note was not signed in his oiiice at all.
but that it was delivered to the president of
the society, who obtained the signatures.
It can be readily gathered from the testi-
mony of the witnesses for the defense that
they are not certain where the note was
signed. Some of them testified that they
thought it was signed in the office of Barnes
& McCandless. In fact, there is a mist of
uncertainty hanging over their testimony in
regard to the whole transaction; just such
uncertainty as might be expected where men
are relying upon their memories concerning
the transaction of several years before, un-
certainties which it is the special ofllce of a
written agreement to avoid.
There is another circumstance in this case
which strengthens the theory of appellants.
and that is that certain signers of this note.
some years afterwards, when they were
pressed for payment, individually agreed
each one to pay the one-fourth of this note..
'i‘his agreement is testified to by Kalli-Tlmill.
a disinterested witness, and is a pertinent
circumstance in the case. Again, the form
of the note itself indicates that the under-
standing was as testifled to by Barnes. If
these parties had intended to sign a note
binding the corporation only, they would
have signed it as they did, adding after their
names, “Trustees of the Agricultural Fair
Association." Such a signing as this would
simply have been held to have been descrip-
tivc of the names _of the signers, and would
probably not have bound the association;
but it would have indicated the intention of
the parties to bind the association, and
would have been such a. signing as the or-
dinary citizen, not acquainted with technical
law, would have executed. But here the
note not only is not signed, “The Agricul-
tural Fair Association, by Packwood et ai..”
nor “Pack\\'0od et al., for the Agricultural
Fair Association," nor “Packwood et al.,
Trustees of the Agricultural Fair Associa-
tion“; but is signed in such a manner that
it indicates that there was no attempt or
thought of binding the association in any
way. It is true that there occurs in the note
this language, “For the use of the Agricul-
tural Fair Association." This is explained
by the testimony of Barnes that they told
him they wanted that inserted so that it
would show where the money went, as the
money was actually for use of the fair asso-
ciation, and assisted them in keeping their
books with the said association. It is also.
no doubt, true that the resolution was passed
authorizing these trustees to borrow money
for the association. In fact, it is not likely
that they would have borrowed it under
any circumstances had not such a resolution
been passed, and the will of the association
been thereby expressed. But, in our Judg-
ment, that was ail the effect that the reso-
lution had, and from that resolution the
trustees felt warranted in borrowing money
for the use of the association, and made
themselves personally liable for the same,
looking to the society for their pay, and rely-
ing upon the resolution as authority for bor-
rowing the money. It is true that there are
four witnesses who testify here in favor of
the contention of the respondents. and only
two in favor of that of the appellants. But
this, as we have said before, can go no fur-
ther than a preponderance of the testimony,
conceding the witnesses to be all of equal
credibility. We think there are no cases sus-
taining the doctrine that the presumption
that a written instrument expresses the true
agreement of the parties can be overcome by
a mere preponderance of the testimony. The
judgment will be reversed, and the cause re-
manded with instructions to give judgment
to the plaintiffs for the amount asked for in
the complaint.
SCOTT, ANDERS, STILE-S, and HOYT,
JJ., concur.
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ORAL EVlDE~CE TO VARY OR EXPLAl~ DOCUllEN'r:S. [Case No. 114 
asked if he could get the money it those 
parties would go on the note [mentioning 
the names of the parties who now appear 
on the note]. I told him, while we were all 
there together, lf he would get a note signed 
by those parties indlvldually we would let 
him have the money. I made out the note 
myself, and be took It, and afterwards 
brou,ght It ba<'k with those names on thrre. 
Q. Did you pay out the money on the note? 
A. I dld." The witness also tPstUled that 
be knew of the ftnanclal condition of the as-
sociation; that tht>re was o. mortgage on Its 
property for $2,500, and he knew that it 
would not be a safe Investment to loan ft 
money. This witness testifies, bPsldes, thnt 
tho note was not signed In his oftlce at all. 
but that It wns dellvered to the president of 
the society, who obtained the signatures. 
It can be readily gathered from the testi-
mony of the witnesses for the defense that 
they are not certain where the note wa" 
signed. Some of them testified that •bt•y 
thought It was signed In the oftlce of Bnl'llr.s 
& McCandless. In fact, there ls a mist of 
uncertainty hanging over their testimony In 
regard to the whole transaction; just such 
uncertainty as might be expected where men 
are relying upon their memories concerulng 
the transaction of several years b!'fore, un-
certainties which It ls the special oftlce of a 
written agreement to avoid. 
There Is another circumstance In this case 
which strengtheDB the theory of appellants, 
and that Is that certain signers of this note, 
some years afterwards, when they were 
pressed tor payment, Individually agreed 
each one to pay the one-fourth of this note. _ 
'rhls agreement Is testified to by I~auA'11111n, 
a disinterested witness, and ls a pt•rttnent 
circumstance In the case. Again, the form 
of the note Itself Indicates that the under-
standing was as testified to by Barnes. It 
these parties had intended to sign a note 
binding the corporation only, they would 
have signed It as they did, adding after their 
names, "Trustees of the Agricultural Fair 
Auociatlon." Such a signing as this would 
simply have been held to have been descrip-
tive of the names of the signers, and would 
probably not have bound the association; 
but It would have Indicated the Intention of 
the partlea to bind the association, and 
would huve been such a signing u the or-
dinary citizen, not acquainted with technical 
law, would have executed. But here the 
note not only Is not signed, ''The Agricul-
tural Fair .Association, by Packwood et al." 
nor "Packwood et al., tor the Agricultural 
Fair Association," nor "Packwood et al., 
Trustees of the Agricultural Fair Associa-
tion"; but ls signed ln such a manner tlmt 
It lndlcn.tes that there was no attempt or 
thought of binding the association ln any 
way. It ls true that there occurs In the note 
this language, "For the use of the Agricul-
tural Fair ASBOClatlon." This ls explained 
by the testimony of Barnes that they told 
him they wanted that inserted so tnat It 
would show w)lere the money went, as the 
money was actually for use of the fair aBSo-
clatlon, and &Bslsted them ln keeping their 
books with the said aSBOclatlon. It ls also, 
no doubt, true that the resolution was paBSed 
authorizing these trustees to borrow money 
for the association. In tact, It ls not likely 
that they would have borrowed It under 
any circumstances had not such a resolution 
be<•n passed, and the wlll ot the aBBOClatlon 
been thereby expressed. But, In our Judg-
ment, that was all tli.e effect that the reso-
lution had, and from that resolution the 
trustet-s felt warranted in borrowing money 
for the use of the association, 8Jld made 
themsel\'es personally liable tor the same, 
looking to the society for their pay, and rely-
ing upon the resolution as authority tor bor-
rowing the money. It ls true that there are 
four witnesses who testify here In favor or 
the contention of the reti(loudents, and only 
two ln favor of that of the 11.ppellants. lsut 
this, as we have said before, can go no rur-
ther than a preponderance of the testimony, 
conceding the witnesses to be all of equal 
credlblllty. We think thel'e are no cases sus-
taining the doctrine that the p1·esumptlon 
that a Wl"ltten Instrument expre&8ell the true 
agreement of the parties can be overcome by 
a mere preponderance of the testimony. The 
judgroent wlll be reversed, and the cause re-
manded with Instructions to give judgment 
to the plalntUrs for the amount asked for In 
the complaint. 
SCOTT, ANDERS, STILES, and HOYT, 
JJ .. concur. 
Case No. 115]
PROOF.
THOMAS et al. v. SCUTT.
(27 N. E. 961, 127 N. Y. 133.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Division.
June 2, 1891.
Appeal from a. judgment of the general
term of the supreme court. in the fourt.h
iudicial department, affirming a judgment
entered on the report of a referee. Action
to recover the sum of $800 alleged by the
plaintiffs to be due them from the defend-
ant upon the sale of a quantity of lumber.
The defendant denied the purchase. and
alleged that all the lumber that he had of
the plaintiffs‘ was turned out to him to se-
cure advances that he had previously
made to them, under the express agree-
ment that it should be rafted to market,
and sold as his lumbcr.and thathe should
account to them for the proccetls thereof
when received, after deducting all ex-
penses and the amount of their indebted-
ness to him. The defendant further al-
leged that,owing to low water in the Del-
aware river, the lulnber could not be got
to market without great expense, neces-
sarily incurred in taking it out of the river
and rerafting it, and that the proceeds
received by him were much less than the
actual expenses and the amount of his
claim against the plaintiffs. The action
was tried before a referee. who found that
June ll, 1883. the lumber in question was
sold by the plaintiffs to the defendant for
the sum of $728, \vhich was to be applied
by him upon a chattel mortgage given
by them upon said lumber and other
property to secure a debt of $l.60’l,and
that soon after the balance of the mort-
gage was paid in cash. It appeared that
the defendant, at about the date of the
alleged sale, took possession of the lum-
ber, and,after some delay. sold it; but,
owing to the unusual difficulty of getting
it to mnrket.little or nothing was real-
ized abovs expenses.
W. J. Welsh. for appellant. A. Taylor
and John B. Gleason, for respondents.
VANN, J., (after stating the facts as
above.) Upon the trial, the plaintiffs put
in evidence a. written instrument. dated
June ll. 18823, duly signed by them, of
which the following is a copy, viz.: “For
the consideration hereinafter named, we
hereby sell, assign, transfer, and deliver
to Milo Scutt one raft of hemlock toggle
timber. and loading thereon, now lying
at Equinunk Eddy, just below the Rock.
in Buckingham township, Pa., the said
lumber being covered by a chattel mort-
gage of which the mortgage hereto at-
tached is a copy. viz.:
4,000 feet cherry boards. at $12.. . $ 48 00
85,000 maple plank, about, at $l0 350 00
11,000 feet of toggle timber, at 3 .. , 3 0 00
$728 00
—The same to apply on the amount due on
said chattel mortgage, and, if any mis-
take in amount of lumber, same to be
corrected." A chattel mortgage was an-
nexed to this writing, dated March ‘.29,
1583, given by the plaintiffs to defendant
to secure the payment of $1,600 on the
first of May following. It covered a large
quantity of lumber in addition to that
mentioned in the written agreement. and
stated that it was all at Peas Eddy. a.
place within the state of New York. The
indebtedness of the plaintiffs to the de-
fendant on the llth of June. 1883. amount-
ed to the sum of $2.100, including that se-
cured b_v the chattel mortgage. The
plaintiffs also showed that, shortl__v after
the written instrument was given, they
paid to the defendant enough money to
fully equal the amount unpaid upon the
mortgage, provided said sum of $728 had
first been applied. Thereupon the defend-
ant, in due form, offered to show " what
was said between the parties in reference
to the bill of sale,” but the offer was ex-
cluded. upon the ground that the writing
was the best evidence, and that it could
not be contradicted or avoided by parol.
The defendant further sought to prove
“that. prior to and at the time of the
drawing of the bill of sale. the plaintiffs
refused to make an absolute disposition
of the lumber; that they were informed
that such was not intended, but that the
raft was in Pcnlisylvania, and that the
chattel mortgage did not protect defend-
ant against a levy upon or disposition of
the lumber b_v the plaintiffs in that state;
that plaintiffs should have the full benefit
of the lumber, and what it brought on
the sale when marketed, after paying the
plaintiffs'claim, and the expense of run-
ning and marketing it: thatplaintiffs said
they were satisfied with that, and would
make the bill of sale on this basis. and
thereupon did sign the bill of saie." This
evidence was also objected to and exclud-
ed upon the same ground. At a later
stage of the trial the defendant. under the
same objection, was permitted to testify
in reference to whatwas said between him-
self and one of the piaintiffsjust before
the written instrument, called for conven-
ience a-"bill of sale," was executed; but it
was subsequently stricken out on motion
of the plaintiffs, and against the objec-
tion of the defendant. upon the same
ground that bad governed the prior rul-
ings. Exceptions to these decisions of
the referee present the only question that
the learned counsel for the defendant has
asked us to decide. It is ageneral rule
that evidence of what was said between
the parties to a valid instrument in writ-
ing. either prior to or at the time ofits ex-
ecution. cannot be received to contradict
or vary its terms. This rule is not uni-
versal in its application, because the
courts. in their effort to prevent fraud
and injustice. have laid down certain ex-
ceptions. which. although correct in prin-
ciple. are sometimes so loosely applied in
practice as to threaten the integrity of the
rule itself. l (ireenl. Ev. § 284:1. 'l‘he
real exceptions maybe grouped in two
classes.the first of which includes those
cases in which parol evidence has been re-
ceived to sho w that that which purportsto
bea writlen contract is in fact no colltract
at all. Thus. fraud, illegality, want of
consideration, delivery upon an unper-
formed condition. and the like, may be
shown by parol, not to contradict or
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Case No. 115] PlWOF. 
THOMAS et al. v. SCUTT. 
(27 N. E. 961, 127 N. Y. 133.) 
Court of A)lpeals of Xew York, Sl'cond Division. 
June 2, 1891. 
Appeal from a judgment of the genera.I 
term of the supreme court, in the fourth 
judil'lnl de1>11rt111ent, affirming a judgment 
entered on the report or a rf:'feree. Action 
to recover the Hurn or f~oo alleged b:\' the 
plalnttfJs to I.le due them from the defend-
ant upon the 1mle ore quantity of lumbPr. 
The defendant denied the purchase. and 
alleJ(el! that all the lumber that he had or 
the plaintlffR' was turned out to hlm to ee· 
curP. aclvnnl'es tlu1t he bed pre,·lo111ily 
made to them, under the exr1re11H ngrt>e-
ment chat It 11hould b~ rartl'd to mnr·krt, 
an1l 1ml<.! n11 hh1h1111ht•r,11111I tlrnt he Rliould 
accom• •. to the Jn for ttw pr"'=""' I" thPreof 
when received, eftflr deducting t1ll ex-
p£n11es and thP amount of their lnclt•bte11-
oeHe to him. The defentlunt further al-
lt'ged thnt,owlng to low water In thP Del-
aware river, the lumber r.011111 not be got 
to murket without great expense, nel'l'R · 
Hurll,v hu:m·red In taking it out of the rlv1~1· 
end rernftlng It, an<l that the procee1le 
rec~lve1I by him were much lees than the 
artunl ex11ensea eo1l thP amount of his 
claim against the plalotiff.i. 'l'he action 
wus tried hefore a rderee, who found thttt 
.rune 11, 1~~1. the lumher In queHtlon wee 
eol<l hy the plnlntiff11 to the cleft!ndant for 
the Rnm of fi:!8, which was to be applied 
by him upon a l'huttel mortgage gl \•en 
by them upon tmld lumher and other 
property to ..... ·ure u dt>l.Jt of $1.60'I, anll 
thu t Moon after the balanl'e of the mort-
gage was paid In ca11h. It appeared that 
the defemhmt, at abont the date of the 
alleged sale, took p0Hfol~1111lon of the lum-
be", and, after some delay. solrl It; bur, 
owing to the u11us1Jal tllftlcnlty of getting 
it to mnrket. little or nothing was 1·eal-
lzed uhovp, t•xpen11e11. 
W. J. l-l'Plsll. for a1>pellant. A. Taslor 
ttnd Joll11 B. Gle11srm, fur respondents. 
VANN, J., (nfter stating the facts· 88 
above.) U111111 tlw trlnl, the pl&lnliffH put 
In evlrlence a written ln11rrument. rla te1I 
June 11. lSX:l, duly Hl1rned l.Jy them, of 
which thP folluwl111t le a copy, viz.: "For 
thP con11l<leratlon herPlnnfter namccl. we 
hereby 11ell, asHlgu, transfer, and dellvl'r 
to Milo Scutt one raft of ltemlock toagle 
timber. and loading thereon, ni>w lvi11g 
at F.qulnunk Eddy, ju11t below the Ifol'k, 
In Hul'kin~luuu towuship, Pa., the suicl 
lumber being covered by a chattel mort-
gage of which the mortgage hereto at-
tal'hed le a 1·opy, viz.: 
4.000 feet cherry boards, at S12 . . ...••••••• g 411 oo 
115,000 maple plank, about, at i10......... •• a;-)(J oo 
11,000 feet of toggle timber, at Sc......... 8 O 00 
$728 00 
-The11ume toup11lyontbe nruount <1111• on 
said d1u ttel mort~ngP, and, If nny 111h1-
take in nmonnt of lumb .. r, same to Lie 
t•orrl'Ctecl." A c·hattPI mortgn~e WUR a11-
1wxe1l to thlH writing-, dated l\f11rd1 2'J, 
11S~3. given by the pluintiffs to dl•fenchmt 
a:H 
to 1tecure the payment of fl,600 on the 
flrHt or Muy following. It CO\'ered a !urge 
qunntlty of lumber In addition to tlrat 
mPntloned In the written agreemt'nt. 11nd 
stated tilnt it was all at Peas Eddy. a. 
plal'e within the state of New York. 'l'he 
lmlt-btedueeH of the plalntlff11 to the de-
fendu ot on the 11th of .June, 1&!3. amount-
ed to the sum or $2.100, Including that. se-
cured by the chattel mortJrRJrf'. The 
ple1ntlff'4 111110 showe1I that, Hhnrtly ofter 
the wl'ltten Instrument was given, tlley 
paid to the defendant enough monE>y to 
fnlly equal the amount unpuid upon the 
mortgui.:e, provided Knlcl 1111111 of $728 hnrl 
Hr11t been tttiplled. Tt1ereupon the dPlencl· 
ant, in due form, offered to show" what 
wue sahJ hetwet•11 the pnrtlE>R in reference 
to the I.Jiii of tlnle," but the offer was ex-
clullP1]. upon the grounCI tha ~ the writing 
was the best evhJenct', an1l tllftt It could 
not be contradlctecl or &'rold~d by parol. 
The de!(•ndunt furthe1· sought to prove 
"the t, prll•r to an cl at the time of the 
druwl11i; of the blll of Hall', the plaintiffs 
re!usl'd to make an aheolute dlHposltion 
or the lumher; that they were Informed 
thnt flUl'h wa"' not Intended, bnt that the 
raft was In Pcnni'yh•ania, 1rnd that the 
chattel m•>rtgage dicl not protect dl'feocl-
an t u~alnHt e le\'Y npon or dlspuRltlon of 
the lumher hy the )llalntitte In that state; 
that plulntlttH should have the full bPnetlt 
of the lumber, and what It brouv:ht on 
the sale when marketed, after paying the 
plalntlffe' claim, anti the expemie uf run-
ning and markPtlng It; Uta t plaintiffs said 
tlwy were enti11fiNl with that, and would 
make thP. bill of i,1nle on this basis. and 
tlwreupon did Rlgn the hlll of sale." This 
evltlence wue 11lso objected to and exclud-
ed upo11 the folll me ground. At a litter 
stage of tbR trial the defe11d1int, under the 
11nme ohjectlon, was permitted to teHtlfy 
111 refe1.,.nce to what was 11ald betwePn him· 
self anil on11 of the plaintiffs juHt bt'fore 
tht' written lnetrnment, calle1l for cotn•en-
lenl'e a··• bill of sale," w11s executed; hut It 
waR Huhseqnently stril'ken out on motion 
of the plain tlff11, and against the ut.)PC· 
tion of the clefendnnt, upon the 1mme 
ground that Imel p;ovemed the prlor rul· 
Inge. Excr•ptlons to the11e declsiooM of 
the referee pre1>ent the ouly question that 
the learoell con11Rel for the defendant bu.s 
a11kPcl ue to decide. It le a general rule 
that evlilPnce or what woe eald between 
the parties to a valid lnstrumPnt In writ-
ing. either prl1Jrto or at the time of Its ex· 
ecutlon. cannot he receh·ed to contrnclll·t 
or vury Its termH. '!'hie rule le not unl-
VP.real In Its application, because the 
courts, In thdr effort to prevent fraud 
and lnjm~tlcE>, havt> lald down c~rtaln ex-
Ct'l•lions. which, altho111{h correct in prln-
clpll'. al'e so•netlmes so looRely Appllecl In 
Jll'ltctit'e as to threaten the integrity or the 
rule lti,;elf. J Ureenl. Ev. § 21'411. The 
reul exceptions may be groupPrl In two 
clm111eR. the flrHt of which lnclnde11 thoRe 
cuHes In whlrh 1mrol evidence haH bePn rc-
ct>i'red to show thnt thnt which purports to 
hea written contract iR In fal't no contract 
at all. 'l'hus, fraud, Illegality, want or 
cun11iclerntion, rll'livt>r.v u11011 an unper-
forml'd co1111ltion. and the like, muy be 
shown b,y pa1·ol, not to contradict or 
ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS. [Case N0. 1l5
vary, but to destroy, a written instru-'
ment. Such prooi docs not recognize the
contract as ever existing as a valid agree-
ment, and is received. from the necessity
of the case, to snow that that which ap-
pears to be is not. and never was. a con-
tract. Illustrations oi this class may be
iound in the following citations: Beet-ker
v. Vrooman, 13 Johns. 301; Hammond v.
Hopping. 13 Wend. 50.5; Johnson v. Miln,
14 Wend. 195; Benton v. Martin. 52 N.
Y 570; Grierson v. Mason. 60 N. Y. 39-i;
I Greenl. Ev. § 284: Phil. Ev. (2 Cow. &
H. notes) p. 665. note 49-l. The second
class embraces tliose cases which recog-
nize the written instrument as existing .
and valid, but regard it as incomplete,
either obviously. or at least possibly. and
admit pnroi evidence. not to contradict
or vary. but to complete, the entire agree-
ment, of which the writing is only a. part.
Receipts. bills oi parcels, and writings
that evidently express only some parts oi
the agreement. are examples of this class,
which leaves the written contract un-
changed. but treaisit as a purtoi an entire
oral agreement, the remainder oi which
was not reduced to writing. Two things
however. are essential to bring a case
within this class: (1) The writing must
not appear. upon inspection. to be a com-
plete contract, embracing all the particu-
lars necessary to make a periect agree-
ment. and designed to express the whole
arrangement between the parties, ior in
such a case it is conclusively presumed to
embrace the entire contract. (2) The pa-
rol evidence must be consistent with, and T
not contradictory oi, the written instru-
ment. Chapin v. Dohson, 78 N. Y. 74, is an
instance oi this class. nnd. although near
the border line, illustrates thetworcquire-
ments just mentioned. In that case it
was held competent to show by parol ev-
idence that a. written contract to iurnish
machinery oi a specified kind. at a deiinite
price, within a certain time, and to deliv-
er it in a particular way, was part oi an
entire verbal contract, which provided
that the machines should be so made that
they would do the work oi the person
who ordered them to his satisiaction.
'l"he ground oi the decision was that
there was nothing on the lace oi the in-
strument to show that it was the whole
_agreement between the parties, and that
the oral guaranty did not contradict and
was not inconsistent with the written
contract.
In Eighmie v. Taylor. 98 N. Y. 288, the
court bad under consideration a written
instrument that was regarded as, upon
inspection, appearing to be a full, deli-
nite. and complete agreement oi’ bargain
and sale, and therefore held that evidence
oi a verbal warranty in that r-use was
inadmissible. ln the course oi‘ the opin-
ion. comment was made upon (‘hapin v.
Dohson, supra, in this way; " It was said
oi the instrument then in question that
there was nothing upon its lace to show
that it was intended to express the whole
contract between the parties; the inter-
;-nce being. as was declared in an earlier
case, that where a contract does iudica te
such intention and (lcsigu. nnd is one con-
summated by the wiiting, the presump-
tion oi law arises that the written instru-
ment coniains the whole of the agree-
ment. and that, where there is such form-
al contract oi bargain and sale executed
in writing, there can be no question but
that the parties intended the writing as
a repository Ji the agreement itseii;"
citing Filkins v. Whyland. 24 N. Y. 338. A
i'urther illustration oi the inflexibility oi the
first of the two requirements mentioned
may be seen in the still latercnse oi Marsh
v. McNair, 99 N. Y. 174, 1 N. E. Rep. 660.
where the written instrument was in
these words: “This is to certify that, in
consideration of crediting (‘-. H. Marsh at
the Exchange Bank oi Lima, $353.72, pay-
ing mortgage (on property formerly deed-
ed by J. R. Marsh. in Avon, to (J. W. Gib-
sou) given by Williain F. Russell to (‘. H.
Marsh, $110.46. and iudorsing $35.82 upon
a note made by U. H. Marsh, June 8. 1871,
for $300, we jointly and severally sell, as-
sign, and transicr all our right title, and
interest in two policies. Nos. 4.277 and
4,287. upon the lives oi Charles H. Marsh
and John R. Marsh. issued by the Nation-
al Liie Insurance Company oi the United
States oi’ America to (‘hnuncey W. Gibson,
oi 1 -Ina, J. Y.” It was held that. in the
absence oi any claim oi iraud or mutual
mistake as to the contents oi the assign-
ment, it was conclusi\'e,and that oral evi-
dence was incompetent to show that it
was executed as collateral security only.
The opinion recognizes as well settled
that an instrument assigning or convey-
ing real or personal property in absolute
terms may, by parol evidence. be shown
to have been intended as security mere-
ly; states the history oi the exception,
and its theory; but declares, in words ap-
plicable to the casein hand. that “this in-
strument is more than an assignment. It
contains what both parties agreed to do.
It shows that the assignment was made
ior the purpose mentioned, and precisely
what Gibson was to do in consideration
thereoi. He became hound to do precisely
what was specified ior him to do, and he
could have been sued by the assignors ior
damages ii‘ he had iailed to periorm.
Hence the instrument is not a mere as-
signment or transieroi the policy. It is a
contract in writing, within the rule which
prohibits parol evidence to explain, varv.
or contradict such contracts.” The au-
thorities cited in the opinion apply with
equal force to the case now under consid-
eration.
'i‘he principle upon which parol evidence
is held admissible to show that a simple
assignment. although absolute in terms,
was intended as security merely is the sup-
posed incompleteness oi the instrument.
and it is not regarded ascontradictingthe
writing. but as showing its purpose.
Truscott v. King. 6 N. Y. 147.161; (‘hester
v. Bank. 16 N. Y. 336, 343; Horn v. Ketel-
tas, 46 N. Y. 605, 610. V»-'hcre. however, in-
stead oi a mere transfer or assignment.
there is e. contract, appearing on its
lace to be complete. with mutual obliga-
tions to be peri )l'illi‘(l. “you can no more
add to or contradict its legal effect by pa-
rol stipulations, preceding or accompany-
ing its execution, than you can alterit.
through the same means, in any other re-
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Tary, but to 11estroy, a written lnl!tro- ., 
meut. Such proof dot's not rt'COJtnlze the 
-contract as ever exl11th1Jt as a ,·ull!l agree- ! 
ment, und Is received. from the net•e!!slty 
-Of the cBBe, to Hhow that that which up-
pea1'8 to be Is not, and never was. a con-
nact. lllustratlor111 or this class may be 
found In the followlnJt cltatlom1: Beecker 
v. Vrooman, 13 .Johns. 301; Hammond v. 
Bopping. rn Wencl. 5Ua; Johmmn v. Milo, 
14 Wt>nd. l!I;;; Benton v. Martin. 52 N. 
Y 5711; Grlemon v . .Mfl11on. 60 N. Y. 394; 
1 Green!. Ev. § 284; Phil. Ev. (2 Cow. & 
H. notes) p. 6(1i,, note 49.J. 'fhe Recoml 
class embract•s tHm1e caKe11 which recog-
nize the written lnstr11ment BK existing ' 
and valid, I.Jut reg11rd lt as Incomplete, , 
either obviously, or at leaRt posMlbly, and 
ad:11lt pnrol evidence. not to contradict 
~Jr Y'lry. but to <.'omplete, the entire ugree-
meut, of which the writing i'I only a part. 
Recel(Hl!I, l.Jill11 ol 11urcelM, und writings 
that evidently ex1n·e11s only 1mme parts of 
the ogreement. are example" of thl11 clat1s, 
which leaves the written r.ontract un-
chanl(ed. but tren1sltaR a part of an entire ' 
oral ugreement., tbe rema!nder of which 
was not reduced to writing. Two things 
howe,·er, are e11sentlal to bring a c11ee 
within tble clnse: (1) The wrltlnJr must 
not ap11ear. upon Inspection, to be a com-
plete contrn<.'t, t>mhradng all the particu-
lars neces1mry to make a perfect agree-
ment, und dPslgned to expresR the whole 
~rrangement between tbt> 11artleF1, for In 
14UCb a ca11e It Is conclusively pretrnmed to 
f'mbrnee the entire contra1~t. (2) 'fhe pa-
rol e\'irleuce muRt be consistent with, tmd 
J1ot contradictory of, the written ln1Jtru-
ment. Chapin v. Dohson, 7~ N. Y. i4, le an-
lnst11nce of this cittss. 11111!, nlthough uear 
the border line, Illustrates thetworl•quire· 
ments juHt mentioned. In that caHe It 
watt held compett>ot to 11ho\V l.Jy par:.il ev-
idenre that a written contract tu furnish 
machinery of a 11pecltled kind. at a definite 
prict!, within a cPrtaln tlnw. anll to dellv-
t.-r it in a particular way, wait part or 11n 
t.'nth-e vt>rbal contract, which p1·ovlllerl 
that the machlneH should he so mude thut 
they would do the work of the person 
who orden>d tht>m to hlK satlld11ctlon. 
'fbe ground or the drcl11lon was that 
there waR oothlug on the race of the lri-
strumt>nt to show that It was the whole 
.11~rt>e111ent betwt>en the parties, anti th11t 
the orel guaranty dlcl nut <.'ontralllct and 
w11s not lncon11l11tent wltb the written 
contract. 
In Elghmle v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288, the 
C?onrt bnd under consldt>ra tlon a written 
instrument that wu11 rt>ganled as, upon 
inHpectlon, appearing to l.Je a full, '!Pfl-
nlt.-. and complete uirree111Pn t of bar~aln 
and sale, nod the1·efore hclil t hut evldPm·e 
of a \'erhal warrunty In thnt rn14c waR 
Inadmissible. Jn the com·He of the opln· 
ion. comment waR made upon f'hapln v. 
Dob1<on. supra, lu thiK way: "It waH t<llld 
of the instrument then In queHtlon that 
there Wllll nothing upon Its fact> to 1:1how 
that it wns lntendt'd to e:rpl'f'Hi4 tlw whole 
cun tro<' t bet WPen the pa rtleR; tlw In rl'r-
,.nce bt>lng;, aR watt declared In an earlit>r 
t•ase, that where a contract does lt11lk11te 
Moch Intention untl th'llll.\"n. 11n1l ill one 1·on-
Hummated by the wilting, the prt>1:1u111p-
tlon of law a rleP.s that the written lnstru-
mi>n t cont11i1111 the whnlt> of the Agree-
ment, and that, where there l1t 11uch form-
al rontruct of barp;a In and 11ale e:recntt-d 
In writing, there cau be no question hut 
that the parties lnteuded tbu writing as 
a re1>u11ltory Jf the agreement ltseU;" 
<.'ltlng Filkins v. Whylanll, 24 N. Y. 838. A 
further lllustration or the inttexlbllity of the 
first of the two reqnlremt>nts mentioned 
muy be seen In the 11tlll lotercnse of lfarHb 
v. McNalr, 99 N. Y. 174, 1 N. E. Rep. 660. 
where the written ln11trument wall In 
these words: "Thie Is to certify that, In 
con11hleratlon or <.'l'edltlng C.H. Mar11h at 
the Exchange Bunk of Limn, $3fi3.i2, 11ay-
lnJC mortgage (on prope1·ty for1only deed-
ed I>.\' J. fl. MarRh, lo Al'on, to C. W. Glb-
11on) gh·en hy \\'illinm F. Hu1<sell to(', H. 
Marsh, $110.46, and lndorslng $35.82 upon 
a note made by C. H. Marsh, .June 8. um, 
for $:-!00, we Join Uy and severally SPll, a~ 
slgn. and transfer all onr right title, and 
lntel"C'st In two poll<.'les, Nos. 4.277 and 
4,!!S7. upon the lh·es of Churle11 H. Marsh 
and .John R. '.\iart!h. l11sued by the Nation-
al Life Insurance Company of the United 
Stntr•s of AmPrka to ('huum·~.\· W. OlbHon, 
of 1 .1ua, N. Y." It was heitl that, In the 
11hHence of any claim or fraud or mutiJal 
111i11t11ke as to the contents of the a11slgn. 
ment, It wa11 conclu11lve, llml that oral evi-
dence was lneompetent to 1thuw that it 
was ext>cuted as collateral security only. 
The or1lnlon re<.'ognlzes as well St>ttled 
that an ln11trument as11lgnlng or conVl',V-
in~ real or pl'nional prl)pcrty In al•solnte 
ternu1 may, by parol e\•ldence, be sh•nvn 
to have been lntPnde<I ae secur:ty mtore-
ly; etatPs the hlswry or the exception, 
anll ltR theory; but declares, In wordH t1J1· 
pllrHble to the ca11e In hood, that" thh1 ln-
tttrument le more than an aRslgnment. It 
<.'ontah111 what both parties HJtree1I to rlo. 
It 11hows thnt the a'lslgoment was mnde 
ror the porposP lllt'lltlonNI, Bild precl1<cly 
what Ci!h!lon waR to do In consldt>rntlon 
thereol. He llel'ame bou111l to do preclHely 
what was 11r1eclt1Pd for him tn do, and he 
could hove been sued by the 81JRlgnor11 for 
damages If he h!ld failed to perform. 
Hence the lnstrnml'nt Is not a mere aR-
Elgnment or transfer of the pollc.v. It Is a 
contra<.'t In writing, within the rule which 
prohibits parol e\•hlence to explain. varv. 
or contradict 1mch contracts." 'l'he au-
thorities cited In the opinion apply with 
equul force to the case now under consld-
erlltlon. 
The principle upon which 11arol evldt>nee 
Is held a1lml11Hlhle to Flhow that a simple 
aR11i11;nmcnt. althongh ul.>11olnte In tt>rms, 
wus lnt.-nded as securlt,v merl•ly Is the SUJI· 
poKPd lncumplt>teueHH of thP Instrument. 
end It ls not rep-ar!led a11contraulctlnic thfl 
wrltlnJl;, hut as 11howl1111: Its pur1m11e. 
Tr1111cott v. King, 6 N. Y. 147. 161; l'lwster 
v. Bn11k. 16 N. Y. :l.'J6, :Ha: Horn v. Ketel-
tas, 46 N. Y. ll05, 610. \',··lwre. however, tn-
stt>nd of a mere trunsrl'r or HKBlgnment, 
there Is a contr11ct, n 11peurlng on lt11 
fnce to be complete, with mutual ohllga-
tlons tu be Jlt'rf >rnw11. "~·ou can no more 
ailtl to or con tra1lll't ltH IPgal erfP<.'t hy pa-
rol 11tlpnlntlons. pr<.'1'l'tll11:.:- or at•compnny. 
lnJt its t-Xt>Cutlon, thRn you e1111 alter It. 
through tbe same m'.!uns, In any other l'l'-
335 
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spect."
668; Renard v. Sampson. 12 N. Y. 561:
Shaw v_. Insurance (‘o.. 69 N. Y. 286; Long
v. Iron Co.. 101 N. Y. G38, 4 N. E. Rep. 735;
Snowdcn v. Guion. 101 N. Y. 458, 5 N. E.
Rep. 322; Gordon v.Niemann,1l8 N.Y.153,
23 N. E. Rep. 454: Humphreys v. Railroad
t?o..121 N. Y. 435. 24 N. E. Rep. 695; En-
gelhorn v. Reitlinger, 122 N. Y. 76, 25 N. E.
Rep. 29". In the foregoing classification
collateral agreements are not included, be-
cause they are separate. independent. and
complete contracts. although relating to
the same snblect 'l‘he_v’ are allowed to
be proved by pa.rol, because they were
made by parol. and no part thereof com-
mitted to writing. Evidence to explain
ambiguity, establish n custom, or show
the meanin,<.>: of technical terms. and the
like, is not regarded as an exception to
the general rule, because it does not con-
tradict or vary the written instrument.
but simply places the court in the posi-
tion of the parties when they made the
contract, and enables it to appreciate the
force of the words they used in reducing
it to writing. It is received where doubt
arises upon the face of the instrument as
to its meaning, not to enable the court to
hear what the parties said, but to enable
it to understand what they wrote, as
they understood it at the time. Such evi-
dence is explanatory, and must be incon-
sistent with the terms of the contract.
Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40: t‘ollender r.
Dlnsmore. 55 N. Y. ‘200: Newhall v. Ap-
pleton. l14 N. Y. 140, 21 N. E. Rep. 1C5:
ismith v. (Jlews, 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. Rep.
60.
Returning. now. to the written instru-
ment executed by the plainliffs in this
case, and it appears. upon analyzing its
provisions. to be nn agreement of a com-
plete and comprehensive character. There
is, first, a transfer in formal terms by the
plaintiffs to the defendant of a draft of
hemlock lumber lying at a place named.
followed by the statement that such lulu-
bcr is covered by the chattel mortgage nn-
nexed. Three ditferent kinds of lumber
are then enumerated. with the quantity
in feet of each, the price per foot or per
thousand, and the amount that each kind
comes to at the pricenamed. Those sums
are added. and the amount thereof, con-
stituting the purchase price, the defendant
expressly agrees to apply on his chattel
mortgage, and both parties agree to
correct any mistake there may be in the
amount of the lumber. The method of
correcting‘ mistakes is not provided, but
it is clear that. if the lumber overran the
amount stated. the plaintiffs were to have
the benefit of it, while, if it fell short. the
$36
Phil. Ev. (2 Cow'en & H. notes.) '
defendant was to have the deficiency made
good to him in some way. We regard
this contract us complete upon its face.
What element is wanting? If such a writ-
ing can be undermined by parol evidence,
what written instrument is safe? How
can a man, however prudent, protect him-
self against perjury, infirmity of memory,
or the death of witnesses? What stipu-
lation was omitted that should have been
inserted in order to bring the instrument
within the general rule? What will be
left of the rule if it is established that it
does not control such a contract? Will
anytliing of value be left, if it is held that
a writing which contains the full and defi-
nite terms of a contract, apparently com-
plete, may be shown by parol evidence to
be simply part performance of an entire
verbal agreement previously made? We
think that the writing in question is gov-
erned by the rule. not by the. exception.
As was said by this court in Eighmle \'.
'I‘a_vlor. supra, 296. it contains a definite
agreement of bargain and sale.specifles
the consideration, describes the subject,
contains mutual covenants for the protec-
tion of each party, and leaves nothing
of a complete, perfect, and consummated
agreement to be supplied. On its face,
“no element is wanting of an entire con-
tract. exhausting the final intentions of
both parties. It is therefore such n paper
as falls within the protection of the rule.
and must be conclusively presumed to
.ont.aln the wh;~le contract as made.”
Moreover, aside lroni the presumption
arising from an inspection of the paper,
such a parol arrangement . s the defend-
-int tried to prove would be mconsistent
with the written instrument. because the
purchase price was not according to the
former, to be applied as provided in the
latter. Indeed, it would be taken bodily
out of the writing. and an arrangement
of adifferent and inconsistent character
substituted. Besides. the agreement that
any mistake in the amount of the lumber
should be corrected, while consistent
\vlth an absolute sale, is inconsistent with
u transfer, for the purpose of securinga
ebt. We think that the writing in ques-
.’on imports on its face acomplete expres-
bl()l‘l of what the parties agreed to, and
hence that it is conclusively presumed to
contain all that they agreed to. We are
further of the opinion that the parol evi-
dence sought to be introduced was incon-
sistent with and contradictory of the
written agreement, and was hence inad-
missible on that ground also. It follows
that the rulings of the referee were cor-
rect, and that the judgment should be
affirmed. All concur.
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spttt." Phil. Ev. (2 Cowen & H. notPA.) 
6flS; Uenu1l v. Sampson. 12 N. Y. 561: 
Shn w v. Insurunce <.'o •• 69 N. Y. 286; Long 
v. Iron to., 101 N. Y. fi3~, 4 N. E. Rep. 785; 
lilnowden v. Guion. 101 N. Y. -tr>S. 5 N. E. 
Rep. 32'2; Gorilon v. Niemann, 118 N. Y . lr>8, 
23 N. E. Rep. 4.'>4; Humphreys v. Railroad 
Co., 121 N. Y. 435, 24 N. E. Rep. 695; En-
Jeelhorn v. Reltllnger, 122 N. Y. 76, 25 N. E. 
Ut'p. 297. In the foregoing classification 
rolla terttl a11;reementR ure not induded, be-
c:11 t1Rl' they are separRte, lndP(lendt>nt. und 
cnm11lete e.mti•acts. although n>lat.lng to 
tho same KnbJect . '!'hey Rt~ allowt>d to 
be proved by parol, because they were 
made by parol, und 110 ))llrt thereof com-
mitted to writing. E\•ldeace to explain 
ambiguity, e11tal>ll11h n t'ustom, or show 
the meanlug of technical terms. and the 
like, ill not rt'11;arded aR an exception to 
the i;teneral rule, because It does not con-
tradlet or vary the written lustrument, 
but simply ph1ces the court In the posi-
tion Of the partleH When they JDUde the 
contract, and enablee It to appreciate the 
force of the words they ui1ed In redudng 
It to writing. It Is J'e(."elved where doubt 
arises upon the face of the Instrument as 
to lbt meaning, not to enable the court to 
bear wbat the parties said, but to enable 
It to uno:JerHtand what they wrote, as 
they undel'fltood It at the tlmf'I. Such evi-
dence le explanatory, and must be loc~on­
slstent with the term111 of the contract. 
Ilana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40: Collender ""· 
Dinsmore; 55 N. Y. 200; Newhall v. Ap-
pleton, 114 N. Y. 140, 21 N. E. Rep. 1C5: 
Hmlth v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 1110, 21 N. E. Rep. 
100. 
Returning, now. to the wrlt~en Instru-
ment executed by the ph1l111UfM In this 
case, and it appears. upon analyzing ltet 
provisions. to be ,,n agl'et'ment of a com-
plete and c·om1wehenslve character. There 
Is, first, a transfer lo fornrnl tt>rmti by the 
plalntnrs to the defendant of a draft of 
hemlock lumber lying at a plare named, 
followed by the Htatement that such Jom· 
ber le covered by the chattel mortgage an-
nexed. Three dlfft>reot kinds of lumber 
are then eoumerat<:'ll. with tbe quantity 
111 feet of t>ach, the price per foot or per 
thousaml, ond the nmouot that each kind 
<·omes tu at the price named. Thoiw. sums 
are added. and the amount thereof, con-
fltltutlng the purcha11e price, the defendtt'l'lt 
expretisly agrees to a1111ly on bis chnttel 
mort11:Rge, itud both parties agrett to 
correct any mlstflke there may be lo the 
umount of the lumber. "rhe mt>thud or 
c·orrectlng mlstnkett ls not provided, bot 
It Is clear that, If the lumber ov<:'rrao tbe 
amount stated. tbe plaintiffs were to have 
the benefit or it, whUe, H lt fell Bhort, the 
.136 
<lC:'fendant was to have the deftcl<:'ncy made 
good to him In some way. We re11;1•rd 
this contract as t'omplete upon Its face. 
What element Is wanting? If such a writ-
ing can l>e undermined by parol evld1mce, 
what written lnstr11ment ls safe? How 
can a man, however prudent, protect blm-
aelf against perjury, Infirmity or meworJ', 
or th" death of wltnelftfeS"! What stipu-
lation was omitted that should have heen 
losert.ed ln 01·der to bring the lnstrurnent 
within the gt>neral rule? What will be 
left of the rule If It h1 etttabllshed that It 
does not rnntrol such a contract? Will 
anythlnsr of value be left, If It Is held that 
a writing which contnlns the full and deft-
olte terms of a contraet, apparently com-
J>lete, may be shown by parol evidence to 
be simply part performaD1·e of an t"Dtlre 
verbal agreement preYlously made? We 
think that the writing In quf'Ktloo Is gov-
Prne11 by the rule, not by the exception. 
Ae wu said by tble court In Elghmle v. 
Taylor. suprfl, 296. It contains a definite 
agrreml'nt of bar{laln and sale. s11eclftes 
th" com1lderatlon, desrrlbee the eubJect, 
contains mutual covenants for the protec-
tion of each party, and leaves nothing 
of a compleh', perft>et, and consummated 
agreement to be SUIJplled. On Its ftt.ce, 
Mno elt>ment ls wanclng of an entire con· 
tract. exhRu11tlng fhe final Intentions of 
both partil'tl. It Is therefore sur.h n paper 
as fitlls within the pr.-:.tectlou of Lhe rule, 
'lDd most be conclusl\'ely presumed to 
.onteln the wlw•~ contract 8IJ made.• 
Moreo\'er, &Rid\• lt•om the presumption 
11rl<1ln~ from an lm1pectlor• or the pRper, 
HUch a parol arrangement . '4 tht> defend· 
••nt tried to prove would he .ncom1istent 
with the wrlttC:'n instrument. hecause tbe 
purchase 11rlce wae oot arcurdlng to tbe 
former, tu be appllt>d as provided In the 
latter. Indeed, It would be taken bodily 
out of thl' writing. anti an arrangement 
of a different and loconsll~tent character 
substituted. Be11idC:'s, thl' ngrePment that 
any mistake In the amount of the lumber 
Hhoulr\ he l'Orrec:ted, while coueletent 
with an absolute salt>, IA Inconsistent with 
" tran14fllr, tor the l>Dl'llo11e or securing a 
.ebt. We think that the writing ln quee-
. 'on Imports on Its face a complete ex pres· 
1>1on of what the parties agreed to, and 
henre that It Is ronclmdvely preHumed to 
contain all that they egret'd tu. We ere 
further of the uulnlon that the pared evl-
denre sought to ·he Introduced was lncon-
sl11tent with and coutradlctory or tbe 
written e11:reement, and waa hence Inad-
missible on that ground also. It follows 
that the rullngs of the referee were cor-
rect, and that the Judgment should be 
a11lrmed. All concur • 
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STATE (CUMMINGS, Prosecutor) v. CASE.
(18 Atl. 972, 52 N. J. Law, 77.)
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Dec. 28, 1889.
Certiorari to court of common pleas, Es-
sex county.
Argued June term. 1888, before Sounmsu
and REED, JJ.
Franklin M. Olds, for plaintiff in cartin-
rari. Robert H. McCa1-ter, for defendant.
action against Samuel Cummings, Jr.,'in the
second district court of Newark, for the re- i
covery of the sum of $125, the price which ,
she had paid for a horse purchased by her of
Cummings. The gravamen of the demand
of the plaintiff was that such sale was brought
about by the fraudulent representation of the
defendant, which fraudulent conduct con-
ferred upon her the right of rescission, and
that. in the exercise of such right, she ten-
dered back the animal, and demanded a return
of the consideration paid, and that the defend-
ant refused to comply with such demand.
The case was tried before a jury; and, under
the law, as charged by the court, the jury
found the facts to be such as to entitle the
plaintiff to a verdict for the full amount paid.
The judgment entered upon this verdict was
taken to the Sussex county common pleas,
and thercadirmed. Thatjudgmentis brought
up by the present writ.
The representations, the falsity of which
constituted the ground of the verdict against
the defendant, appears, by the state of the
case agreed upon by the attorneys, to have
been made as follows: One Van Buskirk, as
the agent of thc plaintiff, inquired of defend-
ant about a certain brown horse owned by
defendant. Van Bnskirk asked if the brown
hoise could travel seven or eight miles an
hour, and stated that a horse that could do
that was required. The defendant said that
the brown horse was too slow for that pur-
pose, but pointed Van Buskirk to a gray
horse, stating that he could easily go seven
or eight miles an hour, as it had formerly
been a very fast horse, and attached to the
salvage corps wagon, but that. meeting with
an accident one day, while going to a lire, it
had injured one legalitlle, making it unfit
for the work required of it by the salvage
corps. On another occasion, Mr. Cass, in
the presence of his wife, the plaintiff, stated
to defendant that they desired a horse that
could make the distance between Roselaud
and Orange Valley, between seven and eight
miles, in one hour. or one and a half hours,
and stated that, if the horse could not do that,
they did not want to buy him; to which de-
fendant replied that the horse could easily do
that. Plaintiff sought to try the horse by
driving him one evening; but the defendant
refused to allow said trial, stating that the
horse had already, on that day, been to Har-
lem and Orange, which statement was true.
The next morning plaintiff purchased the
horse for $125, paid $50 in cash, and gave a
wrneos, EV. —22
I
I
l
l
l
promissor_v note of four months. indorsed by
Iilr. Van Buskirk. There was evidence that
the horse was not able to travel seven or
eight miles in one hour, or in one hour and a
half, and was not lit for the purpose for
which he had been bought. lt appeared on
the cross-examination of the plaintiff that at
the time of the sale a written warranty of the
horse had been given, in the following form:
“Newark, April 6th, 1887. To one gray
~ horse. Charley, which I warrant to be sound
REED, J. Catharine E. Case brought an .
and kind, with the exception of straining of
muscle of left hind leg.” The counsel for
defendant thereupon moved that all evidence
as to representations made by the defendant,
other than those contained in the written
‘ warranty, be stricken out, on the ground that,
the agreement of the parties having been're-
riuced to writing, such writing could not be
varied or enlarged by parol evidence. The
court denied the motion, and allowed an ex-
ception. When the plaintiff rested his case,
the counsel for defendant moved for a non-
suit. upon the ground that, a written war-
ranty having been proved lo have been given
on the sale of the horse. and there being no
evidence that the horse did not correspond
with this warranty, the plaintiff had not made
out any case for damages. This motion was
denied, and an exception was allowed. At
the close of the summing up of counsel, the
counsel for the defendant requested the court
to charge the jury that, there being no war-
ranty, the jury cannot consider any testimony
as to any representation not contained therein.
This request was refused, and an exception
allowed. The court charged the jury that if
they believed that the representations alleged
to have been made in relation to the speed of
the horse were made, and that the plaintiff,
relying upon them, purchased the horse, and
that such representations were in fact not
truc, and the horse was therefore unfit for
the purpose for which it was bought. that
plaintiff could recover the purchase money,
she having offered to return the horse, on the
ground of fraud or deceit, which was inde-
pendent and irrespective of the so-called war-
ranty. To this portion of the charge an ex-
ception was allowed. The counsel for the
defendant also requested the court to charge
that. if the jury should find for the plaintiff,
the measure of damages must be the differ-
ence in value between what the horse was act-
ually worth in the condition he was in at the
time of the sale and what he would have been
worth if the representations made by the de-
fendant had been true; which request the
court refused to charge, and allowed an ex-
ception. The court, to the contrary, charged
the jury that if they found for the plaintiff
they must find in the sum of $5125, that being
the price she had paid for the horse. An ex-
ception was allowed to this part of the charge.
Reasons covering the above exceptions were
assigned for the reversal of the judgment
below.
The primary question raised by the excep-
tions, and argued with elaborate care, is one
no-
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STATE (CUllUIXGS, PrOllt"cutor) v. CASE. 
(18 Atl. 972, 52 N. J . Law, 77.) 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Dec. 28, 1889. 
Certiol'ari to court of common pleas, Es-
sex county. 
Argued .June term, 1888, before SCUDDER 
and RE~:D, J.J. 
Franlt'lin M. Olds, for plaintiff in certio-
rari. Robe1·t H. McCartw, tor defendant. 
REED, J. Catharine E. Case brought an 
action sgainst 8smuel Cummings, Jr.; in the 
second cij,strict court of Newark, for the re-
covery o( the sum of $125, the price which 
she hail paid for a horse purchased by her or 
Cummings. The graMmen of the demand 
ot the plaintiff was that such sale was brought 
about by the fraudulent representation of the 
defendant, which fraudulent conduct con-
ferred upon her the right of rescission, and 
that, in the exercise of such right, she ten-
dered back the animal, and de111a11ded a return 
ot the consideration paid, and that the def1md-
ant refused to comply with such demand. 
'fhe case was tried before a jury: amt. under 
the law, as charged by th11 court, the jury 
found the facts to be such as to entitle the 
plaintift to a verdict for tlle full amount paid. 
'fhe judgment entered upon this verdict was 
taken to the Susse>e county common pleas, 
and therealflrmed. Thatjudgment.is l>rought 
up by the present writ. 
The r11presentatlons, the falsity of which 
constituted the ground of the verdict against 
the defendant, appea1·s, by the state of the 
case agreed upon by the attorneys, to have 
been made as follows: One Van Buskirk, as 
the agent of the plaintiff, inquired of defend-
ant about a certain l>rown horse owned by 
defendant. Van Buskirk asked If the brown 
ho1se could travel seren or eight miles an 
hour, and stated that a horse that could do 
that was required. 'fhe defendant said that 
the brown horse was too slow for that pur-
pose, but pointed Van Buskirk to a gray 
horse, stating that he could easily go seven 
or eight miles an hour, as it had formerly 
been a very fast horse, and 11tt.ad1ed to the 
salvage corps wagon, but that, meeting with 
1111 accident one d11y, while going to a fire, it 
had injured one leg 11 litlle, making it unfit 
for the work required of it by the salvage 
corps. On another occasion, Mr. Cuss, in 
lhe presence of bis wife, tl.1e plaintiff, staled 
to defendant that thev desired a horse that 
could makll the distance between Roseland 
and Orange Valley, betwe~n seven and eight 
miles, in onll hour, or one and a half hours, 
and st11ted that, if the horse could nut do that, 
they did not want to l>uy him; to which de-
fendant replied that the horse could easily do 
that. Plaintiff sought to try the hor:ie by 
driving him one evening; but the defendant 
refused to llllow said trial, stating that the 
horse had already, on that day, been to Har-
lem and Orange, which statement was true. 
The next morning plaintiff purchased the 
horse for tl25, paid $[10 in cash, and gave a 
WYLOUS.EV.-22 
promissor.v note of four months, imlorsed by 
~Ir. Van Buskirk. The1·e was evidence that 
the horse was not able to travel seven or 
i-ight miles in one hour, 01· in one hou1· and a 
half, and was not fit for the purpose for 
which he had been bought. 1t appeared on 
the cross-examination of the plaintiff that at 
the time of the sale a written warranty of the 
horse had been given, in the following form : 
"Newark, April 6th, 1887. To one gra~· 
horse, Charley, which I warrant to be sound 
!In~ kind, with the exct~ption of straining of 
muscle of left hind leg." The counsel for 
defendant thereupon moved that all evidence 
as to representations made by the defendant, 
other than those contained in the written 
warranty, be stricken out, on the ground that, 
the agreement of the parties having been re· 
:luced to writing, such writing could not be 
varied or enlarged by parol evidence. The 
court denied t.lle motion, and allowed an ex-
ception. When the plaintiff rested his case, 
the counsel for defendant moved for a non-
suit, upon the ground that, a written wa1·-
ranty having been proved to have been given 
on the sale of thE horse. and there being no 
evidence that the horse did not correspond 
with this Wl\ITanty, the plaintiff had not made 
out any case for damages. This motion was 
denied, and an exception was allowed. At 
the close of the summing up of counsel, the 
counsel for the defendant requested the court 
to clrnrge the jury that, there l>eing no war-
ranty, the jury cannot consider any testimony 
as to any representation not contained therein. 
'fltis request 'fVHS refused, and an exct>ption 
allowed. The court charged the jury that if 
they believed that the representations alleged 
to have beeq made in relation to the speed of 
the horse were made, and that the plaintiff, 
relying upon them, purchased the horst>, and 
that such 1·epresentaLions were in fact not 
true, and the horsi- was therefore nnftt for 
the purpose tor which it was bouf{ht, that 
plaintiff could recover the purchase money, 
she having offered to return the horse, on the 
ground of fraud or deceit, which was lnde-
pendt.>nt and irrespective of the so-called war-
ranty. To this portion of the charge an flx-
ception was allowed. The counsel for the 
dttfend1rnt also requested the court to ch1uge 
that, if the jury should find for the plaintiff, 
the measure of damages must be the differ-
ence in value betwet>n what the horse was act-
ually worth in the condition he was in at the 
time of the sale and what he would have been 
worth if the representations m1&de by the de-
fendant had been true; winch request the 
court refused to charge, and allowed an ex-
ception. The court, to the contrary, charged 
the jury that if they found for the plaintiff 
they must find in the sum of $12!>, that being 
the price she bud paid fur the horse. An ex-
ception was allow I'd to this part of the charge. 
UeW:1011s covering the above exceptions were 
assigned for the reversal of I.he judgment 
below. 
The primary question raised by the excep-
tions, and argued with elaborate care, is one 
..... -... \. 
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of evidence. It involves the correctness of
the judicial ruling by which the testimony in
respect to certain representations made by
the vendor previous to, and at the time of,
the sale, were admitted in evidence. These
representations, as already appears, were
made in respect to the traveling qualities of
the animal sold. It also appears that there
was a written warranty in respect to the
quality of soundness and quietness. It is
insisted by the counsel for the defendant be-
low that the admission of the verbal repre-
sentations enlarged and varied the written
contract. Ile therefore invokes the inexora-
ble rule of evidence that, when parties have
put their contract into Writing, oral testi-
mony cannot be substituted for, or added to,
the written evidence of the agreement. 1
Greenl. Ev. § 88. This principle has. from
the earliest period of jurisprudence, been rec-
ognized as a wholesome and necessary rule
of public policy. Id. § 275; Wright v. Rem-
ington, 41 N. J. Law, 48. 43 N. J. Law, 451;
Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. Law, 331.
But this rule of evidence is not infringed
by the admission of parol testimony which is
not intended as a substitution for, or an ad-
dition to, a written contract, but which goes
to show that the instrument is void or void-
able, and that it never had any legal exist-
ence, or binding force, either by reason of
fraud, or for want of due execution and de-
livery, or for the illegality of the subject-
niatter of the contract. 1 Greenl. liv. § 284.
Nor is the admission of parol evidence for
the purpose of avoiding a written contract
on the ground of fraud confined to such tes-
timony as goes to show that a party was lured
to make a contract other than that intended,
as by the suhstitutioii of one contract for an-
other by trickery, or by misreading a contract
to an illiterate person. Parol testimony may
be admitted to show that the execution of a
written contract was brought about by a
fraudulent representation. The force given
to a seal, which formerly excluded testimony
in respect to the failure of consideration in a
specialty, is now abolished by legislation.
So that the rule above stated, respecting the
admissibility of fraudulent representation, is
now applicable to all contracts. The ele-
ments essential to constitute such fraudulent
representation will be considered later; and
it is now necessary only to remark that such
evidence as will lay a foundation for an ac-
tion of deceit, or a ground for the rescission
of the contract. is always receivable, although
it consists of oral representations. This
point was strenuously denied in the argu-
ments submitted by the counsel for the de-
fendant. His contention was that fraud in
the execution of the instrument could be
shown, but that oral representations, going
to u failure of consideration only, could not.
The seeming strength of his contention lay
in the likeness between the written and the
oral facts in the present case, both concern-
ing the quality of the animal sold. The
written warranty applied to the soundness
, tions:
and kindness of the horse, and the oral testi-
mony to the speed of the animal. The dan-
ger of permitting parol declarations to be
proved which were so nearly related to the
subject-matter of the written warranty was
strongly pressed as an evil which the rule of
evidence already stated seemed especially de-
signed to prevent. But the distinction be-
tween such representations as add to the con-
tract and such as avoid the contract, because
of their fraudulent character, is too firmly
established in our jurisprudence to be now
shaken. As an additional warranty, that is,
as an addition to the contract, the present
representations were clearly inadmissible.
So soon, however. as they displayed such feat-
ures as went to show that through them the
contract had been fraudulently induced, and
So was unenforceable, for that reason, at the
election of the defrauded party, the rule ex-
cluding parol testimony to enlarge a written
contract became inoperative. It is, of course,
obvious that the fact that there was a written
warranty in respect to the soundness and
kindness of the animal would be a forcible
argument that no other representations as to
quality were made. The existence of the
written warranty would be useful in deter-
mining the probability of the truth of the
counter-statements of the parties as to the
existence or nun-existence of the parol decla-
ration; but when the fraudulent atiirmalion
is once proven to exist the written contract
becomes unimportant. This seems to be an
elementary principle of the law of evidence.
The right to prove fraud, in whatever shape
it may exist, to avoid written contracts, has
been so uniformly recognized that it can
hardly be said to have been the subject of se-
rious judicial discussion. The power to con-
sider parol evidence, in regard to its effects
upon contracts in respect to the question of
fraud, has been passed over sub silentio, and
the courts have gone on to consider the pro-
bative force of the testimony. No case was
discovered by the industry of counsel which
excluded such testimony, and all the cases in
which judges have touched upon the subject
have assumed the admissibility of testimony
setting up fraudulent representations to
avoid a written contract. l)obell v. Stevens,
3 Barn. &. C. 623; Hotson v. Browne, 9 C. B.
(N. S.) 442; Steward v. Coesvelt, 1 Car.
& P. 23; Koop v. Handy, 41 Barb. 454; Pren-
tiss v. Russ, 16 Me. 30; Van Buskirk v. Day,
32 Ill. 260; Eaton v. laton, 35 N. J. Law,
290. lconclude, therefore, that if the evi-
dence established fraudulent conduct on the
part of the defendant the testimony was prop-
erly admitted.
'l‘his conclusion leads to the consideration
of the testimony received and submitted to the
jury. This consideration involves two ques-
Fi1'.-t. \‘Vas the testiiiiony properly
submitted to the jury at all? Serond. if so,
was it submitted -ind.-r proper instructions?
As already remarked, the admissibility of the
testimony, and tlierefore its submission to the
jury, depends for its sanction upon the ques-
338
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
08
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Cl\88 No. 116] PROOF 
of evi1!Pnce. It involvPS the correctness of 
the judicial ruling by which the testimony in 
respect to certain representations made by 
the vendor previous to, Hnd Ht. the time of, 
the sale, were admitted in evidence. These 
representations, aa already appears, were 
made in respect to the traveling qualitiPs of 
the animal sold. It also appears that th!'re 
was a written warranty in respect to the 
quality of soundness and quietness. It is 
insisted bv the counsel for the defendant be-
low that the admission of the verbal repre-
sentations enlarged aml varied the written 
contract. Ile therefore invokes the inPxora-
ble rule of evidence tlult, when parties ha\'e 
put their contract into writing, oral testi-
mony cannot be substituted for, or 11.dtled to, 
the written evidence ot the agreement. 1 
Green). Ev. § 88. This principle has, from 
the earliest period of jul'i8pr111lence, been rec-
ognized as a wholesome Rnd necessary rnle 
of public policy. Id.§ 275; Wright v. Rem-
ington, 41 N.J. Law,48, 43 N .• J. Law,451; 
Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. J,aw, 331. 
But this rule of evidence is not infringed 
by the admission of parol testimony which is 
not intended as a substitution for, or an ad-
<lition to, a written contract, but which goes 
to show that the instrument is void or void-
able, and that it never had any legal exist-
ence, or binding force, either by reason of 
fraud, or for want of dne execution and de-
livery, or for the illegulity of the suhject-
matter of the contract. 1 Green!. Ev. § 2t:!4. 
Nor is the admission of parol evidence for 
the purpose of avoiding a written co11tract 
on the ground of fraud confined to such tes-
timony as goes to show that 11 party was lured 
to make a contract other than that intended, 
as by the substitution of one contract for an-
other by trickery, or by misre11ding a contract 
to an illiterate person. Parol testimony may 
be admitted to show tLat. the execution of a 
writlen contract was brought about by a 
fraudulent representation. The force glvl'n 
to a seal, which formerly excludetl testimony 
In respect to the failure of consideration in a 
speciRlty, is now abolished by legislation. 
So that the rule above stated, respt>cting the 
admissibility of fraudulent represent.ation, ir. 
now applicable to all contracts. The ele-
ments l's~ential to constitute such fraudulent 
representation will be considered later; and 
it is now necessary only to remark that such 
evidt>nce as will lay a foundation for an ac-
tion of deceit, or a ground for the rescission 
of the contract, is always receiv11ble, although 
it consists of oral representations. This 
point was strenuously denied in the argu-
men~ submitted by the co1ms!'l for the ue-
fe.ndant. His contention was that fraud in 
the execution or the instrument could be 
shown, but that oral representations, going 
to a failure of consid1•ration only, l'011hl 11ot. 
The seeming strength of his conte11tion lay 
In the lihness betwPen the written and the 
oral facts in the present casP, both concern-
in~ the quality of the animal sold. The 
written warranty applied to the soumlness 
338 
and kindness of the horse, ancl the oral testi-
mony to the speed of the animal. The dan-
ger of permitting parol declarations to be 
pro,·f'd which were so nearly related to the 
subject-matter of the written wananty wu 
strongly pressed as an evil which the rule of 
evidence already stated seemed especially de-
signed to prevent. nut the distinction be-
tween such representations as add to the con-
tract and such as avoiJ the contract, because 
of their fra11dulent character, Is too firmly 
estalJlished In our jnrispru1lence to be now 
Ehaktm. As an additiom\I warnmtv, thut is, 
113 an addition to the contract, tlte pl'!'SE"nt 
rE"presentations were clP.arly lnadmi~sihle. 
8o soon, however. as they displayed s11ch feat-
ures as went to show that through them the 
contract had been fraudulently induced, and 
so w11s unenforceal>le, for that reason, at the 
election of the defraudf'd party, the rule ex-
cluding pal'Ol testimony to enlarge a written 
contract l>t>c11me inopP.rati ve. It is, of course, 
obvious that the fact that there was a written 
warranty in respect to the soundness nnd 
klndne!ls of the animal would be a forcible 
argument that no other representations as to 
quality were made. The existt•nce or the 
written warranty would be useful in deter-
mining the probability of the truth of the 
counter-statements of the parties as to the 
exi~t!'nce 01· non-existence of the pa.rol decla-
ration; but when the frnudulent affirmation 
is once proven to 11xist the written contract 
becomes unimportant. This seems to ht> an 
elt>mentary principle of the law of evidence. 
'.fhe right to pro,·e fraud, in whatever shape 
it ma\• exist, to avoid written contracts, has 
bern °so uniformly recognizrd that it can 
hardly be said to have been the subject of se-
rious judicial discussion. The power to con-
sider parol evidence, in regard to its elfects 
upon contracts in respect to the question of 
fraud, has beeon passed over .mb .<tilmtio, and 
the courts hnva gone on to consider the pro-
bative force of Lhe testimony. No caRe was 
discovt>red by lhe industry of counsel which 
excluded such testimony, and all the casf'S in 
which judges have touched upon the subject 
have 11ssumed the aclmissihility of tt".slimony 
setting up fraudulent representathins to 
a.void a written contract. l>ohell v. Ste\·ens, 
8 Barn. & C. 6:.!3; Hutson v. Browne, 9 C. B. 
(N. 8.) 442; Steward v. Coes\'elt, 1 Car. 
& P. 2;i; Koop v. Handy, 41 Darb. 454; Pren-
tiss v. Ru~. 16 Me. 30; Van Buskirk v. Day, 
32 Ill. 260; Eaton v. }~at.on, 35 ~. ,J. Law. 
290. 1 conclude, then•fore, that if the evi-
dence established fraudult:'nt conduct on the 
part of the dl'fendant the testimony was prop-
erly admitted. 
'i'his conclusion !Pads to the consirleration 
of the te.'ltimony r!'cehed and submitted to the 
jury. 'rllis considl·ration inrnlves two qu~­
tions: Fir.,t. 'Vas th~ testimony properly 
sub111ittl'd to the jury at all? Se•ond. lf su, 
was it s11bmit11·d 11n1l ·r proper instructions!' 
As alremly rem11rkt>d, the aumi~sibility ot' the 
te11t1mom·, aml lherPfore its submission to the 
jury, depends for its sanction upon the ques-
ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS.
[Case No 116
tion whether it was sufficient, in any aspect
in which the jury might view it, to establish
fraud. The general character of a fraudulent
representation which will lay a foundation for
an action for deceit, or a ground for adefense
against a counter-action upon a contract, or a
basis for the rescission of a contract-, are well
settled,‘ 0 far as general rules can settle any
legal question. The representation must be
concerning a material fact, must induce to
the execution of the contract. and must he
made falsely. The falsity constitutes the
scienter, which is an essential element in every
fraudulent representation. This falsity may
consist in making a representation of a ina-
terial fact, knowing it to be false; or it may
consist in making a representation which is
untrue, without knowledge whether it is true
or false. and by coupling with the representa-
tion an expressed or implied alfirmation that
it is known to be true, of personal knowledge.
The instances in which representations can
be said to be fraudulent, as they a.re cogniza-
ble in a. court of law, are conlined within the
limits of the above statement. The case of
Bennett v. Judson. 21 N. Y. 238. which at-
tempted to extend the limits of this rule be-
yond that stated, and import into it the equita-
ble doctrine laid down by Judge Story, has
been repudiated by subsequent cases in the
courts of that state, (0berlander v. Spices. 45
N. Y. 175; Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y. 427;
Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27;) and this is
the rule of the common-law courts of Eng-
land and Massachusetts, and our own state,
as shown by Mr. Justice DEPUE in the case
of Cowley v. Smyth, 46 N. J. Law, 380. The
.s-cie'nter, therefore, must be proved in one or
the other of these shapes. In the present
case, it was not proven in the first shape;
for proof of a knowledge of the falsity of the
statement on the part of a vendor of the horse
was not attempted, nor was the question sub-
mitted to the jury. The question arises,
therefore, whether ascienter appears in the
second possible shape. It does not appear
that the defendant expressly stated that the
facts atfirmed were true, of his own knowl-
edge. In examining the cases. however, we
discover that an express atlirmance of per-
sonal knowledge is not always requisite, as
such aflirmance may be implied. Nor, on the
other hand, does it appear that an express af-
firmance of personal knowledge is to be taken
as fixing conclusively the defend-ant‘s liabili-
ty;- for it may be so qualified by the facts
stated as to convey a modified impression.
Indeed, the test seems to consist not so much
in the absence or presence of an expressed as-
seri ion of personal knowled_-e as in the char-
acter of the facts alleged to be true. The rule
of discrimination stated by Mr. Justice DE-
PUB in Cowley v. Smyth, 46 N. J. Law. 350. is
this: “If the party adds to a representation
an atfirniation that he made the representa-
tion as of his own knowledge, the force and
effect of the evidence will depend in a great
measure upon the nature of the suhjet-t con-
.cerning which the representation was made.
If it be with respect to a specific fact, or facts
susceptible of exact knowledge, and the sub-
ject-matter be such as that the aflirmation of
knowledge is to be taken in its strict sense,
and not merely as a strong expression of he-
lief, the falsehood in such a representation
lies in the defendant‘satl1'rmati0n that he had
the requisite knowledge to vouch for the truth
of his as.-iertions, and that, being untrue, the
falsehood would be willful, and therefore
fraudulent. But. where the representation
is concerning a condition of aliairs not sus-
ceptible oi’ exact knowledge, * * * the
assertion of knowledge is to be taken sec-
nndrun an-bjcctam matcrirnn, as meaning
no other than a strong belief founded upon
what appeared to the defendant to be reason-
able and certain grounds." Therefore. with-
out rl-gard to whether the allirmance of per-
sonal knowledge was express or otherwise,
the existence of such aflirmation depends
upon the form of the allirmation of fact, and
of tile character of subject-matter, concerning
which the affirmation was made. From these
circumstances, it must be considered, in the
language used in Marsh v. Falker, 40 N. Y.
5152, whether the party assume-l, or intended
to convey the impression, that he had actual
knowledge, though conscious that he had not.
In the following cases there was no express
aliirmance of personal knowledge: Ila/ard
v. Irwin, 18 Pick. 95; Milliken v. Thorndike.
103 Mass. 382; Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117
Mass. 195; Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27.
The question whether there is an allirma-
tion of personal knowledge is sometimes one
of law, but oftener one of fact. In the line
of cases of which Cowley v. Smyth is a
sample. it is treated as a question of law,
arising from the character of the facts which
were the subject-matter of the representa-
tions. It was legally concluded that the rep-
resentations could only be those of belief.
On the other hand, there might be express
allirmance of personal knowledge with re-
spect to facts so obviously the subject of ac-
curate knowledge that it could be legally
concluded that it was not an expression of
belief or opinion, and that, therefore, the
falsity of the facts stated would imply a
scienter. In a wide. range of cases the ques-
tion of the existence of an alfirmation of per-
sonal knowledge was submitted as one of
fact, and it was either in support or reversal
of the finding of j urie.-i or reports of referees
that the legal rules applicable to such repre-
sentations were laid down. This will be ob-
served by reference to the following cases:
Tucker v. White, 125 Mass. 3-14; Millikan
v. Thorndike. 103 Mass. 382; Page v. Bent,
2 Metc. 371; and cases already cited upon the
preceding points. In the present case, it ap-
pears, to my mind, clear that it could not be
legally inferred that there W81 an assertion
of personal knowledge ot’ the truth of the
facts slaled.' The whole conversation be-
tween vendor and purchasersuggests the op-
posite. It implied that the vendor's knowl-
edge of the traveling ability of the horse
33'.)
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tion whether it was sufficient, in any aspPct 
in which the jury might view it, to establish 
fraud. The genernl character of a fraud11l1>nt 
representation which will lay a fo1mrlation for 
an action for deceit, or a ground for a defense 
11gainst a counter-action upon a contract, or a 
basis for the rescission of a cont1"act, are well 
settled,- so far as general rules t•an settle any 
legal question. 'fhe representation must be 
concerning a material fact, must ln1l11ce to 
the execution of the contract, 11nd must be 
made falst'ly. The f1th1ity constitutes lhe 
scienter, which is an essential element in every 
fraudulent rt>presentation. This falsity may 
consist in n111king a reprt>senb1tion of a ma-
terial fact, knowing it to he false; or it may 
consist in making a representalion which i~ 
untrue, without knowledge whether it is true 
or false, and by coupling with the representa-
tion an expressed or implied affirmation that 
it is known to he true, of personal knowledge. 
The instances in which r11presentations can 
IJe said to be fraudulent, as they are cogniza-
ble in a conrt of law, are conHned within the 
limits of the above statement. The case of 
Bennett v. Judson, ~l N. Y. 238, which at-
temptoo to extend the limits of this rule 00-
yond tb1lt stated, and import into it the equita-
ble doctrine l11id down by Judge l::it.ory, hllll 
been repu1liated by sub~equent cast>s in the 
courts of that state, (Oberlander v. Spiess, 45 
N. Y. 175; Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y. 427; 
Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27;) and this is 
the rule of the common-lnw courts of Eng-
land and Massachusetts, and our own state, 
as shown by Mr. Justice Dm>UE In the case 
of Cowley v. Smyth, 46 .N. J. Law, 380. The 
.YCienter, therefore, must be provt>d in one or 
the other of these shapes. In the present 
case, it was not proven in the tirst shape: 
for proof of a knowledge of the falsity of the 
<!tattlment on the part of a vendor of the horse 
was not attempted, nor was the quest.ion sub-
mitted to the jury. The question am1es, 
therefore, whether a scienter appears in the 
•ecuncl possiule shape. It does not a11pt'ar 
that the defendant expressly stated that the 
facts affirmed were true, of bis own knowl-
edge. In examining the cases, however, we 
discover that an express atllrmance of per-
sonal knowleJge is not always requ;site, as 
such affirmance maybe implied. Nor, on the 
other hand, does it appe11r that an express af-
flrmance of penional knowledge is to be taken 
as Hxing condusively the d1·fendant's liabili-
ty;. for it may be so qualified by the faets 
stated u to convey a modifiPd lmpre~sion. 
Imlt>eJ, th" test seems to consist not so mu\!h 
in th ... a[)'4ence or presen•·eof an expres~ed as-
ser1 ion of personal knowled..;e as in the char-
acl er of the facts alleged to tie true. The rule 
of discrimination stated by Mr. Justice Di.:-
PUE in CnwJ .. y v. Smyth, 46 N. J. L1w, ilt:>O. is 
this: "IC the party adds tn a reprt>Sl'ntation 
an atfirmation that he maJe tl1t' repre~enta­
tinn as of his own knowl1>1lgP, the force anti 
effecl or tl:e evid•·nce will d1•pend in a great 
mea,.ure upon the nature of tl1'• s11hjec·t con-
..cerniug which the representation was made. 
If it be with respect to a specific fact, or facts 
susceptible of t>Xact knowled~e, and thP sub-
ject-matter be such as that the atl1rmation of 
knowledge is to be taken in its st1ict sense, 
and not merely as a strong expression of ba-
lief, lhe f11lsehood in such a represt>ntation 
lies in the defendant's affirmation that he had 
the requisite knowledge to vouch for the truth 
of his as>1ertiuns, anJ that, being nntrul', the 
falsehood would be willful, and therefore 
fraullult>nt. But, where the represe11lat1on 
is concerning a condition of nfiuil's not sus-
ceptible or exact knowledge, • • • the 
assertion of knowledge is to be taken sec-
11ndtim 1n~jectam materiam, ns meaning 
no othPr th1m a strong belief fo11nded upon 
what appeared to the defendant to be reason-
able and certain grounds." '.rherefore, with-
out rc•gard to wlll'the1· the atHrnrnnce of per-
sonal knowh·dge was express or otherwise, 
the existence of such affirmation depends 
upon the form of the alHrmation of far.t, and 
of t:1e character or subject-matter, concerning 
which the affirmation was made. From these 
circumstances, it must be consitlered, in the 
language used in Marsh v. Falker, 40 N. Y. 
562, whether the party assumeJ, or intended 
to convey the impression, thttt he had actual 
knowledge, thongh conscious that he had not. 
In the following cases there was no express 
affirmance of personal knowledge: Ila1ard 
v. Irwin, 18 Pick. 95: .Milliken v. Thorndike, 
103 Mass. 382; Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 
Mass.195; Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27. 
'rhe question whether there is an alDrma-
tion of personal knowled~e Is sometiml's one 
of law, but oftfiner one of fact. In the line 
of cases of which Cowley v. Smyth is a 
samplt>, it is treatPd as a question of law, 
arising from the character of the facts which 
were the subject-matter of the representa-
tions. It was le)Cally concludeJ that the rep-
resentations could only be those of belief. 
On the other hand, there mil(ht be express 
am1:mance or personal knowledge with re-
spect to facts so obviously the subject of ac· 
curate knowledge that it could be legally 
concludt>d that it was not an exprf'ssion of 
belief or ooinion, and that, tlwri·fore, the 
falsity of the facts stnted would imply 11 
scimter. In a wide range of casPS the q ues-
tion of the existence of an affirmation of pt>r· 
sonal knowlt!tlge was submitted as one of 
fact, and it wa>1 either in support or reversal 
of the finding of jurie>i or reports of referees 
that the legal rull's applicable to such rc•pre-
sentations were laid down. This will be ob-
servl'd by ref,.renc:e to the follol\'i11g cases: 
Tucker v. White, 125 Mass. 3-14; Milllkon 
v. Thorndike. 103 Mass. ~2; Page v. Hent, 
2 Mete. 371; and cases already ciled upon the 
preceding points. In the p1·81!ent case, it ap-
pPan1, to my mind, clPar that it could not ue 
IPl{ally i nfened that tlwre wa 1 an as3ertion 
of per~unal knowleJ;;e or the truth of the 
fact~ slate•l: The whole convnsalion he-
lwPen vendor anti purcha:1er Sll)Ci;rests tlte op-
posite. It implietl that the V•·ndor's knowl-
edge of the traveling ability of the horse 
339 
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rested upon what he knew of the previous
history of the animal, and perhaps, in some
degree, from the use of a horse by other per-
sons. The animal seems to have been used
for livery purposes. The horse had been ad-
mittedly driven to Orange and Harlem the
day before the sale was consummated. The
vendor did not say that he had driven
the horse the alleged distance in the time
. representations in the sale of a horse.
stated. He does not say he had driven him l
at all. His statement that the horse could
easily do that, for he had been a very fast
horse, and had been used to the salvage
corps wagon, implied that his knowledge
was grounded upon such information, rather
than upon personal knowledge. Therefore
it seems to me that it was clearly a mistake L
for the court to say that the representation
was so~obviously of a fact susceptible of .
exact information, made as of the personal
knowledge of the vendor. that this question
was not one to be left to the jury.
seems to me that the representations, as they -
appear in the case, and as they were treated
at the trial, amounted to something more
than an allirmation that the horse was able
to travel the distance named within the time
mentioned on a single occasion, but they im-
plied that the animal could habitually do so.
The idea conveyed was that the horse was to
be fit for the service required, namely, to
convey the purchaser from Rockland to
Orange Valley, in the course of his business.
horse’s ability to perform that service con-
tinually. Now, it seems apparent that when
the representation not only covers the pres-
ent ability to perform a service once, but also
its ability to do so frequently and continu-
ously, it extends beyond the realm of exact
inforlnation, if it does not cease to be a rep-
resentation of a subsisting fact at all. and
become a mere promise for future perform-
ance. But, without regarding this feature
of the case, I am convinced that, in assum-
3-£0
It also 1
ing that the present case was one in which
the falsity of the representation raised the
legal inference of fraud, the court was in er-
ror. The case of Searing v. Lum, 5 N. J.
Law, 785, was an action for deceit, brought
in a jnstice’s court, upon the ground of false
The
gracamen of the action was that the vendor
had represented the horse to be so nd and
kind. The justice charged that it was un-
necessary to prove that the defendant had
any knowledge of the unkindness of the horse.
The court above held this to be error. The
case of Allen v. Wanamaker, 31 N. J. Law,
370, was an action for false representations.
in that the defendant represented certain
peach trees to be good. The court charged
that the defendant was liable for such rcp-
resentations, if false, whether he knew them
to be true or not. This was held error. I,
however, incline to the opinion that in this
case the question whether there was an af-
firmation of personal knowledge of the truth
of the representation was not one for the jury;
but 1 think that this is so because the rep-
resentations were of a kind concerning which
the judge could say it was legally inferable
that they were the statement of a strong be-
lief only in the truth of the facts asserted.
The feature of the case already mentioned.
which led me to the conclusion that the as-
sumption of the trial judge was a mistake.
, leads me to the opposite conclusion, that the
This seems to involve the question of the ‘
legal inference to be drawn is that it would
not have been understood by the vendor and
the vendee, at the time of the sale. that there
was coupled with the representations concern-
ing the horse a representation that the vendor
had personal knowledge concerning them. but
that it was understood that he expressed his
strong belief in their truth, resting upon his
knowledge of the previous history of the ani-
mal,and his useas :l.liver\'hnrse. For these
reasons. I think the judgment below should
be reversed.
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rested upon what he knew of the previous ' ing that the present case WM one in which 
history of the animal, anll perhaps, in some I the falsity of the representation raised the 
degree, from the use of a hors~ by other pel'- I legal inference of fra11d, the court was in er-
sons. The animal seems to have heen used 1 ror. The case of Searing v. Lum, 5 N. J. 
for livery purposes. The hol'se had been ad- : Law, 785, was an aclion for deceit, brought 
mittedly driven to Orange an<l Harlem the in a justice's court, upon the ground of false 
day before the sale was consummated. The representations in the sale of a horse. The 
vendol' did not say that he had driven gra~amen of the action was that the vendor 
the horse the alleged distance in the time • had represented the horse to be so nil and 
11tated. He does not say he had driven him ! klnd. The justice charged that it was un-
at all. His statement that the hol'se could necessary to prove that the defendant had 
easily do that, for he had been a very fast any knowledge of the unkindrwss of the hon1e. 
horse, and had been used to the salvage The court above held this to be error. The 
corps wagon, implieJ that his knowledge case of Allen v. Wanamaker, SI N. J. Law, 
was gl'ounded upon such information, rather 370, was an action for false representation8, 
than upon personal knowledge. 'fhel'efore In that the defenrlant repl'esented certain 
it seems to me that 1t was clt>1u-ly a mistake peach trees to be good. 'fhe court charged 
for the court to say thnt the rt>prt>sentation that the defend;mt was liable for such rep· 
was so· obviously of a fact susceptible of resentations, if false, whether he knew them 
exact information, made as of the personal to be true or not. This was held error. I. 
knowledge of the vendor, that this question however, incline to the opinion that In this 
was not one to be left to the jury. It also case the question whether there was an af-
seems to me that the repre11entations, as they ftrmation of personal knowlf!dge of the truth 
appear in the case, and as they were treated of the representation was not one for the jury; 
at the trial, amounted to something more but l think that this is so because the rep-
than an altirmation that the horse was able resentations were of a kind concerning which 
to travel the distance named within the time the judge could say lt was legally inff'lrable 
mentioned on a sinirle ocCRSion, but they im- that tlu~y were the statement of a strong be· 
plied that the animal could habitually do so. lief only in the truth or the facts ae!lerted. 
· The idea conveyed was that the horse was to The feature of the case already mentioned, 
be fit for the service required, namely, to which led me to the conclnsion that the as-
convey the purchRser from Rockland to sumplion of the trial judge was a mistake, 
Orange Valley, in the course of his business. leads me to the opposite conclusion, that the 
This seems to involve the question of the legal inference Lo be drawn is that it would 
horse's ability to perform that service con- not have been underetooll by the vendor and 
tinually. Now, it seems apvarent that when the vendee, at the time of the sale, that there 
the representation not only covers the pres- was coupled with the representations concem-
ent ability to perform a service once, but also ing the horse a representation that the vendor 
its ability to do so frequently and con ti nu- had personal knowledge concerning them, but 
ously, it extends beyond the realm of exact that it WHS nnderi;tood that he expressed his 
infor111ation, if it does not cease tQ be a rep- stmng belief in their truth, resting upon his 
resentation of a subsisting fact at all, and knowledge of the previous history of the ani .. 
become a mere promise for future pel'form- mai, 1tnd his use as 1\ Ii vton horse. For these 
ance. But, without regarding this l'eature reasons, I think the judgtnt!llt below should 
of the CW1e, I am conviuct!d that, in assu1n- be re\·erseu. 
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ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OB. EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS. [Case N0. 117
DURKIN v. COBLEIGH.
(30 N. E. 474, 156 Mass. 108.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
folk. Feb. 27, 1892.
Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk
county; James M. Barker, Judge.
Action by Patrick Durkin against Benj. F.
Cobleigh for breach of agreement. A verdict
was rendered for defendant by direction of
the court, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions
sustained.
F. W. Kittredge and W. H. Drury, for
plaintifl. F. Hutchinson, for defendant.
Suf-
ALI.l~}.\', J. This is an action of contract.
The plaintiff had taken i’rom the defendant a
deed of land described as bounded on a
street, and referring to a plan on which the
street was shown. This street was upon
land owned by the defendant. The deed
contained no covenant that the defendant
would build the street, or cause water to be
introduced therein. The plaintilI‘s case rests
upon the proposition that, in order to induce
him to buy the lot, the defendant orally
promised to grade and build the street so
as to connect with a certain public street
already built and open, and also to cause the
city water to be put into the street by a
certain specified time. The question is
whether such an oral agreement may be
shown. The plaintiff gained a right of way
by estoppel over the land owned by the de-
fendant, and described as a street. Howe V.
Alger, 4 Allen, 206; Insurance Co. v. Cousens,
127 Mass. ‘.558; Crowell v. Beverly, 134 Mass.
98. And this right would extend for the
entire length of the street, as indicated, pro-
vided the defendant owned the same. Tobey
v. Taunton, 119 Mass. 404; Fox v. Sugar
Refinery, 109 Mass. 292. But the defendant
would not be bound by his deed to build and
maintain the street fit to travel. Ilennessey
v. Railroad Co., 101 Mass. 540. The obliga-
tion of the defendant to do the acts now in
question depends wholly on his alleged oral
agreement. A rule has been established
which may be stated in general terms to be
that an agreement by parol. which is col-
lateral to the written contract and on a dis-
tinct subject, may be proved. It is rather
tlitiicult to lay down a precise formula to
deline in advance for all cases what will
come within this rule. In Steph. Dig. Ev.
(Am. Ed.) 163, this is attempted as follows:
"The existence of any separate oral agree-
ment as to any matter on which a document
is silent, and which is not inconsistent with
its terms, if from the circumstances of the
case the court infers that the parties did not
intend the document to be a complete and
final statement of the whole transaction be-
tween them," may be proved. Where the
oral agreement is on the face of it incon-
sistent with what was written, it is plain
that the writing must prevail. Flynn v.
Bourneuf, 143 Mass. 277, 9 N. E. 650, and
Knowlton v. Keenan, 146 Mass. 86, 15 N. E.
127, were cases of this kind. But the more
ditlieult question arises where the oral agree-
ment relied on relates to something not
specified in terms in the writing. It must
then be determined whether the written doc-
ument is to be deemed to contain all that
was agreed between the parties. There are
many cases in which this question has been
presented, and the decisions are not entirely
harmonious. Thus in Naumberg v. Young,
44 N. J. Law, 331, the court disapproved of
the decisions in Morgan v. Griffith, L. R. 6
Exch. 70, and Erskine v. Adeane, 8 Ch-. App.
756, in which cases it was held that an oral
agreement by a lessor to destroy the rabbits
might be proved. In an early Massachusetts
case it was hold that a lessor is not bound
by an oral agreement to provide other and
better accommodations than those stipulated
for in the lease. Brigham v. Rogers, 17
Mass. 571. And on a written contract of
sale of goods an additional warranty cannot
be proved by parol. Whitmore v. Iron Co.,
2 Allen, 52, 58; Elghmie v. Taylor, 98 N.
Y. 288. So where one, by a written instru-
ment, agreed to sell out his business stand
and stock of goods, it cannot be shown by
parol that he also agreed not to engage in a.
similar business in the same town. Doyle v.
Dixon, 12 Allen, 576; Wilson v. Sherburne,
6 Cush. 68. On the other hand, in several
cases more nearly resembling the present
in their facts, it has been held that an addi-
tional oral agreement might be proved. Thus
oral agreements by vendors of land requir-
ing to be filled, that they would pay for the
filling, have been held to be independent col-
lateral agreements which might be enforced.
Page v. Monks, 5 Gray, 492; McCormich v.
Gheevers, 124 Mass. 262. Also an oral agree-
ment by a grantor to pay for building a
sewer in the street. Carr v. Dooley, 119
Mass. 294. The case of Graffam v. Pierce,
143 Mass. 386, 9 N. E. 819, was deemed to
come within the same doctrine. It was de-
termined in Ayer v. .\ianufaeturing Co., 147
Mass. 46, 16 N. E. 754, that a manufacturer
of goods who accepted a written order, with
stipulations as to quality, price, and rebate
or claims for allowance, might be held on
an oral agreement to advertise the goods.
Sec, also, Willis v. Huibert, 117 Mass. 151;
Rennell v. Kimball, 5 Allen, 356; Tayl. Ev.
§§ 1135, 1147. It seems to us that the case
falls within the last class of decisions, and
that the alleged agreement of the defendant
should be treated as an independent collat-
eral agreement, which need not be included
in the deed. The result is that the plaintiff
was entitled to have his case submitted to
the Jury. Exceptions sustained.
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OHAL EVIDE~CE TO V Alff 01~ EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS. [Case No. 117 
Dl'UKIN v. COBLEIGH. 
(30 N. E. 474, 156 Ma88. 108.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Mnivmchusetts. Suf-
folk. Fe.b. 'n, 1892. 
Exceptions fl'Om superior court, Sutiolk 
county; James M. Barker, Judge. 
Action by Patrick Durkin against Benj. F. 
Coblel,i:h 1'01· bn>ach of agreement. A verdJct 
was rendered tor defendant by direction ot 
the court, and plalntiiT excepts. Exceptions 
sustained. 
~·. W. Kittredge and W. H. Drury, tor 
plalntltI. F. Hutchinson, tor defendant. 
ALLKX, J. This Is an action of contract. 
The pl11inttrr hnd taken from the defrndunt a 
deed of land described as bounded on a 
Mtt·eet, and referring to a plan on whkh the 
street was shown. This 11treet was upon 
land owned by the defendant. The deed 
contained no covenant that the defendant 
would build the street, or cause water to be 
introduced therein. The plulntltI"s cuse rests 
upon the pro1>0sltlon that, In order to Induce 
him to buy the lot, the dPtendant orally 
promised to grade and build the Mtreet so 
as to conneC't with a certain public street 
alreac.ly bunt and open, and also to cause the 
<'ity water to be put Into the street by a 
certain speelflec.1 time. The question Is 
whether such au oral agreement may be 
shown. The plalntltr gained a right of way 
by estoppel over the land owned by the de-
fendant, and described 1111 a 11tr1>et. Howe v. 
Alger, 4 Allen, '.!00; Insm·um'I' Cu. v. Cousens, 
127 MaAA. :.i.-18; Crowell v. Be,·erly, 134 Mm1s. 
98. And this rlgllt would extend for the 
entire length of the street, as Indicated, pro-
'1ded the defendant owned the sumP. Tobey 
v. 'raunton, 119 Mass. 40!; Fox v. Sugar 
Refinery, 109 Mass. 29'2. But the def Pndant 
would not be bound by his deed to build and 
maintain the street flt to travel. Hennessey 
v. Hailrond Co., 101 l\la11S. 540. The obliga-
tion of the defendant to do the actl!I now In 
question de)lends wholly on his alleged oral 
agreement. A 111fo has been established 
which mny be Rtated In general tPt'ms to be 
that an ngrPt>nwnt by parol, which ls c·ol-
lu tPral to the written contract und on a dls-
tlm·t sul>jeet, n111~· be proved. It Is rather 
ditlicult to lny down a precise formula to 
dt>tlne In mh'ance for nil cn11es what will 
<~m1e within thi!l rule. In Steph. Dig. Ev. 
(Am. Ed.) 163, this Is atterupted as follows: 
'"Tht> existence of 11ny separate oral agree-
ment as to any watter on which a document 
Is silent, and which Is not lnC'onslst1>nt with 
Its terms, It from the circumstances of the 
case the court Inters that the parties did not 
Intend the document to be a complete and 
final statement of the whole transaction be-
tween them," may be ~roved. Where the 
ornl agreement Is on the tace ot It lncon· 
slstt>nt with what was wrltte~. It Is plain 
that the writing must prevail. Flynn v. 
Bourneuf, 143 1\lass. 277, 9 N. E. 650, and 
Knowlton v. Keenan, 146 Mass. 86, lo N. E. 
12i. were cases of this kind. But the more 
dlm<·ult question arises where the oral agree-
ment relied on relates to something not 
specltled In terms In the writing. It must 
then be determined whether the written doc-
ument ls to be deemed to contain all that 
wa11 agreed between the parties. There are 
many cases In which this question has been 
presented, and the decisions are not entirely 
harmonious. Thus In Naumberg v. Young, 
44 ~- J. Law, 331, the court dlsn.pproved ot 
the decisions In Morgan v. Griffi.th, L. R. 6 
Exch. 70, and Erskine v. Adeane, 8 Cir. App. 
766, ln which cases It was held that an oral 
agreement by a lessor to destroy the rabbits 
might be proved. In an early Massuchusetts 
case It was held that a lessor ls not bound 
by an oral agreement to provide other and 
better accommodations than those stipulated 
tor In the lease. Brigham v. Rogers, 17 
Mass. 571. And on a written contract of 
sale ot goods an additional warranty cannot 
be proved by pnrol. Whitmore v. Iron Co., 
2 Allen, 52, 58; Elghmie v. Taylor, 98 N. 
Y. 288. So where one, by a. written Instru-
ment, agreed to sell out his business stand 
and stock of goods, It cannot be shown by 
parol that he also agreed not to engage In a 
similar business in the same town. Doyle v. 
Dixon, 12 Allen, 576; Wilson v. Sherburne, 
O Cush. 68. On the other hand, In several 
cases more nearly resembling the present 
In their tacts, It has been held that an addi-
tional oral agreement might be proved. Thus 
oral agreements by vendors ot land requir-. 
Ing to be filled, that they would pay tor the 
filling, have been held to be independent col-
lateral agreements which might be enforced. 
Page v. llonks, 5 Gray, 492; McCormlch v. 
Cheevers, 124 Mass. 262. Also an oral agree-
ment by a grantor to pay tor building a 
sewer In the street. Carr v. Dooley, 119 
Mass. 294. The case of GraiTam v. Pierce, 
143 Mass. 386, 9 N. E. 819, was deemed to 
come within the samP doctrine. It wns dP-
termlnetl In Ayer v. ~lnnutacturlng Co., Hi 
Mass. 46, 16 N. E. 754, that a manufacturer 
of goods who accepted a written order, with 
stipulations as to quality, price, and rebate 
or claims for allowance, might be held on 
an oral agreement to adYertlse the goods. 
See, also, Willis v. Hulbert, 117 Mass. 151; 
Rennell v. Kimball, 5 Allen, 3..'i6; Tayl. Ev. 
§§ 1135, 1147. It seems to us that the case 
tails within the last class of decisions, and 
that the alleged agreement of the defendant 
Rhould be treated as an Independent collat-
eral agreement, which need not be included 
in the deed. 'fhe result Is that the plaintiff 
wns entitled to have hts case submitted to 
the jury. Exceptions sustained. 
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Case N0 118]
PROOF.
GILBERT ct al. v. 1\IcGI.\'NlS et al.
(28 N. E. 382, 114 Ill. 28.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. May 15, 1885.
Appeal from appellate court, Second
district; Gl-zonol-: W. STIPP, Judge.
Action by Herbert S. Gilbert & Co.
against Patrick McGinnis and others to
recover on a contract for the non-delivery
ofcorn. There was a. judgment for de-
fendants in the circuit court, which was
affirmed in the appellate court, and plain-
tiffs appeal. The judgment is again af-
firmed.
Bull, Straivu & Ruger, for appellants.
Duncan & O'Connor, for appellees.
MULKEY, J. On the 16th of February,
18M, Patrick Mt-Glnnis, the appeliee, sold
to the appellants, Herbert S. Gilbert &
Co., 7.000 bushels of corn. at 39 cents per
bushel, to be delivered in the months of
August and September following. As a
part of the sa,mo agreement, the appel-
lants promised to make advances on the
contract to appellee of what money he
might, from time to time, require. A
short time alter the making of this agree-
ment, appellee called on the appellants, at
their business house in Ottawa. and re-
quested an advance on the contract, as
per agreement. 'l‘he clerk in charge of
their business told him he could have the
money, and commenced writing a note
for the amount, whereupon appeliee stat-
ed to the clerk he would not sign a note,
remarking, in effect, that if he wanted to
obtain money in that way he could get
it from the hank. Appellants refused to
make the required advance unless appellee
would give his note for the amount.
This he declined to do, and informed the
clerk at the time he would not let appel-
lants have the corn. 'l‘he corn not having
been delivered within the time specified in
the agreement. the appellants, on the 3d
day of ()ctober,1881, commenced an action
of assumpsit against appellec-,in theclrcuit
court of La Salle county, to recover dam-
ages for the non-delivery of the corn,
which resulted in ajudgment in favor of
the defendant for costs. This judgment
having been affirmed by the appellate
court for the second district, the plaintiffs
appealed to this court.
On the trial the plaintiffs offered to
show there was a general custom among
grain merchants to take notes from the
seller for the amount of advances made
under contracts for the sale of grain, like
the one in question. They also proposed
to prove that on previous occasions there
had been contracts and dealings similar
in character to the one sued upon, and
that the manner of dealing between the
parties was, when an advance was made,
memoranda or notes should be taken for
the money advanced. The court declined
to admit evidence to thejury in support
of either of these positions, and the rui-
ing of the court in this respect presents
the only question for determination. The
same question is raised by certain refused
instructions asked on behalf of the ap-
pellants. The rule is well recognized that
where a commercial contract is in any
respect ambiguous, a particular custom
or usage of trade known to the parties.
or which,undcr the circumstances. they
are presumed to know, or any previous
course of dealing between them that will
have a tendency to disclose the real inten-
tions of the parties, and to aid the court
in arriving at its true construction, will
be admissible in evidence. Such evidence
is not only admissible for the purpose of
explaining the terms of a contract, but
also for the purpose of ingraiting, as it
were, new terms into it, subject, however,
to the qualification that such new terms
are not expressly or impiiedly excluded
by the express agreement. 1 Smith, Lead.
Cas. '30? et seq. To have this effect, how-
ever. the usage must be reasonable, and
notln conflict with any general rule oflaw.
Macy v. Insurance Co., 9 Metc. (.\iass.)
354. The proof offered in this case was
clearly not for the purpose of explaining
any ambiguity in the contract, or for the
purpose of showing that some particular
word or phrase in it is used out of its or-
dinary signiflcation. No claim of‘ this
kind is made. it is conceded by both par-
ties that appellants were to make ad-
vances,—that is, let appeliee have money.
from time to time. as he might need it.
under the contract. So far there is‘ no
controversy. But appellants contend
that a custom or usage prevailed, not an-
verted to in the express agreement, which
required the appellee to give to them hie
note upon receiving any such advances.
The usage here sought to be shown. it is
clear, was for the purpose of adding a
stipulation on the part of appellce, which.
it is conceded, is not found in the express
agreement. This, as we have already
seen, may sometimes be done; but wheth-
er it could be done in this particular case
depends upon whether the stipulation
thus to be added is inconsistent or in con-
flict with that part of the agreement
which is expressed,and about which there
is no controversy. We are clearly of opin-
ion that lt is, and that the trial court,
therefore, ruled properly in excluding the
evidence and in refusing the instructions
complained of. An advance orpayment of
money on a contract of sale, without
doubt, is altogether a different thing from
that of obtaining money from the pur-
chaser on the seller's own note. The legal
effect of the transaction in the first case is
to extinguish. pm tanto, the seller's claim
and the purchaser's corresponding liabili-
ty. In the second, no part of either is ex-
tinguished. Instead of collecting some
thing on his corn, as provided by the
agreement, the seller is offered aloan of
money on his individual note, which
would be a complete change of the legal
relations of the parties. Whereas the sell-
er was before a mere creditor of the pur-
chaser. he at once, upon giving such a
note, becomes the debtor of the purchas-
er, and no part of the debt due him on uc-
count of the sale is thereby discharged.
Thus it is seen the legal effect in the one
case is practically the very opposite of
what it is in theother. and might in many
cases result in the grossesi injustice. For
instance, had appellee given his note for
the required advance, the appellants
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Case No 118] PROOF. 
GILBERT et al. "'· llcGIXXIS et al. 
(28 N. E. 38'2, 114 Ill. 28.) 
Supreme Court of Illinois. May 15, 1885. 
Appeal from appellate conrt, Second 
district; G•:onoE W. ~TIPP, Judgt'. 
Action by Herbert S. Gilbert & Co. 
against Pa'trlck McGlnnlR anrl others to 
rPCover on a contract for the nun-delivery 
or <:orn. There was a judgment !or de· 
fendanb.1 In the circuit court, which WRS 
affirmed in the appellate court, and 1>laln-
ttrr11 ttppeal. The Judgment le again ar-
tirmed. 
lJull, Strawu tf Ruger, for appeJlanta. 
Duuc1w ct O'Cormor, for appellees. 
MULKEY, .J. On the 16th of February, 
181.'11, Patrick McGlnnlK, thti appellee, 1mlll 
to the appellon ts, HE'rbert 8. Gilbert & 
Co., 7,000 bushels of corn, at 39 cents per 
bushel, to be delivered in the montha of 
August and Reptember following. As a 
part of the eiync 84!-'ref'ment, the appel-
lant& promised to make odvanceR on the 
contract to appellee of what money he 
might, from time to time, require. A 
11hort time nftt'r the making of this agree-
ment, appellee cnll<'d ou thP nppellantK, at 
their bulllne@s house In Ottawa. ancl re-
quested an advance on thf' contract, 8.!I 
per agreement. The clerk in <'harge of 
their huelness told him he could have the 
money. and commenced 'vrltlng a note 
for the amount, whereupon a(Jpellee stat-
ed to the clerk he would nut sign a note, 
remarking, in effect, that If be ~anted to 
obtain money in that way he could get 
It from the honk. Appellants refused to 
mukP the req•1ired advance unless appellee 
would give his note for the amount. 
ThlM he declined to do, and informed the 
clerk at the time he would not let appel-
lants have the corn. 'J'he corn not havln~ 
been delivered within the time speclfled In 
the agreement. the apfJelhrnts, on the 3d 
day of October, 1881, com•uenced an uctlor1 
of 11.Ssumpslt against appellet', In the circuit 
court of La Salle county, to reccn·er dam· 
ages for the non-delivery of the corn, 
which reflulted In a judgment In favor uf 
tbA <lefendant for costs. This jud,nnent 
hu·ing been affirmed by the appellate 
court for the second district, the plaintiffs 
appealed to this court. 
On the trlRl the plaintiffs offered to 
show there was a genl'ral cu11tom among 
grain merchants to take noteM from the 
Meller for the amount or advances made 
uudt'r contracts for the sale of grain, like 
the one In question. Tht'Y also propoeecl 
to prove that on previous or.cuslone therl' 
h1td bPen contracts and dealings slmllnr 
in churncter tu the one sued upon, anrl 
that the manner of dealing between the 
parties was, when an advance was nwde, 
memoranda or notes ghould be taken for 
the money advnnced. The court derllned 
to admit evidence to the jury In support 
of <'lther of these positlune, and the rul-
ing of the conrt In this reHpect presents 
the only question for determination. The 
same qnestlon IH ralwed by certain refused 
lnstructlonR 1111ked on hehalf of the ap-
pellants. 'l'he rule le well recognized that 
where a commercial contract is lo any 
342 
respect ambiguous, a particular custom 
or usnge of trade known to the parties, 
or which, under the clrcumstunces, they 
are presumed to know, or any prevluu11 
course of dealing between them that wlll 
ho.\"e a tendem•y to dhll"I08c the real lnten· 
tlons or the parties, and to aid the court 
In arrlv.lng at its true con11tructlon, will 
be admls~lble in evidence. Such evidence 
I& not only admissible for the purpo11e of 
e.ltplnlnlng the terms of a contract, but 
also for the pnrpose of lngraftlog, aa It 
were, new tpr1m1 Into It, subject, however, 
to the quallllcatlon that 1mch new terms 
are not expressly or lmplleltly excluded 
by the expr~!Jll agreement. 1 ~mlth, Lead. 
Cas. •307 et seq. To ha vc thl11 effect, how-
E:ver, the osage must be rea110011ble, and 
not In conftlct with any general role of law. 
Macy v. Insurance Co., 9 Mete. (llasa.) 
854. The proof oflert!d In this case W8.t' 
clearly not for the purpo!!e or explaining 
any ambiguity In the contract, or for the 
purpo11e of showing that some particular 
word or phraRe In it Is used out of Its or-
dinary shcnlftcatlon. No claim of thlP 
kind 111 made. It 18 concPded by both par· 
ties that appellants \Vere to make ad· 
vances,-thnt la, let appellee haT'e money. 
from time to time. as he might need It. 
under the contract. 80 far there ls· no 
contro'ferHy. But appellants contend 
that a custom or usage prevailed, not ad· 
verted to In the express agreement, which 
required the app<>llee to glvP to them hl11 
note upon receiving any such odvan1:e11. 
The usa1;te here s•Jugllt to be shown, It 111 
clPar, was for the purpose of adding a 
stipulation on the part of appellee, which. 
It Is con<'edcd, 111 not found In the expreea! 
agreement. 'l'hls, as we have already 
seen, may sometimes be done; bot wheth-
er It could be done lo this partlculRr case 
depends upon whether the 11tipulatlon 
thus to be added Is inconsistent or In con-
Olct with that r1art of the agl'l't'ment 
wbl<'h Is expressed,a.nrl about which there 
la no contro\·ersy. We are clearly of opin-
ion that It Is, and that the trlPI court, 
therefore, ruled properly In excluding the 
evidence and in refm1lng the instructions 
complained of. An advance orpayment of 
monPy on a contract of sale, without 
doubt, is altogether a different thing from 
that of obtaining money from the pur-
chaser on the seller'H own note. The lPgal 
effect of the trnnsactlon In the first r.aee le 
to extlngulRh, pro tnnto, the seller's claim 
and the purchaser's corre!!pondlng llabill-
ty. In the second, no part of either Is ex· 
tlnguished. Instead of collecting some-
thing on his corn, as provided by the 
agreement, the seller lit ottered a. loan of 
money on his individual note, which 
woultJ he a complete change of the le1tnl 
relations of the parties. Wbe:"eas the sell· 
er was before a mere creditor of the pur-
chaser. he at oncP, upon ttlvlng such a 
note, become& the dPbtor Of the purt•has• 
er, and no part of the debt due him on UC· 
<'ount of the tiale is thereby discharged. 
ThuM it is seen the Jpgal effect in the one 
cuse Is practlrall.v the very opposite of 
what It ls In tht'other,aud might In nurny 
cal!eti result In the grosite~t Injustice. l''or 
Instance, had appellee given his note for 
the required ad vauce, the appellants 
ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR. EXPLAIN DOCUMENT5.
[Case No. 118
might, the next hour thereafter, have
transferred it to another for value, and
appellee would have been compelled to
pay it, whether he ever got a cent ior his
corn or not. This is appuren t. That one
will not be permitted to prove acnstom
or usage the eiiect of which will be to add
to an express agreement a condition or
limitation which is repugnant to or incon-
sistent with the agreement itseli, will
hardly be questioned. This is not only
the universally received doctrine on the
subject, but it has been oiten iully recog-
nized by this court. Cadweil v. Meek. 17
Ill. 220; Bisseil v. Ryan, 23 Ill. 566: Desi!-
ier v. Beers. 32 Iii. 368; Wilson v. Ban-
man, 80111. 493. In the editor's note to
Wigglesworth v. Dallison, 1 Smith, Lead.
Gas. 309, it is said: “Evidence of usage,
though sometimes admissible to add to
or explain, is never to vary or to contra-
dict, eitner expressly or by implication,
the terms oi a written instrument;" eit-
ing, in support of the proposition. Magee
v. Atkinson, 2 Mees. & W. 442; Adams v.
Wordiey, 1 Mees. & W. 374; Truenlan v.
Loder, ll Ado]. & E. 589; and Yates v.
Pym, 6 Taunt. 446. The rule here stated
is equally applicable to a. verbal contract,
where the terms 01- it are definitely fixed,
as they are in the present case. Itfolio ws
from what we have said, and the-au-
thorities cited, the judgment oi the appel-
late court must he aifirmed.
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mll(ht, the next hour thereafter, have 
transferred It to another for vRlue, and 
appellee won Id have been compelled to 
pay It, whether he ever got a cent for his 
corn or not. This ls ar1parent. That one 
will not be permltte(} to prove a. c11stom 
or nsau;e the effect of which wlll be to add 
to an express agrePment a condition or 
limitation which Is repngnant to or incon-
sistent with the agreement lbielf, will 
harl1ly be questlo11ed. Thht 18 not only 
the unl\•erK1dly received doctrine on the 
a11bject, but It has been often fully rt..'(!og-
nlzerl IJy this court. Cadwell v. Meek, 17 
Ill. 220; Bh1sell v. Ryan, 23 Ill. 566; Desh-
ler v. Beers, 32 Ill. 368; WUson ,., Bau-
man, 80 m. 493. In the editor's note to 
Wlgglc1nvortb v. Dallbmn, 1 Smith, Leud. 
Cea. SUD, It 111 said: "Evidence of usage, 
though sometime.. admissible to add to 
or explalu, ls never to vary or to contra-
dict, eitner expre1111ly or by Implication, 
the terms of a written Instrument;" cit-
ing, In 1mpport of the proposition, Magee 
v. Atklmmn, 2 Mee11. & W. 442; Adams v. 
WordlPy, 1 Mees. & W. :174; 'l'rueman v. 
Loder, 11 Adol. & E. 5~U; and Yates '"· 
Pym, 6 Taunt. 446. The rule here stated 
Is equally applicable to a verbal contrllct, 
where the terms of. It are deftnltely flxed, 
as they are In the present ca11e. ltfollows 
from what we have said, and the. ao-
tborltlee cited, the joilgmeot of the appel-
late court must be affirmed. 
• 
Case No. 119]
PROOF.
COONROD v. MADDEN.
(25 N. E. 1102, 126 Ind. 197.)
Nov. 25, 1890.
Appeal from circnitcourt, Knox county ;
Gi~:ono1~: A. Biclmi-:Ll., Special Judge.
George C. Reily, for appellant. Cobb &
Cobb, for appellee.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
COFFEY, J. This was a suit by the ap-
pellee against the appellant upon a prom-
issory note. Answer, payment. Reply,
general denial. Trial by the court. Find-
ing and judgment for the appellee, over a
motion for a new trial,for the full amount
of the note, with reasonable attorney's
fees. The assignment of error calls in
question the propriety of the ruling of the
circuit court in overruling the motion for
a new trial. No brief is filed in the cause
on behalf of the appellee, and by reason of
that fact we are not informed as to the
ground upon which the court made its
several rulings in his favor. On the trial
of the cause the appellant introduced and
read in evidence a certain check executed
by him to the appellee, and also testified
that such check was given and received in
part payment of the note in suit. The ap-
pellee, over the objection of the appellant,
was permitted by the court to testify that
the check was received by him in part pay-
ment of another and different note from
the one in suit, giving the date and
amount of said note, and its rate oi’ inter-
est. He also testiiied that thcappellant
had paid the note to him in full, and that
it had been surrendered to the appellant.
The objection to this evidence, stated by
the appellant to thecourt at the time of its
introduction, was that it was secondary,
and that the appellee could not give evi-
dence of the contents of such note without
first proving its loss, or serving notice up-
on the appellant to produce it in court. to
be used in evidence in the cause. It is un-
doubtedly the general rule that, before
parol evidence can be received of the con-
tents ol a written instrument, it must be
shown that such instrument is lost or de-
stroyed, or that such instrument is in the
hands of the party against whom the evi-
dence ls offered; and that, upon proper
notice so to do, he has failed to produce
the original in court, to be read in evi-
dence. Smith v. Reed. 7 Ind. 242; Mum-
ford v. Thomas. l0 Ind. 167; Manson v.
Blair, l5 Ind. 242: Bridge Co. v. Apple-
gate, l3 Ind. 331); Fra zee v. State, 58
Ind. 8; McMakin v. Weston, 64 1110.270.
But there is a well-defined and well-estab-
lished exception to this general rule. The
general rule has no application where the
written instrument is merely collateral to
the issue; as where the parol evidence re-
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lates to matters distinct from the instru-
ment ol writing, although the same fact
could be proved or disproved by the writ-
ing. Wood, Pr. Ev. p. 4. In the case of
Daniel v. Johnson, 29 Ga. 207, it was held
that payment might be proved by parol
to have been made in promissory notes,
without the production of the notes. The
rule is that. where the parol evidence is
as near the thing to which the witness tes-
tifles as the written evidence, then each is
primary. Whart. Ev. § 77. The case of
Hewitt v. Slate. 121 Ind. 245, 23 N. E. Rep.
83,is analogous in principle to the case un-
der consideration. ln that case Hewitt
was charged with maliciously killing a
dog. The state was permitted to prove
by parol that the dog in question had
been listed for taxation. over the objection
of Hewitt that the tax-list returned by the
assessor was the best evidence of that
fact. 1n answer to this objection, this
court said: “The substantive fact to be
proved was that the dog killed had been
listed for taxation, and the rule is that,
- where parol evidence is as near the fact
testifled to as the written, then each is
primary. The rule which requires the pro-
duction of written instruments in evidence
has no application when the instrument is
merely collateral to the issue, and where
the fact to be proved relates to a subject
distinct from the writing.” In this case,
had the note upon which the appellee
claimed the check read in evidence had
been applied been produced in court, the
parties would have been as far from the
real controversy between them as they
were before its production; namely, the
question as to whether the check was ap-
plied on that note or the notein suit. For
this reason, we think the case falls within
the exception to the general rule above
stated. The plea of payment filed by the
appellant was no notice to the appellee
that he would insist that the check read
in evidence was a. payment on the note in
suit; and so there was no occasion to
serve notice to produce. to be read in evi-
dence, the note on which it was actually
applied. To hold that notice must be
served in order to authorize evidence of
the existence oi a written instrument com-
ing collaterally in question like the case
before us would result in much inconven-
ience. and would often result in defeating
the ends of justice. It will be observed
that the contents of the note which had
been paid was immaterial to the contro-
versy, savc as it furnished evidence of the
existence of a debt to the payment of
which the check read in evidence might
have been applied. In our opinion. the
court did not err in admitting the evidence
of which complaint is made. Judgment
atiirined.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
08
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Caae No. 119] PUOOF. 
COONROD v. lfADDEN'. 
(25 N. E. 1102, 1:?6 Ind. 197.) 
Supreme Court of Indiana. Nov. 25, 1890. 
Appeal from clrcuitcourt, Knox county; 
GEOHOE A. BICKNELi., Special Judge. 
Geurge C. Reily, for appellant. Cobb ct 
Cobb, for appellee. 
COFFEY, J. Thie was a eutt by the ap-
pellee aatainet the ap(>elhmt upon a prom-
issory note. AnKwer, payment. Reply, 
general denial. •rrlal by the court. lt'lnd-
lng 11nd judgment for the a1>11ell1.."f', over a 
motion for a new trial, for the full amount 
of the note, with reasonable attorney's 
fees. The assignment of error calls in 
question the propriety of the rullnar of the 
circuit court In overruling the motion for 
a new irial. No brief ls filed In the cause 
on behalf of the apprllee, a~d by reason of 
that fact we nre not Informed ns to the 
ground upon which the coul"t made Its 
several rnllngR In his favor. On the trial 
of the cauHP the appellant Introduced and 
read In evhlence a certain check executed 
by him to the appellee, and also teetlfted 
that such check was given an<l received In 
part payment of the note to suit. The ap-
pellee, over the objection of the ap11ellant, 
was permitted by the cuurt to testify that 
the check was received by him in part pay-
ment of another and different note from 
the one tn 11utt, giving the date and 
amount or said note, and lte rate or fnter-
est. He al110 teellfte<J that the appellant 
bad paid the note to him tn full, and that 
It had been 1rnrrendered to the appellant. 
The ol>jectlon to this evidence, stated by 
the appellunt tothecourt at the time of its 
Introduction, was that It was sccondury, 
and that the nppellee could not give evi-
dence of the contents of such note without 
first proving Its loHs, or serving notice up-
on the apprllant to procluce it In court, to 
be used tn C\'idence In tbfl cam~e. It 111 un-
doubtedly the general rule that, before 
parol evidence can be received of the con· 
tents or a wl'lt~n Instrument, It muRt be 
shown that such ln11trn1nent le lost or de-
stroyed, or that such instrument ls In the 
hands of the party ugalm~t whom the evi-
dence le offered; and that, upon proper 
notice so to do, he has failed to produce 
the original to court, to be rrud In evi-
dence. ::;mtth v. Recd, 7 Ind. 2*2; .Mum-
ford v. Thomas, 10 Ind. 167; Maoeon v . 
Blall', 15 Ind. 242; Bridge Co. v. Apple-
gate, 13 Ind. :la!l; l<'ra zee v. State, 58 
Ind. 8; Mc!\fukin v. We11ton, tU Ind. 27U. 
But there Is a well-defined and well-estab-
lished exception to this general rule. 'l'he 
general rule has no oppllcatlon where the 
written Instrument Is merely collnte ral to 
the l11sue; ae where the parol evidence re-
344 
h\tee to matters distinct from the Instru-
ment of wrltln1t, although the same fact 
could be proved or disproved by the writ-
ing. Wood, Pr. Ev. p. 4. In the case of 
Dtrnlel v. JobnHon, 29 6a. 207, It was held 
that payment might be pro\'ed by parol 
to have been me.de tn promlesory notee, 
without the production of the notea. The 
rule ls that, where the parol evidence 18 
ae near the thing to which thewitnt.'88 tes-
tlftee as the written e\•ldence, then each is 
primary. Whart. Ev. § 77. The case or 
Hewitt v. State, 121 Ind. ~5, 23 N. E. Rep. 
83, le analogous In prlncl11le to the case un-
der consideration. Jn tlutt cuee Hewitt 
was charited with mallclou11ly killing a 
dog. The state was 1.1ermltted to prove 
by parol that the dog lo qm'Btion bad 
been listed for taxation, over the objection 
of Hewitt that the tax-list returned by the 
aeeeseor was the beet ttvldence of that 
fact. Jn Hnawer to this objection, this 
court said: '"The eubstentlve fact to be 
provecl was that the dog killed bad been 
llRte<l for tnxatlon, and tile rule 111 that. 
where purol evidence le as near the fact 
testified to ae the written. then each le 
primary. The rule which requires the pro-
duction of written Instruments In e¥1dence 
bas no application when tbe luetrumPot la 
merely collateral to the Issue, and whf're 
the fact to be prov~ relutes to a subject 
distinct from the writing." In this t•ase, 
had the note upon which the appellre 
claimed the check read In Pvldence had 
been applied been produced in court, the 
parties would have been ae far from the 
real cnntro\·ersy between them ae thP.y 
were before tte producttoo; namely, the 
question a11 to whether the check was ap-
plied on that note or the note In suit. For 
this reason, we think the cue falls within 
the exce1>tlon to the general rule above 
stated. 'fhe plea of payment flied by the 
appellant was no notice to the ap11ellee 
that he would h1slet that the check read 
In evidence was a payment on the note in 
suit; and eo thl:'re was no occaelou to 
serve notice to produce, to be reall In evi-
dence, the note on which It was actually 
applied. To hold that notice must bo 
served In ordP.r to authorize evidence or 
the existence of a written Instrument com-
ing collaterally In q nestlon like the case 
bl.'fore us would result in mur.h Inconven-
ience. and would often result lo defeating 
the ends of justice. It will be ob1ter\"ed 
that the cc•ntente of 1he note which bad 
bt->en paid was tmma.terlal to the contro-
versy, 11a ve a11 it furnished evidence of the 
existence of a debt to the payment of 
which the check read In evidence might 
have been applied. In oor opinion, the 
court did not err in admtttingthe evidence 
of which complaint 18 made. Judgment 
afDrmed. 
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WHITCOMB et al. v. R()D.\I.\N ct al.
(40 N. E. 553, 156 Ill. 116.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. April 2, 1895.
Appeal from circuit court, Mcliean county;
Owen T. Reeves, Judge.
Bill by Edward L. Rodman and others
against Lucinda Whitcomb and others. Com-
plainants obtained a decree. Defendants ap-
peal. Aiiirmcd.
This is a bill brought by Edward L. Rod-
man, Joseph L. Rodman, and .\lary J. Rod-
man against the heirs and other devisees of
John Rodman, deceased, to construe the will
of deceased, and to grant title to certain lands
alleged to have been devised by the will.
John ltodman died testate July 30, 1889. At
the time of his death he owned in fee the N.
W. 1,4, of the N. E. 1/4 of section 27, 60 acres
oi‘! of the west side of the S. E. 1/4 of section
22, the S. W. 54 of the N. E. 14 of section 22,
and the S. E. 1/4 of the N. E. 1/4 of section 22,
all in township 23 N., range 3 E., in McLean
county. He left surviving him Mary Jane
Rodman, his widow, and his only heirs at
law, his children, Ann Eliza Boyce, Joseph
L. Rodman, Edward L. Rodman, Lucinda
lvhitcomb, and his grandchild, Mary Eveline
King. the sole heir and child of his deceased
daughter, .\iary A. Craig. The will was ex-
ecuted October 17, 1888, and admitted to pro-
bate July 19, 1889, and was as follows:
“First. I will to my daughter Ann Eliza
Boyce forty (40) acres of land, being the
northwest quarter of the northeast quarter
of section twenty-seven (27). Second. To my
son Joseph L. Rodinan I will and bequeath
one hundred acres of land (100),-sixty acres
(60) oli of the west side of the southeast
quarter of section twenty-two (22), forty
acres (40) being the northwest quarter of the
southeast quarter of section twenty-two (22).
Third. To my son Edward L. Rodman I will
and bequeath forty acres or land, being the
northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of
section twenty-two (22). I<‘ourth._ I give to
my daughter Lucinda Whlt('OlHb two thou-
sand dollars ($2.000). Fifth. To my grand-
daughter, Mary Eveline King. I give two hun-
dred dollars ($200). The above legacies to be
paid out of moneys and credits on hand, and
proceeds of the sale of personal property. >All
oi.’ the above land being in town twenty-three
(23) north, range three (3) east of the third
principal meridian." The will contained a
sixth clause, in which certain personal prop-
erty was devised to the widow, and she was
also given the control of the above-described
lands during her life. It will be observed
that the two 40-acre tracts (S. W. 14 N. E. 1/4
section 22 and S. E. 1/4, N. E. 1/; section 22)
owned by the testator are not mentioned in
the will, and that the testator never owned
the N. E. 1,-3 of S. E. 1,4 section 22, which is
devised to Edward L. Rodman, and that the
40 acres devised to Joseph L. Rodlnan laps
onto the 60 acres devised to him, and includes
within it the north 30 acres ot the 60 acres,
and that he did not own the east 10 acres of
the .\'. WV. 1/4 of the S. E. 1/,,, which is devised
to Joseph. The situation will be better under-
stood by the following plats of the land; No.
1 being the land owned by the testator, and
No. 2 that specifically named in the will:
.7v'¢.2.*
The testator, when he executed the will, and
at the time of his death, was in possession of
the lands owned by him. He owned no oth-
er lands. The hill prayed for a construction
of the will, and that the lauds be held to have
vested under the will, the S. E. 1/, of N. E. %
of section 22 in Edward L. Rodman, and the
S. W. 1A of N. E. 1/t in Joseph Rodman, and
that the widow be held to have a. life estate
in all the lands. The answer practically ad-
mitted the facts set up in the bill, but denied
that it was the intention of the testator to de-
vise the two 40-acie tracts in the N. E. $4, of
section 22, or that the will was capable of
construction, and claimed that said lands de-
scended as intestate estate. The court, on the
hearing, decreed substantially as prayed for
in the bill.
Kerrick, Lucas & Spencer, for appellants.
Benjamin & Morrissey, for appellees.
CRAIG, J. (after stating the facts). In the
construction of a will the important question,
always, is to ascertain the intention of the tes-
tator. As was well said by Chief J nstice Mar-
shall in Finlay v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. 346:
“The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule
in the construction of wills. and if that intent
can be clearly perceived, and is not contrary
to some positive rule of law, it must prevail,
although, in giving effect to it, some words
should be rejected, or so restrained in their
application as materially to change the literal
meaning ot the particular sentence." See,
also, Decker v. Decker, _121 Ill. 354, 12 N.
E. 750. It will be presumed that a person,
when he makes and publishes a- will, intends
to dispose of his whole estate, unless the
presumption is rebutted by its provisions, or
345
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
08
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
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WHITCOMB et al. v. RODlf.\N Pt al. 
(40 N. E. 553, l::i6 l11. 116.) 
Supreme Court of Illinois. April 2, 1800. 
Appeal from circuit court, McLean county; 
Owen T. Reeves, Judge. 
Blll by Edward L. Rodman and others 
against Lucinda Whitcomb and others. Com· 
pla1D4Dts obtained a decree. Defendants ap-
peal. AWrmt>d. 
Thia ts a blll brought by Edward L. Rod-
man, Joseph L. Rodman, and Mary :r. Rod-
man against the heirs and other devisees of 
.Tohn Rodman, deceased, to construe the wlll 
of de<'t'llsed, and to grant tltle to certain lands 
allt>ged to have been devised by the wm . 
• Tolw Rodman died testate July 30, 1889. At 
tht> time of his d('nth be owned in fee the N. 
W. 14 of the N. 1'~. 14 of section 27, 60 acres 
olf of the west sldP of the S. E. 1A, of section 
zi, the S. W. % ot the N. E. 1A, of sectlon 22, 
and the S. E. 14 of the N. E. 1A, of section 22, 
all in township 23 N., range 3 E., in McLean 
<.'Ounty. He left 81ll'Vlvlug him Mary Jane 
Rodu1an, his widow, and his ouly heirs at 
law, his children, Ann Eliza Boyce, Joseph 
L. HO<lman, Edward L. Rodman, Lucinda 
'Vltltcomb, and his grandchild, Mary Eveline 
King, the sole heir and child of his deceased 
da1111:hter, llary A. Craig, The will was ex-
ecnt~ll October 17, 1888, and admitted to pro-
bate July 10, 1889, and was as follows: 
.. 1''1rst. I will to my daughter Ann I~llzn 
Boyce forty (40) acres of land, being the 
northwest quarter of the northeast quarter 
of se<·tlon twenty-seven 127). Second. To my 
son Joseph L. Rodman I will and bpqueath 
one hundred acres of land (100),-slxty acres 
(00) olf of the west side of the southeast 
quarter of section twenty-two (22), forty 
a<."l"e8 (40) being the northwest quarter of the 
southeast quarter of section twenty-two (22). 
•rhlrd. To my son Edward L. RO<lman I will 
.and bequeath forty acres of land, being the 
nortl1east quarter of the southPast quarter of 
section twenty-two (22). Fourth. I give to 
my daughter Lucinda WhltC'omb ·two thou-
sand dollars ($2.000). I<'lfth. To my grand-
daughter, Mary Eveline King, I give two hun-
dred dollars (1$200). 'J'he above legacies to be 
paid out of moneys and credits on hand, and 
proceeds of the sale of personal property. ·All 
of the above land being In town twenty-three 
(23) north, range three (3) east of the third 
principal meridian." The will contained a 
sixth clause, in which eertaln personal prop-
erty was devised to the widow, and she was 
.also given the control of the above-described 
lands during her Ute. It will be observed 
that the two 40-acre tracts (8. W. 1A, N. E. IA. 
section 22 and S. E. % N. E. % section 22) 
owned by the testator are not mentioned in 
the will, and that the testator never owned 
the N. E . 1A. of S. E. 1A. section 22, which le 
devised to Edward L. Rodman, and that the 
40 acres devised to JosPph L. Rodman laps 
onto the 60 acres devised to him, and includes 
within It the north 30 acres of the 60 acres, 
and that he did not own the east 10 acres of 
the X. W. 1i4 of the 8. E. v... which ts devised 
to Jose1>h. The situation will be better under-
stood by the following plats of the land; No. 
1 being the land owned by the testator, and 
No. 2 that specifically named tn the will: 
' • -
I , 
The testator, when he executed the will, and· 
at the time of his death, was In posseBSion of 
the lands owned by him. He owned no oth· 
er lands. The bill prayed tor a construction 
of the will, and that the lands be held to have 
veste<l under the will, the S. E. % ot N. E. % 
of section 22 In Edward L. Rodman, and the 
S. W. % of N. E . 1i4 In Joseph Rodman, and 
that the wl<low be held to have a lite estate 
in all the lands. The answer practically ad-
mitted the taets set up In the bill, but denied 
thnt it was the Intention of the testator to de-
vise the two 40-acie tracts In the N. E. % ot 
section 2'i, or that the wm was capable of 
construction, and claimed that said lands de-
scended as lnte>1tate estate. The court, on the 
hearing, decreed substantially as prayed for 
in the bill. 
Kerrick, Ln<.'fls & Spencer, tor appellanta. 
Benjamin & Morrissey, tor appelleea. 
ORAIO, ;r, (after Rtatlng the tacts). In the 
construction of a will the Important 'fll<'Stlon, 
always, Is to as<'ertnln the Intention or the tes-
tator. As was well said by Chief Justice Mar-
shall In Finlay v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. 346: 
"'!'he intent of the testator ls the cardinal rule 
In the construction of wills, and If that Intent 
can be clearly perceived, and Is not contrnry 
to some posltl-re rule of law, It must prevail, 
although, In giving el!ect to It, some words 
should be rejected, or so restrained In their 
application as materially to change the llte1'11l 
meaning of the particular sentence." See, 
also, Decker v. Decker, ,121 Ill. 354, 12 N. 
E. 750. It wlll be presumed that a person, 
when he makes and publishes a · wlll, Intends 
to dispose of his whole estate, unless the 
presumption 18 rebutted by Its provisions, or 
345 
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evidence to the contrary. Higgins v. Dwen.
100 Ill. 556; Society v. Mead, 131 ill. 358.
23 N. E. 603; 2 Redf. Wills, 35. Upon an
examination of the will in this case, nothing
will be found tending in the least to establish
an intention on the part of the testator to
leave any portion of his property to descend
as intestate estate. On the other hand, in
view of the property owned by the testator, it
is manifest from the language of the will that
the testator intended to devise his entire es-
tate. When the will was executed, and at tin-
time of the testator's death, he owned 180
acres of land, and no more. Of this the tes-
tator, as is manifest from the will, attempted
to devise 100 acres to his son Joseph, 40 acres
to his son Edward, and 40 acres to his daugh-
ter Ann Eliza Boyce, making 180 acres,—ali
the land possessed by the testator. But.
while it is manifest that the testntor intended
to dispose of all the lands he possessed, yet
the language of the will, as found in the
second and third clauses, if construed liter-
ally as written. will defeat the plain inten-
tion of the testator. Shall that be done, or
shall resort be had to extrinsic evidence to
ascertain the real intent of the testator? In
the consideration of a question of this char-
acter, in Decker v. Decker, supra, it was
held: “While the general rule is that the
intention of the tcstator is to be gathered
from an inspection and consideration of the
will, and from no other source, yet, in case
of latent ambiguity, courts do and must listen
to extrinsic evidence, not for the purpose of
contradicting or adding to the terms of tin-
wlll, but for the purpose of determining
the existence or nonexistence of latent am
bigulty, and to enable the court to look upon
the will in the light of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the testator at the time
the will was made, whereby to determine the
intention of the testator." In Wig:-am on
Extrinsic Evidence, on the interpretation of
wills, after citing cases to prove that ex-
trinsic evidence may be resorted to, the au-
thor says “they might be multiplied without
end." and adds, “They appear to justify the
conclusion that every claimant under a will
has a right to require that a court of con-
struction, in the execution of its oflice, shall.
by means of extrinsic evidence, place itself
in the situation of the testator, the meaning
of whose language it is called upon to de-
clare." Quoted with approval in Society v.
Mead, 131 Ill. 362, 23 N. E. 603. In Patch
v. White, 117 U. S. 210-217, 6 Sup. Ct. 617.
710, it is said: “A latent ambiguity in a
will, which may be removed by extrinsic
evidence, may arise: (1) Either when it
names a person as the object of a gift, or a
thing as the subject of it, and there are two
persons or things that anwer such name or
description; or (2) when the will contains
a misdescription of the object or subject. as
where there is no such person or thing in
existence, or, if in existence, the person is
not the one intended, or the thing does not
belong to the testator." After citing casm,
the court concludes: “By merely striking
out the words ‘six’ and ‘three’ from the de
' scription of the will, as not applicable [unless
“ interchanged] to any lot which the testator
owned, ‘ " " the residue of the descrirr
tion, in view of the context, so exactly ap-
plies to the lot in question that we have no
hesitation in saying that it was lawfully de
vised to Henry Walker.” Page 220, 117
U. S., and pages 617, 710, 6 Sup. Ct. In
Moreland v. Brady, 8 Or. 303, in considering
a question of this character, the court said:
“We apprehend there can be no question of
the admissibility of extraneous oral evidence
to show the state and extent of the testator‘s
property, in order to place the court in the
same position the testator was at the time
he made the will in question. This, we think,
is unquestionably the rule established by the
decided cases. This being done, it appears
that the testator had no such lots as those
described as lots 1 and 2 in the particular
block named. This renders it certain that
the lots named were erroneous, and the words
describing them can have no possible opera-
tion, and must be rejected.” In Decker v.
Decker, supra, by the terms of the will the
testator devised 20 acres oi! the W. 1,5 of N.
E. $4, of N. E. 1/4 of section 33. township 18
N., range 11 W. The evidence. however,
showed that the testator never owned N. E.
1/; of N. E. 1/4 section 33, or any part of it.
but he did own N. W. 1/; of N. E. 1/4 of the
section. Held, that there was a latent am-
biguity in the devise, the descriptive words
of the land devised being in part false; that
the false description might be stricken out,
and the devise sustained, as embracing the
land owned by the testator.
Keeping in view the foregoing rules of con-
struction, it seems plain that the testator did
not intend to leave the two 40-acre tracts in
N. E. 1/4 of section 22 to descend as intestate
estate. He, in plain words, devised to Jo-
seph 100 acres of land, and then follows with
a particular description; that is. 60 acres off
of the west side ot S. E. 1/4, of section 22, and
40 acres, being the N. W. 1,4 of S. E. 1,4 of
section 22. Thereby the40-acre tract was made
to overlap the north 30 acres of the 60 acres
which was to be a part of the 100 acres devised
to Joseph. The east 10 acres of the 40 devised
to Joseph the testator never owned. So that
the general purpose to devise to Joseph 100
acres would be defeated, and he would take
but 60 acres, under the devise, and the ad-
joining 40 acres on the north of the 60 acres
is left undevised, and the general intent for
the disposition of the entire tract would be
defeated. It is also apparent that the pur-
pose of the testator, as expressed in the will,
was to give his son Edward L. Rodman 40
acres of land. Indeed. the will says, “I will
and bequeath 40 acres of land to my son Ed-
ward L. Rodman." The land is then describ-
ed as the N. E. 1,4 of the S. E. V4 of section
22,-land which the testator never owned;
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evidence to the contrary. Higgins v. Dwen, 
100 Ill. M>G; Society v. Mead, 131 Ill. 3,j8, 
23 N. E. 603; 2 Redf. Wills, 30. Upon an 
examination of the wlll In this case, nothing 
will be found tending In the least to establish 
an Intention on the part of the testator to 
leave any portion of bis property to descend 
as Intestate estate. On the other hand, In 
view of the property owned by the testator, It 
Is manifest from the language of the will that 
the testator Intended to devise hl1 entire es· 
tate. When the will was executed, and at thl! 
time of the testator's death, he owned 180 
acres of land, and no more. Of this the tes· 
tator, as Is manifest from the will, attempted 
to devise 100 acres to his aon Joseph, 40 acrE'S 
to his son Edward, and 40 acres to his daugh· 
ter Ann Elim Boyce, making 180 acres,-all 
the land J>Os."lessed by the testator. But. 
while It Is manifest that the testator Intended 
to dlspoSt> of all the lands he posst>KKed, yet 
the language of the will, as found In tbe 
second and third clauses, If construed liter· 
ally as written, will defeat the 1>laln lnten· 
tion of the testator. Shall that be done, or 
shall resort be had to extrinsic evidence to 
ascertain the real Intent of the testator? In 
the consideration of a question of this char· 
acter, In Decker v. Decker, supra, It was 
held: "While the general rule Is that the 
Intention of the testator Is to be gathered 
from an Inspection and consideration of the 
will, and from no other source, yet, in case 
of latent ambiguity, courts do and must llstl•n 
to extrinsic evidence, not for the purpose of 
contradicting or adding to the terms of thP 
wlll, but for the purpose of determlnln~ 
the existence or nonexistence of latent am 
blgulty,. and to enable the court to look upon 
the will In the light of the facts and clrcum· 
stances surrounding the tL'lltator at the tlnw 
the will was made, whereby to detel'mlne tlw 
in«,ntion of the testator." In Wlgram on 
Extri11Slc Evidence, on the Interpretation of 
wills, aft;?r citing casPs to pro'\"e that ex· 
trlnslc evidence may be resorted to, the au· 
thor says "they might be multiplied without 
end," and adds, "They appear to justify thP 
conclusion that e'\"ery claimant under a will 
bas a right to require that a court of con· 
stru<'tlon, In the execution of its ofilce, shall. 
by mPans of extrinsic evidence, place Itself 
In the situation of the testator, the meaning 
of whose language It la called upon to de· 
clnre." Quoted with approval In Society v. 
Mead, 131 Ill. 362, 23 N. E. 603. In Patch 
v. White, 117 U. S. 210-217, 6 Sup. Ct. 617, 
710, It ls said: "A latent ambiguity In a 
will, which IDay be removed by extrinsic 
evidence, may arise: (1) Either when It 
nnmes a pel'l!On as the object of a gift, or a 
thing as the subject of It, and there are two 
pPrsons or things that answer such name or 
description; or (2) when the will contains 
a mlsdescrlptlon of the object or subjt~t. as 
where there Is no suc·h pel'l!on or thing In 
exh1tence, or, It In existcnt•e, the person Is 
not the one Intended, or the thing does not 
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belong to the testator." After citing cases. 
the court concludes: "By merely striking-
' out the words 'six' nnd 'three' from the de-
scription of the will, as not applicable [unless. 
lnterl'hanged] to any lot which the testator-
owned, • • • the residue of the descrip-
tion, In view of the context, so exactly ap-
plies to the lot In question that we have no 
hesitation In saying that It was lawfully de-
vised to Henry Walker." Page 220, 111 
U. S., and pages 617, 710, 6 Sup. Ct. Ill 
Moreland v. Brady, 8 Or. 303, In conslderlnaJ" 
a question of this character, the court said: 
"'We apprehend there can be no question of 
the admlRSlblllty of extraneous oral evidence 
to show the state and extent of the testator'• 
property, In order to place the court In th• 
same position the testator was at the time 
be made the will In question. This, we think. 
ls unquestionably the rule established by th~ 
decided cases. This being done, It appears 
that the testator bad no such lots as those 
described as lots 1 and 2 lD the particular 
block named. This renders It certain that 
the lot11 named were erroneous, and the worda-
descrlblng them can have no possible oper1r 
tlon, and must be rejected." In Decker T. 
DPCker, supra, by the terms of the will the-
testator devised 20 acres off the W. ;(. of N. 
E. % of N. E. 1.4 of section 33, township lS 
N., range 11 W. The evidence, however, 
showed that the testator never owned N. E. 
14 of N. E. 1.4 section 33, or any part of It. 
but be did own N. W. 1.4 of N. E. % of the-
se<-tlon. Held, that there was a latent am-
biguity In the devise, the descriptive words 
of the land devised being In part false; that 
the false description might be stricken out. 
and the devise sustained, as embracing th• 
land owned by the testator. 
Keeping In view the fo1 egolng rules of con-
struction, It aeems plain that the testator did 
not Intend to leave the two 40-acre tracts In 
N. E. % of section 22 to descend as lntestate-
estate. Be, In plain words, devised to Jo-
seph 100 acres of land, and then follows with 
a particular description; that la. 60 acres ofr 
of the west slde ot S. E. % of section 22, and 
40 acres, beln1: the N. W. 1.4 of 8. E. % o~ 
section 22. Thereby tbe~cre tract waa mad& 
to overlap the north 30 acres of the 60 a.ens 
which was to be a part of the 100 acres devlsecl 
to Joseph. The east 10 acres of the 40 devilled 
to Joseph the testator ne'\"er owned. So that 
the general purpose to devise to Joseph 100 
acres would be defeated, and be would tak& 
but 60 acres, under Nie (levlse, and the ad-
joining 40 acres on the north of the 60 acres 
ls left undevlsed, and the general Intent for 
the disposition of the entire tract would be 
defeated. It ls also apparent that the pur-
pose of the testator, as expressed In the will, 
was to give bis son Edward L. Rodman 40 
acres of land. Indeed, the wlll says, "I will 
and bequeath 40 acres of land to my son Ed-
ward L. Rodman." The land ls then descrlbo 
ed. as the N. E. % of the S. E. 1.4 of eectioo 
22,-land wbleh the testator never ownedi 
ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS.
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but he did o\vn 40 acres lying directly north
of the 40-acre tract described, which was
known as S. E. 1/T of N. E. 1,4 of section 22.
If the will is to be construed as contended
for by plaintiffs in error, the devise of the
40 acres of land to Edward will be defeated
entirely, and the intention of the testator will
be disregarded. If, therefore, by any of the
recognized rules of construction, the will may
be so construed as to give the language of the
testator effect, and thus tarry out the evident
intention, not only to dispose of his entire
estate, but to give to his sons, Joseph and Ed-
ward. the land intended to be devised to tizem,
it is the duty of the court to adopt that con-
struction. Redf. Wills, p. 469, says: “Where
the testator misdescribes his estate as being
in different localities from the fact,—putting
one estate in the locality of another, and
vice versa.—it was held that where suflicient
appeared upon the face of the will, as applied
to the subject-matter, to show that such mis-
descrlption was a mere mistake. either of the
testator or the person who drew up the will,
that it would not have the effect to defeat the
obvious intention of the testator." While
words cannot be added to a will, yet in arriv-
ing at the intention of the testator, as has
been shown by the authorities, so mucn as is
false in the description of the premises devis-
ed may be stricken out; and after Sirlking
out the false description, if enough remains
to identify the premises intended to be de-
vised, the will may be read and construed
with the false words eliminated therefrom.
Adopting that rule here, the second and third
devises will read as follows: “Second. To
my son Joseph L. Rodman I will and be-
queath one hundred acres of land (100),—sixty
acres (60) oi! of the west side of the south-
east quarter of section twenty-two (22), forty
acres (40) being the‘ quarter of the
quarter of section twenty-two (22). Third.
To my son Edward L. Rodman I will and be-
queath forty acres of land, being the
quarter of the quarter of section twen-
ty-two (22)." Bearing in mind that the tes-
tator owned two 4()acre tracts in N. E. 1/, of
section 22, and reading the two clauses of the
will in the light of surrounding circumst'an-
ces, we think all difficulty is removed, in re-
gard to the lands devised by those two provi-
sions of the will. The testator, owning two
quarters of a quarter of section 22, devised
one quarter to his son Joseph. and the other
quarter to his son Edward, and the two sons
took and held the two tracts undivided. The
circuit court, in its decree, held that the two
40-acre tracts were devised by the will; the
S. W. 40 to Joseph, and the S. E. 40 to Ed-
ward. In this respect, we think the court
erred; but as the error was one which did
not affect plaintiffs in error, they having no
interest whatever in the premises. the error
was one which did no harm, and hence no
ground for reversing the decree. The decree
of the circuit court will be atlirmed. Ailir1n-
ed.
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bot he. Jld O\VD 40 acres lying directly north 
of the 40-aere tract described, which was 
known as S. E. 1.4 of ~. E. % of sa·tlon 22. 
It the will ls to be construed as contended 
for by plaintiffs In error, the devise or the 
40 acres of land to Edward will be defeated 
entirely, and the Intention of the testator will 
be disregarded. It, therefore, by any of the 
recogn17.ed roles of construction, the will may 
be so construed as to give the language of the 
testator effect, and thus rnrry out the evident 
Intention, not only to dispose of his entire 
estate, but to give to hie son11, Joseph nnd Ed-
wartl. tlte laud Intended to b<? devised to tl:em, 
It Is the duty of the court to adopt thnt con-
struction. Redf. Wills, p. 400, says: "Where 
the testator mlsdescrlbes his estate as being 
In dltrerent hx:ulltlee from the fact,-puttlng 
one estate In the locality or another, and 
vice vel'88,-lt was held that where suftlclent 
appeared upon thP race or the will, as applied 
to the subject-matter, to show th11t such mis-· 
description was a mere mistake, either of the 
testator or the person who drew up the will, 
that It would not have the effect to defeat the 
obvious Intention of the te<Jtator." "While 
words cannot be added to a wlll, yet In arriv-
ing at the Intention of the testator, aa has 
been shown by the authorities, so mucn aa t& 
false In the description of the premises devis-
ed may be stricken out; and after strtk111g 
ont the false des:-rlptlon, tr enough remains 
to Identify the p1·emlses Intended to be de-
vlsoo, the will may be read and construed 
with tile falst- words eliminated therefrom. 
Adopting thnt rule here, the secor.d and third 
devises will read as follows: "Second. To 
my son Joseph L. Rodman I will and be-
queath one hundred acres of land (100),-slxty 
acres (60) off of the west slcle of the south-
east quarter of section twenty-two (22), forty 
acres (40) being the'-- quarter of the --
quarter of section twenty-two (22). Third. 
To my eon Edward L. Rodman I will and be· 
queath forty acres of land, being the --
quarter of the -- quarter of section twen-
ty-two (22)." Bearing In mind that the tell· 
tator owned two 40-acre tracts ln N. E. 1.4 of 
section 22, and reading the two clauses of thP 
will In the light of surrounding clrcumsfan-
ces, we think all difficulty ls removed, In re-
gard to the lands devised by those two provl-
eloWI of the wlll. The testator, owning two 
quarters or a quarter of section 22, devised 
one quarter to his eon Joseph, and the other 
quarter to his son E;dward, and the two sons 
took and held the two tracts undivided. The 
circuit court, In Its decree, held that the two 
40-acre tracts were devised by the wlll; the 
S. W. 40 to Joseph, and the S. E. 40 to Ed· 
ward. In this respect, we think the court 
erred; but as the error was one which did 
not affect plaintiffs In error, they having no 
Interest whatever In the premises, the error 
was one which did no harm, and hence no 
ground for reversing the decree. The decree 
of the circuit court wW be a111.rmed. Atllrm-
ed. 
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GOODE v. RILEY.
(28 N. E. 228, 153 Mass. 58.1.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
dlesex. May 19, 1891.
Exceptions from superior court, Mid-
dlescx county.
Bill by George F. Goode against Pat-
rick J. Riley to reform a deed. Decree for
laintiff. Defendant brings exceptions.
xceptions overruled.
Geo. F. Ricbanlson and John Davis, for
plaintifl. C’. S. Lllley, A. G. Lamson, and
John J. Hogan, for defendant.
HOLMES, J. This is a hill in equity for
the reformation of a deed. The judge
who tried the case found the following
facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
The parties, just prior to the execution
and delivery oi the deed, made and com-
pleted an oral agreement, the plaintiff to
sell and the defendant to buyalot of land,
situate on the southerly side of Summer
street, in Lowell, bounded and described
as testified to by plaintiff, and a warranty
deed thereof was to be executed and deliv-
ered; the parties were upon the land to-
gether, and then hoth saw and examined
the same, and knew the location, descrip-
tion, and bounds thereof, and the rear
line of the premises was theta marked by a
hoard fence five feet high, and other monu-
Mid-
I
i
ments, and both parties understood and =
knew its exact location and limits; the
deed, when executed and delivered, de-
scribed more laud,
square feet more. to the rear and beyond
said board fence, land not owned by the
plaintiff, and so much more than was bar-
gained ior; and both parties then errone-
ously supposed and believed that said
deed described the land orally agreed up-
on, and no more. This mutual mistnkeof
the parties was not discovered until two
months or more thereafter.
The court also found that the plaintiff '
had not been guilty of negligence or
inches, and that he was entitled to the
relief prayed ior,—a decree to reform and
rectify said deed.
The only question argued is raised by
the defendant’s exception to the refusal
of a ruling that. if both parties intended
that the description should be written as
it was written, the plaintiff was not enti-
tled to a reformation. It would beasu’rfi-
cient answer that the contrary is settled
in thiscommonwealth. Uanedy v. 1\iarc_v.
13 Gray, 373. 377; Glass v. Huibert, 102
Mass. 24, 34; Stockbridge iron (Yo. v. limi-
son Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290, 319; Wilcox v.
Lucas, 121 Mass. 21; Johnson v. Taber, 10
N. Y. 319; Bush v. Hicks,60 N. Y. 298;
Andrews v. Andrews, 81 Me. 337,17 Atl.
Rep. 166; May v. Adams,58 Vt. 74. 78. 3
Atl. Rep. 1-ST; Fuchs v. Treat, 41 Wis. 40-i.
In view of these, among other, cases, \ve
shall not follow the elaborate argument
which was addressed to us in favor ofa
different rule, but we will add a fe\v words
Itollexpiain our opinion somewhat more
u y.
When both parties toe conveyance have
intended to describe acertain parcel of
land identified by their senses, and by the
to-wit, about l,03l 1
words of their previous agreement, and
have used words supposed by them to he
apt for their purpose, but in fact describ-
ing that parcel, and something more. the
full purport of all their acts. taken to-
gether,ls only to convey the parcel in-
tended; and yet that result cannot be
reached by way of construction merely,
for you cannot prove a mere private con-
vention between the two parties to give
languageadifferent meaning from itsco|n-
mon one. Waterman v. Johnson. 13 Pick.
261, 266, 267; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass.
160, 170; Flynn v. Bourneuf. 143 Mass.
277. 278. 9 N. E. Rep. 650; Millard v. liai-
ley. L. R-. 1 Eq. 378, 392: Shore v. Wilson,
9 Clark & F. 355,565, 566; Drummond v.
Attorney General,2 H. L. Cas. 837. 862,
863. It would offer too great risks if evi-
dence were admissible to show that when
they said 500 feet they agreed it should
mean 100 inches, or that Bunker Hill Mon-
ument should signify the Old South
Church. As an artificial construction can-
not be given to plain words by express
agreement, the same rule is applied when
there isa mutual mistake, not apparent
on the face of the instrument.
Since, then. the instrument must be con-
strued to mean what the words would
mean ii there were no mistake, evidence
of the mistake shows that neither party
has purported or been understood to ex-
press assent to thecon veyance as it stands.
it is not necessarily fatal that the evi-
dence is parol which is relied on to show
that the contract was not made as it pur-
ports on the face of the document to have
been made. There was a time when a
man was bound if his seal was affixed to
an instrument by a stranger and against
his will. But the notion that one who
has gone through certain forms of this
sort, even in his own person. is bound al-
ways and unconditionally,gave way long
ago to more delicate conceptions. See. e.
g., Wail v. Hickey. 112 Mass. 171; Mc-
Ulurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225.
So it is settled, at least in equity. that
this particular kind of parol evidence-—
that is to say. evidence of mutual mistake
as to the meaning of the words use:i—is
admissible for the negative purpose we
have mentioned. And this principle is en-
‘ tirely consistent with the rule that you
cannot set up prior or contemporaneous
oral dealings to modify or override what
you knew was the effect of your writing.
' Batcheidcr v. insurance Co., 135 Mass. 4-iii.
But the effect of the evidence is not to
show that no conveyance was made. It
is only to show that no conveyance was
made of part of the land embraced in the
description. Obviously, therefore. it
would be most unjust simply to rescind
the whole transaction, and. in order to
do complete justice, the grantor who has
used too extensive language should have
a reconveyauce to set his title right on
the face of the instrument; for, as things
stand, a purchaser without notice could
hold him to the words which he has used.
Cross v. Bean, 81 Me. 525. 17 Atl. Rcn.
710; O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145 Mass. 461.
463. 14 N. E. Rep. 747. if a purchaser were
attempting to insert a parcel left out un-
der similar circumstances, he would be
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Case No. 121] PUOOF 
GOODE T. RII,EY. 
"(28 N. E. 228, 153 MRBa. ;)8."i.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Ma888cbm1ettll. Mid· 
dlesex. Ma7 19, 1891. 
Kxceptlone from superior court, Mld-
dlesox county. 
Bill by George F. Goode agftlnet Pat-
rick J. Illley to reform a deec'I. J>ecree for 
platntlft. I>efendant brings exceptions. 
Exceptions overruled. 
Geo. F. Rlcbardt1on and John Davia, for 
plRlntllf. c. s. Lll/ey, A. a. L&IDBOD, ancl 
Jobo J. HogMD, for tlefendant. 
HOLMES, J. Thlte Is 11 hill In equity for 
the reformation of a deed. 'l'he Jndge 
who tried the ca'*' found the followin1r 
facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 
words of their previous agreement, and 
have uBfld words supposed by them to tie 
apt for their purpose, but In fact detWrlh-
fnJr that parcel, and something more, the 
full purport of all their ac•ts. taken to· 
gPther, le only to convey the parcel In-
tended; and yet that result cannot be 
reached by way of construction merely, 
for you ctuinot prove a mere private con-
vention between the two parties to give 
laogualleadlfterent meaning from Its com-
mon one. Waterman v. Johneon.13 Plt•k. 
21st, ~. 267; Paine v. Woode, 1118 Ma811. 
160, 170: Flynn v. Bourneuf, 143 MWlti. 
277, 278, 9 N. E. Rep. 650; Millard , .. llal-
ley, L. R. 1 Eq. 378, 882; Hhore v. Wilson, 
9 Clark a: F. 355, 565, 566; Drummond v. 
Attorney General, 2 H. L. (.'as. 837, 862, 
863. It would offer too gre,at risks If evl-
deonce were admlHllible to sbow that when 
tbPy said 50U feet they agreed It should 
mesn 100 Inches, or that Bunker Hill Mon-
ument should signify the Old South 
Church. A11 an artlftclal construction can-
not be ~lven to plain words by expl't'llll 
agreement, thf> eame rule IH applied when 
then> le a mutnal mistake, not apparent 
on the face or the Instrument. 
'rhe parties, Juet prior to tbe execution 
and delivery of the deed, made and com-
pleted an oral agreement, the plaintiff tt> 
sell and the defendant to buyalot of Ian•:., 
sltoatP on the southerly elde of Summer 
street, In Lowell, boondecl and descrlhecl 
ae teetllil'd tu by plalutlft, and a warranty 
deed thereof was to be executed and deliv-
ered; tbe parties were upon the land to-
geth1>r, and then both saw and exRmlnecl 
the eame, and knew the location, detirrlp-
tlon, and bounds the1-uof, and the rear 
line of t11e premise& wee the:? marked by a 
board f1>ocettve feet high, and other monu-
ments, and both parties uoderetootl and 
knew Its exact lm~ntioo and limits: the 
deed, when executed and delivered, lie· 
scribed more IRncl, to-wit, about 1,031 
11quare fPet more, to the rear and beyuncl 
ealil board fence, land not owned by the> 
pleln~lft,and so much more than wae bar- ' 
gained lor; and both parties then erro1,e-
011HIY euppoerd and believed that said 
deed deecrlbe<l the land orally agreed up-
on, and no more. Thie mutual mletukeof 
the parties wae not tllecovered untll two 
months or more thereafter. 
Since, thPo, the lnittrument must be con-
strued to mean what the words wonld 
mean If there were no mistake, evldl'nce 
of the mletake shows that neither party 
hne purported or been understood to ex-
' preseaSHenttothecnnveyanttae It stands. 
Tbe court also found that the plnintltt 
bad not been gullt.v ur neitllgence or 
laches, and that he wee entitled to the 
relief prayed for,-a decree to reform and 
rectify said deed. 
The only question argued le rallied by 
the defendant'1:1 exception to the refusal 
of a ruling thdt, If both parties Intended 
that the deecrlt)tlon ehoultJ be written as 
It wa1:1 written, the plaintiff wa11 not enti-
tled to a reformation. It would beaMnftt-
clent answer that the contrary iH Hl'ttlecl 
In thlecommonwealtb. ~anf'dy , .. :\lnn•y, 
13 Gray, 373, 377; Olaes v. Hulbert, JO:! 1 
MaRH. :U, 84; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hnd· 
eon Iron Co., 107 MRse. 290, 319; Wilcox v. 
Lucas, 121 Maes. 21; Johnson v. Ta her, 10 
~. Y. SIU; Bush v. Hicks, 60 N. Y. 298; 
An1lrewe v. AndrewH, 81 A~e. 337, 17 Atl. 
Re1•. 166; May v. AdamH, 58 Vt. 74, 7R. 3 
Atl. Rep. 1157; Fuchs v. Treat, 41 WIH. 404. 
lu view of these, among other, caHe1:1, we 
shall not follow the elnhorate argument 
which wae addressed to ue In favor of a 
different rule, but we will add a few words 
to explain our opinion somewhat more 
fully. 
When both parties toacouveyance have 
Intended to 1leHc·rlhe a certain pnrcel of 
laud ldentifteu by their seneeit, au<l b,y the 
:ws 
It le not neceesa.rlly fat11I that the evi-
dence Is parol which le relied on to show 
that the contract waR out mu de ae It pnr-
porte on the face of the document to ha \•e 
been ma•le. There was a time when a 
man wus bound if hie seal wa11 afHxed to 
an Instrument by a stranger and against 
hie will. But the notion that one who 
has gone through certain fonm1 of thl11 
Hort, even In his own person, is bound al-
ways and uocondltlonally,gave way long 
ago to more delicate conceptions. 8ee, e. 
g., Woll v. Hickey, JUI .Maes. In; Mc-
clurg v. Terry, 21 N. J, Eq. 226. 
So It le Nettled, at least In equity, that 
this particular kind of parol evldence-
t11at le to say, evidence of mutual mistake 
a11 to tht> meaning of th6 words use:l-111 
admteeible for the negative purpose we 
have mentioned. And this principle le en· 
tirely coneletent with the role that you 
cannot set up prior or contemportmeoue 
oral dealings to modify or overrl1le whRt 
you knew was the eft'er.t of your writing. 
Batchelder v. Insurance Co .• 13!> M888. 449. 
But the eftPCt of the evldeol'e le not to 
show that no coo\·eyance was made. It 
111 only to 11how that no ~onveyance w1111 
made of part of the land embracep In the 
dl'Hl'rlptlon. Obviously, therefore, It 
would be most 1mjuet simply to reticlnd 
the wbole traneaction, and, In 01·clt•r to 
do CClmplete justice, the grRntor who hss 
uel'd too exteneh·e language .Jhould have 
a recon\'eyauce to eet his title right on 
the fal'e of the Instrument; for, as things 
stand, a purchaser without notice could 
hold him tu the words which he has used. 
Crose v. Hean, 81 Me. 52:;, 17 Atl. Ueo. 
710; O'nonnell v. Clinton, l* Maes. 461, 
463, 14 N. E. ReJ>. 747. If a purchaser were 
attempting to Insert a parcel left oat un-
der similar clrcuwetancee, be would be 
ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR. EXPLAIN DOCUMENTS. [Case N0. 121
met by the statute oi iru ud. But there is
no such diflicuity here. Glass v. Huibert,
102 Mass. :54,
The defendant’s testimony. although
ambiguous. looked tmun-(ls the conclu-
sion that the price was tixed by the num-
ber oi feet; but this was denied by the
plaintiff, and it does not appear what
thejudge found to be the fact, or what
he did. and no question as to whether an
allowance should he made to the defend-
ant is before us. Exceptions overruled.
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ORAL EVIDENCE TO VARY OR EXPLAIN DOCU.MEN'fS. [Case No. 121 
met liy the 11tntute or frnml. But there la 
no Rlll'h dlfficnlty here. Gloss v. Hulbert, 
102 MlW!. :!.J, 35. 
The defendant's testimony. althon,;h 
amblguouR. lookerl to\Hll'dH the conclu-
adon that the price was Oxed by the num-
' 
her of f~t: but tble was denied by the 
plaintiff, and It does not appear what 
the Judge found to be th~ fnct, or whot 
he did. and no question as to whPther an 
nllowa111•t:' should lw made to the defend-
ant Is before us. Exceptions overruled. 
349 
Case No. 122]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
FARMERS‘ LOAN & TRUST CO. V.
SIEFKE.
(39 N. E. 358, 144 N. Y. 354.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 15, 1895.
Appeal from common pleas of New York
city and county, general term.
Action by the Farmers‘ Loan & Trust Com-
pany, as 'committee for Frederick Siefke.
against Henry Siefke. From a judgment of
the general term (22 l\'. Y. Supp. 546) affirm-
ing a judgment for defendant, plaintiff ap-
peals. Affirmed.
David McClure, for appellant. Brainard
Tolles, for respondent.
ANDREWS, C. J. The complaint alleged
that the note sued upon was given for value,
and was under the hand and seal of the de-
fendant. The answer contained a general
denial of the allegations in the complaint, and
in separate paragraphs, stated to constitute
separate defenses, alleged that the note was
without consideration, and that it was altered
in material parts, and, among other things,
by afiixing a seal thereto without the consent
or privity of the defendant. On the trial the
note was offered in evidence by the plaintiff,
and he then rested. The execution of the
note by the defendant seem to have been ad-
mitted, as no proof was given upon the sub-
ject. It purported to be signed by him, and
a seal was attached to his signature. The
defendant thereupon entered upon the de-
fense. The question of consideration was lit-
igated, and the defendant also gave proof
tending to show that the seal wa attached
without his knowledge or consent, by the
plaintifi, after the execution and delivery of
the note. The evidence on the part of the
defendant, as to the alteration by the addi-
tion of the seal, was met by evidence in be-
half of the plaintiff that the seal was at-
tached before execution. The case was sub-
mitted to the jury, under a charge of the
judge, and the jury rendered a general ver-
dict for the defendant. Judgment was en-
tered on the verdict, from which the plaintiff
appealed to the general term, which afllrmed
the judgment, and this appeal is from the
judgment of afifirmance.
The allegations of error are founded main-
ly upon the charge to the jury. The judge
charged, in substance, that if the seal was at-
tached to the note by the plaintiff after ex-
ecution and delivery, without the knowledge
or consent of the defendant, it constituted a
material alteration, and the note was void.
There was no exception to this part of the
charge, and it must be taken, on this point,
to have correctly stated the law. We are not
to be understood, however, as dissenting from
this view, but it is unnecessary now to con-
sider it. The court further proceeded to
charge that the plaintiff was bound to estab-
lish, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
seal was not att:u-in-d after the signature to
the note. This was qualified afterwards by
the statement that this burden rested upon
the plaintiff after testimony had been given
to show that the seal was attached after the
inception of the note. The plaintiff's counsel
excepted to the charge, as made and ex-
plained. This exception presents the prin-
cipal question in the case. We think the
charge was correct. Upon the pleadings, a
general denial having been interposed by the
answer to the whole complaint, the plaintiff
was bound to establish every material fact
therein alleged. The primary issue was the
execution or nonexecution by the defendant
of a sealed instrument. The plaintiff alleged
the making by the defendant of a specialty
creating a. pecuniary obligation, and, issue
having been taken on this allegation, the
plaintiff was bound to etabllsh the allega-
tion by proof. If it had turned out on the
trial that the allegation had been made by
mistake, and that the instrument was not
sealed, but was a simple contract only, or
that the seal had been attached after execu-
tion, by a. stranger, without the privity or
knowledge of the plaintiff, it would have
been in the power of the court to have per-
mitted an amendment of the pleadings upon
such terms as it should deem just. But, as
the pleadings stood, the question whether the
defendant had executed a sealed instrument
was an issuable fact, which was asserted on
one side and denied on the other, and which
the plaintiff was bound to establish, as a
part of his case. The defendant, under a
general denial, may adduce evidence to con-
trovert what the plaintiff is bound to prove
in the first instance. Miibank v. Jones, 141
N. Y. 3-15, 36 N. E. 388. and cases cited. And
the general rule is well established that what-
ever a plaintiff is bound to prove in the first
instance, as part of his case, he is bound to
establish by a preponderance of evidence.
The burden of proof upon the issue of a ma-
terial alteration of a written instrument, sued
upon in its existing condition, presents no
anomaly, but is governed by the general rule
that the party alleging that the instrument
sued upon is the act and deed of the defend-
ant must establish it by proof. The case of
Schwarz v. Oppold, 74 _N. Y. 307, is a pre-
cise authority for the proposition that, under
a general denial in an answer in a suit
brought upon a written obligation, a material
alteration may be proved. Under_this au-
thority, we see no escape from the conclu-
sion that evidence of alteration. which goes
to the identity of the instrument, controverts
a fact which a plaintiff is bound to prove in
the first instance.—that the inirument is the
act of the defendant.
There is confusion, sometimes, in treating
of the burden of proof, arising out of un-
exact definitions. The burden is upon a
plaintifl! to establish his cause of action, when
it is, in proper form, denied by the other
party. In actions upon a promissory note.
this burden is, in the first instance, dis-
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Case No. 12'J] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST CO. T. 
SIEFKE. 
(39 N. E. 358. 144 N. Y. 354.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. Ui, 1895. 
.Appeal from common pleas ot New York 
city and county. general term. 
Action by the !•'armers' Loan & Trust Com-
pany, as "commltteE' for Frederick Siefke, 
against Henry Siefke. From & judgment of 
the general tl'rm (22 N. Y. Supp. 546) aftlrm-
lng a judgment for defendant, plaintiff ap-
peals. Affirmed. 
David 1\-IcClure, for appenant. Brainard 
Tolles, for respondent. 
.ANDREWS, C. J. The complaint alleged 
that the note sued upon was given for value, 
and was under the hand and seal of the de-
fendant. The &DBwer contained a general 
denial of the allegations In the complaint, and 
In separate paragraphs, stated to constitute 
separate defenses, alleged that the note was 
without consideration, and that It was altt>red 
In material parts, and, among other things, 
by &nixing a seal thereto without the consent 
or privlty of the detendant. On the trial the 
note was otrered In evidence by the plalntltr, 
and he then rested. The execution of the 
note by the defendant seems to have been ad-
mitted, as no proof was given upon the sub-
ject. It purported to be signed by him, and 
a seal was attached to his signature. The 
defendant thN·eupon entered upon the de· 
tense. The question of consideration was llt-
lgated, and the defendant also gave proof 
tending to show that the seal was attached 
without bis knowledge or consent, by the 
plaJntltr, after the execution and delivery of 
the note. The evidence on the part of the 
defendant, as to the alteration by the addl· 
tlon of the seal, was met by evklence In be-
half of the plalntltr that the seal WalS at-
tached before execution. The case was sub-
mitted to the jury, under a charge of the 
judge, and the jury rendered a general ver-
dict for the defendant. Judgment was en-
tered on the verdict, from which the plaintiff 
appealed to the general term, which atDrmed 
the judgment, and this appeal ls from the 
judgment of atDrmnnce. 
The allegations of error are founded main-
ly upon the charge to the jury. The judge 
charged, In substance, that It the seal was at-
tached to the note by the plnlntltf after ex-
ecution and delivery, without the knowledge 
or consent of the defendant, It constituted a 
material alteration, and the note was void. 
There was no exception to this part of the 
charge, and It must be taken, on this point, 
to have correctly Ktnted the law. 'V\-'e are not 
to be understood, however, as dissenting from 
this view, but It ls unnecessary now to con-
sider It. The court further proceeded to 
charge that the plalntll'f was bound to estab-
lish, by a preponderance of evltlence, that the 
1<1>111 wn11 not nttm·lwd after the signature to 
a;.o 
the notA!. This was quali11.ed afterwards b7 
the statement that this burden rested upon 
the plalntltr after testimony had been given 
to show that the seal was attached aft.er the 
Inception of the note. The plalntllf's counsel 
excepted to the charge, as made and ex· 
plained. This exception presents the prln· 
clpal question In the case. We think the 
charge was correct. Upon the pleadings., n 
general denial having been Interposed by the 
answer to the whole complaint, the plalntur 
was bound to establish every material tact 
therein alleged. The primary IBSUe was the 
execution or nonexecution by the defendant 
of a sealed Instrument. The plaintiff alleged 
the making by the defendant of a speclaicy 
creating a pecuniary obligation, and, Issue 
having been taken on this allegation, the 
plalntll'f was bound to establish the allega-
tion by proof. If It had turned out on the 
trial that the allegation had been made by 
mistake, and that the Instrument was not 
sealed, but was a simple contract only, or 
that the seal had been attached after execu-
tion, by a stranger, without the prlvlty or 
knowledge of the plalntur, it would have 
been In the power of the court to have per· 
mitted an amendment of the pleadings upon 
such terms as It should deem just. But, as 
the pleadings stood, the question whether the 
defendant had executed a sealed Instrument 
was an Issuable fact, which was asserted on 
one side and denied on the otlier, and which 
the plaintiff was bound to establish, aa a 
part of his case. The defendant, under a 
general denial, may adduce evidence to con-
trovert what the plalntltf Is bound to prove 
In the first Instance. Milbank v. Jones, 141 
N. Y. 345, 36 N. E. 388, and cases cited. And 
the general rule Is well established that what-
ever a plaintiff Is bound to prove In the first 
Instance, as part of bis case, he ls bound to 
esta bllsb by a ·preponderance of evidence. 
The burden of proof upon the Issue of a ma-
terial alteration of a written Instrument, sued 
upon in Its existing condition, presents no 
anomaly, but Is governed by the general rule 
that the party alleging that the Instrument 
sued upon Is the act and deed of the defend-
ant must establish it by proof. The case of 
Schwarz v. Oppold, 74 ~· Y. 307, ls a pre-
cise authority for the proposition that, under 
a general denial In an answer In a suit 
brought upon a written obligation, a material 
alteration may be proved. Under . this au-
thority, we see no escape from the conclu-
sion that evidence of alteration, which goes 
to the Identity of the Instrument, controverts 
a fact which a plaintiff Is bound to prove In 
the first lnstance,-that the ln8trument Is the 
act of the defendant. 
There Is confusion, sometimes. lo treating 
of the burden of proof, arising out of un-
exact definitions. The burden ls upon a 
plaintiff to establish his cause of action, when 
lt Is, lo proper form, denied by the other 
party. In actions upon a promls..'lory note, 
this burden Is, In the first Instance, dis-
BURDEN OF PROOF.
[Case No. 12.’
charged by giving evidence tending to show
that the note was signed by the defendant.
Proof of signing also identifies and proves
the seal, when the action is upon a sealed
instrument. This, prima facie, establishes
the cause of action. But a defendant is not
concluded. He may give evidence, under a
general denial, to show that the signature is
a forgery, or that the note had been material-
ly altered by the plaintifl without his con-
sent, or many other things which might be
mentioned, showing that the plaintifl never
had a cause of action. It is very common to
say, in such cases. that the burden is upon
the defendant to establish the fact relied up-
on. All that this can properly mean is that.
when the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case, the defendant is bound to contro-
vert it by evidence; otherwise, he will be
cast in judgment. When such evidence is
given, and the case, upon the whole evidence,
—that for and that against the fact asserted
by the plaintifl',—is submitted to court or
jury, then the question of the burden of
proof as to any fact, in its proper sense,
arises, and rests upon the party upon whom
it was at the outset, and is not shifted by the
course of the trial; and the jury may be prop-
erly lnstructed that all material issues ten-
dered by the plaintiff must be established by
him by a preponderance of evidence. Sec
Davis v. Jenney, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 221; Simp-
son v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269; Periey v. Per-
ley, 144 Mass. 104, 10 N. E. 726. The general
rule of pleading, which also accords with
reason, is that defenses which assume or ad-
mit the original cause of action alleged, but
are based upon subsequent facts or transac-
tions which go to qualify or defeat it, must
be pleaded and proved by the defendant;
and, on the other hand, the cause of action al-
leged by the plaintiff, and all its material
incidents, must be asserted and proved by
him; and, in both cases, the final event must
be supported by a preponderance of evidence
in favor of the party tendering‘ the issue.
This is illustrated in cases somewhat ger-
mane to the one before us. It is held by the
weight of authority that the alteration of a
bill or note need not be pleaded, when the in-
strument is declared on in its altered state,
but, where the declaration is on the instru-
ment in its original condition, the alteration
must be specifically pleaded. Hirschma-n v.
Budd, L. R. 8 Exch. 171; Byles, Bills (7th
Am. Ed.) 328. In the latter case, the plain-
tiff sues on the actual contract made, and the
defendant is seeking to defeat a recovery be-
cause lt had been subsequently tampered
w~ith, and this defense must be pleaded and
sustained by a preponderance of proof.
The appellant, in support of his contention
that the charge as to the burden of proof was
erroneous. cites some cases in other states,
which, to some extent, sustain his view. But
it seems to us they are opposed to sound prin-
ciple, and, at least. cannot be followed in this
state, in view of our decision in Schwarz v.
Oppold. The remark quoted from the opin-
ion in the case of Wiliiamsburgh Sav. Bank
v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y. 465, 32 N. E.
1058, was in a case where the supposed ad-
dition of the seal made the instrument what
it was intended to be, both by the legislature
and the town. The case, however, was de-
cided wholly irrespective of the question of
alteration, on the ground of a former adjudi-
cation. Our conclusion is that the charge
was not erroneous. in putting upon the plain-
tiff the burden of proof as to the existence of
a seal when the note had its inception.
One other question, only, needs special ref-
erence. The plaintiff was not present on the
trial, and his counsel, early in the case. in-
troduced a witness to account for his ab-
sence; and the reason given was that he
was partly paralyzed, and, although mental-
iy sound, was not able to attend the trial.
it seems that the fact that the plaintifl had
not appeared as a witness was commented
upon by counsel, and the court, in the charge,
referring to the subject, said, “It is true,
of course, that his testimony might have been
taken at his house.” This statement was
subsequently excepted to, and it is claimed
by the plaintiff's counsel that it was preju-
dicial, because an examination of a party be-
fore trial, on his own behalf, could not be
taken. This is a clear misapprehension of
the Code provision (section 8'72, subd. 5),
as it now stands. The last clause in the sub-
division was inserted to except a party to the
action from the restriction in that subdivi-
sion. A party complying with the provisions
of the other sections is permitted to per-
petuate his own testimony in the case by an
examination before trial. We think the judg-
ment is right, and it should therefore be af-
firmed. All concur, except I-IAIGHT, J., not
sitting. Judgment athrmed.
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BURDEN OF PROOF. [Case No. 1~.! 
-charged b7 gtvlng evidence tending to show 
that the note was signed by the defendan.t. 
Proof of algnlng also ldentlftes and pron!! 
the seal, when the action ls upon a sealed 
instrument. This, prima facle, estnbllshes 
the cause of action. But a defendant Is not 
concluded. He may give evidence, under n 
general denial, to show that the signature ts 
a forgery, or that the note had been material-
ly altered by the plalntUr without his con-
sent, or many other things which might be 
mentioned, showing that the plalntltr never 
had a cause of action. It Is very common to 
say, In such cases, that the burden Is upon 
the defendant to estnbllslt the fact relied up-
on. All that this can properly mean Is that. 
when the plalntltr has established a prlma 
facle case, the defendant Is bound to contro-
vert It by evidence; otherwise, he will be 
cast In judgment. When sueh evidence Is 
given, and the case, upon the whole evidence, 
-that for and that against the fact asserted 
by the plalntltr,-ls submitted to court or 
Jury, then the question of the burden of 
proof as to any fact, In its proper sense, 
arises, and rests upon the party upon whom 
It was at the outset, and Is not shifted by the 
course of the trial; and the jury may be prop-
erly Instructed that all material bJ.~ues ten-
dered by the plalntttr must be establ111hed by 
him by a preponderance of evidence. RN" 
Davis v. Jenney, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 221; Simp-
son v. Davl!I, 119 Mass. 200; Perley v. Per-
ley, 144 Ma88. 104, 10 N. E. 726. The general 
rule of pleading, which also accords with 
reason, Is that defenses which assume or ad· 
mlt the original cause of action alleged, but 
are based upon subsequent facts or transac-
tions which go to qualify or dereat It, must 
be pleaded and proved by the defendant; 
and, on the other hand, the cause of action al-
leged by the plalntltr, and all Its material 
Incidents, must be alll!erted and proved by 
hJm; and, In both cases, the final event must 
be supported by a preponderance of evldenc<' 
In favor of the party tendering· the Isam>. 
This ls Illustrated In cases somewhat ger-
mane to the one before us. It ls held by the 
weight of authority that the alteration of a 
bill or note need not be pleaded, when the In-
strument Is declared on In Its altered state, 
but, where the declaration Is on the Instru-
ment In Its original condition, the alteration 
must be specifically pleaded. Hirschman v. 
Budd, L. R. 8 Exch. 171; Byles, B111s (7th 
Am. Ed.) 328. In the latter case, the plain· 
tltr sues on the actual contract made, and the 
defendant Is seeking to defeat a recoveTy be-
cause It had been sub11equently tampered 
with, and this defense must be pleaded and 
sustained by a preponderance of proof. 
The appellant, In support of his contention 
that the charge as to the burden of proof was 
erroneous. cites some cases In other states, 
whJch, to some extent, sustain his view. But 
it seems to us they are opposed to sound prin-
ciple, and, at least. cannot be followed In this 
state, In view of our decision in Schwarz v. 
Oppold. The remark quoted from the opin-
ion In the <'8Be of Wllliamsburgh Sav. Bank 
v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y. 465, 32 N. E. 
10""J8, was In a case where the supposed ad-
dition of the seal made the Instrument what 
1t was Intended to be, both by the legislature 
and the town. The case, however, was de-
cided wholly Irrespective of the question of 
nlt~tlon, on the ground of a former adjudi-
cation. Our conclusion Is that the charge 
was not et'l'oneous. In putting upon the plaln-
tttr the burden of proof as to the existence of 
a seal when the note bad Its Inception. 
One other question, only, needs special ref-
erence. The plalntltr was not present on the 
trial, and bis counsel, early In the case, In-
troduced a witness to account for his ab-
sence; and the reason given was that he 
was partly paralyzed. and, although mental· 
ly sound, was not able to attend the trial. 
It seems that the fact that the plaintiff had 
not appeared as a wltuess was commented 
upon by counsel, and the court, In the charge, 
referring to the subject, said, "It Is true, 
of course, that his testimony ml11:ht have been 
taken at his house." This statement was 
subsequently excepted to, and It ls claimed 
by the pla1nturs counsel that It was preju-
dicial, because an examination of a party be-
fore trial, on his own behalf, could not be 
taken. This Is a clear mbiapprehen11lon of 
the Code provision (section 872, subd. 5), 
as It now stands. The last clause In the sub-
division was Inserted to except a party to the 
action from the restriction In that subdivi-
sion. .A. party complying with the provisions 
ot the other sections Is permitted to per-
petuate his own testimony In the case by an 
examination before trial. We think the judg-
ment ls right, and 1t should therefore be af-
r firmed. All concur, except HAIGHT, J., not sitting. Judgment atllrmed. 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
PEOPLE v. DOWNS.
(25 N. E. 988, 123 N. Y. 558.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, third department.
Lewis E. Gritfith and John P. Kelly,
Dist. Atty., for the People. Orin Gmnbelf
and J. K. Long, for respondent.
FINCI-I,J. Thedefendantwasconvicted
of manslaughter in the first degree, but
the general term has reversed that con-
viction for alleged error in the charge to
thejury; and from that reversal the peo-
ple have appealed to this court, insisting
that the charge, fairly construed, was cor-
rect and violated no established legal rule.
The prosecution proved the corpus delicti,
the death of Logan.and the violence which
caused it, by direct evidence which was in
no respect disputed. His dead body was
found upon the premises of the prisoner
shot through the heart. The bullet had
penetrated his clothing and entered his
breast in a manner indicating that he was
facing his antagonist when the shot was
fired. The absence from the clothing of
the deceased of anything like scorch or
stain oi powder was claimed to indicate
that the weapon when fired was not in
contact with his person, but at some dis-
tance from hlm,greater or less. The bullet
was taken from the body. A pistol was
found in the prisoner's room. under his
bureau, having 10 chambers, the central
one carrying a bullet of 32 caliber, and the
9 surrounding it of 22. A discharged shell
was found in the central chamber, which
the bullet taken from the body of the de-
ceased iitted, while the9smaller cartridges
remained undischarged. On the day of
the homicide, at about midnight, the pris-
oner aroused a neighbor named Morey,
and Dr. Harvie, saying to each that he
had shot his best friend, or was afraid he
had shot his best friend, but giving no ex-
planation of the circumstances; and they,
going with him to the house, found Lo-
gan lying dead near the entrance to the
summer kitchen. The prisoner was pale
and nervous, and on finding Logan dead
was taken with afit of vomiting,but made
no effort to escape, and quietly surren-
dered himself to the officers who were
summoned and took him into custody.
He was entirely sober. and there was no
evidence of intoxication. His previous
relations with Loga.n,wh0 was a. married
man, were those of intimate friendship
without anything to mar or disturb it.
That was the case made by the prosecu-
tion, and it presented to the jury a prob-
lem with very slight material for its solu-
tion. That Logan met his death from a
pistol discharged in the hands of Downs
was sufficiently proved, but whether the
shot was fired intentionally or accident-
ally, and, if intentionally, for what rea-
son, did not appear. The evidence dis-
closed no possible motive for anintention-
al homicide, and left the character and
grade of the crime, if one had been com-
mitted, an unexplained mystery. One cir-
cumstance, however, would be sure to
attract the attention of an intelligent
jury. They would ask how Logan came
to he at the rear of the house, near the en-
‘trance to its living rooms, at midnight;
and what he was doing there when he
should have been at home with his wife
and children. The saloon was in the
front part of the house opening onto the
street. It was closed for the night, and
there had been no brawl or quarrel or
disturbance there during the evening.
The presence of Logan in the rear of the
house, at or near midnight, and the ab-
sence of any previous quarrel or difficulty,
would make it reasonably certain that
somefhingdue to his presence, and suffi-
ciently grave and serious to account for an
intentional or accidental homicide, had act-
uallyoccurred. What thatwaswehaveno
means of knowing except through the ex-
planation given by Downs and his wife.
He testifies, in brief, that he was aroused
by the noise of a scufiie in the back kitch-
en; that he seized the pistol, which lay
upon a stand near his bed, and rushed out;
that he found Logan and Mrs. Downs On
the floor in the act oi’ adultery or rape.
according as the woman was consenting
or resisting: that he seized Logan, who
at once attacked him, and in the struggle
the pistol went off; and that this was
after the woman had left the room, and.
as she says, while she was at the front
door going out for help or escape. She
testifies that Logan seized her and threw
her down, but does not say whether with
her consent, or why she made no outcry.
()f course this explanation was open to
the criticism of the prosecution and the
consideration of the jury. The principal
fact sworn to has a strong probability in
its favor. It accounts for the presence of
Logan, at midnight, on the premises
where he had no right to bc. and furnishes
the needed motive and explanation of the
homicide which occurred. Withoutit we
cannot understand the event: with it we
can easily see how it did occur, or how it
might have happened. It supplies both
motive and occasion. But granting so
much, the rest does not necessarily follow,
and it was still for the jury to say whether
the shooting was accidental or inten-
tional, whether justifiable or excusable,
whether with deliberate purpose, or in
the heat of passion. and without intent to
kill. It is obvious that in their considera-
tion of these questions very much would
depend on the charge of the court as to
the burden of proof and the operation and
extent of the rule relating to a reasonable
doubt. That such doubts might easily
arise in many and different directions is
quite apparent from the facts to which we
have adverted. Take, for example, the
prisoner's statement that the pistol ex-
ploded in a fight between him and Logan,
and without his conscious act. If that be
true, while there was a homicide there
was no crime; for the killing would be-
come merely an accident or misadventure.
lf, now. the burden is upon the prisoner
to satisfy the jury oi‘ that fact, and unless
they are so satisfied they mustdeem the
homicide intentional, a verdict. of guilty
might easily result. But if that burden is
not upon the prisoner, if the jury are told
that it remains with the pr0secution.—tlmt
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Olse No. 12-'J] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
PEOPLE T. DOWNS. 
(25 N. E. 988, 123 N. Y. 558.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890. 
Appeal from supreme court, general 
tem1, third department . . 
LeV1ri.<J E. Gr/tilth an•t John P. Kelly, 
Dist. Atty., for the People. Orin G111nbel( 
and J. K. Long, for respondent. 
FJNCH, J. ThedefendantwRsconvlctf'tl 
of manslaughter to the first degree, hut 
the jl;eneral te1·m haa reversed that con-
viction for alleged error In the charge to 
the Jury; and from that revenial the peo-
ple have appenlf!d to tbla court, Insisting 
thut the charge, fairly construed, was cor-
rect and violated no estiihllshed legal rule. 
The p1·osecutlon proved the corpus delir.tl, 
the death of Logan.and the violence which 
caused it, by direct evidence which was In 
no re11pect disputed. His dead body woa 
found upon the premises of the prisoner 
shot through the heart. The bullet had 
JJE>netrated bis clothing and t:ntered hie 
breast In a manner Indicating that he was 
facing blK antagonist when the Rhot wue 
tired. The absence from the clothing of 
the deceased of anything like scorch or 
t1taln of powder was claimed to Indicate 
that the weapon when fired was not In 
contact with bis penion, but at some <lls-
ttmce from lllm,jl;reater or less. '£he bullet 
was taken from the body. A pistol was 
found In the prisoner's room. under his 
bureau, having 10 chambers, the central 
one carrylnK a bullet of 32 caliber, and the 
9 surrounding It of ~2. A discharged shell 
was found In the centl'al chamber, whkb 
the bullet taken from the body of tbP dl'-
ceased lltted, while tbe98maller cartridges 
remoined undischarged. On the day or 
the homicide, at about midnight, the pris-
oner arouHed a neighbor name+l Morey, 
and Dr. Harvie, saying to Pach th1tt hl' 
had shot his best rrload, or Wtlt! afraid he 
had shot bis beat friend, but &{lvlnJ!: no ex-
planation of the clrcumt1tancea; and they, 
goinJ!: with him to the house, found Lo-
gan lying dead ne1tr the entrance to the 
summer kitchen. The prisoner was pale 
and nervous, and on finding Logan deUtl 
was taken with a fit of \'omitlng, but made 
no effort to t>acupe, and quietly em·ren-
dered hiWNPlf to the officers who were 
11ummooed and took him tnto custody. 
He was entirely solwr. and then! waK no 
evidence of lntoxlcutlon. · Hie prevlouN 
relations with Loga.n, who was a marriell 
man, were those of Intimate frlendHhfI> 
without anything to mar or 1lh1t11rb ft. 
That was the case mu1le by the prosecu-
tion, und It preHented to the jury a 1•rob-
lem with very slight material for itt1 soln-
tton. '!'hat J.,ogan met his death from a 
t>lstol discharged In the hands of Downe 
was sufficiently proved, but whether the 
shot was tired Intentionally or a<·clclent-
ally, and, If intentlonully, for what reu-
1m11, llld not nppeur. The e\'ldence dls-
cloRPd no pm1Hihle motive for an intentlon-
Rl homl!•ide, and left the cburacter and 
grade of the crime, if one had been com-
mitted, an unexplained mystery. One cir-
cumstance, htnf·ever, wonld be sure tc 
nttract the attention of un Intelligent 
:m2 
jury. They would aHk how Logon came-
to lie at the rear of the bunse, ne11r the en-
"trance to itH living roomH, at midnight; 
amt what he was doing there when be 
should have heen at borne with hie wife 
and chtldren. 'fhe saloon was in the 
front part of the houHe openln11: onto the 
11treet. It was closed for the night, and 
thne had been no brawl or quarrel or 
disturbance there during the evening. 
The (lresence of Logan In the l'('HI" of the 
houtte, at or nl'ar mi<lnl~ht, and the ab-
sence of a.ny previous quarrel or difficulty, 
would make it reasonably c ... rtain that 
something due to his presence, and euffl-
c;eotly grave and serious to account for an 
In tentlonal or aecJ,dental homicide, bad act-
""'llY occurred. What that wa11 we have no 
means of knowing except through thl' ex-
phmatlon given by Downs and his wife. 
He tet1tfftes, In brief, thot he was aroused 
by the noise of a scume to the back kitch-
en; that be seized the pistol, whleb lay 
upon a stand near bis berl, and ruMhed out; 
thut he found Logan and MrH. Downe on 
the floor in the act of adultery or rape, 
according as the woman WRB consenting 
or ret!lstlng: that ho selzell Logan, who 
at once attacked him, and In the atrup;gle 
the pistol went off; and that this Wa.tl 
aftl.'r the woman had lt>ft the room, and. 
as she says, while she wae at the front 
<loor going out for help or escapt'. l'ibe 
testifies thnt Logan selzl'il her and threw 
her down. but does not say whether with 
her consent, or why 11he matle no outcry. 
Of course this ex plan a tlon ~as 01Jen to 
the critlcllm1 of the prosecution and the 
consl<leratlon of the Jury. 'J'be principal 
fact sworn to bas a strong probability In 
Its favor. It accounts for the preMeoce of 
Lognn, at midnight, on the premises 
where be had no right to be, eud rurnlttbet! 
the needell motive and explanation of the 
liomiclde which occurrell. Without it we 
cannot understand the event: with It we 
can easily t1ee how it did occur, or how It 
might havl'! happened. It supplies both 
motive and OC"<'l\Hlon. But granting t!O 
much, the l'eHt does not n~es1mrllyfOJIOW, 
and it waR still for the Jury to say whether 
the shooting was accidental or inten· 
tlonal, whether jm1tlfta hie or excusable, 
whether with deliberate purpose, or In 
the heat of passion, and without Intent to 
kilt. It ls ob,·ious that In their conl41dera-
tlon of these queAtlons very much would 
depend on the charge of the court a11 to 
the burden of proof and the operation and 
extent of thP rule relating to a reaaonablt> 
doubt. That such doubts . might eB.Hlly 
arise lo mRny and dlffPJ'ent directions le 
quite app11n>nt from the fuc>ta to which we 
have adverted. Take, for example, the 
prisoner's ~tatement that tbe pu1tol ex-
plodt'd In a flght between him and Lngan, 
and without his eonsetous act. Jf that be 
true, while tluire was a homicide tht>re 
was no crime; for the killing would b<'-
come merely an aecident or mls1uh·e11ture. 
If, now, the burden ls UilOD the rrl1mnf'r 
to Flatlsfy the Jury or that fact, and unless 
they al'e so satb1fled they must deem tht-
homiclde Intentional, a verdict of ~uilty 
ml~ht eRslly result. But If th1:1t burd1•n IH 
not upon the prhmner, If thf' jury are told 
thu.t it rema;ne with the prosecut1011,-t1111t 
BURDEN OF PROOF.
[Case No. 123
if the evidence leaves in their minds a rea- ' own, but within the definitions
sonable doubt whether the killing may
not have been an accident or misadvent-
ure, the prisoner must have the benefit of
the doubt, because it goes directly to the
vital elements of the people's case, and
leaves it uncertain whether n. crime has
been committed at all,—the verdict of the
jury might be entirely different. A similar
result might attend a defense of justifiable
homicide, and so the question of thc bur-
den of proof a.nd the scope and effect of a
reasonable doubt, became in the case at
bar of very great importance. We have
decided so recently as to make further ci-
tation needless that the rule that in crimi-
nal cases the defendant is entitled to the
benefit of a. reasonable doubt applies not
only to the case as made by the prosecu-
tion, but to any defense interposed. (Peo-
ple v. Riordan, ll7 N. Y. 71, 22 N. E. Rep.
455;) and we had earlier held under the
statute defining, the different classes of
homicide that whether it was murder .or
manslaughter in one of the degrees, or
justifiable or excusable. and o no crime
at all, depended upon the intention and cir-
cumstances of its perpetra tion. and there-
fore mere proof of the killing raised no
legal implication of the crime of murder,
(Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 177.) I think
the charge in this case ran counter to
these rules. and was calculated to impress
upon thejury a conviction that proof of
the homicide carried with it a. legal im pli-
cation of crime which shifted the burden
of proof upon the prisoner. and required
him to satisfy the jury that the killing
was either justifiable or excusable. at the
peril of a conviction if he should fall in his
attempt.
The learned trial judge began his charge
with-the definitions of the statute, and
very fairly and correctly explained its clas-
sification of the different forms of homi-
cide. Having done so he approached the
rules which should govern the jury in de-
ciding between them, and in so doing used
expressions to which exceptions were
taken. He said: “Now it is for you to
say to which one of these classes of crime
this evidence points. Herc has been a
homicide. Herc has been a human life
taken. It becomes a serious question as
to whether or not a man shall execute the
law or execute vengeance upon his fellow.
If he does he must do it at the peril of
either being punished for it or being able
to excuse himself when called upon to an-
swer to the wrong within one of the ex-
cuses that is fixed and given in the law.
If he is not he must be iound guilty of one
or the other of the crimes which are im-
puted to him by reason of the homicide."
A jury could hardly fail to understand
from this language that a homicide. thc
fact of u. human life taken.invoivcd a legal
implication of murder which must compel
a verdict of guilty Jniess the prisoner is
uble to excuse himself within the :tatn-
tory definitions. If there was room to
doubt about the meaning if became plain-
er from what followed. The learned judge
added: “If you reach the conclusion that
he was justified in taking the life of this
man within the definitions given in the
books, not within any notions of your
wn.ous,nv.—28
given in
the law. if you reach the conclusion that
he was justified. then your verdict will be
one of acquittal." Here the sume idea is
conveyed in another form. To acquit. the
jury must "reach the conclusion” that a
justification has been established. It is
evident that the prioner's counsel so un-
derstood the charge, and, after excepting
to it, made a series of requests with a view
of more clearly ascertaining the meaning
of the charge. or procuring a modification
of its terms. He asked the court to charge
“ that no state of proof ever clianges the
burden of proof: the burden remains
throughout the trial upon the people; "
to which the learned judge replied: “I de-
cline to charge it in those words. I quali-
fy it by saying that if the people establish
the homicide by the use of a deadly weap-
on, committed by the defendant inten-
tionally and with deliberation. that then
any excuse for the commission of that
crime or the commission of that act must
come from the defendant." The under-
standing of the jury of the position of the
court was quite likely to be that the bur-
den did not always rest on the prosecu-
tion; but when a. prima facile case of mur-
der had been made the burden shifted to
the defendant, who sought to excuse or
justify. And this is in precise accord with
the previous charge that where a homicide
was shown to have been committed by
the prisoner he must be convicted unless
he is “able" to justify or excuse the act.
and unless the jury “reach the conclusion "
that there is le,\.<nl excuse or justification.
And then, to further test the attitude of
the court, the defendant's counsel asked
for a charge “ that there is no legal impli-
cation irom the fact of the shooting that
the defendant intended to take the life of
Logan.” 'l‘hut was declined, and an ex-
ception tuken.
Now. construing together what the
court said, and what it reins-cd to say, 1
think it is obvious that the jury were like-
ly to act under the impression that a
homicide proved implied crime on the part
of the slayer; that a conviction must fol-
low unless the prisonerjustified or excused
the act; that the burden of that defense
was upon him: and that to secure acquit-
tal he must be able to show a legal justifi-
:a.tion or excuse, and the jury must reach
that conclusion if it would acquit. The
learned district attorney, however, insists
that the court did charge that the guilt of
the prisoner must be established beyond
a. reasonable doubt, and refers to several
passages in which that was said. A refer-
ence to them indicates that none of them
related to the defense of justification or
excuse, nor did they indicate that a Ica-
sonabic doubt would operate in the pris-
oner’s favor beyond the case mnde by the
prosecution. Thus,in describing the char-
acter of the proof requisite to establish
the corpus delicti as distinguished from
the guilt of the prisoner, the court said the
forme. must be proved by direct evidence,
and the iutterbeyond a reasonable doubt
In describing the killing of Logan. the
court said ' “I do not know that it is
controverted on either side that he came
to his death by a bullet, a pistol shot, as
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BURDEN OF PROOF. [Case No. 123 
ff the evidence leave11 In their minds area-
sonable donbt whether the killing may 
not have been an accident or mlsadvP.nt-
ure, the prisone1· must have the beneHt or 
the douht, because it goes directly to the 
vital elements of the people's case, and 
leuves lt uncertain whether R crime bas 
been committed at all,-the verdict of the 
Jury might be entirely dllferent. A similar 
result might attend a defense of Jm1tltlable 
homicide, and so thfl question of tht• bur-
den of proof and the BCQ(.>e ttnd eftect or " 
reasonable doubt, became In the case at 
bor of very great lmportunce. We have 
decided so l'f!Cently as to make further cl-
ta tton needless that the rnle that In crimi-
nal calfe& the defendant Is entitled to the 
benefit of a reasonable doubt applll!I! not 
only to the case as made by the t>l'osecu-
tlon, but to any defense lntei:eoRed. (Peo-
ple v. Riordan, 117 N. Y. 71, w2 N. E. Rep. 
4.'>ii;) and we bad earlier held uoder the 
.stptute deftnlog . the dllferent clasllt.'S of 
homicide that whether It was murder .or 
mamllaughter in one of the deg-rees, or jostlfiahle or excm1able, and so no crime 
at all, depended oprm the Intention and clr-
cum11tanr.eR of Its perpetrH tlon, and there-
fore mere proof of the killing rah1f'd no 
leiral tmpltcatloo of the crime of murder, 
(Stokes "· Peoplt1, 6S N. Y.177.) I think 
the charge lo this case ran counter to 
theee rules, and was calculated tu tmprei'11 
upon the Jury a conviction that proof of 
the homMde earrlecl with It a legal Impli-
cation of crime wbleb shifted the burden 
of proof upon the prisoner. aud required 
him to satisfy the Jury that the killing 
was either Justifiable or exeusabl<>, at the 
peril of a conviction lf he should fall In hlB 
attempt. 
The learned trial Judge began bis cbanre 
with. tbe deftnltlone of the statute, and 
very fairly and correi•tly explained Its clafl· 
slftcatlon of the diflert>nt forms of homi-
cide. Having done&•> he approached the 
rules which should govern the Jury lo c.le-
~iding between them, and lo 80 doing used 
expre&ffluna to which exceptlonll were 
taken. He said: "Now It i8 for you to 
11oy to whlr.b one of these classes of crime 
this evidence points. Here has been a 
homicide. Here hos been a humon life 
taken. It becomes a serious question aEt 
to whether or not a man shall exec·ute the 
law or execute vengeance upon bis fellow. 
If be doe11 be must do It at the peril of 
either being punished for It or beh1g abl~ 
to excuse himself wbt'n coiled upon to an· 
ewer to the wrong within one of the ex-
cusP.S that ts fixed a.nd given In the law. 
If he ts not be must be found guilty of one 
or the other of the crimes whkh are Im-
puted to him by reuson of the homklde." 
A Jory euuld hardly fall to unclenitand 
from tbt11 lami:uap;e that a homicide, tbt> 
fact of a human lire taken . Involved a legal 
tmplkatton of murder which muHt compf'I 
a verdict of guilty JnleKM the prisoner iK 
able to excu110 himself within the 1tatu· 
tory deftnitiona. If th~re wa11 room to 
doubt about tht> mt-anlnic It became plaln-
er from what followed. 'l'be learned Judgt> 
added: "If yon reach the conr.luslon that 
ht' w1:1a Jnatlfled to toking the ltfe of this 
man within the deftnltlons given in the 
books, not within any notions of your 
WlLGl18,BV.-28 
own, bnt within the definitions given In 
the law, U you reach the conclusion that 
be was J11stlfled, then your verdict will be 
one of acquittal." Here the some idea ta 
conveyed In 8nother form. To acquit, the jory must .. reach the conclusion" tbnt a 
JustUlcation bas been e.st11ull11hed. It is 
evident th8t the prisoner's eoum1el so un-
derstood the char.,;e, and, after exceptinJP: 
to It, made a series of requests with a view 
of more clearly aKCertalnlng the meaning 
of the charge, or prol·urlng d modification 
of ltl'I term11. He asked the court 1o charJl,"tl 
"that no 8tate of proof ever clurngeH the 
burden or proof: the burcJen remains 
throughout the triu.I upon the people;" 
to whlc·h tile learned Juctge replied: "1 de-
cline to eharge tt In those words. I quaU-
fy it by sa~·tng that If the people establ111h 
the homlchle by the llRe of a deadly weap-
on, committed by the defendant inten-
tionally and with deliberation. that then 
any excuflP. for the commlHsiuo of that 
crime or the couunlsaion of that act must 
come from the drfendant." The un<ler-
stan<ling of the Jury of the position of tht• 
court was quite likely to be that the bur-
den did not always rest on the prosecu-
tion: but when a prlma facle case of mur-
der bad been made the burden sbtlted to 
the defendant, who sought to excuse or justify. And this ls In prt>else accord with 
the previouscharge thatwbere a bomldde 
was shown to have been committed by 
the prlsouer he mm~t be convteted unles!! 
he le "able" to Justify or excuse the act. 
and onleaR the Jury" reach the conclusion" 
that there Is lt'J(RI ncuse or Justlfic11tlon. 
And then, to further test the attitude of 
the court, the defendant's counsel asked 
for a charge" that there Is no legal Impli-
cation from the fact of the shooting that 
the defendnnt Intended to take the life of 
Logan." 1'hat waM dt>t•llned, and an ex-
ception tt1ken. 
Now. construing together what the 
court said, anc.1 what tt refused to say, 1 
think It Is obvious tbat the jury wert• llke-
1.v to act under the lmp~>1lon that a 
homicide proved Implied crime on the part 
of the slayer; that a convktlon must fol-
low unless the prisoner Justified or excused 
the uct: that the hnrdPn of that defense 
wa11 upon him: and that to 8et"ure ucqutt-
tal he must be able to show a legal Justlfl-
:!8tlon or excuae, and the jnry must reach 
tnat conclusion tr It would acquit. The 
IP.urned district attorm•y, however, insists 
that the court did charge that the guilt of 
the pl.'leoner must be establl11hed beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and 1-eferR to several 
pas1mgeH In which that was said. A rere1·-
enee to them Indicates that none of them 
rf'lated to the defense of Justification or 
e:iccUHP, nor did the.) lndlcnte that a rt-u-
sonable doubt would operate In the prls-
unt>r's favor bl'yund the cast' mnde by tbe 
prosecution. Th1111, tn descrlhlng the char-
acter of the proof requisite to establl11h 
the corpus dell<·tf as distinguished from 
the guilt of the prisoner, the court said the 
form~. muflt be pr·wed by direct evidence, 
and thl:' lntterhe.\·ond a reasonable duul1t 
In deflcrlbu.J~ the ;c1111np; of Logan. the 
coort said· "I do n'lt know that It ts 
controverted on eltbe .. side that he came 
to bis death by a bullet, a pistol shot, M 
8Cl3 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
almost conceded , ‘butyou are to find that
fact. If there is any doubt about it, of
course the defendant has the benefit of the
doubt." Upon request of the prisoner’s
counsel, the court also charged “that it is
incumbent upon the people to prove ai-
firmatively beyond a reasonable doubt
what grade of crime, if any, was com-
mitted;” and also, upon the like request,
“that if upon the Whole evidence of the
people and the defendant taken together
there is a reasonable doubt in the minds
of the jury as to whether or not the de-
fendant discharged the pistol at Logan
with intent to kill him, they must acquit
the defendant of the crime of murder in
both degrees." I am unable to see that
these expressions at all modify or control
what was said and refused to be charged
as to the burden of proof, and the manner
in which justitication or excuse should be
proved. They fall very far short of a cure
for the error which was committed. Tak-
ing the charge together, and construing it
354
as a whole, I am unable to resist the con-
viction that in the minds of the jury it
shifted the burden oi‘ proving his defense
upon the prisoner. and deprived him as to
that defense of the benefit of a reasonable
doubt. While there is no l<-gal implica-
tion of the crime of murder from the bare
fact of a homicide, the jury may infer it as
a fact. and may do so even though no mo-
tive is assigned for the act, and the case
is bare of circumstances of explanation.
People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 77. But the in-
ference is one of fact which the jury must
draw if such seems to them to be their
duty. nnd not one of law which the court
may impose upon their deliberation, and
then upon that assumption shift the bur-
den upon the prisoner and require him to
prove that no crime has in fact been com-
mitted. We think, therefore, that the or-
der of the general term, reversing the iudg-
ment of conviction, was right, and should
be affirmed. All concur, except RUGEB, C.
J., not voting.
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Case No. 123] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDEYCE. 
almost conceded, 'butyou are to find that 
fact. If tbt-re le any doubt about It, of 
coUt"Me the defendant hne the benefit of the 
do11bt." Upon requeHt of the prisoner's 
counsel, the court ahm charged "that It Is 
Incumbent upon the people to prove ar-
tirmo.tl vely beyond tt reasonable doubt 
what grade of crime, If any, waK com-
mitted;" and also, upon the like request, 
"that If upon the whole evidence of the 
peo1>le and the defendant taken togethPr 
there Is R reasonable doubt In the minds 
of the Jury as to whether or not the de--
fen<111nt discharged the pistol at Logan 
with intent to ktll him, they must acqnlt 
the defendant of the crime of murder In 
both degreei;." I am unable to see that 
these expretnlions at all modify or control 
what was daid 1md refused to he charged 
as to the burrten of proof, and the manner 
In which JuKttflcatlon or excuse should be 
proved. They fall very far short of a cure 
for the error which was committed. 'fak-
ing the charge toKether, and construing It 
SM 
as a whole, I am unable to reMlst the con-
viction that In the minds of the Jury It 
shifted the bt11'den of proving hie defenM 
upon the prisoner. and deprl\"ed him as to 
that defenRe of the benefit of a reasonable 
doubt. While there is no lPgal Implica-
tion of the crime of murder from the hare 
fact of a homll'lde, the Jury may Infer It ss 
a fact, and may do so even though no mo-
tive le aselg-ned for the act, and the case 
le bare of circumstances of explanation. 
People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 77. Bot the In-
ference Is one of fact which the jury must 
draw If such seems to them to be their 
duty, nn<l not one of law which the court 
may Impose upon their deliberation, and 
then upon that atl8umptlon shift the bur-
den upon the prh1oner. Rnd require him to 
pro\·e that no crime has tn fRct been com-
mitted. We think, therefore, that the or-
der of the general term, rEveralng t be Judg-
ment of conviction, was right, and should 
be affirmed. All concur, except Roosa, C. 
J., not voting. 
BURDEN OF PROOF.
[Case No. 124
COLORADO COAL 8: IRON CO. et al. v.
UNITED STATES.
(8 Sup. Ct. 131, 123 U. S. 317.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Nov. 21,
1887.
Appeal from the circuit court of the Unit-
ed States _f0r the district of Colorado.
Lyman K. Bass, B. H. Bristow, and David
Willcox, for appellants. Sol. Gen. Jenks, for
the United States.
MATTHl~)\\'s, J. This is a bill in equity
filed in the name of the United States by the
attorney general on January 22, 1880, the ob-
ject and prayer of which are to declare void
and cancel 61 patents for as many distinct
pieces of land, situated at different places in
Las Animas county, in the state of Colorado,
amounting in the aggregate to 9,565.95 acres.
To the original bill the Southern Colorado
Coal & Town Company, a corporation or-
ganized under the laws of Colorado, was the
sole defendant. The patents in question
were issued at different times between Octo-
ber, 1S73, and October, 1874, upon pre-emp-
tion claims, under the act of 1841. In each
case there appeared to be filed all the neces-
sary and proper affidavits, duly verified be-
fore the register or receiver of the land-of-
flce at Pueblo, showing that the pre-emptors
had entered and settled in person upon the
land on a day named, and had made im-
provements thereon, the nature of which
were set out in detail, and that the lands in
question were non-mineral lands, and subject
to pre-emption under the acts of congress re-
lating thereto. Between May, 1873, and De-
cember, 1875, warranty deeds in the names
of the pre-emptors and patentees were made,
acknowledged, and recorded, apparently con-
veying the premiscs to William S. Jackson,
as trustee, who represented a number of in-
dividuals who had deposited money in his
hands to be used in the purchase of lands in
Colorado. On June 1, 1876, by deed duly
acknowledged and recorded, but without
covenant of warranty. Jackson conveyed and
released all these lands to the defendant. the
Southern Colorado Coal & Town Company.
On January 20, 1880, that corporation was
consolidated with other corporations under
the name of the “Colorado Coal & iron Com-
pany," to which, upon that date, the lands in
question were conveyed. Under date of Feb-
ruary 1, 1880, the coal and iron company
made a mortgage covering the premises in
the time to the proper oii1cer,—$1,813.1-1 in
cash, and the remainder in certificates
known as “Agricultural College Scrip,” which
by law was receivable for that purpose.
It is charged in the bill that these patents
were procured by means of a fraudulent con-
spiracy entered into by and between Irving
W. Stanton, register of the land-office, Charles
A. Cook, receiver for the land-district, at
Pueblo, in Colorado, Alexander C. Hunt, and
others unknown, who, it is alleged, organized
and had incorporated the Southern Colorado
Coal & Town Company. In furtherance of
this conspiracy, and as the means of ac-
complishing its purpose, it is alleged “that
neither of the supposed pre-emptors of the
land as aforesaid described by their names,
as stated in said several proofs of pre-emp-
tion, or in the said certificates of location,
ever settled upon the said lands, or im-
proved the same, as represented in said sev-
eral proofs of pre-emption, and that no per-
son or persons whatsoever, as represented
in either of said certificates of location, ap-
peared or presented himself before said
Stanton or Cook, or either of them, at any
time, and made proof of pre-emption or
agricultural college scrip location, either as
pre-emptor or as witness for any pre-emp-
tor as aforesaid described, as in and by
said proofs of pre-emption and location cer-
tificates, or either of them, as aforesaid, is
supposed, but that the same, and each of
them, are false and fraudulent, and were
designed, made, and executed by said Stan-
ton and Cook and said Hunt, and the said
persons to your orator unknown, or some one
or more of them, in the manner aforesaid,
’ and for the purpose of fraudulently depriving
your orator of its title to the said pieces of
land."
It is further alleged that all the said sup-
poed pre-emptors are fictitious persons, and
their names are fictitious names, and that the
_ supposed names that appear as witnesses to
the said several proofs of pre-emption are
fictitious names, and that no such person or
persons, either as pre-emptors or as \vlt-
nesses, have ever lived or been known in the
county of Las Animas, where said pieces and
parcels of land are located, and, in fact, that
no such persons exist.
It is further alleged in the bill “that the
aforesaid pieces and parcels of land are not
agricultural land, and are not suitable for
agricultural or grazing purposefi. “ml “Ye “t
no value for any purpose excel“ 101‘ “IQ Q03‘
deposits therein contalllell ' ' ' '“““
the said several pieces and \““'°°\s °t mm‘
contain large and valuable ‘\e\’“““‘ °\t cm“)
and that the said deposit“ °‘ *2“ (\“';:,‘§,
known to the said SUUMOD fin“ C“: :10“, ,0
Hunt, and to the said Derso“ is gut s‘\v_neo, O
your orator unknown, who *“"Q.. wr\‘t\en out,
and executed, or caused e‘-Qm\ greets oi
signed. and executed, me
_ afl\\\sv\\s s\ \\\s
pre-emption 11 nd non-mmef 337,
question, with others, to Louis H. Meyer, as
trustee, to secure an issue of bonds amount-
ing to $3,-’>00.000. On January 7, 1882, an
amendment to the bill was flied, making the
Colorado Coal & Iron Company, the consoli- '
dated corporation, together with Meyer, the
trustee in the mortgage, parties defendant.
The purchase price of the lands to the gov-
ernment was $11,9i)7.45, which was paid at
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BURDEN OF PHOOF. (Case No. 1::!4 
COLORADO COAL & IRON CO. et al. T. 
UNITED STATES. 
(8 Sup. Ct. 131, 123 U. S. 317.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Nov. 21, 
1887. 
Appeal trom the circuit court of the Unit· 
ed States .t.or the district of Colorado. 
Lyman K. Bass, B. H. Bristow, and David 
Wlllcox, for appellants. Sol Gen. Jenks, for 
the United States. 
MATTHEWS, J. This Is a bill lo equity 
tlled In the name of the 'Lnlted States by the 
attorney general on January :t'.:?, 1880, the ob-
ject and prayer of which are to declare void 
and cancel 61 patents for as many distinct 
pieces of land, situated at different places In 
Las Animas county, lo the state of Colorado, 
amounting In the aggregate to ~.a65.9a acree. 
To the original bill the Southern Colorado 
Coal & Town Company, a corporation or-
ganized under the laws of Colorado, was the 
l901e defendant. The patents In question 
were lBBued at different tlmea between Octo-
ber, 1873, and October, 1874, upon p~mp­
tlon claims, under the act of 1841. In each 
case there appeared to be filed all the neces-
sary and proper amdnvlts, duly verified be· 
fore the register or receiver of the laud-of-
fice at Pueblo, showing that the pre-emptors 
had entered and settled In person upon the 
land on a day named, and had made Im-
provements thereon, the nature of which 
were set out ln detail, and that the lands In ' 
question were non-mineral lands, and subject 
to pre-emption under the acts of congress re-
lating thereto, Betw-n May, 1873, and De-
cember, 1875, warranty deeds ln the nameFI 
of the pre-emptors and patentees were made, 
acknowledged, and reeorded, apparently con-
Teylng the premises to William 8. Jackson, 
as trustee, who represented a number of ln· 
dlvlduals who had deposited money In hie 
hand8 to be ueed ID the purchase of lande In 
Colorado. On June 1, 1876, by deed duly 
!lcknowledged and recorded, but without 
covenant of warranty, Jackson conveyed and 
released all these lands to the defendant, the 
Southern Colorado Coal & Town Company. 
On January 20, 1880, that corporation was 
consolldated with other corporations under 
the name of the "Colorado Coal & Iron Com-
pany," to which, upon that date, the lands In 
question were conveyed. Under date of I<'eb-
ruary 1, 1880, the coal and Iron company 
made a mortgage covering the premises In 
question, with other11, to Louie H. Meyer, ae 
trustee, to secure an Issue of bonds amount-
ing to $3,500,000. On January 7, 1882, an 
amendment to the bill wae fllE>d, making the 
Colorado Coal & Iron Company, the consoll- ' 
dated corporation, together with Meyer, the 
trustee In the mortgage, parties defendant. 
The purchase price of the lands to the gov-
ernment was ,11,997.45, wbl<'h wns paid at 
the time to the proper otncer,__.1,813.H In 
cash, and the remainder In certl11cates 
known as "Agricultural College Scrip," which 
by law was receh·able for that purpose. 
It le charged In the blll that these patents 
were procured by means of a fraudulent con-
spiracy entered Into by and between Irving 
W. Stanton, register of the land-omce, Charles 
A. Cook, receiver for the land-district, at 
Pueblo, ln Colorado, Alexander C. Hunt, and 
others unknown, who, It ls alleged, organized 
and had incorporated the Southern Colorado 
Coal & Town Company. In furtherance of 
this conspiracy, and as the means of ac-
complishing lte purpose, It Is alleged "that 
neither of the supposed pre-emptors of the 
land as aforesaid described by their names, 
as 11tated In said several proof• of p1-e-emp. 
tlon, or In the said certlfl.cates of location, 
ever settled upon the said lande, or Im· 
proved the same, u represented lo said sev· 
eral proofs of pre-emption, and that no per· 
son or peraons whatsoever, aa represented 
ln either of said certificates of location, ap. 
peared or presented himself before said 
Stanton or Cook, or either of them, at any 
time, and made proof of pre-emption or 
agricultural college scrip location, either u 
pre-emptor or as witness for any pre-emp-
tor as afol"eS&ld deecrlbed, aa In and by 
said proofs of pre-emption and location cer-
Wlcates, or either of them, as aforesaid, la 
aupposed, but that the same, and each of 
them, are false and fraudulent. and were 
designed, made, and executed by said Stan-
ton and Cook and said Hunt, and the uld 
persons to your orator unknown, or some one 
or more of them, In the manner aforesaid, 
and for the purpose of fraudulently depriving 
your orator of its title to the said pieces of 
land." 
It le further alleged that all the eald 1up-
poeed pre-emptors are ftctitloue persons, and 
their names are ftctltlous names, and that the 
supposed names that appear as witnesses to 
the said several proofs of pre-emption are 
fictitious names, and that no such person or 
persons, either llR pre-emptore or as wit-
nesses, have ever lived or been known In the 
county of Las Animas, where said pieces and 
pa1"Cele of land are located, and, In fact, that 
no such persons exist. 
It Is f.urther alleged ln the blll "that the 
aforesaid pieces and parcels of land are not 
agricultural land, and are not suitable for 
agricultural or grazing pul"pOBe&, and are of 
no value for any purpose ex~\)t tor the coal 
deposits therein contalneu. • • • That 
the said several pleees and \larce\s ot \and 
contain large and valuable de\)QB\\s ot con\, 
and that the said deposU:s ot ~~n::~ 
known to the said StantoJ> ~~~ C: \)etsoug to 
Hunt, and to the sa\d per -WTG\e ou\, g\v.ned, 
your orator unknown, w\.10 ~ be 'llt\\\en out, 
and executed, or caused t S.e...,l!'tll.\ \)t<i11ts ot 
slgnl'1l, and executed, tne I a.~'1\\1!. a\\\\~ 
pr1•-P111ptlon nnd non-m\uet'9- ~ 
Case No. 124]
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time the said several proofs of pre-emption
and non-mineral aiiidavits were made out,
signed, and executed."
It is also charged in the bill that the said
Hunt was a stockholder in the Southern Col-
orado Coal & Town Company, and general
manager of its business, and that the in-
corporators of said company and the trustees
thereof, including William S. Jackson, “knew
at the time the aforesaid described land was
conveyed to said company by said William
S. Jackson, as hereinbefore described, that
the several patents to said several pleces and
parcels of land had be.en fraudulently ob-
tained from your orator, and knew that the
said several supposed pre-emptors and pat-
entees were myths and fictitious persons, and ,
holders for value." Mcader v. Norton, 11
Wall. 442, 458. It is, indeed, an elementary
knew that the said Jackson had no right, ti-
tle, or interest in said land, or any part
thereof.”
The answer of the Southern Colorado Coal
& Town Company, tiled November 2, 1881,
specifically denies all the allegations of the
bill alleging fraud, and denies that the said
lands, or any portion of them, were mineral
lands in the sense of not being lands capable
of being acquired under the pre-emption
law, and sets up by way of further defense
that it was a purchaser of all the said lands
in good faith for a valuable consideration
without any knowledge or notice whatever
of any or either of the pretended fraudulent
acts and conspiracies in the bill alleged.
‘Louis H. Meyer, on June 5, 1882, answered
to the same effect, and by a stipulation the
answer of the Southern Colorado Coal &
Town Company was directed to stand as the
answer of the Colorado Coal & Iron Com-
pany. Beplications were duly filed, and the
cause was heard on a large amount of proofs,
resulting in a decree in favor of the‘ com-
plainant, declaring all the patents in the bill
mentioned, and the subsequent conveyances
of the land therein described to the defend-
ants, to be fraudulent and void, and decree-
ing that they should be held for naught, and
be delivered up to be canceled. The present
appeal is from that decree.
It was held by the circuit court that the
charge in the bill that the supposed pre-
emptors and patentees were fictitious per-
sons, having no existence, was sufficiently
proved; that, consequently, there being no
grantees, no legal title passed from the Unit-
ed States; and that, as the defendants ac-
quired no legal title by virtue of the sup-
posed conveyances to them, they cannot
claim protection as bona fide purchasers for
value without notice of the fraud. 18 Fed.
273.
It is fully established by the evidence that
there were in fact no actual ettlements and
improvements on any of the lands, as falsely
set out in the aflidavits in support of the
pre-emption claims, and in the certificates is-
sued thereon. This undoubtedly constituted
a fraud upon the United States sufficient in
equity, as against the parties pcrpetratlng
it, or those claiming under them with notice
of it, to justify the cancellation of the pat-
ents issued to them; but it is not such a
fraud as prevents the passing of the legal ti-
tle by the patents. It follows that, to a bill
in equity to cancel the patents upon these
grounds alone, the defense of a bona fide pur-
chaser for value without notice is perfect.
In reference to such a case, it was said by
this court in U. S. v. Minor, 114 U. S. 23¢‘,
243, 5 Sup. Ct. -S36: “Where the patent is
the result of nothing but fraud and perjury,
it is enough to hold that it conveys the legal
title, and it would be going quite too far to
say that it cannot be assailed by a proceed-
ing in equity, and set aside as void, if the
fraud is proved, and there are no innocent
' any person.
doctrine of equity that, where a grantor has
been induced by fraud to part with the legal
title to his property, he cannot reclaim it
from subsequent innocent purchasers for
value. Hence it becomes necessary, to sup-
port the decree of the circuit court, to main-
tain, as that court declared, that the legal
title to the lands in question did not pass
from the United States by virtue of the pat-
ents, because there were in fact no grantees.
And it was that proposition of fact which, by
the proofs introduced into the cause, the
United States undertook to establish. The
evidence on that point is found in the deposi-
tions of 1-l persons examined as witnesses.
They were called to prove, and did prove, in
the first place, in respect to the several tracts
of land in’ controversy, the facts that they
had not been settled upon, and that no im-
provements had been made upon them by
They also testified, in sub-
stance, that they were acquainted, at the
time of the transactions, with the lands. and
were acquainted with the people then living
in Las Animas county, some of them stating
that they knew every white man residing at
that time therein; that with the exception of
one person, named Martine, there ‘were no
persons in the county at the time bearing
the names specified as pro-emption claimants,
and no persons bearing the names subscribed
as witnesses to their statements; and that
they never saw or heard of persons residing
in the county having such names. This is
the extent of this description of evidence,
the weight of which is to be estimated in
connection with the fact that the county of
Las Animas, although sparsely settled, em-
braces an area extending about 150 miles
from east to west, and about -l0 miles from
north to south. In corroboration of it, testi-
mony was introduced, on behalf of the Unit-
ed States, of experts in handwriting. with a
view of establishing, by a comparison of the
documents, that they were fabricated; which.
however, was met by the opposing opinions
of other experts called on the part of the de-
fendants. This evidence we think not only
inconclusive, but entitled to no weight, not ill
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Caae No. 124] PRODUC'rlON AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
time the said several proofs of pre-emption It, or those claiming under them with notice 
and non-mineral atlidavlts were made out, of it, to Justify the cancellation of the pat-
slgned, and executed." ents issued to them; but It ls not such a 
It Is also charged In the bill that the said fraud as prevents the pa&1lng of the lepl tl-
Hunt was a stockholder in the Southern Col- tle by the patents. It follows that, to a bill 
orado Coal & Town Company, and general In equity to cancel the patents upon these 
manager of Its business, and that the in- grounds alone, the defense of a bona fide pur-
corporators of said company and the trustees chaser tor value without notice la perfect. 
thereof, Including William S. Jackson, "knew In reference to su~h a case, It was said by 
at the time the aforesaid described land was this court in U. 8. v. Minor, 114 U. 8. ~. 
conveyed to llllld company by said William 243, 5 Sup. Ot. 836: "Where the patent Is 
S. Jackson, as herelnbefore des<•rlbed, that I the result of nothing but fraud and perjury, 
the several patt>nts to said sevt>ral p.eees and I It ls enough to hold that It conveys the legal 
parcels of land had been fraudulently ob- I title, and 1t would be going quite too far to 
tained from your omtor, and knew that the say that It cannot be assailed by a proceed-
said se'l"eral supposed pre-emptors and pat- Ing in equity, and set aside as void, lt the 
.entees were myths and fictitious persons, and : fraud ls proved, and there are no innocent 
knew that the said Jackson had no right, ti· 1 holders for value." Meader v. Norton, 11 
tie, or Interest in said land, or any part ' Wall. 442, 458. It ls, Indeed, an elementary 
thereof." doctrine of" equity that, where a granter bait 
The answer of the Southern Colorado Coal been Induced by fraud to part with the legal 
It Town Company, ftled November 2, 1881, title to his property, he cannot reclaim It 
specifically denies all the allegations of the fl'om subsequent Innocent purchasers tor 
bill alleging fraud, and denies that the said value. Hence It becomes necessary, to sup-
lands, or any portion of them, were mineral I port the decree of the circuit court, to main-
lands In the sense of not being lands capable I taln, as that court declared, that the legal 
of being acquired under the pre-emption title to the lands ID question did not pass 
law, and sets up by way of further defense from the United States by virtue of the pat-
that 1t was a purchaser of all the said lands ents, because there were In fact no grantees. 
In good faith for a valuable consideration And It was that proposition of fact which, by 
without any knowledge or notice whatever the proofs Introduced Into the cause, the 
~r any or either of the pretended fraudulent United States undertook to establish. The 
·acts and conspiracies In the blll alleged. evlden<.'t' on that point Is tound in the deposl-
·Louls H. Meyer, on June 5, 1882, answered tlons of 14 persons examined as witnesses. 
to the same effect, and by a stipulation the They were called to prove, and did prove, in 
answer of the Southern Colorado Coal & the first pla~. In respect to the several tracts 
Town Company was directed to stand as the of land In' controversy, the facts that they 
answer of the Colorado Coal & Iron Com- had not been settled upon, and that no Im~ 
pany. Repllcatlons were duly filed, and the 1 provements had been made upon them by 
cause was heard on a large amount of proofs, j any person. ThPy also testified, In sub-
resulting In a decree in favor of the· com- stance, that they were acquainted, at the 
plalnant, declaring all the patents In the blll time of the tnmsa<'tlons, with the lands, and 
mentioned, and the subsequent conveyances were acquainted with the people then llvlng 
ot the land therein described to the defend- In Las Animas county, some of them stating 
ants, to be fraudulent and void, and decree- that they knew every white man residing at 
Ing that they should be held for naught, and that time therein; that with the exception of 
be dellvered up to be canceled. The present one person, named Martine, there ·were no 
appeal ls from that decree. persons In the county at the time bearing 
It was held by the circuit court that the the names specified as pre-emption claimants, 
t'harge in the bill that the supvosed pre- and no pers0ns bearing the names subscribed 
emptors and patentees were ftctltlClus per- as wltot>sst>s to their statements; and that 
sons, having no existence, was sumelt>ntly tht>y never saw or heard of persons residing 
proved; that, eo'1sequently, there beleg no In the county having such names. This ls 
grantees, no legal title passed from the Unit· the extent of this descrlp~lon of evidence, 
ed States; and that, as the defendants ac- the weight of which ls to be estimated ID 
quired no legal title by virtue of the sup- conne<>tton with the fact that the county of 
posed conveyances to them, they cannot Las Anlmaa, although sparsely settled, em-
clalm protection as bona fide purchasers for braces an area extending about l:iO mil~ 
value without notice of the fraud. 18 Fed. from east to west, and about 40 miles from 
273. north to south. In corroboration of It, tt>stl-
It Is fully established by the evidence that mony was Introduced, on behalf of the Unit-
there were In fact no actual settlements and ed States, of experts in handwriting. with a 
Improvements on any of the lands, as falsely view of establishing, by a comparison of th1• 
set out In the amdavlts in support of the documents, that they were fabricated; which. 
pre-emption claims, and In the certificates Is- however, was met by the opposing opinions 
sued thereon. This undoubtedly constituted I of other experts called on the part of the de-
n fraud upon the United States sumclent In fendants. This evidence we think not only 
equity, as aimlnst tile parties perpetrating Inconclusive, but entitled to no weight, not at 
R:"Jt 
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all supporting the inference sought to be
drawn, that the same handwriting is trace-
able in the signatures of the various names.
The conclusion, if warranted at all, must de-
pend upon the statements of the other wit-
nesses, the substance of whose testimony
has already been given, and such presump-
tions of fact or law as legitimately arise
thereon. _
It is charged in the bill that these title
papers were falsely and fraudulently made
by the register and receiver, combining with
Hunt and others unknown in a conspiracy
for that purpose; but there is no direct
proof of such a conspiracy. It is sought to
be inferred from the fact that the pre-emp-
tion statements were falsely nlade, and
from the evidence tending to show that the
persons named were fictitious. There is no
proof to connect the register and receiver
with such a conspiracy, except the fact that
the affidavits purport to have been made be-
fore them, and were certified to by them.
Hunt’s connection with it rests upon the
fact that he procured deeds from the sup-
posed patentees, conveying the lands to
Jackson in pursuance of a bargain with him.
It may well be admitted that if there were
no actual persons who made applications as
pre-emption settlers, none who made and
signed the necessary declarations and aili-
davits, and no persons as witnesses who at-
tested the same, the register and receiver
must have known the fact; but the fact of
the conspiracy depends upon prior proof that
the alleged transactions were mere fictions.
The proof necessary to justify that conclu- -
sion is supposed to be found in the facts
testifled to by the witnesses, a summary of
which has been given.
It certainly does not follow that no such
persons in fact existed, as a necessary con-
clusion from the testimony of these witness-
es that they knew no such persons as named
in these papers. The utmost that can be
said, as was said by the learned judge of the
circuit court in delivering judgment in the
case, is that “if none of them were ever in
the county, and no improvements were ever
made upon the land, then the proofs upon
which the patents issued were false, and
the inference that the papers were manu-
factured without the presence of any per-
sons bearing or assuming the names of the
patentees is not more unreasonable than
would be the inference that til actual per-
sons committed perjury themselves, and sub-
orned as many others to pcrjure themselves
as wltneses. in order to acquire the title.”
This, it is argued, establishes at least that
it is more probable that the grantees were
iictitious than that they were real persons,
and that, in view of the difliculty, if not the
impossibility, of proving the negative propo-
sition that no such persons existed, and of
the fact that the defendants connect their
title and right with a transaction which
must have occurred with these grantees if
they had an actual existence, the burden of
proof is shifted from the United States to
the defendants, and that, as the latter in-
troduced no evidence tending to show the
fact as they claimed it to be, the case of the
complainants must be considered as estab-
lished by a preponderance of proof.
‘We have had recent occasion to consider
the question of the character and degree of
proof necessary in such cases to invalidate
titles held by purchasers in good faith for
value, and without notice, under patents
issued by the United States. In Maxwell
Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 379, 7 Sup.
Ct. 1015, it is said: “The deliberate action
of the tribunals to which the law commits
the determination of all preliminary ques-
tions, and the control of the. processes by
which this evidence of title is issued to the
grantee, demands that to annul such an in-
strument, and destroy the title claimed un-
der it, the facts on which this action is
asked for must be clearly established by
evidence entirely satisfactory to the court,
and that the case itself must be entirely
within the class of causes for which such
an instrument may be avoided. ‘ ‘ ‘ \Ve
take the general doctrine to be that when,
in a court of equity, it is proposed to set
aside, to annul, or to correct a written in-
strument for fraud or mistake in the exe-
cution of the instrument itself, the testi-
mony on which this is done must he clear,
unequivocal, and convincing, and that it
cannot be done upon a bare preponderance
of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt.
If the proposition, as thus laid down in the
cases cited, is sound in regard to the or-
dinary contracts of private individuals, how
much more should it be observed where the
attempt is to annul the grants, the patents,
and other solemn evidences of title emanat-
ing from the government of the United
States under its ofilcial seal. In this class
of cases, the respect due to a patent, the
presumptions that all the preceding steps
required by the law had been observed be-
fore its issue, the immense importance and
necessity of the stability of titles dependent
upon these official instruments, demand that
the effort to set them aside, to annul them,
or to correct mistakes in them should only
be successful when the allegations on which
this is attempted are clearly stated, and
fully sustained by proof. It is not to be ad-
mitted that the titles by which so much
property in this country and so many rights
are held, purporting to emanate from the
authoritative action of the oificers of the
government, and, as in this case, under the
seal and signature of the president of the
United States himself, shall be dependent
upon the hazard of successful resistance to
the whims and caprices of every person
who chooses to attack them in a court of
justice; but it should be well understood
that only that class of evidence which com-
mands respect, and that amount of it which
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BURDEN OF PHOOF. (Case· No. 124 
~ll supporting the Inference 80\tght to be 
drawn, that the 1111.me handwriting 18 trace-
able in the signatures of the various names. 
The conclusion, 1f warranted at all, must de-
pend upon the statements of the other wlt• 
nesaea, the substance of whose testimony 
has already been given, and such presump-
tions of fact or law as legltlmately arise 
thereon. 
It 18 chareed In the bill that these title 
papers were falsely and fraudufontly made 
by the register and receh-er, combining wlth 
Hunt and others unknown In a conspiracy 
tor that purpose; but there ls no direct 
proof ot such a conspiracy. It ls sought to 
be Interred from the fact that the pre-emp-
tion statements were falsely made, and 
from the evhlence tending to show that the 
persons named were fl.ctltlous. There ls no 
proof to connect the register and receiver 
with such a conspiracy, except the fact that 
the affidavits purport to have been made be-
fore them, and were certified to by them. 
Hunt's connection with It rests upon the 
fact that be procured deeds from the sup-
posed patentees, conveying the lauds to 
Jackson In pursuance of a bargain with him. 
It may well be admitted that It there were 
no actual PN'flODS who made applications as 
pre-emption settlers, none who made and 
signed the ne<>eseary dedarations and atll-
da vits, nod no persons as witnesses who at-
tested the same, the register and receiver 
must hnve known the fact; but the fact of 
the conspiracy depends upon prior pt'Oof that 
the alleged trall88ctfone were mere fictions. 
The proof necessary to justify that conclu- · 
slon Is supposed to be found In the facts 
testlfled to by the witnesses, a summary ot 
which bas been given. 
It certainly does not follow that no such 
persona In fact existed, as a necessary con-
clusion from the testimony of these witness-
es that they knew no such persons as named 
In these papers. The utmost that can be 
said, as was said by the learned judge of the 
circuit court In delivering judgment In the 
case, la that "If none ot them were ever in 
the county, and no Improvements were eyer 
made upon the lantl, then the proofs upon 
which the patents Issued were false, and 
the inference that the papers were manu-
factured without the presence of any per-
aons bearing or assuming the names of the 
patentees ls not more unreasonable than 
would be the Inference that 61 actual per-
sons committed perjury themselves, and sub-
orned as many others to perjure themselves 
ae witnesses, in order to acquire the title." 
This, lt la argued, establishes at least that 
It ls more probable that the grantees were 
llctltloue than that they were real persons, 
and that, In view of the dlMculty, lf not the 
Impossibility, of proving the negative propo-
sition that no such persons existed, and of 
the fact that the defendants connect their 
title and rlitbt with a transaction which 
must have occurred with these gmntees If 
they had an actual existence, the burden ot 
proof ls shifted from the United States to 
the defendants, and that, as the latter In-
troduced no evidence tending to show the 
fact as they claimed It to be, the case ot the 
complainants must be considered as estab-
llehed by a preponderance of proof. 
· We have bad recent occasion to consider 
the question of the character and degree of 
proof nece81181'y In such cases to Invalidate 
titles held by purchasers In good faith tot 
value, and without notice, under patents 
lseued by the United States. In Maxwell 
Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 32:>, 379, 7 Sup. 
Ct. 1015, It ls said: "The deliberate action 
of the tribunals to which the law commits 
the determination ot all preliminary ques-
tions, and the control of the processes by 
which this evidence of title ls lsaued to the 
grantee, demands that to annul such an In· 
strument, and destroy the title claimed un-
der it, the tacts on which this action ls 
asked for must be clearly established by 
evidence entirely satisfactory to tbe court, 
and that the case Itself must be entirely 
wlthln the cl888 ot causes for which such 
an instrument may be avoided. • • • We 
take the general doctrine to be that when, 
in a court of equity, It la proposed to set 
aside, to annul, or to correct a written In-
strument for fraud or mistake In the exe-
cution of the Instrument Itself, the testi-
mony on which this Is done must be clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing, and that It 
cannot be done upon a bare preponderance 
of evidence wblcb leaves the lBBue In doubt. 
It the proposltlon, as thus laid down In the 
cases cited, ts sound In regard to the or-
dinary contracts of private Individuals, how 
much more should lt be observed where the 
attempt ls to annul the grants, the patents, 
and other solemn evidences of title emanat· 
Ing from the government of the United 
States under Its oftfclnl seal. In this clasa 
of cases, the respect due to a patent, the 
presumptions that all the preceding steps 
required by the Jaw had been observed be-
fore its lBSue, the immense Importance and 
necessity of the stablllty of tltlel!I llepl'ndent 
upon the'*' otftclal ln11t rnments, demand that 
the eJrort to set them aside, to annul them, 
or to correct mistakes In them should only 
be successful when the allegations on which 
this ls attempted are clearly statect, and 
fully sustained by proof. It ls not to be ad-
mitted that the titles by which so much 
property in this country and so many rights 
are held, purporting to emanate from the 
~uthorltatlve action of the ofDcers of the 
government, and, as In this <'ase, under the 
seal and signature of the president of the 
United States himself, shall be dependent 
upon the hazard of successful resistance to 
the whims and caprices of every person 
who chooses to attack them In a court ot 
justice; but it should be well understood 
that only that class of evidence which com· 
mands respect, and that amount of It which 
~7 
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produces conviction, shall make such an at-
tempt successful."
It thus appears that the title of the de-
fendants rests upon the strongest presump-
tions of fact, which, although they may be
rebutted, nevertheless can be overthrown
only by full proofs to the contrary, clear,
convincing, and unambiguous. The burden
of producing these proofs, and establishing
the conclusion to which they are directed,
rests upon the government. Neither is it
relieved of this obligation by the negative
nature of the proposition it is bound to es-
tablish. It is, indeed, sometimes said that
a negative is incapable of proof, but this is
not a maxim of the law. In the language
of an eminent text writer: “When the
negative ceases to be a simple one,-when it
is qualified by time, place, or circumstance,
—much of this objection is removed; and
proof of a negative may very reasonably be
required when the qualifying circumstances
are the direct matter in issue, or the atiirma-
tive is either probable in itself, or supported
by a presumption, or peculiar means of
proof are in the hands of the party assert-
ing the negative.” Best, Ev. (Am. Ed.) 1883,
270. So, also, Id. § 273: “When a pre-
sumption is in favor of the party who as-
serts the negative, it only affords an addi-
tional reason for casting the burden of proof
on his adversary; it is when a presumption
is in favor of the party who asserts the
affirmative that its effect becomes visible,
as the opposite side is then bound to prove
his negative.” Also Id. § 276: “This appears
from the cae of Doe v. Whitehead, 8 Adol.
& E. 571, which was an ejectnient by a land-
lord against a tenant on an alleged forfei-
ture by breach of a covenant in his lease to
insure against fire in some ofllce in or near
London, in which it was contended that it lay
on the defendant to show that he had in-
sured, that being a fact within his peculiar
knowledge. The argument ab inconvenienti
was strongly urged, viz.,‘ that the plaintiff
could not bring persons from every insur-
ance oflice in or near London to show that
no such insurance had been effected by the
defendant, and Rex v. Turner, 5 Maule & S.
206, Apothecaries’ C0. v. Bentley, Ryan &
M. 159, and some other cases of that class,
were cited. But Lord Denman, (T. J., in de-
livering judgment, said: ‘I do not dispute
the cases on the game laws which have been
cited; but there the defendant is in the
first instance shown to have done an act
which was unlawful unless he was qualified,
and then the proof of qualification is thrown
upon the defendant. Here the plaintiff re-
lies on some thing done or permitted by the
lessee, and takes upon himself the burden
of proving that fact. The proof may be dif-
ficult where the matter is peculiarly within
the defendant's knowledge, but that does
not vary the rule of law.’ And in the same
case Littledale, J., said: ‘In the cases cited
as to game, the defendant had to bring him-
self within the protection of the statutes;
and a like observation applies to Apothe-
carles’ Co. v. Bentley. But here, where a
landlord brings an action to defeat the es-
tate granted to the lessee, the onus of proof
ought to lie on the plaintifl.’ And this rul-
ing has been upheld by subsequent cases.
Toleman v. Portbury, L. R. 5 Q. B. &;
Wedgwood v. Hart, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 288; Price
v. Worwood. 4 Hurl. & N. 512."
Mr. Greenleaf states the rule in equiva-
lent terms. He says (1 Greenl. Ev. § 78):
“To this general rule, that the burden of
proof is on the party holding the aflirmative,
there are some exceptions, in which the
proposition, though negative in its terms,
must be proved by the party who states it.
One class of these exceptions will be found
to include those cases in which the plaintiff
grounds his right of action upon a. negative
allegation, and where, of course, this nega-
tive is an essential element in his. case."
And in section 80: “So, where the negative
allegation involves a charge of criminal neg-
lect of duty, whether oflicial or otherwise,
or fraud, or the wrongful violation of actual
lawful possession of property, the party
making the allegation must prove it; for in
these cases the presumption of law, which
is always in favor of innocence and quiet
possession, is in favor of the party charged."
In the present case the facts shown are,
in our opinion, not sufilcient to overcome
the presumption of innocence on the part of
the register and receiver of the laud-oflice.
It is quite consistent with these facts that
real persons, whether under their own or
under assumed names, did actually appear
before them and make pre-emption claims.
There is no testimony whatever tending to
establish directly any complicity on their
part with the fraud which may have been
practiced upon them, and not through them.
It is certain that there were real persons
acting in the matter. The purchase price
due on the entry of the lands was in fact
paid. There is no proof of any actual fab-
rication of the papers, the genuineness of
which is not negatived by any internal evi-
dence. The allegations in the bill that they
were in fact manufactured by the register
and receiver and Hunt, or by any one with
their connivance, are entirely unsupported
by direct evidence.
It is alleged in the bill. also, that “by the
rules and regulations which then and since
have governed it in the issue of patents for _
land located with agricultural college scrip.
no patent was issued by your orator except
on presentation at its general land-otflce by
the person making such location, his agent
or his assign. of the duplicate certificate as
aforesaid delivered to the locator for the land
for which a patent is claimed." and “that
after the forwarding by the said Stanton and
Cook of said supposed proofs of pre-emption.
said agricultural college scrip. said money.
said non-mineral affidavit, and said dupli-
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Case No. 121] PRODUCTION AND EFPECT OJI' EVIDENCE. 
produoea conviction. shall make such an at- self within the protection ot the statutes; 
tempt euccesstul." and a like obeervatlon applies to .A.Pothe-
It thus appears that the title ot the de- caries' Co. v. Bentley. But here, where a 
fendante rests upon the strongest presump- landlord brings an action to defeat the ee-
tlons ot fact, which, although they may be tate granted to the lessee, the onua of proof 
rebutted, nevertheless can be overthrown ought to Ue on the plaintiff.' And tb1B rul-
only by full proofs to the contrary, clear, Ing has been upheld by subsequent caaee. 
convincing, and unambiguous. The burden Tolewan v. Portbury, L. R. 5 Q. B. 288; 
ot producing these proofs, and establishing Wedgwood v. Hart, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 288; Price 
the conclusion to which they are directed, v. Worwood, 4 Hurl. & N. 512." 
rests upon the government. Neither 18 It Mr. Greenleaf states the rule In P.Qulva-
relleved of this obligation by the nP.gatlve lent terms. He says (1 Greenl. Ev. I 78): 
nature of the proposition It ts bound to es- "To this general rule, that the burden of 
tabllsh. It Is, Indeed, sometimes said that proof Is on the party holding tlle aftlrmatlve, 
a negative Is Incapable of proof, but this Is there are some exceptlone, In which the 
not a maxim of the law. In the language proposition, though negative In Its terms, 
of an eminent text writer: "When the must be proved by the party who states It. 
negative ceases to be a simple one,-when It One class of these e:r:ceptlons will be found 
Is qualified by time, place, or clrcumfltance, I to Include those <'ases In which the plaintiff 
-much of this objection Is removed; and grounds hie right of action upon a negative 
proof of a negath·e may very reasonably be allegation, and where, of course, this nega-
requtred when the quallfylng ctrcuru11tances tlve Is an essential element In his. case." 
are the direct matter In 188ue, or the atfinna- And In section 80: "So, where the negative 
tlve Is either probable In Itself, or eu11ported allegation lnl"olves a charge of criminal neg-
by a presumption, or peculiar means of lect of duty, whether ottlclal or otherwise, 
proof are In the hands of the party IUISf'!rt- or fraud, or the wrongful violation ot actual 
Ing the negative." Best, Ev. (Am. Ed.) 1883, lawful possession of property, the party 
I 270. So, also, Id. I 273: "When a pre- making the allegation must prove It; tor In 
sumptlon ts In favor ot the party who as- these cases the presumption of law, which 
serts the negative, It only affords an addl- ls always ln favor of innocence and Quiet 
tlonal reason tor casting the burden of proof possession, Is In favor of the party charged." 
on his adversary; lt ts when a presum11tlon In the present case the facts shown are, 
Is In favor of the party who asserts the ln our opinion, not sutllcient to overcome 
amrmative that its effect becomes visible, the presumption of Innocence on the part of 
as the opposite side le then bound to prove the register and receiver ot the land-oftlce. 
his negative." Also Id. I 276: "This appears It ls Quite consistent with these facts that 
from the case of Doe v. Whitehead, 8 Adol. real persone, whether under their own or 
& E. 571, which was an ejectment by a land- under a88uined names, did actually appear 
lord agalwit a tenant on an alleged torfei- before them and make pre-emptlon claims. 
ture by breach of a covenant In his lease to There Is no testimony whatever tending to 
Insure against 11.re In some otllce ln or near establish directly any complicity on their 
London, ln which It was contended that it lay part with the fraud which may have been 
on the defendant to show that he had In· practiced upon them, and not through them. 
sured, that belnir a tact within his peculiar It Is certain that there were real persons 
knowledge. The argument ab lnconvenientl acting In the matter. The purchase price 
was strongly urged, viz.,_ that the plalntlff I due on the entry of the lands was In fact 
could not bring persons from every Insur- paid. There ls no proof of any actual fab-
ance oftlce In or near London to show that rlcatlon of the papers, the genuineness ot 
no such Insurance had been effected by the which Is not negatll"ed by any internal evl-
defendant, and Rex v. Turner, o Maule & S. dence. The allegations In the bill that they 
200, Apothecaries' Co. v. Bentley, Ryan & were In tact manufactured by the register 
M. 159, and some other cases of that cla88, and receiver and Hunt, or by any one with 
were cited. But Lord Denman, C. J., lo de- their connivance, are entirely unsupported 
livering judgment, said: 'I do not dispute by direct evidence. 
the.cases on the game laws which have been It le allea:ed In the bill, also, that "by the 
cited; but there the defendant ls In the rules and regulations which then and since 
first instance shown to have done an act have g°'·erned it In the Issue of patents for 
which was unlawful unless he was qualified, land located with agricultural college scrip, 
and then the proof ot quallfi<'atlon Is thrown no patent was Issued by your orator except 
upon the deft>ndant. Here the plaintiff re- on presentation at Its geneml land-otfice by 
lies on some thing done or permlttt>d by the the person making such location, his agent 
lessee, and takes upon himself the lnml<>n or hh1 assin, of the duplicate certificate BR 
of proving that fact. The p,root may be dlf- aforesaid delivered to the IO<'ator for the land 
flcult where the matter Is peculiarly within for which a patent ts claimed," and "that 
the defendant's knowledge, but that does after the forwarding by the said Stanton and 
not vary the rule of law.' And In the same Cook of said "Supposed proofs of pre-emption. 
case Llttledale, J., said: 'In the cases cited said agricultural college scrip, said money. 
as to game, the deft-mlant had to brln1: him- said non-mineral amdavlt, and said dupll· 
358 
BURDEN OF PROOF.
[Case No. 124
cate certificate, in each of the said pretended
pre-cmption claims as aforesaid mentioned,
to your orator’s general land-ofiice at Wash-
ington, the said Alexander C. Hunt, pretend-
ing to act as agent of each of said supposed
pre-emptors, presented to the oflicers of the
geneml land-oflice such other duplicate certifi-
cates of location, and requested said oificers
to cause a patent for each of the said several
pieces of land to issue from your orator to the
said supposed persons in each case purport-
ing to claim and apply for the same.” And
it is added that the oflicers of the general
land-oflilce, confiding in the honesty of the
register and receiver, and believing the state-
ments contained in the proofs to be true, did
issue its patents therefor. ‘The allegation is
that the patents were issued to Hunt. In
point of fact, it appears from the evidence
that a number of patents were delivered to
Britton & Gray, W. P. Dunwoody, and W. W.
Cowling, respectively, through whom the du-
plicate certificates were presented to the gen-
eral land-oflice for that purpose. There is no
allegation that these were not real persons,
nor are any charges made against them as
participants in the fraud. They professed to
represent the parties entitled to the patents;
they must have known for whom in fact they
were acting. There is nothing to show that
they were not accessible as witnesses. From
the correspondence in the record it appears
that Britton & Gray were transacting busi-
ness in the city of Washington, and that Cow-
ling was also a resident of the District of
Columbia. None of these parties were called
by the government as witnesses. Whatever
may be said as an excuse for the failure to
call Hunt and Stanton and Cook, on the
ground that they are charged with being the
actual conspirators in the fraud, no reason
can be assigned for not calling Britton 8.:
Gray, Dunwoody, and Cowling.
Neither do we think the reason assigned as
an excuse, on the part of the government, for
not calling the register and receiver as wit-
nesses, is valid or satisfactory. One of them,
it was said at the bar, had died. But the oth- -
er might and ought to have been examined.
He was one of its own oflicers, through whom
the government had received the price of the
lands sold, and which it has ever since re-
tained. If his oflicial conduct was impugned,
nevertheless his misconduct. if proved, was
not imputable to the defendants, and they
should not be prejudiced by the odium of an
accusation, against him. The United States
had trusted him, and, inspired by that con-
fidence, the defendants also had relied upon
his otiicial acts. In this faith they had paid
full value for what they had reason to be-
lieve was a perfect title. They were not ac-
cused of any complicity with, nor had they
any knowledge oi’, the fraud charged. In the
absence of direct proof of his guilt, the gov-
ernment could not properly treat the defend-
ants as his confederates, nor deprive them of
any defense which as a witness he might be
able to make for himself. The United States
had no higher interest at stake than to estab-
lish the truth and justice of the transaction.
It was due from it to these parties, whose
estate this suit was instituted to defeat, to
produce and examine as witnesses those who
must have had the best knowledge of the
facts, so as not to force the defendants to ex-
planations which, b_v the very theory of their
innocence and ignorance, they were incapable
of making. To raise a suspicion, however
strong, of the fraud and wrong-doing of its
own oiiicers is not enough to justify the gov-
ernment in casting upon the defendants the
burden of establishing their title.
In addition warranty deeds, made to Jack-
son as trustee, were put in evidence by the
government, reciting a consideration in each
case, a'mounting in the aggregate to $52,200,
to the payment of which Jackson also testi-
ties. Each of these deeds was executed, ac-
knowledged, and recorded in conformity with
law. They were regular on their face, the
acknowledgments purporting to have been
taken by public oificers before whom, it is
recited, the grantors severally appeared and
acknowledged their execution. These offi-
cers, if called and examined as witnesses,
would probably have thrown some light up-
on the transaction, and should have been ex-
amined upon the points in issue. It is to be
presumed that they could have testifled
whether any persons in fact appeared before
them at the times and places named in their
certificates, and whether, if so. they were
identified as being the persons named as
grantors in the deeds. None of them were in
fact called on the part of the United States,
and no reason is assigned for not having
done so. It thus appears that the govern-
ment did not make all the proof of which the
nature of the case was susceptible, and which
was apparently within its reach.
On the other hand, the defendants, by their
evidence, have fully established all the steps
by which they became connected with the
transaction. The lands were bought and paid
for at their full value by William S. Jack-
son, acting for himself and associates, who
united together for the purpose of making
purchases of land in that region, upon Jack-
son's belief and assurance of its ultimate
value, expecting it to increase by the building
of railroads and general growth of the coun-
try. He arranged with Hunt, who was en-
gaged in dealing in lands, and had been gov-
ernor of the territory, to pay for titles to such
lands as he might accept. Hunt submitted
to him descriptions of lands which he said
he could control, from which Jackson made
selections. For these Hunt sent to Jackson
deeds duly executed, attested, and acknowl-
edged, accompanied by receiver’s certificates
in regular form, showing that the party nam-
ed as grantor was entitled to a patent. These
he was advised by counsel to accept, and did
accept in good faith, as being equivalent to
patents. In many instances the patents were
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BURDEN OF PROOF. (Cue No. IU 
eat.e cert:Ulcate, in each of the said pretended 
pre-emption clalms as aforesaid mentioned, 
to your orator's general land-oftlce at Wash-
ington, the said Alexander C. Hunt, pretend-
ing to act as agent of each of said supposed 
pre-emptora, presented to the offtcel'll of the 
general land-offtce such other duplicate certlft-
cates of location, and requested said offtcers 
to cause a patent for each of the said several 
pieces of land to l&Bue f1-om your orator to the 
llBid suppoaed pel'llODs in each case purport-
ing to claim and apply for the same." And 
It ls added that the offtc.1!1'8 of the general 
land-offtce, confiding in the honesty of the 
register and receiver, and believing the state-
rut-nts contained in the proofs to be true, dld 
lssue Its patents therefor. The allegation is 
that the patents were IBSued to Hunt. In 
point of fact, It appears from the evidence 
that a number of patents were delivered to 
Britton & Gray, W. P. Dunwoody, and W. W. 
Cowling, respectively, through whom the du-
plicate certificates were presented to the gen-
eral land-offtce for that purpose. There is no 
allegation that these were not real per11ons, 
nor are llJl3' charges made againat them as 
participants In the fraud. They professed to 
represent the parties entitled to the patents; 
they must have known for whom in fact they 
were acting. There ls nothing to show that 
the)' were not accessible as witnesses. From 
the correspondence In the record it appeara 
that Britton & Gray were transacting busl-
net111 In the city of Washington, and that Cow-
ling was also a resident of the District of 
Columbia. None of these parties were called 
by the government as witnesses. Whatever 
may be said 88 an excuse for the failure to 
call Hunt and Stanton and Cook, on the 
ground that they are charged with being the 
actual conspirators in the fraud, no reason 
can be assigned for not calling Britton & 
Gray, Dunwoody, and Cowllug. 
Neither do we think the reason assigned as 
an excuse, on the part of the government, for 
not calling the register and receiver as wit-
nesses, ls valid or satisfactory. One of them, 
lt waa said at the bar, had died. But the otb- · 
er might and ought to have been examined. 
He was one of its own omcen, through whom 
the government bad received the price of the 
lands sold, and which 1t has ever since re-
tained. If his offtclal conduct was Impugned, 
nevertheless his ml!1comluct, It proved, was 
not Imputable to the defendants, and they 
t1bould not be prejudiced by the odium of an 
accusation, against him. The United States 
had trusted him, and, Inspired by that con-
fidence, the defendants also had relied upon 
bis offtclal acts. In this faith they had paid 
full value for what they bad reason to be-
lieve was a perfect title. They were not ac-
(•used of any complicity wltll, nor had they 
any knowledge of, the fraud charged. ID the 
abaence of direct proof of hie guilt, the gov-
ernment could not properly treat the defend-
ants as his confederates, nor deprive them of 
any defense which as a witness be might be 
able to malce for himself. The Uulted States 
had no higher interest at stake than to estab-
lish the truth and Justice of the transaction. 
It was due from It to these parties, whose 
estate thlll Bult was Instituted t.o defeat, to 
produce and examine ns witnesses those who 
must have bad the best knowledge of the 
facts, so as not to force the defendants to ex-
planations which, by the very theory ot thelr 
Innocence and Ignorance, they were Incapable 
of making. To raise a SllllPlclon, however 
strong, of the fraud and wrong-doing of Its 
own offtcers ls not enough to justify the gov-
ernment In casting upon the defendants the 
burden of establlsbing their title. 
In addition warranty deeds, made to Jack-
son as trustee, were put tn evidence by the 
government, reciting a consideration In each 
case, amounting lo the aggregat.e to '52,200, 
to the payment of which Jackson also testi-
fies. Each of these deeds was executed, ac-
knowledged, and recorded in conformity with 
law. They were regular on thelr face, the 
acknowledgments purporting to have been 
taken by public offtcers before whom, It ls 
recited, the grantors severally appeared and 
acknowledged their execution. 'l'hese offt. 
cers, If called and examined as witnesses, 
would probably have tbrowu some light up-
on the transaction, and should have been ex-
amined upon the points in Issue. It ls to be 
presumed that they could have testlfted 
whether any persons in fact appeared before 
them at the times and places named In their 
certificates, and whether, If so, they were 
identified as being the persons named as 
grantors in the deeds. None of them were In 
fact called on the part of the United States, 
and no reason ls assigned for not having 
done so. It thus appears that the govem-
ment did not make all the proof of which the 
nature of the case was susceptible, and which 
was apparently within Its reach. 
On the other hand, the defendants, by their 
evidence, have fully established all the steps 
by which they became connected with the 
transaction. The lands were bought and paid 
for at their full value by Wllllam S. Jack· 
son, acting for himself and a880clates, who 
united together for the purpose of making 
purchases of land in that region, upon Jack-
son's belief and assurance of Its ultimate 
value. expecting It to Increase by the building 
of railroads and general growth of the coun-
try. lie arranged with Hunt, who was en-
gaged In dealing In lands, · and bad been gov-
ernor of the territory, to pay for titles to such 
lands as he might accept. Hunt submitted 
to him descriptions of lands which he said 
be could control, from which Jackson made 
selections. For these Hunt sent to Jackson 
deeds duly executed, attested, and acknowl-
edged, accompanied by receiver's certificates 
ID regular form, showing that the party nam-
ed as grantor was entltled to a patent. These 
be wa11 advised by coumiel to accept, and did 
accept In good faith, 88 being equivalent to 
patents. In many instances the patents were 
!U'..!I. 
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issued before the deeds were executed. Jack-
son had no connection whatever with making
the proofs of pre-emption, and had no knowl-
edge in reference thereto, except such as was
disclosed by the deeds and certificates, in re-
liance upon which, and without visiting the
lands, or having them examined, he bought.
The deeds to Jackson were duly acknowledg-
ed before competent ofiicers by persons cer-
tified to be the grantors therein named. The
transactions were several, as regards the vari-
ous tracts of land, and successive, during
more than two years, the deeds being deliver-
ed within a period extending from May 2,
1873, to May 21, 1875. The circumstance that
many of the acknowledgments of the deeds
were taken in Arapahoe county before a no-
tary in Hunt's oflice, while the grantors pur-
ported to be residents of Las Animus county,
was not calculated to raise any suspicion of
fraud, as Jackson supposed that Hunt was
dealing with the pre-emptors, and was pro-
curing their deeds to be executed for delivery
to him, nnd it was natural to expect that this
would be done at Hunt's own oflice. In fact,
14 of the acknowledgments were taken be-
fore other ofilcers, and some of them in Las
Animus county. That Jackson and his as-
signs, the coal and town company, and its
successor, the coal and iron company, in good
faith believed that they had acquired a valid
title to these lands, is manifest from their
subsequent dealing with them. They not on-
ly paid full value for the lands in the con-
dition in which they were, but they made
large investments thereon in the way of im-
provements. At the time of the organization
of the consolidated company there were up-
on the premises described in the bill coke-
ovens, and machinery in connection there-
with, buildings constituting the town of El
Moro, and coal-mine improvements, consist-
ing of entries, rooms, gangway, tracks,
chutes, repair-shops, houses, and store build-
ings. Coal was then, between 6 and 7 years
after Jackson's purchase, being mined upon
one quarter section, and the town of El Moro
covered 30 or 40 acres, comprising 20 to 25
buildings, erected by various individuals, to
whom the company had sold lots, in accord-
ance with a regular survey and map of the
town-site. The entire value of the mine and
coke improvements was estimated to be about
$2-.'>(I,O0(). The property was used by the com-
pany in connection with works which they
had established at South Pueblo for the manu-
facture of iron and steel. on which there had
been an expenditure of from one to two mil-
lions of dollars, the coal and coke necessary
for carrying on which was obtained from the
coal mines on part of the premises in dis-
pute. As against interests of this magnitude
and value vested upon a clnim of title, the
good faith of which on the part of the defend-
ants is absolutely unimpeached, the proof of
a fraud which renders their title absolutely
void should be stronger than the legal pre-
sumptions on which it may rightfully rest.
It is urged in argument by the solicitor gen-
eral that this case cannot be distinguished
from that of Moifat v. U. S., 112 U. S. 2-i, 5
Sup. Ct. 10. The two cases are undoubtedly
similar in their general aspects, but, never-
theless, differ in some particulars most ma-
terial to the decision. It is stated in the re-
port of the case cited that “the testimony
taken fully established the truth of the al-
legations and charges, except as to the knowl-
edge by Moffat and Carr of the alleged
frauds.” The charges proven, or to be taken
as proven, therefore, as set forth in the bill,
were that the title papers in the case were
manufactured by a clerk in the oflice of the
receiver, and that the receiver was also the
owner of the agricultural college scrip used
to pay for the lands located, and that, for the
purpose of locating the land with it in the
name of Quinlan, the register and receiver
hnd inserted in a blank indorsement his fic-
titious name and residence, and in that name
had located the scrip on the land, there being
no such person, nor any settlement and im-
provement on the land; and that the dupli-
cate certificate on which the patent issued
was presented to the general land-oflice by
the defendant himself, who was thus brought
into direct connection with the ofiicers who
had committed the fraud, and with the trans-
action before the issue of the patent. In that
case Moffat did not offer his deed in evidence,
was not examined as a witness, and attempt-
ed no proof either of his own innocence, or
of the payment of value, but stood without
explanation as to who his immediate grantors
were, or how he came in contact with them.
The receiver was examined as a witness, but
wholly failed to meet the charges alleged
against him. There was further proof tend-
ing to show that the acknowledgments of the
deeds to Moffat had been taken without iden-
tiiication of the grantors from whom Moffat
received hi deeds directly, and in respect to
whom he must have had some knowledge.
These circumstances. in our opinion, clearly
distinguish that case from the present one.
There is, however, another ground on
which it is contended by the government
that the patents described in the bill are
void. It is alleged that the lands in contro-
versy were not subject to settlement and
sale under the pre-emption laws, being
“known mines” within the description .of
those laws. The act of September 4, 18-i1
7» Stat. 455, c. 16, 5 10), provided that no pre-
emption entry should be made on “lands on
which are situated any known salines or
mines.” By the act of July‘ 1, 1864 (13 Stat.
343, c. 205, § 1), it is enacted “that Where
any tracts embracing coal-beds or coal-fields
constituting portions of the public domain,
and which as ‘mines’ are excluded from the
pro-emption act of 18-11, and which under
past legislation are not liable to ordinary
private entry. it shall and may be lawful
for the president to cause such tracts, in
suitable legal subdivisions, to bc offcrcd at
360
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Issued before the deeds were executed. Jack-
son had no connection whatever with making 
the proofs of pre-emption, and bad no knowl-
edge In reference thereto, except such a11 was 
disclosed by the deeds and certificates, In re-
liance upon whlcli, and without visiting the 
landB, or having them examined, he bought. 
The deeds to Jackson were duly acknowledg-
ed before competent omcera by pel'llOns cer--
tltied to be the grantors therein named. The 
traDBactlons were several, u regardB the vari-
ous tracts of land, and successive, during 
more than two years, the deed.a being deliver-
E'd within a period extending trom May 2, 
1873, to May 21, 1875. The circumstance that 
many of the acknowledgments of the deeds 
were taken In Arapahoe county before a no-
tary In Hunt's omce, while the grantors pur· 
ported to be. residents of Laa Animas county, 
was not calculated to raise any suspklon of 
fraud, as Jackson supposed that Hunt was 
dealing with the pre-emptors, and wa11 pro-
curing their deeds to be executed for delivery 
to him, and it was natural to expect that this 
would be done at Hunt's own omce. In fact, 
14 of the acknowledgments were taken be-
fore other otncers, and some of them In Las 
Animas county. That Jackson and his u-
slgns, the <.'Onl and town company, and Its 
successor, the coal and Iron company, In good 
faith believed that they had acquired a valid 
title to these IandB, Is manifest from their 
subsequent dealing with them. They not on-
ly paid full value for the lands In the con· 
dltlon In which they were, but they made 
large Investments thereon In the way of Im-
provements. At the time of the organization 
of the consolidated company there were up-
on the premises described In the bill coke-
ovens, and machinery In connection there-
with, buildings constituting the town of EI 
Moro, and coal-mine lmprovements, consist-
ing of entries, rooms, gangways, tracks, 
chutes, repair-shops, houses, and store build-
ings. Coal was then, between 6 and 7 years 
after Jackson's purchase, being mined upon 
one quarter section, and the town of El Moro 
<'OTered 30 or 40 acres, comprising ~ to 25 
bulldlngs, erected by various Individuals, to 
whom the company had sold lots, In accord-
ance with a regular survey and map of the 
town-site. The entire value of the mine and 
coke improvements was estimated to be about 
$200,000. The property was used by the com-
1>any In connection with works which they 
had established at South Pueblo tor the manu-
fa<'ture ot Iron and steel, on whll•h the1·e had 
been an expenditure of from one to two mil-
lions of dollars, the coal and coke necessary 
for carrying on which was obtained from the 
coal mines on part ot the premises In dis-
pute. As against lnterest11 ot this magnitude 
and value vested upon a claim of title, the 
good talth ot which on the part ot the defend-
ants is absolutely unimpeached, the proof ot 
a fraud which rernters their title absolutely 
void should be stronger than the legal pre-
11umptlons on which it may rightfully rest. 
360 
It ts urged in ari."llment by the solicitor gen-
eral that this c·ase cannot be distinguished 
from that ot Moffat v. U. S., 112 U. 8. 2-l, ;; 
Sup. Ct. 10. The two cases are undoubtedly 
similar In their general aspects, but, never-
theless, differ In some particulars most ma-
terial to the de<:lslon. It Is stated in the re-
port of the case cited that "the testimony 
taken fully established the truth of the al-
legations and charges, eilcept as to the knowl-
edge by Moffat and Carr of the alleged 
fraudB." The charges proven, or to be taken 
as proven, therefore, as set torth in the blll, 
were that the title papers In the case were 
manufactured by a clerk In the oftice of the 
receiver, and that the recelTer was also the 
owner of the agricultural college scrip used 
to pay tot the landB located, and that, tor the 
purpose of lO<'atlng the land with It In the 
name ot Quinlan, the register and receiver 
had inserted In a blank indorsement his fic-
titious name and residence, and In that name 
had located the scrip on the land, there being 
no such person, nor any settlement and im-
provement on the land; and that the dupli-
cate cerWlcate on which the patent tssued 
was presented to the general land-ofDce by 
the defendant himself, who was thus brought 
Into direct connection with the omcers who 
had committed the traud, and with the trans-
action before the issue of the patent. In that 
case Motrat did not offer his deed In evidence, 
was not examined as a witness, and attempt-
ed no proof either of his own Innocence, or 
of the payment of value, but stood without 
explanation aa to who his immediate grantol'B 
were, or how he came In contact with them. 
The receiver was examined as a witness, but 
wholly failed to meet the charges alleged 
against him. There was further proof tend-
ing to show that the acknowledgments of the 
deeds to :Motrat had been taken without Iden-
tification of the grantors from whom Moffat 
received his deeds directly, and In respect to 
whom he must have had some knowledge. 
These circumstances, In our opinion, clearly 
distinguish that case from the present one. 
There is, however, another ground on 
which it is contended by the government 
that the patents described In the bill are 
void. It ls alleged that the lnnds In contro-
versy were not subject to settlement and 
sale under the pre-emption laws, being 
"known mines" within the description .of 
those laws. The act of September 4, lSU 
(:'.; Stnt. 455, c. 16, f 10), provided that no pre-
emption entry should be made on "lands on 
which are situated any known salines or 
mines." By the act of July 1, 1864 03 Stat. 
343, c. 205, t 1), it ls enacted "that where 
any tracts erubra<'lng coal-beds or conl-ft<'lds 
com1titutlng portions of the public domain, 
and which as 'mines' are excluded from the 
pre-emption act ot 1Sl1, and which under 
past legislation are not liable to ordlnarr 
private entry, It shall and may be lawful 
for the president to cause surh trac-ts, In 
suitable legal subdivisions, to be otr(•red at 
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public sale to the highest bidder, after pub-
lic notice of not less than three months, at
:1 minimum price of twenty dollars per acre;
and any lands not thus disposed of shall
thereafter be liable to private entry at said
minimum.”
'1‘he language of the pre-emption act of
1841 is preserved in section 2258, Rev. St.
"The act of 1864 and its supplemental act of
March 3, 1865 (13 Stat. 529, c. 107), were sub-
stantially re-enacted by the act of March 3,
1873 (17 Stat. 607, c. 279), now embodied in
section 2347, Rev. St., and the sections im-
mediately following. The force and mean-
ing of the original legislation remains un-
changed. The subsequent provisions relate
to the classification and terms and mode of
entry and sale of the coal lands excluded
from pre-emption by the laws on that sub-
ject. In reference to coal lands, which are
noted on public surveys and plats as such, of
1'Olll‘S(! it is not to be disputed that their char-
acter is thereby made known so as to with-
draw them from entry under the pre-emp-
tion and homestead acts. Where this is not
done it remains, as in the present case. to
determine how the character of the lands
is to be ascertained, so that they may be
classified as those “on which are situated
any known salines or mines.”
it is argued by the solicitor general, upon
the facts as disclosed by the evidence in
this record, that the lands covered by tin-se
patents embraced “known mines" or coal,
and that, as such lands are expressly ex-
cepted out of the pre-emption laws, the pat-
cnts issued therefor were void for want of
power on the part of the ofiicer to issue
them, as decided in Polk v. Wendall, 9
Cranch, 87; Minter v. Crommclin, 18 1-low.
87; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 160; Morton
v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. (560. In the last-nam-
ed case, Morton v. Nebraska. it was said
(page 674): “The salines in this case were
not hidden as mines often are, but were so
incrusted with salt that they resembled
‘snow-covered lakes,’ and were consequently
not subject to pre-emption.” In McLaugh-
lin v. U. S., 107 U. S. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. 802,
the decree of the circuit court canceling
the patent, on the ground that it purported
to convey lands as part of a railroad grant,
which were excepted therefrom as mineral
lands, was affirmed. The court say (page
528): “It is satisfactorily proven, as we
think, that cinnabar, the mineral which car-
ries quicksilvcr, was found there as early
as 1863; that a man named Powell resided
on the land, and mined this cinnabar, at
that time, and in 1866 established some form
of reduction-works there; that these were
on the ground when application for the pat-
ent was made by the defendant McLaugh-
lin, as agent of the Western Pacific Railroad
Vompany, and that these facts were known
to him. He is not, therefore, an innocent
purchaser." See Railroad Co. v. U. S., 108
U. S. 510, 2 Sup. Ct. 802.
In the case of Mullan v. U. S., 118 U S.
271, 6 Sup. Ct. 1041, after referring to the
acts of congress above recited,.the court,
speaking of the act of July 1, 1864, say (page
277, 118 U. S., and page 10.41, 6 Sup. Gt.):
“This is clearly a legislative declaration that
‘known’ coal lands were mineral lands with-
in the meaning of that term as used in stat-
utes regulating the public lands, unless a
contrary intention of congress was clearly
manifested. Whatever doubt there may be
as to the effect of this declaration on past
transactions, it is clear that. after it was
made, coal lands were to be treated as min-
eral lands. That the land now in dispute
was ‘known’ coal land at the time it was
selected no one can doubt. 1t had been
worked as a mine for many years before.
and it had upon its surface all the applian-
ces nccessary for reaching, taking out, and
delivering the coal. That Barnard knew
what it was when he asked for its location
for his use is absolutely certain, because he
was one of the agents of the coal company
at the time, and undoubtedly acted in its
behalf in all that he did. If .\iullan and
Avery were ignorant of the fact when they
acquired their respective interests in the
property, it was because they willfully shut
their eyes to what was going on around
them, and purposely kept themselves in ig-
norance of notorious facts.’ But the evi-
dcnce satisfies us entirely that they were
not ignorant.”
It will thus he seen that, so far as the de-
cisions of this court have heretofore gone, no
lands have been held to be “known mines"
unless at the time the rights of the purchas-
er accrucd there was upon the ground an
actual and opened mine, which had been
worked, or was capable of being worked.
In the case of Deiteback v. Hawke, 115 U.
S. 392, 6 Sup. Ct. 95, the legislation on the
ubject was reviewed at length. It was there
held that no title from the United States to
land known at the time of sale to be valu-
able for its minerals of gold, silver, cinna-
bar, or copper can be obtained under the
pre-emption or homestead laws, or the town-
site laws, or in any other way than as pre-
scribed by the laws specially authorizing the
sale of such land, except in the states of
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri,
and Kansas. The court say (page 404,
115 U. S., and page 95, 6 Sup. Ct.): “We say
‘land known at the time to he valuable for
its minerals,’ as there are vast tracts of pub-
lic land in which minerals of different kinds
are found, but not in such quantity as to
justify expenditures in the effort to extract
them. It is not to such lands that the term
‘mineral,’ in the sense of the statute, is ap-
plicable. " ' * We also say lands known
at the time of their sale to be thus valuable,
in order to avoid any possible conclusion
against the validity of titles which may be
issued for other kinds of land in which years
afterwards rich deposits of mineral may be
361
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BURDEY OF PROOF. [Case :No. 124 
public sale to the blgbellt bidder, after pub-
lic notice of not leas than three months, at 
.a minimum price of twenty dollars per acre; 
and any lands not thus disposed of shall 
thereafter be liable to private entry at Mid 
minimum." 
The language of the pre-emption act of 
1841 Is preserved In section 2258, Rev. St. 
"The act of 18tl4 and tts supplemental act of 
March 3, 1800 (13 Stat. 529, c. 107), were sub-
'ltantlally re-enacted by the act of March 3, 
1873 (17 Stat. 607, c. 279), DOW embodied in 
.section 2347, Rev. St., and the sections im-
mediately following. The force and mean-
ing of the original legislation remains un-
<'hanged. The subsequent provisions relate 
to the classi.ftcatlon and terms and mode of 
-entry and l!lllle of the coal lands excluded 
from pre-emption by the laws on that sub-
ject. In reference to coal lands, which are 
noted on public surveys and plats as such, of 
<'<>Urse It is not to be disputed that their char-
.acter is thereby made known so as to with-
draw them from entry under the pre-emp. 
tlon and homestead acts. Where this ls not 
-done It remains, as In the present case. to 
-determine bow the character of the lands 
Is to be ascertained, so that they may be 
-classi.fted as those "on which are situated 
.any known l!lllllnes or mines." 
It Is argued by the solicitor general, upon 
the facts as disclosed by the e\"ldence In 
this record, that the lands covered by tht>se 
patents embraced "known mines" ot coal, 
and that, as such lands are expressly ex-
--cepted out of the pre-emption laws, the pat-
ents lasued therefor were void for want of 
power on the part of the omcer to luue 
them, as decided In Polk v. Wendall, 9 
Crancb, 87; .Minter v. Cromruelln, 18 How. 
87; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 100; Morton 
v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660. In the lallt-nam-
-ed case, Morton v. Nebmska, It was said 
<page 674): ''The salines in this case were 
not hidden as mines often are, but were so 
lncrusted with salt that they resembled 
"snow-covered lakes,' and were consequently 
not subject to pre-emption." In McLaugh-
lin v. U. S., 107 U. S. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. BO'l, 
the decree of the circuit court cancellns 
the patent, on the ground that It purported 
to convey lands as part of a railroad grant, 
which were excepted therefrom as mineral 
lands, was afllrmed. The court say (page 
-028): "It Is BBtlsfactorlly proven, as we 
think, that cinnabar, the mineral which car-
ries quicksilver, was found there as early 
aa 1863; that a man named Powell resided 
on the land, and mined this cinnabar, at 
that time, and in 1866 elltabllshed some form 
i>f reduction-works there; that these were 
i>D the ground when application tor the pat-
ent was made by the defendant McLaugh-
!ln, as agent of the W e11tern Pacific Railroad 
<'ompany, and that these facts were known 
to him. He ls not, therefore, an Innocent 
purchaser." See Railroad· Co. v. U. S., 108 
U. S. 510, 2 Sup. Ct. 802. 
In the case of Mullan v. U. S., 118 U S. 
271, 6 Sup. Ct. 1041, atter referring to the 
acts of congress above recited, . the court • 
speaking of tht- act of July 1, 1864, say (page 
277, 118 U. S., and page l<Wl, 6 Sup. Ct.): 
''This Is clearly a legislative declaration that 
'known' coal lands were mineral lands with-
in the meaning of that term as used In stat-
utes regulating the public lands, unless a 
contrary intention of congress was clearly 
manifested. Whatever doubt there may be 
as to the effect of this declaration on past 
transactions, ft Is clear that, after It was 
made, coal lands were to be treated as min-
eral lands. That the land now In dispute 
was 'known' coal land at the time It was 
selected no one can doubt. It had been 
worked as a mine for many years l>PforP. 
and it had upon Its surface all the applian-
ces neceSBary for reaching, taking out, ar:d 
delivering the coal. That Barnard knew 
what It was when he asked for Its location 
for his use Is absolutely certain, because he 
was one of the agents of the coal company 
at the time, and undoubtedly acted In Its 
behalf In all that he did. If llullan and 
Avery were Ignorant of the tact when thPY 
acquired their respective Interests In the 
property, It was he<'nuse they willfully shut 
their eyes to what was going on around 
them, and purposely kept themselves in lg-
nomnce of notorious tacts. · But the evi-
dence satisfies DB entirely that they were 
not Ignorant." 
It will thus be seen that, so far as the de-
cisions of this court have heretofore gone, no 
lands have been held to be ''known mines" 
unless at the time the rights of the purchas-
er accrued there was upon the ground an 
actual and opened mine, which bad been 
worked, or was capable of being worked. 
In the case of Delfeback v. Hawke, 115 U. 
S. 392, 6 Sup. Ct. 95, the legislatton on the 
subject was reviewed at length. It was there 
held that no title from the United States to 
land known at the time of sale to be valu-
able for Its ~lnerals of gold, silver, cinna-
bar, or copper can be obtained under the 
pre-emption or homestead laws, or tbe town-
slte laws, or in any other way than as pre-
scribed by the laws specially authorizing the 
sale of such land, except in the states of 
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, 
and Kansas. The court say (page 404, 
115 U.S., and page 95, 6 Sup. Ct.): "We say 
'land known at the time to be valuable for 
Its minerals,' as there are vast tracts of pub-
llc land In which minerals of different kinds 
are found, but not in such quantity as to 
justify expenditures In the effort to extrnct 
them. It is not to such lands that the term 
'mineral,' In the sense of the statute, ls ap-
plicable. • • • We also say lands known 
at the time of their sale to be thus valuable, 
In order to avoid any possible conclusion 
against the validity of titles which may be 
Issued for other kinds of land In which years 
afterwards rich deposits of mineral may be 
Rm 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
discovered. It is quite possible that lauds
settled upon as suitable only tor agricultural
purposes, entered by the settler, and patent-
ed by the government, under the pre-emp-
tion laws, may be found, years after the pat-
ent has been issued, to contain valuable min-
erals. indeed, this has often happened. We
therefore use the term ‘known to be valua-
ble at the time of sale,’ to prevent any doubt
being cast upon titles to lands afterwards
found to be diiterent in their mineral char-
acter from what was supposed when the en-
try of them was made and the patent is-
sued."
It is not suiiicient. in our opinion. to con-
stitute “known mines" of coal. within the
meaning of the statute, that there should
merely be indications oi’ coal-beds or coal-
fields of greaitn-1' or less extent, and oi’ great-
er or less value, as shown by out-croppings.
The act of 186-1 evidently contemplates a
distinction between coal-he(ls or coal-fields
excluded from the pre-emption act of 1841
as “known mines.” and other coal-beds or
coal-fields not coming within that descrip-
tion. We hold. therefore. that to constitute
the exemption contemplated by the pre-emp-
tion act undcr the head of “known mines "
there should be upon the land ascertained
coal deposits of such an extent and value as
to make the land more valuable to be work-
ed as a coal mine, under the conditions ex-
362
isting at the time, than for merely agricul-
tural purposes. The circumstance that
there are surface indications of the exist-
ence ot veins of coal does not constitute a
mine. It does not even prove that the land
will ever be under any conditions suflicient-
ly valuable on account of its coal deposits to
be worked as a mine. A change in the con-
ditions occurring subscquently to the sale.
whereby new discoveries are made, or by
means whereof it may become profitable to
work the veins as mines, cannot affect the
title as it passed at the time of the sale.
The question must be determined according
to the facts in existence at the time ot the
sale. It upon the premises at that time
there were not actual “known mines" capa-
ble of being profitably worked for their
product, so as to make the land more valu-
able for mining than for agriculture. a title
to them acquired under the pre-eniption act
cannot be successfully assailed. In the
present case, the testimony. in our opinion,
does not justify us in finding that at the
time Jackson acquired his title there were
upon any part of the premises in controver-
sy any "known mines" of coal. in the sense
of the statute.
For these reasons the decree of the circuit
court is reversed, and the cause remanded,
with a direction to dismiss the bill; and it
is so ordered.
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Caae No. 124] PRODUCTION A.ND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
discovered. It ls quite poHlble that lands 
settled upon 118 suitable only ror agricultural 
purposes, ~ntered by the settler, and patent-
ed by the government, under the pre-emp-
tlon laws, may be found, years after the pat-
ent has heen l88ued, to conqln valuable min-
erals. lt1dl'ed, this has ofteu ha11pened. We 
therefore use the term 'known to be valua-
ble at the tlme of sale,' to pl"event any doubt 
being cat upon titles to lands afterwards 
found to be dUlerent In their mineral char-
acter from what was 11upposed when the en-
try of them was made and the patent ls-
snoo." 
It ls not sufHclent, lo our 011lnlon. to C'OD-
stitute "known mines" of coal, within thl' 
meaning of the 11tatute, that there should 
merely be lndlrntlou11 of C'Oal-bed11 or coal-
11.elds of i:reutl'r or leKS extent, and of great-
er or less value, as shown by out-cropplngs. 
The net of 1804 evidently contemplates a 
distinction between coal-becls or coal-fields 
exduded from the pre-t>mptlon act of 1841 
as "known mines." and other coal-beds or 
coal-fldcls not coming within that desc>rlp-
tlon. We hold. therefore, that to constitute 
the exemption <·outempluted by the pre-emp-
tlon a~t und<•r the head of "known mines '' 
thl'l"l' 11hould be upon the land o.scertalned 
coal deposits of such an extent and value as 
to make the land more valuable to be work-
ed as a coal mine, under the conditions ex-
302 
!sting at the time, than for merely agricul-
tural purpoBeB. The clrcumatance that 
there are surface lndlcatlolll!I of the exist-
ence of veins of coal does not constitute a 
mine. It does not even prove that the land 
will ever be under any condltlons sufH<'lent-
ly valuable on account of Its coal dl'poslts to 
be worked as a mint'. A change In the con-
ditions occurring sub8<'Quently to the sale. 
whereby new discoveries are made, or by 
means whereof It may become profitable U> 
work the veins as mines, cannot affect the 
title as It passed at the time of the sale. 
The question must be determined a<.'COrdl.ng 
to the facts In exlRtence at the time of the 
sale. If upon the premises at that time 
there were not actual "known mines" capa-
ble of being profitably worked for their 
product, so BB to make the land more valu-
able for mining than for agri<'ulture. a title 
to them acquired under the pr~mptlon act 
cannot be suc<'t"RSfully aSBalled. In the-
11resent case, the testimony, ln our opinion, 
does not justify us In finding that at the 
tlm.- J1wkson ecqulrt><l bis tltlt> there were-
upon any part of the premlees In controver-
sy any "kJ:\OWn mines" of coal, In the aen~ 
of the statute. 
For these reasons the decree of the circuit 
eourt ls reversed, and the cause remanded, 
with a direction to dlstniss the bill; and It 
ls so ordered. 
RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE.
[Case No. 125
LAKE ONTARIO NAT. BANK v. JUDSON.
(25 N. E. 367. 122 N. Y. 278.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi-
sion. Oct. 7, 1890.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, fourth department.
The action was brought to recover the
a mount offour promissory notes, which by
the complaint the plaintiff alleged were
made by the defendant. payable to the or-
der of E. M. Fort, delivered to the payee,
and by him indorsed and transferred to the
plaintiff. And the plaintiff also thereh_va»l-
leged that the defendant was indebted to it,
in asum stated,for money advanced on his
checks drawn upon the plaintiff for an
amount in excess of his deposits there.
The defendant by his answer alleged that
he and Fort purchased of the plaintiff
sonlecanal-boats; that they were induced
to make the purchase by the warranty of
the plaintiff, particularly specified, and
gave for them their joint notes; that, aft-
erwards, the plalntiff took up those notes,
and the makers gave their individual
notes for their respective interests in the
purchase to the plaintiff, which notes
were received by the plaintiff “in place of
and in payment of said first-mentioned
notes, and which notes last gifen are the
notes and the renewal thereof set forth in
the complaint.” The defendant alleged a
breach of this warranty and damages as
the consequence, which he claimed should
be allowed to him. He also alleged b_v
way of counter-claim that the plaintiff
was indebted to him in a further sum for
services performed by him for and at the
request of the plaintiff. for which, with the
amount of damages for the alleged breach
ofwarranty, he demanded judgment. And
for further answer. he denied the com-
plaint, and each and every allegation
therein contained, except as thereinbefore
admitted. The plaintiff by reply put in
issue the new matter of the answer con-
stituting the alleged counter-claims. The
trial court directed judgment for the
amount of the notes and of the overdraft
mentioned in the complaint.
H. C. Benedict and Miller. Lewis &
Judson, for appellant. S. C. Hunting-
ton, Jr., for respondent.
BRADLEY, J., infter stating the facts
as above.) Thecontest on the trial mainly
had relation to the defendant's alleged
counter-claim for services. upon which
claim he gave evidence to the effect that
they were performed by him pursuant to
an agreement with the plaintiff, b_v which
the latter undertook to pay him $'_’_5l)0, of
which $160 had been paid. This claim,
and the evidence on the part of the (lcfen(l-
ant tending to support it, were disputed
by the evidence on the part of the plaintiff,
and the trial court found the facts against
the defendant. For the purpose of this re-
view, the findings and determination of
the court below must be deemed conclu-
sive. Upon the trial. the question as to
which party was entitled to the closing ar-
gument was raised. The court held that
the plaintiff had the right to it, and the
defendant excepted.
i
The rule that the party having the af-
firmative of the issues in an action shall
have the opportunity to make the open-
lng and closing prcsen ta tion of his case is
deemed founded upon a substantial right,
the denial of which is error. Conselyea v.
Swift,103 N. Ya 604, 9 N. E. Rep. 489. In
its application to trials by jury, it has or-
dinarily more practicalimportaneethnn in
those before the court without a jury, and
before referees. If it appears that a party
could not have been prejudiced by the fail-
ure of the court to observe the rule, the er-
ror would not be available; and in trials
by the court without jury, or before
referees, that question would be depend-
ent upon the circumstances of each case.
In the present case. the view of the court
evidently was that the affirmative of the
entire issues was not with the defendant;
and that is the question presented for con-
sideration. The denial by the defendant
in his answer, except as therein admitted,
of each and every allegation of the com-
piaint, putin issue any material allegation
of the complaint not distinctly admitted
by the answer. Allis v. Leonard, 46 N. Y.
688; Calhoun v. i-fallen, 25 Hun. 155. The
charge in the complaint, in due form, of
the indebtedness of the defendant to the
plaintiff for the amount advanced to him
upon his check, in excess of the balance of
his account with the plaintiff, was not ad-
mitted by the answer, but was contro-
verted by such denial. It appears that
after the trial had been moved, and the
plaintiff by its counsel had, by statement
of it, made the opening of the case to the
court, the defendant orally admitted the
count of the complaint alleging the over-
draft. The plaintiff then proceeded to
prove the signature of the defendant to
the notes, and the indorsement by the
payee,and rested. It seemsthat the plain-
tiff deemed it necessary to makethis proof,
perhaps for the reason that the allegation
in the answer of the making and delivery
of the notes by the defendant to the plain-
. tiff was treated as not sufficient upon
which to rest, coupled as it was with the
further allegation of their consideration
as the foundation of the counter-claim, al-
leged to have arisen out of a. warranty
and its breach. The apprehension may
have been that the adoption of the admis-
sion in the answer of the making and de-
livery of the notes could not be severed
from what was alleged as the considera-
tion out of which they arose, within the
principle that when an admission of a fact
is made in connection with that oi anoth-
er, which nuilifies the effect of it. the entire
statement must be taken together. Gil-
dersleevc v. Landon. T3 N. Y. 609. Assum-
ing, as we do, that such rule of construc-
tion was not applicable to this admission
in the answer, and that no proof of the
execution or indorselncnt of the notes was
necessary. the question arises whether the
oral admissions at the trial of the plain-
tifi's claim for the amount of the defend-
ant's overdraft entitled him to the right
of closing the argument on the final sub-
mission of the case to the court for deter-
mination. And that depends upon the
question whether the affirmative of theis-
sue, with a. view to such right,must be as-
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RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. [Cue No. 125 
I.AKE ONTARIO NAT. BA....~K v. JUDSON. 
(2G N. lll. 367, 122 N. Y. 278.) 
Court of .Appeals of New York, Second Dll'l-
lion. Oct. 7, 1890. 
APIM'RI from 11Upreme court, general 
tf"rm, fourth department. 
The action was brought to reeovPr the 
11 monnt offoor proml111eory note,., which by 
the complaint the plalntlft alleged were 
made by the defendant, payable to the ur-
der ot E. M. l<'ort, dellvt>red to the payee, 
and by him lndorsed and trA.neferred to the 
platntln. And the plaluttn also thereby al-
leged that the dcfendan twas Indebted to It, 
lnaaumstated,for money advanced on his 
checks drawn upon the plalntlft for an 
amount In excess ot bis tteposlta there. 
The defendant by hie answer alle~ed that 
be and Fort purc•based of the plaintiff 
eomeeanal-boata; that they were Induced 
to mnke the purchnse by the warranty of 
the plalntln, particularly specified, and 
gave for them their Joint notes; that, aft-
erwards, the plaintiff took up those notes, 
and the makers gave their Individual 
notes for their reepPCtlve lntereKU. In the 
porcbaRe to the plalntln, which notes 
were received by the plalntln "In plaee of 
and In payment of said first-mentioned 
notes, and which noteR last grten are the 
noteti and the renewal thereof set forth In 
the complaint." The defendant alleged a 
breach of this warranty and damages as 
tbe consequence, which be claimed should 
be allowed to him. He also alleged by 
way of counter-claim that the plaintiff 
was Indebted to him In a further sum for 
services performed by him for and at the 
request of the plalotlft, for which, with the 
amount of damag;ee for the alleged breach 
of warranty, be demanded Judgment. And 
for furth~r answer, he denied the com-
plaint, and each and every allegation 
therein contained, escept as thf'reinhefore 
admitted. The plaintiff by reply put In 
l1t1oe the new matter of the anBwer eon-
Ptltotlng the alleged counter-claims. The 
trial court directed Judgment for the 
amount or the notes and of the overdraft 
mentioned In the complaint. 
R. C. Bf'nedlct and MI11er, Ltrn·ls 41' 
Judson, for appellant. S. C. Hunting-
ton, Jr., for respomlent. 
BRADLEY, J., laftP.r 11t11tlng the facte 
811 above.) Thecontetiton the trial mainly 
bad nolatlon to the defendant's alleged 
connter-clalm for services, upon which 
claim he ga n• evidence to the effect that 
they were performed by him pursuant to 
an agreement with the plalntln, by which 
the JattPr undertook to pny him $:!,500, of 
which $160 had been lmid. This claim, 
and the evidence on the lUlrt of the ddend-
ant tendlnK to sup11ort It, were dl1111t1t('() 
by the evidence on the part of the plalntlrf, 
and the trial court found the ractenjlalm1t 
the defendant. For the purpose of thlH re-
view, the flndlnge and determination or 
the court below must be deemed conclu-
sive. lipon the trial, the question as to 
which party waH entltl<'cl to the do1dnjl ar-
gument woe raised. '£he court held that 
the plaintiff hntl the right to lt, and the 
llefendant excepted. 
The role that the party having the af-
llrma tive of the Issues in an action shall 
have the opportunity to make the open-
lng and closing presentntlon or hilt case la 
d~med founded upon a substantial right, 
the denial of which la error. ConRelyea v. 
i:lwlft, 103 N. Y1 6114, 9 N. E. Rep. ~9. In 
Its application to trials by jury, It has or-
'dlnurlly morepracticalimport&nt'ethun In 
those ber01-e the court without a jury, a111l 
before refereee. If It appears that a party 
could not have heen prejudiced by the fnll-
ure or the court to observe the rnle, the er-
ror would not be available; aocl In trials 
by the court without jnry, or before 
referl'f's, thnt question would be depend-
ent upon the clrcumetance8 of each c1111e. 
In the present case, the view or the court 
evidently was that the amrmatlve or the 
entire laeueR was not with the defendant; 
and that is the question presented for con-
sideration. 'l'be denial by the dcfendRnt 
In his answer, except as therein admitted, 
of eftch and every allegation of the com-
plo.lnt, put in Issue any material allt"gatlon 
of the complaint not distinctly admitted 
bv the answer. Allie v. Leonard, 46 N. Y. 
6ii8; Calhoun v. Hnllen, 25 Hun, 166. The 
cbar,,;e In the complaint, In due form, of 
the lndebtedneRR of the defendant to the 
plaintiff fur the amount advanced to him 
npon his check, In eXCCH8 or the balance or 
hie account with the plalntlft, wa11 not ad-
mitted by the anRwer, but was contro-
verted by such dt>nlal. It appears that 
' after the trial bad been moved, and the 
plalntlft by ltM counsel had, by Rtatcruent 
of It, made the opening of the ca11e to the 
court, the defendant orally admitted the 
count of the complaint altf'Jrfng the over-
draft. The plalntlft then procee<led to 
prove the slgnuture of the defendant to 
the notes, and the lndoreement by the 
payee, and rested. Iteeemsthat the plain-
tiff rleemed It nece1111&1-y to make this proof, 
perhapt4 for the reason that the allegation 
In the answer of the making and delivery 
or the notes by the defendant to the plaln-
tnr was treated as not sumctent upon 
which to rest, conpled aR it waR with the 
further allegation of their consideration 
as the foumJailon of the counter-claim, al-
leged t<I hnve arlF1en out of a warranty 
and Its breach. The apprehension may 
have bet-n thnt the adoption of the admis-
sion In the answer of the making and de-
ll very of tbe not.e11 could not be 11cvered 
from what was allPged as the eom1ldera-
tlon out of which they nrose, within the 
principle thnt when an ndmll!lilon of a fact 
is made In connection with thut ol anoth-
er, which nulllflee the effect of It, the entire 
statement must be tnkeu togetber. Gil-
dersleeve v. Landon. 73 S. Y. 609. As11um-
lng, as we do, that such rule of construc-
tion wne not appllcahle to this 1ulml11slon 
In the an11wPr, und that no proof of the 
execution or lndorsPmt•ntof the notes was 
neceHi.iary. the que11tlon arises whf!tber the 
oral aclmlM11lon11 at the trial or the plaln-
tln'11 claim for the amount of thf! defend· 
ant's overclrnft entitled him to the right 
of clOF!lng the argument on the tlnal aub-
mlsHlon of the case to the court for deter-! mlnatlon. And that d<'pPnds upon the •1uestlon whether the att11·m11tlve of the l111-11ue, with a view to such right, muHt lie ae-
363 
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certained from the pleadings, or may arise
from admissions orally made at the trial.
The issues to be tried can be ascertained
only by reference to the pleadings; and
they must govern so far as relates to the
right of the parties to open the case at the
beginning and conclude the argument at
the close of the trial. When the parties
go to trial, they respectively assume the
burden oi establishing that which they
have affirmatively alleged as a cause oi’ ac-
tion or counter-claim, if it is controverted
by allegation sufficient to put it in issue.
The admission of a fact upon the trial is
evidence meiely. It may obviate the
necessity of furi her trial of the issue to
which it relates. but does not change it as
represented by the pleadings. That can
be done by amendment only. It is true
the admission made at the trial may re-
duce the controversy to matter as to
which the allirmative is with the defend-
ant. Such would be the effect of evidence
of any character undisputed and indisput-
able of the facts constituting the alleged
cause of action. The right under consid-
eration does not depend simply upon the
admission of those facts unless they are
admitted or uncontroverted by the an-
swer; otherwiseltis evidence only. There
is no occasion to extend the rule so as to
give effect, for such purpose, to conces-
sions at the trial. This might lead to the
adoption of such a course. when further
dispute oi the facts upon which a plaintiff
relies may appear hopeless to a. defendant,
for the purpose oi’ obtaining the right of
closing the trial. There is no apparent
reason for applying such rule to any one
more than to any other stage oi the trial.
364
The defendant who may wish to take the
right oi opening and concluding the trial
must frame his pleading with that view,
and so as to present no issue upon any ai-
legation of the complaint essential to the
plaintiff's alleged cause of action. if the
defendant fail to do that, no matter how
little proof the remaining issues require. or
how easily or in what manner it may be
established by evidence, the right of the
plaintiff to open and close the case is not
denied to him. Mercer v. \\'hall, 5 Ado].
& E. (N. S.) 447. The test is whether,
without any proof, the plaintiff upon the
pleadings is en titled to recover upon all
the causes of action alleged in his com-
plaint. If he is, and the defendant alleges
any counterclaim controverted by the
plaintiffs pleading, or any affirmative
matter ofdefense in avoidance of theplain-
tifi‘s alleged cause of action. and which is
the subject of trial. the defendant has the
right to open and close; otherwise not.
Huntington v. Conkey. 33 Barb. 218; Ei-
well v. Cha|nberlin. 31 N. Y. 614; Murray
v. insurance (.‘o.,85 N. Y. 236. The pro-
duction of the note sued on and the com-
putation of interest proved are not em-
braced in the facts essential to the cause
of action. If the defendant, by permission
of the court, had stricken out the denial in
his answer, or amended it by inserting the
admission orally made, a different ques-
tion would have been presented at the
trial upon the claim of the defendant to
the right to conclude it. No other ques-
tion requires the expression of considera-
tion. The judgment should be aflirmed.
All concur, except FOLLETT, C. J., not
sitting.
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certatned from the pleadings, or may arise 
from adml881ons orally made at the trial. 
The l88lle& to be tried can be IUK'ertalned 
only by refere11ce to the pleadings; and 
they mu11t go\"ern so far us relates to the 
rip:ht of thepurtll'S to open the c&Ae at the 
beginning and conc.-lude the argument ut 
the l'lmie of the trial. When the pa rtles 
go to trial, tlwy l"effpectln•ly aMMume the 
burden of estubllshiug that which tlil'Y 
have affirmatively alleged as a cause of ac-
tion or counter-claim, if It ill contro\"erted 
by allegattou sufflclt>nt to put It In IS1tue. 
The admlBBion of a fact upon the trial ls 
e\'ldence me1ely. It may obviate the 
necessity of further trial of the ll!Rue to 
which it relatt'S, hut c1oe11 not changt> It BR 
represented by the plcacllnp:M. That can 
be done by amendment only. It Is true 
the admission made at the trial may re-
duce the contro\"ersy to matter as to 
which the afH1·matlve Is with the defend-
ant. Such would be the enect of evhlence 
of nny character undisputed and lndls)>ut-
able of the fac·tK constituting the alleged 
cause of action. The right under consid-
eration does not depend simply upon the 
admission of those facts unlesR they are 
admlttP.«J or uncontrm·erted by the an-
swer; otherwise It is evidence only. There 
is no occ1111lon to extend the rule HO WJ to 
gl\'e eftect, for Ruch purpose, to concE'M-
sluos at the trial. This might lead to the 
a<1or1tton of 11uch a course, when furtht~r 
dl>4pute or the factK upon which a. plalntlft 
relies may a11pe11r bopelettR tu a defend11nt, 
for thfl purpose of obtaining the right of 
cluaing the trial. There IR no apparent 
reason for applying such rule to any one 
more than to any other atage of the trial. 
364 
The dPlendant who may wlMh to takfl the 
right of opening and concluding the trial 
muHt frame his pleading with that vll'w. 
and 110 aa to present no IMue upon any al-
)l'gatlon of the l'omplalnt essential to the 
plalotlft's alle~ed eause of action. If the 
defendant fall to do that, 110 matter how 
little proof the remaining Issues require. or 
bow easily or lo what manner It may be 
established by evidence. the rl~ht of the 
plalotlft to open aml close the caHe ls not 
denied to him. Mercer v. \\'hall, 5 Adol. 
& E. (N. S.) 447. The tt'Bt Is whetller, 
without any proof, tl1e plulnttn upon the 
11leadlngtJ iR entitled to recover upon all 
the causes of action alleged in his com-
plaint. If he ls, and the defendant alleges 
any counterclaim controverted by thE' 
plalntlft's pleading, or any affirmative 
J11atter 0Jcleft>n11e In avoidance of thet>lttln-
tlfl'R allegtd cau11e of actlou, and which hJ 
the subject of trial. the defendant h&11 the 
right to open and clo11e; otherwise nut. 
Huntington v. Conkey. 88 Barb. 21~; El-
well v. Chamberlin. 31 N. Y. 614; Murray 
,., InRurance Co., R5 N. Y. 236. The pro-
duction of the note suPd on and the com-
putation of Interest proved are not em. 
braced In the facts essential to the cause 
of action. If the defendant, by permlMlon 
of the court, had stricken out the denial In 
hiR answer, or amended tt by Inserting the 
adml1111luo orally made, a dlfterent que&-
tlon would ha\•e been prt'ffented at the 
trial upon the r.lalm or the defendant to 
the right to conclude It. No other ques-
tion req ull"l'B the expres11lon of coniddera-
tlon. The Jm:Jgment should be afftrmed. 
All concur, except FOLLETT, C. J., nut 
sitting. 
RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE.
[Case No. 126
ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. TAYLOR.
(20 S. W. 1083, 57 Ark. 136.)
Jan. 7, 1893.
Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson coun-
ty; John M. Elliott, Judge.
Action by E. S. Taylor against the St.
Louis, iron Mountain & Southern Railway
(Jompany to recover the value of a mule
killed through defendant's alleged negligence.
Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Atiirmed.
In proving ownership of the mule for
which damages were sought to be recovered,
plaintiff was asked, “How long had you
owned the mule?" and he answered, “I
think about a month or two." Wlfen asked
how much he originally paid for the mule,
he said: “I did not pay for him until after
he was killed. I bought the mule from a
party. I do not remember his name. After
he had been killed, I then paid for the mule."
He also testlfied that he had possession of
the mule on trial. He had not paid for it.
“As soon as the mule was killed, and the
man wanted his money, I gave him $90, and
promised to pay him the balance as soon as
I collected it.”
Dodge & Johnson, for appellant.
-Bridges,-for appellee.
Supreme Court of Arkansas.
Bell &
COCKRILL, C. J. 1. Construing the evi-
dence most strongly in favor of the appel-
lant, Taylor had a special property in the
animal killed, which empowered him to re-
cover its full value. Railway Co. v. Biggs,
50 Ark. 169, 6 S. W. 72-L. No prejudice re-
sults to the railway, therefore, in permitting
him to maintain the action.
2. The statute declares that railroads oper-
ated in this state shall be responsible for
all damages done or~ caused by the running
of their trains. Mansf. Dig. § 5537. In a
suit against n railway company to recover for
an injury done to property by a running eu-
gine or tmin, this statute casts upon the
company the burden of showing due care
on its part. That is not the express pro-
vision of the statute. but it is the nearest
approach to the legislative intent that the
court was able to extract from it, consistent
with the constitution. Railway Co. v. Payne,
33 Ark. S16; Tllley v. Railway Co., 49 Ark.
535, 542, 6 S. W. 8. The statute has found
application in our courts mainly in cases
where live stock, when running at large, has
been injured by railway trains; and we have
ruled many times that proof of injury by
the railway in such cases raises a presump-
tion of negligence against the company.
There is nothing in the terms of the statute
to warrant a change in the construction of it
when the proof shows that an animal was
under the control of its owner or his agent
at the time of the injury. The statutory
policy of casting the burden of proof on the
railway to show care when the injury is
proved may have had its origin in the fact
that the company's employes are most likely
to know the facts, while the owner of the
injured property is ignorant of them; but
the enactment does not limit the operation
of the rule to that state of facts. The argu-
ment that the party having the best means
of information should bear the burden of
proof might well be addressed to the policy
of enacting such a statute, but not to its
construction when its language will not ad-
mit of the distinction. Whcn the proof
shows that the act of the owner, having
control of the animal when injured, has
contributed to the injury, the statute is in-
operative, because the contributory negli-
gence of the owner would bar a recovery.
Thus, if the plaintiff here, in developing his
case, had shown that he was wrongfully us-
ing the track of the railway as a highway
for his mule and vehicle, and had shown no
other fact save that the property was in-
jured by the defendant's moving train, he
would not have established a prima facie
case under the statute, because, upon the
case thus proved, he could recover only for
a wanton injury, and the statute raises no
presumption of wantonness. Railway Co.
v. .\ionday, 49 Ark. 257, 264, 265, 4 S. W.
782. But in this case the plaintiff adduced
evidence tending to show that at the time
of the injury he was using the right of way
between the main and side tracks by the
license and invitation of the company. If
that was true, he was not a trespasser, but
was there as of right, and the company owed '
him the duty to observe ordinary care to
preserve his property from injury. The fact
of injury is, therefore, evidence of the want
of such care; that is, of negligence. The
charge to that effect was not erroneous. The
court’s charge upon the subject of contribu-
tory negligence by the owner was full, and
it was favorable to the defendant. The jury
found. upon conflicting testimony, that he
was not guilty of contributory negligence,
and that the railway did not use due care.
The verdict is conclusive. .
3. The party having the “burden of proof
in the whole action" has the right to" open
and conclude the argument. Mansf. Dig. §
5131. Such a burden lies on the party who
would be defeated if no evidence were given
on either side. Id. § 2871. Upon the defend-
ant's admission of the killing only, if the
plaintiff could have recovered at all, his
recovery would have been confined to nom-
inal damages, because the defendant specif-
ically denied the extent of his injury. But
a recovery of substantial damages, and not
of the costs only, was what the plaintiff
sought. The burden of proving the extent
of his injury remained upon him throughout.
and gave him the right to begin and reply.
Railway Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 258, 264; 1
Thomp. Trials, §§ 228, 229. No other objec-
tion is urged by the appellant. Finding no
error, the judgment ls aflirmed.
303
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
08
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
RIGHT TO OPEN .A.XD CLOSE. (Case No. 1:!6 
ST. LOUIS, I. II. & B. RY. CO. T. TAYLOR. 
(20 s. w. 1083, 57 Ark. 136.) 
Supreme Court of A.rbDBU. Jan. 7, 1893. 
Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson coun-
ty; John M. Elliott, Judge. 
Action by E. R. Taylor against the St. 
J..oula. Iron llouutaln & Southern ltallwuy 
Company to recover the value of a mule 
killed through d~fendant's alleged negligence. 
Judgment for plalntllf. Defendant appeals. 
.Affirmed. 
In proving ownership of the mule for 
which damages were sought to be recovered, 
plalntllf was asked, "How long had you 
owned the mule?" and be answered, "I 
·think about a month or two." wlien asked 
how much he originally paid for the mule, 
he said: "I did not pay for him until after 
he was killed. I bought the mule from a 
party. I do not remember his name. After 
he had been kllled, I then paid for the mule." 
He also testified that he had possession of 
the mule on trial. He had not paid for It. 
"As soon as the mule was killed, and the 
man wanted his money, I gave him ,00, and 
promised to pay him the balance as soon as 
I collected It." 
Dodge & Johnson, for appellant. Bell & 
·Brldgee,-.tor appellee. 
COCKRILL, C. J. 1. Construing the evi-
dence moet strongly Jn favor of the appel-
lant, Taylor had a special property In the 
animal killed, which empowered him to re-
cover Its full value. Railway Co. v. Biggs, 
00 Ark. 169, 6 S. W. 724. No prejudl<'e re-
sults to the railway, therefore, In penuttttng 
him to maintain the action. 
2. The statute <lecl:i.res that railroads ope~ 
ated In this state shall be rusponsfble for 
all damages done or· caused by the ruunln~ 
of their trains. llansf. Dig. I 5537. In a 
lmlt aJ(alnlrt n rallwa.y company to recover for 
an Injury done to property by n running en-
gine or train, this statute casts upon the 
com1:mny the burden of showing due care 
011 Its part. 'l'hnt ts not the express pro-
\1slon of the statute. but It ls the nearest 
approach to the legislative Intent that the 
t"lUrt was nble to extract from It, consistent 
with the constitution. Railway Co. v. Payne, 
33 Ark. 816; Tilley v. Railway Co., 49 Ark. 
U.'l:'i, 542, tl S. W. 8. The statute bas found 
application In our courts mainly In cases 
where live E.tock, \\hen running at large, has 
been Injured by railway trains; and we have 
ruled many times that proof of Injury by 
the railway In such cases raises a presump-
tion of negligence agaln&t the company. 
There ls nothing In the terms of the statute 
to warrant a change In the construction of It 
when the proof shows that an animal was 
under the control of Its owner or his agent 
at the time of the Injury. The statutory 
poll<>y of casting the burden of proof on the 
railway to show care when the Injury ls 
proved may have had Its origin In the fact 
that the company's employ~ are most likely 
to know the facts, while the owner of the 
lnj1ll'ed property ls Ignorant of them; but 
the enactment does not limit the operation 
of the rule to that state of tacts. '..1.'he argu-
ment that the party having the best means 
of Information should bear the burden of 
proof might well be addressed to the poll(')' 
of enacting such a statute, but not to Its 
construction when Its language will not ad-
mit of the distinction. When the proof 
shows that the act of the owner, having 
control of the animal when Injured, has 
contributed to the Injury, the statute ts In-
operative, be<.·anse the contributory negli-
gence of the owner would bar a recovery. 
Thus, If the plaintiff here, In developing his 
case, had shown that he was wrongfully us-
ing the track of the railway as a highway 
for his mule and vehicle, and had shown no 
other fact save that the property was In-
jured by the defendant's moving train, he 
would not have established a prlma facle 
case under the statute, because, upon the 
c:nse thus proved, he could l'e<'Over only for 
a wanton Injury, and the statute raises no 
pl'esumptlon of wantonness. Railway Co. 
v. l\londay, 49 Ark. 257, 264, 265, 4 S. W. 
78'2. But In this case the plaintiff adduced 
eYldence tending to show that at the time 
of the Injury he wns using the right of way 
between the main and side tracks by tht• 
license and Invitation of the company. If 
that was true, he was not a trespasser, but 
was there as of right, and the company owed • 
him the duty to observe ordinary care to 
preserve his property from Injury. The fact 
of Injury ls, therefore, evidence of the want 
of such care; that Is, of negligence. The 
charge to that effect was not erroneous. The 
court's charge upon the subject of contribu-
tory negllgence by the owner was full, and 
It was favorable to the defendant. The jury 
found, upon eonfllctlng testimony, that he 
was not gullty of contributory negligence, 
and that the railway did not use due care. 
The verdict ls conclusive. . 
3. The party having the "burden of proof 
In the whole action" has the right to· open 
and conclude the argument. Manet. Dig. f 
5131. Such a burden lies on the party who 
would be defeated If no evidence were given 
on either side. Id. § 2871. Upon the defend-
ant's admission of the killing only, If the 
plaintiff could have recovere1t at all, his 
recovery would have been confined to nom-
inal damages, because the defendant specif-
ically denied the extent of bis Injury. But 
a recovery of substantial damages, and not 
of the costs only, was what the plaintiff 
sought. The burdeu of proving the extent 
of bis Injury remained upon him throughout, 
and gave him the rlght to begin and reply. 
Itallway Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 258, 264; 1 
Thomp. Trials, ff 228, 229. No other objec-
tion ls urged by the appellant. Finding no 
error, the judgment Is afftrmed. 
Case No. 127]
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CRABTREE v. ATCHISON et al.
(20 S. W. 260, 93 Ky. 338.)
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 1, 1892.
Appeal from circuit court, Daviess county.
Action by J . D. Atchlson and others against
Moses Crabtree. Judgment for plaintiffs.
Defendant appeals. Reversed.
Sweeney, Ellis & Sweeney, for appellant.
Weir, Weir & Walker, for appellees.
BE.\‘l\'l<JTT, J. The appellant executed to
J. McDanrich & Co. a promissory note for
$102.60. McDanrich & Co. assigned the note,
before its maturity, to the appeliees. They
brought suit on it. The appellant answered
that the note was obtained from him by the
fraud of the pa yees, and that it was without
consideration, having been executed for a
lightning rod that was utterly worthless.
The appeliees, replying, traversed these alie-
gations. They further alleged that when the
appellant executed and delivered the note to
McDanrich & Co. he executed and delivered
to them two writings. The one deemed ma-
terial to the question at issue is as follows:
"To all whom it may concern: This is to ._
certify that a note executed by me to J. Mc- I
Danrich & Co., for $102.60, is a bona fide
debt against me. There is no offset, dis-
count, or defense against the same, and the
same is good against me for the full amount
thereof, and will he paid to the said J. .\1c-
Danrich & Co., or to such persons as they
may assign said note to." (Signed, etc.) The
appeliees further alleged that they purchas-
ed said note for value, and without notice
of the alleged fraud or want of considera-
tion, and that at the time of the negotiation
for the note the writing, supra, was exhibited
to them, and they purchased the note upon
the faith of the assurances therein contain-
ed. The appellant rejoined, denying that ap-
pellees knew of the contents of said writing,
or that they purchased the note upon the
faith of the assurances therein contained.
On the trial of the case the lower court rul-
ed that the burden was on the appellees; con-
sequently they were entitled to conclude the
argument. The appellees obtained judgment
on the note, and the appellant has appealed.
Under the instructions of the court, to
which there is no serious objection, the jury
was authorized from the evidence to find
that the said writing was exhibited to ap-
peliees at the time they purchased the note,
and that they purchased it upon the faith of
the assurances therein contained. But it
does not appear that the appellant issued
and delivered the writing with the purpose
of defrauding or deceiving the appellees, or
any one else. So the question is, there being
no actual fraudulent or deceitful purpose on
the part of the appellant in issuing and de-
livering said paper, does the doctrine of es-
toppel apply in favor ot‘ the appellees, they
luiving purclmsed said note for value, and
Z clude the argument.
without notice of the alleged intlrmities, and
upon the faith of the assurances contained
in said writing? In a case like this, where a
person has made certain assurances upon
which he intends third persons to rely as
true in contracting in reference to the sub-
ject-matter of the assurances, and upon
which they do rely as true in making such
contracts, and hut for which they would not
have thus contracted, and the denial of the
truth of the assurances would be injurious
to the contractual rights of such person, the
person giving the assurances is estopped
from denying their truth as to such persons.
The fact, in a case like this, that the person
made the assurances in good faith, and with-
out design to defraud, cannot relieve or
avoid the doctrine of estoppel, because he
, intended the other party to rely upon the
truth of the assurances, and he did rely upon
them in contracting, and would not have
thus contracted but for such reliance; and
it would be a fraud upon him to allow the
person to deny the truth of them to the detri-
ment of the other party. See Rudd v.
Mathews, 79 Ky. -179. The writing delivered
to the pa_vees of the note, and exhibited to
the appellees by the payees to induce them
to purchase it, and upon the assurances of
which they relied in making the purchase,
was equivalent to personal assurances made
to the appellees by the appellant, face to
face, to induce them to make the purchase,
and upon which theyyrelied in making the
purchase. But, as said, the court held the
burden to be upon the appellees; conse-
quently it allowed them to open and con-
The appellant com-
3 plains of that ruling. We have decided that
an error in that particular is a reversible er-
ror. The Civil Code, § 526. provides as fol-
lows: "The burden of proof in the whole ac-
tion lies on the party who would be defeated
if no evidence was given on either side."
The note sued on being prima facie evidence
(the signature being admitted) that the pay-
or was indebted according to its terms, the
burden was upon him to establish the alle-
gations of fraud and want of consideration.
Those allegations being traversed, and if no
proof was offered establishing them, the
appellees would be entitled to judgment on
the note; hence the burden thus far was
on the appellant to establish the allegations
of fraud and want of consideration; and.
failing to establish that issue, the appellees
would be entitled to judgment for the full
amount of the note. The plea of estoppel
in event of such failure would cut no figure.
for, the proof having failed on the issue of
fraud and no consideration, the appciiecs
would he entitled to judgment on the note;
so, notwithstanding, the appellees, in case
the plea of fraud and no consideration was
established, would, in order to avoid the
effect of it, be compelled to establish by
proof their plea of estoppel, yet, in case there
was no proof offered, they would be entitled
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Case No. 127] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
CRABTREE v. ATCHISON et aL 
(20 S. W. 200, 93 Ky. 838.) 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 1, 1892. 
Appeal trom circuit court, Daviess county. 
Action by J. D. Atchison and others against 
Moses Crabtree. Judgment for plaintiffs. 
Defendant appeals. Reversed. 
Sweeney, Ellis & Sweeney, tor appellant. 
Weir, Welr & Walker, for appellees. 
BEXNKTT, J. The appellant executed to 
J, McDanrlch & Co. a promiBBOry note for 
$102.60. l\lcDanrlch & Co. aBSlgned the note, 
before Its maturity, to the appellees. They 
brought suit on lt. The appellant answered 
that the note was obtained from him by the 
fraud of the payees, and that lt was without 
consideration, having been executed for a 
lightning rod that was utterly worthless. 
The appellees, replying, traversed these alle-
gations. They further alleged that when the 
appellant executed and delivered the note to 
McDanrlch & Co. he executed and delivered 
to them two writings. The one deemed ma-
terial to the question at lBBUe ls as follows: 
"To all whom It may concern: This ls to 
certify that a note executed by me to J. Mc-
Danrlch & Co., for $102.60, ls a bona fide 
debt against me. There ls no offset, dis-
count, or defense against the same, and the 
same ls good against me for the full amount 
thereof, and will be paid to the said J. Mc-
Danrlch & Co., or to such persons as they 
may assign said note to." (Signed, etc.) The 
appellees further alleged that they purchtls-
ed said note for value, and without notice 
of the alleged fraud or want of considera-
tion, and that at the time of the negotiation 
for the note the writing, supra. was exhibited 
to them, and they purchased the note upon 
the faith of the assurances therein contain· 
ed. The appellant rejoined, denying that ap-
pellees knew of the contents of said writing, 
or that they purchased the note upon the 
faith of the assurances therein contained. 
On the trial of the case the lower court rul-
ed that the buraen was on the appellees; con-
sequentl~· they were entitled to conclude the 
arguml'nt. The appellees obtained judgment 
on the note, and the appellant bas appealed. 
Under the Instructions of the court, to 
which there Is no serious objection, the jury 
was authorized from the evidence to find 
that the said writing was exhibited to ap-
pellees at the time they purchased the note. 
and that they purchased It upon the faith of 
the ll88Urances therein contained. But It 
does not appear that the appellant Issued 
and delivered the writing wltll the purpose 
ot defrauding or deceiving the appellees, or 
any one else. So the question ls, there being 
no actual fraudulent or deceitful purpose on 
the part of the appellant In Issuing and de-
livering Sllfd JJRJJN, does the doctrine of es-
toppel npplr In favor of the nppellees. they 
hdYin:; pm·t•hmwd said note for value, and 
:100 
without notice of the alleged Infirmities, and 
upon the faith of the aBSurances contained 
ln said writing? In a case like this, where a 
person has made certain assurances upon 
which he Intends third persons to rely as 
true in contracting In reference to the sub-
ject-matter of the assurances, and upon 
which they do rely as true In making such 
contracts, and but for which they would not 
have thus contracted, and the denial of the 
truth or the assuraucetl would be Injurious 
to the contractual rlghb! of such person, the 
person giving the assurances ls estopped 
from denying their truth as to such persons. 
The tact, in a case like this, that tbe person 
made the assurances In good faith, and with· 
out design to defraud, cannot relieve or 
aYold the doctrine of estoppel, because be 
Intended the other party to rely upon the 
truth of the assurances, and be did rely upon 
them In contracting, and would not have 
thus contracted but for such reliance; and 
It would be a fraud upon him to allow the 
person to deny the truth of them to the detri-
ment of the other party. See Rudd v. 
Mathews, 79 Ky. 479. The writing delivered 
to the payees of the note, and exhibited to 
the appellees by the payees to Induce them 
to purchRse It, and upon the assurances of 
which they relied In making the purchase, 
was equh·alent to personal assurances made 
to the appellees by the appellant, face to 
face, to Induce them to make the purchase, 
and upon which they relied In making the 
purchase. But, as Bald, the court held the 
burden to be upon the appellees; conse-
quently It allowed them to open and con-
clude the argument. The appellant com-
plains of that ruling. We have decided that 
an error In that particular ls a reversible er-
ror. The Civil Code, I 526. provides as fol-
lows: ''The burden of proof ln the whole ae-
tlon lies on the party who would be defeated 
It no evidence was given on either side." 
The note sued on being prlma racle evidence 
(the signature being admitted) that the pay-
or was Indebted according to Its terms, the 
burden was upon him to establish the alle-
gations of fraud and want of consideration. 
Those allegations being traversed, and It no 
proof was offered establishing them, the 
appellees would be entitled to Judgment on 
the note; hence the burden thus far was 
on the appellant to establish the allegations 
ot fraud and want of consideration; and, 
falllng to establish that 188ne, the appellees 
would be entitled to judgment tor the full 
amount of the note. The plea of estoppel 
In event ot such failure would cut no figure, 
for, the proof having failed on the Issue of 
fraud and no consideration, the appel!ees 
would be entitled to judgment on the note; 
so, notwlthstnndlng, the appellees, In case 
the plea of fraud and no consideration was 
established, would, In order to avoid tire 
ell'ect of It. be compelled to establish- by 
proof their plea of estoppel, yet, In cue th1>re 
was no proof ot'l'ered, they would be entitled 
RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. [Case N0. 127
to judgment 1'01‘ their demand. Hence, as entitled to conclude the argument. For that
judgment would have been rendered against reason the judgment is reversed, and the
the appellant in case no proof had been of- case is relnanded for further proceedings
tered, the burden was upon him, and he was consistent with this opinion.
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RIGHT TO OPEN A.ND CLOSE. (Ciase No. 127 
to judgment fot thelr demand. ~ence, as 
judgment would have been rendered against 
the appellant In case no proof bad been of-
tered, the burden was upon him, and he was 
• 
entitled to conclude the argument. For that 
reason the judgment le reversed, and the 
case le remanded for further proceedtnp 
CODBlstent with th1• ·opinion. 
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Case No. 128]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. ARMES.
(2 Sup. Ct. 840, 107 U. S. 519.)
Supreme Court of the United States. May 7,
1883.
In error to the supreme court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
A. G. Riddle, for plaintiff in error. S.
Shellaberger, A. A. Birney, and C. H. Armes,
for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion
of the court.
This was an action to recover damages for
injuries received by the plaintiffs intestate,
Du Bose, from a fall caused by a defective
sidewalk in the city of Washington. In 1873
the board of public works of the city caused
the grade of the carriage-way of Thirteenth
street, between F and G streets, to be low-
ered several feet. The distance between the
curbstone of the carriage-way and the line
of the adjacent building was 36 feet. At the
time the accident to the deceased occurred,
this portion of the street——sidewalk it may
be termed, to designate it from the carriage-
way, although only a part of it is given up
to foot passcngers—was, for 48 feet north of
F street, lowered in its whole width to the
same grade as the carriage-way. But, for
some distance beyond that point, only 12 feet
of the sidewalk was cut down, thus leaving
an abrupt descent of about 2 feet at a dis-
tance of 12 feet from the curb. At this de-
scent—from the elevated to the lowered part
of the sidewalk-there were 3 steps, but the
place was not guarded either at its side or
end. Nothing was placed to warn foot pas-
sengers of the danger.
On the night of February 21, 1877, Du
Bose, a contract surgeon of the United States
army, while walking down Thirteenth street,
towards F street, fell down this descent,
and, striking _upon his knees, received a con-
‘ cussion which injured his spine and pro-
duced partial paralysis, resulting in the im-
pairment of his mind and ultimately in his
death, which occurred since the trial below.
The present action was for the injury thus
sustained. He was himself a witness, and it
appeared from his testimony that his mind
was feeble. His statement was not always
as direct and clear as would be expected
from a man in the full vigor of his mind.
Still it was not incoherent, nor unintelligible,
but evinced a full knowledge of the matters
in relation to which he was testifying. A
ph_vsician of the government hospital for the
insane, to which the deceased was taken
two years afterwards, testified that he was
affected with acute melancholy; that some-
times it was impossible to get a word from
him; that his memory was impaired, but
that he was able to make a substantially
correct statement of facts which transpired
before the injury took place, though, from
the impairment of his memory, he might
leave out some important part; that then-
would be some confusion of ideas in his
mind; and that he should not be held re-
sponsible for any criminal act. A physician
of the Freedmen’s Hospital, in which the
deceased was at one time a patient after his
injuries, testifled to a more deranged condi-
tion of his mind, and that he was, when
there in June, 1879, insane. He had at-
tempted to commit suicide, and had stuck a
fork into his neck several times. Upon this.
and other testimony of similar import, and
the feebleness exhibited by the deceased on
the stand, the counsel for the city requested
the court to withdraw his testimony from the
jury, on the ground that his mental faculties
were so far impaired as to render him-in-
competent to testify as a witness. This the
court refused to do, but instructed the jury
that his testimony must be taken with some
allowance, considering his condition of mind
and his incapacity to remember all the cir-
cumstances which might throw some light
on his present condition. This refusal and
Iruling of the court constitute the first error
assigned.
The ruling of the court and its instruction
to the jury were entirely correct. It is un-
doubtedly true that a lunatic or insane per-
son may, from the condition of his mind. not
be a competent witness. His incompetency
on that ground, like incompetency for any
other cause, must be passed upon by the
court, and to aid its judgment evidence of
his condition is admissible. But lunacy or in-
sanity assumes so many forms, and is so
often partial in its extent, being frequently
confined to particular subjects, while there
is full intelligence on others, that the pow-
er of the court is to be exercised with the
greatest caution. The books are full of cases
where persons showing mental derangement
on some subjects evince a high degree of in-
telligence and wisdom on others. The ex-
istence of partial insanity does not unfit in-
dividuals so affected for the transaction of
business on all subjects, nor from giving a
perfectly accurate and lucid statement of
what they have seen or heard. In a. case in
the prerogative court of Canterbury, counsel
stated that partial insanity was unknown to
the law of England; but the court replied
that if by this was meant that the law never
deems a person both sane and insane at one
and the same time, upon one and the same
subject, the assertion was a truism; and ad-
ded: “If, by that position, it be meant and
intended that the law of England never
deems a party both sane and insane at differ-
ent times upon the same subject, and both
sane and insane at the same time upon dif-
ferent subjects, there can scarcely be a posi-
tion more destitute of legal foundation; or,
rather, there can scarcely be one more ad-
verse to the stream and current of legal au-
thority." Dew v. Clark, 3 Add. Ecc. '79, 94.
The general rule. therefore, is that a lu-
natic or a person affected with insanity is
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Case No. 128] PHODUCTIOY AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
DISTRICT OF COLU:\IBIA T. ARMES. 
(2 Sup. Ct. 840, 107 U. S. 519.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Ma7 7, 
1883. 
In error to the supreme court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 
A. G. Riddle, for plaintttr In error. 8. 
Rhellaberger, A. A. Birney, and C. H . .Armes, 
tor defendant in error. 
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion 
of the court. 
Thie was an action to recover damages for 
injuries received by the plalntUf'e Intestate, 
Du Bose, from a fall caused by a defective 
sidewalk in the city of Washington. In 1873 
the board of public works of the city caused 
the grade of the carriage-way of Thirteenth 
street, between F and G streets, to be .low-
ered several feet. 'nle distance between the 
curbstone of the carriage-way and the line 
ot the adjacent building was 36 feet. At the 
time the accident to the deceased occurred, 
this portion of the street-sidewalk it may 
be termed, to designate It from the carriage-
way, although only a part of It le given up 
to toot passengers-was, for 48 feet north of 
F street, lowered in lts whole width to the 
same gmde as the carriage-way. But, for 
some dlstanee beyond that point, only 12 feet 
of the sidewalk was cut down, thus lea vlng 
an abrupt descent of about 2 feet at a dis-
tance of 12 feet from the curb. At this de-
scent-from the elevated to the lowered part 
of the sidewalk-there were 3 steps, but the 
pince was not guarded either at Its side or 
end. Nothing was placed to warn foot pas-
sengers of the danger. 
On the night ot February 21, 1877, Du 
Bose, a contract surgeon of the United States 
army, while walking down Thirteenth etrt>et, 
towards F street, fell down this descent, 
and, striking ,µpon his knees, recel ved a con-
cussion which lnju!'ed hie spine and pro-
duced partial paralysis, resulting In the im-
pnlrment of his mind and ultimately In his 
death, which occurred since the trial below. 
The present action was for the injury thus 
sustained. He was himself a witness, and It 
appeared from his testimony that his mind 
was feeble. His statement was not always 
as direct and clear as would be expected 
from a man In the full vigor of hie mind. 
Still It was not Incoherent, nor unintelligible, 
' but e\'lnced a full knowledge of the matters 
In relation to which he was testifying. A 
physician of the government ho11pltal for the 
Insane, to which the deceased was taken 
two years afterwnn:ls, testified that he was 
affected with acute melancholy; that some-
times it was lmpoRSlble to get a word from 
him; that his men..ory was Impaired, but 
that he was able to make a substantially 
rorrect statement of facts which transpired 
before the Injury took place, though, from 
the Impairment of his memory, be might 
368 
leave out some Important pnrt; that ther•~ 
would be some confusion of Ideas In his 
mind; and that he should not be held re-
sponsible for any cnmlnal act. A physician 
of the Freedmen's Hospital, In which the 
deceased was at one time a patient after his 
injuries, testlfted to a more deranged condl· 
tlon of his mind, and that he was, when 
there In June. 1879, Insane. He had at-
tem11ted to commit sul<'lde, and had stu<'k a 
fork Into hie neck several times. 'Cpon this. 
and other testimony of similar Import, and 
the feebleness exhibited by the deceased on 
the stand, the counsel for the city requested 
the court to withdraw his testimony from the 
jury, on the ground that hie mental faculties 
were so far Impaired u to render him · In· 
competent to testify u a wltneBB. This the 
court refused to do, but lnetmcted the jury 
that hie testimony must be taken with some 
allowance, considering hllf condition of mind 
and his Incapacity to remember all the cir-
cumstances which might throw some light 
on hie present condition. Thie refusal and 
•ruling of the court constitute the first error 
assigned. 
The ruling of the court and Its instruction 
to the jury were entirely correct. It ts un-
doubtedly true that a lunatic or Insane per-
son may, from the condition of bis mind, not 
be a competent witness. Bis Incompetency 
on that ground, like incompetency for any 
other cause, must be pueed upon by the 
court, and to aid Its judgment evidence of 
hie condition Is admlBBlble. But lunacy or In· 
sanity assumes so many forms, and ls so 
often partial In Its extent, being frequently 
confined to particular subjects, while there 
ls full lntelllgence on others, that the pow· 
er of the court Is to be exercised with the 
greatest caution. The books are full of cases 
where persons showing mental derangement 
on some subjects evince a hlich degree of In-
telligence and wisdom on others. The ex-
istence of partial Insanity does not unfit In· 
dlvlduals so atrected tor the transaction of 
business on all subjects, nor from giving a 
perfectly accurate and lucid statement of 
what they have seen or heanl. In a case In 
the prerogative court of Canterbury, counsel 
stated that partial Insanity was unknown to 
the law of England; but the court replied 
that If by this was mt>ant that the law never 
deems a person both sane and lnsa.ne at one 
and the same time, upon one and the same 
subject, the assertion was a truism; and ad· 
ded: "If, by that position, It be meant and 
ll!tended that the law of England never 
deems a party both sane and Insane at differ· 
ent times upon the same subject, and both 
sane and Insane at the same time upon dif-
ferent subjects, there can eCJtrcely be a posi-
tion more destitute of legal foundation; or, 
rather, there <'RD scarcely be one more ad-
vel'se to the strenm and current of legal au-
thority." Dew v. Clark. 3 Add. Ecc. 79, 94. 
The general rule, therefore, le that a lu-
natic or a person affected with Insanity la 
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.
[Case No. 128
admissible as a witness if he have suflicient
understanding to apprehend the obligation of
an oath, and to be capable of giving a cor-
rect account of the matters which he has
seen or heard in reference to the questions
at issue; and whether he have that under-
standing is a question to be determined by
the court, upon examination of the party
lliniself, and any competent witnesses who
can speak to the nature and extent of his
insanity. Such was the decision of the court
of criminal appeal in England, in the case of
Reg. v. Hill, 5 Cox, Cr. Cas. 259. There the
prisoner had been convicted of manslaugh-
ter; and on the trial a witness had been
admitted whose incompetency was urged on
the ground of alleged insanity. lie was a
patient in a lunatic asylum, under the de-
lusion that he had a number of spirits about
him which were continually talking to him,
but the medical superintendent testifled that
he was capable of giving an account of any
transaction that happened before his eyes;
that he had always found him so; and that
it was solely with reference to the delusion
about the spirits that he considered him a.
lunatic. The witness himself was called,
and he testified as follows: “I am fully
aware I have a spirit, and 20,000 of them.
They are not all mine. I must inquire. I
can where I am. I know which are mine.
Those that ascend from my stomach and
my head, and also those in my ears. I
don’t know how many they are. The flesh
creates spirits by the palpitation of the
nerves and the rheumatics. All are now in
my body and around my head. They speak
to me incessantly, particularly at night.
That spirits are immortal, I am taught by
my religion from my childhood. No matter
how faith goes, all live after my death, those
that belong to me and those that do not."
After much more of this kind of talk he
added: “They speak to me instantly; they
are speaking to me now; they are not sep-
arate from me; they are around me speak-
ing to me now; but I can't be a spirit, for I
am flesh and blood. They can go in and out
through walls and places which I can-
not." He also stated his opinion of what it
was to take an oath: “When I swear,” he
said, “I appeal to the Almighty. It is per-
jury, the breaking of a lawful oath, or tak-
ing an unlawful one; he that does it will
go to hell for all eternity." He was then
sworn, and gave a perfectly collected and
rational account of a transaction which he
declared that he had witnessed. He was in
some doubt as to the day of the week on
which it took place, and on cross-examina-
tion said: “These creatures insist upon it,
it was Tuesday night, and I think it was
Monday;” whereupon he was asked: “ls
what you have told us, what the spirits told
you, or what you recollected without the
spirits?" And he said: “No; the spirits as-
sist me in speaking of the date; 1 thought
it was Monday, and they told me it was
wn.ous,1~:v.—24
Christmas eve, Tuesday; but I was an eye-
witness, an ocular witness, to the fall to
the ground." The question was reserved for
the opinion of the court whether this witness
was competent, and after a very elaborate
discussion of the subject it was held that he
was. Chief Justice Campbell said that he
entertained no doubt that the rule laid down
by Baron Parke, in an unreported case which
had been referred to, was correct, that where-
ever a delusion of an insane character ex-
ists in any person who is called as a witness,
it is for the judge to determine whether the
person so called has a sutilcient sense of re-
ligion in his mind and a. suiiicicnt under-
standing of the nature of an oath, and it is
for the jury to decide what amount of cred-
it they will give to his testimony. “Various
authorities," said the chief justice, “have
been referred to, which lay down the law
that a person non compos nientis is not an
admissible witness; but in what sense is the
expression ‘non compos mentis’ employed?
If a person be so to such an extent as not
to understand the nature of an oath, he is
not admissible. But a person subject to a
considerable amount of insane delusion may
yet be under the sanction of an oath, and
capable of giving very material evidence up-
on the subject-matter under consideration."
And the chief justice added: “The proper
test must always be, does the lunatic under-
stand what he is saying; and does he under-
stand the obligation of an aath? The lu-
natic may be examined himself, that his
siaie of mind may be discovered, and wit-
nesses may be adduced to show in what
state of sanity or insanity he actually is;
still, if he can stand the test proposed, the
jury must determine all the rest.” He also
observed that in a lunatic asylum the pa-
tients are often the only witnesses of out-
rages upon themselves and others, and there
would be impunity for offenses committed in
such places if the only persons who can_give
information are not to be heard. Baron Al-
derson, Justice Coleridge, Baron I‘latt, and
Justice Talfourd agreed with the chief jus-
tice, the latter observing that “if the propo-
sition that a person suffering under an in-
sane delusion cannot be a witness were
maintained to the fullest extent, every man
subject to the most innocent, unreal fancy
would be excluded. Martin Luther believed
that he had a personal conflict with the
devil. Dr. Johnson was persuaded that he
had heard his mother speak to him after
death. In every case the judge must deter-
mine according to the circumstances and ex-
tent of the delusion. Unless judgment and
discrimination be applied to each particular
case, there may be the most disastrous con-
sequences.” This case is also found in Den--
ison & P. Cr. Cas. 254, where Lord Camp-
bell is reported to have said that the rule
contended for would have excluded the tes-
timony of Socrates, for he had one spirit
always prompting him. The doctrine of this
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COMPETENCY OF wrrNESSES. [Case .No. 128 
admissible as a witness if he have sufllcieut Ohrlstwas eYe, Tuesday; but I was an eye-
underatandiog to apprehend the obligation of witness, an ocular witness, to the fall to 
an oath, and to be capable of giving a cor- the ground." The question was reserved for 
rect account of the matters which he has the opinion of the court whether this witness 
seen or heard in reference to the questions was competent, and after a very elaborate 
at issue; and whether he have that under- discussion of the subject it was held that he 
standing la a question to be determined by was. Chief Justice Campbell said that he 
the court. upon examination of the party entertained no doubt that the rule laid down 
himself, and any competent witnesses who by Baron Parke, in an unreported case which 
can speak to the nature and extent of his bad been referred to, was correct, that where-
lDBllnity. Such was the decision of the court ever a delusion of an insane character ex-
of criminal appeal ln England, ln the case of lats in any person who 111 called as a witness, 
Reg. v. HUI. 5 Oox, Cr. Ca& 259. There the lt la for the judge to determine whether the 
prisoner bad been convicted of manslaugh- person so called has a sumcient sense of re-
ter; and on the trial a witness had been llglon in his mind and a suftlclent under-
admitted whose incompetency was urged on standing of the nature of an oath, and 1t la 
the ground of alleged insanity. He was a for the jury to decide what amount of cNd-
patient in a lunatic asylum, under the de- 1t they will give to his testimony. "Various 
luslon that he had a number of spirits about authorities," 88Jd the chief justice, "have 
him which were continually talking to hiru, been referred to, which lay down the law 
but the medical superintendent testltled that that a person non compos mentls la not an 
he was capable of giving an account of any admissible witness; but in what sense ls the 
transaction that happened before his eyes; expression 'non compos mentis' employed? 
that he had always found him so; and that If a person be so to su<'h an extent as not 
It was solely with reference to the delusion to understand the nature of an oath, he la 
about the spirits that he conslden>d hlm a not admissible. But a. person subject to a 
lunatic. The witneu himself was called, constderable amount of lIJ.8lllle delusion may 
and be testified as follows: "I am fully yet be under the sanction of an oath, a.nd 
aware I have a spirit, and 20,000 of them. capable of giving very material evidence up-
They are not all mine. I must inquire. I on the aubject-matter under consideration." 
can where I am. I know which are mine. And the chief justice added: "The proper 
Tholle that ucend from my atomach and test must always be, doea the lunatic under-
my head. and also those in my ears. I atand what he ls saying; and does he under-
doo't know how many they are. The ftesh stand the obligation of an .tath? The lu-
createa spirits by the palpitation of the natlc may be examined himself, ·that his 
nerves and the rheumatics. All are now in I state of mind may be discovered, and wlt-
my body and around my head. They speak nesses may be adduced to ahow In what 
to me lncessa.ntly, particularly at night. atate of sanity or insanity be actually le; 
That spirits are immortal, I am taught by stlll, if he can stand the test proposed, the 
my religion from my childhood. No matter jury must determine all the rest." He also 
how faith goes, all live after my death, those observed that In a lunatic asylum the pa-
that belong to me and those that do not." tients are often the only witnesses of out-
Atter much more of this kind of talk he rages upon themselves and others, and there 
added: "They apeak to me instantly; they would be Impunity for ofrenfl('s <.'Ommltted in 
are spenkiDI' to me now; they are not sep- such places If the ouly persons who can.give 
arate from me; they a.re around me speak- Information are not to be heard. Baron Al-
log to me now; but I can't be a spirit, for I derson, Justice Coleridge, Baron Platt, anti 
am flesh and blood. They can go In and out Justice Talfourd agreed with the chief jus-
through walls and places which I can- tice, the latter observing that "if the propc,. 
not.·• He also stated his ovinion of what it sitlon that a person suffering under an in-
was to take an oath: "When I swear," he sane delusion cannot be a witness were 
said, "I appeal to the Almighty. It ls per- nialntalned to the fullest extent, every man 
jury, the breaking of a lawful oath, or tak- subject to the most innocent, unreal fancy 
Ing an unlawful one; he that does it wlll would be exeluded. Martin Luther belleved 
go to hell for all eternity." He was then that he had a personal conflict with the 
sworn, and gave a perfectly colle<·ted aad devll. Dr. Johnson was persundPd that he 
mtionnl account of a transa<'tlon whl<'h he I had heard his mother speak to him after 
declared that he had wltnessPd. He was in I death. In every case the judge must deter-
some doubt as to the day of the week on 1 mine ac<'ording to the circumstances and ex-
which it took place, and on cross-examina- ! tent of the delusion. Unless judgment and 
tton said: "These creaturPs insist upon lt, I 1ll11<'rlminatlon be applled to each particular 
It was Tuesday night, and I think it was 1 c·usP, there mny be the most disastrous con-
Monday;" whereu1lon he was asked: "Is i sequPnces." This <'&Ile Is also found In .Den-
what vou have tt>ld us, what the spirlt11 told I Ison & P. Cr. Oas. 2r>4, where Lord Oamp-
you, or what you recollected without the I bell ls rl.'ported to have said that the rule 
spirits?" And he said: "No; the spirits as- I contended for would have excluded the tes-
Blat me in apeaking of the date; I thought ttmony of Socrates, for he bad one spirit 
lt was :Monday, and they told me lt was always prompting him. The doctrine of thla 
WlLOUS,EV.-24 ZG!> 
Case No. 128]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
decision has not been overruled, that we are
aware of, and it entirely disposes of the
question raised here.
On the trial, a member of the metropolitan
police, who saw the deceased fall on the side‘-
wulk and went to his assistance, was asked,
after testifying to the accident, whether,
while he was on his beat, other accidents
had happened at that place. The court al-
lowed the question, against the objection of
the city's counsel, for the purpose of show-
ing the condition of the street, and the lia-
bility ot other persons to fall there. The
witness answered that he had seen persons
stumble over there. He remembered send-
ing home in a hack a. woman who had fallen
there, and had seen as many as five persons
fall there.
The admission of this testimony is now
urged as error, the point of the objection be-
ing that it tended to introduce collateral is-
sues and thus mislead the jury from the mat-
ter directly in controversy. Were such the
case the objection would be tenable, but no
dispute was made as to these accidents, no
question was raised as to the extent of the
injuries received, no point was made upon
them, no recovery was sought by reason or
them, nor any increase of damages. They
were proved simply as circumstances which,
with other evidence, tended to show the dan-
gerous character of the sidewalk in its un-
guarded condition. The frequency ot acci-
dents at a particuar place would seem to be
good evidence of its dangerous character-at
least, it is some evidence to that effect. Per-
sons are not wont to seek such places, and
do not willingly fall into them. Here the
character of the place was one of the sub-
jects of inquiry to which attention was call-
ed by the nature of the action and the plead-
ings, and the defendant should have been
prepared to show its real character in the
face of any proof bearing on that subject.
Besides this, as publicity was necessarily
given to the accidents, they also tended to
show that the dangerous character of the lo-
cality was brought to the attention of the
city authorities.
In Quinlan v. City of Utica, 11 Hun, 217,
which was before the supreme court of New
York, in an action to recover damages for in-
juries sustained by the plaintifi through the
neglect of the city to repair its sidewalk, he
was allowed to show that while it was out
of repair other persons had slipped and fall-
en on the walk where he was injured. It
370
was objected that the testimony presented
new issues which. the defendant could not
be prepared to meet, but the court said: “In
one sense every item of testimony material
to the main issue introduces a new issue;
that is to say. it calls for a reply. In no
other sense did the testimony in question
make a new issue. Its only importance was
that it bore upon the main issue, and all
legitimate testimony bearing upon that is-
sue, the defendant was required to be pre-
pared for." This case was aflirmed by the
court of appeals of New York, all the judges
concurring, except one, who was absent. 74
N. Y. 603.
In an action against the city of Chicago.
to recover damages resulting from the death
of a person who in the night stepped oi! an
approach to a bridge while it was swinging
around to enable a vessel to pass, and was
drowned,—it being alleged that the accident
happened by reason of the neglect of the city
to supply sufiicient lights to enable persons
to avoid such dangers,—the supreme court
of Illinois hcld that it was competent tor
the plaintiff to prove that another person
had, under the same circumstances. met with
a similar accident. City of Chicago v. Pow-
ers, 42 Ill. 169. To the objection that the evi-
dence was inadmissible, the court said:
“The action was based upon the negligence
of the city in failing to keep the bridge prop-
erly lighted. If another person had met
with a similar fate at the same place, and
from a like cause, it would tend to show a
knowledge on the part of the city that there
was inattcntion on the part of their agents
having charge of the bridge, and that they
had failed to provide proper means for the
protection of persons crossing on the bridge.
As it tended to prove this fact it was admis-
sible; and if the appellants had desired to
guard against its improper application by the
jury, they should have asked an instruction
limiting it to its legitimate purpose.”
Other cases to the same general purport
might be cited. See City of Augusta v. Ha-
fers, 61 Ga. 48; House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn.
6'30; Oalkins v. Gity of Hartford, 33 Conn.
57; Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401;
Hill v. Portland & R. R. Co., 55 Me. 439;
Kent v. Town of Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; City of
Delphi v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520. The above.
however, are suificient to sustain the action
of the court below in admitting the testimo-
ny to which objection was taken. Judgment
atfirmed.
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Case No. 128] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
decision has not been overruled, that we are 
aware of, :md It entirely disposes of the 
question ralaed here. 
On the trial, a member of the metropolltan 
police, who saw the deeensed fall on the slde"-
wulk and went to his alll:llstance, was asked, 
after testifying to the accident, whether, 
while be was on hie beat, other accidents 
had happened at that place. The <.'OUrt al-
lowed the question, agalnet the objection of 
the city's counsel, for the purpose of show-
ing the condition of the street, and the Ila· 
blllty of other persons to tall there. The 
witness answered that he had seen persons 
stumble over there. He remembered send-
ing home In a hack a woman who had fallen 
there, and had seen as many as 11.ve persons 
tall there. 
The admission of this testimony Is now 
urged as error, the point of the objeetlon be-
ing that It tended to Introduce collateral Is-
sues and thll8 mislead the jury from the mat-
ter directly In controversy. Were such the 
case the objeetlon would be tenable, but no 
dispute was made as to these accidents, no 
question was raised aa to the extent of the 
lnJurles received, no point was made upon 
them, no recovery was sought by reason of 
them, nor any Increase of damages. They 
were proved simply as circumstances which, 
with other evidence, tended to show the dan-
ge1-ous character of the sidewalk In Its un-
guarded condltton. The frequency of acc1-
<1en ts at a partlcuar place would seem to be 
good evidence of Its dangerous cbaracter-at 
least, It Is some evidence to that eft'ect. Per-
sons are not wont to seek such places, and 
do not wllllngly fall Into them. Here the 
<'haracter of the place was one of the sub-
jects of Inquiry to which attention was call-
ed by the nature of the action and the plead-
ings, and the defendant should have been 
prepared to show Its reel character In the 
face of any proof bearing on that subject. 
Besides this, as publicity was necessarily 
given to the accidents, they also tended to 
show that the dangerous charocter of the lo-
cality was brought to the attention of the 
city authorities. 
In Quinlan v. City of Utica, 11 Hun, ~17, 
which was before the supreme court or New 
York, In an actkm to recover damages for ln-
jurles sustained by the plalntur through the 
nei:leet of the city to repair Its sidewalk, he 
was allowed to show that while It was out 
of repair other persons bad slipped and fall-
en on the walk where he was Injured. It 
370 
was objected that the te&tlmony presented 
new Issues which the defendant could not 
be prepared to meet, but the court said: "In 
one sense every Item of testimony material 
to the main Issue Introduces a new Issue; 
that ls to say, It calls for a reply. In no 
other sense did the testimony in question 
make a new Issue. Its only Importance was 
that It bore upon the main Issue, and all 
legitimate testimony bearing upon that is-
sue, the defendant was required to be pre-
pared tor." This case was amrmed by the 
court of appeals of New York, all the judges 
concmTlng, except one, who was absent. 74 
'!>\. Y. 603. 
In an action against the elty of CMcag:i. 
to recover damages resulting from the death 
of a person who In the night stepped off. an 
approach to a bridge while It was swinging 
around to enable a vessel to pa88, and was 
drowned,-lt being alleged that the accident 
happened by reason or the negleet of the city 
to supply suffi.clent lighte to enable persons 
to avoid such dangere,-the supreme court 
of Illinois held that it was competent tor 
the plalntitr to prove that another person 
had, under the same circumstances, met with 
a similar accident. City of Chicago v. Pow-
ers, 42 Ill. 169. To the objeetlon that the evi-
dence was Inadmissible, the court said: 
"The action was based upon the negligence 
of the city In falUng to keep the bridge prop-
erly lighted. If another person had met 
with a slmllar fate at the same place, and 
from a like cause, it would tend to 11how a 
knowledge on the part of the city th&t there 
was inattention on the part of their agents 
having charge of the bridge, and that they 
had failed to provide proper means for the 
protection of persons croselng on the bridge. 
As It tended to prove this fact It was admis-
sible; and If the appellants had desired to 
guard against Its Improper application by the 
jury, they should han asked an Instruction 
limiting it to its lei,'1timate purpose." 
Other cases to the same general purport 
might be cited. See City of Augusta v. Ha-
ters, 61 Ga. 48; House v. :Metce.lt, 27 Conn. 
G30; Calkins v. Olty of Hartford, 33 Conn. 
r.7; Darling v. We11tmoreland, 52 N. H. 401; 
Hill v. Portland & R. R. Co., 00 Me. 439; 
Kent v. Town of Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; City of 
Delphi v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520. The above. 
however, are su!Dclent to sustain the action 
of the court below In admitting the testimo-
ny to which objection was taken. Judgment 
affi.rmed. 
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.
[cm No. 129
HUGHES v. DETROIT, G. H. & M. RY.
CO.1
(31 N. W. 603, 65 Mich. 10.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. Feb. 10, 1887.
Error to superior court of Detroit.
Action against a railroad company to re-
cover for personal injuries. Judgment for
plaintiil. Defendant appeals.
Seth E. Engle, for plaintiff. E. W. Med-
daugh, for defendant and appcllant.
CAMPBELL, C. J . Plaintiff, a little colored
boy, who is now between six and seven years
old, and was, when injured, five years old or
under, recovered judgment in the superior
court of Detroit for personal injuries causing
the loss of a leg and some other damage. In
July, 1884, towards the close of the day, but
during daylight, according to the claim of
his declaration, he was on the front of a
switching locomotive which was making up
and distributing freight tra.ins, and standing
upon a plank step used for switchmeu and
brnkemen to stand upon in their yard-work,
and, as he asserts, was thrown off by a sud-
den start or a sudden stop, and run over. The
negligence alleged was the failure of the train-
men to put him otf before moving, and the
rapid action in starting and stopping. Other
facts were set up concerning the condition
of the yard in which the accident happened,
which ran trom Hastings street across a
block, and the use of it as a place of pastime
by children, and some similar matters, all of
which, although gone into on the trial, were
finally ruled to be improper by the judge in
his charge. This final ruling was in accord-
ance with the decision of this court in Chicago
& N. W. R. Co. v. Smith, 46 Mich. 50-l, 9 N.
W. 830, concerning such premises, where it
was held, in a very similar case in all its
circumstances, that the company could not be
held, under such circumstances, for anything
less than wanton and gross negligence in-
volving reckless misconduct.
Under the charge, as already given. the
jury were directed not to find for plaintiff
unless the engineer actually saw the plain-
tit! on the toot-board. If so, the court held
he should not have started the train while the
boy was on it, but should have ordered him
off; and, in giving this charge, the court
said it was conceded that the boy was on the
foot-board, and assumed the boy said the en-
gineer saw him before starting. It was not
disputed, but admitted on the argument in
this court, that, if the engineer actually saw
the boy on the foot-board before moving, he
would be bound to use efilcient care to pre-
vent injury to him; but it is denied that he
was on the foot-board, or, it so, was een by
the engineer, or any one else, in that position.
The fact that the boy himself is the only wit-
1 Dissenting opinion of Morse, J ., omitted.
ness who says the engineer saw him renders
another question important, which is how far
his testimony was admissible.
Upon examining the testimony, we find that,
while there are witnesses for piaintiif who
swear to his being on the foot-board, they
do not agree as to the circumstances or cause
of his being thrown from the board. On the
part of the defense there is testimony which
is not consistent with his being there, as well
as positive testimony that he was not seen
if there. The declaration does not aver that
he was seen. but merely that he might have
been seen with proper diligence, but it does
aver he was on the board and thrown off.
There was conflicting testimony as to the like-
lihood or possibility of seeing him on the
board. He himself says he ran back and
forth over it while the engine was not 1nov-
ing, and finally got on it just before starting,
and then stayed on till he fell off. He also
says he faced the engine, while the other tes-
timony would not so indicate. All of this
shows the great importance of this particular
fact, and the danger of assuming it when
the testimony conflicted. So it was equally
important to know whether, it seen at all, he
was seen before starting, as the duty to keep
ofl a child entirely could not be quite the
same as the duty which would arise from
seeing him already on a moving train. Most
of the testimony indicates that there was
nothing unusual in the running or stopping
of the train after it started. This theory
was not laid before the jury so as to call
their attention to its significance.
The boy's own testimony as to how he fell
off is not quite the same in the direct as on
the cross-examination. On the direct, the
impression he gives is that he was thrown
oft‘ by a sudden starting and jerk. On the
cross-examination he says he was carried tor-
ward, and in no other direction, with the en-
gine, until near the switch, and then fell off
close by the switch. Rosa Bushey, one of
his witnesses, on the other hand, says the en-
. gine went back with him towards Hastings
street before taking him east to the switch.
Tean, another of his witnesses, swore his
back was towards the engineer while he was
standing on the board, and that his hands
were under the hand-rail. The testimony
was by no means uniform upon the impor-
taut matters on which this charge bore.
The charge seemed to go upon the idea. that
the plaintiff's account was the one to be
chiefly acted on by the jury, in connection
with his testimony concerning the engineer,
and there was no other testimony which cov-
ered that matter directly. He does not
swear positively that the engineer saw him,
but his testimony undoubtedly tends that
way, but, when all compared, leaves the time
and circumstances of such seeing in doubt.
Without it, as the court substantially char-
ged, there was no case for the jury. In con-
nection with ihis there was testimony of the
plaintifl himself that the engineer, when he
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COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. (CRSe No. 129 
HUGHES "· DETROIT, G. H. & M. RY. 
co.1 
(31 N. W. 603, 61> Mich. 10.) 
Supreme Court of Michigan. Feb. 10, 1887. 
Error to superior court ot Detroit. 
Action against a railroad company to re-
cover tor personal Injuries. Judgment for 
plalntllf. Defendant appeals. 
Seth E. Engle, tor plalntltl'. E. W. Med-
daugh, tor defendant and appellant. 
CAMPBELL, C. J, Plalntllf, a little colored 
boy, who ls now between six and seven years 
old, and was, when Injured, ftye years old or 
under, recovered judgment in the suJ;l('rlor 
court of Detroit tor personal injuries causing 
the 101!8 of a leg and some other damage. In 
July, 1884, towards the close of the day, but 
during daylight, according to the claim of 
hie declaration, he was on the front of a 
switching locomotive which was malting up 
and distributing freight trains, and standing 
upon a plank step used tor switchmen and 
brakemen to stand upon In their yard-work, 
and, as he asserts, was thrown otl' by 11 sud-
den start or a sudden stop, and run over. The 
negligence alleged was the failure of the train-
men to put him olf before moving, and the 
rapid action la starting and stopping. Other 
facts were set up concerning the condition 
ot the yard In which the accident happened, 
which ran trom Hastings street acl"088 a 
block, and the use of It as a place of pastime 
by children, and some slmllar matters, all of 
which, although gone Into on the trial, were 
finally ruled to be Improper by the judge in 
his charge. This final ruling was In accord-
ance with the decision of this court In Chicago 
& N. W. R. Co. v. Smith, 46 Mich. 504, 9 N. 
W. 830, concerning such premises, where 1t 
was held, In a very similar case In all Its 
circumstances, that the company could not be 
held, under such circumstances, for anything 
less than wanton and gross negligence in-
volving reckless misconduct. 
Under the charge, as already given, the 
jury were directed not to ftnd for plalntltl' 
unless the engineer actually saw the plain-
tiff on the foot-board. If so, the court held 
he should not have started the train while the 
boy was on It, but should have ordered him 
off; and, In giving this charge, the court 
said It was conceded that the boy was on the 
foot-board, and assumed the boy said the en-
gineer saw him before starting. It was not 
disputed, but admitted on the argument In 
this court, that, If the engineer actually saw 
the boy on the foot-board before moving, be 
would be bound to use efficient care to pre-
vent Injury to him; but It Is denied that he 
was on the foot-board, or, It so, was seen by 
the engineer, or any one else, In that position. 
The fact that the boy himself ls the only wit-
1 Dillsenting opinion of Morse, J., omitted. 
ness who says the engineer saw him renders 
another question important, which la how far 
his testimony was admiBBlble. 
Upon examining the testimony, we find that, 
while there are witnesses tor plaintUf who 
swear to his being on the foot-board, they 
do not agree as to the circumstances or cause 
ot his being thrown from the board. On the 
part of the defense there is testimony which 
le not consistent with his being there, as well 
as positive testimony that he was not seen 
If there. The declaration does not aver that 
he was seen, but merely that he might have 
been seen with proper diligence, but It does 
aver he was on the board and thrown olf. 
There was confl.lctlng testimony as to the like-
lihood or possibility of seeing him on the 
board. He himself says he ran back and 
forth over It while the engine was not mov-
ing, and finally got on 1t just before starting, 
and then stayed on till he fell otl'. He also 
says he faced the engine, whlle the other tes-
timony would not 80 Indicate. All of this 
shows the great Importance of this particular 
fact, and the danger of assuming It when 
the testimony conflicted. So It was· equally 
Important to know whether, If seen at all, he 
was seen before starting, as the duty to keep 
off a child entirely could not be quite the 
same as the duty which would arise from 
seeing him already on a moving train. !\lost 
ot the testimony Indicates that there was 
nothing unusual In the running or stopping 
ot the train after It started. This theory 
was not laid before . the jury 80 as to call 
their attention to Its significance. 
The boy's own testimony as to how he fell 
otl' ls not quite the same In the direct ns on 
the cross-examination. On the direct, the 
Impression he gives ls that he was thrown 
otl' by a sudden starting and jerk. On the 
c1'08s-examlnatlon be says he was carried for-
ward, and In no other direction, with the en-
gine, until near the switch, and then fell ofr 
close by the switch. Rosa Bushey, one of 
his wltnetlllef!, on the other hand, says the en-
gine went back with him towards Hftstlngs 
street before taking him east to the switch. 
Tean, another of his witnessee, swore his 
back was towards the engineer while he was 
standing on the board, and that his hands 
were under the hand-rall. The testimony 
was by no means uniform upon the Impor-
tant matters on which this charge bore. 
The charge seemed to go upon the Idea that 
the plaintiff's account was the one to be 
chiefly acted on by the jury, in connection 
with his testimony concerning the engineer, 
and there was no other testimony which cov-
ered that matter directly. He does not 
swear positively that the engineer saw him, 
but his testimony undoubtedly tends that 
way, but, when all compared, leaves the time 
and circumstances of such seeln~ In doubt. 
Without it, as the court substnntlnlly char-
ged, there was no case for the jury. In con-
nection with this there was testimony of the 
plalntilf himself that the engineer, when he 
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saw him, told the fireman not to ring the ' Any one may take the oath or obligation that
bell until the little fellow got ofi, and there
is no testimony that after this warning the
boy showed himself, if he did at ail, to the
engineer. The court committed error in
treating controverted facts as undisputed, as
well as in saying the plaintiff should recover
if the engineer saw him, without reference
to the time and circumstances of seeing him.
Passing by minor points, this makes it nec-
essary to determine concerning the admissi-
bility of this proof. It has been held by this
court, as well as courts generally, that the
fact that a child is under seven years does
not create an absolute disability to testify.
This was held in McGuire v. People, 44 Mich.
286, 6 N. W. U69, and is the doctrine of the
text-books. But the authorities all agree that
8. child cannot testify unless capable of ap-
preciating the obligation of his oath, if he
takes an oath, or of his affirmation if that
is substituted. And this is upon the ground
that a witness must be under some pressure,
arising out of the solemnity of the occasion,
beyond the ordinary obligation of truth-tell-
ing. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 367; 1 Phil. c. 2 (C. &
H.), and notes. One or the other of these
methods of attestation is required of all wit-
nesses, children or adults. and persons un-
sworn cannot testify unless they prefer the
other form, which in this state is under the
pains and penalties of perjury.
The fact that the child was to be put under
oath or affirmation was not brought to his
attention at all, so as to show whether he
did or did not understand the bearing or
effect of it. He merely said he must tell the
truth, or he would go to hell; but, when
asked about any other consequences, he show-
ed entire ignorance, and only said that his
mother told him the day before that he would
go to hell if he did not speak the truth. This
is all that he said bearing on his veracity.
He was examined by counsel, and not par-
ticularly tested by the court, and the court,
without making any personal examination,
certifying or in any way giving an opinion
that the boy understood the nature or obliga-
tion of an oath or affirmation, left it all to the
jury, to be tested by the ordinary question-
ing and erom-questioning by counsel. This
is what might, no doubt, be safe with many
other persons besides children who usually
tell the truth, and may have their truth sub-
stnntially tested, whether sworn or not. But
the law entitles parties to insist that all wit-
nesses shall be put under some solemn obliga-
tion before testifying, and excludes witnesses
who are incapable of understanding its sanc-
tion. As Mr. Starkle very well explains it,
this is not done because the law imputes guilt
or blame to those who do not appreciate it,
but because it requires the higiicst attainable
sanction for testimony. 1 Starkle, Ev. 22.
It is not left to courts to let in everything
which, in their general opinion. or in the case
of the particular witness, might be safe.
Neither does it rest on any particular belief.
accords with his own opinions, but he must
do the one or the other. And he must be
able to comprehend it. Upon this there is no
conflict in the cases. It is necessary to be
left very much to the discretion of the trial
judge if he undertakes to exercise that dis-
cretion, and acts upon such an e.\'aminaiion
as satisfies his own mind. He should con-
duct this examination as in his judgment will
be effectual. lt cannot safely be left to
counsel to make the examination. In Mc-
Guire’s Case, before referred to, the judge
gave a careful personal examination to the
child, and formed a distinct opinion of his
own, founded on that examination. As the
preliminary inquiry cannot be and is not un-
der oath, there is _the stronget reason for
very careful action by the judge himself on
his ofiiicial responsibility. The cases and text-
books recognize this distinctly. See 1 Greenl.
Ev. §§ 367, 368, and notes; 1 Edw. Phil. Ev.
11, and notes. In England it has been held
that recent teaching for the occasion is not
in itself suflicient, because the knowledge
thus received may not be comprehended. 1
Edw. Phil. Ev. 11; Rex v. Williams, 7 Car.
& P. 3'20. A careful judicial examination is
much more satisfactory than answers which
may or may not be really intelligent. The
child's capacity and disposition to answer
correctly and cordially such questioning as
may be given is of the utmost consequence.
because even among mature witnesses it is
not always easy to discriminate between ac-
tual knowledge and what is accepted on
hearsay and influence. It is obviously neces-
sary for the court to be satisfied that the
child will be disposed to tell the truth under
some sense of obligation.
In children of tender age no reasonable
person would expect a complete power of dis-
criminating between his means and sources
of knowledge; and more or less undesigned
coloring and miscoloraiion is almost inevita-
ble. There can be no criminal responsibil-
ity in a young child, and the care used must
therefore be rather in ascertaining his ca-
pacity and disposition than in impressing the
terrors of the law. We are compelled to ap-
ply the law as we find it, until changed by
legislation. But we are greatly impressed
with the practical imperfection of the pres-
ent rules. In France, and probably else-
where, the courts refuse to administer an
oath to children of tender years, and allow
them to be examined without anything more
than suitable cautions, leaving their state
meats on direct and cross-examination to be
taken for what they are worth. This seems
, to .be a. sensible proceeding, and is probably
quite as elficacious as our own system, and less
likely to abuse. There is a proper desire in
courts to receive such testimony as will throw
light on the case, and there is no doubt that in
practice children are often allowed to testify
whose legal capacity to do so is very liberally
construed. It would be better, we think, to put
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saw hlm, told the fireman not to ring the • Any one may take the oath or obligation that 
bell until the llttle fellow got oft, and there accords with his own opinions, but he must 
Is no testimony that after this warnlng the do the one or the other. And be must be 
boy showed himself, If be did at all, to the able to comprehend It. Upon this there Is no 
engineer. The court committed error In con111ct In the ca.ses. It Is nece881lry to be 
treating controverted tacts as undisputed, as left very much to the discretion of the trial 
well as lo saying the plalntltr should recover Judge If be undertakes to exercise that dis.-
it the engineer saw him, without reference eretlon, and acts upon such an examination 
to the time and circumstances of seeing him. as sattsftes his own mind. He should con-
P8881Dg by minor points, this makE'll It nee- duct this examination as In bis judgment wlll 
essary to determine concerning the adm188l- be effectual It cannot safely be left to 
billty of this proof. It has been held by this coUDSel to make the examination. In Mc-
court, as well as courts generally, that the Gulre's Case, before referred to, the judge 
tact that a child Is under seven years does gave a careful pe1'80nal examination to the 
not create an absolute dlllllblllty to testify. child, and formed a distinct opinion of bis 
This was held In McGuire v. People, 44 Mich. own, founded on that examination. As the 
286, 6 N. W. 669, and ls the doctrine of the preliminary Inquiry cannot be and ls not un-
' text-books. But the authorities all agree that der oath, there ls the strongest reason for 
a child cannot testify unless capable of ap- very caretnl action °by the Judge himself on 
preciatlng the obllgatlon of his oath, If be his ofBclal responsibility. The cases and text-
takes an oath, or of bis afBrmatton If that books recognize this distinctly. See 1 Green!. 
ls substituted. And this ls upon the ground Ev. II 367, 368, and notes; 1 Edw. Phil Ev. 
that a witness must be under some pressure, 11, and notes. In England It baa been held 
arising out of the solemnity of the occasion, that recent teaching for the occasion Is not 
beyond the ordinary obligation of truth-tell- In Itself aufBclent, because the knowledge 
Ing. 1 Greenl Ev. t 367; 1 Phil. c. 2 (C. & thus received may not be comprehended. 1 
H.), and notes. One or the other of these Edw. Phil Ev. 11; Rex v. Williams, 7 Car. 
methods of attestation ls required of all wit- & P . 320. A careful judicial examination ls 
nesses, cblldren or adults, and persons un- much more satisfactory than answers which 
awom cannot testify unless they prefer the may or may not be really Intelligent. The 
other form, whlcll In this state Is under the child's capacity and dlsposltlon to answer 
pains and penalties of perj11ry. corre<'tly and cordially such questioning as 
The fact that the child was to be put under may be given Is of the utmost consequence. 
oath or atllrmatlon was not brought to his because even among mature witnesses It la 
attention at all, so as to show whether he not always easy to discriminate between ac-
dld or did not understand the bearing or tual knowledge and what la accepted on 
effect of It. He merely said he must tell the heaniay and Influence. It ls obviously neces-
truth, or he would go to hell; but, when sary for the court to be satlsfted that the 
asked about any other consequences, he show- child will be disposed to tell the truth under 
ed entire Ignorance, and only said that his some sense of obligation. 
mother told him the day before that he would In children of tender age no reasonable 
go to hell If he did not speak the truth. This person would expect a complete power ot dis-
ls all that he said bearing on his veracity. crlmlnntlng between his means and sources 
He was examined by counsel, and not par- of knowledge; and more or less undesigned 
tlcularly tested by the court, and the court, coloring and mlscoloratlon ls almost lnevlta-
wlthout making any personal examination, ble. There can be no criminal responslbll· 
certifying or In any way giving an opinion lty In a young <'hlld, and the care used must 
that the boy understood the nature or obllga- therefore be rather In ascertaining his ca-
tion of an oath or afBrmatlon, left It all to the paclty and disposition than In lmprPsslng the 
jury, to be tested by the ordinary question- terrors of the law. We are compelled to ap-
ing and croes-queatlonlng by counst'l. This ply the law as we ftnd It, until changed by 
Is what might, no doubt, be safe with mnny legislation. But we are greatly lmprP~ 
otbt'r persons besides children wbo usually with the practical lmperfe<'tlon of the pret1· 
tell the truth, and may have their truth sub- ent roles. In France, and probably else-
Rtantlnlly tested, whether sworn or not. But wherP, the courts refuse to administer an 
the law entitles parties to Insist that all wit- oath to chlldrPn of tendPr years, and allow 
DPl!SPS shall be put under some solemn obllga- tbPm to be examined without anything mort" 
tlon before testifying, and excludes wttnes11es than suitable cautions, lea\'lng their state-
who are Incapable of understanding Its sane- mPnti1 on direct and cro11s-examlnntlon to ht• 
tlon. As ~Ir. Starkie very well explains It, taken for what they are worth. This Re<'UI." 
this ls not done because the law Imputes guilt . to .be a sensible prO<'eerllng, and ls probably 
or blame to those who do not appreciate It, quite as eftkaclous as our owo system, and less 
but because It requires the hlghMt attainable llkpb· to abuse. There Is a proper desire In 
lltlnctlon for te11tlmony. 1 Starkie, Ev. 22. <'Onrts to rec:•elve SU<'h tt>Atlmony as wlll throw 
It Is not left to courtR to let In everything lli:ht on the mse, and there ls no doubt that lo 
whkh, In th<'lr it<'nen1l opinion. or In the case proc•tlce children are oftPn allowl'd to testify 
of the partlC'ular witness, might be safe. whose legal capacity to do so Is very liberally 
Neither does It rest on any particular belief. construed. It would be better, we think, to put 
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COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.
[Case No. 129
their testimony on the moreprational ground
that it is calculated to be of some value, and
capable, under a proper examination, of being
reasonably well weighed tor what it is worth.
The other points do not require much con-
sideration. It is possible the instructions con-
cerning damages were open to some criticism,
but the judge appears to have desired to pre-
vent any wild estimates, and it is not very
easy to be precise concerning all the elements
to be considered in such a case. The charge
was intended to keep out improper ‘consider-
ations as far as possible, and to undo some
rulings made earlier in the case which were
found improper. ln cases like this, however.
it is not possible, utter argument, to undo the
effect of important testimony once in, and
impressed on the jury by counsel.
For the reasons given, the judgment should
be reversed, and a new trial granted.
CHAMPLIN and SHERWOOD, JJ., con-
curred. MORSE, J., dissented.
t I l I U I
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COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. (Case No. 129 
their testimony on the more . rational ground 
that It Js calculated to be of some value, and 
capable, under a proper exnmJnatlon, of being 
rensonably well weighed for what it is worth. 
The other pohits do not require much con-
sideration. It is possible the Instructions con-
cerning damages were open to some crltlclBm, 
but the judge appears to have desired to pre-
vent any wild estimates, and it Js not very 
easy to be precise concerning all the elements 
to be CODSidered in such a case. The charge 
was intended to keep out improper ·consider-
ntlons as far as J>088fble. and to undo some 
rulings made earlier in the case which were 
found improper. In cases like this, however. 
it Is not possible, after argument, to undo the 
effect of Important testimony once In. and 
Impressed on the jury by COUI18el 
For the reasons glven, the judgment should 
be reversed, and a new trial granted. 
CHAMPLIN and SHERWOOD, JJ., con-
curred. MOUSE, J., dissented. 
• • • • • • 
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STEPHENS v. BERNAYS.
(42 Fed. 488.)
District Court, E. D. Missouri, E. D. June 7,
1890.
At law.
George D. Reynolds, U. S. Dist. Atty., for
plaintifl. H. A. Loevy, for defendant.
THAYER, J. The testimony of C. C.
Crecllius, taken in connection with other tes-
timony offered by the plaintiff. clearly shows
that the deceased assigned his stock in the
insolvent bank to Crecllius, the cashier, with “
intent to evade his liability as a Silfil'9il0~|ti(‘l'.
According to the testimony of Crecllius, the
deceased had not only been advised before
the sale that the bank had sustained con-
siderable losses, but he declared at the time
of the sale that his purpose in selling was
to avoid his liability as a stockholder. The
sale appears to have been made only two
days before the bank closed its doors, and
no change took place in the condition of the
bank in the mean time. Crecllius gave his
notes for the stock, instead of paying for the
same in money; and according to his state-
ment the notes were to be surrendered, and
the sale canceled, if at the end of 60 days the
deceased was then assured that the bank was
all right. Crecllius himself had little or no
means, at the time of the purchase, and was
rendered utterly insolvent by the failure of
the bank two days later. His object in mak-
ing the purchase in question was to with-
draw the stock from the market, and save
the credit of the bank, which was then in a
precarious condition. These facts, most of
which were established by the testimony of
Crecilius, warrant the conclusion that the
pretended sale was and is voidable as to
creditor of the insolvent bank, who are rep-
resented in this proceeding by the receiver.
Thomp. Liab. Stockh. § 215, and cases cited.
A question arises, however, and was re-
served at the trial, touching the competency
of Crecllius to testify against the executrix
concerning transactions between himself and
the testator. The federal statutes provide
(section S58) that-
“No witness shall be excluded * ' * in
any civil action because he is a party to or
interested in the issue tried: provided, that
in actions by or against executors, " * '
in which judgment may be rendered for or
against them, neither party shall be allowed
to testify against the other as to any trans-
action with or statement by the testator,
' " '°‘ unless called to testify thereto by
the opposite party. ' * * In all other re-
pects the laws of the state in which the
court is held shall be the rules of decision as
to the competency of witnesses in courts of
the United States," etc.
The state law on the subject (section 8918,
Rev. St. Mo. 1889) provides that-
“l\'o person shall he disqualified as a wit-
ness in any civil suit " * * by reason of
his interest in the event of the same, as :1
party or otherwise: ' * * provided that,
in actions where one of the original parties
to the contract or cause of action in issue
and on trial is dead or " * ' insane, the
other party to such contract or cause of ac-
tion shall not be admitted to testify ‘ ' '
in his own favor; " ' * and, where an
executor or administrator is a party, the oth-
er party shall not be admitted to testify in
his own_favor, unless the contract in issue
was originally made with a person who is
living and competent to testify," etc.
The first clause of the proviso of section
8918, supra, as heretofore construed by the
state courts, has much greater scope than
the federal statute above referred to. Thus,
in Meier v. Thieman, 90 Mo. 434, 2 S. W.
-135, it was held that by the proviso in ques-
tion a person was rendered incompetent to
tetify as to transactions with a decedent
in a suit brought by his heirs, although the
person tendered as a witness was not a par-
ty to the suit. The decision appears to be
based on the ground that a witness, to be
excluded by the state law, need not be a par-
ty to the record, but will be excluded as a
witness as to all contracts or transactions
between himself and a deceased person.
when the witness has an interest in the re-
sult of the suit, whether he is or is not a
party to the record. Hence it is important
to determine, in the first instance. whether
the competency of Crecilius to testify as to
transactions between himself and the de-
cedent is to be tested by federal or state law.
The rule is that. where congress has legis-
lated on the sub_1ect,—that is, has enacted a
law covering the particular case,—such law
must prevail in the federal courts. notwith-
standing it differs from the state law. Pot-
ter v. Bank, 102 U. S. 165; Insurance Co. v.
Schaefer, 94 U. S. 458; Rice v. Martin, 8
Fed. 476. The state laws control in deter-
mining the competency of witnesses only in
cases like that of Packet Co. v. Clough, 20
Wall. 537, which do not fall within any pro
vision of the federal laws.
The case at bar is clearly within the terms
of section 858. The effort is to exclude Cre-
cllius as a witness on the ground of interest;
but the first clause of the section declares
that interest shall be no disqualification “in
any civi_l action," and the only exception to
that rule is that mentioned in the proviso,-
that a person called as witness shall not be
allowed to testify as to any transactions
with or statement by a decedent, if the suit
is against his executor or administrator, and
the witness is himself an opposing party to
the suit, unless the witness is called upon to
testify by the executor or administrator.
The case at bar seems to be strictly like the
case of Potter v. Bank, supra, in which a
person situated as Crecllius is, with respect
to the litigation, was held to be a competent
witness. Whatever view, therefore, the
court might entertain as to the competency
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PRODUCTJON AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. Case No. 13J] 
STEPHENSv.BERNAY& 
(42 Fed. 488.) 
Distril't Court, E. D. MiHouri, E. D. June 7, 
1800. 
At law. 
George D. Reynolds, U. S. Dist. Atty., for 
plalntllr. H. A. Loevy, for defendant. 
THAYER, J. 'nle testimony of C. C. 
Creclllus, taken In connection with other te-s-
tlmony offered by the plalntlft', clearly shows 
that the deceased assigned his stock In the 
Insolvent bank to Creclllus, tbe eashler, with 
Intent to evade his llablllty as a shareholtler. 
According to the testimony of Crccllius, the 
deceased had not only been advised before 
the snle that the bank bad sustained ron-
elderable losses, but he declared at the time 
of the 1.1&le that bis purpose In selllng was 
to avoid hie llablllty as a stockholder. The 
sale appears to have been made only two 
days before the bank closed Its doors, and 
no change took _place In the condition or the 
bank In the mean time. Creclllue gave bis 
notes for tbe stock, Instead of paying for the 
same In money; and according to his state-
ment the notes were to be surrendered, and 
the sale canceled, If at tbe end or 60 days the 
deceased was then assured that the bank was 
all right. Creclllus himself had little or no 
means, at the time of the purchase, and was 
rendered utterly lm1olvent by the fallure of 
the bank two days later. Hts object In mak-
ing tbe purchase In question was to wltb-
dra w the stock from the market, nnd save 
tbe credit of the bank, whlcb was then In a 
precarious condition. These facts, most of 
whkh were establlsbed by the testimony of 
Creclllus, warrant the conclusion that the 
pretended eule was and ls voidable as to 
creditors of the lni;olvent bank, who are rep-
resented In this proceeding by the receiver. 
Thomp. Llab. Stockh. § 215, and cases cited. 
A question arises, however, and was re-
served at the trial, touching the competency 
of Creclllus to testify against the executrix 
concerning transactions between himself nnd 
the testator. The federal statutes provide 
(section 858) that-
"No witness llhall be excluded • • • In 
any clvll action becpuse he Is a party to or 
Interested In the Issue tried: provided, that 
In actions by or against executors, • • • 
In which judgmen1 may be rendered for or 
against them, neither party shall be allowed 
to testify against the other as to any trans-
action with or statement by the testator, 
• • • unless called to testify thereto by 
the opposite party. • • • In all other re-
spects the laws of the state In which the 
court ls held shall be the rules of declldon ns 
to the competeney of witnesses In courts of 
the United State11," etc. 
The state law on the subject <section 8918, 
Jlev. St. Mo. 1889) provides that-
"No person F.hnll he dlsqmtllfted as a wit-
ness In any civil suit • • • by renson of 
.l\74 
his lntereet In the event of the same, as a 
party or otherwise: • • • provided that,· 
In a<•tlons where one of the original parties 
to the contract or cause of action In Issue 
and on trial le dead or • • • Insane, the 
other party to such contract or cause of ac-
tion shall not be admitted to testify • • • 
In his own favor; • • • and, where an 
executor or administrator ls a party, the oth-
er party shall not be admitted to testify In 
his own favor, unles11 the contract In Issue 
wu originally made with a person who la 
llvlng and competent to testify," etc. 
The Jlrst clause of the proviso of section 
8918, supra, as heretofore construed by the 
state courts, has much greater scope than 
the federal statute above referred to. Thus, 
In Meler v. Thieman. 00 Mo. 434, 2 s. W. 
435, It was held that by the proviso In ques-
tion a person was rendered Incompetent to 
testify as to transactions with a decedent 
In a suit brought by bis heirs, although the 
person tendered as a witness was not a. par-
ty to the suit. 'Ibe decision appears to be 
based on the ground that a witness, to be 
excluded by the state law, need not be a par-
ty to the record, but wlll be excluded as a 
witness as to all contracts or transactions 
between blmsPlf and a deceued person, 
when the witness has an Interest In the re-
sult of the suit, whether he Is or Is not a 
party to the record. Hence It Is Important 
to determine, In the first Instance, whether 
tbe competency of Creclllus to testify as to 
transactions between himself and the d~ 
cedent Is to be tested by federal or state law. 
The rule Is that. where congress has legis-
lated on the subject,-that Is, bns ena<'ted a 
law covering the pa1tlcular case,-such law 
must prevail In the federal courts. notwith-
standing It dllTers frcm the state law. Pot-
ter Y. Bnnk, 102 U. S. 165; Insurance Co. v. 
Schaefer, 94 U. S. 4?"">8; Rice v. Mnrtln, 8 
Fed. 476. The state laws control In deter-
mining the competency of witnesses only In 
cases like that of Packet Co. v. Clough, 20 
Wall. 537, which do not fall within any pro-
Ylslon of the federal laws. 
The case at bar ls clearly wltbln the terms 
of se<·tlon 858. The effort ls to exclude Cre-
clllus as a witness on the ground of Interest; 
but the first elnul*. of the section declares 
that Interest shall be no dlsquallficatlon "In 
any civil action," and the only cxcPptlon to 
that rul~ ls that mentioned in the provlso,-
that a person called as witness shall not be 
allowed to testify ~s to any trnnsa.ctlons 
with or statement by n decedent, If the suit 
ls against his executor or administrator, and 
the witness Is himself' nn opposing party to 
the suit, unless the witness Is called upon to 
testify by the executor or administrator. 
The case at bar seems to be strictly like the 
case of Potter v. Bank, supm, In which a 
person situated as Creclllus ls, with respect 
to the litigation, was held to be a competent 
witness. Whatevel view, therefore, the 
court might entertain as to the competenc7 
COMPETE N C Y OF WITN ESS ES.
[Case No. 130
of the witness under the state law. it is
compelled to hold that he is made a compe-
tent witness by the federal statutes. Judg-
ment will accordingly go against the ex-
ecutrlx for the amount of the comptroller's
assessment; that is, for $3,500, with interest
at‘6 per cent. per annum, to be computed
from September 24, 1889, to this date.
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CO.MPETE.SCY O~' WITNESSES. [Case No. 130 
of the witness under the state law. 1t Is 
compelled to hold that he Is made a compe-
tent witness by the federal statutes. Judg-
ment wm accordingly go against the ex-
ecutrlx for the amount of the comptroller's 
assessment; that Is, for $3,500, with Interest 
at'6 per cent. per annum, to be computed 
from September 24, 1889, to this date. 
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-PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
SUTHERLAND v. ROSS.
(21 Atl. 354, 140 Pa. St.. 379.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 2,
1891.
Appeal irom court oi common pleas,
Montgomery county; Aanos S. Swswrz,
Judge.
Ejectment by James Sutherland against
William Ross. From ajudgment ior de-
iendant plaintili appeals.
John Ill. Arundel. ior appellant. Louis
M. Childs, Montgomery Evans, and Geo. N.
Corson, ior appeliee.
CLARK, J. The lot oi ground in dispute
is situated in West Conshohocken, in’ the
county oi Montgomery. It is one oi two
lots—Nos. 121 and 122—in a plot oi lots
laid out by one William Da\'is, Sr.,cou-
veyed by Willia.m Dager. Sr., to Nicholas
F. Dager, by his deed dated April 6, 1871,
and this is admitted to be the common
source oi title. The plaintiii gave in evi-
dence a deed irom Nicholas I". Dager and
Elizabeth,his wile,dated llth Maren, 1874.
describing and conveying both oi said
lots to James Sutherland; consideration,
$1,350. The defendants thereupon gave
in evidence the record oi a. deed dated 14th
February, 1877, irom James Sutherland
and Agnes, his Wile, recon veying the par-
ticular lot and premises in dispute to
Nicholas F. Dager; consideration. $1,000;
and also a deed dated 3d April, 1557, irom
Nicholas F. Dager and wile to William
Ross; consideration, $1,400. The plaintiff,
James Sutherland, then took the witness
stand. and it was proposed to prove by
him that the deed irom Sutherland and
wile to Dager, dated 14th February, 1877,
was a iorgery. Having been sworn on
his voir dire. it appeared that Nicholas F.
Dager, the grantee in the deed, was dead,
and objection was made to the competen-
cy oi Sutherland to testiiy to any matter
occurring helore the death oi Dager. The
objection was sustained. and the witness
held to be incompetent. The plaintifl
thereupon called Mrs. Mary Powell, one ol
the subscribing witnesses to the deed,
who testifled that Nicholas F. Dager was
not present at the execution and acknowl-
edgment oi the instrument oi writing,
which she witnessed; that William Hay-
wood. the other subscribing witness. and
the justice oi the peace beiore whom the
deed purports to haveheen acknowledged,
were present, but that the entire transac-
tion occnrred in the absence oi Dager, the
grantee therein. The oiier was then re-
newed with some modification. The plain-
tiii’s counsel oiiered to prove by Suther-
land, the plaintiii, not that a forgery
was committed by Dager,bui: that Da-
ger employed William Haywood, the jus-
tice oi the peace, as his agent on the 14th
February, 1877. to prepare and obtain
irom James Sutherland and his wile a
conveyance oi the premises in dispute in
consideration oi the payment oi $1.000;
and while in that employment the agent,
Haywood. prepared or had prepared the
deed dated 14th February. 1877, purport-
ing to be signed by James Sutherland and
his wife, and witnessed by Mary Nugent
and William Haywood, and purporting
to be acknowledged before William Hay-
wood as a justice oi the peace, and that
no such deed was signed by the witness
or his wile, or by Mary Nugent as wit-
ness, or acknowledged beiore William
Haywood as a. iustice oi the pence. Ob-
jection was also made to this offer, to the
same eiiect as before, which objection was
sustained, and this is the first assignment
oi error. The contention oi‘ the appellant
is that, as Dagcr, the grantee in the deed,
was not present at the alleged execution
oi the deed. but was represented by an
agent, who is alive and competent to tes-
tiiy as to the whole transaction, Suther-
land. the surviving party. may testiiy. ai-
though Dager is dead. In clause E oi the
iiith section oi the act oi Bd May, 1894', it
is provided in the piainest manner that
where any party to a thing or contract
in action is dead, and his rights thereto
or .therein have passed, either by his own
act or by the act oi the law, to a party
on the record, who represents his interest
In the subject in controversy, neither the
surviving or remaining party to such
thing or contract, nor any other person
whose interest shall be adverse to the said
right oi the deceased party. except in cer-
tain specified cases, shall be a competent
witness to any matter occurring beiore his
death. 'i‘he thing or contract in action
here is the. right or title to the premises in
dispute under the deed oi 14th February,
1. 77, which is alleged to be a forgery, and
the record oi which was in evidence. Nich-
olas F. Dager was a party to that deed,
and his right under it has by his own act
passed to William Ross. a party on the
record, who represents his interest in the
subject in controversy; and it ioliows
irom the express words oi the statute that
James Sutherland, who is the surviving
or remaining party to the deed, is not, in
this case, competent to testiiy to any
matter occurring before the death oi Da-
ger, who is deceased. It is true that at
the time oi the execution oi the deed. or at
the time oi its alleged execution, ilager
was not present. This is conceded; but
he was a party to the deed, and in privity
oi estate with the plaintiff; and,although
the transaction may have been conducted
by Haywood, in his absence, in his inter-
est, that, according to the terms oi the
statute, would not render Sutherland com-
petent as a witness to testiiy on that sub-
ject aitcr Dager’s death. Such was the
construction finally put upon similar lan-
guage in the act oi 1869. Aiterthe passage
oi that act the question arose whether the
exclusion oi parties to the action was on-
ly as to transactions with the decedent,
and ior a time, it must be conceded, the
course oi the decisions upon that point
was somewhat unsteady; but it was the
manifest purpose oi the statute to close
the mouth oi him who is adversary to the
deceased assignor. in Karns v. Tanner,
(iii Pa. St. 297. the broad and general doc-
trine was thus stated by Mr. Justice Ao-
NEW: “The true spirit oi the proviso,
then, seems to be that when a party to a
thing oi-contract in action is dead, and
his rights have passed, either by his own
376
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
08
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Case No. 131] ·PRODUCTJOY AXD E1''FEC'r OF EVIDENCE. 
SUTHERLAND v. ROSS. 
(21 At!. 354, 140 Pa. St. 3i9.) 
Supreme Court of J'l'rmsylvanla. llarch 2, 
1891. 
Appeal from conrt of common pleas, 
Montgomery county; AARON s. SWAl<TZ, 
J11<t1£e. 
Ejt!Ctml'nt by James Sutherland agalnRt 
Wllllern Ro11s. From a judgment ror de· 
fendant pin In tiff appeals. 
John M. Arundel, for appellant. Lc>Ui.~ 
M. Childs, !'tlontgomery Evans, and Geo. N. 
Corson, for appellee. 
CLARK, J. The lot of around In dispute 
ls situated tn West Conshohocken, In· the 
county or Montgomery. It ls one or two 
Jobi-NOB. 121 and lt2-ln a plot of lots 
laid out by one William Da \'Is, Sr., con-
veyed by William Da11;er, Sr., to Nicholas 
F. Dager, by hll! deed dnted April 6, H!il, 
and this h1 admitted to be the common 
source of title. The plaintiff gave In evi-
dence a deed frum Nlchoh1s It'. Ds~er and 
Elizabeth, his wife, dated 11th liarcn, 18i4, 
describing and conveying both of itald 
JotK to Jumes Sutherland; consideration, 
$1,350. The defendnnts thereupon gave 
In evidence the r~ord of a deell dated 14th 
February, 1877, from Jamel! Sutherlan(] 
and Agues, bb1 wife, recooveylog the par-
ticular Jot and preml11eR In dispute to 
.Nicholas F. J..>ager; comlllleratlon, $1,000; 
and also a deed dated 3d Aprll, l&;i, from 
.Nicholas 1''. Dager and wife to William 
Ro88; consideration, $1,400. The plaintiff, 
James Sutherland, then took tile witness 
11tand, and It w11s proposed to prove by 
him that the deed from Sutherland and 
wire to Dager, dated 14th February, l!f17, 
was a forgery. Having been Rworn on 
his votr dire, It appeared that Nicholas F. 
Dager, the gruntee In the dt*d, was deed, 
and objection was made to the competen-
r.y of 8uthi>rland to teRtlfy to any matter 
occurring bi>fore the death of Dager. 'l'he 
objection was Rustolned. and the witness 
held to be lncompeteut. The plalntlft 
thereupon called MrR. Mary Powell, one of 
the subscribing wltnt>sseti to the deed, 
who teHtlllecl that Nicholas F. Dager was 
not present at the execution and acknowl-
edgment of the Instrument or writing, 
which she wltn~11ed; that William Hay-
wood. the other subscribing witness, and 
the Justice of the peace before whom the 
deed purports to ha \"e Ileen acknowledged, 
were present, but that the entire t1am1uc-
tlon occurred In the absence of Dager. the 
grantee therein. The offer was then re-
11ew2d with some modlllcation. The plain-
tiff's <'ounsel offered to i>rove by Suther-
land, the plaintiff. not that a forgery 
was committed by Dager. but that l>a-
ger employed Wlllluri Haywood, the jus-
tice of the pettce, ns his agent on the 14th 
Februury, 187i, to prPpare aud ohtaln 
from James Sntherland and his wife a 
conveyunce or the premises In dispute In 
conslclerutlon of the payment or $1,000; 
and while In that employment the agent, 
Haywood. pre11ared nr had prepared the 
deed dated 14th l•'ehruary, 1877, purport-
ing to be slll;'ned by James Sutherland and 
876 
his wire, and witnessed by Mer.r ~ugent 
and Wiiiiam Httywood, and purporting 
to be ackno'i\'ledged before William Hay-
wood as a ju11tlce of the peace, and tha1' 
no t1uch dC'E'd waa 11lgned b.v the witnl"88 
or his wife, or by Mary Nugent a11 wit-
neHs, or acknowledged before Wllllam 
Huywood ae a luRtlce of the pPnce. Ob-jection wus also made to this offer, to the 
same effect es befon-, which objection was 
111111talned, and this IR the first assignment 
of error. The contention or the appellant 
Is that, al! Dager, the grantee In the deed, 
wa11 nut pret1ent at the alle~d execution 
of the deed, but was repre8ented by an 
ngent, who Is alive and competent totes-
tify att to th~ whole transaction, Snther-
land, the Run·h·lng party, may testify. al-
though Dager le dead. Jn cla11ee E or the 
fifth section of the act of 23d May, 18Ri, It 
ls provided In the plainest manner that 
where any [Jarty to a thlnli!: or contract 
In action Is dead, and his rights thereto 
or .therein have passed, either by his owo 
11ct or by the net or the Jew, to a pal"ty 
on the record, who l'f'presents his interest 
m the subject In contt"OverRy, neither the 
Rurvlvlng or remaining party to such 
thing or contract. nor any other pe"on 
whose lntt>reet shall b" ad \'erse to thP. said 
rlJl;b t of the deceased party. except In cer-
tain epeclftP.tl cases, shall be a competent 
wltnt'lls to an.rmntter orcurrlngbefore hie 
death. The thing or contract In action 
here ltt tire right or title to the prerulReK In 
dlHpute under the deed of 14th 1',ebruary, 
18i7, which ls alleged to be a forge1·.r. and 
the record of which was In e\'ldence. :Stell· 
oles F. l>uJ,.rer was a party to that deed, 
and his right under It bas by bis own act 
paMBed to William RoR11, a party oo the 
record, who represt•nts hlH Interest In the 
Rubject In cnntro~el"l1y; end It follows 
from the expreHs words of the statute that 
James Sutherland, who Is the surviving 
or re1m1lnlng party to the deed, Is oot, In 
this case, co!Ilpetent to testify to any 
matter occurring before the death or Dat-
ger, who le deceased. It IA true that et 
the time of the execution of the dred. or at 
the time or Its alleged e:s:ecutlon, Dager 
was not present. This Is conceded; but 
he was a party to the deed, and In prlvlt.v 
of et1tate with the plulntllf; and, although 
the transaction may have been conducted 
by Haywood, In his absen<'e, In his Inter-
est, that, accor1llng to the terma or the 
statute, would not render ~utherland com-
petent as a witness to testify on that sub-
ject aftt•r Dager'11 death. Such was the 
construc•tlon finally put upon similar lan-
guage In the act of 1!l69. After the passa(l;fl 
of tlrnt act the qnestlon arose whether the 
exclu11lon of parties to the action was on-
ly as to tranllactlons with the decedent, 
and for a time, It mul!t be conceded, the 
r.ourse of the declRIOnt! upon that point 
was Humewhat unsteady; but It was the 
manifest purpose of the statute to close 
the mouth or him who Is adversary to the 
deceased assignor. In Karns v. Tanner, 
66 Pa. St. 29i. the broad and general doc-
trine waH thus Rtated by Mr. Justlcll Ao-
NEW: "The true spirit of the proviso, 
then, seems to be tluit when a party to a 
thing or contract In action Is dead, and 
bis rights have passed, either by bis own 
COMPETENCY OF W1'1‘XEb'SES.
[Case No. 131
act or by that of the law,to another,
who represents his interest in the subject
of c0nt.rovers_v, the surviving party to
that subject shall not testify to matters
occurring in the life-time of the adverse
party, whose lips are now closed.” This
statement of the law was followed in
Watts v. Leidig, 29 Leg. Int. 293: Brady
v. Reed.'8T Pa. St. 111; Hess v. Gourley,
89 Pa. St. 195; Ewing v. Ewing. 96 Pa. St.
381; Foster v. Collner. 107 Pa. St. 305; Ad-
ams v. Edwards, 115 Pa. St. 211,8.-\tl.
Bep.42.'>. We think this was the settled
construction. at the time of the passage of
the act of 23d May, 1887, which has also
been similarly construed in Duflield v. Hue,
129 Pu. St. 94, 18 Atl. Rep. 566, and in Par-
ry v. Parry. 130 Pa. St. 94. 18 Atl. Repf
628. As Sutherland was himself incompe-
tent, not only under the words and settled
policy of the statute. but as a person
“ whose interest is adverse to the said
right of the deceased," his wile was also
inconipetent for the same purpose. The
identity of Interest between husband and
wife is such thut. Where one oi them is in-
competent to testify as awitness, the oth-
er is incompetent also. Bitner v. Boone,
128 Pa. St. 567, 18 Atl. ilep. 404.
Judgment is aflirnied.
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COMPETENCY OF wrr~ESSES. (Case No. 181 
act or by that of the law, to another, 
wbo represents his lotel'e8t In the subject 
<>f controversy, the surviving party to 
that subject shall not testify to matters 
occurrinp: lo the life-time of the adverse 
party, whose lips are now closed." This 
11tatement of the law was followed In 
Watts v. Leidig, 29 Leg. Int. 293: Brady 
v. Reed,· 87 Pa; St. 111; Hess ,._ Gourley, 
1j9 Pa. 8t. 195; Ewing v. Ewlnp:, 96 Pa. !!it. 
381; Foster v. Colin er, 107 Pa. 8t. 305; Ad-
ams v. Edwards, 115 Pa. St. 211, 8 Atl. 
Rep. 42.'i. We think this was tbe settled 
construction, at the time of the passage of 
the act of 23d May, 1887, which hRB also 
bPen similarly cone trued In Pnffield v. Hue, 
129 Pa. ~t. 94, JR Atl. Rep. fi66, and In Par-
ry v. Parry, ISO Pa. St. 94. 18 Atl. Rap •. 
628. As Sutherland wa11 himself lncompe· 
tent, not only under the words and settled 
policy of the statute, but ae a person 
"whose Interest le adverse to the suld 
right of the dcccueed," hie wl'fe was also 
lncori1petent for the same purpose. The 
Identity of Interest between husband and 
wife ls such that, where one or them le In-
competent to ttlBtlfy n1.1 a wltneeil, the oth-
er le Incompetent also. Bitner v. Boone, 
1~ Pa. Rt. 667, 1~ A ti. Rep. 404, 
Juda;went 111 a11h'med. 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
BASSETT v. UNITED STATES.
(11 Sup. Ct. 165, 137 U. S. 496.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dee. 22,
1890.
In error to the supreme court of the ter-
ritory of Utah.
F. S. Richards, for plaintiff in‘ error.
Atty. Gen. Miller, for the United States.
BREWER, J. On November 23,1886, the
grand jury of the first judicial district
court of Utah found an indictment for po-
lygamy against the plaintiff in error,
charging him with having married one
Kate Smith on the 1-lth day of August,
1884, whcn his lawful wife, Sarah Ann
Williams, was still living and undivorced.
Upon trial before a jury, a verdict ofguilty
was returned, and he was sentenced to
imprisonment fora term of five years,and
to paya fine of $500. Such sentence, on ap-
peui. was affirmed by the supreme court
of the territory, and is now brought to
this court for review.
A preliminary question is presented by
the attorney general. It is urged that
there was no proper bill of exceptions as
to the proceedings in the trial court, and
therefore nothing is presented which this
court can review. But we are reviewing
thejudgment of the supreme court of the
territory; and the rule in thiscourt is not
to consider questions other than those of
jurisdiction, which were not presented to
the court whose judgment we are asked to
examine. Clark v. Fredericks, 105 U. S. 4.
Beyond the fact that the proceedings of the
trial court were examined and considered
by the supreme court oi the territory, and
are therefore presumably reviewable by
this court. is this matter. noticed by this
court in the case of Hopt v. Utah, 114 U.
S. 48$, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972: That a large
liberty of review is given by the statutes
of Utah to the supreme court of the terri-
tory. even in the absence of a. formal bill
of exceptions. See, also, Stringfellow v.
Cain, 99 U.S. 610; U’Reillyv. Campbell, 116
U. S. 418, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421. But it is un-
necessary to rest upon this recognition by
the supreme court of the territory, or the
presumptions arising therefrom. The rec-
ord shows the pleadings, proceedings, and
exceptions to the charge of the trial judge,
all certified properly by T. A. Perkins, the
clerk of the trial court. At the close of
his certificate, which is of date January
20, 1887, is this statement: "And I further
certify that a copy of defendant's bill of
exceptions in said cause is not made part
hereof because said hill of exceptions is in
the possession oi defendant’s counscl, at
the city of Salt Lake, and because I am
informed by said counsel that it has been
stipulated by and between themselves and
the United States district attorney for
Utnh territory that the original thereof
in place of such copy should he used in the
supremecourt upon this appeal. " The bill
of exceptions referred to by him in this
statement is signed by the trial judge,
and thus indorsed: “No. SIR-i. First Dist.
Court. Utah. The United Statcs vs. Will-
iam E. Bassett. Polygamy. Bill of ex-
ceptions. Filed Jan‘y 19th, 1887. T. A.
PERKINS, Clerk ;” and also by the clerk of
the supremecourt of the territory as “ Filed
Feh’y 2nd, 1887," the date of the filing of
the transcript of the proceedings of the
trial court. The import of all this is that
the bill of exceptions signed by the trial
judge was filed in the trialcourt; and that,
for the purposes of economy , time, and
convenience, such original bill, together
with the record of the proceedings, was
brought to and filed in the supreme court
after having been filed in the trial court.
It needs but thissuggestion. that if a. copy
is good the original is equally good. The
identification of such bill of exceptions is
perfect, vouched by the signatures of the
trial judge, the clerk of the district court,
and the clerk of the supreme court. To
ignore such authentication would place
this court in the attitude of resting on a
mere technicality to avoid an inquiry into
the substantial rights oi’ a party. as con-
sidered and determined by hoth the trial
court and the supreme court of the terri-
tory. ln the absence of a. statute or
special rule of law compelling such a prac-
tice, we decline to adopt it.
Passing from this question of practice
to the merits, the principal question, and
the only one we deem necessary to consid-
er. is this: The wife of the defendant was
called as a witness for the prosecution, and
permitted to testify as to confessions made
by him to her in respect to the crime
charged, and her testimony was the only di-
rectevidenceagainst him. This testimony
was admitted under the first paragraph
of section 1156 of the Code of Civil Proced-
ure, enacted in 1884. (section 3878, Comp.
Laws Utah 1888,) which reads: “A hus-
band cannot be examined for or against
his wife, without her consent, nor a wife
for or against her husband. without his
consent; nor can either, during the mar-
riage or afterwards, be. without the con-
sent of the other,examined as to any com-
munication made by one to the other dur-
ing the marriage; but this exception does
not apply to a civil action or proceeding
by one against the other, nor to a crim-
inal action or proceeding for a crime com-
mitted by one against the other. " And the
contention is that “polygamy” is within
the language of that paragraph a crime
committed by the husband against the
wife. We think this ruling erroneous. A
technicalargument against it is this: The
section is found in the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, and its provisions should not be
held to determine the competency ot wit-
nesses in criminal cases, especially when
there is a Code of (‘rlminal Procedure,
which contains sections prescribing the
conditions of competency. Section 421 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, (section
5197, Comp. Laws 1888,) is as follows:
“ Except with the consent of both, or in
cases of criminal violence upon one by the
other, neither husband nor wife are com-
petent witnesse for or against each other,
in a criminal action or proceeding to which
one or both are parties." (‘leariy llndcr
that section the wife was not a competent
witness. It is true that the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure was enactcd in 1878. and
the Code of (iivil Procedure in 1884.80 that
the latter is the last expression of the leg-
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BASSETT v. UNITED STATES. 
(11 Sop. Ct. 165, 137 U. S. 496.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. n, 
1890. 
Jn error to the supreme court of the ter-
ritory of Utah. 
F. 8. Richards, for plalntln In' error. 
Atty. Gen. Miller, lor the United Sta tee. 
BREW EH, J. On November 23, 1886, the 
grand Jory of the fil"Bt Judicial district 
court of Utah found an lndktment for po. 
Jygnmy agalnat the plalntln In error, 
chnrging him with having married one 
Kate Smith on the 14th day of August, 
188-1, when his lawful wife. Sarah Ann 
Williams, 'was still living and undlvorced. 
Upon trial before a Jury, a verdict ofgullty 
w1u1 returned, and he was sentenced to 
Imprisonment for' a term of ti ve yeanJ, and 
to pay a fine of $500. Such sentence, on a p-
peul, was affirmed by the 1mpreme com·t 
of the territory, and le now brought to 
tbh~ court for review. 
A preliminary question le presented by 
the attorney general. It le urged that 
there WliB no proper bill of exceptlont1 a11 
to the proceedings In the trial court, and 
therefore nothing le presented which this 
court can review. But we are reviewing 
tbe judgment of the supreme court of thi> 
territory; and tlle rule in this court Is not 
to t•oneider questions other than those of 
Jurisdiction. which were not presented to 
the court whose judgment we are asked to 
examine. Clark v. Fredericks, 105 U.S. 4. 
Be,vond the fact that thP. proceed Inge of the 
trlul court WPre examined uod considered 
by the supremP court of the territory. and 
are therefore presumably revlewable l>y 
this court. le this matter, noticed by this 
<'Otnt In thP. case of Hopt v. Utah, 114 U. 
8. 48.'-:, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97:!: 'l'hat a large 
llberty of review ls given by the statutes 
of Utah to the BUt}reme court of the terri-
tory. et"en In the absence of a formal hill 
of exceptions. Sre, also, Stringft>llow v. 
Caln, 99 U.S. 610; U'Reillyv. Cumpbell, 116 
U. K. 418, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421. But It ls un-
necessary to rest upon this recognition by 
the enp1-eme court of the territory, or the 
presumptions arising therefrom. The rec-
ord t1hows the pleading!!, proceedings, and 
exceptions to the charge of the triufjuclge, 
all certlfted properly by ·r. A. Perkins, the 
clerk of the trial court. At the close of 
hie certificate, which le of date January 
20, 1887, le this statement: .. And I further 
certify that a copy of defendant's bill of 
exceptions In sold ca nee IA not made pnrt 
hereof because said hill of exceptlonl'I is In 
the poaeeeelon of defendnnt'e coune<>I, at 
the city of Salt Lake, and because I a.m 
Informed by 1iald coumicl that It has been 
titlpulated by and between themselves and 
the United StateR difitrkt attorney for 
Utnh territory that the original thereof 
In place of sueh copy should be used in the 
snpremecuurt upon thieappeal." The bill 
of exceptions referred to by him in this 
statement le signed by the trial Judge, 
and thus lndorsed: "No. !•x-t. First Dh1t. 
Court. Utah. 'fhe Unikel Sta tr~ vs. Will-
iam E. Bt1sHett. Polyi.:-umy. Bill of ex-
ceptions. :Filed Jan'y 19th, 188i. T. A. 
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PERKINS, Clerk ; " and also by the clerk of 
theeupremecuurt of the territory as" Filed 
}'eb'y 2nd, 1887, '' the date of the filing of 
the transcript of the proceedings of tho 
trial court. The import of all this le that 
the hlll of exceptions slJOted by the trial 
Judge was ftle1l In the trial c·uurt; und that, 
for the purpoRes of econo1113, time, and 
con \"enience, ench original bill, together 
with the record of the pr0t•eedlngt1, was 
brought to and ftled In thP ~upreme court 
after having been filed In the trial court. 
It needs but thleRUJi:geetlon, that If a l'opy 
le good the original le equally good. ThA 
Identification of 11uch bill of exceptlon11 Is 
pel'fect, \'ouched by the signatures of the 
trial Judge, the clerk of the district court, 
a.ud the clerk of the supreme court. To 
Ignore such authentlca.tlou would place 
this court In the attitude of resting on a 
mere technicality to avoid an inquiry Into 
the llubetantlal rll[hte of a party. ae con-
eldere<l and determined by hoth the trial 
court and the supreme court of the terri-
tory. In the absence of a statute ol" 
special rule of In w compelling such a prac-
tice, we decline to adopt It. 
Passing from this question of practice 
to the merltll, the principal question, and 
the ur1ly one we de~m necessary to consid-
er, le thh1: The wire of the defendant was 
ca.lied ae a witness for the prosecution, and 
permitted to testily ae to confessions made 
hy him to her in respect to the crime 
charged, and her testimony wa11 theon!y <11-
rectevlrlenceugalnet him. Thie testimony 
wa11 admittrd under the first parna:raph 
of section 1156 or the Code of l'l\"ll Proced-
ure, enacted In 1884, (section 3878, Comp. 
La w11 Utah 1888,) which reads: "A hus-
band cannot be examined for or agalm•t 
hie wife, without her consent, nor a wife 
for or against hel" husband. without bis 
consent; nor can either, during the mar-
riage or afterwards, be, without the con-
sent of the other,examinP.d ae to any com-
munication made by one to the other Jur-
log the marriage; but thle exception does 
not apply to a clt'll action or proceeding 
by one against the other, nor to a crlm-
lnal action or proceeding for a crime com-
mitted by one against the other." Ami tho 
contention le that "polygamy" Is within 
the language of that paragraph a crime 
committed by the hushand against the 
wife. We think this ruling erroneous. A 
technical argnmen t a.~elnet It 111 thle: 'l'he 
Bl'<'tlon ls fonnd In the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, and Its provisions should not be 
held tu determine the competency of wlt-
neHRes in criminal caeee, especially when 
there le " Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which contains sections prescribing the 
conditions of competency. Section 421 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, (i:iectlun 
51!l7, Comp. Lawe 18S8,) le ae follows: 
"Except with the consent of both, or In 
ca11es of criminal violence upon one by the 
other, neither husband nor wife are com-
petent wttne11eee for or againHteuch other, 
in a criminal action or proceeding to which 
one or both ure parties. " ('!early under 
thut section tlle wife we1:1 not 11 competent 
wltnes11. It Is true that the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure was emictt>d In 1878, and 
the Cude of Ch·ll Pl'Ocedm·e In 1SS4, eu thai 
the latter le the last e:s:prel!Blou of the leg-
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.
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isiative will; but a not unreasonable con- I 209, 222, in which Mr. Justice MCLEAN used
struction is that the last clause of this
paragraph was inserted simply to prevent
the rule stated in the first clause from be-
ing held to apply to the cases stated in
the last, leaving the rule controlling in
criminal cases to he determined by the al-
ready enacted section in the Code oi Crim-
inal Procedure. This construction finds
support in the fact that the same legisla-
ture which enacted the Code oi Civil Pro-
cedure passed an act amending various
sections in the Code oi Criminal Procedure,
among them the section following section
421, quoted above, and did not in terms
amend such section, (Laws Utah 1884,c.
48, p. 119,) and in the further fact
that the same legislature passed an act
for criminal procedure in justices’ courts,
and in that prescribed the same rule of
competency, and in the same language as
is found in section 421. Laws Utah li58~i,c.
54, snhc.10,§l00.p.153. Itcan hardly behe-
lieved that the legislature would establish
one rule oi competency ior a trial in a jus-
tice‘s court, and a different rule for a trial
oi the same offense on an appeal to the
district court. And there are many of-
fenses of which justices’ courts have juris-
diction, which are like polygamy in their
soicfial immorality and their wrong to the
w e.
But we do not rest our conclusion on
this technical argument. If there were
but n single section in force, and that the
one found in the Code oi Civil Procedure,
we should hold the testimony of the wife
lncompeten t. We agree with the supreme
court of California, when. in speaking of
their Codes, which in respect to these sec-
tions are identical with those oi Utah, it
says, in People v. Langtree, 64 Cal-. 259,
“ We think upon a fair construction both
mean the some thing, although the Penal
Code is more explicit than the other. On
this. as on nearly every other subject to
which the Codes relate, they are simply
declaratory oi what the law would beif
there were no Codes.” See, also, People v.
M ullings, 83 Cal. 138, 23 Pac. Iiep. 229. It
was a well-known rule of the common law
that neither husband nor wife was a com-
petent witness in a criminal action against
the other, except in cases oi personal vio-
lence, the one upon the other, in which
the necessities oi juatice compelled n. relax-
ation oi the rule. ’e are aware that lan-
guage similar to this has been presented
to the supreme courts of several states for
consideration. Some, as in Iowa and Ne-
braska, hold that a new rule is thereby
established, and that the wife is a compe-
tent witness against her husband in a
criminal prosecution for bigamy or adul-
tery, on the ground that those are crimes
specially against her. State v. Sloan, 5:’;
Iowa, 217. 7 N. W. Rep. 516: Lord v.State,
17 Neb. 526. 23 N. W. Rep. 507. While oth-
ers, as in 1\'1lllil(’fl0l.'fl- and Texas, hold that
by these words no departure from the
common-luw rule is intended. State v.
Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335, (Gil. 251;) Comp-
ton v. State. 13 Tex. App. 274; Overton v.
State, 43 Tex. 616. This precise question
has never been before this court, but the
common-law rule has been noticed a.nd
commended in Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet.
this language: “It is, however, admitted
in all the cases that the wile is not compe-
tent, except in cases of violence upon her
person, directly to criminate her lins-
band, or to disclose that which she has
learned from him in their confidential in-
tercourse. ‘ ' ' Thisrule isiounded upon
the deepest and soundest principles of our
nature,—p1-inciples which ha vc grown out
of those domestic relations that constitute
the basis oi civil society, and which are
essential to the enjoyment oi that confl-
dence which should subsist between those
who are connected by the nearest and
dearest relations of life. To break down
or impair the great principles which pro-
tect the sanctities of husband and wile
would be to destroy the best solace oi hu-
man existence." We do not doubt the
power oi the legislature to change this
ancient and well-supported rule; but an
intention to make such a change should
not lightly be imputed. It cannot be as-
sumed that it is indifferent to sacred
things. or that it means to lower thc holy
relations of husband and wife to the mate-
rial plnne of simple contract. So, beiore
any departure from the rule affirmed
through the ages oi the common law-a
rule having its solid foundation in the best
interests of society—can be adjudged, the
language declaring the legislative will
should be so clear as to prevent doubt as
to its intent and limit. When a Corie is
adopted, the understanding is that such
Code is a declaration oi established law.
rather than an enactment of new and differ-
ent rules. This is the idea of a. Code, ex-
cept as to matters of procedure and juris-
diction which often ignore the past, and
require affirmative description.
We conclude, therefore, that the section
quoted from the Code oi Civil Procedure,
ii’ applicable to a criminal case, should not
be adiudged as working a departure from
the old and established rule, unless its lan-
guage imperatively demands such con-
struction. Does it? The clause in the(‘-iv-
ii Code is negative, and declares that the
exception of the incompetency of wile or
husband as a witness against the other
does not apply to a criminal action or
proceeding for a crime ‘committed by one
against the other. Is polygamy such a
crime against the wife? That it is no
wrong upon her person is conceded; and
the common-law exception to the silence
upon the lips of husband and wife was
only broken, as we have noticed, in cases
oi assault oi one upon the other. That it
is humiliation and outrage to her is evi-
dent. if that is the test, what limit is im-
posed? Is the wife not humiliated, is not
her respect and love for her husband out-
raged and betrayed, when he forgets his
integrity as a man, and violates any hu-
man ordivineenactment? Isshelessscnsi-
tive, is she less humiliated, when he coin-
mits murder. or robbery, or forgery. than
when he commits polygamy or adultery?
A true wife feels keenly any wrong of her
husband, and her loyalty and reverenceare
wounded and humiliated by such con-
duct. But the question presented by this
statute is not how much she feels or suf-
| iers, but whether the crime is one against
379
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COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. [Case No. 132 
lsiatlve wtll; but a not unreasonable con-
atructton Is that the last t'lauae of this 
paragraph was Inserted simply to prevent 
the rule stated In the 01'8t clause from be· 
Ing ht-Id to apply to the cases stated In 
the last, lea·vlng the rule controlling In 
crlmlnnl caaee tu be determined by the al-
ready enacted aectlon In the Code of Crim· 
lnal Procedure. Title construction llnda 
support In the fact that the same legisla-
ture which enacted the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure paeeed an act amendlnJl various 
st!etlom1 In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
among t11em the 11ectioo following section 
421, quott-d above, and did not In terms 
amend su1:b section, (Lawe Utah 1884, c. 
48, p. 119,) and In the further fact 
that the same legislature passed an act 
for criminal procedure in Justices' courts, 
and In that prE'Scrihed the same rule of 
compewncy, and In the same language att 
Is found In sectlon421. Lawe Utah 18X4,c. 
M, snbc.-. lli, § 100. p.153. It can hardly be be-
lieved that the legl11lature would ei,itabllsh 
one ruh: of competency for a trial in a jus-
tice's court, anll a dlnerent rule for a trial 
of the eamA offem1e on on aP11eal to the 
die~rict court. And there are ma11:v of-
fenses of which Justices' courtH have Juris· 
diction, which are like polygamy lo their 
social immorality and their wrong to the 
wife. 
But we do not rest our conclusion on 
this technical argument. If there were 
but a slntotle section In force, and thnt the 
one found to the Code of Cl\•ll ProcPdure, 
we shoulct hold the testimony of the wtfe 
Incompetent. We Hgree with the supreme 
court of California, when. in Rpenklng or 
their CodP.s, which lo respect to these sec-
tions are identical with ti.Jose of Utah, It 
eaye, In People v. LangtrP.e, 64 Cal. 259, 
"We think upon a fnir construction both 
mean the imme thing, althongb the Penal 
Code le more explicit than the other. On 
this. as on nearly e\'et'Y other subject to 
wbkb the Codee relate, they are simply 
declaratory of what the law would bA If 
there were no Codes." See, also, People v. 
Mullings, 8:J Cal. 138, 23 Pac. HPp. 22!!. It 
was a well-known rule of the common law 
that neither husband nor wife was a com-
petent witness In a criminal action agnt1111t 
the other, except In cal«'l'I of personal vi<>· 
Jenee, the one upon the other, lo which 
tile neceseltleK of Jm~tke compelled a relax-
a tlon of tile rule. l\'e are aware that lan-
guage shnl!ar to this has been presPnted 
to the supreme courts of several states for 
consideration. Some, ns in Iowa anll Ne-
braekR, hold that u new rule ts thereby 
establh1hed, and that the wife le a compe-
tent witnees against her husband In a 
criminal pro11eeutlon for bigamy or adul-
tery, on the gronnd that those are crimes 
spedally against her. State v. Sloon, i'>i? 
Iowa, 217. 7 N. W. R<'p. 5111: Lord v.State, 
17 Neb. 526. 23 N. W. Rep. 507. WhilP oth-
ers, ae In MlnneMota. and Texas, hold tlw t 
by these words no depnrture from the 
common-luw rule 18 Intended. StatP. v. 
Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335, (rm. 251 ;) Comp-
ton v. State, 13 Tex. App. 274; Overton v. 
Htate, 43 'l'ex. 61U. Thie precise question 
bas ne~er been before this court, hut the 
common-law rule ha11 been notlc.-e1l and 
commended in ~teio v. Bowomn, 13 Pet. 
209, 222, In which Mr. Justice McLEAN used 
this language: "It is. bowe,·er, allmlt&d 
in all the cases that tile wife le not compe-
tent, except In caaeit of violence upon her 
person, directly to crimioate her hus-
band, or to dlHclose that which she has 
learned from him In their cootldential In· 
tercourse. • • • '!'his rule is founded upon 
the det-pest and soundest principles of our 
nature,-princlplee which have grown out 
of thos<'rlomestlc relatlonHthat constitute 
the baele of civil Rociety, and which are 
essential to the enjoyment of that conll· 
clence whlcl.J should subeh1t between those 
who are connected lly the nearest and 
dellrt.'St relatiom1 or life. To break down 
or impair the great principles which pro-
tect the sanctities of husband and wife 
would bf' to cle11troy the best solace of hu-
ma.11 existence." We do not doubt the 
power or the legislature to change this 
ancient an<l well-supported rule; but un 
Intention to make Huch a change should 
not lightly Lie lm1rnted. It cannot he a!4-
eumcrl tl.Jat It le inlllfl~reut to sacred 
things, or that It meantc to lower the holy 
relatlonR of husband end wife to the mate-
rial plane of simple contract. So, before 
an.v der11rture from the rule afftrmt"d 
through the ages of the common law-a 
rule having Its solid foundation In thll beet 
interests of sm"iety-c1rn be adjnllged, the 
language declaring the legislative will 
should be so clear as to prevent doubt as 
to its Intent and limit. When a Colle Is 
adopted, the understanding is that such 
Code Is a declaration of f!Btabllshed law. 
rather than an enactment of new and differ-
ent rnles. Thie 11:1 the Idea of a Corle, ex-
cept as to matters or procedure and juris-
diction which often Ignore the past, and 
require afflrmetlve description. 
We conclude, therefore, that the section 
quoted from the Code of Civil Proc.-erlure, 
If appllcuble to a crimlnnl case, should not 
be adJudgell as working a depart.uro from 
the old and estubllslled rule, unles1:1 its lan-
guage Imperatively demands such con-
struction. Doe1:1 it? The clause lo the Civ-
il Code le nega tlve, and declaretJ that the 
exct"ptlon of the Incompetency of wife or 
husbund ae a witness ugulnet the other 
does not apply to a criminal action or 
proceelllng for a crime ·committed by one 
B!Zainst the other. le polygamy :iuch a 
crime a11:alnet the wife? 'l'hat It ht no 
wrong upon her person le conceded; and 
the common-law exception to the silence 
upon the lips of husbuml and wife was 
.mly broken, as we have noticed, In cases 
of ae1111 ult of one upon the other. That It 
is hmnllla tlon an<I outrage to her ie evi-
dent. If that ls the test, what limit 11:1 im-
IJosed? Is the wife not humiliated, le not 
her res1,ect and love for her husband out· 
r iged nnd betruyed, when be forgets bis 
Integrity nM a man, and violates any hu-
man ordlvlneenactment? Ieshelesssensi-
th·e, IR she less humilluted, when he com-
mits murder. or robbery, or forgery. than 
when he commits pol.vgamy or adultery? 
A true wife floela keenly any wrong of her 
hushnnd, and her loyalty and rt:VP.rPnceare 
woundl-'d and humiliated by sur:h ~on­
duct. But the queBtlon presented by this 
statuto ls not how much she feels or suf-
fers, but whether the crime le one against 
379 
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hcr. Polygamy and adultery may be
crimes which involve disloyalty to the
marital relation, but they are rather
crimes against such relation than against
the wile; and, as the statute speaks oi
crimes against her, it is simply an affirma-
tion oi the old.i'amiliar, and just common-
law rule. We conclude, tliereiore, that un-
380
der this statute the wife was an incompe-
tent witness as against her husband.
Other questions in the record need not be
considered, as they will probably not arise
on a new trial. The judgment: oi the su-
preme court oi the territory of Utuh is re-
versed. and the case remanded, with in-
‘ structions to order n new trial.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
08
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Case No. 132] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
her. Polygamy nnd adultery may be 
crimes which Involve disloyalty to the 
marital l'elatloD. hut they are ruther 
crlmeR against each relation than ugahu1t 
the wife; and, ae the Rtatute epeak11 of 
crimes niralnet hPr, it le simply an amrma-
tlon of the old. familiar, and jnHt 1•ommon-
la w rule. We conclude, the1-efore, that un-
380 
f!er this statute the wife wae an Incompe-
tent witness as against her husband. 
Other questions In the record need not be 
conRldered, as the~· will probably not arise 
on a new trial. The Judgment of the su-
preme court of the territory of Utoh Is re-
vcniecl, and the r.aee remanded, with In· 
structluos to order a new trial. 
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.
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ROGERS v. STATEJ
('19 S. \V. 894. 60 Ark. 76.)
Supreme Court of Arkansas. Dec. 15, 1894.
Appeal from circuit court, Yell county; Jer-
emiah G. \\'allace, Judge.
A. L. Rogers was convicted of manslaugh-
ter, and appeals. Reversed.
The appellant. Rogers, was indicted by the
grand jury of Johnson county for the crime
of murder. The indictment alleged that he
killed and murdered one M. L. Kernoodle in
said county by shooting him with a. pistol.
A change of venue was taken to Yell county,
and the case was there tried. The evidence
showed that Rogers and Kernoodle became
engaged in a combat in the town of Clark's-
ville, near the barber shop in which Kernoo-
dle worked; that they had only struggled a
moment before Rogers drew a pistol from his
pocket, and shot Kernoodle. Kernoodle turn-
ed, and ran into his shop, screaming, “Mur-
der!" As he entered, or was about to enter,
the door of the shop, which was only a few
steps away, Rogers fired again. Kernoodle
staggered to the back part of the shop, sank
down on the floor, and expired almost instant-
ly. The ball from the first shot entered the
front part of the body, near the left nipple;
and that from the second entered the back.
near the spine. Both balls passed entirely
through the body, and both, in the opinon of
the medical experts, were fatal wounds,
though they did not feel quite so certain that
the last wound would have destroyed life as
they did that this result would have followed
from the first wound alone. There was a
conflict in the evidence as to whether Rogers
or Kernoodle was the aggressor in the com-
bat. From some of the evidence, one might
conclude that the killing was premeditated
on the part of Rogers; that he armed him-
self, and, going to the shop where Kernoodle
worked, beckoned him to come out, and then,
having willingly entered into a combat with
him, deliberately killed him. There is other
evidence which contradicted this, and tends
to show that Kernoodle was the aggressor,
and that, being a large and powerful man, he
walked up to Rogers, and, after some words,
without provocation struck Rogers a violent
blow with his fist, pushed him against the
wall, and was about to throw. him down,
when Rogers fired the first shot. There was
some proof tending to show that at the time
Kernoodle struck Rogers he was armed with
a razor, although this was contradicted by
other proof. The other facts will sufficiently
appear from the opinion. The jury found the
defendant guilty of the crime of voluntary
manslaughter, and assessed hi punishment
at five years in the penitentiary.
J’. E. Cravens, Martin & Murphy, and A. S.
McKennon, for appellant. James P. Clarke,
Atty. Gen., and Chas. T. Coleman, for the
State.
1 Supplemental opinion omitted.
RIDDICK, J’. (after stating the facts). We
need not consider the objections ur,<;eilagainst
the definitions of the words “willfully" and
“deliberately" contained in instruction No. 1,
given by the court. The object of those defi-
nitions, we suppose, was to inform the jury
concerning the distinctions between the dif-
ferent degrees of homicide. As the defend-
ant was only convicted of manslaughter, it
is plain that, whether erroneous or not, they
did him no harm. We find no error in either
of the instructions numbered 2, 9, and 11,
given by the court on its own motion, and to
which defendant excepted. When taken in
connection with the other instructions, we
think they state the law as favorably to ap-
pellant as he had the right to demand.
The twelfth instruction given by the. court,
and to which the defendant objecled.is as fol-
lows: (12) “If the jury believe that the de-
fendant inflicted upon the body of the de-
ceased two mortal wounds; that both wounds
were necessarily fatal, and either of which,
independent of the other. would have pro-
duced and resulted in the death of the de-
ceased within a short time, of which two
wounds the jury believe the deceased died:
and the jury further find that the deceased
had in good faith declined all further contest
with defendant, and that, while deceased was
fleeing from him, defendant inflicted the sec-
ond fatal wound upon the body of the de-
ceased by shooting him a second time; al-
though the jury might belleve the defendant
fired the first shot in self-defense,—the killing
would not be justifiable, but would amount
to manslaughter oniy." It is said by Mr.
Bishop that "whenever a blow is inflicted un-
der circumstances to render the party inflict-
ing it criminally responsible, if death fol-
lows, he will be deemed guilty of the homi-
cide, though the person beaten would have
died from other causes, or would not have
died from this one had not others operated
with it; provided the blow really contributed
either mediately or immediately to the death
in a degree sufficient for the law‘s notice." 2
Bish. Cr. Law (New) § 637. To same etfect,
see Kee v. State, 28 Ark. 160. If the de-
fendant fired the first shot in necessary self-
defense, and then afterwards, when Kernoo-
dle had abandoned the contest, and was flee-
ing, he again fired upon him, inflicting an-
other wound, when the circumstances were
not such as to make a reasonable man in his
situation believe that he was then in immedi-
ate danger of great bodily injury, he would
be guilty either of some degree of homicide,
or of an unlawful assault, depending upon
the question whether or not the wound in-
flictcd by the last shot either caused, contrib-
uted to, or accelerated his death. In other
words. if the last shot was not fired in neces-
sary self-defense, and the wound inflicted by
it either caused his death, or contributed to
or hastened it, the defendant would be guilty
of some degree of homicide. even though the
first shot was fired in self-defense, and
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COMPETENCY OF WITNE3S.Ed. [C . .ue No. 13:3 
ROGERS v. STAT:K1 
(29 S. W. 894, 60 Ark. 76.) 
Supreme Court of Arkall8&8. Dec. 15, 189-i. 
Appenl from circuit court, Yell county; Jer-
emiah G. Wallace, Judge. 
A. L. Rogers was convicted of mnnslnugb-
ter, and appeals. Reversec~. 
The appellant, Rogers, was Indicted by the 
grand jury of Johnson county !or the crime 
of murder. The Indictment alll•ged that be 
kllled and murdered one M. L. l{ernoodle In 
said county by shooting him with a pistol. 
A change of venue was taken to Yell county, 
and the case was there tried. The evidence 
showed that Rogers and Kernoodle became 
engaged In a combat In the town of Clarks-
ville, near the barber shop In which Kernoo-
dle worked; that they had only struggled a 
moment before Rogers drew a pistol from his 
pocket, and shot Ke1·noodle. Kernoodle turn-
ed, and ran Into bis shop, screaming, "Mur-
der!" As be entered, or was about to ent.er, 
the door of the shop, which was only a few 
steps away, Rogers tired again. Kernoodle 
staggered to the back part of the shop, sank 
down oo the floor, and expired almost Instant-
ly. The ball from the first shot entered thtt 
front part of the body, near the left nipple; 
and that from the second entered the back, 
near the spine. Both balls passed entirely 
through the body, and both, In the oplnon of 
the medical experts, were fatal wounds, 
though they did not feel quite so certain thnt 
the last wound would have destroyed lite ns 
they did that this result would have followed 
from the first wound alone. There wns a 
contllct In the evidence as to whether Rog~rs 
or Kernoodle was the aggreB&or In the com-
bat. From some of the evidence, one might 
conclude that the killing was premt>dltated 
on the part of Rogers; that he armed him-
self, and, going to the shop where Kernoodle 
worked, beckoned hlni to come out, and then, 
having wllllngly entered Into a combat wltb 
him, deliberately kllled him. There Is other 
evidence which contradicted this, and tends 
to show that Kernoodle was the aggressor, 
and that, being a large and powerful man, be 
walked up to Rogers, and, after some words, 
without provocation ·struck Rogers a vlohmt 
blow with his ftst, pushed him against tile 
wall, and was about to throw, him down, 
when Rogers tired the first shot. There was 
some proof tending to show that at the time 
Kernoodle struck Rogers he was armed with 
a razor, although this was contradktt>d by 
other proof. The other facts wlll suttlclently 
appear from the opinion. The jury found the 
de(endant gullty of the crime of voluntary 
manslaughter, and assessed his punishment 
at five years In the penitentiary. 
J. E. Cravens, Martin & :Murphy, and A. S. 
McKennon, for appellant. Jnmes P. Clarke, 
Atty. Gen., and Chas. T. Coleman, for the 
State. 
1 Supplemental opinion omitted. 
RIDDICK, J'. (after stating the facts). We 
need not consider the objections urged against 
the definitions of the words "wlllfully" and 
"deliberately" contained In Instruction No. 1, 
given by the court. The object of those defi-
nitions, we suppose, was to Inform the jnry 
concerning the distinctions between the dif-
ferent degrees of homicide. As the defend-
ant was only convicted of manslaughter, It 
le plain that, whether erroneous or not, they 
did him no harm. "'"e find no error In either 
of the Instructions numbered 2, 9, and 11, 
given by the court on Its own motion, and to 
which defendant excepted. When taken In 
connection with the other Instructions, we 
think they state the law as favorably to ap-
pellant as he had the right to demand. 
The twelfth Instruction given by the court, 
and to which the defendant objected, ls as fol-
lows: (12) "If the jury believe that the de-
fendant lnftlcted upon the body of the de-
ceased two mortal wounds; that both wounds 
were necessarily fatal, and either of which, 
Independent of the other, would have pro-
duced and resulted In the death of the de-
ceased within a short time, of which two 
wounds the jury believe the deceased died; 
and the jury further find that the deceased 
had In good faith declined all further contest 
with defendant, and that, while deceased was 
fteelng from him, defendant Inflicted the sec-
ond fntnl wound upon the body of the de-
ceased by shooting him a second time; al-
though the Jury might believe the defendant 
fired the first shot In self·defell.!le,-the killing 
would not be justifiable, but would amount 
to manslaughter only." It ls eald by Mr. 
Bishop that "whenever a blow le Inflicted un-
der circumstances to render the party Inflict-
ing It criminally responsible, If denth fol-
lows, he will be deemed guilty of the homi-
cide, though the person beaten would have 
died from other causes, or would not have 
died from this one had not others operated 
with It; provided the blow really contributed 
either mediately or Immediately to the death 
In a degree sufficient for the law's notice." 2 
Bish. Cr. Law (New) § 637. To same eft'ect, 
see Kee v. Stnte, 28 Ark. 100. If the de-
fendant tired the first shot In neces..'lllry !lelf-
clefense, and then afterwards, when Kemoo-
dle had abandoned the contt•st, and was flee-
ing, he again ftred upon him, Inflicting an-
other wound, when the circumstances wrre 
not such as to make a rl'llsonnble mnn In his 
situation believe thnt he was then In Immedi-
ate dan~er of grent bodily Injury, he would 
be gu!lty elth<"l' of some degree of homicide, 
or of an unlawful assault, drpencllng upon 
tho quPstlou whether or not the wound In-
flicted by the last shot either caused, contrib-
utc><I to, or accPlerntecl his death. In other 
words. If the Inst shot was not fired In nPCl'S-
snr:v self-defense, and the wound Inflicted by 
It ~ltlwr cnused his death, or contributed to 
or hastened It, the defendant would be guilty 
of some degree of homicide. even though the 
first shot waa fired In self-defense, and 
881 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
though at the time the last shot was flred
the deceased was already so severely wound-
ed that his death would have followed in a
very short time. On the other hand, if the
first shot was fired in self-defense, and the
last shot neither caused his death nor con-
tributed to nor hastened it, then he could not
properly be convicted of any degree of homi-
cide, but might be convicted of an assault.
Davis v. State, 45 Ark. 46-1. The court, in
giving instruction No. 12, doubtless had these
rules of law in his mind, and the instruction.
abstractly considered, is nearly correct, if not
entirely so; but we doubt if in this case it
presented the question in such a way as to
let the jury understand that, in the event the
first shot was fired in self-defense, then it
became material for them to determine
whether the last shot contributed to or has-
tened his death. Instruction No. 4, asked by
the defendant, substantially covered the law
on this point, but it was rather long, and also
stated that, if the second shot did not con-
tribute to the death of deceased, the jury
must acquit, whereas they might still have
found defendant guilty of an assault.
Another question raised by counsel is con-
cerning the meaning of the phrase “great
bodily injury.” One of the counsel for de-
fendant, in the course of his argument be-
fore the jury, stated that the law books did
not define such phrase; whereupon the court
interrupted him, and said that the law books
did define it, and that its meaning was “a
felony committed on the person.” To this
remark of the court defendant excepted at
the time, and now contends that it was not
a correct statement of the law, and that.
even if correct, it should have been reduced
to writing. It was held in Reg. v. McNeil1,
1 Craw. & D. 80, that to constitute a griev-
ous bodily harm, under a statute of Geo. IV.,
it was not necessary to show that the wound
be on a vital part, or that the injury be of
a permanent nature, or that life be endan-
gered thereby; but that proof that the pris-
oner committed an assault with a deadly
weapon, whereby a severe wound was in-
fiicted, was snflicient to sustain an indict-
ment for an assault to inflict grievous bodily
harm. In the case of Lawlor v. People, 7-1
Ill. 230, the court said that the phrase “seri-
ous bodily injury” me-ant substantially the
same as “great bodily injury,” and that the
meaning of both was “a high degree of in-
jury, as opposed to a. slight injury." The
phrase “great bodily injury” is diiiicult to
deline, for the reason that it will define it-
self. It means a “great bodily injury," as
distinguished from one that is slight or mod-
erate, such as would ordinarily be inflicted
by an assault and battery with the hand or
fist withouta weapon. To put one in danger of
great bodily injury from an assault, something
more than an attack with the hand or fist would
usually be required, and it would rarely hap-
pen that one might lawfully take the life of
only. But cases might be supposed when it
would be justifiable to do so; for an assault
and battery by a powerful man with his
fist upon a. weak one might be carried to
such extreme severity as to produce great
bodily injury, and not be unaccompanied by
such circumstances as to make it a felony.
One who intentionally commits a great bodi-
ly injury upon the person of another may or
may not be guilty of a felony, depending up-
on the circumstances; but, as such an in-
jury may under some circumstances be com-
mitted and still the offender not be guilty
of a felony, it is therefore not accurate to
define “great bodily injury” as “a felony
committed on the person." What consti-
tutes a great bodily injury, and whether the
circumstances in any case are such as to
justify one in believing that such an injury
is about to be committed upon him and in
defending himself against it, are matters
which must be left to a great extent to the
judgment of the jury.
It is also contended that the court, before
making this remark concerning the mean-
ing of the phrase, “great bodily harm or in-
jury,” should have reduced it to writing;
but we do not think this contention is well
taken. It is the duty of the court to re-
strain the remarks of counsel within prop-
er bounds. If, in the opinion of the court,
counsel should announce propositions of law
to the jury which are incorrect and mislead-
ing, the court should admonish counsel so
that he may desist. It is not necessary to
stop to reduce the admonition to writing be-
fore making it, but if it contains a statement
of law the court should, at request of coun-
sel, reduce the same to writing, and, if nec-
essary, repeat it in its written form to the
jury. No request was made to reduce this
remark to Writing. The general request to
put all instructions in_ writing cannot be
held to cover this remark, for it was not in-
tended as a part of the instructions, but only
as a correction of what was conceived to be
a. misstatement of the law in the part of
counsel.
During the progress of the trial the pre-
siding judge was called as a witness, and,
over the objections of the defendant, testi-
fled on behalf of the state. His testimony
was, in substance, that at a former term of
the court, before the change of venue was
taken, the defendant had filed a motion for
continuance on account of the absence of
one Bert Cunningham, whom he alleged was
a. material witness in his behalf. After-
wards Bert Cunningham appeared, and, de-
fendant having made an application for bail,
the judge, in open court, notified the attor-
neys of defendant that they might take the
testimony of said Cunningham to be used on
the application for bail; to which notifica-
tion the attorneys of defendant made no re-
sponse, and took no steps to procure the
testimony of said Cunningham. It was not
another to avoid an assault with the fist , shown that the defendant was present at
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Case No. 133] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
though at the time the last shot was ftred 
the deceased was already so severely wound-
ed that his death would have followed In a 
ve1·y short time. On the other hand, if the 
first shot was fired In self-defense, and the 
last shot nelthe1· caused his death nor con-
tributed to nor hastened It, then he could not 
properly be convicted of any degree of homi-
cide, but might be convicted of an assault. 
Davis v. State, 45 Ark. 464. The court, 111 
giving Instruction No. 12, doubtless had these 
rules or law in his mind, and the Instruction, 
abstractly considered, le nea1·ly correct, lt not 
entirely so; but we doubt if In this case It 
presented the question In such a way as to 
let the jury understand that, in the event the 
first shot was fired In self-defense, then It 
became material for them to determine 
whether the last shot contributed to or has-
tened his death. Instruction No. 4, asked by 
the defendant, eubstnntlally covered the law 
on this point, but It was rather long, and also 
stated that, 1t the second shot did not con-
tribute to tile death of deceased, the jury 
must acquit, whereas they might still have 
found defendant guilty of an assault. 
Another quet1tion raised by counsel ls con-
cerning the meaning of the phrase "great 
bodily Injury." One of the counsel for de-
fendant, in the course of his argument be-
fore the jury, stated that the law books did 
not define such phrase; whereupon the court 
Interrupted him, and said that the law books 
did define It, and that its meaning was "a 
felony committed on the person." To this 
remark of the court defendant excepted at 
the time, and now contends that It was not 
a correct statement of the law, and that. 
even If correct, it should have been reduced 
to writing. It was held in Reg. v. l\lcNeill, 
1 Crnw. & D. 80, that to constitute a griev-
ous bodily harm, under a statute of Geo. IV., 
It was not necessary to show that the wound 
be on a vital part, or that the injury be of 
a permanent nature, or that life be endan-
gered thereby; but that proof that the pris-
oner committed an assault with a deadly 
weapon, whereby a severe wound was in-
flicted, was sufficient to sustain an indict-
ment for an as1mult to inflict grievous bodily 
harm. In the case of Lawlor v. People, 74 
Ill. 230, the court said that the phrase "seri-
ous bodily injury" meant substantially the 
same as "great bodily Injury," and that the 
meaning of lmth was "a high degree of in- 1 
jury, as op)loscd to a slight Injury." The 
phrase "grent bodily Injury" ls difficult to 
detlne, for the reason that it will define it-
self. It menns a "great bodily Injury," as 
distinguished from one that is slight or mod-
erate, such as would 01·dinarily be Inflicted 
by an assault and battery with the hand or 
fist without a weapon. To put one In danger of 
great bodily Injury from an assault, something 
morethnnnnntta<>k with the hnndorfist would 
usually be required, and It would rarely haJJ-
pen that one mig-ht lawfully take the life o! 
another to avoid an a.si;ault with the fist 
382 
only. But cases might be supposed when It 
would be justifiable to do so; for an assault 
and battery by a powerful man with his 
fist upon a weak one might be carried to 
such extreme severity as to produce great 
bodily injury, and not be unaccompanied by 
such circumstances as to mnke It a felony. 
One who Intentionally commits a great bodi-
ly injury upon the person or another may or 
may not be guilty of a felony, depending up-
on the circumstances; but, as such an In-
jury may under some circumstances be com-
mitted aud still the otrender not be guilty 
of a felony, It Is therefore not accurate to 
define "great bodily Injury" as "a felony 
committed on the person." What consti-
tutes a grrot bodily injury, and whether the 
circumstances in any case are such as to 
justify one In believing that such an Injury 
is about to be committed upon him and In 
defending himself against it, are matters 
which must be left to a great extent to the 
judgment of the jury. 
It is also contended that the court, before 
making this remark concerning the mean-
ing ot the phrase, "great bodily harm or In-
jury," should have redueed It to writing; 
but we do not think this contention is well 
taken. It is the duty of the court to re-
strain the remarks o! counsel within prop-
er bounds. If, In the opinion of the court, 
counsel should announce propositions of law 
to the jury which are incorrect and mislead-
ing, the court should admonish counsel so 
that he may desist. It ls not necessary to 
stop to reduce the admonition to writing be-
fore making It, but If It contains a statement 
ot law the court should, at request of coun-
sel, reduce the same to writing, and, If nec-
essary, repeat it In its written form to the 
Jury. No request was made to reduce this 
remark to writing. The general request to 
put all Instructions In writing cannot be 
held to cover this remark, for It was not In· 
tended as a part of the instructions, but only 
as a correction of what was conceived to be 
a misstatement of the law In the part ot 
counsel. 
During the progress of the trla.l the pre-
siding judge was called as a witness, and, 
over the objections of the defendant, testi-
fied on behalf of the state. His testimony 
was, in substance, that at a former term of 
the court, before the change of venue was 
taken, the defendant had tiled a motion for 
continuance on account of the absence of 
one Bert Cunnln~ham, whom he alleged was 
a material witness in his behalf. After-
wards Bert Cunningham appeared, and, de-
fendant having made an application for ball, 
the judge, In open court, notified the attor-
neys of defendant that they might take the 
testimony of said Cunningham to be used on 
the application for bail; to which notifica-
tion the attorneys of defendant made no re· 
sponse, and took no steps to procure the 
testimony of said Cunningham. It was not 
shown that the defendant was present at 
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.
[Case No. 133
the time this notification was given to ms
attorneys, or that he in any way approved
of the conduct of his attorneys in this rc-
gard; on the contrary, defendant testifled
that he had been in prison, and did not
know such notification was given. This evi-
dence tended to make the impression that
defendant had endeavored to procure a con-
tinuance on account of the absence of a wit-
ness whose testimony he did not want, when
the failure to take this deposition may have
been due to the neglect of his attorneys, and
through no fault of the defendant. \Ve think
it clear that the testimony was incompetent.
The trial judge seems to have arrived at the
same conclusion, and afterwards, acting as
a. court, excluded the testimony which he
had given as a witness. But the question
still remains whether a judge, while pre-
siding at a trial of a criminal case, may,
against the objection of the defendant. testi-
fy as a witness on the part of the prosecu-
tion. The only reference to this question
we find in our statute is section 2965, Sand.
& H. Dig. That section is as follows: “The
judge or juror may be called as a witness
by either party; but, in such cases, it is in
the discretion of the court to suspend the
trial and ordcr it to take place before an-
other judge or jury; and when a party
knows at the time the jury are iinpaneled,
that a. juror is to be called by him as a. wit-
ness, he shall then declare it, and the juror
shall be excluded from the jury." This sec-
tion was taken from the Code of Practice in
Civil Actions, and is the same as section 660
of that Code. There is a. provision in the
Code of Criminal Practice that the provi--
sions of the Civil Code shall apply to and
govern the summoning and coercing the at-
tendance ot witnesses, and compelling them
to testify in all criminal prosecutions; but
that provision, we think, refers to the chap-
ter of the Civil Code regulating the issuance
of subpoenas for witnesses and attachments
for contempt. It does not refer to the com-
petency of witnesses. While there are other
portions of the Civil Code applicable to
criminal proceedings, we do not find any-
where tlmt this section is to apply to such
proceedings; on the contrary, the language
of the section itself furnishes convincing
proof that it was only intended to apply to
civil cases. It states that, when the judge
or juror is called as a witness, it is in the
discretion of the court to suspend the trial,
and order it to take place before another
judge or jury. It is plain that on a trial of
a defendant for a felony, after the jury are
impaneled and sworn, the court would have
no power, without the consent of the de-
fendant, to suspend the trial, and order it to
take place before another jury. So we con-
clude that this section was not intended to
apply to criminal proceedings, and that we
have no statute permitting a judge to testi-
fy as a witness in 8 criminal trial over
which he is presiding. It has been held in
England that a judge may give evidence, but
that if he does so he must descend from the
bench, and cannot return thither during the
trial. Sichel, Wit. 14. This rule was ap-
plicable to trials where the court was com-
posed of several judges. In such a court, a
judge might descend from the bench, testify,
and take no further part in the trial of the
case without interfering with the progress '
of the trial.
Rapalje says:
Speaking of this question, Mr.
“If the judge sits alone, he
cannot be sworn at all; and, if he be one
of several judges, he ought not to nc, unless
he leaves the bench during the trial. In
such a case, the maxim that ‘no one shall
be both judge and witness in the same cause’
prevails.” Rap. YVit. § -15.
This question came before the supreme
court of New York in a case where one of
the two judges presiding had testified, and
Folger, J., who delivered the opinion of the
court, said that it was erroneous, "bec:iu.-e
such practice, if sanctioned, may lead to un-
seemly and embarrassing results, to the hin-
dering of justice, and to the scandal of the
courts.” In the same opinion, referring to
the same matter, he says: “Other considera-
tions may be added: If a judge is put up-
on the stand as a. witness, he has all the
rights of a witness, and he is subject to all
the duties and liabilities of a witness. It
may chance that he may for reasons suffi-
cient to himself, but not sutiicient for an-
other ot equal authority in the court, decline
to answer a question put to him or in some
other way bring himself in conflict with the
court. Who shall decide what course shall
be taken with him? Shall he return to the
bench. and take part in disposing of the
interlocutory question thus arising, and, up-
on the decision being made, go back to the
stand or go into custody for contempt? The
first would be unseemly, if not unlawful, for
it would be passing judicially upon his own
case. The last would disorganize the court
and suspend its proceedings. Other like
results may be conceived as possible, equal-
ly as contrary to the good conduct of judi-
ciai proceedings." People v. Dohring, 59 N.
Y. 374. This reasoning applies with even
greater force where the court is composed
of only one judge, for, if the judge of
such a court takes the stand to testify
against the defendant, there is no one to
control his testimony or keep him within
proper bounds. Even if he can control his
own testimony, and discharge, at the same
time. what have been called “the incompati-
ble duties of witness and judge," yet, how-
ever careful and conscientious he may be,
the chances are great that by thus testify-
ing he will to some extent detract from the
dignity that should surround the functions of
his high ofiice. Instead of the impartial
judge administering the law with a firm
and even hand, he takes on for the time the
appearance of 8. partisan, endeavoring to
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COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. (Case No. 138 
the time this notlflcatlon was grveo tu 11111 
attorneys, or that he In any way approved 
of the conduct of his attol"lleys In this re-
gard; ou the contrary, defendant testified 
that he had been ln prison, and did not 
know such notification was given. This evi-
dence tended to make the lmpre88lon that 
defendant had endeavored to procure a con-
tinuance on account of the absence of a wit-
ness whose testimony he did not want, when 
the failure to take this deposition may have 
been due to the neglect of his attorneys, and 
through no fault of the defendant. We think 
It clear that the testimony was Incompetent. 
The trial judge seems to have arrived at the 
same conclusion, and afterwards, acting as 
a court, excluded the testimony which he 
had given as a witness. But the question 
stlll remains whether a judge, while pre-
siding at a trial of a criminal case, may, 
against the obje:!tlon of the defendant. testi-
fy as a witness on the part of the p1·osecu-
tlon. The only reference to this question 
we ftnd In our statute ls section 2965, Sand. 
& H. Dig. That section ls as follows: "The 
judge or juror may be called as a witness 
by either party; but, In such cases, It Is In 
the discretion of the court to suspend the 
trial and order It to take place before an-
other judge or jury; and when a party 
knows at the time the jury are Impaneled, 
that a juror ls to be called by him as a wt~ 
ness, he shall then declare It, and the juror 
shall be excluded from the jury." This sec-
tion was taken from the Code of Practice ln 
Civil Actions, and Is the Mme as section 660 
of that Code. There Is a provision In the 
Code of Criminal Practice that the prov!- · 
&Ions of the Civil Code shall apply to and 
govern the summoning and coercing the at-
tendance of wltnessee, and compelling them 
to testify In all criminal prosecutions; but 
that provision, we think, refers to the chap-
ter of the Clvll Code regulating the Issuance 
of subpoenas for witnesses and attachments 
for contempt. It does not refer to the com-
petency of wltne88es. While there are other 
portions of the Civil Code applicable to 
criminal proceedings, we do not find any-
where that this tiection Is to apply to such 
proceedings; on the contrary, the language 
of the section Itself furnishes convincing 
proof that It was only Intended to apply to 
civil cases. It states that, when the judge 
or juror ls called as a witness, It is In the 
discretion of the court to suspend tbe trial, 
and order It to take place before another 
judge or jury. It ls plain that on a trial o.f 
a defendant for a felony, after the jury are 
impaneled and sworn, the court would have 
no power, without the consent of the de-
fendant, to suspend the trial, and order It to 
take place before another jury. So we con-
clude that this section was not Intended to 
apply to criminal proceedings, and that we 
have no statute permitting a ju1lge to testi-
fy as a witness In a crlminnl trial over 
which he ls p1·esldlng. lt ha::J !men held In 
England that a judge may give evidence, but 
that If he doee so he must descend from the 
bench, and cannot return thither during the 
trial. Sichel, Wit. 14. This rule was 11p-
pllcable to trials where the court was com-
posed of several judges. In such a court, a 
judge might descend from the bench, testify, 
and take no further part In the trial of the 
case without Interfering with the progress 
of the trial. Speaking of tMs question, Mr. 
Rapelje says: "If the judge sits alone, he 
cannot be sworn at all; and, If he be one 
of several judges, he ought not to oe, unless 
he leaves the bench during the trial. In 
such a case, the maxim t~at •no one shall 
be both judge and wltne88 in the same cause' 
prevails." !tap. Wit. I 45. 
TWs question came before the supreme 
court of New York In a case where one of 
the two judges presiding had testified, and 
Folger, J., who delivered the opinion of the 
court, said that It was erroneous, "because 
such practice, If sanctioned, may lead to un-
seemly and embarrassing results, to the hin-
dering of justice, and to the scandal of the 
courts." In the same opinion, referring to 
the same matter, he says: "Other considera-
tions may be added: It a judge ls put ui:1-
on the stand as a wltne88, he has all the 
rights· of a witness, and he ls subject to all 
the duties and llabllltles of a witness. It 
may chance that he may for reasons sum-
clent to himself, but not sufficient for an-
other of equal authority In the court, decline 
to answer a question put to him or In some 
other way bring himself In conflict with the 
court. Who shall decide what course shall 
be taken with him? Shall he return to the 
bench. and take part In disposing of the 
Interlocutory question thus arising, and, up-
on the decision being made, go back to the 
stand or go Into custody for contempt? The 
first would be unseemly, If not unlawful, for 
It would be passing judicially upon his owtt 
case. The last would disorganize the court 
and suspend Its proceedings. Other like 
results may be conceived as possible, equal-
ly as contrary to the good conduct of judi-
cial proceedings." People v. Dohring, 59 N. 
Y. 374. This reasoning applies with even 
greater force where the court Is composed 
of only one judge, for, If the judge of 
surh a court takes the stand to testify 
against the defendant, there ls no one to 
control Ws testimony or keep him within 
proper bounds. Even If he can control his 
own testimony, and dlsrharge, at the snme 
time, what have been called "the lncompatl-
ble duties of witness and judge," yet, how-
ever careful and conscientious be may be, 
the chances are great that by thus testify-
ing he will to some extent drtract from the 
dignity that should surround the functions of 
his high office. Instead of the impartial 
judge administering the law with a fl.rm 
and even hand, he takes on for the time the 
appearance. ot a partlswi, endeavoring to 
38:! 
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uphold by his testimony one side against the
other. More than likely he provokes un-
seemly conflicts between himself and coun-
sel, and arouses the distrust of the party
against whom he testifies. In addition to
this, the higher his character and standing
as a judge the more danger that he thus
gives the party in whose favor he testifics
an undue advantage over the opposing side.
For these reasons, in the interest of the
dignity and decorum of the circuit court and
the orderly procedure therein, we feel com-
pelled to hold that a judge presiding at a
criminal trial cannot. against the o1;jor-tion
of the defendant, be sworn and testify as a
witness on the part of the prosecution. Bish.
38-1
Cr. Proc. § 1145; Underh. Ev. § 313. We
do not mean to intimate that in this case
there was any partiality shown by the learn-
ed judge of the circuit court. The record
shows to the contrary. The section of the
Digest above referred to is calculated to mis-
lead, if not read carefully. and the mistake
arose from being compelled to construe it
in the hurry of a nisi prius trial. There
were objections made to other rulings of the
court, but, when taken in connection with
the facts of this case, we do not discover any
error except as above indicated. For those
errors the judgment is reversed, and the
cause remanded for a new trial.
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Case No. 183] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
uphOld by his testimony one side against the 
other. More than likely he provokes un-
seemly conflicts between himself and coun-
sel, and arouses the distrust of the party 
against whom he testifies. In addition to 
this, the higher his character and standing 
as a judge the more danger that be thu."' 
gives the party In whose favor he testifiet1 
an undue advantage over the opposing side. 
For these reasons, In the Interest of the 
dignity and decorum of the circuit court and 
the orderly procedure therein, we feel com-
pelled to hold that a judge presiding at a 
criminal trial cannot, against the olJjeC'tlon 
ot the defendant. be sworn and testify as u 
witness on the part of the prosecution. Bish. 
~ 
Cr. Proc. I 1145; Underh. Ev. I 313. We 
do not mean to Intimate that In this case 
there was any partiality sbo\VD by the learn-
ed judge of the circuit court. The record 
shows to the contrary. The section of the 
Digest above referre<t to ls calculated to mis-
lead, If not read carefully, and the mlstak& 
arose from being compelled to construe it 
In the hurry of a nlsl prlus trial. There 
were objections made to other rulings of the 
court, but, when taken In connection with 
the facts of this case, we do not dlsco¥er any 
error except as above hullcnted. For th~ 
errors the judgment Is reversed, and the 
cause remanded for a new trlnl. 
• • • • • • • 
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MATTOX v. UNITED STATES.
(13 Sup. Ct. 50, 146 U. S. 140.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Nov. 14,
1892.
In error to the district court of the United
States for the district of Kansas. Reversed.
This was an indictment charging Clyde
Mattox with the murder of one John Mullen,
about December 12. 1889, in that part of the
Indian Territory made part of the United
States judicial district of Kansas by section 2
of the act of congress of January 6, 1883, (22
St. p. 400, c. 13,) entitled “An act to pro-
vide for holding a term of the district court
of the United States at Wichita, Kansas, and
for other purposes.”
Defendant pleaded notguilty, was put upon
his trial, October 5, 1891, and on the 8th
of that month was found guilty as charged,
the jury having retired on the 7th to con-
sider of their verdict. Motions for a new
trial and in arrest of judgment were sever-
ally made and overruled, and Mattox sen-
tenced to death. This writ of error was
thereupon sued out.
The evidence tended to show that Mullen
was shot in the evening between 8 and 9
o'clock, and that he died about 1 or 2 o'clock
in the afternoon of the next day; that three
shots were fired and three wounds inflicted;
that neither of the wounds was necessarily ~
fatal, but that the deceased died of pneumonia
produced byone of them described as “in the
upper lobe of the right lung, entering about
two or three inches above the right nipple,
passing through the upper lobe of the right
lung, fracturing one end of the fourth rib,
passing through and lodging beneath the
skin on the right side beneath the shoulder
blade.” The attending physician, who was
called alittle after 9 o’clock and remained
with the wounded man until about 9 o'clock
in the morning, and visited him again be-
tween 8 and 9 o‘clock, testified that Mrs.
Hatch, the mother of Clyde Mattox, was pres-
ent at that visit; that he regarded Mullen’s
recovery as hopeless; that Mullen, being “ per-
fectly conscious” and “in a normal condi-
tion as regards his mind." asked his opinion,
and the doctor said to him: “The chances
are all against you; I do not think there is
any show for you at all.” The physician
further testified. without objection, that, af-
ter he had informed Mullen as to his physical
condition, he asked him as to who shot him,
and he replied “he didn’t have any knowl-
edge of who shot him. I interrogated him
about three times in regard to that,—who did
the shooting,—and he didn't know." Coun-
sel for defendant, after a colloquy with the
court, propounded the following question:
“Did or did not John Mullen, in your pres-
ence and at that time, say, in reply to a ques-
tion of Mrs. Hatch, ' 1 know your son, Clyde
Mattox, and he did not shoot me; I saw the
parties who shot me, and Clyde was not one
of them?’ ” This question was objected to
wr1.ous,sv.—25
as incompetent, the objection sustained, and
defendant excepted. Counsel also propounded
to Mrs. Hatch this question: “Did or did not
John Mullen say to you, on the morning you
visited him, and after Dr. Graham had told
him that all the chances for life were against
him, '1 know Clyde Mattox, your son, and he
was not one of the parties who shot me?’ ”
This was objected to on the ground of incom-
petency, the objection sustained, and defend-
ant excepted.
In support of his motion for new trial, the
defendant offered the aflidavits of two of the
jurors that the bailifl' who had charge of the
jury in the case after the cause had been heard
and submitted, “and while they were deliber-
ating of their verdict,” “in the presence and
hearing of the jurors ora part of them, speak-
ing of the case, said: ‘After you fellows get
through with this case it will be tried again
down there. Thompson has poison in a bottle
that them fellows tried to give him.’ And at
another time, in the presence and hearing of
said jury or apart of them , referring to the de-
fendant, Clyde Mattox, said: * This is the third
fellow he has killed.’ ” The aflidavit ofanoth-
er juror to the same effect, in respect of the
remark of the bailiff as to Thompson, was also
offered, and, in addition, the aflidavits of
eight of the jurors, including the three just
mentioned, “that after said cause had been
submitted to the jury, and while the jury
were deliberating of their verdict, and before
they had agreed upon a verdict in the case. a
certain newspaper printed and published in
the city of Wichita, Kan., known as ‘The
Wichita Daily Eagle,’ of the date of Thurs-
day morning, October 8, 1891, was introduced
into the jury room; that said paper contained
a comment upon the case under consideration
by said jury, and that said comment upon said
case so under consideration by said jury was
read to the jury in their presence and hear-
ing; that the comment so read to said jury is
found upon the fifth page of said paper, and
in the third column of said page, and is as
f0|loWSl
“‘The Mattox Case-The Jury Retired at
Noon Yesterday and is Still Out. The des-
tiny of Clyde Mattox is now in the hands of
the twelve citizens of Kansas composing the
jury in this case. If he is not found guilty
of murder he will be a lucky man, for the
evidence against him was very strong, or. at
least, appeared to be to an outsider. The
case was given to the jury at noon yesterday,
and it was expected that their deliberations
would not last an hour before they would
return a verdict. The hour passed, and nine
more of them with it, and still a verdict was
not reached by 10:30 last night, when the
jury adjourned and wcnt to their rooms at
the Carey. Col. Johnson, of Oklahoma
city, defended him. and male an excellent
speech in his behalf to the jury. Mr. Ady
also made a fine speech, and one that was
full of argument and replete with the de-
tails of the crime committed, as gathered.
from the statements of witnesses. The
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COMPETENCY OF WITNE~ES. [Case No. 134 
MATTOX v. UNITED STATES. 
(13 Sup. Ct. 50, 146 U. S. 140.) 
Supreme Court of the United State&. Nov. 14, 
1892. 
In error to the district court of the United 
Statf's tor the district of KanRas. Revf'rsed. 
This wu an indictment charging Clyde 
Mattox with the murderofoneJohn Mullen. 
about DPCemher 12. 1889, In thRt put of the 
Indian Territory made part of the United 
States judicial district of KRnsas by section 2 
of the Rct of congress of January ti, 1883, (22 
St. p. 400, c. 13,) entitled ".An act to pr~ 
vlde for holding a term of the district court 
of the United States at Wichita, Kansas, and 
for other purposes." 
Defendant pleaded not guilty, was put upon 
his trial, October 5, 18~1. Rnd on the 8th 
of tllat month was fouml guilty as charged, 
the jury having retired on the 7th to con-
sider of their \'erdict. Motions for a new 
trial and in arrest of judgment were sever· 
ally made and overrult'd, and .Mattox sen-
tf'nced to death. This writ of error was 
thereupon sued out. 
The evidence tended to show that Mullen 
was shot in the evening bet.ween 8 and 9 
o'clock, and that be died about 1 or 2 o'clock 
in the afternoon of the next day; thRt three 
shots were fired and tlU"ee wounds inHicted; 
that neither of the wounds was necessaril7 
fatal, but that thedect'ased died or pneumonia 
produced by one of them described as "in the 
upper lobe of the right lung, entering about 
two or three inches above the right nipple, 
passing through the upper lobe of the right 
Jung, fracturing one end or the fourth rib, 
passing through and lodging beneath the 
skin on the right sicle beneath the shoulder 
blade." The attending physidan, who was 
calll'd a lltUe after 9 o'cl->ek and remained 
with the wound!'d man until about 9 o'clock 
in the morning, and visited him again be-
tween 8 and 9 o'clock, testified that Mrs. 
Halcb, the mother of Clyde Mattox, was pres-
ent at that visit; that be rPgartled 'Mullen's 
recovery as hopeless; that Mullen, being" per-
fectly conscious" and "in a normal condi-
tion as regards bis mind," asked his opinion, 
und the doctor said to him: "'fhe chances 
are all against you; I do not think there is 
any show for you at all." The physician 
further test!Hed, without objection, that, af-
ter he had informed Mullen as to his physical 
conuition, he asked him as to who shot him, 
nod be replied "he didn't have any knowl-
edge of who shot him. I interrogated him 
about three times in regard tu Lhat,-whodid 
the shouting,-and he didn't know." Coun-
sel for defendant, after a colloquy with the 
court, propounded the following question: 
"Did or did not John Mullen, in your pres-
ence 11nd at that time, say, in reply to a ques-
tion of Mrs. Hutch, •I know your son, Ciyde 
"Mattox, and he did not shoot mp,; I saw the 
parti~ who 11hot me, and Clyde was not one 
of them?' " This ques~ion was objected to 
WILOUS,EV.-25 
as Incompetent, the objection sustained, and 
defendant excepted. Counsel also propounded 
to Mrs. Hatch this quf'stion: "Did or did not 
John Mullen say to you, on the morning you 
visited him, and after Dr. Graham bad told 
him that all the chances for life were against 
him, •I know Clyde Mattox, your son, and he 
was not one or the parl.lea who shot me?'" 
This was objected to on the ground of incom· 
petency, the objection sustained, and defend· 
ant excepted. 
In support of his motion tor new trial, the 
defendant offered the aftldavits of two of the 
jmors that the bailiff who l1ad ch!\rge of the 
jury in the c1u1e after the cause had been heard 
and submitted, "11nd while they were deliber-
ating of their verdict," "in the preaf'nce and 
bearing of the jurors or a part of them, speak-
ing of the case, 11aid: •After you fellows get 
through with this case it will be tried again 
down there. Thompson has poison in a bottle 
that them fellows tried to 11ive him.' And at 
another time, in the prt>sence and bearing of 
said j nry or a p11rt of them, referring to the de-
fendant, Clyde Mattox, said: •This is the third 
fellow he has killed.' " The afttdavit of anotb· 
er juror to the same effect, in respect of the 
remark of the balHff as to Thompson, was also 
offered, ancl, in addition, the affidavits of 
eight of the jurors, Including the three just 
mentioned, "that after said cause bad been 
submitted to the jury, and while the jury 
were deliberating of their verdict, and before 
they had 11greed upon a verdict In the case, a 
Ct'rtain newspRper printed and published In 
the city of Wichita, Kan., known as •The 
Wichita Daily Eagle.' of the date of Thurs-
day morning, October 8, 1891, was lntrodtwed 
into the jury room; that said paper contained 
a comment upon the case under con1.<ideration 
by said jury, and that said comment upon said 
case so under consideration by said jury was 
read to the jury in their presence and heat"· 
Ing; thnt the comment so read to said jury 111 
found upon the fifth page of said paper, and 
In the third column of said page, and is as 
follows: 
"• Th1i Mattox Case-The Jury Retired at 
Noon Yesterday and ls Still Out. The des-
tiny of Clyde Mattox is now in the hands of 
the twelve citizens of Kansas composing the 
jury in this case. If he is not found guilty 
of murder he will be a lucky man, fur the 
evidence against him was very strong, or, at 
least, appeared to be to an ou_tsider. The 
case was given to the jury at nuon yesterday, 
and it was expected that their drlilleratiuns 
would not last an hour lJefore they would 
return a verdict. The hour passed, and nine 
more of them with it, and still a verdict was 
nut reached by 10:30 lust night, when the 
jury adjourned 1md went to their rooms at 
the l:an~y. Col. Johnson, of Oklahoma 
city, defended him. and ma le an excdlent 
speech in his behalf tu the jury. ?.fr. Ady 
also made a fina speech, and one that was 
full of argument and replete with the de-
tail11 of the crime committed, as gathered 
from the statements of witnesses. Thi> 
885 
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lawyers who were present and the court
otficers also 3.;_'l‘(-:8 that it was one of the best
and most logical speeches Mr. Ady ever
made in this court. it was so strong that
the friends of Mattox gave up all hope of
any result but conviction. Judge Riner’s
instructions to the jury were very clear and
inipaitial, and required nearly half an hour
for him to read them. When thejury filed out,
Mattox seemed to be the most unconcerned
man in the room. His mother was very
pale, and her face indicated that she had but
very little hope. She is certainly deserving
of a good deal of credit. for she has stuck by
her son. as only a mother can, through all
his trials and ditliculties, and this is not the
first one by any means. for Clyde has been
tried for his life once before. He is a youtli-
ful looking man of light build, a beardless
face, and a nervous disposition. The crime
for which he has just been tried is the kill-
ing of a colored man in Oklahoma city over
two years ago. Nobody saw him do the kill-
ing, and the evidence against him is purely
circumstaiitial, but very strong, it ls claimed
by those who heard all the testimony.”'
The bill of exceptions states that these affi-
davits and a copy of the newspaper referred
to “ were offered in open court by the defend-
ant in support of his motion for a new trial,
and by the said district court excluded; to
which ruling the defendant, by his counsel,
then and there excepts and still excepts.”
And the defendant excepted to the overrul-
ing of his motions for new trial and in arrest
of judgment.
J. W. Johnson, for plaintiff in error. Asst.
Atty. Gen. Maury, for the United States.
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating
the facts in the foregoing language, deliv-
ered the opinion of the court.
The allowance or refusal of a new trial
rests in the sound discretion of the court to
whit-h the application is addressed, and the
result cannot be made the subject of review
by writ oi‘ error, (Henderson v. Moore, 5
Cranch, 11; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S.
581:) but in the case at bar the district court
excluded the afiidavits, and, in passing upon
the motion, did not exercise any discretion
in respect of the matters stated therein.
Due exception was taken. and the question
of admissibility thereby preserved.
It will be perceived that the jurors did not
state what influence. if any, the communica-
tion of the bailiff and the reading of the
newspaper had upon them, but confined
their statements to what was said by the one
and read from the other.
In U. S. v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366. alli-
davits of two jurors were otfered in evidence
to establish the reading of a newspaper re-
port of the evidence which had been given
in the case under trial, but both deposed that
it had no influence on llieir verdict. Mr.
Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opin-
ion of the court, said: “The first branch of
the second point presents the question wheth-
er the afiidavits of jurors impe-aching their
verdict ought to be received. It would per-
haps hardly be safe to lay down any general
rule upon this subject. Unq uestiouably such
evidence ought always to be received with
great caution, but cases might arise in which
it would be impossible to refuse them witli-
out violating the plainest principles of jus-
tice. It is, however, unnecessary to lay down
any rule in this case, or examine the deci-
sions referred to in the argument; because
we are of opinion that the facts proved by
the jurors, if proved by unquestioned testi-
mony, would be no ground for a new trial.
There was nothing in the newspapers cal-
culated to influence their decision. and both
of them swear that these papers had not the
slightest influence on their verdict.” The
opinion thus indicates that public policy,
which forbids the reception of the alfidavits,
depositions, or sworn statements of jurors to
impeach their verdicts, may, in the interest
of justice. create an exception to its own rule,
while at the same time the necessity of great
caution in the use of such evidence is en-
forced.
There is, however, a recognized distinction
between what may and what may not be es-
tablished by the testiinony of jurors to set
aside a verdict.
This distinction is thus put by Mr. Justice
Brewer, speaking for the supreme court
of Kansas in Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539,
545: “Public policy forbids that a matter
resting in the personal consciousness of one
juror should be received to overthrow the
verdict, because, being personal, it is not ac-
cessible to other testimony. It gives to the
secret thought of one the power to disturb
the expressed conclusions of twelve. Its
tendency is to produce bad faith on the part
of a minority; to induce an apparent acqui-
escence with the purpose of subsequent dis-
sent; to induce tampering with individual
jurors subsequent to the verdict. But as to
overt acts, they are accessible to the knowl-
edge of all the ]Ul‘0l‘B. it one atfirms mis-
conduct, the remaining eleven can deny.
One cannot disturb the action of the twelve;
it is useless to tamper with one, for the
eleven may be heard. Under this view of
- the law. the aflidavits were properly received.
They tended to prove something which did
not essentially inliere in the \'erdict,—-an
overt act, open to the knowledge of all the
jury. and not alone within the personal con-
sciousness of one.”
The subject was much considered by Mr.
Justice Gray. then a member of the supreme
judicial court of Massachusetts, in Wood-
ward v. Leavitt. 107 Mass. 453, where nu-
merous authorities were referred to and ap-
plied, and the conclusions announced “that,
on a motion for a new trial on the ground
of bias on the part of one of the jurors, the
evidence of jurors, as to the motives and in-
fiuences which affected their deliberations,
is inadmissible either to impeach or to sup-
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Case No. IM] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
lawyers who were present and the court 
offict'rs also agree that it Wl\8 one of the best 
and most logical speeclws Mr. Ady ever 
made in this court. It was so strong that 
the friends of Mattox: gave up all hope of 
any result but conviction. Judge Riner's 
Instructions to the jury were very clear and 
impartial, and rt>qnired nearly half an hour 
for him to read them. When the jury filed out, 
Mattox seemed to be the most unconcerned 
man in the room. His ·mother was very 
pale, Rnd her fRce indicated that she had but 
very little hope. She is certainly deserving 
of a good deal of credit, for she has stuck by 
her son, as only a mother can, through all 
his trials and difficulties, and this is nuL the 
first one by any means, for Clyde has been 
trietl for bla life once before. He is a youth· 
Cul looking man of light build, a beardless 
face, and a nervous disposition. The crime 
for which he has just been tried is the kill-
ing of a colored man in Oklahoma city ove1· 
two years 11go. Nobody saw him do the kill·. 
ing, and the evidtmce against him is purely 
circumstantial, but very stl'ong, It ls claimed 
by those who heard all the testimony."' 
The bill of exceptions states that thes!! aftl-
du v its and a copy of the newspaper referred 
to "were oft'ereil in open court by the defend-
ant in supp01·t of his motion for a new trial, 
and by the said district court excluded; to 
which ruling the defendant, by his counsel, 
tht>n and there exct>pts and still excepts." 
And the defendant. excepted to the overml-
lng of his motions for new trial and in arrest 
of judgment. 
J. W. Johnson, for plalntitf in error. Asst. 
Atty. Gen. Mau1·y, for the United States. 
.Mr. Chit>f Justice FULLER, after stating 
the facts in the foregoing language, deliv-
ered lhe opinion of the court. 
'.fhe 111lowllnce or refuBltl of a new trial 
rests in the sound discretion of the court to 
whkb the application is addressed, and the 
r&sult cannot be made the subject of revit:w 
by writ of error, (Henderson v. Moore, 5 
Cranch, 11; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 
581 :) bnt in the case 11t bar the district con rt 
excluded the affidavits, and, in passing upon 
the motion, dill not exercise any discrelion 
in rt>spect of the matters stated therE-in. 
Due exce11tion was taken, and the question 
of Kdmissihility thereby preserved. 
It will be perceived that the jurors did not 
state what intluence, if any, the communica-
tion or the batlift' and the reatling of the 
newspapet· had upon them, but. conllnt>d 
tht'ir statl'ments to what was said by the one 
and read from the other. 
In U.S. v. Reid, 12 How. 861, 366, am.-
davits of two jurors were offered in evitlence 
to establish the reading of a newspaper re-
port of the eviuen~ which had been given 
in the case under trial, but both deposed that 
it bad no intluence on their vet"dict. Mr. 
Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opin-
ion of tile cou1·t, said: "The first branch of 
886 
the second point presents the question wheth-
er the affidavits of jurors impeaching their 
verdict ought to be reetilved. It would per-
haps hardly be SRfe to lay down any general 
rule 11 pon this subject. Unquestionably such 
evidence ought always to be received with 
great caution, but cases might arise in which 
it would be impossible to refuse them with-
out violating the plainest principles of jus-
tice. It Is, however, unnecessary to lay down 
any rule in this case, or examine the deci-
sions referred to in the argument; because 
we are of opinion I.hat the facts proved by 
the jurors, If proved by unqnestioned testi-
mony, would be no ground for a new trial. 
There was nothing in the newspapers cal-
culated to inliuence their decision, and bolb 
of them swear that these papers had not the 
slightest !nliuence on their verdict." The 
opinion thus indicates that public policy, 
which forbids the reception of the aftidavils, 
depositions, or sworn statements of jurors to 
impeach their verdicts, may, in the interest. 
of justice, create an exceplion to its own rule, 
while at the same lime the necessity of great 
caution in the use of such evidence ls en-
forced. 
There is, however, a recognized distinction 
between what may and what may not be es-
tablished by the testimony of jurors to set 
aside a verdict. 
This distinction is thus put by Mr. Justice 
Brewer, spe1tking for the supreme court 
of Kansas in Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. sm1, 
545: "Public policy forbids that a matter 
resting in the personal consciousness of one 
juror should be received to overthrow the 
verdict, because, being personal, it is not ac-
cessible to other testimony. It gives to the 
secret thought or one the power to disturb 
the expressed conclusions of twelve. Its 
tendency is to produce bad faith on the part 
of a minority; to induce an apparent acqui-
escence with the purpose of suhsequt>nt dis-
sent; to induce tampering with individual 
jurors subs"quent to the verdict. But ll8 to 
overt acts, they are accessible to the knowl-
!'dge of all the Jurors. It one amrms mis-
conduct, the remaining eleven can deny. 
One cannot disturb the action of the twelve; 
It is useless to tamper with one, for the 
eleven may be heard. Under this view of 
the law, the affidavits were properly recei\'e<I. 
They tended to pro\·e something which did 
not essentially Inhere in the ,·erdict,-an 
overt act, open to the knowledge of all the 
jury, and not alone within I.be pel'sonal con-
sciousness of one." 
The subjt>ct was much considered by Mr. 
Justice Gray, then a member of the suprt>me 
judicial court of Massachusetts, in Wood-
ward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, where nu-
merous authorities were referred to and ap-
plied, and the conclusions announced "that, 
on a motion for a new trial on the ground 
of bias on the part of one of the jurors, the 
evidence of jurors, as to the motives anll in-
ftuences which atl'ected their deliberations, 
is inadmissible either to impeach or to sup-
COMPETE NCY OF WITNESSES.
[Case No. 134
port the verdict. But a juryman may tes-
tify to any facts bearing upon the question
of the existence of any extraneous intiuence,
although not as to how far that influence op-
erated upon his mind. S0 a juryman may
testify in denial or explanation of acts or
declarations outside of the jury room. where
evidence of such acts has_ been given as
ground for a new trial.” See, also, Ritchie
v. Iloibrooke, 7 Serg. & R. 458; Chews v.
Driver, 1 N. J. Law, 166; Nelms v. State,
13 Smedes &. M. 500; Hawkins v. New Or-
leans, etc.. Co.. 29 La. Ann. 134, 140; Whitney
v. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405; Hix v. Drury, 5
Pick. 296.
We regard the rule thus laid down as
conformable to right reason and sustained
by the weight of authority. These aflida-
vits were within the rule. and. being mate-
rial, their exclusion constitutes reversible er-
ror. A brief examination will demonstrate
their materiality.
It is vital in capital cases that the jury
should pass upon the case free from ex-
ternal causes tending to disturb the exer-
cise of deliberate and unbiased judgment.
Nor can any ground of suspicion that the
administration of justice has been interfered
with be tolerated. Hence, the separation
of the jury in such a way as to expose them
to tampering may be reason for a new trial,
variously held as absolute; or prima facie,
and subject to rebuttal by the prosecution;
or contingent on proof indicating that a
tampering really took place. Whart. Crim.
Pl. 821, S23, 824, and cases cited.
Private communications, possibly prejudi-
cial, between jurors and third persons. or
witnesses. or the otficer in charge, are abso-
lutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict,
at least unless their harmlessness is made to
appear.
Indeed, it was held in People v. Knapp,
42 Mich. 267. 3 N. W. Rep. 927. that the
presence of an otlicer during the delibera-
tions of the jury is such an irregular inva-
sion of the right of trial by jury as to ab-
solutely vitiate the verdict in all cases, with-
out regard to whether any improper influ-
ences were actually exerted over the jury or
not. And in State v. Snyder. 20 Kan. 306,
where the bailiff who had charge of the jury
had been introduced and examined as a wit-
ness on behalf of the state, and had testi-
fied to material facts against the accused, his
presence in the jury room during the delib-
erations of thejury was held fatal to the ver-
dict.
In Gainey v. People, 97 Ill. 270, the su-
preme court ot Illinois was of opinion that
the presence of a bailiff, in charge of a jury
in acapital case, in the jury room during a
part of their deliberations, was a grave ir-
regularity and a breach of duty on the part
of the officer. which would or would not vi-
tiate the verdict, depending upon the circum-
stances in each particular case; and the ap-
plication of the rule in State v. Snyder was
approved, but the conclusion reached in Peo-
pie v. Knapp was not fully sanctioned. The
text-books refer to many cases in which the
action of the officer having a jury in charge,
when prejudice might have resulted; or un-
authorized communications having a ten-
dency to adverse influence; or the reading of
newspapers containing imperfect reports of
the trial, or objectionable matter in the form
of editorial comments or otherwise,—have
been held fatal to verdicts.
The jury in the case before us retired to
consider of their verdict on the 7th of Octo-
bcr, and had not agreed on the morning of
the 8th. when the newspaper article was read
to them. It is not open to reasonable doubt
that the tendency of that; article was injuri-
ous to the defendant. Statements that the
defendant had been tried for his life once
before; that the evidence against him was
claimed to be very strong by those who had
heard all the testimony; that the argument
for the prosecutaon was such that the defend-
ant’s friends gave up all hope of any result
butconviction; and that it was expected that
the deliberations of the jury would not last
an hour before they would return a verdict,
-could have no other tendency. Nor can it
be legitimately contended that the miscon-
duct of the bailiff could have been otherwise
than prejudicial. information that this was
the third person Clyde Mattox had killed,
coining from the otficer in charge. precludes
any other conclusion. We should therefore
be compelled to reverse the judgment because
the aifidavits were not received and consid-
ered by the court, but another ground exists
upon which we must not only do this, but di-
rect a new trial to be granted.
Dying declarations are admissible on a
trial for murder, as to the fact of the homi-
cide and the person by whom it was com-
-mitted, in favor of the defendant as well as
against him. 1 East, P. C. 353; ltex v.
Scaife, 1 Moody & R. 551; U. S. v. Taylor,
4 Cranch, C. C. 338; Moore v. State, 12 Ala.
764; (loin. V. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S.
W. Rep. 333. But it must be shown by the
party offering them in evidence that they
were made under a sense of impending
death. This may be made to appear from
what the injured person said; or from the
nature and extent of the wounds inllicted
being obviously such that he must have felt
or known that he could not survive; as well
as from his conduct at the time and the
communications, if any, made to him by his
medical advisers, if assented to or under-
standingly acquiesced in by him. The
length of time elapsing between the making
of the declaration and the death is one of
the elements to be considered, although, as
stated by Mr. Greenleaf, “it is the impres-
sion of almost immediate dissolution, and
not the rapid succession of death, in point of
fact, that renders the testimony admissi-
ble.” 1 Greenl. Ev. (15th Ed.) 156, 157,
158; State v. Wensell, 98 Mo. 137. 11 S. W.
Rep. 614; Com. v. Haney, 127 Mass. 455;
Kehoe v. Com., 85 Pa. St. 127; Swisher v.
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COMPETENCY OF WlTNESSF.S. [Case No. 134 
port the verdict. But a juryman may tes-
tify to any facts bearing upon lhe question 
ot the existence of any edraneous inlluence, 
altbough not as to how far that intluence op-
erated upon his mind. So a juryman may 
testify in denial or explanation of acts or 
declarations outside of the jury room, where 
evidence of such actB has. been given as 
ground for a new trial." See, also, Uitchie 
v. Holbrooke, 7 Serg. & R. 458; Chews v. 
Driver, 1 N. J. Law, lti6; Nelms v. State, 
13 Smedes&. M. 500; Hawkins v. New Or-
leans, etc., Co., 29 La. Ann. 134, 140; Whitney 
v. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405; Hix v. Drury, 5 
Pick. 296. 
We regard the rule thus laid down as 
conformable to right reason and sustained 
by the w1>ight of authority. These 11ftida-
vits were within the rule, and, being mate-
rial, tht-ir exclusion constitutes reversible er-
ror. A brief t-xamlnation will demonstrate 
their materiality. · 
It is vital in capital eases that the jury 
should pass upon the case free from ex-
ternal causes tending to disturb the exer-
cise of delillerate and unbiased judgment. 
Nor can any ground of suspicion that the 
administration of justice has been interft>red 
with be tolerated. Hence, the separation 
of the jury in such a way as to expose them 
to tampering may be reason for a new trial, 
va1iously held as absolute; or prima facle, 
and subject to rebuttal by the prost•cution; 
or contingent on proof indicating that a 
tampering rt>nlly took place. Whart. Crim. 
Pl. §§ 821, 8::!8, 824, and cases cited. 
l'nvate communications, possibly prejudi-
cial, between jurors and third persons, or 
witnesses, or the officer in charge, are allso-
lutely forbidtlen, and Invalidate the ,·erdict, 
at least unless their harmlessness is made to 
appeitr. 
Indeed, It was held In People v. Knapp, 
42 Mich. 267, 8 N. W. Rep. 927, that the 
presence of an officer during I.he tleliliera-
tions of the jury is such an irregular inv8-
1ion of the right of trial by jury as to ab-
solutely vitiate tile verdict In all case8, with-
out regard to whether any improper influ-
ences were actnally exerted over the jury or 
not. Anil in State v. Snyder. 20 Kan. 306, 
where the bailiff who hnd charge of the jury 
baJ been introduced and exitmined as a wit-
ness on behalf of the state, and had testi-
fied to material facts a~alnst the accused, his 
presence In the jury room during the delib-
erations of the jury was held fatal to the ver-
dict. 
In Gainey v. People, 97 Ill. 270, the su-
preme court or Illinois was of opinion that 
the prest-nce of a bailiff, in charge of a jury 
in a c11pital case, in the jury room during a 
part of their deliberations, w11s a gra\·e ir-
regularit.y and a breach o( duty on the part 
of the officer. which would or would not vi-
tiate the verdict, depending upon the circum-
stances in each particular case; and the a~ 
plication of the rule In State T, Snyder was 
appro,·ed, but the conclusion reached in Peo-
pie v. Knapp W1\8 not fnlly sanctioned. The 
text-books refer to many cases In which the 
action of the qlHcer having a jury in charge, 
whPn prejudice might have resulted; or un-
authorized communiCdtions having a ten-
dency to adverse intluence; or the reading of 
nPwspapers containing imperfect reports of 
the trial, or objectionable matter in the form 
ot editorial comments or othtirwise, - have 
been heltl fatal to verdicts. 
The jury in the case before us retired to 
consider of thPir verdict on the 7th of Octo-
ber, and hRd not agreed on the morning of 
the 8th, when the newspaprr article was read 
to them. It is not open to rell!IOnRble doubt 
that the tendency of that article WHS inj11ri-
ou11 to the defendant. Statements that the 
defendant had been tried for bis life once 
before; that the evidence 11gainst him was 
claimed to be very strong by those who had 
beurd all the testimony; that the argument 
for the pros1>cut:on was such that the defend-
ant's friends gave up all hope of any result; 
but conviction; and that it was expected that 
the deliuerations of the jury would not last 
an hour before they woultl return a verdict, 
-could have no other tendency. Nor cRn it 
be legllimntely contendetl that the miscon-
duct of the bailiff could have bt'en otherwise 
than prejudicial. Information that this was 
the third person Clyde Mattox had killed, 
coming from the officer In charge, precludes 
any other conclnsion. We should thert-fore 
be compelll'd to reverse the judgment because 
the amtlavits were not received and consid-
ered by the court, but another ground exists 
upon which we must not only do this, but di-
rect 11. new trial to be granted. 
Dying declarations are admissible on a 
trial for murder, as to the fact of the homi-
cide and the person by whom it was com-
. mitted, in ta,·or of the defendant as well as 
against him. 1 Eust, P. C. 353; Hex v. 
8caife, 1 .Moody & H.. 551; U. S. v. Taylor, 
4 Cranch, C. C. 338; Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 
764; Com. v. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. 
W. H.ep. 333. But it must be shown by the 
party offering them in evldt-nce that they 
were ml\tle under a sense of impending 
death. This may be made to uppenr from 
what the injured person said; or from the 
nature and extent of the wounds inllicted 
being obviously such that he must have felt 
or known that be could not survive; as well 
as from his conduct at the time and the 
communications, if any, made to him by his 
medical advisers, if asst-nted to or under-
atanrlingly acquiesced in by him. The 
length of time elapsing between the making 
of the declaration and the death is one of 
the elemt•nts to be considered, although, as 
sb1ted by Mr. Greenlt-af, "it is the impres-
sion of almost immediate dissolution, and 
not the rapid succession of death, in point of 
fact, that renders the testimony admissi-
ble." 1 Green!. Ev. (15th Ed.)~§ 156, 157, 
158; State v. Wensell, 98 Mo. 187. 11 S. W. 
Rep. 614; Com. v. Han1>y, 127 Mass. 455; 
Kehoe v. Com., 85 Pa. St. 127; Swisher v. 
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Com., 26 Grat. 963; State v. Schmidt, 73 Iowa,
469, 35 N. W. Rep. 590. In Reg. v. Per-
kins, 9 Car. 80 P. 395, the deceased received a
severe wound from a gun loaded with shot,
of which wound he died at 5 o’clock the
next morning. On the evening of the day
on which he was wounded. he was told by a
surgeon that he could not recover. made no
reply, but appeared dejected. It was held by
all the judges of England that a declara-
tion made by him at that time was receivable
in evidence on the trial of a person for killing
him, as being a declaration in articulo mortis.
There the declaration was against the ac-
cused. and obviously no more rigorous rule
should be applied when it is in his favor.
The point is to ascertainlthe state of the
mind at the time the declarations were made.
The admission of the testimony is justified
upon the ground of necessity,‘ and in view of
the consideration that the certain expecta-
tion of almost immediate death will remove
all temptation to falsehood and enforce as
strict adherence to the truth as the obliga-
tion of an oath could impose. But the evi-
dence must be received with the utmost
caution, and, if the circumstances do not
satisfactorily disclose that the awful and
solemn situation in which he is placed is
realized by the dying man because of the
hope of recovery, it ought to be rejected.
In this case the lapse of time was but a few
hours. The wounds were three in number,
and one of them of great severity. The
388
patient was perfectly conscious, and asked
the attending physician his opinion, and was
told that the chances were all against him.
and that the physician thought there was no
“show for you [him] at all.” He was then
interrogated as to who did the shooting, and
he replied that he did not know. All this
was admitted _without objection. Defend-
ant’s counsel then endeavored to elicit from
the witness whether, in addition to saying
that he did not know the parties who shot
him, Mullen stated that he knew Clyde Mat-
tox, and that it was not Clyde who did so.
The question propounded was objected to on
the sole ground of incompetency, and the
objection sustained. In this. as the case
stood. there was error. So long as the evi-
dence was in the case as to what Mullen
said, defendant was entitled to refresh the
memory of the witness in a proper manner,
and bring out, if he could, what more, if
anything, he said in that connection. It
was not inconsistent with Mullen’s statement
that he did not know the parties. for him also
to have said that he knew Mattox was not
one of them. His ignorance of who shot
him was not incompatible with knowledge of
who did not shoot him. We regard the er-
ror thus committed as justifying the award-
ing of a new trial.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause
remanded to the district court of the United
States for the district of Kansas, with a di-
rection to grant a new trial.
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Case No. 184] PRODUCTION A.ND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
Com., 26 Grat. 963; State v. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 
469, 85 N. W. Rep. 590. In Beg. v. Per-
kins, 9 Car. & P. 895, the deceased received a 
severe wound from a gun loaded with shot, 
of which wound he died at 5 o'clock the 
next morning. On the evening of the day 
on which he was wounded, he was told by a 
aurgPon that he conld not recover, made no 
reply, but appeared dejected. It was held by 
all the judges of England that a declara-
tion made by him at that time was receivable 
in evidence on the trial of a person for killing 
him, 88 being a declaration in articulo mortis. 
There the declaration was against the ac-
cused, and obviously no more rigorous rule 
should be applied when it is in his favor. 
The point ts to ascertain, the state of the 
mind at the time the declar1ttioos were made. 
The admission of the testimony Is justiHed 
upon the ground of necessity; and in view of 
the consideration that the certain expec:ta-
tion of almo.cit immediate death will remove 
all templaLion to falsehood and enforce 88 
strict adherence to the truth as the obliga· 
tion of an oath could impose. nut the evi· 
deoce must be received with the utmoat 
caution, and, If the circumstances do not 
satisfactorily disclose that the awful and 
aolemn situation in which he is placed Is 
realized by the dying man bec1tuse of the 
hope of recovery, it ought to be rejected. 
In this case the lapse of time wu but a few 
>tours. The wounds were th1·ee in numbe1·, 
and one of them of great severity. The 
888 
patient was perfectly conscious, and asked 
the attending physician bis opinion, and wu 
told that the chances were all against him, 
and that the physician thought there was no 
"show for you [him] at all." He was then 
interrogated as to who did the shooting. and 
he replied that he did not· know. All thia 
was admitted .without objection. Defend-
ant's counsel then endeavored to elicit from 
the witness whether, in addition t.o saying 
that he did not know the parties who shot 
him, .Mullen stated that he knew Clyde .Mat-
tox, and that it was not Clyde who did so. 
The question propounded was objected to on 
the sole ground of incompetency. and the 
objection lmstained. In this, as the case 
stood, there was error. So long aR the e\"'i· 
deoce was In the case as to what Mullen 
said, defendant wl\8 entitled to refresh the 
memory of the witness in a proper manner. 
and bripg out, if he could, what more, if 
anything, he said in that connection. It 
was not inconsistent with Mullen's statement 
that he did not know the parties, for him also 
to have said that he knew Mattox was not 
one of them. His ignorance of who shot 
him was not incompatible with knowledge of 
who did not shoot him. We rrgard the er· 
ror thus committed 118 justifying the award-
ing of a new trial. 
'rhe judgment is reversed, and the cause 
remanded to the district court of the United 
Statrs for the district of KansllS, with a di-
recLion to grant a new trial. 
PBIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
[Case No. 135
VOGEL v. GRUAZ.
(4 Sup. Ct. 12, 110 U. S. 311.)
Supreme Court of the United States.
188-1.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Southern District of Illinois.
J. K. Edsall and John B. Hawley, for
plaintiff in error. H. S. Greene and John
M. Pahner, for defendant in error.
Feb. 4,
Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the
opinion of the court.
This is an action on the case, brought by
'1‘imothy Gruaz, against Rudolph Bircher,
to recover damages for the speaking and
publishing of false, malicious, scandalous,
and defamatory words, charging the plain-
tiff with being a thief, and with having
stolen the money of the defendant, meaning
the crime of larceny. The suit was com-
menced in a state court of Illinois, and was
removed by the defendant into the circuit
court of the United States for the Southern
district of Illinois. At the trial before a
ju-_'y a verdict was rendered for the plain-
tiff, June 6, 1879, for $6,000 damages. On
the next day the defendant flied a motion
for a new trial. On the fourteenth of June
the defendant died, on the twelfth of July
an order abating the case was moved for,
on behalf of the defendant, and on the six-
teenth of August the court overruled the
motion for a new trial and the motion for
an order of abatement, and entered a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, against Bircher, for
$6,000 and costs, as of June 7, 1879. The
order for judgment recited that the hearing
by the court of the motion for a new trial
was, when it was tiled, postponed to a then
future and convenient day of the same term,
and that the defendant died pending the
hearing of the motion. Leave was given to
the executor of the defendant to prepare a
bill of exceptions and to take a writ of er-
ror. The bill of exceptions being signed, it
was flied by the executor, and the writ of
error was issued. Various errors are as-
signed, and among them that the circuit
court did not grant the motion to abate the
suit, and that it rendered a judgment against
Bircher after his death. But it is unneces-
sary to pass on those questions. because we
are of opinion that the judgment must be
reversed for another error committed at the
trial.
Three witnesses for the plaintiff gave evi-
dt-!D\'€ tending to prove the speaking to them
by the defendant of more or less of the
words set forth in the declaration; and after-
wards C. L. Cook was sworn as a witness
for the plnintifi‘, and testifled that he was
state's attorney for Madison county, Illinois:
he had a slight acquaintance with Bircher;
and that he knew Gruaz. The following
‘proceedings then occurred: “Question. l
will ask you if you had any conversation with
Dr. Bircher with regard to Gruaz, and, if
so, when was it? Counsel for defense asked
witness if at that time he was occupying
the same position he now holds. Answer.
Yes, ir. Q. It was communicated to you
while you held that position and were acting
in that capacity, whatever was communicat-
ed to you by Bircher? A. Yes, sir. (De-
fen<iant’s counsel object to witness testify-
ing to matters disclosed to him by the de-
fendant under the circumstances stated, on
the ground that such communications are
to be treated as privileged.) The Court.
I will ask the witness if he regarded it pro-
fessionally as a privileged communication?
A. I had never met defendant before; he
was introduced to me by a citizen of our
place, and he informed me that he wanted
to talk with me with regard to a matter he
wanted to bring before the grand jury. (Ob-
jected to.) The Court. I will allow the wit-
ness to state what the doctor said on that oe-
casion. Of course, if he made the communi-
cation to the witness in good faith, there
would be no malice about it, and I shall in-
struct the jury to disregard it. The objection
is overruled. To which ruling of the court
the defendant at the time excepted. A. As I
stated, I had at that time no acquaintance
with defendant whatever. He inquired for
the state's attorney, and was introduced to
me, and he spoke of his affairs. He said he
wanted to bring a matter before the grand
jury in regard to Mr. Gruaz. I talked with
him in regard to the nature of the mat-
ter, and he talked pretty freely in regard to
it, and I directed him to the grand jury
room. He said a good many things. He
was evidently in earnest at the time, ex-
pressed himself very freely in regard to him.
I would not like to swear to the exact words
used, or that anybody used at the time. I
can give the substance of what he said, I
suppose. He wanted to prosecute Gruaz for
stealing, was the amount of it. I recollect
this: he charged him with having stolen his
money, and I asked him how, and he told
me how it had been done. Gruaz was his
agent and handled his funds, rented his
farms, and had failed to account for a large
amount of money, he told me, and he char-
ged him in this conversation with having
stolen his money, and he said he wanted to
know if there was any law in this state
to prosecute a man for that. I have no ob-
jection to state any words. I remember his
making the charge that he had stolen his
money, but I can't swear that the word
‘thief’ was used at that time; that it was in
substance, undoubtedly. My impression is
that this was the March term, 1878, of the
circuit court of Madison county, either that
or October term. 1877; my recollection and
decided impression is that it was the spring
term, 1878. Dr. Bircher went into the
grand jury room and gave his statement
to the grand jury. He was anxious, of
course, to have the indictment found, and
he evidently believed or so expressed him-
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [Case No. 135 
' VOGEL 1'. GRUA.Z. 
(4 Sup. Ct. 12, 110 U. 8. Sll.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Feb. 4, 
188-.l. 
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United 
States for the Southern District of Illinois. 
J. K. Edsall and John B. Hawley, for 
plalntift' In error. H. B. Greene and Jolui 
ll. Palmer, for defendant In error. 
Mr. JastJce BLA.TOHJJ'ORD delivered the 
opinion of the court. 
This ls an action on the case, brought b;r 
1.'lmothy Gruaz, agalnat Rudolph Bircher, 
to recover damages for the speaking and 
publishing of false, malicious, scandalous, 
and dera01atory words, charging the plaln-
tllf with being a thief, and with havtng 
stolen the money of the defendant, meaning 
tb<' crime of larceny. The suit was com-
mented In a state court of Illinois, and was 
removed by the defendant Into the circuit 
court of the United States- for the Southern 
district of Illinois. At the trial before a 
ju,7 a verdict was rendered for the pl&ln-
tUI', June 6, 18i9, for $6,000 damages. On 
the next day the defendant filed a motion 
for a new trial. On the fourteenth of June 
the defendant died, on the twelfth of July 
an order abating the case waa moved for, 
on behalf of the defendant, and on the six-
teenth of August the court oyerruled the 
motion for a new trial and the motion for 
an order of· abatement, and entered a judg-
ment for the plalntllf, against Bircher, for 
$6,000 and costs, as of June 7, 18i9. The 
order for judgment recited that the bearing 
by the court of the motion for a new trial 
Willi, when it was filed, postponed to a then 
future and convenient day of the same term, 
and that the defendant died pending the 
hearing of the motion. Leave was given to 
the executor of the defendant to prepare a 
bill of exceptions and to take a writ of er-
ror. The bill of exceptions being signed, It 
was filed by the executor, and the writ ot 
error was Issued. Various errors are as-
signed, and among them that the circuit 
court did not grant the motion to abate the 
eult, and that It rendered a judgment ngulnst 
Bircher after hts death. But It Is unneces-
1111ry to pa1111 on those questions. because we 
are of opinion that the judgment must be 
reverBed for another error committed at the 
trial. 
Three witnesses tor the plalntlll' gave evl-
d1m,·e tendl•1g to prove the speaking to them 
by the defendant of more or less of the 
words set forth In the deelnratlon; and after-
wards C. L. Cook was sworn as a witness 
tor the plalntll'f, and testified that be was 
state's attorney for ·!\ladlson county, Illinois: 
he had a slight acquaintance with Bircher; 
and that he knew Gruaz. The following 
proceedings then oc1.:urred: "Question. 1 
will ask you If you had any conversation with 
Dr. Bircher with regard to Gruaz, and, It 
ao, when was It? Counsel for defenae asked. 
\Vltness It at that time he was occupying 
th~ same poeltlon he now hold8. Answer. 
Yes, sir. Q. It was communicated to you 
while you held that position and were acting 
In that capacity, whatever was communicat-
ed to you by Bircher? A. Yes, sir. (De-
fendant's counsel object to wltneu testify-
ing to matters disclosed to him by the de-
fendant under the circumstances stated, on 
the ground that such communlcatlona are 
to be treated as privileged.) The Court. 
I will ask the witness It he regarded It pro-
fessionally u a privileged communication! 
A. I had never met defendant before; he 
was introduced to me by a citizen of our 
place, and he Informed me that he wanted 
to talk with me with regard to a matter he 
wanted to bring before the grand jury. (Ob-
jected to.) The Court. I will allow the wit-
ness to state what the doctor said on that oc-
casion. Of course, It he made the communi-
cation to the witness in good faith, there 
W·>•1ld be no malice about It, and I shall ln-
stn1ct the juey to disregard It. The objection 
la overruled. To which ruling of the court 
the defendant at the time e."tcepted. A. As I 
stated, I had at that time no acquaintance 
with defendant whatever. He Inquired tor 
the state's attorney, and was Introduced 10 
me, and he spoke of his al'f&lrs. He said he 
wanted to bring a matter before the grand 
Juey In regard to :Mr. Gruaz. I talked with 
blm 1D regard to the nature of the mat· 
ter, and he talked pretty freely In regard too 
lt, and I directed him to the grand juey 
room. He said a good many things. He 
was evidently In earnest at the time, ex-
pressed himself veey freely In regard to him. 
I would not like to swear to the exact words 
used, or that anyb.xiy used at the time. I 
can give the substance of what he said, I 
suppose. He wanted to prosecute Gruaz for 
stealing, was the amount of it. I recollect 
this: he charged him wltll having stolen his 
m"ney, and I asked him bow, and he told 
me how It had be~n d:>ne. Gruaz was his 
agent and handled his funds, rented bla 
farms, and had tailed to account for a large 
amount of money, he told me, and he char-
ged him In this conversation with having 
stolen his money, and he said be wanted to 
know If there was any law in this state 
to prosecute a man for that. I have no ob-
jection to st'.lte any words. I remember bis 
making the charge that he bad stolen bla 
money, but I can't swear that the word 
'thief' was used at that time; that It was In 
substance, undoubtedly. My impression 111 
that this was the March term, 1878, of the 
circuit court of Madison county, either that 
or October term. 1877; my recolleetlon and 
decided Impression Is that It was the spring 
term, 1878. Dr. Bircher went Into the 
grand juey room and gav~ his statement 
to the grarid jury. He was anxious, of 
course, to have the Indictment found, and 
he evidently believed or ao expre11Bed him· 
JljlQ 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
self. (Counsel for defendant objected to wit-
ness stating his opinion about what defend-
ant evidently believed.) The Court. He said
he went before U18 grand jury, and said he
seemed to be in earnest in his movements,
but he didn't say what took place before
the grand jury. Don't know, I suppose.
Witness. No, I don‘: know. Cross-examina-
tion. Maj. Prickett introduced Bircher to
me; never saw him before in my life. I
was certain he came to see me as prosecut-
ing attorney, in good faith. That was his
business, as he stated it to me. After he
made his statement to me I advised him to
go before the grand jury; directed him to
their room. He went there by my advice.
Hold on—I don't say that; I advised him
that he had a good case. He came to me
and I showed him where the grand jury
room was. He stated his case to me as
state's attorney. I then directed him where
to go. and said I should prosecute it as
vigorously as possible, if the indictment was
found. In regard to the advice I gave him,
I rather encouraged him to drop the thing;
I told him he had better sue Mr. Gruaz first,
and see if he couldn't get judgment against
him, and so put it in a better shape to prose-
cute him. He stated his case, and I thought
from his statement that he would have few,
if any, witnesses besides himself, and that
it would be doubtful, however honestly he
might believe, that he had cause; it would
be doubtful whether the Jury would bring a
bill; so I advised him to bring a civil suit;
but, said I, you are here, and you u|ustn’t
think hardly of me if the grand jury don't
find a. bill; and I directed him to the grand
jury room."
The bill of exceptions also contains the
following: “In reference to the testimony
of state's attorney C. L. Cook, the court
instructed the jury as follows: ‘I admitted
that evidence with an explanation, and with
the explanation made in the admission of
it I think I am content, and I think the jury
may take it into consideration; but if they
think the defendant was actuated by honest
motives in making the declaration he did,
they will disregard it.’ To the giving of
which last instruction the defendant ex-
ceptcd, for the reason that the instruction .-
ignores the. element of want of probable
cause, and for the reason also that the jury
should have been instructed to disregard
Cook's testimony entirely.”
We are of opinion that what was said by
Bircher to .\Ir. Cook was an absolutely privi-
leged communication. It was said to Mr.
Cook while he was state’s attorney or prose-
cutor of crimes for the county, and while
he was acting in that capacity. Bircher in-
quired for the state’s attorney and was in-
troduced to him, and stated to him that he
wanted to talk with him about a matter he
wanted to bring before the grand jury in
regard to Gruaz. He laid the matter before
Mr. Cook, and charged Gruaz with having
stolen his money, and was asked how, and
stated how and inquired of Mr. Cook if
there was any law in Illinois by which a
man could be prosecuted for that. The
grand jury was then in session, and _\ir.
Cook advised Bircher that he had a good
case and directed him to the grand jury-
room, and Bircher went before the grand
jury. If all this had taken place between
Bircher and an attorney consulted by him
who did not hold the public position which
Mr. Cook did, clearly, the communication
would have been privileged and not to be
disclosed against the objection of Bircher.
Under the circumstances shown, Mr. Cook
was the professional adviser of Bircher, con-
sulted by him on B. statement of his case,
to learn his opinion as to whether there was
ground i11 fact and in law for making an
attempt to procure an indictment against
Gruaz. The fact that Mr. Cook held the
position of public prosecutor, and was not
to be paid by Bircher for information or ad-
vice, did not destroy the relation which the
law established between them. It made that
relation more sacred on the ground of pub-
lic policy. The avenue to the grand jury
should always be free and unobstructed.
Bircher might have gone directly before it
without consulting Mr. Cook, but if he chose
to consult him instead of a private counsel,
there was great propriety in his doing so.
Any person who desires to pursue the same
course should not be deterred by the fear
of having what he may say in the confidence
of a consultation with a professional adviser,
supposed to be the best qualified for the
purpose, disclosed afterwards in a civil suit
against his objection. Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind.
132. By the statute of Illinois in force at
the time of this occurrence, it was made the
duty of each state's attorney to “commence
and prosecute" all criminal actions, suits,
indictments, and prosecutions in any court
of record in his county. in which the people
of the state or county might be concerned.
(Rev. St. 1874, c. 14, § 5, subd. 1.) Under
this provision it was the province and the
privilege of any person who knew of facts
tending to show the commission of a crime,
to lay those facts before the public ofiicer
whose duty it was to commence a prosecu-
tion for the crime. Public policy will pro-
tect all such communications absolutely, and
without reference to the motive or intent of
the informer or the question of probable
cause; the ground being that greater mis-
chief will probably result from requiring or
permitting them to be disclosed than from
wholly rejecting them. Mr. Cook learned
from Bircher the things to which he testified,
because he occupied the position of public
prosecuting oilicer, and because he was act-
ing at the time as the legal adviser of Bircher
in respect to the matter and question which
Bircher was laying before him. The free
and uncmbarrasscd administration of justice
in respect to the criminal law in which the
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Case No. 135] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
8elt. (Counsel for defendant objected to wit- stolen his money, and was asked how, and 
ness statlug his opinion about what defend- stated how and Inquired of Mr. Cook if 
ant evidently believed.) The Court. He said tliere was any law In Illlnols by which a 
be went before u1e grand jury, and said be man could be prosecuted for that. The 
seemed to be in earnest In his movements, grand jury was then In session, and :.\Ir. 
but he didn't Blly what took place before Cook advised Bircher that he bad a good 
the grand jury. Don't know, I suppose. case and directed him to the grand jury-
Witness. No, I don't know. Cross-examlna- room, and Bircher went before the grand 
tlon. Maj. Prickett Introduced Bircher to jury. It all this had tsken place between 
me; never saw him before In my life. I Bircher and an attorney consulted by him 
was certain he came to see me as prOBecut. who did not bold the public position which 
Ing attorney, In good faith. That was bis Mr. Cook did, clearly, the communlcatlon 
business, as be stated it to me. After be would have been privileged and not to be 
made his statement to me I advised him to disclosed against the objecUon of Bircher. 
go before the grand jury; directed him to Under the circumstances shown, Mr. Cook 
their room. He went there by my advice. was the professional advlf'er of Bircher, con-
Hold on-I don't say that; I advised him suited by him on a statement ot his case, 
that he bad a good case. He came to me to learn his opinion as to whether there was 
and I showed him where the grand jury I ground In fact and In law for making an 
room was. He stated bis case to me as attempt to procure an Indictment a~inst 
state's attorney. I then directed him where Gruaz. The fact that Mr. Cook held the 
to go, and said I should prosecute It as i position of public prosecutor, and was not 
vigorously as possible, If the Indictment was I to be paid by Bircher for Information or ad· 
found. In regard to the aavlce I gave him, vice, did not destroy the relation which the 
I rather encom·aged him to drop the thing; law established between them. It made that 
I told him he bad better sue Mr. Gruaz first, I relation more sacred on the ·ground of pub-
and see It he couldn't get judgment against Uc policy. The avenue to the grand jury 
him, and so put It In a better shape to prose- should always be tree and unobstructed. 
cute him. He stated bis case, and I thought I Bircher wight have gone directly before It 
trow his statement that be would have few, without consulting l\lr. Cook, but It he chose 
It any, witnesses besides himself', and that to consult him Instead ot a private counsel, 
It would be doubtful, however honestly be I there was great propriety In bis doing so. 
might believe, that be had cause; it would 1 A.uy person who desires to pursue the same 
be doubtful whether the jury would bring a course should not be deterred by the tear 
bill; so I advised him to bring a civil sult; of having what he may say In the confidence 
but, said I, you are here, and you mustn't ot a consultation with a professional adviser, 
think hardly of me It the grand jury dou't . supposed to be the best qualified tor the 
11.nd a bill; and I directed him to the grand ! purpose, disclosed afterwards in a civil suit 
jury room." I against his objection. Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 
The bill of exceptions also contains the I 13'l. By the statute of Illinois In force at 
following: "In reference to the testimony .,. the tlme of this occun·ence, lt was made the 
of etate's attorney C. L. Cook, the court duty of each state's attorney to "commence 
Instructed the jury as follows: 'I admitted and prosecute" all criminal actions, suite, 
that evidence with an explanation, and with i Indictments, and prosecutions In any court 
the explanation made In the admission ot I of record In his county, In which the people 
It I think I am content, and I think the jury of the state or county might be concerned. 
· may take It Into consideration; but If they t (Rev. St. 1874, c. 14, § 5, subd. 1.) Under 
think the defendant was actuated by honest this provision It was the province and the 
motives In making the declaration be did, privilege of any person who knew of facts 
they will disregard It.' To the giving of tending to show the commission of a crime, 
which Inst Instruction the defendant ex- to lay those facts before the public officer 
cepted, for the reason that the Instruction whose duty It was to commence a prosecu-
lgnores the element of want of probable tlon tor the crime. Puhllc policy will pro-
cause, and tor the reason also that the jury tect all such communications absolutely, and 
should have been Instructed to disregard without reference to the motive or Intent of 
Cook's testimony entirely." the Informer or the question of probable 
We are of opinion that what was said by cause; the ground being that greater mis· 
Bircher to Yr. Cook was an absolutely prlvl- chief will probably result from requiring or 
leged communication. It was said to Mr. permitting them to be disclosed than from 
Cook while he was state's attorney or prose- wholly rejecting them. Mr. Cook learned 
cutor ot crimes for the county, and while from Bircher the things to which he testified, 
be was acting In that capacity. Bircher In- because he occupied the position of public 
quired for the state's attorney and was In- prosecuting officer, and because be was act-
troduced to him, and stated to him that he Ing at the time us the legal adviser of Bircher 
wanted to talk with him about a matter be In respect to the matter and question which 
wanted to bring before the grand jury In Bircher was laying before him. The free 
regard to Gruaz. He laid the matter before nnd un<:>rnbnrrassed administration of jmitlc-e 
Mr. Cook, and charged Gruaz with having I 1n respect to the criminal law lu which the 
390 
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
[Case No. 135
public is concerned, is involved in a case like
the present, in addition to the considerations
which ordinarily apply in communications
from client to counsel in matters of purely
private concern. Bircher made his commu-
nication to Mr. Cook for the purpose of ob-
taining professional advice as to his right,
and that of the public through him, to have
a criminal prosecution commenced by Mr.
Cook by the intervention of the grand jury
against Gruaz.
But there is another view of the subject.
The matter concerned the administration of
penal justice, and the principle of public
safety justiiies and demands the rule of ex-
clusion. In Worthington v. Scribner, 109
Mass. -187, an action for maliciously and
falsely representing to the treasury depart-
ment of the United States that the plaintiff
-was intending to defraud the revenue, it was
held that the defendant could not be com-
pelled to answer whether he did not give
to the department information of supposed
or alleged frauds on the revenue contemplat-
ed by the plaintiff. The principle laid down
in that case was, that it is the duty of every
-citizen to communicate to his government
any information which he has of the com-
mission of an offense against its laws; and
that a court of justice will not compel or
allow such information to be disclosed, either
i
1
i
1
I
I
i
i
i
§
I
I
I
by the subordinate ofilcer to whom it is given,
by the informer himself, or by any other
person, without the permission of the gov-
ernment, the evidence being excluded not for
the protection of the witness or of the party
in the particular case, but upon general
grounds of public policy, because oi.‘ the con-
fidential nature of such communications. The
authorities are collected and reviewed in that
case. The case of Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R.
8 Q. B. 255, there cited, was aflirmed by the
house of lords, L. R. 7 H. L. 744. See, also,
1 Greenl. Ev. 5 250; Black v. Holmes, 1 Fox
& Sm. 28.
It makes no difference that there was evi-
dence of the speaking of the same words to
persons other than Mr. Cook, and that the
speaking of them to Mr. (Jook was not the
sole ground of action or of recovery. The
evidence was incompetent, and it must be
inferred that it atfected the minds of the jury
both on the main issue and on the question
of damages.
It results from these views that the judg-
ment below cannot be upheld, and that it
must be reversed, and the case be remanded
to the circuit court, with direction to set
aside the verdict and vacate the judgment
and take such further proceedings as may be
i according to law and not inconsistent with
this opinion.
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. (Case No. 185 
public IB concerned, ls Involved In a case like 
the present, In addition to the considerations 
which ordinarily apply In communications 
from client to counsel In matters of purely 
private concern. Bircher made his commu-
nication to Mr. C-0ok for the purpose of ob-
taining profe11Slonal advice as to his right, 
and that of the public through him, to have 
a criminal prosecution commenced by Mr. 
Cook by the Intervention of the grand jury 
against Gruaz. 
But there ls another view of the subject. 
The matter concerned the admlnlsti·atlon of 
penal justice, and the principle of public 
aafety justifies and demands the rule of ex-
.cluslon. In Worthington v. Scribner, 109 
Mass. 487, an action for maliciously and 
falsely representing to the treasury depart-
ment of the United States that the plnlntltr 
was Intending to defraud the revenue, It was 
held that the defendant could not be com-
pelled to answer whether he did not give 
to the department Information of supposed 
.or alleged frauds on the revenue contemplat-
ed by the plalntltr. The principle laid down 
In that case was, that It Is the duty of every 
.citizen to communicate to his government 
any Information which he has of the com-
mission of an otrense against Its laws; and 
that a court of justice wlll not compel or 
.allow such lntormat1on to be disclosed, either 
by the subordinate officer to whom It 18 given, 
by the Informer himself, or by any other 
person, without the permission of the gov-
ernment, the evidence being excluded not for 
the protection of the witness or of the party 
In the pnrtlcular case, but upon general 
grounds of publlc policy, because of the con-
ttdentlnl nature of such communications. The 
authorities are collected and reviewed In that 
case. The case of Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R. 
S Q. B. 2;"i;J, there cited, was atllrmed by the 
house o! lords, L. R. 7 H. L. 744. 8ee, also, 
1 Greenl. Ev. I 250; Black v. Holmes, 1 Fox 
& Sm. 28. 
It makes no dltrerence that there w.as evl· 
deuce of the speaking of the same words to 
persons other than Mr. Cook, and that the 
speaklni: of them to Mr. Cook was not the 
sole ground of action or of reco'fery. The 
i evidence was Incompetent, and It must be 
1 lnfen-ed that It all'ected the minds of the jury I' both on the main Issue and on the question of damages. 
I It results from these views that the judg-
1 ment below cannot be upheld, and that It 
' must be reversed, and the case be remanded 
to the circuit court, with direction to set 
aside the verdict and vacate the judgment 
and take such further proceedings as may be I according to law and not inconsistent with th1a opinion. 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
Appeal of HARTRANFT et al.
(85 Pa. St. 433.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 7, 1878.
This is an appeal of John F. Hartranft,
governor of the commonwealth, M. S. Quay,
secretary of the commonwealth, James W.
Latta, adjutant general of the common-
wealth. General R. M. Brinton, and Major
A. Wilson Norris, from an order of the court
of quarter sessions of the peace of Alle-
gheny county, directing attachments to issue
against them for failure to obey a subpcena
of the grand jury who were investigating the
matters of the riots at Pittsburgh of July
21 and 22, 1877.
Thomas M. Marshall, Lyman D. Gilbert,
Dep. Atty. Gen., and George Lear, Atty. Gen,
for appellants. E. A. Montooth, Dist. Atty.,
Morton Hunter, Asst. Dist. Atty., S. A. Mc-
Clung, and George Shiras, Jr., contra.
GORDON, J’. Grand juries have the power
to make presentment, not only of such crim-
inal offences as may be laid before them by
the district attorney in the form of bills of
indictment, and of such as may come within
the personal knowledge of individual mem-
bers thereof, but also of all such matters as
may be given them in charge by the court.
Neither is there any doubt about the power
of the court to direct that body to make in-
quiry concerning afiairs which directly af-
fect the public peace and society, among
which aifairs may be instanced great riots,
such as those which recently disturbed the
well-disposed citizens of Pittsburgh» and its
vicinity. Matters of this kind may properly
be referred to the consideration of the grand
inquest in order that the instigators thereof
and the participants therein may be brought
to justice; and this is the more necessary
because in times of public tumult and alarm
private prosecutors may be overawed through
fear of personal violence.
Doubtless the proceedings in the case be-
fore us are very irregular, since there seems
to be a. total inversion of the proper order
of things. It was the duty of the court, not
of the grand jury, first to move in the matter.
In a subject of so much: importance, and
one requiring the exercise of so much care
and discretion, the court should have in-
structed this jury as to what it was to inves-
tigate, and in what manner the investigation
was to be conducted. Nothing of the kind,
however, was done; but the court, "having
approved its petition, suffered it to proceed
to the adoption of its own subjects, after its
own methods, and, by this sufferance, it al-
lowed an important public investigation to
pass from its own control to that of a body
of men, which, as it was governed by no reg-
ular instructions, resembled more a commit-
tee for the general investigation of public
affairs, than a lawful constituent of the court
of quarter sessions. This, however, is really
of small importance to the matter in hand;
neither can the appellants call in ques-
tion the regularity of the proceedings as
between the court and its grand jury;
for if they have been properly subpoen-
aed, and can present no lawful excuse for
their want of obedience to the mandate
of the quarter sessions, they must stand con-
victed of a contempt, and we cannot help
them. The ubpaana is the process of the
commonwealth, and there is no doubt about
the court’s power to issue that process in
proper case.
Our inquiry, then, is limited to two prop-
ositions: Were the subpoenas regular, such
as an ordinary citizen would be bound to
obey? If so, were the appellants liable to
attachment for disobedience to this process?
The slibpcrna we have-,before us, like the
other proceedings in this case, is very irreg-
ular. It is, indeed, but a general mandate
of the court, ordering the appellants to ap-
pear, “to testify, all and singular, those
things which they may know touching a cer-
tain investigation being had, on formal pre-
sentment, by and before the grand jury,
relating to the late riots of July last, in said
county, in said court depending.” It sets
forth no case, present or prospective, nor
does it state for whom, or at whose instance.
the defendants were to be subpoenaed. As
this writ is a very arbitrary one, obliging
the citizen to leave his home and abandon
his business, however important it may be,
and give his attendance at court, wherever
that may be sitting, it is very important to
know what parties are entitled to it; for if
it be issued at the suit of one having no right
thereto, it is no contempt to disobey it. The
commonwealth may have this process in any
proceeding where its interest is apparent,
whether as a suitor or a prosecutor, and so
may parties in courts, either civil or crim-
inal; but we have yet to learn that any such
right exists in a court, in its mere character
as a court, separated from the case which it
has in hand. So this, as well as every other
compulsory process, must show upon its face
that it was issued for some person or party
having a right thereto, otherwise it is nuga-
tory and void, and disobedience to its man-
date involves no penalty whatever. In the
case before us there was the use of the writ
of subpoena, as a mere order of the court,
without statement of party or case, com-
manding the defendants to appear before
the grand jury, for the purpose of giving
their testimony touching the late riots. If
there is any law authorizing such process,
we have not been informed of it.
No doubt the court might have directed
a subpcena to have issued for the common-
wealth, in any case where the commonwealth
was a party, or where it was apparent it
was in some way interested in some case or
transaction then depending. So might it have
directed a warrant to have issued for the
arrest oi’ some one guilty of a crime or mis-
demeanor; but in such case no one would
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Case No. 136] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
.Appeal of HARTRANFT et al 
(85 Pa. St. 433.) 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 7, 1878. 
This ls an appeal of John I!.,. Hartranft, 
g<ivernor of the commonwealth, M. S. Quay, 
secretary of the commonwealth, Jo.mes \V. 
Latta, adjutant general of the common-
wealth, General R. M. Brinton, and Major 
.A.. Wilson Norris, from an order of the court 
of quarter seBBlons of the peace of Alle-
gheny C"ounty, directing attachments to Issue 
agnlnst them for failure to obey a subprena 
of the grand jury who were im-estlgating the 
matters of the riots at Pittsburgh of July 
21 and 22, 1877. 
'l'homas M. Marshall, Lyman D. Gilbert, 
Dep. Atty. Gen., and George Lear, Atty. Gen., 
for appellants. E. A. Montooth, Dist. Atty., 
Morton Hunter, Asst. Dist. Atty., S. A. Mc-
Clung, and George Shlras, Jr., contra. 
GORDON, J. Grand juries have the power 
to make presentment. not only of such crim-
inal offences as may be laid before them by 
the district attorney In the form of b111s of 
Indictment, and of such as may come within 
the pt>rsonal knowledge or Individual mem-
bers thereof, but also of all such matters as 
may be given them In charge by tlttl court. 
Neither Is there any doubt about the power 
of the court to direct that body to mak~ In-
quiry concerning alrairs which directly af-
fect the public peace and society, among 
which alTalrs may be lnstancecl grt-at riots, 
such as those which recently disturbed the 
well-dispo~ed citizens of Pittsburgh and its 
vicinity. Matters of this kind may properly 
be referred to the consideration of the grand 
Inquest in order that the instigators thereof 
and the participants therein may be brought 
to justice; and this ls the more necessury 
because In times of public tumult and alarm 
private prosecutors maybe overawed through 
fear of personal viol1.>nce. 
Doubtless the proceedings In the case be-
fore us are very Irregular, since there seems 
to be a total Inversion of the proper order 
of thln~s. It was the duty of the court, not 
of the grand jury, drst to wove In the matter. 
In a subject of so much Importance, and 
one requiring the exercise of so much care 
and discretion, the court should have In-
structed this Jury as to what It was to Inves-
tigate, and in what manner the lnYestlgation 
was to be conducted. Nothing of the kind, 
howcYer, was done; but the court, having 
appron•d Its petition, sutl'ered it to proceed 
to tire adoption of Its own sub,lects, after Its 
own methods, and, by this sutTerance, It al-
lowed an important public Investigation to 
pass from Its own control to that of a body 
of men, which, as It was goYerned by no reg-
ular Instructions, resembled more a commit-
tee for the general investigation of public 
affairs, than a lawful constituent of the court 
of quarter sessions. This, however, ls really 
of small Importance to the matter in hand; 
39".l 
neither can the appellants call In quea-
tion the regularity of the proceedings aa 
between the court and its grand jury; 
for If they have been properly trubpren-
aed, and can present no lawful excuse for 
their want of obedience to the mandate 
of the quarter sessions, they must stand con-
victed of a contempt, and we cannot help 
them. The sub:p<ena Is the process of the 
commonwealth, and there ls no doubt about 
the court's power to iBBue that process In 
proper cases. 
Our Inquiry, then, ls limited to two prop. 
osltlons: Were the subprenas regular, such 
as an ordinary citizen would be bound to 
obey? It so, were the appellants liable to 
attachment for disobedience to this proceBB? 
The subprena we have. before us, like the 
other proceedings In this case, Is very Irreg-
ular. It is, Indeed, but a 11:eneral mandate 
of the court, ordering the appellants to ap. 
pear, "to testify, all and singular, those 
things which they may know touching a cer-
tain lnvestlga.tlon being had, on formal pre-
sentment, by and before the grand jury, 
relating to the late riots of July last, In said 
county, in said court depending." It sets 
forth no case, present or prospective, nor 
does it state for whom, or at whose Instance. 
the defendants were to be subpoonaed. As 
this writ Is a Yery arbitrary one, obliging 
the citizen to leave his home and abandon 
his business, however Important It may be, 
and give his attendance at court, wherever 
that may be sitting, It is very Important to 
know what parties are entitled to It; for If 
it be issued at the suit of one having no right 
thereto, It ls no contempt to disobey It. The 
commonwealth may have this process in any ' 
proceeding where its Interest ls apparent, 
whether as a suitor or a prosecutor, nnd so 
may parties In courts, either civil or crim-
inal; but we have yet to learn that any such 
right exists In a court, in its mere character 
as a court, separated from the case which lt 
has In hand. So this, as well as every other 
compulsory process, must show upon Its face 
that lt was Issued for some person or party 
having a right thereto, otherwise it ls nuga-
tory and Yold, and disobedience to Its man-
date Involves no penalty whatever. In the 
case before us there was the use of the writ 
of subprena, as a mere order of the court. 
without statement of party or case, com-
manding the defendants to appear before 
the grand jury, for the purpose of giving 
their testimony touching the late riots. If 
there Is any law authorizing such process, 
we have not been informed of It. 
No doubt the court might have dlrectt-d 
a subpama to have issued for the common-
.wealth, In ony case where the commonwealth 
was a party, or where it was apparent It 
was In some way Interested In some cai>e or 
transaction then depending. So might it h:l\"e 
dlrectt>d a warrant to have Issued for the 
arrest of some one guilty of a crime or mis-
demeanor; but In such case no one would 
PRIVI LEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
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contend that the mere blank warrant of the
court would in itself be suificient to detain
a. citizen for one moment. The authority for
such warrant must appear upon its face or
it is worthless. But the court’s subpoena is
no more respectable than its warrant. If the
suhptena exhibit no authority it may be dis-
obeyed with impunity. Now, in the case be-
fore us, the commonwealth was not a party
in interest, or, if so, it is not now apparent.
It seems, from the petition of the grand
jury, that the citizens of the county of Al-
legheny “were greatly concerned in having
a careful investigation of the late riots," but
whether they were concerned in bringing
the rioters to justice or not is not stated,
though this was the only matter in which
the commonwealth could be concerned.
Moreover, as the grand jury was acting un-
der no instruction, it was not possible, even
for the court, to know what that jury was
doing or, intended to do, but of this the court
should have been informed before it under-
took to interfere with the personal liberty
of the citizen by its summary process of at-
tachment, for, as the matter now stands, it
is apparent that the subpoana was issued for
no tangible cause or party and for no proper-
ly defined legal purpose; hence no one was
bound to obey it.
For the purposes of this case, however,
we may admit the regularity of this sub-
poena, and that, upon an ordinary citizen,
it would have been binding and obligatory,
for we regard the question of the liability
of the appellants to attachment, in any
event, as the prime one in this case. in
order to resolve this, we must first under-
stand who the persons are against whom
the court has directed its attachment, and
for what purpose they have been sub-
poenaed. They are the governor of Pennsyl-
vania, the secretary of the commonwealth,
the adjutaut general, chief oflicers of the
executive department of the state govern-
ment, and two ofiicers of the national guard;
the latter subordinates acting under the or-
dcrs of the former. The purpose, for which
these oflicers are subprenaed is that the
grand jury may be put into possession of
any information they may be possessed of,
or that may be within the power of their
several departments, concerning the military
or other means used by them in the sup-
pression of the late riots in the city of Pitts-
burgh. It will be observed that these per-
sons are subpoenaed for the purpose of com-
pelling a revelation of such things as have
come to their knowledge in their official
capacities, and which strictly belong to their
several departments as officers of the com-
monwealth. This is clearly et out in the
answer by the attorney general to the ap-
plication for the attachment, and there has
been no denial thereof upon the argument
before us. In order to simplify matters, we
may treat this case just as though the pro-
cess, iirst and last, were against the gov-
ernor alone; for if he is exempt from at-
tachment because of his privilege, his im-
munity protects his subordinates and agents.
The general principle is that whenever the
law vests any person with the power to do
an act at the same time constituting him a
judge of the evidence on which the act may
be done, and contemplating the employment
of agents through whom the act is to be ac-
complished, such person is clothed with dis-
cretionary powers, and is quoad hoc a judge.
His mandates to his legal agents, on his de-
claring the event to have happened, will be
a protection to those agents. Vauderheyden
v. Young, 11 Johns. 158, per Spencer, J.
It follows, if the governor, as supreme
executive, and as commander in chief of
the army of the commonwealth, is charged
with the duty of suppressing domestic in-
surrections, he must be the judge of the
necessity requiring the exercise of the pow-
ers with which he is clothed; and his sub-
ordinates, who are employed to render these
powers eflicient and to produce the legiti-
mate results of their exercise, can be ac
countable to none but him. In like manner,
if he is constituted the judge of what things,
knowledge, or information, coming into his
department through himself personally or
from his subordinates may or may not he
revealed, then such subordinates, without
his permission, cannot be compelled to dis-
close, in court, any such matters or informa-
tion.
What, then, are the duties, powers, and
privileges of the governor? In the language
of the constitution (article 4, § 2): "The
supreme executive power shall be vested in
the governor, who shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.” Also, same
article, section 7: “The governor shall be
commander in chief of the army and navy
of the commonwealth, and of the militia,
except when they shall be called into the
actual service of the United States." He is
also invested with the appointment and par-
doning powers, the power to convene the
legislature in cases of emergency, and to ap-
prove or veto bills submitted to him by the
general assembly. It is scarcely conceivable
that a man could be more completely invest-
ed with the supreme power and dignity of
a free people. Observe, the supreme execu-
tive power is vested in the governor, and he
is charged with the faithful execution of
the laws, and for the accomplishment of
this purpoe he is made commander in chief
of the army, navy, and militia of the state.
Who, then, shall assume the power of the
people, and call this magistrate to an ac-
count for that which he has done in dis-
charge of his constitutional duties? If he
is not the judge of when and how these
duties are to be performed, who is? \Vhere
does the court of quarter sessions, or any
other court, get the power to call this man
before it, and compel him to answer for the
manner in which he has discharged his con-
\
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [Case No. 136 
contend that the mere blank warrant of the 
court would in Itself be antDclent to detain 
a citizen for one moment. The authority for 
1uch warrant must appear upon Its face or 
it ls worthleBS. But the court's subprena ls 
no more respectable than its warrant. If the 
subprena exhibit no authority it may be dis-
obeyed with impunity. Now, ln the case be-
fore us, the commonwealth was not a party 
in Interest, or, 1f so, It Is not now apparent. 
It seems, from the petition of the gnmd 
jury, that the citizens of the county of Al-
legheny "were greatly concerned In having 
a careful investigation of the late riots," but 
whether they were concerned In blinglng 
the rioters to justice or not ls not stated, 
though this was the only matter in which 
the commonwealth could be concerned. 
Moreover, a11 the grand jury was acting un-
der no instruction, It was not po88lble, even 
for the court, to know what that jury was 
doing or, Intended to do, but of this the court 
ahould have been informed before It under-
took to Interfere with the personal liberty 
of the citizen by lt11 summary proceSB of at-
tachment, for, as the matter now stands, it 
is apparf'nt that the subprena was i8Bued for 
no tangible cause or party and for no proper-
ly de1lued legal purpose; hence no one was 
bound to obey it. 
For the purposes of this case, however, 
we may admit the regularity of this sub-
pmna, and that, upon an. ordinary citizen, 
it would have been binding and obligatory, 
for we regard the question of the lla.blllty 
of the appellants to attachment, In any 
event, as the prime one In this case. In 
order to resolve this, we must first under-
stand who the persons are against whom 
the court has directed its attachment, and 
for what purpose they have been sub-
prenaed. They are the governor of Pennsyl-
vania, the secretary of the commonwealth, 
the adjutant general, chief otDcers of the 
executive department of the state govern-
ment, and two officers of the national guard; 
the latter subordinates acting under the or-
ders of the former. The purpose, for which 
these otDcers are subprenaed ls that the 
grand Jury may be put Into J)Ossession of 
any information they may be posseSBed of, 
or that may be within the power of their 
several departments, concerning the military 
or other means used by them in tlle sup-
pression of the late riots In the city of Pitts-
burgh. It will be observed that these per-
sons are subprenaed for the purpose of com-
pelllng a revelation of such things as have 
come to their knowledge In their otliclal 
capacities, and which strictly belong to their 
several departments as oft\cers ot the com-
monwealth. This Is clearly set out In the 
answer by the attorney general to the ap-
plication for the attachment, and there has 
been no denial thereof upon the argument 
before us. In order to simplify matters, we 
may treat this case just as though the pro-
t.'tl88, fl.rat and last. were against the gov-
ernor alone; for If he Is exempt from at-
tachment because of his privilege, his Im· 
munlty protects bis subordinates and agents. 
The general principle ls that whenever the 
law vests any person with the power to do 
an act at the same time constituting him a 
judge of the evidence on which the act may, 
be done, and contemplating the employment 
of agents through whom the act Is to be ac-
complished, such person is clothed with dis-
cretionary powers, and Is quoad hoc a judge. 
ms mandates to his legal agents, on his de-
claring the event to have happened, will be 
a protection to those agents. Vanderheyden 
v. Young, 11 Johns. 158, per Spencer, J. 
It follows, If the governor, ft.R supreme 
executive, and as commander In chief of 
the army of the commonwealth, ls charged 
with the duty of suppressing domestic In-
surrections, he must be the judge of the 
necessity requiring the exercise of the pow-
ers with which he ls clothed; and his sub-
ordinates, who are employed to render these 
powers etDclent and to produce the lei."itl· 
mate results of their exercise, can be ac-
countable to none but him. In like manner, 
If he is constituted the judge of what things, 
knowledge, or Information, coming Into his 
department through himself personally or 
from his subordinates may or may not be 
revealed, then such subordinates, without 
his permission, cannot be compelled t.o dis-
close, In court, any such matters or informa-
tion. 
What, then, are the duties, powers, and 
privileges of the governor? In tlle language 
of the constitution (article 4, f 2): "The 
supreme executive power shall be vested In 
the governor, who shall take care thut the 
laws be faithfully executed." Also, same 
article, section 7: "The governor shall be 
commander in chief of the army and navy 
of the commonwealth, and of the militia, 
except when they shall be called Into the 
actual service of the United States." He ls 
also invested with the appointment and par-
doning powers, the power to convene the 
legislature In cases of emergency, and to ap-
prove or veto bills submitted to him by the 
genera.I assembly. It Is scarcely conceivable 
that a man could be more completely Invest-
ed with the supreme power and dignity of 
a free people. Observe, the supreme execu-
tive power ls vested In the governor, and he 
ls charged with the faithful execution of 
the laws, and for the accomplishment of 
this purpose he ls made commander In chief 
of the army, navy, and mllltla of the state. 
Who, then, shall assume the power of the 
people, and call this magistrate to an ac-
count for that which he has done In dis-
charge of his constitutional duties? If he 
ls not the judge of when and how these 
duties are to be performed, who ls? Where 
does the court of Quarter sessions, or any 
other court, get the power to call thht man 
before It, and compel him to answer for the 
manner In whl<!h he has discharged his con-
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stitutional functions as executor of the laws
and commander in chief of the militia of the
commonwealth? For it certainly is a logical
sequence that if the governor can be com-
pelled to reveal the means used to accom-
plish a given act, he can also be compelled
to answer for the manner of accomplishing
such act. If the court of quarter sessions
of Allegheny county can shut him up in
prison for refusing to appear before it and
reveal the methods and means used by him
to execute the laws and suppress domestic
violence, why may it not commit him for 9.
breach of the peace. or for homicide, result-
ing from the discharge of his duties as
commander in chief? And if the courts can
compel him to answer, why can they not
compel him to act’! All these things, we
know, may be done in the ease of private in-
dividuals. Such an one may be compelled
to answer, to account and to act. In other
words, if, from such analogy, we once begin
to shift the supreme executive power from
him upon whom the constitution has con-
ferred it to the judiciary, we may as well
do the work thoroughly and constitute the
courts the absolute guardians and directors
of all governmental functions whatever. If,
ho\\-ever, this cannot be done. we had bet-
ter not take the first step in that direction.
We had better at the outstart recognise the
fact that the executive department is a eo-
ordinate branch of the government, with
power to judge what should or should not
be done within its own department. and
what of its own doings and communica-
tions should or should not be kept secret,
and that with it, in the exercise of these
constitutional powers, the courts have no
more right to interfere than has the execu-
tive, under like conditions, to interfere with
the courts. In the case of Oliver v. War-
mouth. 22 La. 1, it was held (per Taliafero,
J.) that, under the division of powers, as laid
down in the federal and state constitutions,
the judiciary department has no jurisdic-
tion over or right to interfere with, the in-
dependent action of the chief executive in
the functions of his ofiice, even though the
act he is required to perform be purely min-
isterial. This is putting the matter on very
high grounds, for in such case no other
oiflcer would be exempt from the mandatory
power of the judiciary. No case could more
forcibly exhibit the extreme reluctance of
courts to interfere with the functions of
the supreme executive, for the hypothesis
put is the refusal of the governor to per-
form a duty, cast upon him by law, of a
character strictly ministerial. \Ve think,
however, that the ground upon which this
decision stands is substantial; for, as the
learned justice well argues, the ditliculty
arises in the attempt to establish a distinc-
tion between 'ministerial ‘and discretionary
acts as applied to the governor, and then to
conclude. that the former may be enforced
by judicial decree. It is objected, however,
that the doctrine is unsound in this: that it
gives to the judiciary the large discretion of
determining the character of ail acts to be
performed by the chief executive; that this
would infringe his right to use his own
discretion in determining the ver_v same
question; that he must, necessarily, have
the unconditional power of deciding what
acts his duties require him to perform, oth-
erwise his functions are trammeled and the
executive branch of the government is made
subservient to the judiciary. The principle
enunciated in the above-stated case applies
with greater force to that we now have
under consideration; for if the governor's
discretion may not be interfered with in a
matter purely ministerial, much more may
that discretion not be interfered with in a
case which pertains to his oiiice and duties
as commander in chief, in the discharge of
which the constitution makes that discre-
tion his peculiar and absolute prerogative.
Again, the governor, having a proper re-
gard for the dignity and welfare of the peo-
pie of the commonwealth, is not likely to
submit himself to imprisonment on the de-
cree of the court of quarter sessions, or to
permit his oflicers and coadjutors to be thus
imprisoned. Were we, then, to permit the
attempt to enforce this attachment, an un-
seemly conflict must result between the ex-
ecutive and judicial departments of the gov-
ernment. We need not say that prudence
would dictate the avoidance of a catastrophe
such as here indicated. On this point the
_ case of Thompson v. German Val. ll. Co., 22
N. J. Eq. 111, furnishes us with a precedent
well worthy of our consideration. In that
case a subpoena duces tecum had been served
on the governor of New Jersey, commanding
him, by his individual name, to appear and
testify before an examiner of the court of
chancery, and bring with him an engrossed
copy of a private statute which had been
passed by the legislature, and had been sent
to him, as governor, for his approval. He
refused to obey the subpoena, informing the
court at the same time that he did not re-
fuse out of any disrespect to the court or to
the law, but because he thought his duty
required him not to appear or produce the
paper required, or to submit his oiiiciai acts
as governor to the scrutiny of any court. It
will be seen that the case thus presented is
quite as strong as that under discussion;
for the governor, upon his own opinion of
duty, which, as it will appear, did not ae-
cord with that of the court, not only refused
to appear or produce the required paper,
but to submit any of his oiiicial acts to the
scrutiny of the court. An order was granted
on the governor to show cause why he
should not appear and testify. After argu-
ment, Zabriskie, Ch., said: “The governor
cannot be examined as to his reasons for
not signing the bill, nor as to his action, in
any respect, regarding it. But there is no
reason why he should not be called upon to
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atltutlonal functions as executor of the laws 
.and commander in chief of the mllltla of the 
.commonwealth? For It certainly la a logical 
aequence that if the governor can be com-
pelled to reveal the means used to accom-
plish a given act, he can also be compelled 
to answer tor the manner of accomplishing 
11uch act. If the court of quarter sessions 
-of Allegheny county can shut him up In 
prison tor refusing to appear before it and 
reveal the methods and means used by him 
to execute the laws and suppress domestic 
violence, why may It not commit him tor a 
b1·each of the peace, or for homicide, result-
ing from the discharge of his duties as 
-commander in chief? And if the courts can 
-compel him to answer, wh;r can they not 
compel him to act? All these things, we 
know, may be done In the case of private in-
dividuals. Such an one may be compelled 
to answer, to account and to act. In other 
words, If, from such analogy, we once begin 
to shift the supreme executive power from 
him upon whom the constitution ~as con-
ferred It to the judiciary, we may as well 
-do the work thoroughb• and conRtltute the 
-courts the absolute guardians and dlrectol'B 
-of all governmental functions whatever. If, 
however, this cannot be done, we bad bet-
ter not take the fil'Bt step in that direction. 
We had better at the outstart recognise the 
tact that the executive department IR a co-
<>rdlnate branch of the government, wlth 
powe1· to Judge what should or should not 
be done within Its own department, and 
what of Its own doings and communlca- , 
tlons should or should not be kept secret, 
and that with It, in the exercise of these 
constitutional powers, the courts have no 
more right to Interfere than has the execu-
tive, under like conditions, to Interfere with 
the courts. In the case of Oliver v. War-
mouth, 22 La. 1, It wns beld (per Tallnfero, 
.T.) that, under the division of powers, as laid 
down In the federal and state constitutions, 
the judiciary department bas no .1m1sdlc-
tlon over or right to Interfere with, the In-
dependent action of the chief executive In 
the functions of his oft:lce, even though the 
act be Is required to perform be purely min-
isterial. This Is putting the matter on very 
bl~h grounds. for In such case no other 
otncer would be exempt from the mandatory 
power of the judiciary. No case coultl more 
forcibly exhibit the extreme reluctance of 
.courts to interfere with the functions of 
the supreme executive, for the hy11othesls 
put ls tbe refusal of the goyernor to per-
form a dut:v. co.st upon him by law, of a 
chanwter strictly ministerial. We think, 
however, that the ground upon which this 
decision stands ls substantial; tor, ns the 
learned justice well argues, the difficulty 
arlfl('fl in the attempt to establish a cllstlnc· 
tlon lx>tween ·ministerial ·and discretionary 
ads ns applied to the governor, and then to 
conC'llldP. tbnt the former may be enforced 
hy Judicial decree. It ls objected, however, 
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that the doctrine ls unsound in this: that lt 
gives to the judiciary the large discretion of 
determining the character of all acts to be 
performed by the chief executive; that thl8 
would Infringe his right to nae hlB owu 
discretion In determining the very same 
question; that he must, necessarily, hav& 
the unconditional power of deciding what 
acts his duties re(Juire him to perform, oth-
erwise his functions are trammeled and the 
executive branch of the government ls made 
subsen·lent to the judiciary. The principle 
enunciated In the above-stated case appllea 
with greater force to that we now have 
under consideration; for If the governor's 
discretion may not be Interfered with In a 
matter purely ministerial, much more ma7 
that discretion not be interfered with In a 
case which pertains to his office and duties 
al! commander in chief, In the discharge of 
which the constitution makes that discre-
tion bis peculiar and absolute prerogative. 
Again, the governor, having a proper re-
gard for the dignity and welfare of the peo-
ple of the commonwealth, ls not likely to 
submit himself to Imprisonment on the de-
cree of the court of quarter seSBlons, or to 
permit his omcers and coadjutors to be thus 
imprisoned. Were we, then, to permit the 
attempt to enforce this attachment, nn un-
seemly conflict must result between the ex-
ecutive and judicial departments of the gov-
ernment. We siced not say that prudence 
would dictate the avoidance of a catastrophe 
such as here indicated. On this point the 
case of Thompson v. German Val. R. Co., 22 
N. J. Eq. 111, furnishes us with a precedent 
well worthy of our consideration. In that 
case a subprena duces tecum had been served 
on the governor of New Jersey, commanding 
him, by his Individual name, to appear and 
testlt'y before an examiner of the court of 
chancery, and bring with him an engrossed 
copy of a private statute which had been 
passed by the legislature, and bad been sent 
to him, as governor, for his approval. He 
refused to obey the subprena, Informing tbe 
court at the same time that he did not re-
fuse out ot' any disrespect to the court or to 
the law, but because be thought his ducy 
required him not to appear or produce the 
paper required, or to submit bis oWclal acts 
as governor to the scrutiny of any court. It 
will be seen that the case thus presented la 
quite as strong as that under dlscusslon; 
for the governor, upon his own opinion of 
duty, which, as It will appear, did not ac-
cord with that of the court, not only refused 
to appear or produce the required paper, 
but to submit any or his oWclal acts to tbe 
scrutiny of the court. An order was granted 
on the governor to show cause why he 
should not appear and testify. After argu-
ment, Zabriskie, Cb., said: "The governor 
cannot be examined as to bis reasons tor 
not signing the bill, nor as to his action, In 
any respect, regarding It. But there ls DO 
reason why he should IWt be called upon to 
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testify as to the time it was delivered to
him. That is a hare fact that includes no
action on his part. 'l‘o this extent, at least,
I am of opinion that he is bound to appear
and testify. But I will make no order on
him for that purpose. Such order ought not
to be made against the executive of the
state, because it might bring the executive
in conflict with the judiciary. If the execu-
tive thinks he ought to testify in compliance
with the opinion of the court, he will do so
without order; if he thinks it to be his
-oflicial duty, in protecting the rights and
dignity of his ofiice, he will not comply, even
if directed by an order. And in his case
the court would hardly entertain proceed-
ings to compel him by adjudging him in con-
tempt. It will be presumed the chief magis-
trate intends no contempt, out that his ac-
tion is in accordance with his otiicial duty.”
If we adopt this opinion as a sound exposi-
tion of the law, the case before us is de-
termined; for the matter is left to rest solely
on the opinion of the executive, although his
opinion be clearly contrary to that of the
court. We are inclined to think the con-
clusion thus reached is wise and discreet, and
it is supported by‘the best text writers of
our times. These state the law to be that
the president of the United States, the gov-
ernors of the several states, and their cabl-
net oificers, are not bound to produce papers
or disclose information committed to them,
in a judicial inquiry, when, in their own
judgment, the disclosure would, on public
grounds, be inexpedient. 1 Greenl. Ev.§
251; 1 Whart. Ev. § 604. Thus the question
of the expediency or inexpediency of the
production of the required evidence is re-
ferred, not to the judgment of the court be- '
fore which the action is trying, but of the
oiiicer who has that evidence in his posses-
sion. The doctrine that the officer must ap-
pear and submit the required information or
paper to the court for its judgment as to
whether they are or are not proper matters
for revelation, is successfully met and set-
tled in the case of Beaton v. Skene, 5 Hurl.
& N. 838, per Pollock, C. B. It was there
held that, if the production of a state paper
would be injurious to the public interest, the
public welfare must be preferred to that of the
private suitor. The question then arose, how
was this to be determined? It must be de-
termined either by the judge or by the re-
sponsible crown officer who has the paper.
But the judge could come to no conclusion
without ascertaining what the document
was, or why its publication would be injuri-
ous to the public service. Just here, how-
ever, occurred this ditficulty: that, as judi-
cial inquiry must always be public, the pre-
.liminary examination must give to the docu-
ment that very publicity which it might be
important to prevent. The conclusion
reached was that, from necessity, if for no
other reason, the question must be left to
-the judgment of the otiicer.
A like case is that of Gray v. Pentland,
2 Serg. & R. 23. A subpoena had been is-
sued from the court below and served upon
Governor Snyder and Secretary Boileau,
with a duces tecum. A rule was also en-
tered for the purpose of taking their deposi-
tions in Harrisburg. They declined to ap-
pear in answer to the subpoena, or to per-
mit their depositions to be taken under the
rule, and refused to produce the paper or
deliver it to the plaintifi. This paper was
of a very great importance, inasmuch as
its production was necessary for the main-
tenance of the suit pending, the supreme
court holding that, though it was beyond
the plaintilT‘s power, parol evidence of its
contents was not admissible. A motion was
then made, on the part of the plaintiff, for
a special subpoena duces tecum to compel
the production of the paper; but this was
refused. On argument in the superior court
this action of the court below in refusing
compulsory process against the governor and
secretary of the commonwealth does not
seem to have been questioned; on the other
hand, it was approved in opinions delivered
by Tilghman, C. J.,and Brackenridge, J. The
latter was, as he said, inclined to think that
the governor could not be compelled to pro-
duce the paper transmitted to him; that it
was within his own discretion tofurnish or
refuse it; and this on the ground of public
policy. The chief justice observed, inter alia,
that the governor, who best knew the cir-
cumstances under which the charge had been
exhibited to him, and could best judge the
motives of the accuser, must exercise hi
own judgment with respect to the propriety
of producing the writing. Thus the matter
is treated as quite beyond the power of the
court, and the judgment of the executive is
regarded as absolute and final.
We next refer to the celebrated trial of
Aaron Burr. Here is the case of one char-
ged with treason; one who, by the express
terms of the constitution, was entitled to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor. The judge before whom the
examination was conducted was John Mar-
shall, chief justice of the supreme court; a
man renowned, not only for his legal learn-
lug. but also for his judgment and sag-acity
as a stateman; and the president was Thom-
as Jefferson, one not likely unduly to exalt
executive prerogative, or to refuse to the ju-
diciary its just tribute of respect. We may
therefore presume that whatever was done
by the principal actors in the remarkable
judicial drama then in progress was well
done. At the request of the defence a sub-
poena duces tecum was awarded and directed
to the president, requiring him to appear,
and bring with him a certain letter from
General Wilkinson to himself. He refused
either to appear or produce the paper re-
quired. On dlscussion of the question, not
whether compulsory process should be
awarded against the president, for that was
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testify as to the ttme It was delivered to A like case Is that of Gray v. Pentland, 
him. That le a bare fact that Includes no 2 Berg. & R. 23. A eubpmnn had been le-
.action on hie part. To this extent, at least, sued from the court below and served upon 
I am of opinion that be ls bound to appear Governor Snyder and Secretary Boileau, 
.and testify. But I will make no order on with a ducee tecum. A rule was also en-
hlm for that purpose. Sll<'h order ought not tered for the purpose of taking their depoel· 
to be made against the executive of the tlone In Harrisburg. They declined to ap-
11tate, because It might bring the executive pear In answer to the subpmna, or to per-
ln conflict with the judiciary. It the execu- mlt their depositions to be taken under the 
tlve thinks he ought to testify In compliance rule, and refused to produce the paper or 
with the opinion of the court, be will do so deliver It to the plaintiff. This paper waa 
without order; If he thinks It to be his of a very great Importance, Inasmuch as 
-omclnl duty, In protecting the rights and Its production was necessary for the main-
-dignity of bis oftlce, be will not comply, even tenance of the suit pending, the supreme 
H directed by an order. And In bis case court holding that, though It was beyond 
the court would hardly entertain proceed- the plalntltr's power, parol evidence of Its 
tngs to compel him by adjudging him In con- contents was not admissible. A motion was 
tempt. It will be presumed the chief magi&- then made, on the part of the plaintiff, for 
trate Intends no contempt, out that bis ac- a special subpmna duces tecum to compel 
tlon ls In accordance with his oftlclal duty." the production of the paper; but this was 
It we adopt this opinion as a souncl expos!- refused. On argument In the superior court 
tlon of the law, the case before ua ls de- , this action of the court below In refusing 
termlned; for the matter ls left to rest solely I compulsory process against the governor and 
-00 the opinion of the executive, although his I secretary of the commonwealth does not 
opinion be clearly contrary to that of the I seem to have been questioned; on the other 
~ourt. We are inclined to think the con- I hand, It was approved In opinions delivered 
duslon thus reached ls wise and discreet, and \ by Tilghman, C. J., and Brackenridge, J. The 
Jt ls supported by ·the beet text writers of latter was, as he said, Inclined to think that 
our times. These state the law to be that the governor could not be compelled to pro-
the president of the United t!tates, the gov- duce the paper transmitted to him; that It 
-ernors of the several states, and their cabl- was within his own discretion to furnish or 
net offtcers, are not bound to produce papers refuse It; and this on the ground of public 
or disclose Information committed to them, policy. The chief justice observed, Inter alla, 
Jn a Judicial Inquiry, when, In their own that the governor, who best knew the cir-
Judgment, the dlscloeure would, on public cumstances under which the charge had been 
grounds, be Inexpedient. 1 Green]. Ev. f exhibited to him, and could best judge the 
251; 1 Wbart. Ev. § 604. Thus the question motives of the accuser, must exercise his 
of the expediency or Inexpediency of the own judgment with respect to the propriety 
production of the required evidence ls re- of procluclng the writing. Thus the matter 
ferred, not to the judgment of the court be- ls treated as quite beyond the power of the 
fore which the action Is trying, but of the court, and the judgment of the executive Is 
-01Hcer who has that evidence In his posses- regarded as absolute and final. 
slon. The doctrine that the oftlcer mu11t ap- We next 1·efer to the celebrated trial of 
pear and submit the required Information or Aaron Burr. Here Is the case of one char-
llftpers to the court for Its judgment as to ged with treason; one who, by the express 
whether they are or are not proper matters terms of the constitution, was entitled to 
tor revelation, Is successfully met and set- compulsory process for obtaining wltneBSes 
tled In the case of Beaton v. Skene, ;) Hurl. In his favor. The judge before whom the 
A: N. 838, per Pollock, C. B. It was there examination was conducted was John llar-
beld that, If the procluctton of a state paper shall, chief justice of the supreme court; a 
would be Injurious to the public Interest, the man renowned, not only for bis legal learn-
public welfare must be preferred to thatof the Ing, but also for his judgment and sagacity 
private suitor. The question then arose, how as a stateman; and the president was Thom-
was this to be determined? It must be de- as Jetrel'son, one not likely unduly to exalt 
termlned either by the judge or by the re- e~ecutlve prerogative, or to refuse to the ju-
.sponslble crown oftlcer who has the paper. dlclary Its just tribute of respect. We may 
But the judge could come to no conclusion therefore presume that whatever was done 
without ascertaining what the document by the principal actors In the remarkable 
was, or why Its publication would be lnjurl- judlctal drama then In progress was well 
-0us to the public service. Just here, bow- done. At the request of the defence a sub-
ever, occurred this dlftlculty: that, as jndl- pama duces tecum was awardoo and directed 
dal Inquiry must always be public, the pre- to the president, requiring him to appear, 
llmlnary examination must give to the docu- and bring with him a certain letter from 
ment that very publicity which lt might be General Wiikinson to himself. He refused 
Important to prevent. The conclusion either to appenr. "or produce the paper re-
reached was that, from necessity, If for no quired. On discussion of the question, not 
other reason, the question must be left to whether com·pulsory process sh<>uld be 
·the Judgment of the ottlcer. awarded against the president, !or that was 
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withholding the paper called for.
not so much as proposed, but whether the
attorney general should permit the defence
to have the examination of a copy of the re-
quired letter which had been put into his
possession, the chief justice said (as we find
it set down in volume 3, p. 37, Burr‘s Trial,
as published by Westcott. & Co., Washington
City, 1870): “I suppose it will not be alleged
in this case that the president ought to be
considered as having offered a contempt to
the court in consequence of his not having
attended, notwithstanding the subpoena. was
awarded agreeably to the demand of the de-
fendant. The court would, indeed, not be
asked to proceed as in the case of an ordi-
nary individual.” We flnd, also, in volume
2, p. 536, of the same trial, published by
Hopkins & Earle, Philadelphia, 1808, the fol-
lowing recorded as the utterance of the chief
justice: “In no case of this kind would the I
court be required to proceed against the pres- I
ident a against an ordinary individual. The '
objections to such a course are so strong and
obvious that all must acknowledge them.
' ' * In this case, however, the presi-
dent has assigned no reason whatever for I
The pro-
priety of withholding it must be decided by i
himself, not by another for him. Of the \
weight of the reasons for and against pro-
ducing it he himself is the judge.”
Influenced by this and the other precedents
we have cited, as well as by reason and ne-
cessity, we are in like manner disposed to
conclude that the propriety of withholding
the information required by the grand jury
must be determined by the governor himself;
and the weight of the reasons influencing
him in the conclusion at which he has arriv-
ed is for himself, and not for the court, to
consider.
Furthermore, as the governor is the chief
executive of the commonwealth, and as such
embodies the power of the people, for the
conservation of the peace and the protection
of the rights and property of the citizens of
the state, as he is also part of the legislative
branch of the government, it must be ob-
vious to every one that there are times when
he must bé excused from the ordinary pro-
cess of the courts. We presume it will not
be contended that he would be obliged to
obey the mandate of a subpoena during the
sessions of the legislature. when his presence
at the capital is constantly required, or
whilst engaged in the suppression of an in-
surrection. These, however, do not embrace
all his duties as governor. We must, there-
fore, go one step further, and concede that
he is exempt from such process whenever
engaged in any duty pertaining to his oflice.
Granting that there may be times when he
is not so engaged, and when he might be
free to answer to a subpoena, who is to be
the judge of his engagements or disengage-
396
meats? May he be compelled to appear be-
fore a court and submit himself to the judg-
ment thereof as to whether his duties, just
then, require him to be in his oiflce at Harris-
burg, or at the head of the army in the field.
or whether he may not have a few days of
leisure, during which he may await the will
and pleasure of a grand jury? It will be
conceded that in all ordinary cases he must
himself judge as to what things he must do
and what things he must leave undone, and
that this is a duty imposed upon him by the
constitution. Bu-t how, then, shall a court at
any time step in and assume the power of
Judging for him? This cannot be done ex-
cept by an unwarrantabie assumption of ex-
ecutive prerogative. The same reasoning
which brings us to the conclusion that the
governor is the absolute judge of what ofli-
cial communications to himself or his de-
partment may or may not be revealed, in
like manner leads us to conclude that he must
be the sole judge, not only of what his oili-
cial duties are, but also of the time when
they should be attended to. The governor.
disavovving any disrespect to the court or its
process, has answered that, in consequence
of his constant communication with the
state forces, now in the field, in the disorder-
ly and riotous districts, his time is fully oc-
cupied ln the discharge of the duties of his
oflice, and that to leave his post would en-
danger the interests of the public service.
This brings us face to face with the ques-
tion whether the executive, or the courts for
him, are to determine the character of his
otiicial du-ties, and the order in which they
may be performed. For instance, is obedi-
ence to a subpoena one of his duties, and, it
so, shall he discharge that duty in prefer-
ence to that which rests upon him as com-
mander in chief? The answer to this ques-
tion is easy; for if the courts can in any onc
instance or at any one time control or direct
the executive in the performance of his du-
ties, they may do so in every instance and at:
all times. We need not waste time in the
attempt to prove that this proposition is not
allowable; that the governor cannot thus be
placed under the guardianship and tutelage
of the courts. To the people, under the
methods prescribed by law, not to the courts,
is he answerable for his doings or misde-
ings. It is his duty from time to time “to
give to the general assembly information of
the state of the commonwealth,” but it is not
his duty to render such an account to the
grand jury of Allegheny or any other county.
Whilst, therefore, the motives of the court
of quarter sessions in granting the process
before us are not to be lightly impugned,
yet we have no doubt it exceeded its juris-
d-iction in attempting to interfere with the
executive prerogative.
Let the attachment be set aside.
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Dot so much as proposed, but whether the 
attorney general should permit the defence 
to have the examination of a copy of the re-
quired letter which had been put Into his 
possession. the chief justice said (as we find 
It set down In volume 3, p. 87, Burr's Trial, 
as published by Westcott & Co., Washington 
Olty, 1870): "I suppose It will not be alleged 
In this case that the president ought to be 
eonsldered as having offered a contempt to 
the court In consequence ot his not having 
attended, notwlthstRndlng the subprena was 
awarded agreeably to the demand of the de· 
fendant. The court wouJd, indeed, Dot be 
asked to proceed ae In the case of an ordi-
nary Individual." We find, also, In volume 
2, p. 536, of the same trial, publlshed by 
Hopkins & Earle, Philadelphia, 1808, the fol-
lowing recorded as the utterance ot the chief 
Justice: "In no case ot this kind would the 
eowt be required to proceed against the pres-
ident as against an ordinary Individual. 'l'he 
objectlo11t1 to such a course are so strong and 
obvious that all must acknowledge them. 
• • • In this case, however, the presi-
dent bas assigned no reason whatever for 
·withholding the paper called tor. The pro-
priety ot withholding It mu!Jt be decided by 
himself, not by another tor him. Of the 
weight of the reasons for and against pro-
ducing It he himself ls the judge." 
Inftuenced by this and the other precedents 
we have cited, as well as by reason and ne-
cessity, we are In like manner disposed to 
conclude that the propriety ot withholding 
the information required by the grand jury 
must be determined by the governor himself; 
and the weight of the reasons Influencing 
him In the conclusion at which he has arriv-
ed ls tor himself, and not tor the court, to 
eonslder. 
Furthermore, as the governor ls the chief 
executive ot the commonwealth, and as such 
embodies the power of the people, for the 
conservation of the peace and the protection 
of the rights and property of the citizens of 
the state, as he ls ahlo part ot the legislative 
branch of the gm·ernment, It must be ob-
vious to every one that there are times when 
he must be ex(!Used from the ordinary pro-
cess ot the courts. We presume It wlll not 
be contended that he would be obliged to 
obey the mandate of a subprena during the 
sessions ot the legislature. when his presenC'e 
at the capital ls constantly required, or 
whilst engaged In the suppression ot an in-
surrection. These, however, do not embrace 
all his duties as governor. We must, there-
fore, go one step further, and concede that 
he ls exempt trom such process whenever 
engaged in any duty pertaining to bis omce. 
Granting that there may be times when he 
ls not so engaged, and when he might be 
free to answer to a subprena, who Is to be 
the judge of bis engagements or dlsenJt&ge-
300 
ments? May he be compelled to appear be-
fore a court and submit himself to the judg-
ment thereof as to whether his duties, just 
then, require him to be In his o11l<!e at Harris-
burg, or at the head ot the army in the field, 
or whether he may not have a few days or 
leisure, during which he may await the wlll 
and pleasure of a grand jury? It will be 
conceded that In all ordinary cases be must 
himself judge as to what things he must do 
and what things he must leave undone, and 
that tlris Is a duty Imposed upon him by the 
constitution. But how, then, shall a court at 
any time step In and assume the power of 
judging for him? 'nils cannot be done ex-
cept by an unwarrantable aasumptlon ot ex-
ecutive prerogative. The same reasoning 
which brings us to the ooneluslon that the 
governor ls the absolute judge of what om-
clal communications to himself or his de-
partment may or may not be revealed, In 
·i like manner leads us to conclude that he must 
be the sole judge, not only of what hie om-
clal dntles are, but also of the time when 
they should be attended to. The governor. 
dl81lvowlng &Dy disrespect to the court or Its 
process, has answered that, in consequence 
ot his constant commun1catlon with the 
state forces, now in the field, In the disorder-
ly and riorous districts, bis time ls fully oc-
cupied In the dlflcharge of the duties of his 
oftlce, and that to leave his post would en-
danger the Interests CYf. the public service.. 
This brings us face to face with the que&-
tlon whether the executive, or the courts tor 
him, are to determine the character ot his 
oftlclal duties, and the order In which they 
may be performed. For Instance, Is obedi-
ence to a subprena one ot his duties, aDd, if 
so, shall he discharge that duty In prefer-
ence to that which reets upon him as com-
mander ID chlet? The answer to this ques-
tion ls easy; for If the courts can In any one 
Instance or at any one time control or direct 
the executive In the performance of bis du-
ties, they may do so In every Instance and ac 
all times. We need n<Jt: waste time ln the 
attempt to prove that this proposition ls not 
allowable; that the governor mnnot thus be 
placed under the guardianship and tutelage 
of the courts. To the people, under tbe 
methods prescribed by law, not to the courts. 
ls he answerable for his doings or mlsdc>-
!ngs. It ls his duty from time to time "to 
give to the general assembly Information of 
the state of the commonwealth," but it ls not 
his duty to render such an account to thP 
grand jury of Allegheny or any other county. 
Whilst, therefore, the motives of the court 
of quarter sessions In granting the proceBB 
before us are not to be lightly Impugned, 
yet we have no doubt It exceeded Its juris-
clktlon In attempting to Interfere with th~ 
executive prerogative. 
Let the attachment be set aside. 
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ALEXANDER v. UNITED STATES.
(11 Sup. Ct. 350, 138 U. S. 353.)
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In error to the circuit court of the
United States for the western district of
Arkansas.
This was a writ oi error sued out under
the sixth section of the act of February 6,
1889, (.5 St. 656,) to review a judgment of
the circuit court of the United States for
the western district of Arkansas.imposing
a sentence of death upon the plaintiff in
error for the murder of David C. Steadman
“at the (‘reek Nation in the Indian coun-
try.”
The plaintiff in error relied upon the foi-
lowing grounds for reversal:
(1) That the court erred in its selection
of the jury, in that the defendant was re-
quired to make his challeiiges without
first knowing what challenges the govern-
ment’s attorney had made, and thus chal-
lenged two jurors, to-wit, C. F. Needles
and Samuel Lawrence. who were also
challenged by the government, whereby
he was deprived of two of his challenges
contrary to law.
(2) That the court erred in excluding the
testimony offered by the defendant tn
prove threats to kill Steadman made by
House and others, while they were hunt-
ing Steadman under the belief that he had
seduced the wife of the said House and
was secreting himself with her in the
neighborhood.
(3) Because the court erred in admit-
ting the testimony of J. G. Rails as to
confidential communications made to him
as the attorney oi the defendant.
A. H. Garland and Heber J. May, for
plaintiff in error. Sol. Gen. Taft, for the
United States.
Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the
facts as ubovo,deiivered the opinion of
the court.
l. With regard to the first error as-
signed,it appears from the record that
“the court directed two lists of thirty-
seven qualified jurymen to beniade out by
the clerk, and one given to thedistrict at-
tomey and one to the counsel for the de-
fendant; and the court further directed
each side to proceed with its challenges
independent of the other, and without
knowledge on the part of either as to
what challenges had been made by the
other,—to which method of proceeding in
that regard defendant at the time offered
no objections, but proceeded to make his
challenges, and in so doing challenged
two jurors, to-wit, C. F.Needles and Sain-
nel Lawrence, who had been also chal-
lenged by the government." We do not
deem it necessary to inquire whether there
was errorin the method pursued by the
court in impaneling this jury. It appears
distinctly from the bill of exceptions that
the defendant offered no objection to it at
the time, and made no demand to chal-
lenge any of the jury beyond the 20 al-
lowed by Rev. St.§ 819. indeed. it does
not clearly nppcar which side made the
first challenges, or that defendant had
not exhausted his challenges beiore the
Feb. 2,
government challenged the two jurors in
question. If it werea fact that the de-
fendant had mado his 20 challenges before
the government challenged thesetwo men,
it is difficult to‘ see how his rights were
prejudiced by the action of the district at-
torney.
But the decisive answer to this assign-
mentis that the attention of the court
does not seem to have been called toit un-
til after the conviction, when the defend-
ant made it a ground of his motion for a
new trial. It is the duty of counsel sea-
souubly to call the attention of the court
to any error in impaneling the jury, in ad-
mitting testimony. or in any other pro-
ceeding during the trial by which his rights
are prejudiced, and in case of an adverse
ruling to note an exception. Stoddard v.
Glmnibers, 2 How. 284; De Sohry v. Nich-
olson 3 Wail. 420; Railroad Co. v. Hurt,
ll4 U. S. 654. 5 Sup. (it. Rep. l127; Thomp.
Trials, §§ 690. 693, 700.
2. To understand fully the force of the
second error assigned,it is necessary to
state so much of the evidence as exhibits
substantially the case made out by the
government. The evidencctcndcd to show
that the defendant and the deceased,
Steadman, had agreed to gointo the stock
business together, and, upon the day of
the murder, were endeavoring to rent a
farm for the purpose of wintering their
horses, and making a crop the following
year. They were returning to their camp
both armed with guns. Defendant was
also armed with a pistol. So far as the
evidence discloses, Stendman disappeared
and was never seen alive again. A few
minutes after they werelast seen. a witness.
who had met them. saw the two horses.
without riders, standing in the road near
a wood. Shortly after, eight or nine
shots were heard in the wood, and after
this thedefendant wasseen upon the road,
sitting upon one of the horses, and leading
the other, which had no rider. In about
12 days the body of Steadman was found
half a mile from the place from where he
and defendant had been seen,und within 75
yards of the place where the horses were
seen standing. His skull was cmshed,
and there was n bullet hole in it back of
the ear. There was also evidence that
Steadman had a large amount of money
on his person at the time he disappeared.
The defendant offered contradictory ex-
planations oi Steadman’s disappearance.
At one time said he had probably been
killed, and at another time suggested sui-
cide, and at another pretended to believe
a story that had been circulated in the
neighborhood that Steadman and a mar-
ried woman by the name of House had
disappeared and were hiding together. Ev-
idence was admitted tending to show that
Mrs. House and Steadman had been seen
in conference the day beiore, and that the
general impression in the neighborhood at
the time was that tney had gone off to-
gether. House and his friends had armed
themselves with guns and pistols and had
ridden through the country hunting for
them, under the belief that they were hid-
ing together in the neighborhood, or had
fled the country together.
Now, if evidence was admitted to show
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ALEXA~DER T. UNITED STA.TES. 
(11 Sup. Ct. 300, 138 U. S. 333.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
1891. 
Feb. 
I government challen1red the two jurors in question. If It werti a fact that ti.P de· 
fl'ndant had mado his 20 cbullenbre" before 
2, the government challenged these two men, 
It Is dlfHcalt to· "ee how his rights were 
prejudiced by thl' action of the district at-
torney. 
lo error to the circuit court of the 
IJnited 8ta tee for the western district of 
.Arkansas. 
This was a writ of error saecl out under 
the sixth section of the act of February 8, 
1889, (25 Rt. 656,) to review a Judgment of 
the circuit court of the United Ktates for 
the weMtern dbJtrlr.t of Arkansae. lmposlnl( 
a sentencf" of death upon the plaintiff In 
error for the murder of Duvld C. Steadman 
•at the ('reek Nation In the Indian coun-
try." 
The plaintiff In error relh~ll upon the fol-
lowing grounds for revental: 
(1) That the coo rt erl'OO In Its selection 
ot the Jar~·. In that the defendant was re-
quired tu makP his challenges without 
ttnit knowing what challenges the govern-
ment's attorney had made, and thus <'hal-
lenjl,"ed twn jnrm.'IJ, to-wit, C. F. Needles 
and Samuel Lawrenee, who were alHo 
ch111le11ged by the government, whereby 
be was deprived of two of his challenges 
contrary to law. 
(21 That theconrterred lnexcludlnJ!; the 
testimony offered by the defendant to 
prove threats to kill Steadman made by 
Honse and others, while they were hunt-
In~ 8teadman under the belief that he bad 
seduced the wife of the s1tld House and 
wus secreting himself with her In the 
nelj!,"h bo rhood. 
(3) Because the court erred In admlt-
ttn111: the testimony of J. G. RallR as to 
confi<1ent1a1 communicntions made to him 
as the attorney of the defendant. 
A. H. Garlllnd and Heber J. May, for 
J>luintiff In P.rror. Sol. Gen. Taft, for the 
United States. 
Mr. Juetlce BROWN, after elating the 
facts as obovc. delivered the opinion of 
the court. 
l. With 1."eKard to the flrst error as-
sl~ned, It appears from the record tbut 
"tbe court direeted two lists of tblrty-
seven riaallfied jurymen to he made oat by 
the clerk, and one gh'en to the district at-
torney llnd one to the cotmHel for the de-
fendant; and the court further directed 
l'&ch side to pror1..'f'd with Its cballtmg~ 
in<kpe111l~ot of the other, and without 
knowledJ:e on the purt of either as to 
whnt challPllA"eS hod been macle bv the 
other,-to which method of proceeding In 
that rejl,"ard defendant at the time offered 
110 objf!f'tlons, bat proeeeded to mnke his 
chttllenges, and In so doing challenged 
two Jurors, to-wit, C. F. Needles and Sam-
uel Lawrence, who had been ah111 chal-
leng':'d by the gon~rnment." We do not 
deem It necessary to inquire whether there 
was e1Tor In the m1.-thud pursued bv the 
court i11 Impaneling this Jury. It appeat'B 
distinctly from the bill of exceptions that 
the defendant offered no ohJectlon to It at 
the time, and made no demaud to ch1tl-
le11Ke any of the jury beyond the 21.1 al-
lowl•tl by Rev. St.§ t<19. lnl!eed. It doPR 
not ·clearly appear whl<-h side made the 
first chalknge1:1, or the t defendant had 
not exbau11ted hi11 challenges before the 
But the decisive answer to this aBSlgn-
ment is that the attention of the court 
does not setim to have been called to it oo-
tll after the con vlctlon, '!lfhen the defend-
ant made It a ground of his motion for a 
new trial. It IB the duty of counsel st-a-
son11 hly to call the attention of the court 
to any error In fmpanellng the jury, in ad-
mitting testimony, or In any other pro-
ceeding durinl{ the trial by which hl11 rights 
a1•e prejadked, and In case of an advt•rse 
rullng tu note an exception. Stoddard v. 
Clum1bers, 2 How.~; De Sohry v. Nich-
ol.son 8 Wall. 420; Railroad C'o. v. Hart, 
114 U.S. 854. ll Sap. Ct. Rep. 1127; 'rhomp. 
Trials, §§ 6llO, 693, 700. 
2. To understand rally the force of the 
second error assigned, it ls necessary to 
state su much of the evidence as exhibits 
substantially the case made oat by the 
go,·ernment. The evldenct!tended to show 
that the defendant aud the deceased, 
8teadman, bad agreed to go Into the stock 
buslnesR together, and, upon the day of 
the murder, were endeavoring to rent a 
farm for the purpose of wintering their 
horses, and making a crop the following 
year. They were returning to their camp 
both armed with guns. Defendant was 
alHn armed with a pb1tol. So far as the 
evidence dlsclo&E1t, 8teadmen disappeared 
and was never seen altve again. A few 
minutes nfterthey were lastHeen. a witness. 
who hnd met thl'm, saw the two horses, 
without riders, sttwrllng in the roud near 
a wood. Shortly after, eight or nine 
shots were heard In the wood, and nfter 
this the defendant was seen upon the road, 
slttlnj!," upm.1 one of the horses, and leading 
the other, whleh bad no rider. In about 
12 days the body of Steadman Wllll round 
half a mile from the place from where he 
and defendant had been secn, nnd within 75 
yards of the place where the hurse11 were 
11een standing. His skull wns cm11hed, 
and ther" waR a bullet hole In It hack of 
the ear. There was also l'Vldenct1 that 
Steadman hnd a large amount of mone.v 
on bis perl'lon at the time he dlHappeare1l. 
The defend1tnt offered contradictory ex-
planRtlons of Steadman's dlHllJ>pearance. 
At onl' time suid he had probably bet'n 
killed, and at another time Hugge11ted 1ml· 
clde, end at ttnotber pretended to helleve 
a story that had been clrcul11 tecl In the 
neighborhood that Steadman and a mar-
rll'd womnn by the name of House had 
dl!mppen.red and were hiding together. Ev-
idence WllH admitted tendlnp; to show thnt 
Mra. House and Steaclmun had been sPen 
In conference the d11.v before. and thRt the 
~enerul lmpreHslon in theneighhorhootl et 
the time was that tney had gone off to-
gether. House and his friends had nrmed 
tl1emselves with guns and pistols and had 
ridden through the conntr.\· hm1ting for 
them, under the belief that they were hid-
ing together In the ll"ighborhood, or had 
fled the country t•>gether. 
Now, U evidence was udwltted to show 
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that House had armed himself, and was
hunting for Steadman, under the impres-
sion that the latter had eloped with his
wife, and was secreting himself in that
vicinity, it is dlificult to see upon what
principle his threats in that connection
were excluded. Accepting the theory of
the government that mere threats, unac-
companied hy acts of a threatening unt-
ure, were irrelevant to the question of de-
fendant's guilt, it is not easy to under-
stand how the acts themselves could be
made pertinent without testimony tend-
ing to show the reason why House had
armed himself. and, with otherparties. was
scouring the country for Steadman. ' ‘heir
statements in that connection would be
clearly illustrative of the act in question,
and a. partof the res gestze, within the rule
laid down in Lord George Gordon's Case,
1 Greenl. Ev. §]08, and within all the au-
thorities upon the snbject of declarations
as part of the res gesta.-.
At the same time we recognize a certain
discretion on the part of the trial judge to
rule out this entire testimony, both of the
acts and the declarations of House, if, in
his opinion, they were so remote or insig-
nificant as to have no legitimate tendency
to show that House could have commit-
ted the murder. If, for instance, it were
clearly proven that the murder was com-
mitted beiore the threats of House were
uttered, or the two occurrences were so re-
mote in time and place as to demonstrate
that there could have been no connection
between them, it would be the duty of the
court to exclude the testimony. But if,
on the other hand. the time and the cir-
cumstances attendlngthe murder were un-
certain or obscure, the conduct and threats
of House might havea material bearing
upon the identificatlon of the murderer.
It is held by some of the authorities that
the question whether such evidence should
be admitted or excluded is, to a certain
extent, a matter oi discretion with the
trial judge. Shailer v.Bumstead,99 Mass.
112: Thayer v.'i‘hayer, 101 Mass.1l1: Com.
v. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472; Com. v. Ryan,
134 Mass. 223; Mclnturf v. State, 20 Tex.
App. 335.
In the present case, however, it is as-
sumed, both in the exception noted to the
exclusion oi the testimony and in the briefs
of counsel. to have been proven as a fact,
by the witness Terry, that on the day of
the disappearance of Steadman and Mrs.
House, he saw Samuel House, her hus-
band. and several others, relatives and
friends of House, riding around the neigh-
borhood armed with Winchester guns and
pistols, hunting for deceased and Mrs.
House, who were then believed to have
eloped together, or to be secreting them-
selves in the neighborhood; and although
the testimony oi Terry, as set forth in the
bill oi exceptions, fails to support this
statement. or to show definitely what he
did intend to swear to,yet, assuming ir. to
be as stated, we think that, if it were
shown that House was in search oi Stead-
man. his declarations.as to his purpose in
so doing stand upon the same basis, with
regard to admissibility. as his conduct,
and were a. part of the res gestze. But in
the view we take of the next assignment
we find it unnecessary to determine
whether there was such errorin ruling out
this testimony as to require a reversal.
3. The third assignment relates to the
admission of the testimony of J. G. Rails,
an attorney at law, to which objiction
was made upon the ground that it re-
lated to a confidential communication
made by the defendant, who had consult-
ed Ralls as an attorney at law. and was
therefore privileged. Rails stated in sub-
stance that he was practicing law at Mus-
cogec; that defendant came to his office
there between the time of Steadman‘s dis-
appearance and the finding of his body,
“and asked me if I was an attorney. I
told him I Was. He said his name was
Alexander, and he went on to state that
he and his partner had some forty head of
horses across the river, in partnership.
and that some time before that, probably
a week before. his partner was missing,
and he hadn’t heard from him. He says
his partner hadabrotherinCalifornia, and
he was afraid his brother would come up
there and make some trouble about the
horses. He stated at the time his partner
had taken off the money, and he wanted
to know if he could hold the horses so as
to secure his part oi the money. I asked
him if the horses would pay him ior his
part,and hesaid they would. ltold him to
hold the horses. They could not take
them until that was settled.” It is evi-
dent irom this statement that defendant
consulted with Rails as a legaladviser, and
while, if he were guilty of the murder, it
may have had a tendency to show an ef-
fort on his part to defraud his partner's
estate, and to make profit out of hisdeath,
by appropriating to himself the partner-
ship property, it did not necessarily have
that tendency, and was clearly a privileged
communication. If he consulted him in-
the capacity of an attorney, and the com-
munication was in the course of his cm-
ployment, and may be supposed to have
been drawn out in consequence of the rela-
tions of the parties to each other, neither
the payment of n fee nor the pendency of
litigation was necessary to entitle him to
the privilege. Williams v. Fitch, 18 N. Y.
546; Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N. Y. 51; Bacon
v.1~‘1-ishie. S0 N.Y.39-l; Andrews v. Simms,
33 Ark. 771.
In the language of Mr. Justice S'i‘0RY,
speaking for this court in (‘-hirac v. Rein-
icker, 11 Wheat. 280, 294: “\\"l1atcvcr facts,
therefore, are communicated by a client to
a counsel solely on account of that rela-
tion. such counsel are not at liberty, even
if they wish, to disclose; and the law
holds their testimony incompetent. "
We‘ are referred, however, to the case of
Queen v. Cox, 14 Q. B. Div. 153, as holding
the doctrine that, where a communication
is made to counsel in furtherance of a
scheme to commit a crime, the client is
not entitled to the privilege. This was
a crown case reserved and argued before
10 judges oi the queen's bench division.
The defendants Cox and Railtou were in-
dicted for a conspiracy to defraud one
Munster. The facts stated show that
Munster had obtained a iudgmcntugninst
Railton in an action ior libel, upon which
an execution had issued, which the sheriff.
398
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
09
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
Case No, 137] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
that House had ·armed himself, and was 
huntfn~ for Steadm1rn, nnrler the Impres-
sion that the latter hud elop<'d with hlB 
wife, and was secreting himself In that 
vicinity, It is dltllcult to Bee upon what 
principle bis threats In that connection 
were Pxcluded. Ac~eptlng the theory of 
the government that mere threRts, unac-
companied by acts of a threatening nut-
ure, were Irrelevant to the question of de-
fendant's guilt, It ts not easy to under-
stanrl ho.v the arts thP.mRelv(',s could be 
ruade pertinent without testimony tend-
ing to Mhow the reason why House had 
armed himself, and, with other parties, was 
scouring the countr.vfor 8tf'adm11a. Their 
statt'ments in that connection would be 
cleurly llluHtrative of the act In QUt'stlon, 
and a part of the re.<i gestre, within the rule 
laid down In Lord George Gordon's Case, 
1 Green!. Ev. § 108, and within all the au-
thorities upon the snbJeet of declarations 
as part of tile res l(t!stre. 
At tne same time we recognize a certain 
diRCretiou on the part of the trial judge to 
rule out tills entire testimony, both of the 
actN and the declnratione of Hout1e, If, In 
hi11 opinion, they were· so remote or lnsig-
nltlc11nt BR to huve no legitimate tendPncy 
to show that House could hove commit-
ted the murder. If, for lnstnnce, It were 
cle1trly proYen that the murcler was com-
mitted before the threats of House \Vere 
utter<'d, or the t.wo occurrence11 were so re-
mote In time and place as to demonstrate 
thn t there could have been no connection 
between them, it would be the duty of the 
court to exdude the testimony. But If, 
on the other hand, the time and the clr-
cum.-tencee attending the mm·derwere un-
certain or obscure, the conduct and threats 
of House might he'\"e 11 materl11I bearing 
upon the ldentlftcatlon of the murderer. 
It Is held by some of the authorities that 
the qaestlon whether 1mch evidence 11hoald 
be uthnltted or excluded is, to a certain 
extent, a matt.er of di11cretion with the 
trlnl judge. Shaller v. Bumstead,99 Mass. 
112; '!'hayerv. Thayer, 101 Muse.Ill; Com. 
v. Abbott, 130 Maes. 472; Com. v. Uyan, 
134 Muss. 223; Mcinturf v. State, 20 Tex. 
App. 3:{5, 
In the pres~nt case, however, it ls a.s-
sumell, both in the exception noted to the 
exclusion or the testlmon.v ond In the briefs 
of counsPI, to ha,·e been pro\·en RS a fact, 
by the witness 'l'erry, that on the day of 
the disappearance of Stendman and Mrs. 
Hom;e, be 11aw Samuel House, her bus-
bancl. and several others, relath·es and 
frlPn<ls of Hom<ce, riding around thll neigh-
bi1rhoo<l armt'd with Winchet1ter guns nod 
pistole, hunting for deceased an<l Mrs. 
House, who were then believed to have 
eloped together, or to be secreting them-
11eh-e11 in the neighborhood; and although 
the testimony of Terry, as set forth lo the 
bill or exceptlonR, falls to support this 
stntement, or to show cletlnltely what he 
did Intend to swear to, yet, assuming It. to 
be ttH stated, we think that, If it were 
sho\\·n that House was tn search of Steed-
rran. his declaratlons,as to hie purpose In 
so tlolng 11tend u110n the suwe basis, with 
re~ard to admlF11dblllty. as his conduct, 
and were a part of the 1-eR ,.,restre. But in 
tlw view we take of the next usslgnment 
398 
we tlnd it onnecet1sary to determlntt 
whether there was 1meh error In ruling ont 
this tl'Elthnony as to require a reversal. 
3. 'l'he third assignment relates to the 
admission of the testimony of J. G. Halls, 
an a1.torney at law, to wblch objrctlou 
waa made upon the ground that It re--
lated to a confidential communication 
made by the defendant, who bad consult-
ed Ralls as an attorney at law, and was 
therefore privileged. Ralls stated In sub-
stance that be was practicing law at Mnlf-
rogee; that defendant came to bis olHce-
there bttween the time of Steadman's dis-
appearance and the finding of his body. 
"and asked me If I was an attol"nPy. I 
told him I was. He said his name was 
Alexander, and he went on to state that 
he and bis partner had some forty heacl of 
horse8 across the river, In partnership. 
and that some time before th1tt, probably 
a week before, his partner was mlssinJr, 
ancl he hadn't heard from him. He sttys 
hlH partner had a brotherln California, and 
he wus afl'8id his brother would come up 
there and ruak11 some trouble nbout the 
horses. He stated at the tlmP. his partner 
had taken orf the money, and he wanted 
to know If he could hold the bOntel! so as 
to secure bis purt of the money. I asked 
him If the horRes would pay him for his 
part, an<l he 11ald they would. I told him to 
hold the horses. They could not take 
them until that wa11 settled." lt le Pvi-
dent from this statement that defl'ndant 
consulted with Ralls as R legal ad vlHer, and 
while, if he were guilty of the murder, It 
may have bad a tendency to sbuw an ef-
fort on his part to defraud his partner's. 
estate, and tu makeprottt outof hlsdeath, 
by apvroprlatlng to hlmBP.lf the partner-
ship property, It did not necessarily have 
that tendency, and was clearly a privileged 
communication. If he consulted him to. 
the capacity of au a ttoruey, und the eom-
muulcatlon was In the course of his em-
ployment, 11.nd may be supposed to have-
beeo drawn out In consequence of the rela-
tions of the parties to each othPr. neither 
the payment of a fee nor the pend ency of 
litigation was nf'<'eseary to cutltlP him to-
the prl\•llege. Williams v. Fitch, 18 N. Y. 
546; Britton v. Lorenz, 45 N. Y. 51; Bacort 
v.Frlsble, &ON. Y.394; Andrews v. Simms. 
33 Ark. 771. 
In tile language of Mr. Justice STORY. 
speaking for this court In Chirac v. Rein-
lcker, 11 Wheat. 2811, 294: "Whatever facts, 
therefore, are communicated by a client to 
a counsel solely on account of that rela-
tion, such counsel a1'6 not at liberty, even 
If they wish, to disclose; and the 111w 
bolds their testimony Incompetent." 
We are referred, however, to the ca11e or 
Queen v. Cox, 14 Q. B. Di-r. 153, as holt'.lng 
the doctrine that, where a communication 
ls made to counsel In furtherauc<' of a 
scheme to commit a crime, the client '" 
not entitled to the privilege. This was 
a crown case reserved nnd urgueci hPfore 
lO Judµ.es of the qupen's bench division. 
The dcfendnnt11 Cox and Rull tun wen.' In-
dicted for a comipirUl"Y to defraud one 
Munster. 'l'he fucts stated show that 
Munster hnd obtained a juclgmcnt nixuinMt 
Uallton In an action for libel, upon which 
an execution had issued, which the sb<:rlfl 
PRIVILEGED COMMUN1CATlONS.
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proposed to levy upon the defendant's
stock in trade. He was met, however, by
a bill of sale from Railton toCox,the other
defendant, antedating the execution. It
was claimed that the bill of sale was
fraudulent, and made for the purpose of
depriving M nnster of his rights under the
judgment, and Raiiton and Cox were in-
dicted for conspiracy. The question was
whether an interview had by Railton and
Cox with Goodman, a solicitor, as to what
could be done to prevent the property
from being seized under execution. was
competent evidence, or was a. privileged
communication. No point was made that
Goodman was not consulted as an attor-
ney. The court unanimously held that
the evidence was competent. Mr. Justice
S’[‘EPl]l'J.\',\\'li0 delivered the opinion of the
court, said,in a very exhaustive discus-
sion, that the question was " whether, if a
client applies to a legal adviser for ad vice
intended to facilitate or to guide the client
in the commission of a. crime or fraud, the
legal adviser being ignorant of the pur-
pose for which his advice is wanted, the
communication between the two is priv-
ileged. We expressed our opinion at the
end of the argument that no such privi-
lege existed. If it did. the result would be
that a man intending to commit treason
or murder might safely take legal advice
for the purpose of enabling himself to do
so with impunity, and that the solicitor
to whom the application was made would
not be at liberty to give information
against his client for the purpose of frus-
trating his criminal purpose.” After cit-
ing and commenting upon a large number
of cases, he comes to the conclusion that,
if the communication be made in further-
ance of any criminal or fraudulent pur-
pose, it is not privileged. This case. how-
ever, is clearly distinguishable from the
one under consideration, in the fact that
the solicitor was consulted with regard
to a scheme to defraud, for which he was
subsequently indicted and tried, and the
testimony was offered upon that trial;
while in this case the consultation was
had alter the crime was committed, and
was offered in evidence as an admission
tending to show that defendant was con-
cerned in the crime, or rather as a. state-
ment contradictory to one he had made
upon the stand. Had he been indicted
and tried fora fraudulent disposition of
his partner-‘s property, the cue of Queen
v. Cox would have been an authority in
favor of admitting this testimony, but we
think the rule announced in that case
should be limited to cases where the party
is tried for the crime in furtherance of
which the communication was made.
Had the interview in this case been held
for the purpose of preparing his defense,
or even for devising a. scheme to escape
the consequences of his crime, there could
be no doubt of its being privileged, al--
though he had made the same statement
that his partner was missing and he had
not heard from him. Now, the communi-
cation in question was perfectly harmless
upon its face. if it were true than his
partner was missing,and he had notheard
from him. and that Stesdman had taken
off the money, there was no impropriety
in his consulting counsel for the purpose-
of ascertaining if he could hold the horses,
so as to secure his part of it. Rails asked
him in that connection if thehorses would
pay him for his part, and defendant said
they would. He then told him to hold
the horses; that they could not take them
until that was settled.
It is only by assuming that he was
guilty of the murder that his scheme to
defraud his partner becomes at all mani-
fest. His statement that his partner was
missing and that he had not heard from
him is the only material or relevant part
of the conversation, and was plainly
privileged.
The judgment of the court below must
be reversed, and the case remanded for a.
new trial.
GRAY, J. was not present at the argue
ment, and took no part in the decision of
this case.
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propOlled to levy upon the defendant's 
11tock in trade. He watt met, howe\•er, by 
a bill of sale from Ra II tun tu <.:ox, the other 
defendant, un tt•clu ting the exl.ocutlun. It 
Wl\8 claimed that the bill of sule was 
fraudulent, and made for the purpose uf 
deprl\"ing Munster of his rights un<ler the judgment, and Rall ton and Cox were in-
dicted for conspiracy. The question waR 
whether an Interview had by Rallton ancl 
Cox with Goudma.n, a solicitor, as to what 
could be done to prevent the property 
from being seized under execution, wad 
competent evidence, 01· was a privileged 
communication. No point was made that 
Goodman waR not eom~ulted as an attor-
ney. The court unanlmuu1:1Jy held that 
the evidence was comp~tent. Mr. Justice 
8TEPDEN, who delivered the opinion of the 
court, said, in a very exhaustl\e dll!cus-
elon, that the question was "whether, If a 
cllent applies to a legal adviser for ad vice 
lntendetl to facilitate or to guide the client 
In the commission of a crime or frnud, the 
ieKal adviser being Ignorant of the pur-
pose for which hill ad,·fc'e is wanted, the 
communication between the two Is priv· 
lle~ed. We expressed our opinion at the 
end of the argument that no such privi-
lege existed. If It did, the result would be 
that a man intending to commit treason 
or murder might safely take legal ad vice 
for the purpose of enabling him11elf to do 
so with Impunity, and that the rmllcitor 
to whom the application was made would 
not be at liberty to ,r;lve ln!ormatlon 
against his client for the purpo11e of frus-
trating bis criminal purr)ose." After cit-
ing encl commenting upon a large number 
or l'8St<s, he comes to the conclusion that, 
If the communication be made In further-
ance of any criminal or fraudulent pur-
pose, It Is not prlvlleged. This case. how-
ever, le clearly dietingulehable from the 
one under consideration, In the fact that 
the solicitor was consulted with regard 
to a scheme to defraud, for which be was 
1t1heequently Indicted and tried, o.nd the 
testimony was offered upon that trial; 
whlle in this case the commltatlon WWI 
had alter the crime WM committed, nod 
was ottered In e\•lclence as an admls11ion 
tendln&" to show that defendant was con-
cerned In the crime, or rather as a state--
meut cuntra<llctory to one be had mnde 
upon the stand. Had be bPen Indicted 
and trlecl for a frauduleut dl11positlon of 
bis pa1·tner's property, the case of Queen 
v. Cox would have been un authority In 
favor of admitting this testimony, but we 
think the rule announced In that ease 
Mlioul<t he limited to cases where the party 
Is tried for the crime in further11nce of 
w hlch the communication was made. 
Had the interview in this ease bl>en held 
for the purp1 >Se Of preparing bis defenRe, 
or even for <1evl11lng a scheme to escnpe 
the consequenl'es of his crime, there could 
be no doubt of Its being privileged, al-
though he had ma!le the samt: statement 
that his partner wns missing an<t he had 
not beard from him. Now, the coLnmuni-
catlon In question was pe11ectly h1H·mless 
upon its ftM:e. 1f it were true tha,, bis 
partner waM mlflslng, and he hnd not he>nrd 
from him, aud that Steadman had taken 
oH the money, there was no Impropriety 
In his eoueultln'1; counsel for the rmrpos& 
or ascertaining If he could bold the honiee, 
so as to secure his part of it. Ralls usked 
him In that connection tr tbeho~es wuulcl 
pay him for his part, and llefendunt Maid 
they would. He then told him to hold 
the horseH; that they could not take them 
untll that was settled. 
It Is only by assuming tbat he wus 
guilty of the murder that bis erheme t<> 
defraud hie partner becomes at a11 manl-
fet1t . Hie Rtntement that hie partner was 
n1isslnJ1: and that he had not beard from 
him II! the only ma terlal or relevant part 
of the conversation, and was plainly 
pr! vilel(ed . 
'fhe jod~ment of the court below must 
be reverset.1, and the case remanded for a 
new trial. 
GRAY, J. woe not p1'esent at the argu..-
ment, and took no part In the decision or 
this l'llBe. 
Case No. 138]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
SVVAIM v. HUMPHREYS et al.
(42 Ill. App. 370.)
Appellate Court of Illinois. Nov. 25, 1891.
Error to circuit court, McLean county;
Owen T. Reeves, Judge.
Thomas F. Tipton, for plaintiff in error.
Kc:-rick, Lucas & Spencer, for defendants in
error.
BOG-GS, J. This case has been twice be-
fore in this court. Swaim v. Humphreys, 15
Ill. App. 451; Humphreys v. Swaim, 21 Ill.
App. 231.
Plaintiff in error, then sheriif of McLean
county, received an execution issued by the
circuit clerk of that county upon a judg-
ment confessed in vacation by J. S. Arn-
speiger and S. R. Lovell in favor of N. N.
Winslow, and by virtue thereof levied upon
certain groceries and provisions belonging to
the defendants in the execution, being part
of their stock in trade, they being retail
grocers in Bloomington. Defendants in er-
ror, who were wholesale grocers in Bloom-
ington, had sold and delivered to Arnspeiger
& Lovell the goods levied upon, and to secure
the amount due them therefor, had received
a chattel mortgage upon the stock of gro-
ceries, etc., and they instituted this suit in
replevin against the sheriff to recover posses-
sion of the goods.
The chattel mortgage permitted the mort-
gagors to retain possession of the mortgaged
property, and to sell same in regular course
of trade, and, being for that reason regarded
as void, defendants in error sought in the
first trial in the circuit court to recover the
goods on the ground that they had been in-
duced to sell and deliver them to Arnspeiger
& Lovell by false and fraudulent representa-
tions on the part of that firm as to their ti-
nancial condition and commercial standing,
and upon that theory they succeeded upon
the hearing.
Plaintiif in error brought the case to this
court, and it was held (15 Iii. App. -151) that
the evidence did not support the findings of
the circuit court on this issue of fraud, and
the judgment was reversed and cause re-
manded.
Upon the hearing of the case the second
time in the circuit court, defendants in error
claimed that the execution by virtue of which
the sheriif held the property was issued be-
fore the judgment upon which it was based
had been entered of record, and in support
of such claim offered oral testimony, which,
upon the objection of the plaintiff in error,
was rejected by the court, and the second
trial resulted adversely to the defendants in
error, from which they prosecuted an appeal
to this court. Upon consideration of the
question thus presented it was held by this
court: First, that an execution upon a judg-
ment confessed in vacation is void if issued
before the judgment is actually entered of
record; second, that oral evidence is admis-
sible to prove that an execution was issued
and was in fact in the hands of the Sll(‘l‘llT
before the judgment was written up. 'I‘l:c
circuit court having erroneously refused to
permit such oral evidence to be heard, its
judgment was reversed, and the cause again
remanded. Humphreys v. Swaim, 21 Ill.
App. 232.
The cause has again been heard in the cir-
cuit court, the result being a judgment in
favor of defendants in error, to reverse which
the writ of error now before us is prose-
cuted.
The material questions arising upon the
present record are: First. Was William E.
Hughes properly required to testify as to
whether the judgment had been entered of
record when the execution was issued‘! Sec-
ond. Could defendants in error, if their mort-
gage was void as to execution creditors, have
judgment for the recovery of the property?
Counsel for plaintiff in error also insist
that oral testimony is not competent to be re-
ceived to show that the judgment had not
been written of record when the execution
issued, but, as this court in this same case
(21 lll. App. 232) has expressly held that such
evidence is admissible, we mut decline to
again consider, but will adhere to the rule
there announced.
William E. Hughes was introduced in the
circuit court as a witness for defendants in
error._ He testified that he was an attorney
for the plaintiff in error, and was also attor-
ney for Winslow, the execution creditor.
That as such attorney for Winslow he pre-
pared the declaration and cognovit upon
which the judgment in question was render-
ed, and presented them to the clerk, and per-
formed such other duties as were profes-
sionally required to entitle his client to a
judgment in vacation. As such attorney he
requested that execution be issued on the
judgment, which was done by the clerk, and
the same handed by the clerk to him. After
these facts were elicited, the witness was
asked if the clerk had written up the judg-
ment before the execution was issued. To
this the plaintiff in error objected on the
ground that it was by reason of his profes-
sional relation to Winslow that the witness
had obtained whatever knowledge he might
have of the matter desired to be inquired
into, and that it was therefore privileged
from disclosure by him. This objection was
overruled, and the witness required to an-
swer.
The testimony of the witness established
the fact to be that before the judgment had
been entered of record by the clerk the ex-
ecution was issued and delivered to the wit-
ncss, who immediately placed it in the hands
of the sheriff.
The rule is well settled that an attorney
will not be compelled, or even allowed,
against the objection of the client, to disclose
anything communicated by his client to him
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Cue No. 188] PRODUCTION A.ND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
SWAIM v. HUMPHREYS et al. 
(42 Ill. App. 370.) 
Appellate Court of Illinois. Nov. 25, 1891. 
Error to circuit cqurt, McLean county; 
Owen T. Reeves, Judge. 
Thomns F. Tipton, for plaintiff In error. 
KeITick, Lucas & Spencer, tor defendants in 
error. 
BOGGS, J. This case has been twice be-
fore in this court. Swaim v. Humphreys, 15 
Ill. App. 451; Humphreys v. Swaim, 21 Ill. 
App. 231. 
Plaintiff In error, then sheriff of McLean 
county, received an execution lssued by the 
circuit clerk of that county upon a judg-
ment confessed in vacation by J. S. Arn-
spelger and S. R. Lovell in favor of N. N. 
Winslow, and by virtue thereof levied upon 
certain groceries and provisions belonging to 
the defendants in the execution, being part 
ot their stock in trade, they · being retail 
grocers In Bloomington. Defendants In er-
ror, who were wholesale grocers ln Bloom-
ington, had sold and delivered to Arnspelger 
& Lovell the goods levied upon, and to secure 
the amount due them therefor, had received 
a chattel mortgage upon the stock of gro-
ceries, etc., and they Instituted this suit In 
replevln against the sherur to recover possee-
slon of the goods. 
The chattel mortgage permitted the mort-
gagors to retain possession ot the mortgaged 
J!roperty, and to sell same In regular course 
of trade, and, being for that reason regarded 
as void, defendants In error sought In the 
first trioJ In th~ circuit court to recover the 
icoods on the ground that they had been In-
duced to sell and deliver them to Arnspelger 
4 Lovell by false and fraudulent representa-
tions on the part of that firm as to their ll-
nancloJ condition and commercial standing, 
and upon that theory they succeeded upon 
the hearing. 
Plaintiff In error brought the case to this 
court, and It was held (15 Ill. App. 451) tllat 
the evidence did not support the findings of 
the circuit court on this issue of fraud, and 
the judgment was reversed and cause re-
manded. 
Upon the hearing ot the case the second 
time in the circuit court, defendants in error 
claimed that the execution by virtue of which 
the sheriff held the prnperty was issued be-
fore the judgment upon which It WllB based 
had been entered of record, and In support 
of such claim offered oral testimony, which, 
upon the objection of the plaintiff In en-or, 
was rejectetl by the court, nnd the second 
trial rl'sulted adversely to the defendants In 
error, from which they prosecuted an appeal 
to this court. Upon consideration of the 
question thus presented It was hl•id by this 
court: First, thut 11.n execution upon a judg-
ment confessed In vacutlon Is void If Issued 
befo1·e the judgment is actually entered ot 
400 
recol'd; second, that oral evidence ts admls-
sl ble to prove that an execution was Issued 
and was In fact In the hands ot the she1·1tf 
before the judgment was written up. Tlw 
circuit court having erroneously refused to 
permit such oral evidence to be heard, it~ 
judgment was reversed, and the cause again 
remanded. Humphreys v. Swaim, 21 Ill. 
App. Zl2. 
The cause has again been heard In the cir· 
cult court, the result being a Judgment lo 
favor of defendants In error, to reverse whkb 
the Wl'it of error now before us Is pr08e· 
cuted. 
The material questions arising upon the 
present record are: First. Was Wllllam E. 
Hughes properly required to testify as to 
whether the judgment had been entered of 
record when the execution was Issued ·1 Se<--
ond. Could defendants ln error, If their mort-
gage was void as to execution creditors, have 
judgment for the recovery of the property? 
Counsel for plaintiff In error also Insist 
that oral testimony is not competent to be re-
('eived to show that the judgment had not 
been written of record when the execution 
issued, but, as this court in this same case 
(21 Ill. App. 232) bas expressly held that such 
evidence ls admissible, we must decline to 
again consider, but wlll adhere to the rule 
there announced. 
Wllllam E. Hughes was Introduced in tbt' 
circuit court as a witness for defendants In 
error .. He testified that be wu an attorney 
tor the plalntur In error, and was also attor-
ney for Winslow, the execution creditor. 
That as such attorney for Winslow be pre-
pared the declaration and cognovlt upon 
which the jud1:nnent In question was render· 
ed, and presented them to the clerk, and per-
formed such other duties as were profes-
sionally required to entitle his client to a 
judgment In vacation. As such attorney he 
requested that execution be issued on the 
judgment, which was done by the clerk, and 
the same banded by the clerk to him. After 
these facts were elicited, the witness W&JI 
asked it the clerk bad written up the judg-
ment before the execution was Issued. To 
this the plaintiff In error objected on the 
ground that It was by reason of his profes-
sional relation to Winslow that the witneBll 
had obtained whatever knowledge be might 
have of the matter desired to be inquired 
Into, and that It was therefore privileged 
from disclosure by him. This objection WM 
overruled, and the witness required to an-
swer. 
The testimony of the witness established 
the fact to be that before the judgment had 
heen entered of record by the clerk the ex-
ecution was Issued and delivered to the wit-
ness, who Immediately placed It In the hands 
of the sheriff. 
The rule Is well settled that an attorney 
will not be compelled, or even allowed, 
against the objection of the client, to disdose 
anything communicated by his client to him 
PR IVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
[Case No. 138
in his professional capacity, and the reason
on which the rule rests is that it is in the
interest oi.‘ Justice that the most full, free.
and complete communication should take
place between attorney and client. It is not.
however, in the interest of justice to extend
this privilege so that by its operation the
truth in relation to facts otherwise in the
knowledge of an attorney be suppressed.
When desiring to define its breadth and lim-
its, Mr. Greenleaf says: “The great object
of the rule seems to plainly require that the
entire professional intercourse between client
and attorney. whatever it may have consist-
ed in, should be protected by profound se-
crecy.” 1 Greenl. Ev. § 240.
“The privilege." it is said in Best on Evi-
dence (section 281), “does not extend to mat-
ters of fact which the attorney knows by
other means than confidential communica-
tions with his client, even though, if he had
not been employed as attorney, he probably
would not have known them." In effect the
same is held in Bridge Co. v. Jameson, 48 Ill.
283; Crosby v. Berger, 4 Edw. Ch. 25-1; Den-
brough v. Rawlins, 3 Mylne & K. 505; 1
Greenl. Ev. § 2-H.
The fact which Mr. Hughes was called up-
on to disclose did not arise from. and had no
connection with. the professional intercourse
between himself and his client. 1t was not
in its nature or character either private or
confidential. It was not an act done by the
client, or by his agent or servant, or any one
acting in his behalf.
w11.cUs.Ev.--26
The witness, in the discharge of profes-
sional duty, had indeed been called to the
otiice of the clerk of the circuit court. He
placed papers in the hands of the clerk
which required of the clerk the performance
of an oflicial duty, in the discharge whereof
he sustained no confidential relation what-
ever to the witness of his client. It became
important to know what otficial act the clerk
there performed; and of this the witness had
knowledge. Such knowledge was not obtain-
ed by the witncss in any wise from the
client, nor from professional intercourse with
him. The privilege of secrecy does not ex-
tend a.nd cover information and knowledge
thus obtained, and the circuit court ruled
correctly in requiring the witness to answer.
It is clear that the execution issued before
there was a judgment of record to support it.
The execution was therefore void, and the
possession of the goods by the sheril‘! under
it unauthorized. 21 Ill. App. 231, supra.
The chattel mortgage, upon which must
rest the right of defendant in error to pos-
session of the goods in question, was not
valid as against the rights and interests
of third persons. As between the parties to -
it, the mortgage was good and effectual; and
if the sheriff had no legal writ wherewith to
seize the property, it must be surrendered by
him to the owners, or to the defendants in
error, if they have superior right as between
themselves and the owners. The judgment
must be aiiirmcd.
Judgment afilrmed.
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P.RlVlLEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [Case No. 138 
In his professional capacity, and the reason 
on which the rule rests la that It la In the 
Interest of justice that the most full. tree, 
and complete communication should take 
place between attorney and client. It IB not, 
howeve1·, In the Interest of justice to extend 
this privilege so that by Its operation the 
truth In relation to facts otherwise In the 
knowledge of an attorney be sup1>reased. 
When desiring to define Its breadth and lim-
its, Mr. Greenleaf says: "The great object 
of the rule seems to plainly require that the 
entire professional Intercourse between client 
and attorney, whatever It may have consist-
ed in, should be protected by profound se-
crecy." 1 Greenl. Ev. f 240. 
"The privilege,'' It ls said In Best on Evi-
dence (section 281), "does not extend to mat-
tel"3 ot fact which the attorney knows by 
other means than confidential communica-
tions with bis client, even though, If he had 
not been employed as attorney, be probably 
would not have known them." In etl'ect the 
same ls held In Bridge Co. v. Jameson, 48 Ill. 
283; Croeby v. Berger, 4 Edw. Ch. 2:>4; Den-
brough v. Rawlins, 3 Mylne & K. 505; 1 
Greenl. Ev. § 244. 
The fact which Mr. Hughes was called up-
on to disclose did not arise from, and had no 
connection with, the professional Intercourse 
between himself and his client. It was not 
In Its nature or character either private or 
confidential. It was not an act done by the 
client, or by his agent or servant, or any one 
acting In his behalf. 
WILGUS,Ev.-26 
The wltuess, In the discharge of profes-
sional duty, had Indeed been called to the 
ofHce of the clerk of the cll·cult court. He 
placed papers In the hands of the clerk 
which required of the clerk the performance 
of an official duty, In the discharge whereof 
he sustained no confidential relation what-
ever to the witness of his client. It became 
Important to know what official act the clerk 
there performed; and of this the witness bad 
knowledge. Such knowledge was not obtain-
ed by the witness In any wise from the 
cllent, nor fl'oru p1·ofesslonal Intercourse with 
him. The privilege ot secrecy does not ex-
tend a.nd cover information and knowledge 
thus obtained, and the circuit court ruled 
correctly in requiring the witness to answer. 
It Is clear tbnt the execution Issued before 
there was a judgment of record to suppm·t it. 
'fhe execution was therefore void, and the 
possession ot the goods by the sherltl' under 
It unauthorized. 21 Ill. App. 231, supra. 
The chattel mortgage, upon which must 
rest the right ot defendant in error to pos-
session ot the goods In question, was not 
valid as against the rights and interests 
of third persons. As between the parties to 
It, the mortgage was good and etl'ectual; and 
If the sberitl' had no legal writ wherewith to 
seize the property, It must be suri-endered by 
him to the owners, or to the defendants in 
error, If they have superior right as between 
themselves and the owners. The judgment 
must be aftlrmed. 
Judgment aftlrmed. 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
In re COLE.\IAN'S WILL.
(19 N. E. 71, 111 N. Y. 220.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 27, 1888.
Appeal from supreme court. general term,
Third department.
James (J. Rogers, for appellant. A. D.
Wait, for respondent.
RIIGER, C. J’. The probate of the will of
William Coleman, deceased, was contested
before the surrogate by his widow and sev-
eral of his children and grandchildren, upon
the ground that he was not of sound mind
and memory at the time of its execution,
and its execution was procured through un-
due influence, fraud, and intimidation exer-
cised over him by Robert S. Coleman. The
will was admitted to probate, and the de-
cree was affirmed upon appeal by the gen-
eral term. It is urged upon this appeal that
the evidence produced before the surrogate
by the contestants, as to the mental and
physical weakness and incompetency of the
testator to make a valid will, is so strong
and conclusive that this court should reverse
the decision of the court below upon the
facts. It is not our purpose to go into a
detailed history of the evidence, or comment
upon the. weight and force of the various
facts and circumstances proved on the trial
by the respective parties to sustain their sev-
eral positions, as it is not even claimed by
the appellants that there was no evidence to
support the decree of the surrogate. Their
utmost contention is that the evidence on
the part of the contestants is so persuasive
and convincing, either of the mental incom-
petency of the testator or of the exercise of
undue influence by the proponent in procur-
ing the execution of the will, that the court
should hold as matter of law that it was
error for the surrogate to admit it to probate.
The argument of the appellants is based, to
a large extent, upon evidence which was ad-
mitted on the trial against the objections of
the proponent, and which we deem to be
clearly inadmissible. \Vhile we consider the
case made by the contestants upon the evi-
dence to be very strong, and as presenting a
serious question whether the testator was
competent to make a valid will or not, yet
the exclusion of the evidence improperly re-
ceived on their behalf by the surrogate very
much impairs the force and strength of their
case. and leaves the evidence as to the tes-
tator's competency more nearly balanced
than it would otherwise have been.
A general outline of the facts will be suf-
ficient to present the views we deem it nec-
essar_v to express upon the determination of
this appeal. Robert S. Coleman, the only
son of the testator, was the proponent of the
will. and one of the three executors named
therein: the others having renounced or de-
clined io act in that capacity. The testator
at the time of its execution was upwards of
80 years of age, and died within a year there-
after. He Was then possessed of property
mainly consisting of real estate of the value
of about $40,000, and had several children
and grandchildren who were in needy cir-
cumstances, partiaily dependent upon him
for support; but were not mentioned in or
provided for by the will, although apparently
the natural objects of his bounty. That in-
strument, after making slight provision for
two of his grandchildren, gave his personal
property, together with a life-estate in his
homestead, to his widow, and the remain-
der thereof, together with a remainder in the
homestead, to the proponent. Robert was
by profession a lawyer, and although living
in his father's family, and being upported
- by him until he was nearly 40 years of age,
i had never rendered material assistance to
the testator in his business affairs, and was
not apparently regarded by him with favor,
or .as a proper or fit person to have the man-
agement and control of business such as that
in which the testator had theretofore been
engaged.
Upon the trial much evidence was given
upon both sides in regard to the mental and
physical condition of the testator during the
three or four years preceding his death; but
no direct evidence was produced as to any
effort on the part of the proponent to pro-
cure the making of a will by his father, or to
influence or dictate the nature of its pro-
visions. The proof on the part of the con-
testants as to the exercise of undue influ-
ence is based wholly upon inference sought
to be drawn from the apparently unfriendly
relations existing between the testator and
his son; the alleged unnatural and inequi-
table disposition of the property; the ad-
vanced age of the testator; and the absence
- of any apparent reason, except the assumed
existence of some extraneous influence, for
excluding the other children from a share in
his estate. There was much evidence pro-
duced by the contestant as to the impair-
ment of the mental and physical condition of
the testator subsequent to 1877, when it was
claimed that he had experienced a paralytic
affection which caused a gradual but contin-
nous impairment of his faculties down to the
time of his death, in April, 1881. The evi-
dence was met on the part of the proponent
by nearly an equal number of witnesses,
who testified to facts and circumstances
showing the continued mental soundness of
the testator’s faculties, and his capacity to
transact business affairs, until after the ex-
ecution of the will.
The evidence on the part of the contestants
is subject to the criticism that much of it
was given under the objection of the pho-
ponent, and was of doubtful admissibility
upon the questions litigated. Aside from the
evidence of Mrs. Coleman, the most material
and important facts on the part of the con-
testants were undoubtedly proved by the
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In re COLEl.l.L~'S WILL. 
(19 X. E. 71, 111 N. Y. 220.) 
Court of Appealtt of New York. Nov. 27, 1888. 
Appeal from supreme court, general term, 
Thlrd department. 
.Tames C. Rogers, for appellants. A. D. 
Wait, for respondent. 
at the time of Its execution was upwards ot 
80 years of age, and died within a year there-
after. He was then possessed of property 
mainly consisting of real estate of the value 
of about '40,000, and had several children 
and grandchildren who were In needy clr--
cumstances, partially dependent upon him 
for support; but were not mentioned In or 
provided for by the wlll, although apparently 
the naturnl objects of his bounty. That in-
strument, after making slight provision for 
Rl"Gl~R. C. J. The probate of the will of two of his grandchildren, gave his personal 
Wllllum Coleman, deceased, was contested property, together with a Ute-estate in bis 
b<>fore the surrogate by his widow and sev- homestead, to bis widow, and the remalu-
eral of his children and grandchildren, upon der thereof, together with a r~lllalnder ln the 
the ground thnt he was not of sound mind homestead, to the proponent. Robert was 
and memory at the time of its execution, by profesalon a. lawyer, and although living 
and its execution was procured through un- in his father's family, and being supportt'd 
due influ<>uce, fraud, and intimidation exer- , by him until he was nearly 40 years of age, 
clsed ov<>r him by Robert S. Coleman. The · had never rendered materlal assistance to 
wlll was admitted to probate, and the de- the testator in hls buslneBS alfalrs, and was 
cree was atfl.rmed upon appeal by the gen- not apparently regarded by him with fa.vor, 
eral term. It ls urged upon this appeal that or as a proper or fit person to have the man-
the evidence produced before the surrogate agement and control of busine11& such as that 
by the contestants, as to the mental and In which the testator had theretofore been 
physical weakness and incompetency of the engaged. 
testator to make a valid will, ls so strong Upon the trial much evidence was given 
and conclusive that this court should reverse upon both sides in regard to the mental and 
the decision of the court below upon the physical condition of the testator during the 
facts. It ls not our purpose to go into a three or four years preceding his death; but 
detailed history of the evidence, or comment no direct evidence was produced as to any 
upon the weight and force of the various effort on the part of the proponent to pro-
facts and circumstances proved on the trial / cure the making of a will by bis father, or to 
by the respective parties to sustain their sev-
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lntluence or dictate the nature of Its pro-
eral positions, as It ls not even claimed by visions. The proof on the part of the coo-
the appellants that there was oo evidence to testants as to the exercise of undue influ-
support the decree of the surrogate. Their ence ls based wholly upon Inference sought 
utmost contention ls that the evidence on to be drawn from the apparently unfriendly 
the part of the contestants Is so persuasive relations existing between the testator and 
and convincing, either of the mental lncom- his son; the alleged unnatural and lnequl-
petency of the testator or of the exercise of table disposition of the property; the ad-
undue Influence by the proponent ln procur- vanced aee of the testator; and tbe abseo•-e 
Ing the execution of the wlll, that the court of any apparent reason, except the assumed 
should hold as mutter of law that it was existence of some extraneous influence, for 
error for the surrogate to admit it to probate. excluding the other children from a share lo 
The argument of the appellants Is based, to his estate. There was much evidence pro-
a large extent, vpon evidence which was ad- duced by the contestants as to the lmpair-
mitted on the trial against the objections of ment of the mental and physical condition of 
the proponent, and which we deem to be the testator subsequent to 1877, when It was 
clearly Inadmissible. While we consider the claimed that he had experienced a paralytic 
case made by the contestants upon the evl- atrectlon which caused a gradual but contln-
dence to be very strong, and as presenting a uous impairment of his faculties down to tht" 
ser1om1 question whether the testator was time of his death, In April, 1881. The evi-
<'Ompctent to make a valid will or not, yet deuce was met on the part of the proponent 
the t>xl'iuRlon of the evidence Improperly re- by nearly an equal number of witnesses, 
celv<>d on their behalf by the surrogate very who testlfted to facts and circumstances 
muc·h hnpalrs the force and strength of their showing the continued mental soundness of 
<'n!le. noel leaves the evidence as to the tes- the testator's faculties, and bis capacity to 
tutor's competency more nearly balanced transact business alfalrs, until after the ex-
than It would otherwise have been. ecutlon of the will. 
A general outline of the facts will be suf- The evidt•nce on the part of the contestants 
fi<'lent to present the views we deem lt nee- ls subject to the criticism that much of It 
es!Ulry to express upon the determination of was given under the obje<'tion of the pro-
this appeal. Robert B. Coleman, the owy ponent, and was of doubtful admissibility 
son of the teRtntor, was the proponent of the upon the questions litigated. Aside from the 
will. and one of the three executors named evidence of Mrs. Coleman, the most material 
th<>reln: the othf'rs having renounced or de- and important fa<'ts on the part of the <'on-
dined to act In that capacity. The testator testnnts were undoubtedly prol'ed by tht> 
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-ecute the instructions of the testator.
witnesses Mrs. Seelye, the daughter of the
testator, and the two physicians, Drs. Clark
and Little, who testiiied to the unsountlness
of mind of the testator during the year 1877,
and subsequent thereto, from knowledge
acquired by them while attending him, rc-
spectively, in a professional capacity. This
evidence was duly objected to by the pro-
ponent, but was admitted against such ob-
jection. So far as the evidence of the medic-
al witnesses is concerned, there can be but
little doubt of its inadmissibility, and it
should have been disregarded by the surro-
gate in determining the question of the tes-
tator’s mental and physical condition. It
seems to us that this evidence falls clearly
within the prohibition contained in section
834 of the Code, as illustrated and applied in
recent decisions of this court. Grattan v. In-
surance Co., 80 N. Y. 296; Edington v. In-
surance Co., 67 N. Y. 185; Westover v. In-
surance Co., 99 N. Y. 56, 1 N. E. 104; People
v. Schuyler, 106 N. Y. 318, 12 N. E. T83;
Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 574, 9 N. E.
320.
It is perhaps not important that we should
comment upon the propriety of the rulings on
the trial in reference to the evidence on the
part of the contestants, since, in any event,
whether it be considered or not, we are of the
opinion that the question of the testator‘s
mental condition, and the exercise of undue
influence over him in respect to the execution
of the will, was one of fact, to be determined
by the trial court. Whatever may be said of
the evidence, we are clearly of the opinion
that not only was there evidence upon which
the decision of the surrogate could properly
be supported, but there was no such pre-
ponderance, as to the testator’s mental in-
capacity to make a valid will, as would have
authorized a reversal by an appellate tri-
bunal of the surrogate's decree determining
that fact in favor of the proponent. In re
Ross, 87 N. Y. 514; In re Cottrell, 95 N. Y.
~ -333; Hewlett v. Elmer, 103 N. Y. 161, 8 N.
E. 387. .
The most material question in the case
arises over the exception taken by the con-
testants to the admission of the evidence of
the witnesses Hughes and Northrup as to
conversations had by them, respectively,
with the testator at the time of receiving in-
structions in reference to a draft of the will
offered for probate, and another drawn about
two years previously by the same attorneys.
The testimony given by these witnesses was
undoubtedly very material and important in
its bearing upon the issue tried, and if er-
roneously admitted would lead to a reversal
of the judgment appealed from. The evi-
dence showed that the witnesses were a firm
of lawyers residing at Sandy Hill, and were
employed by the testator in their professional
capacity to draw such wills, and that the
conversations testified to were had with
them for the purpose of enabling them to ex-
That
these interviews were had in pursuance of,
and under the sanction of, a professional em-
ployment, and that communications made by
a client under such circumstances to his at-
torney were clearly within the protection of
the statute, we have no doubt. Westover v.
Insurance Co., supra; Renihan v. Dennin,
supra; section 835, Code Civ. Proc.
The prohibition of the statute, therefore,
applies to these communications, and they
were inadmissible as evidence unlessbrought
within the provisions of section 836 authoriz-
ing their disclosure. By that section the
pledge of secrecy imposed by the statute is
to be observed, unless its provisions “are ex-
pressly waivet ” by the client. There is noth-
ing in this section requiring the waiver to be
made in writing, or in any particular form or
manner, or at any particular time or place;
but it is required to be an express waiver,
and made in such manner as to show that
the testator intended to exempt his attorneys
in the particular instance from the prohibi-
tion imposed by the statute. An examination
of the will itself, as well as the evidence of
all of the witnesses present on the occasion
of its execution, concur in establishing the
fact that the testator requested both Hughes
and Northrup to sign the attestation clause
of his first as well as of his second will, as
witnesses thereto. That request implies, not
only information as to the necessity of such
signature to the validity of the instrument
executed, but also knowledge of the obliga-
tions which they assumed in respect to the
proof thereof after his death. He must have
been aware that his object in making a will
might prove to be ineffectual, unless these
witnesses could be called to testify to the
circumstances attending its execution, in-
cluding the condition of his mental faculties
at that time.
The condition of the testator‘s mind, as
evidenced by his actions, conduct, and conver-
sation at the time of makinga will, is a part of
the res gestaa of the transaction, and wit-
nesses thereto are competent to speak there-
of, and give opinions in relation thereto, with-
out any other knowledge thereof except that
derived from his conduct on such occasions.
Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190; Holcomb v.
Holcomb, 95 N. Y. 316. The law presumes
knowledge on his part of its provisions, and
that what he does deliberately is done with
a full comprehension of the legal effect of
his act, and the duty which it imposes upon
those who comply with his request. It
would be contrary to settled rules of law to
ascribe to the testator an intention, while
making his will, and going through the forms
required to make it a valid instrument, to
leave in operation the provisions of statute
which he had power to waive, but which if
not waived might frustrate and defeat the
whole object of his action. It cannot be
doubted that if a client in his life-time
should call his attorney as a witness in a
legal proceeding to testify to transactions
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PRIVILEGED CO.MMUNICATI.ONS. (Case No. 139 
witnesses Yrs. Seelye, the daughter of the 
testator, and the two physicians, D1111. Clark 
and Little, who testified to the unsoundness 
of mind of the testator during the year 1877, 
and subsequent thereto, fl'om knowledge 
acquired by them while attending him, re-
spectively, In a professional capacity. This 
evidence was duly objected to by the pro-
ponent, but was admitted against such ob-
jection. So tar as the evidence of the medic-
al witnesses ls concerned, there can be but 
little · doubt of Its lnadmissiblllty, and 1t 
should have been disregarded by the surro-
gate In determining the question of the tes-
tator's mental and physical condition. It 
seems to us that this evidence falls clearly 
within the prohibition contained In section 
.834 of the Code, as Illustrated and applied In 
recent decisions of this court. Grattan v. In-
surance Co., 80 N. Y. 296; Edington v. In-
surance Co., 67 N. Y. 185; Westover v. In-
surance Co., 99 ~. Y. 56, 1 N. E. lo-!; People 
v. Schuyler, 100 N. Y. 318, 12 N. E. 783; 
Renlhan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 574, 9 N. E. 
~lO. 
It ts perhaps not Important that we should 
~mment upon the propriety of the rulings on 
the trial In reference to the evidence on the 
part of the contestants, since, In any event, 
whether It be considered or not, we are of the 
opinion that the question of the testator's 
mental condition, and the exercise of undue 
Influence over him In respect to the execution 
-0£ the will, was one of fact, to be determined 
by the trial court. Whatever may be said of 
the evidence, we are clearly of the opinion 
that not only was there evidence upon which 
the decision o'f the surrogate could properly 
be support!!d, but there was no such pre-
ponderance, as to the testator's mental In-
capacity to make a valid will, as would have 
authorized a reversal by an appellate tri-
bunal of the surrogate's decree determining 
that fact In favor of the proponent. In re 
Roa, 87 N. Y. 514; In re Cottrell, 95 N. Y. 
· .333; Hewlett v. Elmer, 103 N. Y. 161, 8 N. 
E. 38i. 
The most material question In the case 
arises over the exception taken by the con· 
testnnts to the admission of the evidence of 
the wltnesaes Hughes and Northrup as to 
conversations had by them, respectively, 
with the testator at the time of receiving In-
structions In reference to a draft of the will 
oft'ered for probate, and another drawn about 
two years previously by the same attorneys. 
The testimony given by these witnesses was 
undoubtedly very material and Important In 
Its bearing upon the Issue tried, and If er-
roneously admitted would lend to a rel"'ersal 
of the judgment appealed from. The evi-
dence showed that the witnesses were a ft.rm 
of lawyers residing at Sandy Hill, and were 
employed by the testator In their professional 
capacity to draw such wills, and that the 
conversations testified to were had with 
them tor the purpose of enabling them to ex-
·ecute the Instructions of the testator. That 
these Interviews were bad In pursuance of, 
and under the sanction of, a professional em-
ployment, and that communications made by 
a client under such circumstances to his at-
torney were clearly within the protection of 
the statute, we have no doubt. Westover v. 
Insurance Oo., supra; Renlhan v. Dennin, 
supra; section 835, Code Civ. Proc. 
The prohibition e>f the statute, therefore, 
applies to these communications, and they 
were Inadmissible as evidence unless brought 
within the provisions of section 836 authoriz-
ing their disclosure. By that section the 
pledge of secrecy Imposed by the statute la 
to be observed, unless Its provisions "are ex-
pressly waived" by the client. There ls noth-
ing In this section requiring the waiver to be 
made In writing, or In any particular form or 
manner, or at any particular time or pince; 
but It ls required to be an express waiver, 
and made In such manner as to show that 
the testator Intended to exempt his attorneys 
In the particular Instance from the prohibi-
tion imposed by the statute. An examination 
of the wlll Itself, as well as the evidence of 
all of the witnesses present on the occasion 
of Its execution, concur In establishing the 
fact that the testator requested both Hughes 
and Xorthrup to sign the attestation clause 
of his first as well as of hie second wlll, as 
witnesses thereto. That request Implies, not 
only Information as to the necessity of such 
signatures to the validity of the Instrument 
executed, but also knowledge of the obliga-
tions which they assumed In respect to the 
proof thereof after his death. He must have 
been aware that his object In making a will 
might prove to be Ineffectual, unless these 
witnesses could be called to testify to the 
circumstances attending Its execution, In-
cluding the condition of his mental faculties 
at that time. 
The condition of the testator's mind, as 
evidenced by his actions, conduct, and conver-
sation at the time of making a will, ls a pnrt of 
the res gestre of the tmnsactlon, and wit-
nesses thereto are competent to speak there-
of, and give opinions In relation thereto, with-
out any other knowledge thereof except that 
derived from bis conduct on such occasions. 
Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 100; Holcomb v. 
Holcomb, D5 N. Y. 316. The law presumeR 
knowledge on his part of its provisions, and 
that what he does deliberately Is done with 
a full comprehension of the legal etrect of 
his act. and the duty which It Imposes upon 
those who comply with his request. It 
would be contrary to settled rules of law to 
ascribe to the testator an Intention, while 
making his will, 1tnd going through the forms 
required to make It a valid Instrument, to 
leave In operation the provisions of statute 
which he had power to waive, but which If 
not waived might trust.rate and defeat the 
whole object of his action. It cannot be 
doubted that If a client In bis life-time 
should call bis attorney as a witness In a 
legal proceeding to testify to transactions 
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taking place between himself and his attor-
ney while occupying the relation of attorney
and client, such an act would be held to con-
stitute an express waiver of the seal of se-
crecy imposed by the statute; and can it be
any less so when the client has left written
and oral evidence of his desire that his at-
torney should testify to facts learned through
their professional relations, upon a judicial
proceeding to take place after his death? We
think not. Mc-Kinney v. Railroad Co., 101
N. Y. 352, 10 N. E. 544. The act of the testa-
tor in requesting his attorneys to become
witnesses to his will leaves no doubt as to
40-1
his intention thereby to exempt them from
the operation of the statute, and leave them
free to perform the duties of the oifice as-
signed them, unrestrained by any objection
which he had power to remove. We have
carefully examined other points made by the
appellants upon the argument, and in the
printed brief submitted to the court, but find
no material error committed by the trial
court which entitles the appellants to a re-
versal of the judgment.
The judgment should therefore be atflrmed,
with costs.
All concur.
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taking place between himself and his attor-
ney while occupying the relation of attorney 
and client, such an act would be held to con-
stitute an express waiver of the seal of se-
crecy Imposed by the statute; and can It be 
1 any lCBB so when the cllent hns left written 
and oral evidence of his desire that his at-
torney should testify to fat•ts learned through 
their professional relations, upon a judicial 
proceeding to take place after his denth? We 
think not. llcKlnney v. Railroad Co., 104 
N. Y. 302, 10 N. E. M4. The act of the testa-
tor In requesting his attorneys to become 
witnesses to his will leaves no doubt as to 
4<M 
his intention thereby to exempt them from 
the operation of the statute, and leave them 
tree to pertorm the dutiE'S of the om<.oe as-
signed them, unrestrained by any objeetlon 
which he had power to remove. We have 
carefully examined other points made by the 
appellants upon the argument, and In tile 
printed brief submitted to the court, but find 
no material error committed by the trial 
court which entitles the appellants to a re-
versal of the judgment. 
The judgment should therefore be amrmed, 
with costs. 
All concur. 
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
[Case No. 140
HIIRLBURT ct al. v. HURLBURT.
(28 N. E. 651, 128 N. Y. 420.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 13, 1891.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, tllth department.
Action for money had and received,
brought by Lyman F. Hurlburt and an-
other, administrators of Charles F. Hurl-
burt. deceased, against Ella Hurlburt, ad-
minlstratrix of Theron D. Hurlburt,de-
ceased. Verdict for defendant. Judgment
was ordered for defendant on plaintiffs’
motion for a new trial on exceptions or-
dered to be heard at the genera-l term in
the first instance. Plaintiffs appealed.
Atlirmed.
Charles 2lIcLoutb, for appellants. S. B.
Mclntyre. for respondent.
EARL, J. This action was brought to
recover the sum of $6,682, with interest
thereon, which it is alleged Charles 1*‘.
I-iurlburt, the plaintiffs’ intestate, placed
in the hands of his son Theron,thedel'end-
ant‘s intestate, as his agent. and for his
benefit, in the latter part of the year 1881.
Theron was a son of Charles, and he died
I)ecembe1-25, 188-“Land Charles died Janua-
ry 6, IRR4. The defendant claimed that the
money was a gift to her husband, and
that he was never under any obligation
to repay the same. The plaintiffs were
unable to produce any writing of any
kind evidencing any obligation on the
part of Theron to repay the money.
They are the sons of Charles, and were the
sole witnesses to establish their claim,
and this they attempted to do by testify-
ing to certain conversations which they
overheard between their father and '[‘he-
ron. Upon the trial the defendant rested
her case mainly upon the conceded fact
that for about two years beiore the death
of her husband the money claimed had
been in banks to his credit, and had been
managed and controlled by him, and she
produced proof of various declarations
and admissions made by Charles, tend-
ing to show that the money was trans-
ferred by him to his son as a gilt, and
not to be held for his benefit.
During the progress of the trial the
plaintiffs made objections to evidence
which were overruled. and they now claim
some of the rulings were erroneous. We
will briefly notice some of them. Theron
and (‘harlcs, in the spring of lS.\'3, went
together to consult a lawyer by the name
of Aldrich as to the best mode of dispos-
ing of or adjusting the prospective inter-
est of the plaintiff Lyman as an heir in the
farm belonging to his father, and several
plans were suggested by Theron. in the
presence of his father, and assented to
by him, to accomplish that end. The
statement was there made by Theron to
the lawyer, and assented to by his father,
that Lyman had had all his share in his fa-
ther's personal property; and othcrstate-
ments were there made by Theron, and-
assented to by his lather, of similar im-
port. Aldrich was called by thedefcndant
to prove these statements and admissions.
The plaintiffs objected to his evidence on
the ground that he was an attorney, con-
sulted professionaliy, and that the com-
munlcations to him were privileged. The
court overruled the obiection,and received
the evidence. We think that in receiving
this evidence there was no violation of
section 835 of the Code. which provides
that “an attorney or counselor at law
shall not be allowed to disclose acum-
munication made by his client to him, or
his advice given thereon. in the course of
his professional employment.” This sec-
tion is a mere re-enactment of the com-
mon-law rule, and it cannot be supposed
from the general language used that it
was intended to change or enlarge that
rule as it had been expounded by the
courts. It has frequently been said that
the object of the rule embodied in the sec-
tion is to enable and encourage persons
needing professional advice to disclose
freely the facts in reference to which they
seek advice, without fear that such facts
will be made public to their disgrace or
detriment by their attorney. Such a case
as this is plainly not within the rule.
Here Theron and his father were both in-
terestcd in the advice which they sought,
and they were both present at the same
time, and engaged in the same conversa-
tion. Each heard what the other said,
so that the disclosures made were not, as
between them, confidential, and there can
be no reason for treating such disclosures
as privileged. It has frequently been held
that the privilege secured by this rule of
law does not apply to a case where two
or more persons consult an attorney for
their mutual benefit; that it cannot he in-
voked in any litigation which may there-
after arise between such persons. but can
be in alitigatlon between them and stran-
gers. Root v. Wright, 21‘ Hun. 347; Sher-
inan v. Scott, 27 Hun, 331; Foster v._ Wil-
kinson, 37 Hun. 244: Rosenburg v. Rosen-
burg, 40 Hun, 91; Whiting v. Barney,30
N. Y. 330; Hebbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y.
54; Root v. Wright, 84 N. Y. 72. There-
fore. if Charles and '1‘||eron had been alive,
and parties to this action, this evidence
would have been competent; and, as it
would then have been competent, it is
equally competent in this action between
their personal representatives. The fact
that these plaintiffs are personally inter-
ested in the estate oftheir father can make
no difference in the application of the rule.
They are parties to this action only in a
representative capacity. They legally
stand as the representatives of their fa-
ther. and no one else. Evidence which
would have been competent against him
in his life-time is competent against his
personal representatives. So we think
that this case is not within the reason of
section 835, and. even if it should be re-
garded us within its letter, it should be
taken out of the letter by the application
of the familiar maxim, “cessamte rations
Ie_2'i.~', cesseat l'pS.'L lex. "
Several witnesses were permitted to give
evidence of declarations made by the
plaintiffs’ intestate tending to show that
he had made agilt oi this money to his
son, and this evidence was objected to by
the plaintiffs as incompetent. It is famil-
iar law, for which no citation of authori-
ties is needed, that the declarations of a
testator or intestate binding him or bind-
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PRIVILEGED CO.MMUNICATIONl::J. [Cue No. 140 
m;RLBURT et al v. HURLBURT. 
(28 N. E. 661, 128 N. Y. 420.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 13, 1891. 
Appeal from supreme eourt, general 
term, fifth dPpartment. 
Actlou for money had and received, 
brought by Lyman F. Hurlburt and an-
other, administrators of Charles F. Hurl-
burt, decem1ed, a.Jr;nlnst 1-;11a Hurlburt, ad-
ministratrix of Theron D. Hurlburt, de-
ceased. Verdict for defendant. Judgment 
was ordered for dpfendant on plaintiffs' 
motion for a new trial on exceptions or-
dered to be heard at the grnera.J term 111 
the tl1·st lnstuhce. Plaintiffs appealed. 
Affirmed. 
Clmrles McLouth, for appellants. S. B. 
Mcintyre, for respondent. 
EARL, J. Thie action W&R bronght to 
recover the smu of $G,61ol:l, with lntere11t 
thereon, which It Is alleged Charles F . 
Hurlburt, the plaintiffs' lntestatP, placed 
In the hundR of his eon 'rheron, thedPfend. 
ant'N lntc>Mtate, as his agent, and for his 
hrnetlt, In the latter part of the year 1l'<Sl. 
Theron wsR a son of Charles, a11<l he died 
Decemher2!\, 1R~1.and Charles died .Janua-
r.v 6, l&W. The defendant clalmP<l that tht1 
money was a gift to her buRl:onnd, and 
that he woe never under any obligation 
to re11ay the same. The plaintiffs were 
unable to produce any writing of any 
klocl evidencing any obligation on the 
JIBrt of Theron to rPPRY the JtlUDPy. 
They are the sons or Charle1o1, and wel'e the 
eole wltneRses to estnblleb theh· clalm, 
and this thl'Y attempted to do by testify. 
Ing to certain cooven1attons which thPy 
o\"erhenrd between their fathPr and 'rhe-
ron. Upon the trial the defendant rested 
her case mainly upon the conct>decl fact 
that for about two years before the dt>ath 
or her husband the monPy claimed bad 
been lo hanks to hie credit, and hod been 
mannp;NJ and controlled hy him, and she 
produce1l proof of variou11 declnra tlon" 
and admissions made by Charles, tend-
ing to 11how that thll money was trans· 
ferred by him to his 11on as a gift, and 
not to be held for hl11 benefit. 
Durlnl( the prop;ress of the trial the 
plaintiffs made olJjectlons to evidence 
which l\ere overruled, and theyoowclahu 
eome of the rullni;rs were erroueons. We 
will hrlefty notice some or them. Theron 
and Charles, In the spring of JSS:i, went 
togetllPr tu consult a lnw.rer by tht> n»me 
of Aldrich as tu the beet mode of dh"pos-
lng or or adjusting the pro<1pecth·e Inter-
est of the plRlntlff Lyman as an heir In the 
farm belonging to his father, anrl several 
plans were suggested by Ther<m, In the 
prP.t!t.'DCe of bis father, anrt 11s11entt>d to 
by him, to accomplish that end. The 
stotl:'m~nt was there made by Theron to 
the lnwyer, and a'!11ented to by hlH father, 
the t Lyman had had all his share In his fa-
ther's penmnal property; and otlll'rstate-
ml'nts were there macle by Theron, and. 
a1:1seotect to by hlR father, of similar Im-
port. Aldrich waH cnlle<I by the<IC'fendant 
to prove thl'HP stn trmen ts un1J a1lmlsslons. 
The plalntlffR objected to hlH evidence on 
the grouud that bo was an uttorney, con-
.sultell professlunally, and tbut the com-
munlcatlons to him were privileged. 'rhe 
court o\'erruleil the objection, and received 
the evidence. We think that In receiving 
this evidence there was no violation of 
section R3.'l of the Code, which provides 
that "on attorney or coun11elor at law 
shall not be allowed to disclose a com-
munication made by his c11ent to him, or 
hl.R advice given thereon. In the conrse of 
his profesailonal employment." Th111 sec. 
tlon le a mere re-enaetment of the com-
mon-lt1 w rule, and It caunot be supposed 
from the p;eoeral language •1eel1 that It 
WR'i! lntemled to chaua:e or enlitrge that 
rule as It had been expoumled by the 
courts. It bas frequently lwen said that 
the object of the rulP emhorllcd lo the sec-
tion Is to enable and encourage per11ons 
needlnJP; professional advice to disclose 
freely the ract11 In reference to which they 
seek advice, w!thout fear that such facts 
will be ma1Je public to thPlr dh.igrace or 
detriment by their utton1ey. Such a case 
as thiH Is plainly not within the rule. 
Here Theron and hlR father were both ln-
terestl•d In the advice which they 11ought, 
and they were both present at tbe 1:1ame 
time, and e111.rugcd In the same convenm-
tlon. Each heard what the other said, 
so that the dlsclo11urPs made were not, as 
between them, euutldentlal, and there can 
be no rp1111on for treating such dlsrlosures 
as prl\"lleged. It has frequently been held 
that the prlYllege secured by this rule of 
law does not apply to a case where two 
or more per1mns consult an attorney for 
their mutu11l benefit; that It cannot he In-
voked In any litigation which may there-
after arise between such persona, hut ran 
be In a.lltlp;atlon between them Anrl stran-
gers. Root v. Wright, 21 Hun. 347; Sher· 
irinn v. Scott, 27 Hun, 331; Foster v. Wil-
kinson. 37 Hun. 244: Rosenburg'°· Rosen-
burg, 40 Hun, 91; Whiting v. Barney, 30 
N. Y. 3:.10; Hebhurd v. Haughlan, 70 N. Y. 
64; Root v. Wright, 84 N. Y. 72. There-
fore. If Charles and '!'heron had beeu alive, 
and parties to thht action, this evidence 
woulil have been competent; and, a11 It 
would th~n have been competent, It Is 
equally competent lo this action t:>etweeu 
their pei•sonal representatives. The fact 
thot thesp plaintiffs are personally lnter-
eMtell In the eRtnte of their father can make 
no dlffel'ence In the applies tlon of the rule. 
They are parties to this actlor1 only In a 
representath·e capacity. They legally 
stand as the reprt'sentntlves or tht>lr fa. 
ther, and no one else. Evidence which 
wunl•I have been competent agulnRt him 
In his life-time Is competent aguinst his 
perimnul representatives. So we think 
that thlH case is not within the reneou of 
section s:15, end. e¥en If It should he re-
1o<ardl'rl us within its letter, It Hhonlll be 
tukl•n out of the letter by the Rlll>llcntlon 
of the famlllflr maxim, 04 cessn11te ratioIJt 
/pgf,.,, ce"·"ll t 111.<:n le.r." 
Severul witnPsHes were permitted to give 
e\·idt>nce of declarutions made h.v the 
plaintiffs' lnte11tate tending to Hhow th•1t 
he hacl made u. itlrt of this money to hie 
son, Rntl this evidence was ohjt>cted to by 
the plaintiffs tlH incumpetl'nt. It Is fumll-
lur In w, for which no cltntlou or 11ut1wrl· 
ties IH nl'ede•I, that the <leclarutluns of u 
testator or ln~state binding blw or blnd-
405 
Case No. 140]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
ing or impairing his estate may be given
in evidence against his personal represent-
atlves in all cases where they would have
been competent against himself it he had
been living and a. party to the action.
His executor or administrator represents
him and stands in his place, and his dec-
larations admitting a. debt or obligation,
or tending to discharge u debt or obliga-
tion due him, or to impair his estate in
any way. are competent in any litigation
to which his personal representatives are
a. party. Therefore the evidence of mute-
rial admissions made by Charles in his
life-time was competent against these
plaintiffs. It is further claimed that much
of the evidence thus received was wholly
immaterial, and should, therefore, have
been excluded. We have carefully scruti-
nized the evidence, and. while much of it
has but a slight and remote bearing upon
the case. yet we cannot say that any of it
was wholly immaterial. It was compe-
tent for the defendant to prove the rela-
tions between Theron and his father, and,
to some ex tent, the dealings between them,
and the relations between the father and
the different members of his family.
lomplaint is made of the charge of the
judge. Our attention is called to no erro-
neous rule of law laid down by him, and
406
' the most that can be said is that the
charge shows a significant leaning‘ in fa-
vor of the defendant, and that thejudge
was strongly impressed with the merits
of the deleudant’s case. But the mere in-
timation of an opinion by the judge upon
evidence, or upon the merits of the case,
or his commeu ts upon the evidence, though
unfavorable to the party complaining,
furnish no ground for a reversal here, so
long as the whole case is submitted to
the jury upon a charge which lays down
no improper rule of law. If a judge.in his
charge to the jury. uses such language as
to improperly bias their judgments or
influence their verdict, that may he ground
for the court below. upon a motion for a
new trial, to set aside the verdict if satis-
fied that injustice has been done: but up-
on an appeal to this court, where the
court below has refused to set aside the
verdict, and has aflirmed the judgment
entered thereon. we can review only er-
rors of law which have been properly ex-
cepted to. A careful examination of the
whole case leads us to the conclusion that
the exceptions of the plaintiffs point out
no legal error, and that thereis no ground
for a reversal of the judgment. '.l‘hejudg-
ment should be afiirmed, with costs. All
concur.
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Caie No. 140] PRODUCTION .AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
Ing or Impairing his estate may be given 
In evidence against his personal repreeen t. 
atlvea In ell c1tsee wliere they would have 
bet'n competent &ll'alnst himself If he ball 
been living and Ii party to the action. 
His executor or 11dmlulstrator represents 
him and stand11 In his place, and his dec-
laratlom1 admitting a debt or obligation, 
or tpndlng to discharge a debt or obliga-
tion due him, or to Impair his estate In 
any way. ure competent in any litigation 
to which his personal representatives 11re 
a party. Therefore the e•ldence of mute. 
rial admissions made by Charles In his 
life-time wad competent against these 
plaintiffs. It Is further claimed that much 
of the evidence thus received wns wholly 
Immaterial, and should, therefore, have 
been excluded. We have cal'efully scruti-
nized the evidence, and, while much of It 
bas but a slight and remote be11rlng upon 
the case, yet we cannot say that any of It 
was wholly Immaterial. It was compe-
tent for the defendant to prove tb~ rela-
tlom1 between Theron and his father, and, 
to some extent, tbedealingd between them, 
and the relations between the father and 
the different members of his family. 
Complaint Is madt> of the charge of the 
Juuge. Our attention Is called to no erro-
neouB rule of law laid down by him, and 
406 
· the most that can be Bnid i11 that the 
charge sbowR a slgnifkaot leaning In fa-
vor of the defencl1tnt, and that the juclge 
wa11 stron~ly lmpres11ed with the merit11 
of the dere111lll 11t's cHse. But the mere ln-
tlmatlun or un opinion by the judge upon 
evidence, or npou the merltB of the case, 
or his commeuts upon the evidence, though 
unfavorable to the party compl11inlng, 
furnish no ground for a reversal here, B<> 
long as the whole case ls submlttf"d to 
the Jury upon a charge which lay8 down 
no Improper rule of law. If a judgP, In his 
charge to the jury. uBes Ruch language as 
to Improperly bias their judgment11 or 
lnftuen~e their verdict, that ruay he ground 
for the court below, upon a motion for a 
new trial, to 11et aside the \"e1·dict ll satlB-
fied that Injustice haB been done: but up-
on an appeal to this court, where the 
court below hM refused to Bet aside the 
verdict, and has affirmed the judgment 
entered thereon, we can review only er-
rors of law which have been properly ex-
cepted to. A careful examlnatiun of the 
who.le case leads UR to tbe conclusion that 
the excei>tlons of t11e plalntlHs point out 
no legal error, and that therelt1 noground 
for a re,·ersal of the ju()gment. The judg-
ment should be affirmed, wltb costs. All 
concur. 
PRLVILEGED COMM UNICATIONS.
[Case No. 141
MINTER v. PEOPLE.
(29 N. E. 45, 139 Ill. 363.)
Nov. 4, 1&1.
Error to appellate court, Fourth district.
Reversed.
Proceeding to punish F. E. Minter for con-
tempt of court. Defendant was convicted,
and the appellate court aflirmed the judg-
ment. Defendant brings error.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Pillow & Millspaugh, for plaintiff in error.
Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen., for the People.
CRAIG, J. The plaintiff in error was sul»
poenaed as a witness to testify in reference
to a charge under investigation before the
grand jury of Gallatin county. After being
sworn, the foreman of the grand jury asked
the witness the following question: “Do
you know of any person playing at a game
with cards for money in Gallatin county
within eighteen months past?" towhich ques-
tion he answered, "I do." The foreman then
asked the following question: “(2) Who did
you see playing?" which last question plain-
tifi in error refused to answer on the ground i
that he could not do so without giving evi-
dence against and tending to criminate him-
self. Thereupon the foreman of the grand
jury caused the plaintiff in error to be
brought before the circrit court, then ju-
dicially sitting, to be dealt with as for con-
tempt in refusing to answer said last ques-
tion. Plaintiff in error appeared in open
court, and stated voluntarily that the fore-
going was a. correct statement of the pro-
ceedings before the grand jury, and that he
had answered the first question. and refused
to answer the last, because to do so would
criminate, or tend to criminate, himself.
The court then ruled and stated to him that
he was not required to give evidence against
himself, nor to give evidence that would tend
to criminate himself, but that he was re-
quired to answer whether or not he had seen
any person other than himself play at cards
for money; that he might lawfully refuse to
tell anything that he himself had done, but
that he could not lawfully refuse to tell
what he had seen another person do. Plain-
tiff in error then asked if the court held
that a witness before the grand jury was re-
quired to tell that he had seen others gaming
for money, if the witness was also playing
at the same time, and in the same game,
with such other persons; and the court
thereupon ruled that, under such circumstan-
ces, the witness was bound to tell that the
others had played, but that he (plaintiff in
error) might lawfully refuse to tell anything
that he himself had done or said or anything
that tended to criminate himself, but that
he must tell if he had seen others play; that
the fear that his answer might induce the
other parties to testify against him in retal-
iation, or that the grand jury might summon
the others, and force them to tell, was not a
lawful reason for refusing to answer the
question. The plaintiff in error still refusing
to answer the question, the court adjudged
him in contempt of court, and assessed a tine
against him of $25 as a punishment. The
judgment of the circuit court having been
atflrmed in the appellate court, this writ of
error was sued out to reverse the latter
judgment.
Article 2 of section 10 of our constitution
provides: “No person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to give evidence against
himself.” 1 Starkie, Ev. 136, says: “A wit-
ness is not bound to answer any question,
either in a court of law or equity, if his
answer will expose him to any criminal pun-
ishment or penal liability,” agreeably to the
wise and humane principle that no man is
bound to criminate himself. Greenleaf, in
the discussion of this question, (volume 1, §
451,) says: “Where an answer will have a
tendency to expose the witness to a penal
liability * * ' or to a criminal charge,
here. the authorities are exceedingly clear
that the witness is not bound to answer. If
the fact as to which he is interrogated forms
but one link in the chain of testimony which
is to convict him, and whether it may tend
1 to criminate or expose the witness. is a
point which the court will determine, un-
der all the circumstances of the case, but
without requiring the witness fully to ex-
plain how he might be criminated by the
answer which the truth would oblige him
to give.” In People v. Mather, 4 “fend.
229, it is said: “When the disclosures he
[the witness] may make can be used against
him to procure his conviction for a criminal
offense, or to charge him with penalties and
forfeitures, he may stop in answering before
he arrives at the question the answer t0
which may show directly his moral turpi-
tude. ‘
tions, the answer to all of which would estab-
lish his criminality, the party cannot pick out
a particular one, and say, if that be put, the
answer will not criminate him. If it is one
tep having a. tendency to criminate him. he
is not compelled to answer." In 1 Burr's
Tr. 424, Chief Justice Marshall, in discus-
lug this question, said: “It is the province
of the court to judge whether any direct an-
swer to the question which may be proposed
will furnish evidence against the witness.
If such answer may disclose a fact which
forms a necessary and essential link in the
chain of testimony which would be sufficient
to convict him of any crime, he is not bound
to answer it so as to furnish matter for that
conviction.”
It will be observed from the authorities
cited that a witness is not required to go
on and answer questions until one is pro-
pounded the answer to which will of itself
criminate him of a crime, but if the evidence
elicited tends to criminate the witness, or if
it constituted a link in a chain of evidence
which might criminate the witness, he may
' * If th.-re be a. series of ques- <
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PlUVlLEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [Case No. 141 
MIXTER '"· PEOPLE. 
(29 N. E. 45, 139 Ill. 363.) 
Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 4, 1891. 
Error to appellate court, Fourth district 
Reversed. 
Proceedlng to punish F. E. Minter for con-
tempt of court. Defendant was convicted, 
and the appellate court atnrmed the judg-
ment. Defendant brings error. 
Pillow & Mlllspaugh, for plaintiff in error. 
Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen., for the People. 
CRAIG, J. The plantU'f ln error was sub-
prenaed as a wltneBB to testify ln reference 
to a charge under Investigation before the 
grand jury of Gallatin county. After being 
sworn, the foreman of the grand jury asked 
the witness the following question: "Do 
you know of any pe1son playing at a game 
with cards for money lo Gallatin county 
within eighteen months past?" towhichques-
tion he answered, "I do." The foreman then 
asked the following question: "(2) Who did 
you see playing?" which last question plain-
tiff in erl"Ol" refused to answer on the ground 
that he could not do 80 without giving evi-
dence against and tending to crlmlnate him-
self. Thereupon the foreman of the grand 
jury caused the plalntltr in error to be 
brought before the clrcrit court, then ju-
dicially slttlng, to be dealt with as for con-
tempt In refusing t<> answer said last ques-
tion. Plaintiff In error appeared In open 
court, and stated voluntarily that the fore-
going was a correct statement of the pro-
ceedings before the grand jury, and that he 
bad answered the :first question, and refusetl 
to answer the last, because to do 80 would 
crfmlnate, or tend to crlmlnate, himself. 
The court then ruled and stated to him that 
he was not required to give evidence against 
himself, nor to give evidence that would tend 
to crfmlnate himself, but that be wns re-
quired to answer whether or not he bad seen 
any person other than himself play at cards 
far money; that he might lawfully refuse to 
tell anything that he himself had done, but 
that be could not lawfully refuse to tell 
what he bad seen another person do. Plain-
tiff ln error then asked if the court held 
that a witness before the grand jury was re-
quired to tell that be bad seen others gaming 
for money, if the witness was also playing 
at the same time, and in the same game, 
with such other persons; and the court 
thereupon ruled that, under such circumstan-
ces, the witness wns bound to tell that the 
others bad played, but that he (plaintltr In 
error) might lawfully refuse to tell anything 
that he himself bad done or said or anything 
that tended to crlmlnate himself, but that 
he must tell If he bad seen others play; that 
the fear that his answer might Induce the 
other parties to testify against him In retal-
iation, or that the grand jury might summon 
the others, and force them to tell, was not a 
lawful reason for refusing to &D6wer the 
question. The plalntltr In error stll'! refmlfng 
to answer the question, the court adjudged 
him In contempt of court, and asaesRed a :fine 
against him of $25 as a punishment. The 
judgment of the circuit court having been 
amrmed In the appellate court, this writ of 
error was sued out to reverse the latter 
judgment. 
Article 2 of section 10 of our constitution 
provides: "No person shall be compelled In 
any criminal case to give evidence against 
himself." 1 Starkie, Ev. 136, says: "A wit-
ness ls not bound to answer any question, 
either In a court of law or equity, If his 
answer wlll expose him to any criminal pun-
ishment or penal llablllty," agreeably to the 
wise and humane principle that no mau ls 
bound to crtmlnate himself. Greenleaf, in 
the discussion of this question, (volume 1, I 
451,) says: ''Where an answer will hal·e a 
tendency to expose the witness to a penal 
liability • • • or to a criminal charge, 
here the authorities are exceedingly clear 
that the witness Is not bound to answer. If 
the fact as to which he Is interrogated forms 
but one link in the chain of testimony which 
ls to convict him, and whether It may tend 
to crlmlnate or expose the wltneRs, ls a 
pclnt which the court will determine, un-
der nil the circumstan<'PS of the case, but 
without requiring the witness fully to ex-
plain how he might be crlmlnated by the 
answer which the truth would oblige him 
to give." In People v. Mather, 4 ·wend. 
229, it ls said: "When the disclosures he 
[the witness] may mnke can be usc>d against 
him to procure his ~onvlctlon for a criminal 
otrense, or to charge him with penultles and 
forfeitures, he may stop In answering before 
he arrives at the question the answer to 
which may show directly his moral turpi-
tude. • • • If th;}re be 11. series of ques-
tions, the answer to all of which would estab-
lish his criminality, the party cannot piC'k out 
a particular one, and say, if that be put, the 
answer wlll not crlmlnate him. If lt Is one 
step having a tendency to crfmlnate him, he 
ls not compelled to answer." In 1 Burr's 
Tr. 424, Chief Justice Marshall, In discuss-
ing this question, said: "It ls the province 
of the court to judge whether any direct an-
swer to the question which may be proposed 
wlll furnish evidence against the witness. 
If such answer may disclose a fact which 
forms a necessary and essential link in the 
chain of testimony which would be sufficient 
to convict him of any crime, he le not bound 
to answer It so as to furnish matter for that 
conviction." 
It will be observed from the authorities 
cited that a witness ls not required to go 
on and answer questions until one Is pro-
pounded the answer to which will of itself 
crlmlnate him of a crime, but if the evidence 
elicited tends to crlmlnate the witness, or if 
it constituted a link In a chain of evidence 
which might crimlnate the witness, he may 
407 
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claim his privilege, and refuse to answer. 1 tense that one person cannot commit alone.
Here the grand jury was investigating the
question whether certain persons had been
guilty of gambling by playing with cards
for money. The witness had played in a
certain game with these persons. and the
question presented is whether he could dis-
close the name of the person or persons
with whom he played without furnishing a
link in a chain of testimony sutliclent to es-
tablish his own guilt. In other words, if A.
and B. play with each other a game with
cards for money. can A. testify that he saw
B. play, without disclosing evidence which
will form a link in a chain of testimony sut-
ficient to convict A.? The answer to this
would seem to be obvious. The testimony
of A. establishes the fact that two persons
played with cards for money. The name of
one is given. One mere link in the chain
of evidence will suflice to complete the chain,
and establish the crime; that is, that A.
also joined in the game. Gaming is an of-
408
He must of necessity have an accomplice.
Under the ruling adopted in this case, plain-
tiff in error was compelled to go on the
stand and testify that a crime had been coni-
niitted, and give the name of his accomplice,
and was oni_v allowed to withhold the tact
that he was the other guilty party. ‘Va
think this ruling violated that long and well
established rule of law which shields a par-
ty from testifying to a fact that may crim-
inate himself. It‘ plaintifl? in error had not
been a party to the crime which the people
were attempting to prove; if he had merely
been in a room or place. and saw others play,
——he could be compelled to testify to all he
saw. But such was not the case. He was
a party to the game. He and another had
violated the law. and he could not be re-
quired to establish the crime by his own evi-
dence. The judgment ot‘ the appellate and
circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause
remanded.
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Case No. 141] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
claim his privilege, and refuse to answer. , 
Here the grand jury was Investigating the 
question whether certain persons had been 
guilty ot gambling by playing with cards 
tor money. Tbe witness had playP<I In a 
c·ertalo l{nme with these persons. nud the 
question presented ls whether be <'OUld dls-
t•lose the name of the person or l>erson~ 
with whom he plnye<l without furnishing a 
link lo a <·halo of te11tlmooy sutftcleot to es-
tablish his own gullt. In other words, It A. 
nnd B. play with ea<'h other a game with 
<'tlrds tor money, <'an A. testify that he 11aw 
B. play, without dlS<'loslng evidence which 
wlll form a link lo a <"halo of testimony suf-
ficient to convict A.? The answer to this 
would seem to be obvious. The testimony 
ot A. establishes the tact that two persons 
played with cards for money. The name of 
one ls given. One mere link lo the chain 
of evldencewlll sutft<'e to romplete the chain, 
and establish the t·1ime; that Is, that A. 
also joined In the game. Gaming Is an of-
408 
tense that one person cannot commit alone. 
He must of necessity have an accomplice. 
t.:nder the ruling adopted In tbts case, plain-
tiff In error was compelled to go on the 
stand and testlry that a crime had been com-
mitted, and give the name of his nccompltce, 
and was only allowed to withhold the tact 
that be was the other guilty party. We 
think this ruling violated that long and well 
established rule ot law which shields a par-
ty from testifying to a fact that may crlm-
lnate him11elf. It plaintiff In error bad not 
been a party to the crime whkh the people 
were attempting to prove; It be bad merely 
been In a room or place, and saw others play, 
-he could be compelled to testify to all he 
saw. But such was not the C'&Be. He was 
a party to the ll'!lme. He and another had 
violated the law. and he could not be re-
quired to establish the crime by bis own evi-
dence. The judgment ot the appellate and 
circuit courts wlll be reversed, and the cause 
remanded. 
PRIVI LEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
[Case No. 142
MAHANKE v. CLELAND, Judge, ct al.
(41 N. VV. 53, 76 Iowa, 401.)
Dec. 22, 1888.
Ce1'tirn'a'ri proceeding by Elizabeth Ma-
hanke against John B. Cleland, judge of the
district. court, Twelfth judicial district of
Iowa, and John Barlow, clerk of the district
Supreme Court of Iowa.
court in and for Butler county, Iowa, and I answering such quesfionm
said district court of said county, to test the
validity of an order requiring the plaintiff to
answer questions in regard to a certain issue
involved in an action then pending, to which
she was a party defendant.
Ilemenway ti’: Grundy, for petitioner.
ROBINSON. J. John Smallpage com-
menced an action in the district court
of Butler county, in which the petitioner
in this proceeding and one John Mahanke
were made parties defendant. The peti-
tion in that action alleges tliai; Small-
page is the owner of a judgment rendered
by said district court against said John
Mahanke, on which an execution has been
issued and returned unsatisfied, and on
which there is due about the sum of $8.10;
that before said judgment was rendered said
John Mahanke, being the owner of certain
lands in Butler and Grundy counties, “did
make a pretended sale and conveyance, by
deeds of the same,” to the plaintiff in this
action, "‘ with intent to hinder, delay, and de-
fraud the plaintiff in the collection of his
said judgment;” that the plaintiff in this ac-
tion “took said deeds of conveyance with the
like intent, and without paying therefor any
consideration.” The petition prays that the
conveyances be set aside, and that the land
therein described be subjected to the pay-
ment of said judgment. The plaintiffin this
action, by her answer, admitted the allega-
tions in regard to the judgment, and that the
conveyances specified had been made to her,
but denied that they were made without. con-
sideration, and denied all allegations of fraud.
While the action aforesaid was pending, the
plaintiff in this action was called before a no-
tary public, and sworn, for the purpose of
taking her deposition to sustain the issues
on behalf of the plaintiff Sm.-illpage, and was
asked the following question: “When did
you first know that John Mahanke had made
and executed to you deeds of his interest to
the land left by Henry Mahanke, being the
real estate described in the petition?” There-
upon the witness objected to answering such
question, on the ground “tli-at the witness is
a defendant in the case; that the only issue
in the case is the good faith of the convey-
ance made by John Mahanke to the witness,
set out in the petition_; and the matter sought
to be elicited would render the witness liable
to criminal prosecution;” and “objected to
any further examination concerning issues
in the case upon like grounds.” The patties
agreed in writing that plaintiff was seeking
to prove the atlirmative allegations relating
to the issue, by interrogating Elizabeth Ma-
hanke in regard to the circumstances under
which the deeds were executed by John Ma-
hanke to her, the consideration paid by her,
etc.; and that a return should be made to the
court for its determination as to whether this
test.iinon_v would be competent under the is-
sue, and whether the witness would be ex-
cused, nnder section 3647 of the Code, from
A return was
made by the notary of the deposition, objec-
tions, and agreement. The district court.
overruled the objection made by the witness,
and ordered that she “answer questions pro-
pounded to her relative to the said issues
joined in said cause.” This proceeding is
designed to test the validity of that ruling
and order.
The attorneys for petitioner have made no
argument, but content themselves with sug-
gesting a few points for the consideration of
this court. The questions raised by the sug-
gestions of counsel require an examination
of the following sections of the Code: “Sec.
3647. But when the matter sought to be
elicited would tend to render him criminally
liable, or to expose him to public ignominy,
he is not compelled to answer, except as pro-
vided in the next section. Sec. 3648. A wit-
ness may be interrogated as to his previous
conviction for a felony, but no other proof of
such conviction is competent. except t-he
record thereof.” “Sec. 4074. Any person who
knowingly, being a party to any conveyance
or assignment of any estate or interest. in
lands, * * * or being a party to any
charge on such estate, * * * made or
created with intent to defraud prior or sub-
sequent purchasers, or to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors or other persons, and every
person ‘who, being privy to or knowing of
such fraudulent conveyance, assignment, or
charge, puts the same in use as having been
made in good faith, shall be fined not ex-
ceeding one thousand dollars, and impris-
oned in the county jail not exceeding one
year.” '
1. It is the duty of the court to determine
whether a witness should answer a question
propounded, but, if reasonable grounds for
believing that the answer would tend to ren-
der him criminally liable exist. it should not
be required. But the witness cannot; claim
his privilege on this ground where prosecu-
tion for the offense of which he is guilty is
barred by the statute. 1 Greenl. Ev. 451;
2 Phil. Ev. 933. 934; 1 Whart. Ev. 536,
538; 2 Tayl. Ev. § 1457; Calhoun v. Thomp-
son, 56 Ala. 166.
In this case, the witness is a party defend-
ant called to testify for the plaintiff. She
had filed her answer, in which she had de-
nied all allegations of fraud. and the law pre-
sumes, in the absence of proof, that there
was no fraud in the transactions. The wit-
ness objected to answering, on the ground of
her privilege, but it does not appear that she
understands what answers would tend to ren-
der her criminally liable. The date of the
409
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PRIVJLEGED COMMUNICATIONS. (Case No. 142 
MAHA."lffi:E T. CLELAND, Judge, et al. 
(41 N. W. 53, 76 Iowa, 401.) 
Supreme Court of Iowa. Dec. 22, 1888. 
Certtorarl proceeding by Elizabeth Ma-
banke against John B. Cleland, judge of the 
district court, Twelfth judicial district of 
Iowa, and John Barlow, clerk of the district 
court in and for Butler county, Iowa, and 
said district court of said county, to test the 
validity of an order requiring the plaintiff to 
answer questions in regard t.o a certain issue 
invoh·ed m 11n nction thPn pending, to which 
she was a pa1·ty def1>ndant. 
Hemenway cf lJrundy, for petitioner. 
to the issue, by interrogating Elizabeth Ma-
hanke in regard to the circumstances nnder 
which the deeds were executed by John .Ma-
hanke to her, the consideration paid by her, 
etc.; and tl111t a return should be made to the 
court for il:.!4 determination as to whether this 
testimony would be competent under the is-
sue, and whether the witn1>ss would be ex-
cused, under section 3647 of the Code, from 
answering such questions. A return was 
made by the notary of the deposition, objec-
tions, and agreement. The district court 
overl'llled the objection made by the witness, 
and ordered that she "answer questions pro-
pounded to her relative to the said issues 
joined in said cause." This proceeding Is 
designed to test the validity of that ruling 
ROBINSON, J. John Smnllpap:e com- and order. 
menced an action in the district l'ourt The attorneys for petitioner have made no 
of Butler county, in which the petitioner argument, but eontent themselves wltll sug-
iu this proceeding ancl one John Mahanke p:l'Sting a few points for the c11nsideration of 
were made parties defendant. The peti- this court. The questions raised by the sug-
tion in that action alll'ges that Sm11ll- gestions of counsel require an examination 
page is the owner of a jutlgment rendered I of the following st'4:tions of the C-Olle: "~ec. 
by said district court against said John 3ti47. But when the mattei: sought to be 
Mahanke, on which an execution h11s been elicited would tend to rendt>r him criminally 
issued and returned unsatisfied, and on liable, or to expose him to public ignominy, 
which there is due about the sum of 88.10; he is not compelled to answer, except as pro-
that betore said judgment was rendered said vided in the next section. Sec. 3648. A wit-
'1ohn .Mahanke, being the owner of cl'rtain ness may be interrogated as to his previous 
lands in Butler and Grundy counties, "did conviction for a felony, but no other proof of 
make a pretended sale and conveyance, by such conviction is competent, except the 
deeds of the same," to the plaintiff in this record thereof." "Sec. 4074. Any person who 
action, .,. with intent to hinder, delay, and de- knowingly, being a party to any conveyance 
fraud the plaintitr in the coUection of hiB or assignment or any estate or lnte1·est in 
said judgment;" that the plRintiff In this ac- lands, • • • or being a party to any 
tion "took said deeds of conveyance with the charge on such estate, • • • made or 
like intent, and without paying therefor an~ created with intent to defraud prior or sub-
consideration." The petition prays that tb41 sequent purchasers, or to hinder, delay, or 
conveyances be set aside, and that the land defraud creditors or other persous, and every 
therein described be subjected to the pay- person ·who, being privy to or knowing of 
ment of said jndgment. Th~ pl11intitr in this such fraudulent conveyance, assignment, or 
action, by her answer, admitted the allega· charge, puta the &1&me in use as having been 
tions in regard to the judgment, and that the matle in guod faith, shall be fined not ex-
conveyances specified had been made to her, ceeding one thousand doUars, and impris-
but denied that they were made without con- oned in the county jail not exceeding one 
sideration, and dt>nled all allegations of fraud. year." · 
While the action aforesaid was pending, the I. It is thfl duty of the court to determine 
plaintiff in this action was called before a no- whether a witness should answer a qul'Stion 
tary pubJic, and sworn, for the purpose of propounded, but, if reasonable grounds for 
taking her deposition to sustain the issues believing that the answer woultl tend to ren-
on behalf of the plaintiff Sm1dlp11ge, and was der him criminally liable exist, it should not 
asked the following question: "When did be req1~ired. But the witness cannot claim 
you first know that John Mahanke had made his privilege on this ground where pros .. cu-
and executed to you deeds of his interest to tion for the offense of which he is guilty is 
the land left by Henry Mahanke, bein~ the barred by the statute. 1 Green}. Ev.§ 451; 
real est.ate described in the petition?" '!'here- 2 Phil. Ev. 933, 984; 1 Whart. Ev.§§ 536, 
upon the witnt'Bs objected to answering such 538; 2 Tayl. Ev.§ 1457; Calhoun v. Thomp-
que.'ltion, on the ground "that the witnt>ss is son, 56 Ala. 166. 
a defendant in the case; that the only issue In thi~ case, the witness Is a party defend-
tn the case is the good faith of the com•ey. ant called to testify for the plaintiff. She 
ance rollde by John Mahanke to the witness, had ftled her answer, in which she had de-
set. out in the petition.: and the matter sought nied all allegations of fraud, and the law pre-
to be elicited would render the witness liable sume!l, in the absence of pl"Oof, that there 
to criminal p1·osecution ;" and "objected to was no fraud in the transactions. The wit-
any further examination concerning issues ness objected to answering, on the ground of 
in the case upon like grounds." The parties her privilege, but it does not 11ppear that she 
agreed in writing that phtintilT was &t>eking understands what answers would tend to ren-
to prove the affirmative allegations relating der ber criminally liable. The date of the 
409 
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execution and delivery of the deeds is not
shown. It may be that prosecution for the
crime, if any, involved in their execution
and acceptance, is barred by the statulae of
limitations. Again, their execution and de-
livery may have involved a constructive
fraud, suflicient to render them invalid as
against creditors, but not of such a character
as to render the grantee criminally liable.
There is nothing in the record, as submitted
to us, which overcomes thepresumption that,
so far as the wit-ness is concerned, the trans-
action in question involved no criminal lia-
bility on her part. She should not be per-
mitted to defeat the ends of justice by claim-
ing a privilege to which there is no reasonable
grounds for believing her entitled.
2. In case the witness has been guilty of a
crime within the meaning of section 4074 of
the Code, prosecution for which is now barred
by the statute, would she be privileged from
testifying as to her share in the transactions
in controversy, on the ground that her an-
swers would tend to expose her to public ig-
nominy? “Ignominy” is defined to be “pub-
lic disgrace, infamy. reproach, dishonor.”
Bouv. As used in our statute, it seems to
have a wider meaning than the word “infa-
my, ” as formerly used lo test the competency
of witnesses; but, in our opinion, it was not
intended to apply to all acts which mightjus-
tify public censure or disapproval, but those
of a more serious nature, which would tend
410
to expose the perpetrator to public hatred or
detest-ation or dishonor. For example, a
woman cannot be compelled to testify to sex-
ual intercourse with ditferent men. Brown
v. Kingsley, 38 Iowa, 221; Lolnnan v. Peo-
ple, 1 N. Y. 385. Treason, felony, and of-
fenses founded in fraud, were considered in-
famous at common law, and persons guilty
of any of them were incompetent to testify.
1 Greenl. Ev. § 373. Under our statute, no
rule applicable to all cases is possible. but the
privilege of the witness must depend largely
upon the facts of the transaction which are
sought to be shown. It is possible that the
circumstances involved in the giving and
taking ot‘ the deeds in controversy were of
such a. character as to entitle the witness to
the privilege which she claims, but there is
nothing in the record to indicate that such is
the case. The order of the court of which
the witness complains must be understood as
requiring her to answer the particular ques-
tion set out in the record, and such other
questions as may be proper. We cannot, say
that the question shown was improper, nor
that the witness should not be further inter-
rogated as to the issues involved in the case.
The witness will be entitled to show reason-
able grounds for believing that her answer
to the question in controversy would tend to
render her criminally liable, or expose her to
public ignominy. With this modification the
order of the district court is atfirmed.G
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execution and dellvery of the deeds is not 
11hown. It may be that prosecution for the 
crime, if any, involved in their execution 
und acceptance, is barred by the statute of 
limitations. Again, their execution and de-
livery may have involved a constructive 
fraud, sufficient to render them invalid as 
against cre<litors, but not of such a character 
as to render the grantee criminally liable. 
'£here is nothing in the record, as submitted 
to us, which overcomes the presumption that, 
eo far as the witness is concerned, the traM-
action in question involved no criminal lia-
bility on her part. She should not be per-
mitte<I to defeat the ends of justice by chtim-
ing a pri vilt>ge to which there is no reasonable 
grounds for believiug her entitled. 
2. In case the witness has been guilty of a 
crime within the meaning of section 4074 of 
the Code, prosecution for which is now barred 
by the statute, would she be prh·ilegt>d from 
testifying as to her share in the transactions 
in controversy, on the ground that her an-
swers would tend to expose her to public ig-
nominy? "Ignominy" is defined to be "pub-
lic disgrace, infamy, reproach, dishonor." 
Houv. As used in our statute, it seems to 
have a wider meaning than the word "infa-
my," as formerly used lo test the competency 
of witnesses; but, in our opinion, it was not 
intended to apply to all acts which might jus-
tify public censure or disapproval, but those 
of a more serious nature, which would tend 
410 
to expose the perpetrator to pubUc hatred or 
dete!ltation or c.liithonor. For example, a 
woman cannot be compelled to testify to sex-
ual intercourse with ditferE>nt men. Brown 
v. Kingsley, 38 Iowa, 221: Lohman v. Peo-
ple, 1 N. Y. 385. TrPason, feluny, and of-
fenses founded in frawl, were considered in-
famous at common law, and persons guilty 
of any of them were incompetent to testify. 
1 Green!. Ev.§ 373. Under our statute, D() 
rule applicable to all cases is po!lsiule. but the 
privilege of the witness must depend largely 
upon the facts of the transaction which are 
sought to be shown. It is possible that the 
circumstances involved in the giving and 
taking of the dePds in controversy were of 
such a character as to entitle the witness to 
the privilege which she claims, but there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that such is 
the c11se. The order of the court or which 
the witness complains must be understood as 
requiring her to answer the pa1'licular ques-
tion set out in the record, and such other 
questions as may be proper. We cannot say 
that the question shown was improper, nor 
that the witness shuuld not be further inter-
rogated as to the issues involved in the C&l!fl. 
The witness will be entitled to show reason-
able grounds for believing that he1· answer 
to the question in controversy would tend to 
render her criminally liable, or expose her to 
public ill'nominy. With this modification the 
order of the district court is affirmed. 
PR IVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
[Case No. 143
COUNSELMAN v. HITCHCOCK, Marshal.
(12 Sup. Ct. 195. 142 U. S. 547.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 11,
1892.
Appeal from the circuit court of the
United States for the northern district of
Illinois.
Petition by Charles Counselman for a
writ oi habeas corpus to release him
from the custody of United States Mar-
shal Frank Hitchcock, by whom he was
held under an order made in certain con-
tempt proceedings. The circuit court dis-
missed the petition, and remanded the
prisoner. Petitioner appeals. Reversed.
John N. Jewett and Jas. (.. Carter, for
appellant. Atty. Gen. Miller and G. M.
Lamhertson, for appeliee.
Mr.Justice BLATCHFORI) delivered the
opinion oi the court.
On the 21st of November, 1890, while the
grand jury in attendance upon thedistrict
court of the United States forthenorthcrn
district of Illinois was engaged in inves-
tigating and inquiring into certain alleged
violations, in that district, of an act oi
congress entitled “Au act- to regulate
commerce,” approved February 4, i887. c.
104, (2-iSt.379,) and the amendments there-
to, approved March 2. i889, c. 382, (25 St.
855,) by the offlcers and agents of the Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway
Company. and by the officers and agents
of the Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City
Railway Company. and by the officers
and agents of the Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Company, and the offi-
cers and agents of various other railroad
companies having lines of road in that
district, one Charles Counselman appeared
beiore the grand jury,in response to a
subpcena. served upon him. and, after hav-
ing been duly sworn, testified as follows:
“Question. Your name is Charles Coun-
selman? Answer. Yes, sir. Q. You are
the sole member of Charles Counselman
&Co.'I A. Yes, sir. Q. Engaged in the.
grain and commission business in the city
oi Chicago‘! A. Yes, sir. Q. Have you
been a receiver of grain from the west dur-
ing the past two years? A. Yes, sir. Q.
Over what roads did you ship grain re-
ceived by you during the present summer
of1890‘! A. The Rock Island & Burling-
ton, principaliy. Q. From what states
was most oi the grain shipped? A. From
Kansas and Nebraska. I think. Q. What
did your receipts in bushels amount to
of corn in the months oi May, June, and
July, 1890? A. I haveno idea; Icouid not
tell you. Q. Five hundred thousand
bushels a month? A. I cannot tellyou.
Q. How many men have you employed
during the last year? What is the usual
number of men employed in connection
with your business? A. I have, I think.
six or seven men in my oiiice. Q. Have
you during the past year, i\ir.Counselman.
obtained a rate for the transportation of
your grain on any oi the railroads com-
ing to Chicago, from points outside oi this
state, less than the taritf or open rate?
A. That I decline to answer, Mr. Mil-
christ, on the ground thatit might tend to
crlminate me. Q. During the past year
have you received rates upon the Chica-
go. Rock Island & Pacific from points out-
side oi the state to the city of Chicago,
at less than the tariff rates? A. Thatl
decline to answer on the same ground.
Q. I will ask you the same question with
reference to the Burlington. A. I answer
in the same way. Q. 'l‘he same with ref-
erence to Atchlson. A. I can‘t recollect
_ that we have done any business with that
road. Q. I will ask you whether you
have during the last year received a rate
less than the tariff rate on what is called
the ‘Diagonal’ or Stickney road. A. Not
to my knowledge. Q. Who attends to the
freightdepartment of your business‘? A.
Myself and Mr. Martin. Q. Have you or
the firm oi Charles Counselman 8: Co. re-
ceived any rebate, drawback, or commis-
sion from the Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railroad Company, or the Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company,
on the transportation of grain from
points in the states oi Nebraska and Kan-
sas. to the city of Chicago. in the state
of Illinois, during the past year, where-
by you secured the transportation of said
grain atless than the tariff rates estab-
lished by said railroad‘? A. I decline to
answer on the same ground."
The grand jurors thereupon filed in said
court. on the 22d of November, 1890, their
report, signed by their foreman and clerk.
certifying to the court the several ques-
tions which Counselman so refused to an-
swer. Thereupon thejuflge of the court
granted a rule on Counselman to show
cause why he should not answer the said
questions, a hearing was had, and the
court made an order, on the 25th of No-
vember, 1:490, which found that theexcuses
and reasons advanced on behalf of Coun-
seiman, as to why he should not answer
said questions, were wholly insufficient,
and directed that he appear beiore the
grand jury without delay, and there answer
the said questions, and also such further
questions touching the matter under in-
quiry by the grand jury,and whichshouid
be pertinent to such inquiry, as should
be propounded to him by any member of
the grand jury, or the district attorney,
or any of his assistants.
Counselman was again called before the
grand jury, and the same questions. to-
gether with other kindred questions, were
submitted to him to answer; and he re-
fused to answer them, and each of them,
for the same reasons. The grand jury, by
its report signed by its foreman and clerk,
reported to the court that Counselmau
still refused to answer the questions
which he had previously refused to an-
swer, and upon the same grounds, and
that there were also propounded to him
by the district attorney and the grand
jury additional questions, which, and the
answers thereto, were as follows:
“Question. Do you know whether or
not the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railroad Company transported for any
person, company, or corporation in the
city of Chicago, during the year last past,
grain from any point in the states of Ne-
braska. Kansas, or Iowa. to the city of
Chicago, in the state of Illinois, for less
411
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PHlVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [Case No. 148 
COUNSELMAN v. HITCHCOCK, :Mnrshnl. 
(12 Sup. Ct. 195. 142 U. S. 547.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 11, 
1892. 
Appeal from the circuit court of the 
United States for the northern district of 
Illinois. 
Petition hy CharleR Counselman for a 
writ of habetts corf>UH to release him 
from the custody nf United States Mar-
11hal Frank Hitchcock, b,v whom he was 
held under an urder made In certain con-
tempt proceedings. The circuit court dls-
mli1sed tht> petition, aud n~manded the 
prisoner. Petitioner appeals. Ht>verst'd. 
John N .• Tew,.tt and Ja.o,:. C <:u1ter, for 
appellant. A tty. Gen. Miller and G • • V. 
Lamt1ertllon, for appellee. 
Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the 
opinion or the court. 
On the 21et of November, lROO, while the 
grand Jury In attendance u1>on the<llstrlct 
court of the {Tnlted Sta.tea forthenortht"ro 
district or Illinois waR en.cai.ted In In ves-
tlgatlng and lnqulrin!l' lntot'ertaln allt-ged 
violations, in that dl!trlct, of an act of 
coni;i;rese entitled "An act · to regulate 
commerce," approved February 4, 1~7. c. 
104, (24St.37D,} and the amendments there-
to, upproved March 2. 18X9, <!. 3M2, 0!5 St. 
855,) by the officers and agents of the Chi-
cago, Rock Island a: Pacific Hallwa.r 
Com1>any. and by the otflcel'H and agentK 
of the t:hlcago, ~t. Paul & Kansas City 
Railway Company, and by the offtceni 
and agents of the Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy Uallroad Com1>any, Rnd the offi-
cers anll agents of various other rtlllroad 
companiea having lines of road in that 
district, one Charles Counselman uppeared 
oorore the grtlnd JUl'Y, tn response to It 
subprena served upon him. and, after hav-
ing been duly 11 worn, testified as follows: 
"Q11eRtlon. Your name Is Charles Coun-
selman? Answer. Yes. sir. Q. You are 
thP. .. ole member of Charles Counselman 
& Co.? A. Yes, 11ir. Q. Engaged In the 
grain and commission business lo the l'lty 
of Ct>lcago'! A. Yes, sir. Q. Have you 
been a receiver of grain from the west dur-
ing the past two years? A. Yes, sir. Q. 
Over whut road11 dlil you ship grain re-
ceive<) by you during the present Hummer 
of 1800'! A. The Rock l1dund & Burling-
ton, principally. Q. From what stateR 
was mol!t of the grain Khlpped? A. From 
Kansas and Nebraska. I think. Q. What 
did your receipts In bushels amount to 
of corn 111 the won th11 of !\Jay, June, and 
July, 1890? A. I haveno hlea: lcouh1not 
tell you. Q. Five hundred thousand 
bu11hels a month? A. I r.annot tell you. 
Q. How many men have you employed 
during the last year? Whnt IH the usual 
number of men employed In connection 
with your business'? A. 1 have, I think. 
six 01· seven men In my offll'e. Q . Have 
you during the 1>m1tyeur, Mr. l'oum1elman, 
obtained a rate for the trunsportation of 
yom· grnln on an,\• of the railrmuls com-
ing tu Chlcair;o, from points ou tslde of this 
statt>, leRs than the tariff or open rate'? 
A. 'fbat I decline to answer, Mr. Mll-
cbrlst, on the ground thatltmlght tend to 
erlmlnate me. Q. Outing the past year 
have you recolved rateA upon the Chica-
go. Rock Island & PttclHc from points out· 
side of the state to the l'lty of Chlca~u, 
at less than the tarlH rntes? A. That I 
decline to answer on the 11ame ground. 
Q. I will aek you the Ra me question with 
referent'e to the Burlington. A. I a1111wer 
In the same way. Q. The same with ref-
erence to Atchl11on. A. I can't recollect 
. that we have done any huslneAe with that 
road. Q. I will ask you whether you 
have during the Jost year recel\"ed a rate 
Iese than Ute tariff rate on what Is cHfted 
the' Diagonal' or Stickney road. A. Not 
to my knowledge. Q. Who attends to the 
freight department of your hm1lnPHR? A. 
Myself and Mr. Martin. Q. HavA you or 
the firm of Cbarlee Coun11ehnun & Co. re-
ceived any rebate, drawback, or commis-
sion from the Chlca~o. Rock lRlund & 
Ptlt'lftc RH II road Cumpan.v, or the Chit' ago, 
Rurllngton & Quincy Railroad Company, 
on the transpol'tntlon of grain from 
polnt11 In the states of Nebraska Rud Kan-
sas, to the city of ChlCUKO. In the state 
of IlllnoiH, daring the past year, where-
by you secured the transportation of said 
Krain ut less than the tariff rateR e11tah-
llshed by eald rallrond? A. I dt>cllne to 
answer on the same ground. " 
'l'he grand Jurors thereupon flied in ealrl 
court, on the 22d of No,·emher, 1~90. their 
report, signed by their foreman aud clerk, 
certifying to the court the several q11ee-
tluns which Counse1mun eo refused to an· 
ewer. Thereupon the judge of the court 
granted a rule on (.'ouuselman to 11huw 
cause why he 1<hould not anHwer the ;mid 
questions, a hctlrlng wal! hurl, und the 
court made nn order, ou tl.tt> 25th of :So· 
\"ember, 1H90, which found that thP.excuRes 
and rt>a11ons advanced on behalf of Conn-
selman, us to why he should not anMwer 
said questions, were wholly insuffil'lent, 
and directed that he appeur ht>fore the 
grand Jury without delay, and there answer 
the s1tld questions, and also such further 
qnestlons tout'hlog the uwttcr unrle1· in-
quiry by the grand Ju1·y, and which should 
be pertinent to such inquiry, as should 
be propounded to him by any mP.mber of 
the g;rnnd Jury, or the district attorney. 
or any of his aesh1tants. 
Counselman was again coiled beforll the 
grand Jury, and the same QUP.Htlons. to-
gether with other kindred questions, were 
submitted to him to answer; and he re-
fused to answer them, and each of thP.m, 
for the same reReons. The grand Jury, by 
Its report signed by its foreman und clerk, 
reported to t .he court thllt CounHl'lman 
still refused to answer thfl que11tlune 
which he had prcvlouel,v refused to an-
swer, and upon the same grouncls, and 
that there were also propounded to him 
by the dlHtrlct attorney and the grand 
Jury oddltlonul questions, whkh, and the 
answerR thereto, were us follows: 
"Question. llo you know whether or 
not the Chlc1tgo, Rock Island & Pacific 
Railroad Company tt·am~portecl for any 
person, company, or corporation In the 
city of Chlcai:o. during the year laRt pest, 
Jtraln from any "olnt In the states of Ne-
braska, Kani.as, or Iowtt, to the city of 
Chicago, in the state of Illlnoht, for less 
11:11 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
than the established rates in force on such
ro-"'i at the time of such transportation?
Answer. I decline to answer, on the
ground that my answer might tend to
crimiuate me. Q. Do you know any per-
son, corporation. or company who has
obtained their transportation of grain
from points or places in the states of
Iowa, Nebraska. or Kansas, to the city of
(‘hicago. over the Chicago. Rock island &
Pacific Railroad, during the past year. at
a rate and price less than the published
and legal tariff rate at the time of such
shipment? A. I decline to answer, for the
reason that my answer might tend to
criminate me. Q. Do you know whether
the Uhicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-
road Company, within the past year. has
charged, demanded, or received from any
person. company, or corporation in the
city of Chicago any less rate than the
open rate, or rate established by said rail-
road company. on grain or other proper-
ty transported by the said railroad com-
pany from points in the states of Nebras-
ka. Kansas. and Iowa to the city of
Chicago. in the state of Illinois? ifyou
have such knowledge, give the name of
such shipper of whom said rate was
charged, demanded. or received, and the
amount oi such rate and shipments, stat-
ing fully all the particulars within your
knowledge. A. I decline to answer, for
the reason that my answer might tend to
criminate me. Q. Do you know whether
the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-
road Com pany. during the year A. D. 1890,
has paid to any shipper. at the city of
Chicago. any rebate, refund, or con1|nis-
siou on property and grain transported
by such company from points in the
states oi Kansas, Nebraska, or Iowa,
whereby such shipper obtained the trans-
porta tion of such grain or property from
the said points in said states to the city
of Chicago, in the state of Illinois, at a
less rate than the open or tariff rate, or
the rate established by said company? ll‘
you have such knowledge, state the
amount of such rebates, the drawbacks,
or commissions paid. to whom paid, the
date of the same, and on what shipments,
and state fully all the particulars within
your knowledge relating to such transac-
tion or transactions. A. I decline to an-
swer, for the reason that my answer
might tend to criminate me. ”
Thereupon. after a hearing. the court on
November 2-3. 1890. adjudged Counselman
to he in contempt of court. and made an
order fining him $500 and the costs of the
proceeding, and directing the marshal to
take him into custody and hold him until
he should have answered said questions,
and all questions of similar import which
should he propounded to him by the
grand jury, or the district attorney, or
any assistant district attorney. in the
presence of such jury, and until he should
pay such fine and costs. i_Tmler that or-
der he was taken into custody by the
ma rshnl and held.
On the 26th of November. I890. he filed
in the circuit court of the United States
for the northern district of Illinois a peti-
tion setting forth the foregoing facts, and
praying l'or a writ of hahens corpus. The
petition alleged that the grand jury had
no jurisdiction or authority to make the
investigation in question. or to submit to
him the several questions referred to;
that his answers to those questions would
tend to incriminate him, and, by compel-
ling him to answer them, he would be
compelled to be a witness against himself
in the criminal p|'oceeding and investiga-
tion pending before the grandjury.and
in any criminal proceedings which might
be brought as a result of such investiga-
tion, contrary to the provisions of the
constitution of the United States. and
especially the fourth and fifth amend-
ments thereof; that the district court had
no jurisdiction to compel him to answer
said questions; that its order to that
effect was contrary to the constitution
and laws of the United States, and was
void; that the district court had no juris-
diction so to adjudge him in contempt;
that the order imposing a. fine upon him
and committing him to the custody of the
marshal was void: and that he was held
in custody without legal right. and con-
trary to the constitution and laws of the
United States.
On the same day. the circuit court is-
sued a writ of Imheas corpus. returnable
forthwith, the return to which by the
marshal was that Counselman was held
under the order of the district court. made
November 25,1890. The case was heard
on November 28th. and on December 18th
the circuit court, held by Judge GRESIIAM.
delivered an opinion. (44 Fed. Rep. 268.)
and made an order adjudging that the
district court was in the exercise of its
rightful authority in doing what it had
done. overruling the motion of Counsel-
man for his discharge, dismissing his peti-
tion. remanding him to the custody of
the marshal, discharging the writ of ha-
beas corpus, and adjudging against Coun-
selman the costs of the proceedings. He
excepted to the order and appealed to
this court, and an order was made admit-
ting him to bail pending the appeal.
in the opinion of the circuit court. it
was held that. under the fifth amendment
to the constitution, which declares that
“no person * * ‘* shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself," a person cannot be compelled to
disclose facts before a court or grand jury
which might subject him to a. criminal
prosecution, or his property to forfeiture;
that, under the interstate commerce law,
it is made a criminal offense, punishable
by fine and imprisonment. for any officer
or agent of a railroad company to grant
any shippers of merchandise from one
state to another, and for any such shipper
to contract for or receive. a rate less than
the tariff or open rate; that shippers. as
well as the oiiicers, agents, and employes
of corporations engaged in the carrying
business between states, are made subject
to the penalties of the statute; but that.
as the protection of section S60 of the Re-
viscd Statutes was co-extensive with that
of the constitution. Counseiman was enti-
tled to no privilc:.»;e under the constitu-
tion; that, ii‘ thereafter he were to be
prosecuted for the offense. section S60
would not permit his admissions to be
proved against him; that his refusal to
testify was not a refusal to testify in a
Vii’)
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Case No. 143] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
than the established rateR In force on eoeh 
ror •I at the time of such tr1meportntlon? 
Answer. I decllue to auswer, on the 
ground that my answer mlarht tend to 
erlmlnate me. Q. Do you know any per-
t1oo, corpora tlon, or company who ht1e 
obtained their transportation of grain 
from poiuts or places In the states of 
Iowa, !Sebrllska, or Kansas, to the city of 
{'bit ago, over the Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pa.:lfic Railroad, during the past year, ttt 
a rate and 11rlce les11 tlrno the publhihed 
and IPgHI tariff rate at the time of such 
shltimeiit? A. I decline to answer, for tho 
rea11on that my Rnswei· might tend to 
crlmlnate me. Q. Do you know whethl'r 
the Chicugo, Rock l1dand & Pacific Rail-
road Company, within the pal!lt yP.ar, bas 
eharge1l, demanded, or received from any 
person. compuoy, or r.orporatlon lo the 
dty or l'hicago any let111 rate than the 
011en rate, or rate e11ta hllllhed O)· said rail- ' 
road company, on 11:raln or other proper-
ty transported by the sairl rallrund com-
pany from points In the stntl'~ of NPbras-
ka. KOJmms. and Iowa to the city of 
<.'blcago, In the state of llllnole? 1f you 
ha t"e lluc!J knowledge, give the name of 
1rnch shlJ1pl'r of whom said rate was 
<:barged, demanded, or recelvP.d, aucl the 
amonot of such rate and shipments, stat-
ing fully all the particulars within your 
knowledge. A. I d('('Jlne to anHwer, for 
the reason that my answe1· might tend to 
erlmlnate me. Q. Do you know whether 
the Chlcag;o, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-
road Company, during the y11ar A. D. 1800, 
has paid to any shipper. at the city of 
('blcago. any rebate, refund, or commh1-
sloo on property and grain tram1ported 
by such company from polntM lo the 
8tates or K1tnea111, Nebraska, or Iowa, 
whereby such shipper obtained the trnnR-
portatloo of snch gruln or propPrty rrom 
the said polot11 In said statPH to the city 
of Chicago, lu the state of Illinois, at a 
le11s rate than the open or tarltt rate, or 
the rate established by sal<t company? If 
you have such knowledge, state th~ 
1tmount or llUCh rebntes, the druwbacks, 
nr rommls111lone paid, to whom pald, tbtl 
date of the same, Bnd on what shipments, 
and state fully all the particulars within 
sour knowledge relating to such transac-
tion or traneactloue. A. I decline to an-
swer, for the rea11100 thftt my answer 
mlJtht tend to crlmlnu.te me." 
Thereupon, 11ftPr a hparlnJ,t, the court on 
Novt>mher 25. 1~0. Rdjudged Counselmun 
to lie In contem11t of court, and made an 
order fining lllm $500 and the costs or the 
prucePCliog, and 1llrectlng Ute mai·slutl to 
tllkl' him into custody end bold him 1111t11 
he should have answered snl'.l queMtlone, 
and all que1ttlons of similar Import which 
sbonld be pr<•poun1led to him by the 
gran1l j11ry, or the district attorney, or 
any RlfSiHtnnt dhitrlct attorney, In the 
preiwnce of such jnry, and until be should 
pay Kuch ftne and cu111ts. l;ncler that or-
der he was tRkeu Into cm1tody by the 
lllll l'Klrnl and held. 
On the 26th of November, 1800, he flied 
fn the circuit court of the United State11 
for thl' northern diHtrlct of llllnol11 a petl · 
tlon setting forth the for<•golng facts, und 
11ra~·ing for a writ of ha/Je11s cor111111. 'l'he 
11ctlUou allt>getl that the grund Jury bad 
·11:.? 
no Jurisdiction or authority to make the 
Investigation fn question. or to submit to 
him the several questlon11 referred to: 
that hie answers to tboeequestlona would 
tend to Incriminate him, and, by compel-
ling him to auewer them, he would be 
compelletl to be a witness agalot.'t himself 
In the crhnlual proceeding and Investiga-
tion pending before the grand Jory, and 
In any criminal proceedings which might 
be brought as a re1mlt of auch Investiga-
tion, contrary to the provisions of tbe 
constitution of the United StatP.B, and 
especially the fourth and fifth amend-
ments thereof; that the dh1trlct court h11d 
no jurt11dlctlon to compel him to answer 
s11ld question&; thnt ltH order to that 
effect was contrary to the constitution 
and laws or the Ur.lted States, and was 
void; that the district court had no Juris-
diction so to adjudge him lo contempt; 
the t the ordn Imposing a ftne upon him 
and committing him to the cuKtody of the 
marshal was void: and that be was held 
lo custody without legftl right, and l'on-
trary to the constitution and laws of the 
l'nlted States. 
On the same <lay, the circuit court ts-
Rued R writ of hHhf'aR corp11s, retnroable 
forthwith, the return to which by the 
marshal weB that Coun11elman was held 
nnder the order of the dlotrkt court. made 
November 25, 1!l90. The case waa beard 
on No'\'ember !?!Ith, and on December 18th 
the circuit court, heJtl by Judge 0REflllAll, 
delivered an opinion, (44 Fed. Rep. 268.) 
anti made uo order adjudging that the 
district court was lo the exercise of Its 
rightful authority in doing what It had 
done, overruling the motion of Couusel-
mao for his dl11charge, dlamlBHlng bis peti-
tion, remanding him to the custody of 
the marshal, discharging the writ of b• 
beas corp11s, anti adjudging against Coun-
sel man the cost"' or the proceedings. He 
exceptE'd to the order and appealed to 
this court, and an ordl"r was made admit-
ting him to ball p~udlog the appeal. 
Iu the opinion or the circuit court, It 
was bt'ltl that. under the fifth ame11dmeot 
to the constitution, which declares that 
.. no pl•rson • • • shall be compelled In 
Roy criminal co11e to be a witness og11lnet 
himself," 11 persou cagnot be compelled to 
dlecloHe faces before a court or grand Jory 
which might snhject him to a criminal 
proMecntlon, or hlM property to forfeiture; 
that, undP.r the Interstate commerce law, 
It Is rnulle u criminal offem1e, punishable 
by fine and Imprisonment, ff>r any omcer 
or agent or a ralltoad company to grant 
any shippers of mt'rchandlse from one 
state to another, and for anyanch shipper 
to eontrac~t for or reeelve, a rate lesR than 
the tariff or open ratt; that shippers, 88 
well a11 the olttcers, Rl!,"eute, and em)lloyee 
of corporations engage1l lo the carrying 
bu11lm•HH bt>t ween eta tee, are made subject 
to the penaltieK of the eta tutl'; bot that, 
aK the ,,rotl'ctloo of section !160 of the Re-
\•ls1•d 8tatuteH WllS ('o-extemdve with that 
or the conetit11tlon, Counsi,lman waF. Pntl-
tlt'd to no prlvllt•ge under the constitu-
tion; that, tr thereuftE'l' be were to be 
vroseruted for thP offense, Bt'rtlon f\60 
would not 11ermlt blM admi111do1111 to be 
proved against hlru; that bis )'('fu11ul to 
testify was not a refusal to testify lo a 
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the commission may apply to institute in
proceeding to obtain evidence upon which
he might be indicted, but in a proceeding
to obtain evidence upon which others
might be indicted; and that, although in
his testimony he might disclose facts and
circumstances which would open up
sources of information to the govern-
ment, whereby it might obtain evidence
not otherwise obtainable to secure his
conviction, yet, if his testimony could not
be repeated in any subsequent. proceeding
against him or his property, he was pro-
tected as fully by section 860 as the consti-
tution intended he should be.
Section 860 is ‘a re-enactment of section
1 of the act of February :15, 1868, c. 13. (15
St. 37,) which provided as follows: “That
no answer or other pleading of any par-
ty. and no discovery or evidence obtained
by means of any judicial proceeding from
any party or witness in this or any for-
eign country,shall be given in evidence.
or in any manner used against such par-
ty or witness, or his property or estate,
in any court of the United States, or in
any proceeding by or before any ofiicer
of the United States. in respect to any
crime, or for the enforcement of any pen-
alty or forfeiture, by reason of any act or
omission of such party or witness: pro-
vlded, that nothing in this act shall be
consnued to exempt any party or wit-
ness irom prosecution and punishment
for perjury committed by him in discover-
ing or testifying as aforesaid."
Section >460 provides as follows: “No
pleading of a party, nor any discovery or
evidence obtained from a. party or wit-
ness by means of a judicial proceeding in
this or any foreign country, shall be given
in evidence. or in any manner used against
him or his property or estate, in any
court of the United States,in any criminal
proceeding, or for the enforcement of any
penalty or forfeiture: provided, that this
section shall not exempt any partyor wit-
ness from prosecution and punishment
for perjury committed in discovering or
testifying as aforesaid."
iiy section 10 of the interstate commerce
act of February 4, 1887, c.104. (24 St. 382,)
as amended by section 2 of the act of
March 2, 1889, c. 382. (25 St. 857,) unlaw-
ful discrimination in rates. fares, or
charges, for the transportation of pas-
sengers or property, is made subject, not
only to a fine of not to exceed $5.000 for
each offense. but to imprisonment in the
penitentiary for not over two years, or to
both, in the discretion of the court. B
section 12 of the act of 1887, (24 St. 383,)
as amended by section 3 of the act oi 1889,
(25 St. 558,) the interstate commerce com-
mission is authorized and required to
execute and enforce the provisions of the
act, and, on the request of the commis-
sion, it is made the duty of any district
attorney of the United States to whom
the proper court, and to prosecute under
the direction of the attorney general of
the United States, all necessary proceed-
ings for the enforcement of the provisions
ofthe act and for the punishment of all vio-
lations thereof.
it is contended by the appellant that
the grand jury of the district court was
not in the exercise of its proper and legiti-
mate authority in prosecuting the investi-
gations spccifically set out in its two re-
ports to the district court: that "those re-
ports couid not be made the foundation
of any judicial action by the court; that
the interstate commerce commission was
specially invested by the statute with the
authority to investigate violations of the
act and charged with that duty; and
that no duty in that respect was imposed
upon the grand jury, until specific charges
had been made.
But. in the view we take of this case,
we do not find it necessary to intimate
any opinion as to that question in any of
its branches, or as to the question whether
the reports of the grand jury, in stating
that they were engaged in investigating
and inquiring into “certain alleged viola-
tions" of the acts of 1957 and 1889 by the
otlicers and agents of three specified rail-
way and railroad companies. and the
officers and agents of various other rail-
road companies having liues of road in
the district, (there being no other show-
ing in the record as to what they were in-
vestigating and inquiring into.) are or are
not consistent with the fact that. they
were investigating specific charges against
particular persons; hecauseweare oi opin-
ion that upon another ground the judg-
ment of the court below must be reversed.
It is broadly contended on the part of
the appellee that a witness is not entitled
to plead the privilege of silence, except in
a criminal case against himself; but such
is not the language of the constitution.
Its provision is that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to bea. wit-
ness against himself. This provision must
have a broad construction in favor of the
right which it was intended to secure.
The matter under investigation by the
grand jury in this case was a criminal
matter, to inquire whether there had been
a criminal violation of the interstate com-
merce act. if Counselman had been guilty
of the matters inquired of in the ques-
tions which he refused to answer, he him-
self was liable to criminal prosecution un-
der the act. The case before the grand
jury \vas therefore a criminal case. The
reason given by C-ounselman for his re-
fusal to answer the questions was that
his answers might tend to criminate him,
and showed that his apprehension was
that. if he answered the questions truly
and full)‘. (us he was bound to do if he
should answer them at all,) the answers
might show that he had committed a
crime against the interstate commerce
act, for which he might be prosecuted.
His answers, therefore, would be testi-.
mony against himself, and he would be
compelled to give them in a criminal case.
It is impossible that the meaning of the
constitutional provision can only be that
a person shall not be compelled to bee.
witness against himself in a criminal
prosecution against himself. It would
doubtless cover such cases: but it is not
limited to them. The object was to in-
sure thataperson should not be com-
pelled, when acting as a witness in any
investigation, to give testimony which
might tend to show that he himself had
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [CaRe No. 143 
proceeding to obtain evidence upou which 
hP ml~ht be Indicted, but In a proceeding 
to obtain evidence upon wbleh othel'B 
might be Indicted; aml that, although In 
his testimony he ml~bt disclose facts and 
clrcumstanct'fl whtr.h would 011eo up 
sourl'e& of Information to the i:overn-
ment, wherPhy it might obtain evhlenct! 
not otherwise obtainable to secure hlat 
conviction, yet, if his tet1tlmony could not 
be repPah•d In any subsequent proceeding 
against him or his property, he wa11 pro-
tected as fully by section SISO as the couRtl-
tutlon Intended be 11hould be. 
Section 860 Is ·a re-enactment of section 
1 of the act of February !!5, 1868, c. 13, I 16 
St. 37,) which provided as followR: "That 
no ao11wer or other pleading of any pur-
ty, and no dlsco\"'ery or evidence obtained 
by means of an.v judicial proceeding from 
Ruy party or wltoesR in this or any for-
eign cmrntry, shall be given In evldem·e. 
or In any manner need agalnl!t Huch par-
ty or witness, or his property or estate, 
In any court of the Unlterl States, or In 
RllY proceedlup; by or before uny officer I 
of the Tlntted States, In respec:t to any ' 
crime, or for the enforcement of any r1en-
alty or forfeiture, by reason of any act or 
omlseloo of such pllrty or wltnt>HS: pro-
fiued, tllat nothlu11: lo this act sllnll be 
co11&t1ued to exempt any party 01· wlt-
nes1J from proNeCutlo11 and punlHhment 
for perjnry committed hy him lo d!Mcover-
lng or testifying aR aforetutld." 
Hectlon "'60 provides aa follows: .. No 
pll•adlop: of a party, nor any discovery or 
evtdenc·e obtal~d from a party or wlt-
net1e by means of a Judicial procef'dlng In 
this or any forelf{D country, 1Jball be given 
In e\·idence. or lo any manner used 8Jtalm1t 
him or ll\e property or estate, In any 
court of thA United St&tt>R, In any criminal 
}lroceedlng, or for the enforcement of any 
penalty or forfeiture: provided, that this 
section shall not exempt any party or wit-
ness from prosecution and punishment 
for perjury committed lo discovering or 
tpstlfylng ae aforesaid." 
By section lU of the tntt>rBtate commerce 
act of February 4, 1"87, c. 104, (24 St. ~2,) 
as amenrled by section 2 of the act of 
March 2, ll-189, c. at\2. (25 St. 857,) unlaw-
ful dleel'lmlnatlon In rates, fares, or 
charges, for the tra11s1wrta tlon of pas-
eengen1 or property, h1 made subject, not 
only to a fine of not to e~ceed $fi,OOO for 
each offense, but to Imprisonment Ir. the 
penitentiary for not over two years, or to 
both, In the dllilcretlon of the conrt. By 
section 12 of the act of 18lol7, (24 St. 38:i,) 
&R amended by section 8 of the ar.t of 1!:'8U, 
(25 St. !:158,) the Interstate commerce cum-
mleslon le authorlzPd and· required to 
e:1:ecnte and enforce the provisions of the 
ar.t, and, on the req11est of the commh1· 
slon, It 111 marle the duty of any distrkt 
attorney of the United Stutes to whom 
·the commission may llPJ>ly to Institute in 
the prop!>r court, anll to prusel·ute under 
the direction of the att.orney generul of 
the United :States, all necessnry proreell-
tng11 for the enforcement of the provisions 
of the act and for the punlshnwnt of all vio-
la lions thereof. 
It Is <'On tended by the uppeJ:ant that 
the grand jury of the district court was 
not In the exercise of Its proper and lea;ltl-
ma te authority In prosecuting the inve11tl-
gntlone speclftcally t1et out 111 Its two re-
ports to the district court; that tho11e rt'· 
ports could not be made the foundation 
of any Judicial action by the court; that 
the Interstate commerce commlHslon waH 
specially l11veeted b.v the statute with the 
authority to Investigate violations of the 
act nnd chargPd with that duty; snd 
that no duty In that 1~pect wee Imposed 
upon the grand Jury, until Rpeclftc charges 
bad been mude. 
But, In the view we ta(le of this case, 
we do not tlnd it J>ecessary to Intimate 
any opinion as tu that 11ue11tlon In any of 
lte branches, or ae to the qul'Btlon whethPr 
the reports of the grand Jury, In statln~ 
thut they were enll'll ited In investigating 
and Inquiring Into "certain alleiz:ell viola-
tions" of the actll of 1~7 and 1889 by the 
officers and agents of three 11peclfted rall-
w11y and railroad companiett, and the 
oftlrers and agents of various other rail-
road companies ha vlng lines of road lo 
the district, (there bPh1g no other 11how-
lng lo the record as to what they were ln-
veetlgo ting and Inquiring to to,) are or are 
not COllHIHtPnt with thP fRct that they 
were Investigating speclflccharge1:1agdlr.st 
partlcular~rsons; hecaueeweare of opin-
ion that upon another ground the judg-
ment of the court below must be rever1:1'.!d. 
It II' broadly c1Jnte11decl on the part of 
the appellAe that a wltneR11 le not eotltlt>d 
to plead the privilege of silence, except In 
a criminal caae against blmeeJr; but sul'h 
le not the languttge of the conetltutloo. 
Its pro\•ltilon Is that no person shall be 
com1>elll'd lo any criminal case to bea. wlt-
DeHeagalm•t himself. Thie provision mm1t 
have a broad construction In fa\•or of the 
right which It wae Intended to secure. 
The matter under lnvesthotatlon hy the 
grao~ Jury In this ca11C was a <'l"l•nlmd 
matter, to Inquire whether there hail heeu 
a criminal vlolutlon of the lnterBtate com-
merctl act. If Coum1elman had been guilty 
of the matter& Inquired of In the ques-
tions which he refused to an<iwer, he him-
self was liable tu criminal prosecution un-
der the act. The case before the grand 
Jury wae therefore a criminal case. The 
reason given by Counselman for bis re-
fusal to answer the que1:1tlooe wee that 
his a11sweN1 might tend to crlmlnate him, 
and showed tbnt bis apprehension wns 
that, If he answered the questlonH truly 
anrl fully, (as be was bound to do If he 
should antlwer them at all,) the answers 
might show th11t he bad committed a 
crime ageln11t the Interstate commerca 
act, for which be might be prusecuted. 
Hts anewere, therefore, would be teHtl- . 
mony aKalnst himself, and he would be 
compelled to give them In a criminal l'a&e. 
It Is lmpos<tlble that the meaning of the 
constitutional proviHlon can onl.v be that 
a person shall not be compelled to be n 
witness a~alnst himself In a criminal 
pro11ec11tlon against himself. It wo111ll 
doubtle1Js cover such caseti: lmt It Is not 
limited to them. The ohject w11e to in. 
sure that a pe1·son ahoulrl not be coP.>-
pelled, when acting RS a wltneHs In uny 
Investigation, to 11;ive testimony whlrh 
might tend to show tbat he himself bad 
.u::t 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
committed a crime. The privilege is lim-
ited to criminal matters, but it is as
broad as the mischief against which it
seeks to guard.
It is argued for the appeliee that the in-
vestigation before the grand jury was
not n criminal case. but was solely for the
purpose of finding out whethera crime
had been committed. or whether any one
should be accused of an offense, there be-
ing no accuser and no parties plaintiff or
defendant, and that a case could arise
only when an indictment should be re-
turned. in support of this view reference
is made to article 6 of the amendments to
the constitution of the United States,
which provides that in all criminal prose-
cutions the accused shall enjoy the right:
to a speedy and public trial by an impar-
tial jury. to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him. to have compulsory
process for witnesses. and the assistance
of counsel for his defense.
But this provision distinctly means a
criminal prosecution against a person
who is accused and who is to be tried by
a petitiury. A criminal prosecution un-
der nrticle 6 of the amendments -is much
narrower than a “criminal cuse," under
article 5 of the amendments. it is entirely
consistent with thelanguage of article 5
that the privilege of not being a witness
against himself is to be exercised in a pro-
ceeding before a grand jury.
\\'e cannot yield our assent to the view
taken on this subject by the court of ap-
peals of New York in People v. Kelly, 2i
l\'. Y. 74, 84. The provision of the consti-
tution oi New York of 1846 (article 1, § 6)
was that no person shall "be compelled,
in any criminal case. to be a witness
against himself.” The court, speaking by
Judge DENIO, said: “The term ‘criminal
case.’ used in the clause. must be allowed
some meaning. and none can be conceived
other than u prosecution for a criminal
offense. But it must be a prosecution
against him; for whnt is forbidden is that
he should be compelled to be a witness
against himself.” This ruling, which has
been followed in someother cases, seems
to us. as applied to the provision in the
fifth amendment to theconstitution of the
United Slates, to take away entirely its
trne meaning and its value.
it is an ancient principle of the law
of evidence that a witness shall not be
compelled, in any proceeding, to make dis-
closures or to give testimony which will
tend to crimiunte him or subject him to
fines. penalties. or forfeitures. Itex v.
$laney.5 Car. & P. 213; Gates v. Hard-
acre. 3Taunt. 424: Maloney v. Bartley, 3
Camp. 210; 1 Starkie, Ev. Tl, 191; (“‘-ase of
Sir John Friend, 13 How. St. Tr. 16;
(Jase oi Earl of Macclesiield. iii How. St.
'i‘r. 767; 1 Greenl. Ev.§ 451; 1 Burr’s 'l‘r.
244: Whart. Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) § 463:
Southard v. Rexford. 6Cow. 254; People
v. Mather. 4 Wend. 229; Lister v. Boker, ii
Blackf. 439.
The relations of Counselman to the sub=
jectoi inquiry before the grand jury, as
shown by the questions put to him. in
connection with the provisions of the in-
terstate connncrcc nct. entitled him to in-
voke the protection of the constitution.
State v. Nowell. 58 N. H. 314; Emery’s
Case. 107 Mass. 172.
It remains to consider whether section
860 of the Revised Statutes removes the
protection of the constitutional privilege
of Counselman. Thai. section must be
construed as declaring that no evidence
obtained from a witness by means of a ju-
dicial proceeding shall begiven in evidence,
or in any manner used against him or his
property or estate, in any court of the
United States, in any criminal proceeding,
or for the enforcement of any penalty or
forfeiture. It follows that any evidence
which might have been‘ obtained from
Counselman by means of his examination
before the grand jury could not be given
in evidence nor used against him or his
property in any court of the United States,
in any criminal proceeding, or for the en-
forcement of any penalty or forfeiture.
This, of course, protected him against the
use of his testimony against him or his
proper ty in any prosecution against him
or his property. in any criminal proceed-
ing. in a court of the United States. But
it had only that effect. It could not, and
would not, prevent the use of his testi-
mony to search out other testimony to be
used in evidence against him or his prop-
erty, in a criminal proceeding in such
court. it could not prevent the obtaining
and the use of witnesses and evidence
which should be attributable directly to
the testimony he might give under com-
pulsion, and on which he might be con-
victed, when otherwise, and if he had re-
fused to answer, he could not possibly
have been convicted.
The constitutional provision distinctly
declares that a person shall not “be com-
pelled in any criminal cuse to be a wit-
ness agninst himself,” and the protection
oi section 860 is not co-extensive with the
constitutzional provision. Legislation
cannot detract from the privilege afford-
ed by the constitution. it would be quite
another thing if the constitution had pro-
vided that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, unless it should be provided by
statute that criminating evidence cxti act-
ed from a witness against his will should
not be used against him. But u mere act
of congress cannot amend the constitu-
tion, even if it should ingraft thereon such
a proviso.
in some states, where there is alike con-
stitutional provision. it has been at-
tempted by legislation to remove the con-
stitutional provision. by declaring that
there shall be no future criminal prosecu-
tion against_ the witness, thus making it
impossible for the criminal charge against
him ever to come under the cognizance of
any court, or at least enabling him to
plead the statute in absolute bar of such
prosecution.
A review of the subject in adjudged cases
will be useful.
In Com. v. Gibbs,3 Yeates, 429, and 4
Dali. 253, in 1802. the declaration of rights
in the constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776
declared that no man can “ be compelled
to give evidence against himself," and the
same language was found in the constitu-
tion oi 1790. Under this, the supreme court
414
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committf'd a rrhne. The privilcp;e le lim-
ited to rrlminl\I mattP-re, but It le eR 
broad ae the mischief agaloet which it 
St!ekt< to gua1·d. 
It le erJ!;ued for the appellee that the In-
vestigation before the grand jury wee 
not a criminal caRe, but waR solely for the 
)JUrpoRe of finding out whether a crime 
hRcl been committPd, or whether any one 
should be accused of au offt>nse, there he-
lnj( 110 accuRer and no parties plalntltt 01• 
<lefendant, end thut a c1H1e couhl arlRe 
only wl11m an Indictment. ehoulct be re-
turned. In support or this view reference 
IH nrnde to article 6 of the amendmPnh to 
the constitution of the UnitPd States, 
which provides that In ull criminal pr1111e-
cutions the accused 1o1hall Pnjo;v the right 
to a SJJeedy and public trial by an Impar-
tial jur~·. to be confrontt>d with the wit· 
neiiseR against him. to h11 ve compulsor~· 
process for wltneeset1, anll the BRBletaoce 
of coun11el fur hie defense. 
But this provl11lon distinctly means a 
criminal pro;iecutiou against a pt>rson 
who IR accused and who le to be tried by 
e petlt Jury. A criminal prm•ecutlon un-
der urtlcle 6 of the amendments 111 mueh 
nnn·ower than a "criwinul cuse," under 
llrtlt'le 5 of the nmemlmente. It IA Pntlrely 
con11i1:1tent with the language of article 5 
that tbe prl vllege of nut being a witness 
againl't himself le to be exercised in a pro-
ceeding before a grand Jury. 
We <'annnt yield our assent to the view 
taken on this subj~t by the court of ap-
pe11ls of New York in People v. Kelly, 2-l 
N. Y. 74, 84. The provision of the consti-
tution of New York of 1846 (article 1, § 6) 
was that no person shall "be compelled, 
lo any criminal cnHe, to he e wltneRB 
against himself." The court, speaking by 
Judge DENIO, said: "The term • rrlmlnttl 
case,' need In the clnuse, must he allowed 
some meaning, and none can bP. conceived 
othe1· thttn 11 prosecution for a criminal 
onense. But it must be a prosecution 
agulmJt him; for whnt IH fnrbid!len IR l hat 
he Rhould be compelled to be a witneRe 
8A"uln<tt himself." This ruling, which htt11 
been followed In some other cases, seems 
to UH, as a11plled to the provision In tbe 
fifth amendment to theconHtitution of the 
United Ht ates, to tnke away entirely Its 
true me1mlng and itR value. 
It is an ancient princi11le of the law 
of evidence tbs t e wltne11s shall not be 
compelJPd, In Rny 11roceelllng, to make dls-
elo1o1ure11 or to ~vc teRtlmony which will 
tend to crlmlnnte him or suhject him tu 
tines, penalties, or forfeitureH. HPX v. 
~laney. 5 Car. & P. 21.a; Cates v. Hard-
Rcre, 3 Taunt. 424: Mttlnney v. Bartley, 3 
Cl1mp. 210; l Sturkie, Ev. 71, 1!ll; f'111,;e of 
8ir John Friend, 13 How. St. Tr. 16; 
Case ol ERrl of MaccleRfleld, 1ll How. St. 
'rr. ill7; 1 Green!. Ev. § 451: l Burr'11 'l'r. 
244: Whart. Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) § 46:~: 
Houthlird v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254; l'eor>IP. 
v. Muther, 4 WenlJ. 229; Lister v. Boker, 6 
Bla.ckf. 4:-19. 
The relations or CounHelman to the sub~ 
ject of inquh•_y IJefore the grand jury, &M 
Hhown h.v the questions put to him, In 
connediun with the m·ovlslons of the in-
tP.rRtate l'ot11111e1·cn 1wt. entitled him to In-
voke tho p1·utectlun of the co1111titutlun. 
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State , .. XowPll, 58 N. H. 314; Emery's 
CH11e, 107 MaRR. 172. 
It rPmalns to consider whether section 
860 of the Revised :Stat u tee rtlrnoveA the 
protection of the constitutional privilege 
of Cnuneelman. '.fhat 11ectlon mm1t be 
construed as rleclarlnll that no e\"idence 
ohtalned from a wltne"'s by means of a jn-
clicinl proceeding shall be given in evidence, 
or In any manner used ttgainet him or his 
property or e11tate, in uny ·~ourt of the 
United Slates, in any criminal proceeding, 
or for the enforcemPnt of any penalty or 
forfeiture. It follows that ttn.v evidence 
which might have ul'f!n' obtained from 
Coun11elman hy mean11 of his examination 
before the grand jury could not be given 
in evidence nor used aµ-ain11t him or hie 
property In any court of the United StateA, 
In an.v criminal proceeding, or for the tlD· 
fotcement of any penalty or forfeiture. 
Thie, or couree, protected him a1&Hlnst the 
USt' of his testimony against him or hie 
propm ty tn any prosecu tlon Bllttlnst him 
or his property. In any criminal procred-
ing, In a court of the United StaleR. But 
It had only that effect. It could not, and 
would not, prevent the use of his testi-
mt•ny to search out other testimony to he 
u1<ed In evidence against him or his prop-
erty, In a crlmi1111l proceeding In 11uch 
court. It could not prevent the obtaining 
und the UF!e of witnesseo;i and evidence 
which should be attrlhutahle directly to 
the testimony he ml11:ht give under com-
pulsion, and on which he might be con-
victed, when otherwil4e, and If he had ~ 
fused to answer, hA could not possibly 
have been convicted. 
The constitutional provision dlet1nctly 
decla!i('S that a person shall not "be com-
pelled In any criminal cuse to be a wit-
ness agRlnst himself," and the proteetloo 
or section 860 Is not co-extensive with tbe 
constitutional provision. Legislation 
cannot detruet from the privilege afford-
ed by the constitution. It would be quite 
another thing If the coni1tltutlon bad pro-
vided that no person shall bt compelled in 
any criminal case to be a wltneBB Against 
himself, unless It slwuld be provided b~ 
statute that crlml11atln11: evidence ext1 act· 
ed from a wltnees B!l&inst his will should 
not be used against him. But a mere act 
of congress cannot emend the constitu-
tion, eYen If it should lngraft thereon such 
a proviso. 
In some states, where there ls a like con-
stitutional provision, It has been at-
tP.m11te<1 by leg;lsletion to remove the con-
stitutional provision, by d~larlni: that 
there i,ahall be no future criminal proriecu-
tion against the wltnei.s, t11ue making It 
lmpoRslhle ro'rthe r.rlmlnal charite against 
him ever to come urder the cognizance of 
Any court, or at least enabling him to 
pleod thP statute In absolute bar of such 
prosecn tlon. 
A re\'lew of the subject In ttdJmlged ca8t'8 
wlll be useful. 
In Com. v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates, 429, ttnd 4 
Dall. 2a:J, In 1802, tbP dechtrutlon of rights 
In the constitution of Pennsylvania of 1176 
declared that no man c11n "be compelled 
to gl?e e\•ldencc a~olust himself," and tht' 
same languHgc wa" found In tbP constitu-
tion of 17llO. Under this, the supreme court 
PRlVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
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of Pennsylvania held that the maxim that
no one is bound to accuse himself ex tend-
ed to cases where the answer might in-
volvehlm in shame or reproach; and it
held to the same effect in Lessee of Gal-
brcath v. Eichelberger, 3 Yeates, 515. in 1803.
In June. 1807, Chief Justice Mansuann,
in the circuit court of the United States
for the district of Virginia. in Burr’s trial,
(1 Bun-’s Tr. 244.) on the question whether
the witness was privileged not to accuse
himself. said: “lithe question he of such
a description that an answer to it may or
may not criminate the witness, according
to the purport of that answer, it must
rest with himself, who alone can tell what
it would be, to answer the question or
not. if, in such acase, he say, upon his
oath, that his answer would criminate
himself, the court can demand no other
testimony of the fact. * ' ' According
to their statement. [the counsel for the
United States,] a witness can never refuse
to answer any question, unless that an-
swer, unconnected with other testimony,
would besufficient'toc0nvict him of crime.
This would be rendering the rule almost
perfectly worthless. Many links frequent-
ly compose that chain of testimony which
is necessary to convict any individual of
a crime. It appears to the court to he
the true sense oft.he rule that no witness is
compcilable to furnish anyone of them
against himself. It is certainly not only
a possible, but a probable,case thata
witness, by disclosing a single fact, may
complete the testimony against himself,
a.nd to every effectual purpose accuse him-
self as entirely as he would by stating
every circumstance. which would be re-
quired for his conviction. That fact, of it-
self, might be unavailiug, but all other
facts without it would be insufficient.
While that remains concealed within his
own bosom. he is safe: but draw it from
thence, and heis exposed to a prosecution.
The rule which declares that no man is
compellable to accuse himself would most
obviously be infringed by compelling a
witness to disclose a fact of this descrip-
tion. What testimony may be possessed
or is attainable against any individual
the court can never know. It would seem.
then. that the court ought never to com-
pel a witness to give an answer which dis-
closes a tact that would form a necessary
and essential part of a crime which is
punishable b_v the laws."
In 1-*%.'»3, in State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307,
the declaration of rights in the constitu-
tion of Arkansas of lsrm (article 2,§ 11) had
declared that, in prosecutions by indict-
ment or presentment, the accused “shall
not be compelled to give evidence against
himself." Quarles was indicted under a
gaming law, for betting money on a game
of chance. A nolle prosequi having been
entered as to one Neal. against whom a
like prosecution was pending, Neal was
sworn as u witness for the state, and in-
formed of the nolle prosequf. and that no
indictment for a similar offense would be
preferred against him. and was asked
whether he had seen Quarles bet money
at cards within a specified time. Neal re-
fused to answerthe question, alleging that
he feared that he would criminate himself
thereby. The trialcourt refused to compel
him to answer. and, the jury having found
for the dcfendau t, the state appealed.
There was a statute of Arkansas which
read as follows: “In all cases where two
or more ]:"i'soI'i8 arejointly or otherwise
concerned in the commission of any crime
or misdemeanor. either of such persons
may be sworn as a witness in relation to
such crime or misdemeanor; but the tes-
timony given b_v such witness shall in no
instance be used against him in any crim-
inal prosecution for the same offense. "
Eng. Dig. 398, § 72.
The supreme court of Arkansas held
that. although witnesses were not ex-
pressed in the terms of the provisions of
the bill of rights, yet they were substan-
tially embraced to thefull extent of a com-
plete guaranty against self-accusation;
and that the privilege of the bill of rights
was that awitness should not becom-
pelled to produce the evidence to prove
himself guilty of the crime about which he
might be called to testify. But it was
further held that, by the statute, the legis-
lature had sochauged therule by directing
that the testimony required to be given
should never be used against a witness
for the purpose of procuring hisconvlction
for the crime or misdemeanor to which it
related, that it was no longer necessary
for him to claim his privilege in regard
to such testimony, in order to prevent its
afterwards being used against him; and
that the only question was whether the
statutory regulation afforded sufficient
protection to the witness, responsive to
the new rule and to the constitutional
guaranty against compulsory self-accusa-
tion. It was held that the statute suffi-
cien tly guarded witnesses from self-accusa-
tion, within the meaning of the constitu-
tion. to make it lawful for the courts to
compel them to testify as to all matters
embraced by the provisions of the statute
on that subject.
In Higdou v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255, in 1853,
it was said that the constitution of
Georgia declared that “no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." In that case the
plaintiff had filed'a bill in equity praying
a discovery as to property which he al-
leged the defendants had won from him in
a game of cards. The bill was demurred
to on the ground that the law of the
state compelling a discovery of gaming
transactions was unconstitutional, be-
cause such transactions were criminal. and
the statute did not grant an absolute and
unconditional release from punishment,
and because the defendants could not
make the discovery sought without crim-
inating themsel ves and incurring penalties.
The demurrer was overruled by the su-
Dreme court of Georgia, on the ground
that, although all pers(ms were protected
by the constitution from furnishing evi-
dence against themselves which might tend
to subject them to a. criminal prosecution,
they received their protection by virtue of
an act of Georgia of 1764, because, under
that act, their answers could not be read
in evidence against them in any criminal
case whatever, being excluded by the con-
stltution.
In Ex parte Rowe. 7 Cal". 184. in 1857. the
constitution of California oi 12449 provided
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of Pennsylvania held that the mnxlm that 
no one 111 bound to accuse hlm11elf extencJ-
f'<l to ca11es where the answer might In-
volve him lo shame or reproucb; and It 
held to the same erfect In Lessee of Onl-
brllatb v. Eichelberger, a Yeo.tes,516, In 1803. 
Jn June. 1807, Chief Juetke MARl!HALL, 
in the circuit com·t of the United States 
for the district of Virginia, In Burr's trial, 
( 1 Burr's Tr. 244.) 011 tht' question wht tll'3r 
the wltne11e was privileged not to accuse 
himself. said: "If the quP.Stlon be of 11uch 
a description that an answer to 1t ma.v or 
may not crimlnate the witness, according 
to the purport of that answer, It must 
rest with hlmselr, who alone <'an tell what 
it would be, to answer the que1ttlon or 
not. If, In such a case, be say, upon his 
oath, that his answer would crlmlnate 
himself, the court can demand no other 
testimony of the fact. • • • According 
to their statement, [the counsel for the 
United States,] a witness can r.ever refuse 
to an11wtir uuy question, u11le1n1 that an-
swer, unconnected with other testimony, 
would beenfflclent·to convil't him of crime. 
Thie would be rendering the rule almost 
perfectly worthlee11. Many links frequent-
ly com1JOs~ that chain of te11tlmony which 
is nece1:11uu·y to convict any lndl vidual of 
a crime. It ap11eurs to the court to be 
the true eenKe oftberule that no witness ls 
compelloble to fnrnlsh any one of them 
agaln11t hlm&elf. It le certainly not only 
a possible, but a probable, case that a 
witnet1s, by dlecloelug a single fact, may 
com11lete the testimony against hlm11elf, 
and to every eftectual purpoHl' accUBA him-
self ae entirely ae be would by stating 
every circumstance. which would be re-
quired for bht conviction. That fact, of It· 
seU, might be unavailing, but all other 
faete without It would bl' Insufficient. 
While that remalnR concealt-d within hie 
own bmmm. he le eafe: hnt <Ira w It from 
theore, and hele exposed to a 1>ro1:1eeutiun. 
The rule which declareH that no man 111 
comptillable to ac<"nse himself would most 
obviously bP. lofrlop:ed by compelling a 
wltnet111 to dhreloKe a fact of this descrip-
tion. What te1:1tlmony may be possessed 
or Is attainable aKalnst any lndlvhlual 
the court con never know. It would 11eem. 
then, that the court ought never to com-
pel a witness to ~Ive an an11wer wblch r1le-
clo11ee a ract that would form ft neceHeury 
itnd e1111entlal DRrt of a crime which le 
punlRhAhle by the Jaws." 
lo 18ii3, In ~tate v. Quarlel', 13 Ark. 307, 
the declaration of rhrh tR In the conetlt11-
tlon of Arkansas of JX:jti ( lll'tlcle 2, § 11) had 
declared that, In prosecutions Lly Indict-
ment or presentment, tht- accused "shall 
not be compelled to gh·e evidence ugaloet 
himself." Quarlt>e WftB Indicted under a 
gaming law, for betting money on a irame 
of chance. A uol/P. prose(/111 ha vlng been 
entered all to 'lne Neal. against whom a 
like pr011ecutlon was pendlnr.c. Neal wa11 
sworn as o witness for the state, and In-
formed of the no/le prnseq11I, and that no 
Indictment for a 1dmllar offen11e would be 
preferrt d against him. and wa11 a11ked 
whethc>r he had seen Quarles bet money 
at cards within a specified time. Nenl re-
fused to answer the q nuitlon, alleirlnr.c thnt 
he feured that he would crlmlnute hlmseH 
thereby. The trial court relu11ed to compel 
him to answer, end, the jury ha vlnir found 
for the dc>fenllent, the state appealed. 
There was a statute of Arkansas which 
rend as follows: "In all caeet1 where two 
or more r:~1·sone are Jolntl~· or otherwise 
concerned in the commission of eny crime 
or ml11demeao01', either of such persons 
may be sworn as ft witness In relation to 
such crime or misdemeanor: but the tes-
timony given by BUCh wltneMB sbAll In no 
Instance be used against him In nny crim-
inal prosecution for the same offense. " 
Eng. Dip;. 398, § 72. 
The 11upreme court of Arkansas held 
that. although witnesses were not ex-
pressed In the terms of the provisions of 
the bill of rights, yet they were eubetan-
tlally embraced to thefull extent or a com-
plf'te guarauty against 11elf-accusntlun; 
and that the prlvlJElge or the bill of rights 
wa11 that a wltne1111 should not be com-
pelled to produce the evidence to prove 
blmKelf guilty or the crime al>out which he 
ml11:ht be called to tel'tlfy. But It was 
further held that, by the statute, the legl11-
latnre had sorhanged therole by directing 
that the testimony required to be gh•en 
should never be used against a witness 
for the purpose of procurlop; hle<'onvlC'tlon 
for the <:rime or UJlsdemeanor to '~hlch It 
related, t11at It wus no lunger nec0H11ary 
for him to claim bis prl \'liege In regard 
to such testimony, In order to prevent Its 
afterwnrlle bf>ing used against him: and 
that the only question was whether the 
11tututory regulation afforded sutHelc>nt 
protectlor1 to the witness, responsive to 
the new rulA and to the constitutional 
guaranty ngalnst compulaory self-accuse· 
tlon. Jt was held that the statute ~um­
clen tly guarded witnesses from eelf-aet·u1:1a-
tlon, within the meunlng of the constitu-
tion, to make It lawful for the courts to 
compel them to testify ae to all mattert1 
embraced by the provisions of the statute 
on that Knbject. 
Jn Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 2.>5, In 1803, 
It was said that the constitution of 
Georgia declared that "no penmn shall be 
compelled In any criminal case to be a wit-
ness ll~alnet himself." In that ca110 the 
plalotln had Oled' a bill lo equity praying 
a dleco\•ery as to property which be al-
leged the defendants had won from him In 
a game of card11. The bill wa11 demurred 
to on the ground that the law of the 
state compelllng a discovery of gaming 
tran11actlone was uoconstltutlonnl, be-
cause such transactions were crlmtn11l. and 
the statute did not grant an absolute and 
unconditional relea11e from punb1hmeot, 
and because the defendant11 <'Ould not 
make the dlecovery sought without crlm-
lnatlrigthemselveeaod incurring penalties. 
The demurrer was overruled by thtt su-
preme court of Ueorgla, on the ground 
that, although all pe1·sone were protected 
by the constitution from furnbihlng evi-
dence agaln11t themselves which mlgh t tend 
to subject them to a criminal prosecotlon, 
tbey received their protection by virtue of 
an act of Georgia of li64, bccar•se, under 
that act, their 1rnsweri! could not be read 
In evidence agaln11t them In any crlmlnal 
caHe w hRtever, l>elng exclurled by the con-
stitution. 
In Ex parte RowA, 7 Cal. 184. In 1~'17, the 
constitution of California of 1~49 provided 
415 
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(article ].§8) that no person shall "be
compelled,in any criminal case. to he a
witness against himself." Rowe had been
committed for refusing to answer, under
an order of the court, certain questions
propounded to him by thegrand jury in an
examination concerning thedisposition of
certain moneys taken from the state
treasury. on the ground that his answer
would disgrace him, and would tend to
subject him to a prosecution for felony.
Thesupreme court of California.,on habens
corpus, considered the construction and
constitutionality of the fifth section of an
act passed April 16,1855, which provided
that“the testimony given by such wit-
ness shall in no instance be used against
himself in any criminal prosecution. ” The
court held that the provision of the con-
stitution was intended to protect the wit-
ness from being compelled to testify
against himself in regard to a criminal of-
fense; that he could not be a witness
against himself unless his testimony could
be used against him in his own case; and
that the statute gave the witness that
protection which was contemplated by
the constitution, and therefore be was
bound to answer.
in 1860. in Wilkins v. Malone,14 Ind. 153,
the constitution of Indiana of 1851, in its
bill of rights, (article 1, § 14,) had declared
that “no person in any criminal prosecu-
tion shall be compelled to testify against
hinisell‘. " In a suit brought by Malone to
recover on a promissory note, the defense
pleaded usury, and offered to examine
Malone as a witness to prove the usury.
The plaintiff objected, on the ground that
such examination would criminate himself,
and the objection was sustained. On ap-
peal to the supreme court of Indiana by
the defendants, it was held that the con-
stitutional provision protected a person
from a compulsory disclosure, in acivil
suit, of facts tending to criminate him,
whenever his answer could be given in
evidence against him in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. The court referred
to State v. Quarles, supra, and i-ligdon v.
Heard, supra, and to the statute of In-
diana, (1 Rev. St. p. 345. § 8,) which pro-
vided that a. person charged with taking
illegal interest might be required tonn-
swer, but that his answer should not be
used against him in any criminal prosecu-
tion for usury. The court held that by
this statute the constitutional privilege of
the party was fully secured to him, al-
though he might disclose circumstances
which might lead to a criminal prosecu-
tion.
in 1S61.~in the court of app}-nls of New
York, (People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74,) the
constitution of New York of 1846 declared
that no person shall“ be compelled, in any
criminal case. to be a witness against
himself.” In that case, one Hackley, as a
witness before the grand jury on a com-
plaint against certain aidermen for feloni-
ously receiving a gift of money under an
agreement that their votes should be in-
fluenced thereby in a matter then pending
bciore them in their otiicial capacity, in
answer to a question put to him as to
what he had done with certain money
which he had received, said that any an-
swer which he could give to the question
would disgrace him, and would have a
tendency to accuse him of a crime. and
he demurred to the question. Having
been ordered by the court of general ses-
sions of the peace to answer it, he still re-
fused, and was adjudged guilty of con-
tempt, and put in prison. On a. writ of
Izabeas corpus, he was remanded into cus-
tody by the supreme court, and he ap-
pealed to the court of appeals.
By chapter 539 of the Laws of New York
of 1853 it was enacted, by section 2, that
section 14 should be added to article 2. tit.
4, c. 1, pt. 4. Rev. St. 'l‘he act provided
that the giving of money to any member
of the common council of a city, with in-
tent to influence his action upon any mat-
ter which might be brought before him in
his official capacity, should be an offense
punishable by fine or imprisonment in a
state-prison or both; and section 14 pro-
vided that every person offending against
the statute should “be a competent wit-
ncss against any other person so offend-
ing, ” and might be compelled to give evi-
dence before any magistrate or grand
jury, or in any court, in the same manner
as other persons, “but the testimony so
given shall not be used in any prosecution
or proceeding, civil or criminal, against
the person so testifying." A similar pro-
vision was contained in chapter 446 of the
Laws of 1857, in section 52.
The court of appeals considered the
question whether those provisions were
consistent with the true sense of the dec-
laration of the constitution. and said,
spenkingby Judge DENIO, (page 82:) “The
mandate that an accused person should
not be compelled to give evidence against
himself would fail to secure the whole ob-
ject intended,if a prosecutor might call an
accomplice or confederate in a criminal
offense, and afterwards use the evidence
he might give to procure a conviction, on
the trial of an indictment against him. If
obliged to testify, on the trial of the co-
offender, to matters which would show his
own complicity, it might be said upon a
very liberal construction of the language
that he was compelled to give evidence
against himself,—-that is, to give evidence
which might be used in a criminal case
against himself. ' " ‘ it is, of course,
competent for the legislature to change
any doctrine of the common law, but I
think they could not compel a witness to
testify, on the trial of another person, to
facts which would prove himself guilty of
a crime. without indemnifying him against
the consequences, because I think, as has
been mentioned, that by a legal construc-
tion the constitution would be found to
forbid it." But'the court went on to say:
“If a man cannot give evidence upon the
trial of another person without disclosing
circumstances which will make his own
guilt apparent, or at least capable of
proof, though his account of the transac-
tions should never be used as evidence, it
is the misfortune of his condition, and not
any want of immunity in the law. lf a
witness objects to a question on the
ground that an answer would criminnte
himself, he must allege, in substance. that
his answer, if repeated as his admission,
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Case No. 143] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
(article 1. § 8) that no pereon shall "be 
compelled, In any criminal rnee, to be a 
witness against hlmel'lf." Rowe had been 
committed for refusing to answer, under 
an order of the court, certain questions 
propounded to him by thel(rand jury In on 
examination concerning thedlepoHltlon of 
certulo moneys taken from the state 
treasury, on the ground that hie auewer 
would dh11erace him, and would tencl to 
subject him to a proeerutlon for felony. 
'l'beeuprewe court of California, on habe11s 
curp11s, considered the conettuctlon and 
com1tltutlonallty of the fifth section of an 
act passed April 16, 1H.'l5, which provided 
that" the testimony given by such wit-
ness shall In no Instance be used a1ralnet 
himself In any criminal prosecution." The 
court hell) that tbe provision of the con-
stitution was Intended to protect the wit-
ness from being compelled to testify 
against himself lo regard to a criminal of-
fense; tlrnt he could not be a wltnee11 
against himself unless bis testimony could 
be used ngaln11t him In his own case; nnd 
that the statute gave the witness that 
protection whtcb was contemplated by 
the constitution, and therefore be was 
bound to answer. 
lu 181i0, In Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153, 
the co11stltutlon of Indiana of 1851, In Its 
bill of rights, (nrtlclA 1, § 14,) hall declared 
that" no person In any criminal prosecu-
tion 11ball be compelled to teHttry ageln11t 
hlmseU." In a suit brought by Malone to 
recover on a promle11or.v note, tht1 defen11e 
pleaded usury, und offered to examlno 
Malone as a wltneHe to pro\•e the usury. 
Th~ plalntln objected, on the ground that 
such examine tlon would crlmlna te himself, 
amf the objection WWI eustalne11. On op· 
peal to the 1mpreme court of Indiana by 
the defen1lants, it was held that the con. 
etltutional provision protected a person 
from a compulsory di,iclosure, In a civil 
suit, of facts tending to crlmlr1a te him, 
whenever hie answer coultl be given In 
evidPnce ngalnst blm ln a subsequent 
criminal pro11ccutlo11. The court referred 
to Stute v. Quarles, 11upra, tmd Higdon v. 
Heard, BuJ>ra, and to the stutnte or In-
diana, (1 Rev. St. p. a.Iii, § 8,) which pro-
vided that a person ch1:1rged with taking 
lllei;al interest might be required to an-
swer, but that hfH uuswer should not be 
u11ed against him In any criminal prot1ecu-
tlon for usury. The court held that by 
thlH t1tatute the constitutional privilege of 
the party was fully sccured to him, al-
though he mhr:ht disclo11e circumstances 
which might leall to a criminal proeecu· 
tion . 
In 1861 :-in the court of apyieals of New 
York, (Peo1>le v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74,) the 
com~tltution of New York of 1R46 declared 
that no per11on shall" be compelled, In any 
crlmlnnl case, to be a wlt11e11s agnln11t 
hlm1<clf." lo that case, one Har:kley, as a 
witness before the grnnd jury on a com-
plulnt aJr;uln11t certain aldermen for felonl-
om1ly receiving a gift of money under an 
ngreement that their votes should be in-
fluenced the1"P.hy In a matter then pe11dfng 
bl'fore them In their •JtHclal capacity, In 
uns wer to a qneHtlon put to him n11 to 
what he hud tlone with certain money 
whkb be ball recci vecl, 111nill that any ttn· 
416 
ewer which he could give to the question 
would disgrace him, and would have a 
tenden<'y to Recuse him of 11 crime, and 
bff demurred to the qu011tlon. Having 
been ordereli by the court of general ses-
sions of the peace to answer It, ho etlll re-
fused, and was adjud~ed guilty of con-
tempt, and put In prison. On a writ of 
hllbeas corpus, be was remnmled into CUB· 
tody by the supreme court, and he ap-
pealed to the conrt of appeals. 
B.v chapter 539 of the Laws of New York 
of 1~ii.1 It waR enact!ld, b,v s~tlon 2, that 
section 14 should be edde<I to article 2. tit. 
4, c. l, pt. 4, H1w. St. 'l'be act provicled 
thnt the glvin1t of money to any meruber 
of the common council of a city, with In-
tent to lnftuence his action upon any mat-
ter which mlitht be brought before him In 
bi11 official capacity, ehoulll be an onen110 
punlHhable by ftne or Imprisonment In a 
l'ltate-prlson or both; and section 14 pro-
vided that every person offending agalnMt 
the statute should" be a rompetent wit-
ness against any other person so oftP.nd-
lng," and might be cohl{lelled to give evf. 
dence befo1·e nny mngl11trate or granl\ 
Jury, or In any court, In the same manner 
as other persons, "bot the testimony so 
Kfven shall not be 011ed In any prosecution 
or proceeding, civil or criminal, against 
the person BO testifying.• A similar pro· 
vision was cont11l11ed ln chapter 446 of the 
Laws of 1857, in section 52. 
The court of appeals considered the 
question whether those pro\·lsions were 
consistent with the true 11ense of the dec-
luratlon of the constitution, and ttald, 
B)lenklngby Judsr:eDENIO, (page 82:) "1.'he 
mandate that an accoi!ed person should 
not be compelled to gl"e evidence against 
himself would fall to secure the whole ob-ject Intended, If a prosecutor might call an 
accomplice or confederate In a criminal 
oftE1n11e, and afterwardt1 nee the evidence 
be might give to procure a conviction, on 
the trial of an Indictment against him. If 
obliged to testify, on the trial of the co-
onender, to matters which would show hie 
owu compllclty, lt might be said u1wo a 
very liberal const1·uctlon of the lang1u1~ 
tha.t he was compelled to give evlclem·e 
against hlmsPlf,-that Is, to gl'f'e evidence 
which might be used In a criminal cmre 
against himself. • • • It le, of course, 
competent for th!' legislature to change 
any doctrine of the common law, but I 
think they could not compel a wltneRs to 
tP.l!tlfy, on the trial of another pet'flon, to 
fact11 which woulcl }Jrove hlmflelf guilty of 
a crime, without lndemnlfyio1rhlm agalm1t 
the conseqnenres, bec·ouse I think, as has 
been mentlonecl, that lJy a le1ral construc-
tion the C•)nstitutlon would be found to 
forlJld it." Ilut ·the court Wl'llt on to e11y: 
"If a man cannot give e"ldl•nce upon the 
trial of another per1:1on without dl11cloalng 
clrc1,1mstnnces whll•h wlll make hi11 own 
guilt apparent, or at lenst caJ>able of 
proof, thou~h hl11 account of the tramme-
tlons should never be ut1e1l as evld!:!nl'e, It 
Is the mh1furtune of his condition, Hnd not 
any want or humunlty ln the law. lf a 
wltneRH objects to a question on the 
1!.'Toun1l that an an11wer would crhninnte 
bimHeif, he mu11t nllt>ge, In 1mh11tam·e. that 
his answer, If repca ted as bis admls11ion, 
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on his own trial, would tend to provehim
guilty of a criminal offense. Ii the case is
so situated that a repetition of it on a
prosecution against him is impossible, as
where it is forbidden by a positive statute,
I have seen no authority which holds or
intimates that the witness is privileged.
It is not within any reasonable construc-
tion of the language of the constitutional
provision. The term ‘criminal case.‘ used
in the clause, must be allowed some mean-
ing. and none can be conceived other than
a prosecution for a criminal offense. But
it must be a. prosecution against him; for
what is forbidden is that he should becom-
pelled to be a witness against himself.
Now.if he be prosecuted criminally, touch-
ing the matter about which he has testi-
fied upon the trial of another person, the
statute makes it impossible that his testi-
mony given on that occasion should be
used by the prosecution on the trial. It
cannot, therefore, be said that in such
criminal case he has been made a witness
against himself, by force of any compul-
sion used towards him, to procure, in the
other case. testimony which cannot possi-
bly be used in the criminal case against
himself.” The court held, therefore, that
Ha:-kie,v was not protected by the consti-
tution of New York from answering before
the grand jury.
In 1157.1, in Emery’s Case, 107 Mass. 172,
article 12 of the decla ration of rights in the
constitution of Massachusetts of 1780 had
declared that no subject shall be" compelled
to accuse or furnish evidence against him-
self.” A statute of Massachusetts. of
March 8. l871,c. 91, entitled “An act for
the better discovery of testimony and the
protection of witnesses before the joint
special committee on the state police,”
provided as follows: “No person who is
called as a witness beiore the joint special
committee on the state police shall be ex-
cused from answering any question or
from the production of any paper relating
to any corrupt practice or improper con-
duct of the state police, forming the sub-
ject of inquiry by such committee, on the
ground that the answer to such question
or the production of such paper may crim-
fna te or tend to criminate himself. or to
disgrace him, or otherwise render him in-
famous, or on the ground of privilege;
but the testimony of any witness exam-
ined before said committee upon the sub-
ject aforesaid, or any statement made or
paper produced by him upon such an ex-
amination, shall not be used as evidence
against such witness in any civil or crim-
inal proceeding in any court oi justice:
provided, however. that no official paper
or record. produced by such witness on
such examination. shall be held or taken
to be included within the privilege of said
evidence so to protect such witness in any
civil or criminal proceeding as aforesaid.
and that nothing in this act shall be con-
strued to exempt any witness from pros-
ecution and punishment for perjury coin-
mitted by him in testifying as aforesaid. "
Emery was summoned as a witness be-
fore the joint special committee of the sen-
ate and house of repesentatives of the gen-
eral court "to inquire if the state police is
guilty of bribery and corruption.” Inter-
wznous, Ev.—27
rogatories were propounded to him by
the committee, which he declined to an-
swer. On a report of the facts to the sen-
ate. it ordered his arrest for contempt.
He was brought before the senate, and
asked the following question: “ Are you
ready and willling to answer before the
joint special committee. appointed by this
senate and the house of representatives of
Massachusetts, toinquireif the state police
is guilty of bribery and corruption, the
following questions, namely: First.
Whether, since the appointment of the
state constabulary force, you have ever
been prosecuted for the sale or keeping for
sale intoxicating liquors. Second. Have
you ever paid any money to any state
constable, and do you know of any cor-
rupt practice or improper conduct of the
state police? If so.state fully what sums,
and to whom you have thus paid money,
and also what you know of such corrupt
practice and improper conduct." He an-
swered in writing as follow:-': "Intending
no disrespect to the honorable senate, I
answer, under advice of counsel, that 1
am ready and willing to answer the iirst
question; but I decline to answer the sec-
ond question. upon the gro\mds—l"irst,
that the answer thereto will accuse me of
an indictable offense: second. that the an-
swer thercto will furnish evidence against
me by which I can be convicted of such an
offense." The senate thereupon commit-
ted him to the custody of the sergeant at
arms, to he confined in jail for 25 days, or
until the funther order of the senate, un-
less he should sooner answer the ques-
tions. He was imprisoned 8(‘(?urdi||;_';ly,
and the case was brought before Judge
WsL1.s of the supreme judicial court on a
writ of fmln-as cofiius, and was fullv ar-
gued. It was held under advisement and
for conference with the other ju(l'.'.'es; and
in the opinion subsequently delivered by
Judge W|~:1.1.s it is stated that that opin-
ion had the approval and unanimous con-
currence of all the members of the court.
It is said in the opinion, in regard to the
second question put to the witness: “it
is apparent that an affirmative answer to
the question put to him might tend to
show that he had been guilty of an offense,
either against the laws relating to the
keeping and sale of intoxicating liquors,
or under the statute for punishing one
who shall corruptiy attempt to influence
an executive otiicer by the gift or offer of
a bribe. Gen. St. c. H53. §7."
in regard to the clause abovequoted from
the bill of rights, the opinion says: “By
the narrowest construction, this prohibi-
tion extends to all investigations of an in-
qnisitoriai nature, instituted for the pur-
pose of discovering crime. or the pcrpei ra-
tors of crime. by putting suspected parties
upon their examination in respect thereto,
in any manner, although not in lllt‘ course
of any pending prosecution. Put it is not
even thus limited. The principle applies
equally to any compulsory disclosure. oi his
guilt by the offender himself, whether
sought directly as the object of the in-’
quiry, or indirectly and incidentally for
the purpose of establishing facts involved
in an issue between other parties. If the
disclosure thus made would be capable of
{l7
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on bfa own trial, would tend to prove him 
~ullty of ll criminal otft•n11e. If the caRfl fa 
eo Rltunted that a repetition of It on a 
prosecution a,,;alnst him le Impossible, as 
where it ie forbidden by a pmdtlvestatute. 
I have seen no antborlty which bolds or 
totlmatee that tbe wltoeaB le privileged. 
It le not within any reasonable construc-
tion of the lnnaruaite of the constitutional 
provision. Tbe term 'criminal case,• used 
fn the clau~. must be allowed some mean-
ing, and none can be conceived other than 
a prostieutlon for a criminal offense. But 
tt must be a prosecution against him: for 
what 18 forbidden ls that he should becom-
pelled to bo a wltneas against bimBf'll. 
Now. If be be prosecuted crlmlnaJly, touch· 
Ing the matter about which he baa tescl-
11ed OJ.Ion the trial of another penion, the 
etatute makea it lmpoeslhle that hie tf'tltl-
mooy gi'f'en on that occasion should be 
ospd by the prusecutlon on tbe trial. It 
cannot, tben>fore, be said that lo such 
erltoloal case he bas been made a wltoe11s 
against himself, by forcit of any compul-
elon used towarcls blm, to procure, In thP 
other cuse, te11tlmooy which conoot JhJHtli· 
bly be uaed In the criminal cnee aKnlnst 
hlm11elf." The court held, therefore, that 
Hac•kley waa not protected by tbe eonetl-
totlon of New York from answering before 
the grand Jnry. 
In 18i.1, In Emery's C'a111>, 107 Maes. 172, 
artfcle 12 of theclecl11ratlon of rlghtR In tbe 
eonstltutloo of MasKachueettR of 17!'0 ho.d 
declared that no euhject 11hall be" compelled 
to a<"cuse or furnish 1tvldetll'e agaln11t blm-
BPlf." A statute of MaHeachueette. or 
March 8, JKTI, c. 91, entitled "An act for 
the better dl11co\"ery of testimony and the 
protPCtlon (Jf wltneset-a before tile Joint 
special committee on the stete police," 
provided ae follows: M No penion wbo Is 
ealled as a witness before the Jolot special 
eommlttee on the state police Mlu1ll be ex-
eust>d from answerlnir any question or 
from the production of any paper relating 
to any corr11pt practice or Improper con-
duct of the state police, forming the sub-jef!f of Inquiry by sm•h committee, on tne 
ground that the anHwer to 1mcb question 
or tbe production of such paper maycrlm-
inate or tencf to r.rlmlnate himself, or to 
dls1trace him, or otherwise reader hlw In-
famous, or on the ground of pt·lvlle,,;e; 
bot the testimony or any witness exam-
ined before said committee ur>un the 11ub-
Ject afore11ald, or nny statement made or 
paper prmluced by him upou such an ex-
aruinathm, shall not be u~ed ae evidence 
ap;olnst such witness lo any civil or crim-
inal proceeding In any court of JuKtlce: 
provided, however, that DO official f1aper 
or rt'cortJ, prodnced by such wltuese on 
such examination. ellflll be held or taken 
to be Included within the prlvllc1te of suld 
evicl~nce so to protect 1111ch wltnPt1M In any 
eh·ll or crlmlnel proceeding ae aforPRald, 
and that noth1nic in tblH act Rholl be cnu. 
strnE'd to exempt an.v wltnPss from proP-
ecu tlon ond puulshmeut for pnjury com-
mitted by him In testifying ae aforeRahJ ... 
Emery wne eummoued nK a wlt11P11e b~ 
fore the Joint epl"Clal committee of the 11en-
ate and house of rPpesPotatlveeof tht> gen-
eral court "to Inquire If the state police la 
gullty of bribery nnd corruption." lnter-
WlLGVS,EV.-27 
rogatorleil were propounded to him by 
the committee, which he declined to an-
ewer. On a report of the facts to the sen-
ate. ft ordered hie arrest for contempt. 
He was brought before the seuate, and 
asked the following qul'Btlon: " i\ re yon 
ready and wlllllng to answer hefore the 
Joint special committee, a1>pol11ted hy thl1 
senate and the bouee of repreiieotatlvee of 
Museacho11etta, to Inquire If theetate police 
le gnllty of bribery and corrnptlon, the 
following qoeetlone, namely: Flr11t. 
Whether, since the nppolntmcnt of the 
state com1tab11Jary fort'e, you have ever 
tleen proeecoted for the sale or keeplnsr for 
sale lnto:r.lcatlnp; liquors. Second. Have 
you ever paid any money to any state 
constable, nod do you know of nny cor-
rupt practice or Improper condnrt of the 
etote police? If 110. state fully whet 1111111&, 
and to whom you bave thus paid money. 
and altto what you know of such corrupt 
prartlce and lmpn>Jlt'r conduct.,. He an-
swered In writing es follow": "JntPndlng 
no disrespect to the honorable seuatP, I 
answer, under advice or counsel, that 1 
am ready and willing to ant1wer the ttret 
question; but J decline to answer the l'ec-
ond quet<tlon. upon the groundR-Ffrst, 
that the answer thl!reto will accuse me or 
an lndlctahle oHPm1e; .'lecond, that the an-
11wer thereto will furoh1h evldl'nce agalni;t 
me by wbkb I cnn be convicted of eucb an 
oftense." The senate thereupon commit-
ted him to the rustor1y of the MergPunt at 
armR, to be couflnl'd In Jail for 25 duy11, or 
no tll the fur.ther order of the Bl'n ate, un-
le1111 he should sooner answer the Qllt'S· 
tlunM. He was lmt,rleoued arcortJl111dy, 
and the <loee was brought before ,J ut11-~ 
WE1,u of the supreme Judklal court en a 
writ of bubf'llB curpus, and wee fullv ar-
11:ued. It WRH helcl under advlflf'ml'nt and 
for conference with the other Jurl:?Pll; nnd 
In the opinion Huhst>quentl.v dt•llverPCI by 
Judge WELLS It llJ 11tatPcl that that opin-
ion had the approval and unanhlionM cun-
,•urrence of all the members or tho court. 
It le said In the opinion, In rejrnrd to thf'l 
Hecon<l question JJUt to the witnPMs: "It 
le apparent that an affirmative nnswer to 
the question put to him might tenrl to 
show that be had been guilt.¥ of on offPnRe, 
either against the laws relating to the 
keeping and 1tale of lntoxlclltln~ liquors, 
or undrr the shttute for punlHhlnsr one 
wbo shall corruptly attempt to loflut>111·0 
an executive ofHcer b.v the gift or offer of 
a bribe. Oen. Ht. c. 163, § 1." 
In n>gnrd to ther.lauMealJovequoted from 
the bill or 11gbte, thll opinion M8YH: .. By 
the 11t1rrowest conMtructloo, thiH prohihi· 
tlon extends to all lnve11tlgatlo11R of an ln-
quh!ltorial nature, lnMtituted for the pur-
pose of dlHcoverlng crime, or the perpetra-
tors of crime. by putting suspectt>d purtles 
upon their examlnutlon In rt>t<pect thereto, 
In any manner, althoughuot In the courtie 
of any pending proMerutlon. Put It le not 
even thus limited. The prlncl11le ap11llee 
equally to any compuleory dlsrioHUJ"A of his 
guilt by the offender himself, whether 
sought directly aa the object of the In-' 
qulry, or indirectly and btcldentnlly for 
the purpose of estuhllMbfug facts lnvol\"ed 
In an leene between other partlee. If the 
dleclo11ure tbus ma.de would be capable of 
417 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
being used against himself as a confes-
sion of ciime. or an admission of facts
tending to prove the commission of an
offense by hi|nself,in any prosecution then
pending',or that might he brought against
him therefor, such disclosure would be an
accusation of himself, within the meaning
of the constitutional provision. in the
absence of regulation by statute, the pro-
tection against such self-accusation is se-
cured hy according to the guilty person,
when called upon to answer as witness or
otherwise. the privilege of then avowing
the liability and claiming the exemption,
instead oi compelling him to answer, and
then excluding his admissions so obtained,
when afterwards offered in evidence
against him. This branch of the consti-
tutlonal exemption corresponds with the
common-law maxim, neum tenetur seip-
sum uccusare, theinterpretation and ap-
plication of which has always been in ac-
cordance with what has been just stated.
Broom, Leg. Max. (5th Ed.) 968; Wing.
Max. 486; ltosc. Crim. Ev. (2d Amer. Ed.)
159; Starkie. Ev. (Hth Amer. Ed.) 41, 204,
and notes; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 451. and notes.”
The opinion then cites the case of People
v. Kelly. supra. as holding that the clause
in the constitution oi New York of 1846
protected a witness from being compelled
to answer to matters which might tend
to criminate himself, when called to testi-
fy against another party; and also People
v. Matiier, 4 Went]. 229, as declaring that
the exemption in the constitution of New
York extended to the disclosure of any
fact which might constitute an essential
link in a chain of evidence by which guilt
might he established, although that fact
alone would not indicate any crime. The
opinion then proceeds: “The third branch
of the provision in the constitution of
Massacliiisetts. ‘orfurnlsh evidence against
himself,’ must he equally extensive in its
application; and, in its interpretation.
may be presumed to he intended to add
something tothesigniiicanceof that which
precedes. Aside from this consideration,
and upon the language of the proposi-
tion standing by itself, it is a reasonable
construction to hold that it protectsa
person from being compelled to disclose
thecircumstances of his offense, the sources
from which, or the means by which, evi-
dence oi its commission, or of his connec-
tion with it. may be obtained, or made
effectual for his conviction. without using
his answers as direct admissions against
him. For all practical purposes. such dis-
closures 'wouid have the effect to furnish
- evidence against the party making them.
They might furnish the only means of dis-
covering the names of those who could
give evidence concerning the transaction,
the instrument by which n crime was per-
petrated, or even the corpus delicti itself.
Both the reason upon which the rule is
founded. and the terms in which it is ex-
pressed. forbid that it should be limited to
confessions of guilt, or statements which
may be proved in subsequent prosecu-
tions, as ud missions of facts sought to be
established therein.” The court then pro-
ceeds to hold that those constitutional
provisions applied to investigations be-
fore a legislative body.
Passing. then. to consider the effect of
the statute of l87l, the opinion says: “It
follows from the considerations already
named that so far as this statute requires
a witness, who may he called, to answer
questions and produce papers which may
tend to criminate himself, and attempts
to take from him the constitutional priv-
ilege in respect thereto, it must be entire-
ly ineffectual for that purpose, unless it
also relieves him from all liabilities, for
protection against which the privilege is
secured to him by the constitution. The
statute does undertake to secure him
against certain of those liabilities. to-wit.
the useof any disclosures he may make.as
admissions or direct evidence against
him. in any civil or criminal proceeding. "
The opinion then refers to the case of Peo-
ple v. Kelly, supra. and says that that de-
cision was made upon the ground that
the terms of the provision of the consti-
tution of New York protected the witness
only from being compelled “to be a wit-
ness against himself," and did not protect
him from the indirect and incidental con-
sequences of a disclosure which hc might
be called upon to make.
The opinion then says: “The terms of
the provision in the constitution of Massa-
chusetts require a much broader interpre-
tation, as has already been indicated; and
no one can be required to forego an 8D-
peai to its protection, unless first secured
from future liability, and exposure to he
prejudiced, in any criminal proceeding
against him. as fully and extensively as he
would be secured by availing himself of
the privilege accorded by theconstitution.
Under the interpretation already given,
this cannot. be accomplished so long as he
remains liable to prosecution criminally
for any matters or causes in respect nf
which he shall be examined, or to which
his testimony shall relate. It is not done,
in direct terms. by the statute in ques-
tion: it is not contended that the statute
is capable of an interpretation which will
give it that effect; and it is clear that it
cannot and was not intended to so op-
erate. Failing, then. to furnish to the
persons to be examined an exemption
equivalent to that contained in the consti-
tution, or to remove the whole liability
against which its provisions were intend-
ed to protect them. it fails to deprive
them of the right to appeal to the priv-
liege therein. The result is that. in ap-
pealing to his privilege. as an exemption
from the obligation to answer the inqui-
ries put to him, the petitioner was in the
exercise of his constitutional right: and
his refusal to answer upon that ground
was not, and could not be considered as,
disorderly conduct. or a contempt of the
authority of the body before which he
was called to answer. There heing no
legal ground to authorize the commit-
ment upon which he is held. he must be
discharged therefrom. "
In Cullen v. (‘om.. 24 Grat. 62-i. in i873.
Cullen. when asked before u grand jury to
state what he knew of a certain duel, de-
clined to answer. because the answer
would tend to criminate him. The hus-
tings court ordered him to answer. and.
on his still refusing to do so. fined him
4.18
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being used against hhuaelf as a confes-
sion of c1lme. or an admlsRlon of facts 
tending to prove the commission of an 
olJen"'e by himself, In an.v prosecution then 
pending, or that mhrht he brought against 
him therefor, surh disclosure would bf' an 
accusation of himself, within the meaning 
of the constitutional provision. In the 
ahfience of reAulatloo h.v statute, thP pro-
tPctlon ugalm1t such self-11ccu11ation la se-
curt>il hy arror<.llng to the p;ull1y person, 
wtwn called upon to answer a11 witness or 
otherwll!e, the prlvllPge of then avowing 
the llaulllty and clalminp; th" exemption, 
lnsteo<I of rompdllng him to answer, and 
then exclmlin11: his admissions 1m obtalnPd, 
"'' hl'n aft(>rwards ofterl'd In evhlenc& 
ap;afnl!t him. Thie branch of the consti-
tutional Pllemptlon corrl'spond11 with the 
common-law maxim, nemo tPnetur seip-
1>u111 11rc1ma rf!, the interpretation and ap-
pllcntlon of which bal! alw11y11 been In ac-
cordance with what h'IM hPPn ju11t 11htted. 
Broom, J.eg. Max. (5th Ed.) 968; Wing. 
Max. 486; Ho11c. Crim. Ev. (2d Amer. Ed.) 
1511; ~torkle, Ev. (~th Amer. Ed.) 41, 204, 
and notc11; 1 Green I. E\·. § 451. an<l 11ot"8." 
The opinion tbt·n clte11 the r_·nse of People 
v. Kelly, 1mpra. ae holtllng that the clause 
In the con11titutlon ol New York of 1~6 
protectl:d a witness from helng compelled 
to anKwt-r to m11tter11 which might tend 
to crlminate himself, when c111led to testl· 
f;v Agaln ... tanotlwrparty: and also People 
'"·Muther, 4 Wend. 2:z9, a11 rleclarlng that 
the exemntlon In the co11Rtltutlon of NPW 
York extended to the dh1cloaurei of anv 
fact which might constitute an eRsentl~I 
link In a chain of evldenre by whkh guilt 
miJrht he e11tablished, although that feet 
alonf' would not lnrllcate any crime. ThP 
opinion then procP.edB: "The thlr•I branch 
of the provision In thA conetitution of 
M a11s11rh11eetls, 'or fnrnild1 evidence agnlnHt 
hlm11Plf,' mm1t he equally extem1h·e In lte 
eppllca tlon; and, In lte Interprets tion, 
may hf' presumed to he lnten•led to add 
something tothPRlgnltlcanceof thntwhlch 
precedes. ARlde from this consideration, 
and upon tbe lan11:u11ge of the proposl-
tlou standing by Itself, It le a reasonable 
cunRtrurtlou to ho)fl that It protects a 
per1111n from being compt>llell to disclose 
therircumRtance1111f bis offense, thP Rourre11 
from \VhlC'h, or the means by which, evi-
clence of lte commleslon, ur of his connec-
tlo11 with ft. ma.v be obh.1lned, or made 
effectual for hie conviction, without mllnp; 
hie an11wera as dlrPCt aclmleslone against 
him. For all practical purpose11. sul'h dls-
clo11uret1 'would have the effect to furnish 
· e'·l1le11cP 81(8ln11t the party making them. 
'J'hey might furnish the 011ly means of dis· 
('O\'erln~ the nameR of those who could 
give e'l'ldem:e ('Oncerr.lng the trausul·tlon, 
the lnRtrument l>y which R rrlme wus per-
petrn tecl, or e'\"en thP rorp11s delicti lt11elf. 
Both the re111mn upon which the rule Is 
fo1111'1er'I, anrl the terms In which It 111 ex-
pre11Hed. forbid thnt lt!!houlcl be llmitell to 
confeRl!iu1111 of Jeullt, or statements which 
may he provl'rl In l4Ub11equent pro11ecu-
tlonF1, nR 111lmiHHions of fart11 eonght to be 
eetlthllsht'd therl'in." The court then pro-
ceedR to bold that tho11e com1tltutlonal 
provlsion11 n1>plled to Investigations be-
fore a legislative body. 
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Pa1111ing, tlwn. to consider the effect of 
the statute of l!l71, the opinion says: "It 
follows from the conRlderatlone alren1lv 
named that so far as this statute requir~ 
a wltnesH, who may he called, to 1111swer 
qneMtloue and produre 11apers which may 
tend to criminate hlru11elf, and attemptB 
to tnke from him the ronstitutional prl¥-
llege In respect tbt>reto, It must be entire-
ly lnelJCf'tual for thRt purpose, unle8ll It 
al110 relieves him from nll llRbllitles, for 
protection agalnRt which the privllep:E> Is 
secured to him by the constitution. The 
etatnte does undertake to secuni him 
ap;uin11t certain of tbm1e liabilities, to-wit. 
the UMP Of any dlscloeares he may make. es 
adml111don11 or direct evidence ap;alnet 
him, In any civil or criminal proct'eclin~ ... 
The opinion then refers to the caRe of Peo-
plP. v. Kelly, supra, and says thut that d(>-
cli;lon was macle upou thP 11:ro11nd that 
the termM nf the prnvlMlon of the l'OnHti-
tution of New York protected the wltnces 
only from being compelled "to he a wlt-
nes11 SJ?alnet himself,·· and did not protect 
blm from the i1J11irert aml Incidental con-
eequencPS of a disclosure which be might 
be calle<l upon to make. 
The opinion then 11aye: "The terms of 
the provlHion In the constitution of MaRBa-
chnMetts require a much broader Interpre-
tation, as haR already b~n Indicated; aucf 
no one can be required to forego an ap-
peal to ltM protection, unleHs f1r11t secured 
from future liability, and exposure to bet 
prejmli<'ell, In any criminal proceeding 
ap;alrun him, as fnlly and extemlively es he 
would he secured by a valllng hlmHelf or 
the privilege acrorde<l by theronl!tltlltlon. 
Un•ler the Interpretation alreacly given, 
thl" cannot. be accomplll!hed so long as he 
remaln<J llRble to proMecution crfmloally 
for any matters or causes In respect of 
\vhlch he shall be examined, or to whit:h 
his te11tlmony shall relate. It Is nut done, 
In direct tl'rmH, hy the statute In queK-
tlon; It Is not contended that thP 11tatute 
le capable of rm Interpretation which wlll 
,Kh·e ft that Pffect; end It 111 clear that It 
cannot and was not Intended to so op-
erate. Falling, then. to furnish to the 
pPt"llons to be examined an exemption 
e11ulvalent to that cont11lnec1 In the con11ti-
tutlo11, or to remove the whole liability 
arz;alnst which its provisions wP.re Intend-
ed to protect them, It falls to deprl¥e 
them of the right to fl!Jpeal to the prlv-
llt•p;e therein. The reHul t fH that, In ap-
penling to his privilege, a11 an Pxemptlon 
from the oblhrntlon to nnswer the lnqui-
rlPM put to him, the petitioner was In the 
exercl11e of his constltutlonul rlJ1,ht: and 
hlR refu11al to answer upon that ~round 
was not, an<l could not be considered 11e, 
rllRurdPrly conduct, or a contempt of the 
t1uthorlty of the body bf'fore which he 
wa11 callecl to anRwer. There helnp; no 
leizal ground to authorize the commit-
ment upon which he Is held, he mm1t be 
dh1chare:el1 therefrom." 
In CullPn v. Com., 24 Grat. 624. In 18i3, 
Cullen, when asked before u gr11nd jury te> 
state what he knew of a certain duel, de-
cllnerl tn auewe1·, \il'('nuse the answer 
would tenll to crhnlnate him. The h118-
tfngM court ordered him to answer, an1f, 
on his etfll refu11lng tu do so, tlued him 
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and committed him to jail. The case was
brought before the court of appeals of
Virginia. The hill of rights of the consti-
tu tion of Virginia of l-‘<70, in section 10 of
article 1, provided that no man can “be
compelled to give evidence against him-
self.” That provision had existed in the
bill of rights ‘of Virginia as far back as
June 12, 1776, and of it the court of ap-
peals said that it was the purpose of its
framers “ to declare, as part of the organ-
ic law, that no man should anywhere, be-
fore any tribunal. in any proceeding, be
compelled to give evilence tending to
criminate himself, either in that or any
other proceeding;" and thatthe provision
could not be confined “only to casesin
which a man is called on to give evidence
Einiself in a prosecution pending against
in."
The opinion then cited People v. Kelly
and Emcr_v's (Vase, hereinbefore referred
to, as sustaining‘ its view, and proceeded
to consider the effect of an act of Virginia,
passed October 31, 1870, in regard to duel-
ing, which provided as follows: “Every
person who may have hcen the bearer of
such challenge or acceptance, or otherwise
engaged or concerned in any duel, may be
required, in any prosecution against any
person but himself, for having fought or
aided or abetted in such duel, to testify as
a witness in such prosecution; but any
statement made by such person. as such
witness, shall not be uscd against him in
any prosecution against himself." The
court held that the effect of the statute
was to invade the constitutional right of
the citizen, and to deprive the witness of
his constitutional right to refuse to give
evidence tending to crimina te himself,
without indemnity, and that the act was
therefore, to that extent. unconstitution-
al and void. It held further that, hcfore
the constitutional privilege could be taken
away by the legislature, there must be
absoluteindcmnity provided; that noth-
lug short of complete amnesty to the wit-
ness, an absolute wiping out of thcofieuse
as to him, so that he could no longer be
prosecuted for it, would furnish that in-
demnity: that the statute in question did
not furnish it, but only provided that the
statement made by the witness should
not be used against him in a prosecution
against himself; that. without using one
word of that statement, the attorney for
the commonwealth might ln many cases,
and in a. case like that in hand inevitably
would, be led by the testimony of the wit-
ness to means and sources of information
which might result in criminntingthe wit-
ness himself; and that this would he to
deprive the witness of his privilege, with-
out indemulty. The judgment of the hus-
tings court was reversed.
In State v. No“ ell, 5-F4 N. H. 314, in 1878,
article 15 of the bill of rights in the con-
stitution of New 1~ianipshire of 1792 de-
clared that no subject shall “be compelled
to accuse or furnish evidence against him-
self. " Nowell refused to testify before a
grand jury as to whether, asa clerk for
one Goodwin. he had sold spirituous liq-
unrs, and whether Goodwin sold the-'ll] or
kept them for sale. He declined to an-
swer on theground that hisevldence might
tend to criminate himself. A statute of
the state (Gen. St. c. 99,9‘ 20) provided as
follows: “No clcrk, servant, or agent of
any person accused of a violation of this
chapter shall he excused from testifying
against his principal, for the reason that
he may thereby criminate himself; but no
testimony so given by him shall, in any
prosecution,be used as evidence, either
directly or indirectly, against him, nor
shall he be thereafter prosecuted for any
offense so disclosed by him." A motion
having been made. before the supreme
court of New Hampshire, for an attach-
ment agaiust him for contempt for refus-
ing to testify, that court, after quoting
the provision in the bill of rights. said:
“The common-law maxim [thus afiirmed
by the bill of rights) that no one shall be
compelled to testify to his own criminal-
ity has been understood to mean, not
only that the subject shall not he com-
pelled to disclose his guilt upon a trial of
a. criminal proceeding against himself, but
also that he shall not be required to dis-
close, on the trial of issues between others,
facts that can be used against him as ad-
‘ missions tending to prove his guilt of any
crime or offense of which he may then or
afterwards be charged. or the sources
from which, or the means by which. evi-
deuce of its commission or of his connection
with it may be obtained. Emer_v’s Case,
107 Mass. 172,181."
in regard to the statute, the court said
that the legislature, having undertaken
to obtain the testimony of the witness
without depriving him of his constitu-
tional privilegc of protection, must re-
lieve him from all liabilities on account of
the matters which he is compelled to dis-
close; that he was to be secured against
all liability to future prosecution as effect-
ually as if he were wholly innocent; that
this would not be acconipllshed if he were
left liable to prosecution criminally for
any matter in respect to which he might
he required to testify; that the statute
of New Hampshire went further than the
statute of Massachusetts considered in
Emery's Case, becauseit provided that the
witness should not he thereafter prose-
cuted for any offense so disclosed by him;
that the witness had. under the statute,
all the protection which the common-law
right, adopted by the bill of rights in its
common-law sense, gave him; that, if he
should be prosecuted, a plea that he had
disclosed the same offense on a lawful
accusation against his principal would
be a perfect answerin bur or abatement
of the prosecution against himself; and
that, unless he should testify, the motion
for the attachment must be granted.
In 1X80, in La Fontaine v. Southern Un-
derwriters. >13 N. C. 132, the constitution
of North Carolina of 1876 had provided,
in the declaration of rights, (article 1, §
1],) that, “in all criminal prosecutions
every man has the right ' ' * to
I G
" not he compelled to give evidence
against himself.“ One Blacknall, as a
witness in a hearing before u referee in a
civil suit, had refused to answers ques-
tion as to his possession of certain books.
on the ground that indictments were
pending against him, connected with the
419
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and committed him to )all. The case was 
brought before the court of appeal1:1 of 
Vll'Klula. 'file hlll or rhrhts of the consti-
tution or Virginia or 1)110, In section 10 of 
article 1, provided that no man ean "be 
compelled to give evidence aJtafnst him-
self. n 'l'lrn t provlRlon ha ti exl1:1ted In the 
bill of riJ?hts ·of Virginia as fer back a. 
June 12, li71l, and of It the court of ap-
peals 1mlcl that It was the purpm•e of Its 
framers" to declnre, n1:1 part of tho organ-
ic law, that nn mnn sbonld anywhere, be-
fon1 any tribunnl, In any pro<'ee1ll11g, be 
compelled to give evi.lenr.e tending to 
crlminate hlrust>U, either In that or any 
oth~r proceeding; n and that the provhdon 
ronlll not be confined "only to ca11(.>H In 
which a man Is called on to give evidence 
hlmst>lf in a i;rosecutlon pending against 
him." 
The opinion tl1en cited People \•. Kelly 
and Eml'ry's Cnse, berelnuefore referre!I 
to, as 1:11111taining itH Yiew, an<l procl'cliell 
to <'onsfller the rffect of an act of "lrglnh1, 
PBHHell <>t:tubur 31, 1870, In reJCnrd to duel-
ing, which pro,·ided us follow!!: "Every 
perl!OO \\"hO ffiay ha Ve fleell the hearer or 1 
such chnllenge or acceptance, or otherwise 
enl(aged or concerntid In Bny duel, may be 
re<1ulrt'd, In any proHecutlun aiculnst any 
per~on but hlml'.lelf, for having rou~ht or 
uhle<I or abetted in atuch duel, to teetUy as 
a witntsH In such proee<·ution: but any 
eta tl'meot made by such person, a8 such 
wltnet!s, shall not br used against him In 
an.\· prosecution against himself." 'l'be 
court held that the effect or the statute 
was to Invade the coni,itltutlonal right of 
the <'itlzen, and to deprive the wlt11e1111 of 
blt1 cont1tltutlonal right to refuse to give 
evidence tending to crimina te hhm1Plf, 
without ludemnlty, and that the act waR 
therefore, to tbat extent, unconstitution-
al ancl void. It held fnrther tbHt, hefore 
the con11tltutlonnl privilege could betaken 
awa.v by the le11:h!lature, there must be 
a hatolute Indemnity provided; that uoth-
lmc ehurt of com(llete amneRty to the wit-
ness, an absolute wiping uut or the offe11Me 
as to him, so that he could no longer he 
prosecuted for It, w'lul<J fnrnlsb thnt In-
demnity: thttt the etutntn 111 question did 
not fnrnish it, but only provided that the 
statement made hy the wltne1111 shoul<J 
not be need a,11;aln1:1t him in a pro1:1ecution 
ogolm1t himself; that, without usln1t one 
word of that statement, the attorney for 
the commonwealth might In muny cases, 
1rnd in a case like th1:1t In lurnd inevitably 
would, be Jed by the teMtlmon.v of the wlt-
nt>Kt! to meam1 anrl eourcPR of Information 
which might result In crimlnutlngthe wlt-
Dl'llH himicelf; unll that this would be to 
deprive the wltnrfls uf his privilege, with-
out lnclemulty. The judgment of the hus-
tings l'ourt was rever1:1ecL 
In ~tate v. No,H'il, 5~ N. H. 314, In 1k78, 
article 15 of the bill or rights In thP. con-
Htltn tlon of New Hnmp11hlri' of 1i92 de-
clared that no subject Khnll "be compelled 
to accuse or furnish evlctenl'e Bgalnst him-
self." Nowell refuee<l to tPstlfy before a 
grand jury a.i to whetht•r, as a clerk for 
one Good win. he bnd sold spirituous llq-
uorH, and whether Goodwin sold th .. m or 
kept them for sale. He declined to an-
sweron tbeground that his evidence might 
tencl to crlmlnate himself. A statute of 
the state (Hen. St. c. 99, § 20) provldeti as 
follows: "No clerk, t1er·1ant, or agent or 
any person accused or a violation or this 
chnpter shall he excused from testifying 
against hie prlnclnel, for the reason that 
he may thereby crlmlnate himself: hut no 
te11tlmony so given by him 11hall, In any 
pro11ecutlon, be used ne evidence, either 
directly or Indirectly, ngalnst him, nnr 
slrnll he be thereafter prosecuted for any 
offense so dliccloeell by him." A motion 
having bt>eu malle, before the supreme 
court of New Hamp1:1hlre, for an attal'h-
ment against him for contem1't for ref1111-
lng to te11tlfy, that court, ofter quoting 
the provision In the bill of rlghtt1. 11aid: 
"The common-law maxim (thu'j affirmed 
by the hill of rights) thut no one shall be 
compelled to testify to bl11 own criminal-
ity has been unrlet'l!too<l to mean, not 
only that the Huhject llhnll not he com-
pellrd to disclose hi11 gull t upon a trial of 
a criminal prO<'eefllng against himself, 1111t 
als11 that he shall not be required to dis-
cloer, on the trial of Issues between others, 
facts that can bo used a,11;Hln11t him a11 ad-
mlsHlonH tending to (H"OVe hill guilt or HllY 
crime or offense of which he may then or 
afterwards be charged, or the sourc011 
from which, or the means by which. evl-
denre of it11<·om mission or of hill connection 
with It may be obtained. Emery's Ca11e, 
107 MllRll. li:.!, 181. .. 
!n 1·egard to the statute, the court said 
that the legislature, ha vlng undertaken 
to obtain the teet.lmuny of the witneHS 
wltliout de11rlvlng him of his constitu-
tional prh·llegc of prntectlon, must re-
lieve him from all llabllltlet1 on account of 
the ruatters which he is compelled to dl1:1-
cloi;;e; that be we11 to be eecurPd agnlust 
all llahlllty to future proRecution as effect-
ually as If be were wholly Innocent; that 
thlll woul<l not be accomplished If he were 
left liable to prosl't'utiun criminally for 
any mutter In respect to which he mlJtht 
he requirer! to tes...ty: that tbe i,itatute 
of New Hampshire went further thuo the 
statute of Mn1111achuHetts co1111idered in 
Emery·e Case, because It provided that the 
wltnP1:1s shoulfl not he thereartm· prose-
cute!] for any offense so dl11closed by him; 
that the wlt11e11e had. under the stu tute, 
nil the fJrotecllon which the l'ommon.Jnw 
right, adopted by the bill of rl~htll In Its 
conunnn-law sense, gave him; that, ff he 
should he pro1:1ecute•I, a plea tbot he had 
dl11elosed the same offense on a lawful 
accusation against his 11rlnclpal would 
be a perft>t•t an11wer In bur or abat1•ment 
or the pro11ec11tlon against hlm,..elf; and 
tho t, nnleN& he should testify, the motion 
for the a.thtchment must be granted. 
In l~o. In La Fontaine v. Southern Un-
derwriters,~ N. C. 132, the com1tltntlon 
of North Carolina of 11'176 had provided, 
in the clecll1ratlon or rights, (article 1, § 
11,) that, "In all criminal prosecutions 
every man has the right • • • to 
• • • not he c:ompelled to give evidence 
against himself." One Blncknnll, as a 
witness In a hearing before a referee In a 
civil Rutt, had refm1ed to answer a ques-
tion 88 to hill po1:111eHelon of cC'rtalu books, 
on the gronnd that Indictments were 
pending against lllw, connected with the 
419 
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management of the affairs oi’ the associa-
tion owning the books, and that his an-
swer to the question might tend to crim-
inate him. The case was heard before an
inferior state court, which ruled that he
must answer the question. On appeal to
the supreme court of North Carolina, it
held that the fair interpretation of the
constitutional provision was to secure n
person who was or might be accused of
crime from making any compulsory rev-
elations which might be used in evidence
against him on his trial for the offense;
that, as the witness was protected from
the consequences of the discovery. and the
facts elicited could be given in evidence in
no criminal prosecution to which they
were pertinent, the plaintiff in the case
was entitled to all the information which
the witness possessed, whether it did or
did not implicate the witness in a framin-
lent transaction; that the inquiry could
not be evaded upon any ground of the
self-criminatlng answer which might foi-
low, although the answers of the witness
:ould not be used against him in any
criminal proceeding whatever; and that
his constitutional right not to “he com-
pelled to give evidence against himself”
Wolll-'i be maintained intact and full.
In Temple v. (‘om., 75 Va. 892, in 1881,»
the same section l0 oi article i oi the hill
oi rights of the constitution oi Virginia oi
1870. that was considered in (‘alien v.
(,‘om., supra, wns in iorce. An indictment
had been found by a grand jury. on the
evidence of Temple, against one Berry for
setting up a lottery. On the trial oi Berry
before the petlt ]ury,Tcmple refused to
testif_v,on the ground that by so doing he
would crin-inate himself; and for such re-
fusal he was fined and imprisoned for con-
tempt hy the hustings court. The case
was taken to the court oi appeals by writ
of error. That court cited with approval
Cullen's Case, supra, and held that it was
applicable. it appeared that in the hus-
tings court the attorney ior the common-
wealth was asked whether any proscen-
tion was pending against Temple in that
court, or whether it was the intention ‘of
such attorney to institute a pro._t.ling
against Temple for being concerned in a.
lottery, to both of which questions he re-
plied in the negative.
The court of appeals held that Temple
had a right to stand upon his constitu-
tional privilege, and not to trust to the
chances oi.a further prosecution; that the
court could offer him no indemnity that
he would not be further prosecuted, nor
could the attorney forthecommon wealth;
that Temple had a right to remain silent
whenever any question was asked him,
the answer to which might tend to crim-
inn te himself; that the great weight of
authority in the United States was in
favor of the rule that, when a witness on
oath declared his belief that his answer
would tend to criminnte himself, the
court could not compel him to answer, un-
less it was perfectly clear. from a careful
consideration of all the circumstances in
the case. that the witness was mistaken,
and that the answer could not possibly
have such a tendency; and that the hus-
tings court had no right to compel Tem-
pie to answer the question propounded
to him. and to fine and imprison him for
his refusal to answer it. The court fur-
ther held that the statute oi the state
which provlded that no witness giving
evidence in a prosecution for unlawful
gaming should ever be proceeded against
for any offense of unlawful gaming com-
mitted by him at the time and place
indicated in such prosecution did not
apply to the case then in hand, because set-
ting up a. lottery was not within the stat-
ute against uniawful gaming. 'I‘hejudg-
ment oi the hustings court was reversed.
In Boyd v. U. S.,1l6 U. S. 6l6, 6 Sap. Ct.
Rep. 524, in 1886, this court, in considering
the fifth amendment to the constitution of
the United States, which declares that no
person “shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself," and
the fourth amendment. which declares
that the right oi the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures. shall not be violated, sairl, speaking
by Mr.Justice BnAm.1:\'.(pageii3l,ll6Li.S.,
and page 533, 6 Sup. (‘t. Rep.:) “And any
compulsory discovery by extorting the
party's oath,or compelling the produc-
tion of his private books and papers, to
convict him oi crime, or to forfeit his prop-
erty, is contrary to the principles of a free
government. it is abhorrent to the in-
stincts oi an Englishman; it is abhorrent
to theinstincts of an American. it may
suit the purposes of despotic power; but
it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of
political liberty and personalfreedom.“ It
was further said. (page 633, 116 U. S., and
page 534, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.:) “We have
already noticed the intimate relation be-
tween the two amendments. They throw
great light on each other. For the‘un-
reasonable searches and seizures’ con-
demned in the fourth amendment are al-
most always madeforthe purpose of com-
pelllng a man to give evidence against
himself, which in criminal cases is con-
demned in the fifth amendment; and com-
pciling a mun ‘in a criminal case to he a
witness against himself.’ which is con-
demned ln the fifth amendment. throws
light on the question as to whnt is an
‘unreasonable search and seizure‘ within
the meaning of the fourth amenduncnt.
And we have been nimble to perceive that
the seizure oi a man's private hooks and
papers to he used in evidence against him
is substantially different from compelling
him to be a witness against himself. We
think it is within the clear intent and
meaning of those terms. * " ' As.
therefore. suits for penalties and forfeit-
ures incurred by the commission of oi-
fenses against the law are of this quasi
criminal nature, we think that they are
within the reason of criminal proceedings
for all the purposes oi the fourth amend-
ment oi the constitution. and of that por-
tion of the iifthamendlnent which dccla res
that no person shall he compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against him-
self; and we are further oi opinion that a
compulsory production oi the private
books and papers of the owner oi goods
sought to be forfeited in sucha suit is
compelling him to be a witness against
420
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mBnnzement or tlrn 11nnll'8 or thl' nR!'lodn-
tlon owning the books, and thut hlH nn-
Rwer to the 11uestlon might tend to crlm-
lnate him. The case wns heard befon> an 
lnlerlor stnte court, which rult:d that he 
must an;iwer the qneRtloo. On appl'al to 
the supreme eourt of North Uarollna, It 
held that the fair In terr, re ta tton of the 
constitutional provision waa,i to secure R 
perRun who waH or might be accused of 
crime from making any compulsory rE'v-
elatlons which might be uRed In evhJence 
81P.'alnst him on his trial for the offense; 
that, ae the witness was proteeted from 
the conRequeucee of the dlsco\•ery, and the 
facts ellclt!'d could be given In evl<lent'e In 
no erlmlnnl proHe<>utlol'l to whleh they 
were pertinent, the plaintiff In the caRe 
waK entitled to All the Information which 
the wltneRs posResse1J, whether It did or 
dlll not lm111lcate t11e wltnesR to a fra111lu-
lent tranRAetfon: that the Inquiry l'onld 
out be evaded upou any grouud of thu 
11elf-eriminatlng am1wer which ml:tht fol-
low, althoulP.'b the answers of the witness 
::ould not be uRed aitalnat him In any 
rrlmlnal proce!'dlng whatever; and t!l!lt 
hlR constitutional rlirht not to" ht' com-
pelled to aclve evl•lence airnlnst hlmRell" 
woulil be maintained lntnct and full. 
In Temple v. Com., i5 Va. '>'92, In 18Rl, 
the sit nm lll>ctlon 10 of article 1 of the bill 
or rlghtK of the constitution of Vlr2initt of 
11\70. tlrnt wne conHldered In Cullen v. 
Com., supra, w1111 In force. An Indictment 
bud been found by a grand jury. on the 
evldPnce or Temple, against oue Hl'rry for 
setting uµ a luttery. On thetrlal uf .Berry 
before the petlt Jury, Temple refused to 
testlf.v, on the ground thut hy 110 dulng he 
woukl c·1·in.lnate himHelf; and for such re-
fmml he waR fined and Imprisoned for con-
tempt hy the huetl11ge court. The enHe 
was tu ken tu the court of appeals by writ 
of error. 'fhat court cited with approntl 
Cullen's Case, 11111>ra, and held that It was 
applicable. Jt appeared that In th~ hus-
tings court the attorney for the common· 
wealth Wlll! aHked whether an.r pr1111ece-
tfon was pPn!llmr ag1:1inst Temple In thut 
court, or whether It was the lutenlhn ·or 
11m·h uttomey tu Institute a pru, . uling 
aJtainst Temple for IJeinlP.' concerned In a 
lottery, to both of which questions he re-
plied In thE' npgn tive. 
The court of er>peals held that Temple 
bad a rtgh t to stand u11on hie cons tit U· 
tlonnl prlvllPg<', und not to trust to the 
-chanceH of.a further prosreutlon: thnt the 
court coulll offer him 110 Indemnity that 
he would not be further proeecute1I, nor 
('OU Id the attorntiy for thrcotnmon wealth; 
that Temple hurl a right to remain silent 
whene\·er any question wm1 nKkl'cl him, 
the 1:1nHwer to which might tend to crlm-
frrnte hilliHt>lf; tl1at the grent wPlght of 
a11thorit.v In the United :Stnte!! was In 
favor uf the rnle thut. when a witness on 
oath decloretl his bt>llt."f that his anRwer 
woulcJ t!'nd to crimlnute himself, the 
Cl1urt could not co11111L•I him toan11wer, un-
lt>!'l4 It was 11erfectly ch·ur, from 11 careful 
t•om;ideratlon of all the clrcum11tnnce11 In 
tht> caRe. thut the witneRR was ml11t11ken, 
and that the am~wer could not pol!!lihly 
hn ,.e 11uch u teu<lency: end thnt the hus-
llng!I court bad no right to compel Tem-
'20 
11le to answer the question propounded 
to lllm, anll to fine and Imprison him for 
his t•cfuRal to answer It. The court fur-
ther held that the stetute or the state 
which provided thAt no witness giving 
evldE>nce In a prosecution for onlawfol 
11:nmlng should ever be prqceeded against 
for any ofte1111e of unlawful gaming com-
mitted by him at the time and plac.-e 
Indicated In such prosecution dlt1 not 
apply to the CAl!e then In hand, becnuRe et•t-
tfng op a lottery wait not within the stat-
ute against unln wful gaming. 'l'he Jmlg-
ml'nt or the hu11ting11 court was revPrlled. 
Jn Boyd v. (T. S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 Slip. Ct. 
Rep. 524, 111 1AA6, thlR court, In considering 
the fifth amendment to the coni~tltu lion of 
the United States, which declares thAt no 
pereon "11ball he t'ompelled In anyrrlmlnal 
case to be I\ witness a~nlnet himself," And 
the fourth nmE'ndment, which dPClarPe 
that the right of the people to he secure In 
theh· persons, houses, 11apers, 11od erleets, 
agalnRt onrensonahle searches oml ~elz­
ur~. 11hall not bfl violated, seltl, spenking 
by Mr. JuKtit'e BnADl.EY,(pnlP.'cli3l, 116 li. 8., 
and puge 5;:1!i, 6 !Sup. Ct. Rep.:) "And any 
compulsory dlRcovery by extorting the 
party's oath, or compelling the produc-
tion of bis }lrlvate books and pn11ers, to 
convh·t him uf c1ime, or to forfeit hie prop. 
erty, le coutrary to the principles of a free 
government. It le ahhorrPut to tht> lu-
Rtl111.·ts of an En~lishruen; ft Is alJhorn•nt 
to the lnstlnrtH of an American. It may 
suit the purposes of d~potlc powE'r; but 
It eannot abide thP. pure atmo11plwre of 
pollth·nl liberty and penmnAI freedom." It 
was further said, <1u1;:r:e oaa. 116 u. s., tt.nd 
11age 534, 6 !Sup. Ct. HPt). :) "We hnve 
ulrcudy noticed the Intimate relation be-
tween the two amE>udment11. They throw 
grent li~ht un en ch other. For the' uo-
renRonable searches and erllmreli' con-
clemnPd iu the fourth amendment are al-
moRt fllwaye made for the 11ur110He of com-
pelling a man to 11:lve evldt!DCC a~nlnMt 
himself, which In criminal Ctt!!Pll le con-
demned lo the ftlth amendment; and l'\JID· 
pellln~ a mnn 'In a criminal caKe to he a 
wltue .. s agnlnRt himself.' which IR con-
demned In. the firth Amendment. throw11 
light on the qneRtion nK to whnt IH nn 
'unren1mnahle HPareh an1l KPlztirP' within 
the mennlng or the fourth a111e111l11w11t. 
And we have been unnble to p<'rcPive that 
thel1\l'lzureofa mnn'H pri\·ate hookH 1111<1 
papl'l'I! to be lll!l'<I In evldt>nre a:i;aim~t him 
le enl11stnnti111lv <1iffen•nt from !'011111elllng 
him to be a w!tiw!!s Ag11l11Rt hfms<•lf. We 
think It is within the clear intent and 
meaning of those terms. • • • As, 
therefore, suits for penalties nnd forfeit· 
ur('ll Incurred by the commh11don of uf-
fem1es 11~11ln11t the law are or thiH qu11sl 
criminal 11nture, we tbluk thnt th('y are 
within the reAl'!On of criminal proeeedin~ 
for all the pt1rp0Re11 of the fonrth amend-
ment of thl' constitution, anrl of tbut por-
tion of the Hfth Amen<lm!'nt which dC'Clures 
that no penion "'bull he compellE'tl lo nny 
criminal eaHe to be u wit1wss ugninHt him-
self; anrl we are further of opinion that ll 
compulsory 11roductlon of the prh·nte 
books and papers or the owner or ltOlHIB 
sought to be forfeited In such.a suit la 
cowpelllng him to IJe a witneu against 
1’RI VILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
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himself, within the meaning of the fifth
amendment to the constitution, and is
the equivalent of n search and selzure——and'
an unreasonable searchand sci1.ure—with-
in the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Though the proceeding in question is di-
vested of many of the aggravating inci-
dents of actual search and seizure, yei:,
as before said, it contains their substance
and essence, and effects their substantial
purpose. it may he that it is the obnox-
ious thingin its mildest and least repul-
sive form: butillegitimate and unconstitu-
tional practices get their first footing in
that way, namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure. This can only be obviated by
adhering to the rule that constitutional
provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction deprives
them oi half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it
consisted more in sound than in sub-
stance. it is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of
the citizen, and against any stealthy en-
croachmentsthercou. Thcirmottoshould
be ohsta prim-ipiis. ”
In that case, the fifth section oi the act
of June 22, 1874, (18 St. 157,1 which slither-
ized the court in revenue cases to require
the defendant or claimant to produce his
private papers in court, or else the allega-
tions of the government's attorney would
be taken as confessed, was held to be un-
constitutional and void, as applied to a
suit for a penalty or to establish 0. forfeit-
are of the goods of the party, because it
was repugnant to the fourth and fifth
amendments to the constitution: and it
was held that a proceeding to forfeit the
goods was a criminal case, within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. Mr.
Justice i\lI|.1.r:R, in the concurring opinion
of himself and Chief Justice \VArrE in the
case, agreed that it was a criminnione,
within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment, and that the effect of the act of con-
gress was to compel the party on whom
the order of the court was served to be a
witness against himself.
in People v. i~iharp,107 N.Y. 427, 14 N. E.
Rep. 319, in 1887, the court of appeals of
New York had under consideration the
provision of article 1, § 6, of the constitu-
tion of New York of 1846, that no person
shall "be compelled, in any criminal case.
to he n witness against himself,” and the
provision ofscction 79 of the Penal (‘ode of
New York, tit. 8, c. 1. in regard to bribery
and corruption, which was in these
words: "A person offending against any
provision of any foregoing section of this
Code relating to brlberyis a competent
witness against another person so offend-
ing, and may be compelled to attend and
testify upon any trial, hearing, proceed-
ing, or investigation, in the same manner
as any other person. But the testimony
so given shall not be used in any prosecu-
tion or proceeding, civil or criminal,
against the person so testifying. A per-
son so testifying to the giving of a bribe
which has been accepted shall not there-
after be liable to indictment. prosecution,
or punishment for that bribery, and may
plead or prove the giving of testimony
accordingly, in bar of such an indictment
or prosecution.” Sharp and others were
indicted for bribing n member of the com-
mon council, and Sharp was tried sepa-
rately. It was proved that he had been
examined as a witness before a committee
of the state senate. and there gave testi-
mony which the prosecution claimed was
evidence of his complicity in the crime;
and that testimony was offered in evi-
dence by the prosecution. The testimony
had been given under the compulsion of a
subpmna. and was admitted at the trial,
against the objection that the disclosures
beiore the senate committee were privi-
leg-ed. The court of appeals held that sec-
tion 79 of the Penal Code made the consti-
tutional privilege inapplicable. because it
indemnified or protected the party against
the consequences of his previous testi-
mony. The court clted with approval the
case of People v. Kelly, supra.
in Bcdgood v. h'tate,115 Ind. 275, 17 N.
E. Rep. 621, in IRSS, the supreme court of
Indiana had under consideration the pro-
vision of article l, § 14, of the bill of rights
of the constitution of ' Indiana of 1851,
which provides that “no person in any
criminal prosecution shall be compelled to
testify against himself." and the provision
of section 1800 of the Revised Statutes of
Indiana of 1881, to the effect that testi-
mony given by a witness should not be
used in any prosecution against him. On
a trial before a potii: jury in a criminal
case against others, a woman had re-
fused to answer a question.on the ground
that the answer might crlminatc her.
The supreme court held that, as the stat-
ute prohibited her testimony from being
used against her, it completely protected
her, and the judgment was reversed be-
cause the trial court had erroneously re-
ililS8(.l to require her to answer the ques-
t on.
This review of the cases above referred
to shows that in the constitutions ofGeor-
gia, California, and New York the provis-
ion is identically or substantially that of
the constitution of the United States,
namely, that no person shall “ be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness
against hlmseii;” while in the constitu-
tions of Pennsylvania. Arkansas, Indiana,
Massacliusctts, Virginia, New Hamp-
shire, und North Carolina it is different in
language, and to the effect that “no man
can he compelled to give evidence against
himsclf;” or that. in prosecutions, the ac-
cuser “shall not be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself;" or that “no per-
son in any criminal prosecution shall be
compelled to testify against hhnself;" or
that no person shall be “compelled to ac-
cuse or furnish evidence against himself;"
or that no man can “be compelled to give
evidence against himself;” or that, in all
criminal prosecutions,“ every man has the
right to not be compelled to give evidence
against himself. "
Under the constitutions of Arkansas,
Georgia, California, Indiana, New York,
New Hampshire, and North Carolina it
was held that a given statutory provision
made it lawinl to compel a witness to tes-
tify; while in Massachusetts and Virginia
it was held that the statutory provisions
were inadequate, in view oi the constitu-
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:PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. [Case No. 143 
himeeU, within thA meaning of the ftfth 
amen1tment to the constitution, and J., 
the equivalent of o sean:b and seizure-and· 
1tn uorea11onahle t1earch aotl Reizure-wlth-
ln tbe meaning of the fourth amendment. 
Tbougb the procl>eUing In question le di-
vested of muny of the aggravating Inci-
dents or act11al search anu seizure, yet, 
as hefore s11id, It contalnK their sul111ta11ce 
and e1>Hence, and effects their 11ubstantlal 
purpoHt>. It may be that It le the oh11ox-
lou11 thing In lt11 mild~st and lea11t repul-
sive form; bn t lllegl tlma tl' anu unconstitu-
tional practke11 get their first footing in 
that way, namely, by silent approaches 
and slight dt>viatlons from legal modes of 
procedure. '!'bis can only be obviated by 
adhering to the rule thftt con11tltutional 
prm•lelons for the eP.curlty of per11on and 
property should be llherally construed. 
A close and llterul construction deprlvt'll 
them of half thc:>ir effic'lry, and leads to 
gradual deprecla tion of the right, ae If It 
com1!sted more In souud than In sub-
stance. It Is the duty of coui·t11 to be 
watchful for the constitutional rights of 
the cltlzPn, amt agulm1t any stealthy en-
croachments thereon. Their mutto 11hould 
be obHtR prlnclplis." 
In that caee, the fifth section of the act 
of June 22, 1~74, (18 tlt. 187, 1 which author-
ised the court In revenue cases to require 
the defendant or claimant to produce hie 
private papers in court, or el11e the allega-
tiom1 of the government's attorney would 
be taken aa conft>Bsed, was held to be un-
comitltutlonal and void, as applied to a 
suit fur a penalty or to establish a forfeit-
ure of the goods of the party, because It 
was repugnant to tht> fourth and fifth 
amendment11 to the constltntlon; and It 
was ht>ld that a proceeding to forfeit the 
goods was a criminal c1111e, wllhln the 
mt>anlnp: of the fifth amendment. Mr. 
Justice Mll.LER, In the concurriug opinion 
of hln111elf and Chief Ju11tice WAITE In the 
caHe, a-"reed that It was a criminal one, 
within the meaning of the ftfth amend· 
ment, and that the erfect of the act of con-
gress was to compel the part.v on whom 
the order of the court was Perved to be a 
witness against blm11elf. 
Jn People v. 8harp, 107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 
Rep. 319, In 1887, the court nf appeals of 
Sew York had unuer consideration the 
provision of article 1, § 6, of the conetltn-
tlon of New York of 1846, that no person 
shall" be compelled, In any criminal ca11e, 
to he a witness against hlm11eH," and the 
pro\·lslon of section 79 llf the Penal Code of 
New York, tit. 8, c. l, In re1tard to brlb<.'ry 
and corruption, which was In these 
worcls: .. A person offendlnp: against any 
provl11lon of any forl'!going 11ectlon of this 
Code relating to brlhery 111 a competent 
wltne11s a~alnet another per11..>n so orfeud-
lng, aud may be compelled to attend and 
testify upon any triul, henrlnp;, procee<1-
ing, or Investigation, In the 11ame manner 
as any other person. But the testimony 
so given shall not be used In any proHecu-
tlon or proceeding, civil or criminal, 
against the person so testifying. A ptir-
eon so testl!ylng to the a:lvlug of a bribe 
which has been acc:>eptecl shall not there-
aftf'r be liable to Indictment. prosecution, 
or panlshmt>nt for that bribery, and may 
plead or prove the giving of testimony 
accordingly, In bar of such an Indictment 
or prmiecutlon." Sharp and others were 
Indicted for bribing a member of the com-
mon council, and 8hnrp was tried sepa-
rutel~·. It was proved that he had been 
examined as a witness before a committ1>e 
of the etnte 11en11te, and tht>re gave testi-
mony whil'h th" prosecution clulmed was 
e\·luence of hie co:npllclt,v In the crime; 
an<l that te11tlmo'ly was offered In evi-
dence by the prosecution. The testimony 
had been gl ven under the compulsion of 11 
eubp<Pna, und was admitted at the trial, 
ap;ulnet the objection that the disclosures 
before the eeuate committee were privi-
leged. '!'be court of a11pe&l11 held th11t sec-
tion 79 of the Penal Code maue the consti-
tutional prh·llege lnappllcal.Jle, hecnm1e it 
lndemnlfl<'d or protected the pnrt.v n~al1111t 
the con11equencee of hh prevlonK te1:1tl-
mony. The court cited with approval the 
c1111e of People v. Kelly, supra. 
In Bedgood v. 8tate, 115 Ind. 275, 17 N. 
E. Rep. U21, In 1888, the supremti court of 
ln<Jiftna hau under consideration the 1n·o-
vlslon of ftrticle 1, § 14, of the bill of rights 
of the constitution of· Indiana of 18.il, 
whkh provides that "no person In any 
Cl'lminal prost>cutlun ehRll be compelled to 
testlry aJ?,alnet himself," And the provli;lon 
of sectlf)D 1800 of tile HevlHed 8tututes of 
Inulana of 1881, to the effect tint tei<tl-
muny gtven by a witness ebuuld not be 
need In any prosecution against him. On 
a trlul before a p1?tlt Jury iu a crlmlnul 
case against otbel's, a woman had re· 
fui1ed to an11wer a queetioo,on the grouud 
that the am1wer might crlmlnatc her. 
The 11uvreme court held that, as the stat-
ute prohibited her testimony from being 
URed against lier, It completely protected 
her, and the Juugment was reversed be-
cau11e the trial court hacl erroneously re-
fused to reqnire ber to answer the ques-
tion. 
Thie review of the casPs abo\"e referred 
to shows that In the conetltatloneofGeor-
gla, California, and New York the provis-
ion is Identically or eubstantlall,v that of 
the constitution of the United States, 
namely, that noper11on shall .. be compelled 
tu any crlmlottl case to be a wltne11s 
against himself;" w bile in the constlt u-
tlooe of Pennsylvania, Arkansa11, Indiana, 
Massar.hu11etts, Virginia, New Hamp-
shire, nnd North Carolina ft ls different In 
hrngunge, and to the P.ffect that" no m1m 
cun hP. compelled to give evidence agah111t 
himself;" or that, In prosecutions, the 11c-
cu11ed "shall not be compelled to give evi-
dence agalnHt hi meelf;" or that "no per-
son In any criminal pro11ecutlon shall be 
compelleu to testify against hhnHelf;" or 
that no person 11hall be "compellP.u to nc-
cnee or fnrnl"'h evidence ngalnst himself; n 
or that no man can "he compelled to give 
evidence a~alnet himself;" or that, In all 
criminal prusecutluns,"every man has the 
right to not be !~ompelled to give evidence 
agaln11t himself." 
Under the constltutlllnB or Arkamms, 
Georgia, California, Indiana, New York, 
New Hampshire, and North Carolina it 
was held that a given statutory provl11lon 
made It lnwinl tu compel a wltnesH totes-
tlf,v; while In M11e11achusette and Virginia 
it was held that the statutory provisions 
were Inadequate, In view of the constltu-
.. ..,1 
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tional provision. In New Hampshire, and
in New York under the Penal Code, it was
held that the statutory provisions were
sufficient to supply the place of the consti-
tutional provision, because, by statute,
the witness was entirely relieved from
prosecution.
But, as the manifest purpose of the con-
stitutional provisions, both of the states
and of the United States, is to prohibit
the compelling of testimony of a self-crim-
inating kind from a party or a witness,
the liberal construction which must be
placed upon constitutional provisions for
the protection oi personal rights would
seem to require that the constitutional
guaranties, however differently worded,
should have as far as possible the same
interpretation: and that where the consti-
tution, as in the cases oi Massachusett
and New Hampshire, declares that the
subject shall not be “compelled to accuse
or furnish evidenceagninst himself, "such
.1 provision should not have a different in-
terpretation from that which belongs to
constitutions like those of the United
States and of New York, which declare
that no person shall be “compelled in any
criminal case to be u witness against him-
self.” Under the rulings above referred
to by Chief Justice 1\IAltSHAi.L and by this
court, and those in Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Virginia, the judgment of
the circuit court in the presentcase cannot
be sustained. It is a reasonable construc-
tion, we think, oi the constitutional pro-
vision,that the witness is protected " from
being compelled to disclose the circum-
stances of his offense, the sources from
which, or the means by which, evidence
of its commission, or of his connection
with it, may be obtained,or madceffectuai
for his conviction, without using his an-
swers as direct admissions against him. "’
Emery’s Case, 107 Mass. l72, 182.
lt is quite clear that legislation cannot
abridge a constitutional privilege, and
that it cannot replace or supply one, at
least unless it is so broad as to have the
same extent in scope and effect. It is to
be noted of section 860 oi’ the Revised Stat-
utes that it does not undertake to compel
self-crlminating evidence from a party or
a witness. In severalof the state statutes
above referred to thetestlmonyof the par-
ty or witness is made compulsory, and in
some either all possibility of a future pros-
ecution of the party or witness is distinct-
ly taken away, or he can plead in bar or
abatement the fact that he was compelled
to testify.
422
We are clearly of opinion that no stat-
ute which leaves the party or witness
subject to prosecution after he answers
the criminating question put to him can
have the effect of suppianting the privi-
lege conferred by the constitution of the
United States. Section 860 of the Revised
Statutes does not supply a complete pro-
tection from all the perils against which
the constitutional prohibition was de-
signed to guard. and is not a full substi-
tute for that prohibition. in view of the
constitutional provision, a statutory en-
actment, to be valid, must afford absolute
immunity against future prosecution for
the offense to which the question relates.
In this respect, we give our assent rather
to the doctrine of Emery‘s Case, in Massa-
chusetts, than to that of People v. Kelly.
in New York; and we consider that the
ruling of this court in Boyd v. U. S., su-
pra, supports the vlew we take. Section
860, moreover, affords no protection
against that use of compelled testimony
which consists in gaining therefrom a
knowledge of the details of a crime, and
of sources of information which may sup-
ply other means of convicting the witness
or party.
It is ‘contended on the part of the appel-
lee that the reason why the courts in \‘ir-
ginia, Massachusetts, and New Hamp-
shire have field that the exonerating
statute must be so broad as to give the wit-
ness complete amnesty is that the consti-
tutions of those states give to the witness
a broader privilege and exemption than
is granted by the constitution of the [Tuit-
ed States, in that their language is that
the witness shall not be compelled to ac-
cuse himself, or furnish evidence against
himself, or give evidence against himself;
and it is contended that the terms of the
constitution of the United States, and of
the constitutions of Georgia, California,
and New York, are more restricted. But
we are of opinion that, however this dif-
ference mayhave been commented on in
some of the decisions, there is really, in
spirit and principle, no distinction arising
out of such difference of language.
From a consideration of the language
of the constitutional provision and of all
the authorities referred to, we are clearly
of opinion that the appellant was enti-
tled to refuse, as he did, to answer. The
judgment of the circuit court must there-
fore be reversed, and the case remanded to
that court, with a direction to discharge
the appellant from custody on the writ
of llabeas corpus.
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Case No. 143] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
tlonal provision. Jn New Hampshire, and 
in New York under the Penal Code, It was 
held that the 11tRtutory provisions were 
t1ulttelent to 1rnpply the 11l11ce of the conetl-
tutlonal provision, because, by Rtatnte, 
the wltnPRS was entirely relieved from 
prosecution. 
But, as the manifest purpose of the coo-
stltu tlonal provislom1, buth or the sttttf'll 
aud (Jf the Uolterl States, Is to prohibit 
the compelling of testimony of a self-crlm-
lnatln11: kind from a party or 8 wltneBB, 
the llhPrul construction which mm1t be 
placed npon com1tlt11tionnl provllllonR for 
the protl'Ctlon or 11er1mnal rights wonld 
St'em to require that the con11tltutlon11l 
gunrnntlee, bowe'l'er differently worded, 
shonld hnvo 88 far 88 posRlble the same 
Interpretation; 1md that whPre the constl-
tntlon. as In the cases of Ma11RachuRetts 
and New Hampshire, declares that the 
tmhjPct shall not be "compellefl to accnse 
.ir fnrnleh evldenceagnlnet nlm11elf, "such 
..l provision should not have a diffeI"Pnt ln-
terpretu tlon from that w hlrh helongs to 
conRtitutlons like those of the tlnlted 
State-R and of ~ew York, whll•h declare 
thut no person sh11ll be "com11elled In any 
criminal ra11e to be- ll wltneH11 ngulm1t hlm-
sdr." Under the rullngH nbove referred 
to by Chief Jm1tlce l\IAW!HAl.L und by this 
conrt, and tho11e In MaHsachusette, ~ew 
HompRblre, and Virginia, the Judgment of 
the circuit court In the present case cannot 
be 11ustni11ecl. It Is a rPasonahle con11trnc· 
tlon, we think, or the constltutlunol pru-
vi ... 1011, thnt the wltne111< le protected" from 
being compelled to disclose the ch-cum· 
stnnreA of his offense, the 11ource11 from 
which, or the- means by which, e\·ldence 
of ltR commission, or of his counectlon 
with It, may be obtained, or modeeffoctuul 
for hlf! conviction, without using his an· 
Mwers as direct admis1dons ngolnst him." 
Emer.r'11 Cose, 107 .Mas11. 172, 182. 
It Is qnite clear that legislation cannot 
a brldite a con11tltutlonal prl vllege, and 
that It cannot replace or supply one, at 
le8f;t unleMR It h1 so broad as to havo the 
same extent In scope and effect. It ls to 
be notecl of 11ectlon 1!60 of tbeRevlMed Stat· 
utl'H tho t it iloes not undertake tu l'ompPI 
self-crlmlnatlng evidence from a party or 
a witues~. In se\'eralof the state etatutt's 
above referred to thetestlmonyof tht>par-
ty or witness Is made com1)Ulsory, anrt In 
some either all posRlblllty of a future pro11-
f'Cu tlon of the party or wltneP11 Is distinct-
ly tuken away, or he can plead In bar or 
al.att>ment the fR.ct that he was compelled 
to testify. 
422 
We are clearly of opinion that oo Mtat-
nte which leaves the party or wltneHH 
1mbJe<:t to prosecution after he answers 
the crlmlnatlng que11tlon put to him can 
have the effert or supplantln11: the prl¥l-
lege ronferred by the constitntion or the 
United Stote11. Section ~O of the Revised 
l-ltatutei1 does not supply a complete pru-
tPCtlon from all tbP perils against whirh 
the con11tltutlon11l prohihltlon WOK de-
shcned to guarrl. 11nd Is not a full substi-
tute for that prohlllltlon. In view of the 
con11titutlonal pro,·ielon, a 11tatutory en-
actauent, to be valid, must arforrl ahsulute 
hnmnnlty egalnRt future pro11t'Cutloo for 
thl' offense- to which the queHtlon relate11. 
In this respect, we give our assent rather 
tu the doctrine of Emery'11 C'o11e, in Mm•1<a-
ch11Flettto, than to that or People v. Kelly, 
In New York; and we comllder thttt the 
ruling <.1f thlH court In Bo.r1l v. U. S., su-
pra, supp(Jrts the view we take. Se1·tlon 
860, moreover, a 0fforrl11 no protection 
against that use or com11elled te11timony 
whleh co1111l11ts In galn!ng therPfrom a 
knowledge of the details of a erime, and 
of snurrPs of Information which may sup-
ply other means of convicting the witness 
or party. 
Ith! eon tended on tlu~ pnrt of the appel-
lee that the rea1mn why the courtR In Ylr-
Jl;inla, !\la11snch11sefts, 11nrt New Hamp-
shire hnve lwld that the exonerating 
etetnte mn11t be 110 broad UR to gh-e- the wlt-
ne11s completA emneRty le that the c·onsti-
tutlonR of thoRe states irlve to thl• witness 
a broader pri \'liege and exemption than 
Is gr1111te1l hy the COllHtlt:ntlon or the Fult-
ed l;tuteH, In that th<•lr lungnage 111 that 
the wltneRR shall not he compelled tu ac-
cuse himself, or furnish evldt>nce BKRln11t 
hlm11elf, or give e\'ldenl'e ngninst himself; 
and It Is contended that the terms of the 
constitution of the r~nltPd States, and of 
the constitutions of Georgia, California, 
end New York, are more restricted. But 
we ore of GJJlnion that, however this dif-
ference may bave been commented on lo 
some. of the decisions, tlwre Is really, In 
spirit and principle, no dfl.itlnctlon arising 
ont or 1111eh difference of l>tnguoge. 
From a con11lcJera tlon of the lnngua1te 
or th" constitutional provision and of nil 
the authorities referred to, we are clearly 
of opinion that the ap(>t'llant was e11tl-
tled to refuse, as he did, to an11wer. The 
Judgment of the circuit court muRt there-
fore be rever11ed, and the case re111anded to 
that court, with a direction to dlRcharge 
the Appellant from custody on the writ 
or habeas corp11s. 
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE.
[Case No. 144
STATE v. PETERS.
(12 S. E. T4, 107 N. C. 876.)
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
1890.
Nov. 6,
Indictment for perjury, tried before Wo- J
MACK, J., and a jury, at May term, 1890. of
Guilford superior court. The indictment
was as follows: “The jurors for the state
upon their oath present that George Pe-
ters, of Guilford county, did unlawfully
commit perjury upon the trial of an action
in the mayor's court oi the city of Greens-
boro, before Jame W. Forbes, mayor, in
Guilford county, wherein the state was
plaintiff and Amos Phillips was defendant,
by falselyasserting on oath that he (mean-
ing the said George Peters) had not pur-
chased any spirituous liquors from Amos
Phillips less than half a pint on Sunday,
April 27, 1890, knowing the said statement
to be false, or being ignorant whether or
not said statement was true, against the
form of the statute in such case made and
provided, and against the peace and dig-
nity of the state. ” The false swearing was
alleged to have taken place before the
mayor of Greensboro, in the trial of Amos
Phillips upon the following warrant,
which was introduced in evidence: “State
and City of Greensboro against Amos
Phillips, before James W. Forbes, mayor.
Warrant for retailing. State of North
Carolina to the Chief of Police of the City
of Greensboro, or other lawful officer of
Guiiford (.‘ounty,—Greeting: Whereas,
complaint has been made before me this
day, on the oath of W. J. Weather-ly, that
Amos Phillips, on or about the 28th day
of April, 1890, with force and arms, at and
in the county aforesaid. and within the
city limits, did willfully and unlawfully
sell spirituous liquors inside the corpora-
tion to one George Pcters,in quantity less
than five gallons, without having license,
against the statute in such cases made
and provided, against the pence and dig-
nity of the state, and in violation of the
city ordinance, (section 8, c. 15, p. ll0:)
These are therefore to command you forth-
with to apprehend the said Amos Phillips,
and him have before me at the mayor's
office. then and there to answer the said
charge, and be dealt with according to law.
Given undermy hand and seal this 7th day
of May, A. D. 1890. Jss. W. Fonnl-:s, May-
or. [Seal.]” The evidence is substantial-
ly stated in the opinion. The jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty. Motion in ar-
rest of judgment, on the ground that the
indictment was not sufficient in its aver-
ments to charge the crime of perjury. Mn-
tion denied. Sentence pronounced as in
the record from which defendantappeuled.
The Attorney General, for the State.
John W. Graham, for defendant.
CLARK, J., (after stating the facts as
above.) The defendant’s counsel asked a
witness, “ Was not the warrant on which
Amos Phillips was tried issued without a
sworn complaint or affidavit being made
by any person whatever?” The indict-
ment charged the perjury to have been
committed in that trial. The question
was ruled out on objection by the state,
and defendant excepted.
In State v. Bryson, 84 N. C. 780, Assn,
J.. in construing the act which is now
Code, § 1133, says that no written affida-
vit or complaint is essential, and that the
appellate court “can onlylook at the war-
rant which is the complaint," and “can-
not look hehind the warrant for objec-
tions lying in the defects or irregularities
of the preliminary evidence. ” If the objec-
tion now made could not have availed
Phillips on appeal :1 fortiori. it could not
he raised in this collateral way by the de-
fendant. In England, where a written in-
formation on oath, it seems, is necessary
to the validity of a warrant, it was held
by a full bench in the court of criminal ap-
peals in a recent cas-e—(iieg. v. Hughes. 14
(‘ox, Crlm. Cas. 284 (187i))—tliat on an in-
dictment for perjury, alleged to have been
committed by a witness in a case where
the warrant was issued without either
written information or any oath what-
ever. this irregularity could not avail the
witness in such case when on trial for per-
jury committed in such action any more
than whether the court in such case pro-
nounced a legal or illegal jud,e,ment.
Those are matters which concerned the
defendant in that case, but not the wit-
ness ii’ the court had jurisdiction of the
offense charged in the warrant. In State
v. Lavalicy,9 Mo. 834. the court says that
it is no defense for a person charged with
perjury to show that the court committed
error in its proceeding, provided it had ju-
risdiction of the suhject-matter and of the
parties, and that any other rule would
change the issue, so that, instead of try-
ing the defendant for false swearing, the
court would review the ' regularity and
correctness of the proceeding in another
case. In State v.Alcxander,4 Ha.wks,1H2,
the court upon the face of the warrant
had no jurisdiction of the action in which
the false oath was taken. '1‘hejurisdiction
depends not upon the affidavit preliminary
to issuing the warrant. but on the nature
of the offense charged in the warrant.
The defendant asked the court to instruct
the jury “that, as the evidence of Weath-
erly and others did not establish the fact
that the liquid which Phillips had was
spirituous, and that as their evidence,
with the other circumstances taken to-
gether, only afforded an inference that it
was spirituous liquor, it was not sufficient
to convict of an indictment for perjury, ”
and further“ that no witness corroborated
the evidence of Wea therly as to the sale by
Phillips to the defendant, nor was there
any confirmatory circumstances as to the
sale itself from Phillips to defendant. and
that it amounted only in either of above
cases to the oath of Weatherly against
the oath of Peters, the defendant, and
that such was not sufficient to warrant a
conviction for perjury.” The court did
not give these instructions, and defendant
excepted. A witness for the state testifled
that on the Saturday night beiore the
Sunday (April 27, 1890) on which the ille
gal sale of spirituous liquor by Phillips
was charged to have been committed, he
saw Phillips get a. jug of white liquid
drawn from a. barrel in a bar-room, and
pay for it, and take it and place it near
where he afterwards saw him in the alley,
on the north side oi the strcet,0n the Sun-
423
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CORHOBORA.TIVE EVIDENCE. (Caae No. 144 
STATE Y. PETERS. 
(12 S. E. 74, 107 N. C. 876.) 
Supreme Court of North Carolina. Nov. 6, 
1890. 
Indictment for perjury, tried before Wo-
MACK, J., and a Jury, at l\fay term, 1800, of 
Hnllforcl 1mperlor court. '.rhe Indictment 
was as follows: "The jurors for the ti ta te 
upon their oath present that George Pe-
ters, of Guilford county, did unluwfully 
commit perjury upon the trial of an action 
1n tbP. mayor's court of the city of Greens-
boro, before Jamee W. Forbes, mayor, lo 
Gullford county, wherein the state was 
plalntlft and Amoe Phllllps was defendant, 
by fall1ely asserting on oath that be I mean-
ing the said George Peters) had not pur-
.chnsed any 11plrltuoue liquors from Amoe 
PhllllpR les11 than hulf a pint on Sunday, 
April 'Z'I, 1~00. knowing the tiaill statement 
to be fnlse, or being hrnorant whether or 
nol said statement was true, against the 
form of the Htatute In such case made and 
provided, and against the peace and dig-
nity of the state." The falRe swearlug was 
alle~ed to have taken pince before thfl 
mayor of Greensboro, In the t1ial of Amoe 
Phillips upon the following warrant, 
which was Introduced In evidence: "State 
and City of Grecn11horo agulnet Amoe 
PhllllpK, before James W. J•orbcs, mayor. 
Warrunt for retailing. State of North 
Carolina to the CbM of Police of the City 
of Grel'nsboro, or other Ju wful officer of 
Guilford County,-Grt•etlng: Whereas, 
eo11111lalnt bas heen made berore me this 
day, on the oath of W. J. Wettthl•rly, that 
Amos Phlllipe, on or about the 28th day 
of April, 11\00, with force and armri, at aml 
In the county aforeE<nld. and within the 
city llmltti, did willfully an<t unlawfnlly 
sell spirituous liquors lmilde the corpora-
tion to one George Peterf'.l, In quuntlty Iese 
than five J?,o.llons, without ha\·lng license, 
agalnRt the statute In such cusee mude 
unrl provided, agalnrit the pence and dig-
nity of the state, nod In violutlon of the 
city ordinance, (section 8, c. 15, p. 110:) 
TheHe are therefore tocommaml you forth-
with to apprehenrJ the suld Amos PhllllpH, 
and him have before me at the ma,roi:-'s 
office, then and there to answer the said 
.charge, nnd be dealt with nccortllni;r tu law. 
Given undermyhand antl seul thh1 7th day 
of M11y. A. D.1~110. JAH. W. Fonm:s,l\Jay-
<>r. [SE'al.]" The evidence le e11bF1tantlul-
ly statl'd In the opinion. The Jury re-
turned a wrdlct of guilty. Motion In ar-
retlt of Judgment, on the ground that the 
Indictment was not sntficient In Its aver-
ments to charge the crime of perjury. Mo-
tion denied. Hentence pronouncetl UR In 
the record from whkh defendant appealed. 
The AttorneJ' <ienernl, for the State. 
John W. Graham, for defendant. 
CI.JARK, J., (after stating the facts as 
above.) The defendant's coum1el asked a 
wltneHR, "Was not the warrant on which 
Amos PhlllipK wuK tried li;Rut.'d without a 
sworn comvlulnt or affidavit being made 
by any prreon whatever?" The Indict-
ment ch11rged the perjury to have been 
committed In that trial. 'l'he IJlH'Rtion 
was ruled nut on objection by the state, 
and clefenda.nt excepted. 
In State v. Bryson, ~ N. C. 780, ABBE, 
J .. In com1trulng the act which le now 
Code,§ 113:3, says that no wrlttl'n affidt1-
vlt or complaint le e8Rentlnl, antl that the 
appellate court "can only look at the war· 
rant which le the complaint," and "can-
not look heblnd the wttrrant for otJjec-
tlone lying In the defectK or lrregnlaritlee 
of the preliminary tivldence." If the objt~­
tlon now mAde could not htt \•e &\·ailed 
Phillipe on appenl /1 fortiori. It could not 
he raised In thlR collateral way by the de-
fendi.nt. la Eup:lnnd, where tt written In-
formation on oath, It 11eeme, Is necessury 
to the vttlldlty ot s wa1-rant, It was held 
by a full bench In the court of crlmlnnl ap-
peals In a recent case-(Heg. v. Hughes. 14 
('ox, Crim. (;as. ~4 (18711)-that on an In-
dictment for perjury, alleged to have been 
committed by a wltneKe ltJ a case where 
the warrant was lsRned without either 
wrlttt>n Information or an.v oath wbnt-
e\'t'r, this Irregularity conld not avail the 
wltn1>ss In such case when on trlul for pl'r-
jury con1mitted In such action Any more 
than whether the court In tmch cnse pro. 
nounced a legal or Illegal jutl~meut. 
Those are matters which concerned the 
defendant In thn t caeP, but not the wit. 
ness If the conrt bad JurlH<lictlon of the 
offe1111e churged In the warrant. In State 
v. Lavalley,9 Mo.~. the <'ourt esys that 
It le no defense for a. person cbarj?.'ecl with 
perjury to show that the court committed 
error In Its proceeding, provlcled It had Ju-
risdiction of the snhJect-matter and of the 
parties, nnd that any other rule would 
change the Issue, eo that, Instead of try-
ing the deft>ndunt for fal1<e swearing, the 
conrt would re\•lew thP , regularity and 
correctness of the procPedlng In another 
cnse. In Stn te v. Alexander, 4 HawkR, JS:!, 
the court upon the face of the witrrant 
had no jurl1<1llctlon of the action In which 
thfl fnlse ot1th was taken. 'l'hejurlsdktion 
depends not upon the affida vlt prelhul11ary 
to h1snlnF: the warrant, bnt on the nature 
of the offense charged in the warrant. 
The defemlan t aekP<l the court to Instruct 
the Jury" that, ae the evidence of Weath-
erly and others lllcl not esta bllsh the foct 
that the liquid which l'hlllipH bad was 
spirituous, and that as their evidence, 
with the other <·ircumstanr.eR taken to-
gether, only afforded an Inference that It 
was Rplrltuous liq um-. It was not sufficient 
to convict of an Indictment for perjur.v," 
and further"'thRt no wltuesecurrohor,ntl'd 
the evidence of Weatherly as to the eule by 
Phillipe to the defendant, nor was therf' 
anv confirmatory clrcnmetanceR as to the 
suie iti;elf from Phillips to rlefendant, and 
thnt It amounted only In either of abo,·e 
cases to the oath of Weatherly against 
the oath of Peters, the defendant, and 
that such wne not sufficient to warrant a 
convktlon for perjury." The court did 
not µ:Ive these Instructions, and defendnnt 
ext•t>pted. A wltneeH for the state tl'StlttPd 
that un the Snturday night before thf 
Suntfa.y (April Zl, 1800) on which the Ille 
gal sale of Flpirltuous liquor by Pbllllpll 
was charged to have IJecn committed, he 
Bl\W Phillipe get a Jug of white liquid 
drawn from a barrel In a ba1·-room, and 
pa.y for It, and tuke It and p)uce It near 
where he afterwards saw him In the alley, 
on the north side ot the street, on the Sun-
4:!3 
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day referred to, on which day he saw Phil-
lips go to where it had been placed several
times, and return with a bottle, from
which he poured out the drinks in a. small
glass, holding much less than half a pint,
to divers colored men, who drank and
handed Phillips money, and he saw Peters
in the crowd. Another witness, one
Weatherly, testified that the liquid looked
like corn whisky; that Phillips poured it
out of a bottle into a “short" glass hold-
ing much less than half’ a. pint; that he
saw the defendant, Peters,drink, and give
Phillips a nickel, and that divers other col-
ored men came to Phillips at the same
place, in the alley on the north side of the
street, in the course of some hours. A
third witness testified to the crowd of col-
ored men coming to Phillips, who was on
the north side of the street, into the alley.
described by the other witnesses, and that
the defendant. Peters, was among them.
The witness heard money rattling out in
the alley, but did not look to see who had
it, and did not see any transaction be-
tween Phillips and Peters. There was al-
so evidence by the mayorand another wit-
ness that on the trial of Amos Phillips, the
defendant, Peters, was sworn and exam-
ined as a. witness, and testified that he did
not buy any liquor in quantity less than
half a pint from Amos Phillips on the day
testified to by the state's witnesses. and
that he was not on the north side of the
street on that Sunday. The false oath
charged in the indictment is that the de-
fendant testified at the trial of Amos Phil-
lips that “he had not purchased any spir-
ituous liquor from Amos Phillips less than
half a pint on Sunday, April 27, 1890.”
The materiality of the oath. and that the
defendant so swore, are not controverted
by any exception taken; We think there
was sufficient evidence to go to thejury
upon the question whether the liquid dis-
pensed on that occasion by Amos Phillips
was spirituous liquor. One witness testi-
ficd that he saw defendant purchase of
Amos Phillips some of the liquid in quan-
tity less than half a. pint on Sunday, April
27, 1890, and pay for it. The testimony of
other witnesses of sales by Amos Phillips
of the liquid at the same time and place to
divers others, and of defendant being in
the crowd, and on the north side of the
street, together with defendant's denial
before the mayor that he was on that
day north of the street, together with all
the circumstances in evidence, make evi-
dence corroborative of the single witness
who testifled as eye-witness of the sale by
Phillips to Peters. State v. Brown, 79 N.
C. 642. It is not required that-“the corrob-
orative circumstances should equal in
weight the testimony of one witness, but
there must be enough. in addition to the
testimony of one witness,to turn the scale
as against the weight of the prisoner's
oath on the former trial." 2 Bish. Grim.
Proc. §S71. The instructions asked were
properly refused.
The defendant moved in arrest of judg-
ment, on the ground that “the bill of in-
dictment was not sufficient in its aver-
ments to charge the crime of perjury. "
The bill of indictmentis asubstantial copy
of the form authorized by chapter 53, Acts
1889, except that it adds the formal con-
clusion, “against the form of the statute,
in such case made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the state. ”
These words are not required by the act
cited. nor are they necessary or material
in an indictment for any offense in this
state, as was held by the court in State v.
Kirkman, 104 N. C. 911, l0 S. E. Rep. 312.
The same rule obtains in England. The
House of Lords,in the famous perjury case
of Castro v. Queen. (better known as the
Tichborne (.‘ase,) L. R. 6 App. Cas. 229,
held, LUi'(iChflllC€ll()l‘Sl£l.Il()RNI-I and Lords
BLACKBURN and “'ATSO.\’ concurring in the
opinion, affirming the court below, that
by virtue of St. 14 & l5 Vict. (similar to
our Code, § 1183) the words “against the
form of the statute and against the pence
and dignity of the queen ” were not essen-
tial in any indictment, and their omission
not ground either for a motion to quash
or in arrest of judgment. But we take it
that their use is meresurplusage The de-
fendant contends however that the indict-
ment is defective in that no time is laid.
The act does not require it, and indeed, as
time is nut uf the essence of the offense.
“the omitting to state the time at which
it was committed” is not ground to stay
or reverse the judgment. Code. § 1189.
It is urged here that the warrant in the
case against Amos Phillips was entitled,
“State and City of Greensboro vs. Amos
Phillips,” and that it charged that the
offense was against the ordinance of the
city of Greensboro, when the illegal sale
of spirituous liquor is an offense only cog-
nizahle by state authority. No objection
was taken below to the introduction of
the warrant, nor was there any prayer for
instruction that there was a variance be-
tween the allegation and proof. If we
could notice such objection, when taken
here for the first time, it issufiicient to say
that the warrant in proper terms charges
a sale of spirituous liquor, withoutlicense,
and as an offense against the state. The
additional averment in the warrant that
it was a violation of a. town ordinance
also was mere surplusage as was the use
of the words, “and City of Greensboro," in
entitling the warrant. State v. Collins, 85
N. (‘.. 51]; State v. Brown, 79 N. U. u-L2.
Objection was also taken here that on
the face of the record the mayor had no
jurisdiction of the offense charged against
Phillips, and therefore the defendant could
not be convicted of false swearing. the ac-
tion being comm nonjudice. By virtue of
Code, § 3318, the mayor is a. court, with
the jurisdiction of a magistrate. and as
such he had authority to investigate the
charge of selling liquor without license.
it does not appear whether he assumed
final jurisdiction or merely bound the par-
ty over to court, or acquitted the defend-
ant or dismissed the action. Noris it ma-
terial, since the subsequent erroneous or
illegal judgment of the mayor could not
affect the guilt or innocence of this defend-
ant. The charge in the warrant deter-
mines the jurisdiction, and not what is
done in the trial.
it is further objected that the allegation
of the false oath as having been taken at the
“trial of an action," etc., is not sufficient-
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Case No. 144] PRODUCTIOY AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
day referred to, on which day he ea w Phil-
lipe go to where It bad been placed several 
tlme1t, 11ml return with a bottle, from 
which be poured out the drlnkH In a smllll 
ghlSH, hole.ling ruucb less th11n half a pint, 
to dlverH colored men, who drank and 
banded Pbllll11e money, and be saw Peters 
In the crowd. Another witness, one 
Weathl'rly, testified that the liquid looked 
like corn whh~ky; that Phllllpa poured It 
out of a bottle into a "short" glass hold-
ing much less than half a pint; that be 
saw the defendant, Peters, drink, and Klve 
Phillipa a nickel, and that divers other col-
oret.I wen came to Phllllpa at the same 
place, In the alley on the north side of the 
atre<>t, ln the coui't!e of some houl't!. A 
thir'd witness testified to the crowd of col-
ored men coming to Phillips, who wat1 on 
the north aide of the street, tntQ the alll'y, 
described by the other wltneaReB, and that 
the defl'ndant, Petel."fl, was among them. 
The witness heurd money rattling out In 
the alley, but did not look to see who had 
it, and did not see any transaction be-
tween Phillips and Peters. There was al-
so evidence by the mayoraDfl anothPrwlt-
ness that on the trial of Amos Phillips. the 
defendant, Peters, was aworn and exam-
ined as a witness, and testified that he did 
not buy any liquor in quantity leaH then 
bolf a pint from Amos l'hllllps on the duy 
tf'Btified to by the state'H witnesses, and 
that he was not on the north aide of the 
atrttet on that Sunday. '£he false oath 
charged In the Indictment IH tbRt the de-
fendant testified at the trial of Amo!I Phll-
llpe that ·•be had not pun·baHed any spir-
ituous liquor from A mos Phillips less than 
half a 11lnt on Sunday, April 'IT, 1890." 
The materiality of the oath. and that the 
defendant so swore, are not controverted 
by any exception taken; We think there 
was sufficient evidence to go to the jury 
upon the question wbethl'r the llqulcl dis-
pensed on that occasion by Amoe Phillips 
was Hplrituous liquor. One witneaR testi-
fied that he saw defenclant purchase of 
Amoe Phillipe 1wme of the liquid In quan-
tity lPRB than half a pint on Sunday, April 
'IT. 1890, and pay for it. The testimony of 
other witnesses of sales by Amos Phillips 
of the liquid at the same time and piece to 
divers others, and of defenclnnt being In 
the crowd, and on the north side of the 
street, together with defendant's denial 
before the mayor that he was on that 
day north of the street, together wlth all 
the clrcnm'ltanr.ea in evidence, make e\·l-
dence corroborative of the single witness 
who testified as eya-wltnetJs of the sale by 
Phillipe to Peters. State v. Brown, 79 N. 
C. 642. It le not reqnlred that"the r.orrob-
oratl ve circumstances Hhonld equal In 
weight the testimony of one witness, but 
there m net be enough, in addition to the 
teHtlmony of one witness, to turn the scale 
as against the weight of the prhwner'e 
oath on the former trial." 2 Bish. Crim. 
Proc.§ 871. The Instructions RBked were 
properly refused. 
The defendant moved In arrest of Judg· 
ment, on the ground that "the bill of i11-
dlctment was not sufficient ln Its aver· 
menta to charge the crime of perjury." 
The blll of lndlctmentla asubMtantial l'opy 
of the form authorized by chapter ~. A.!tB 
124 
1889, except that It adds the formal con-
clusion," aa;atnst the form of the statute, 
In such case made and provided, and 
against thP. peace and dl&"uity of theetate." 
The.ie words are not required by thfl ar.t 
cited, nor are they nece11Sary or material 
In an Indictment for any offense to tills 
state, as was held by the court lo State v. 
Kirkman, 104 N. C. 911, 10 s. E. Rep. 312. 
The same rDle obtains In England. The 
Hu use of Lords, iu the famous perjury cuee 
rif Custro v. Queen, (b('tter known al:! the 
Tlchborne Case,) L. R. 6 App. Caa. 229, 
held, Lord ChancellorSi,;1.noRNE and Lords 
BLACKBUllN and \V ATSO.S co11cur1·iug in the 
opinion, affirming the court below, tbut 
by virtue of St. 14 & 15 Viet. (similar to 
our Codt', § 11R3) the words" against the 
form of the statute and againMt the pence 
and dignity of the queen" were not et111en-
tlal lo any Indictment, and their omiHRion 
n•>t ground either for a 1uotlon to quush 
or In arreet of judgment. But we take It 
that their use la meresur11lusagP The de-
fcnclnnt contends however that the Indict-
ment IH defective In that no time is laid. 
The act does not require It, and indeed, as 
time le nut uf the essence of the offense, 
•the omitting to state the time at which 
It was com mltted" ls not ground to etay 
or reverse the judgment. Code, § 1189. 
It ls urged here that the warrant In the 
case ag!llnst Amos Phllllpt1 was en tilled, 
"State and City of Greensboro vs. Amoe 
Phillips," and that It charged that the 
offense was against the ordinance of the 
city of Greensboro, when the Illegal sale 
of splrltuouR liquor la an offense only cog-
nizable by Htate authority. No objection 
was tu ken below to the Introduction t•f 
the warrant, nor ll'aH there any prayer for 
Instruction that there was a vari1tnce be-
tween the nlleittttlon and proof. If we 
could notice' such objection, when taken 
here f<>l' the first time, It iel:luftklent to say 
that the warrant lu proper terrus chargea 
a ea.le of spirituous liquor, without llcende, 
and as an orrenae niralnat the state. The 
addltlon!\l a\·erment In the warrant that 
It was a \'iolatlon of a town ordlnam.-e 
also was mere aurpluange as wna the use 
of the words, "and City of G reeneboro," In 
entltlinat the warrant. State v. l'olllna, Si> 
N. C. 511; State v . Brown. 79 N. C. ti42. 
Objection wea also taken here that on 
the face of the record the mayor had no jurlsclictlon of the offense charged against 
Phillipe, and therefore the defendant could 
not be convicted of false swearing, the ac-
tion beln~ corR.m nonjudlce. By virtue of 
Code, § 3."$18, the mayor le a court, with 
the juri1ulktlo11 of a magistrate, and as 
such he bad authority to investigate the 
charge of selling liquor without license. 
It does not appear whether he assumed 
final jurisdiction or merely bound the par· 
ty over to court, or acquitted the •lefend-
ant or dlemlRRed the action. Noris It ma-
terial, since the eubRPquent erroneous or 
Illegal Judgment of the mayor could not 
atfect the guilt or innocence of this defend· 
ant. 'rhe cbar~e in the warrant deter-
mlnl's the Jnri11dictton, 11.nct not what la 
done In the trial. 
lt le further objected that the allegation 
of the false oath as having ~n taken at the 
"trial of an action," etc., Is not auttlcleut-
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE.
[Case No. 144
iy definite. Still it is such allegation as is
declared sufiicient by the statute. and we
cannot see that it can make any difference
whether it was a. “preliminary trial” or a.
trial with final jurisdiction. Eithercomes
within Code, § 1092. The many technicali-
ties which have hampered the administra-
tion of justice in regard to false swearing
moved the legislature to enact section 1185
of the Code, and more recently the above-
cited act prescribing a simple form of in-
dictment for that offense. Chapter 83,
Acts 1889. The authority oithe legislature
to prescribe forms of indictment is sus-
tained in State \'. Moore, 104 N. C. 743. l0
S. E. Rep. 183. The form of indictment
here authorized points out to the defend-
ant that the offense charged is perjury,
the court and the names of the parties to
the proceeding in which it is alleged to
have been committed, the words alleged
to have been sworn. and their falsity.
The charge is simplified. But the constit-
uent elements of the offense remain as he-
fore. They are included in the nllega tion,
“did commit perjury, ” and it must still
he shown in prooi that the defendant made
oath or aflirmation substantially as
charged that the defendant was duly sworn
by an officer competent to administer the
oath. and in a matter of which he had
jurisdiction, and In one oi the instances
specified in Code, § 1U92,—I. e., “in a suit,
controversy, matter, or cause depending
in any of the courts oi the state, or in a
deposition or aflidavit taken pursuant to
law, or in an oath or aflirmation duly ad-
ministered of or concerning any matter or
thing whereof such person is lawfully re-
quired to he sworn or a['iirmed;" that it
was in a material matter, and the iury
must be furthersatjsfied that such oath or
affirmation was willfully and corruptly
Ialse. When, however. falsity is proven,
it has been held that the burden is on the
defendant to show that it arose from sur-
prise, inadvertence, or mistake. and not
from a corrupt motive. State v.Chambcr-
iin, 30 Vt. 559; 2 Whart. Crim. Law, (9th
Ed.) § 1320.
PER CURIAM. No error.
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CORROBORATIVE EVIDE~CE. (Case No. 144 
ly definite. Still It le euch allegation as la 
uf!<:lared sufficient by the statute, and we 
cannot see thnt It can make 1my difference 
whether it was a" preliminary trial" or a 
trial with final jurisdiction. Elthercomes 
within Code, § 10112. 'l'he many teclmicali-
tles whll'h have hampered the administra-
tion of ju11tlce in regua"tl to fulRe swearing 
mo\'ed the legislature to enact section 11S5 
of the Code, and more rt'Cently the above-
Citt'd act prt'scrl bing a elm pie form of in-
dlctmen t for that offense. Chapter 83, 
Acts 1889. The authority of the leg is la tu re 
to prescribe forms of lndictm1,mt is sus-
tained in 8tate v. Moore, 104 N. C. 743, 10 
S. E. Rep. 18:J. The form of Indictment 
here authorized points out to the derend-
ant that the offense charged Is perjury, 
the court and the name11 of the partle8 to 
the proceetling In which It Is alleged to 
have bef'n committed, the words allege(} 
to have be<>n sworn, and their falsity. 
The rharge Is eimplltled. But the constit-
uent elements of the otfen11e remain a11 be-
fore. They are included in the alll'U:ll tion, 
"did commit perjury," and it must still 
be shown In proof that the defendant made 
oath or affirmation substantially us 
charged that the defendant was duly Rworn 
by an officer competent to af1mlnh1ter the 
oath, and In a matter of which he had 
JuriR<lictlon, and In one of the instances 
specified In Code, § 1092,-/. e., "In a suit, 
controversy, matter, or cause deptmdlng 
In any of the courts of the etn te, or In a 
deposition or nffl<lavlt taken purRuant to 
law, or In an oath or affirmation duly ad-
mlnlRte:-ed of or eoncen1lng any matter or 
thin~ whereof such person Is la wfull.r re-
quired to he 11worn or affirmed;" that It 
was in a material matter, and the Jury 
must be further 1:1atjsfled that such oath or 
affirmation was willfully and corruptly 
falHe. When, however. falsity le proven, 
It has been held that the burden is on the 
defendant to show that It aroRe from eur-
nrise, Inadvertence, or mistake, and not 
from a corrupt mntlve. State v. Chamber-
lin, 30 Vt. 559; 2 Whart. Crim. Law, (9th 
Ed. ) § 13:l0. 
PER CUlUAM. No error. 
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DEIMEL et al. v. BROWN ct al.
(27 N. E. 44, 136 Ill. 586.)
March 30, 1891.
Appeal from appellate court. first dis-
trict.
Moses, Newman & Pam, for appellants.
Tenney, Huwley & Coffeen, E..C. Crawford,
and Cratty Bros. & Ashcraft,for appeliees.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
BAKER, J. in September, 1884, Jacob
Biersdorf, of 362 Canal street, Chicago,
failed in business. Thereafter Brown. De
Furck & (J0. recovered in the superior
court of Cook county two judgments
against him for the aggregate amount of
$7,291.64, besides costs; and Bean, Hughes
& Cu. recovered judgment against him in
the same court for $410.87, besides costs;
and William A. Comstock recovered judg-
ment agaiust him in the county court of
said county for $499.13, besides costs; and
l-lammacher, Schlemmer & Co. recovered
judgment against him in said superior
court for $1,285.34 and costs. Bro\vn, De
Fnrck &()o.and Bean, Hughes & Co.joined
in a creditors‘ bill, which was exhibited in
said superior court, and William A. Com-
stock and Hammacher, Schlemmer & Co.
filed intervening petitions. Jacob Iiiers-
dorf, Mrs. Jacob Biersdorf, the Sage; &
Biersdorf Furniture Manufacturing (Tom-
pnuy. and the present appellants, Simon,
Joseph, and Rudolph Deimel, composing
the firm of 1)eimel & Bros.,were made par-
ties to the original and amended bills, and
the intervening petitions. Subsequently
the complainants in the bills and the in-
tervening petitioners dismissed their suits
as against Mrs. Jacob Biersdorf and the
Sugg &Biersdorf Company. Answers and
replications were filed, and the cause was
hea rd upon the pleadings and proofs, and
the court found the material allegations
of the amended bill and the intervening pe-
titions to be true, and entered a decree
rendering judgments against Simon Dei-
mel. Joseph l)eimel, and Rudolph Deimel,
and in favor of Brown, De Furck & Co.,
for $8,820.47; in favor of Beau, Hughes &
Co.for $504.13; in favorof William A.Com-
stock for $608.42; and in favor of Ham-
macher, Schlemmer & Co. for $1,437.19;
and" awarding executions for said several
and respective amounts, and for costs.
Appeals were taken by the Deimels from
these several decrees in favor of different
judgment creditors of Biersdorf, and by
consent of parties the appeals were heard
both in the appellate court and in this
court as one appeal. There wasajudg-
ment of affirmance in the appellate court.
The theory of the amended bill and of the
intervening petitions is that in February,
1884, Biersdorf, the principal defendant,
sold and delivered to the co-defendants,
Simon. Joseph, and Rudolph Deimel, com-
posing the firm of Deimel & Bros., 209
pieces of Tiugue plushcs, at $1.05 per yard,
and of the aggro,-.;ute value of $14,700; and
that said $14,700 remains unpaid and ow-
ing from the co-defendants to Blcrsdorf;
and that they, for the purpose of keeping
said money out of the reach of the credit-
ors of Riersdorf, falsely claim and pretend
that the purchase price of said Tingue
plushes has been paid and discharged, but
that in fact the claimed payment was
fictitious and colorable merely, and a part
of a scheme to defraud the creditors of
Biersdorf, and that since said money still
remains unpaid, it ought to be applied in
satisfaction of the judgments of the sev-
eral appellees against Biersdorf. The
principal defendant and the co-defendants
were called upon to answer under oath.
The answer of Biersdorf states that for
nearly three years prior to his failure he
was, and since has been, confined to his
bed by sickness, and thereby compelled to
leave the management of his business in
the hands ofone Max Berg.“ and therefore
has little orno knowledge of thecondition
or character of said accounts or other
matters connected with said business or
its assets." It further states that he has
neither possession nor control nor knowl-
edge of his hooks of account. It admits
that Rudolph Deimel, Joseph Deimcl, and
Simon Deimel had numerous business
transactions with him in the way of pur-
chasing goods of him, but denies that at
the time of the filing of the bill ofcomplaint
a large part or any part of the purchase
price of said goods remained unpaid, or
that the Deimels were then or are owing
him on account of said purchases $15,000
or any other sum. The substance of the
joint and severa.l answers of Simon. Jo-
seph. and Rudolph Deimel is as follows:
That some time in the month of February.
188-'l,tl|e_v bought n large quantity of plush
from Jacob Biersdorf, amounting in all to
about 209 pieces. The plush was received
in the month of February, 1884, and was
what is known in the commerciulworld as
“Tingue” plush. and was of the value of
about $14,700. The plush was paid for in
the following manner: On the 29th day of
January, 1884, Jacob Biersdorf had pur-
chased from the defendants lumber and
merchandise to the amount of $12,787, and
on February 7, 1884, to the amount of
about $a'>.502.50, and afterwards became in-
debted to them upon other transactions
in the sum of about $1,000, and that said
accounts were adjudged and set off against
each other, and the difference paid these
defendants in cash or notes. which were
afterwards paid by Biersdorf; that said
settlement was made in September, 1884,
and that at that time Biersdorf was in-
debted to the defendants in the sum of
$19,000. They further answered that they
were not, nor are either of them, in any
wise or to any extent indebted to Jacob
Biersdorf. nor were they so indebted at
the time of the filing of the original bill in
said cause. and that they did not then
ha ve or have they now in their possession,
custody, or control any property of any
kind or nature belonging to Jacob Biers-
dorf, or in which he has or had any inter-
est, claim, or demand whatsoever, and
that they hold no such property in trust
for him. either directly or indirectly. The
mutter to churgeappellants—the purchase
by them in February, 1884, from Biersdorf
ofa lot of Tingue plushes for $14,700—is
claimed in the bill and petitions and ad-
mitted in the answer. The rule is that
where a fact is alleged in a bill and admit-
ted by the answer, such admisslon is con-
clusive of the existence of the fact, and
other evidence to establish such fact is un-
necessary. Insurance Co. v. Myer, 93 lll.
271; Morgan v. Corlies, 81 Ill. 72. The
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Case No. 145] PRODUCTION AND EFl'ECT OF EVIDE:SCE. 
DED!EL et al. v. BROWN et. al. 
(27 N. E. 44, 136 Ill. 1586.) 
Supreme Court of llllnoill. March 30, 1891. 
Appeal from appellate conrt, first dis· 
trlct. 
Moses, Newman & Pam, for appellants. 
Tenney, Huwley & Coffeen, E.C.Crawford, 
and Cratty Bros. & Ashcraft,for appellees. 
BAKER, J. In September, 1884, Jacob 
Bte.redurf, of 362 Canal street, Chlrag.>, 
failed In buslnP.ss. Thereafter Brown, De 
Forck & Co. recovenad In the superior 
court of Cook county two jucJgments 
against him for the aggregate amount of 
f7,21U.6.J, besides rosts; and Bean, Hught>s 
& Co. recovt>red judgment agnlnst him In 
the same ronrt for $410.87, besides costs: 
and Wllllum A. Comstock 1·ecovered Judg-
went a11.alnst him In the county coul't of 
.11aid county for f499.13, beel<leK costs; and 
Hammacher, Schlemmer & Co. n.>covcrcd judgment agaimit him In said superior 
court for $1,2~.34 and costs. Brown, De 
Furck &. Co. and Hean, Hughes & Co. Joined 
In a creditors' bill, which was exhlbltl'd In 
said superior court, and William A. Com-
stock and Hammacher, Schlemmer & Co. 
Hied Intervening petitions. Jacob Ble1'8-
1Jorf, Mrs. ,Jacob Blersdorf, the l:)ug~ & 
. Biel'Kdorf Furniture Manufacturing Com-
pany, and the present avpella.nts, tilmon, 
.Joseph, and Rudolph Delmel, composing 
the Hrm of llelmel & BroK., were maue par-
ties to tbe original and amended blllH, and 
the Intervening petitions. Sub11eque11tly 
the complainants lo the bills and the ln-
ter'l'enlug petitioners dlsmlKHet.l tllelr 1rnltt1 
as against Mrs. Jacob Bie1"11dorf and the 
Sugg &Blersdorf Company. Answers and 
replications were flied, and the cau11e wa11 
beard upon the pleadings and proofM, and 
the court found the mutt11iRI allegations 
of the amended bill and the Intervening pe-
titions to be true, 11.ild entered a deeree 
rt1ulerlng judgments against Simon J>el· 
mel, Joseph Delmel, and Rudolph Delmel, 
an<l In favor of Brown, De Furck & C:o .. 
for $8.~20.47; In fa\•or of Bt>an, Hughes & 
Co. for fii04.13; In favor of WIJllam A. Com-
st0t•k for $60!U2; and In favor of Ham-
marher, Schlemmer & Co. for $1,437.lll; 
anti a wardln& executions for 11aill Heveral 
an<l respective amount!", and for costs. 
Appeals were taken by the Delmels from 
these several decree"J In favor of different 
Judgmt>nt creditors of Blersdorr. and by 
-consent of parties the ap1>eals were heard 
both In the appellate court and In this 
court as one appeal. 'J'here was a Juclg-
ment of affirmanee In the appellate court. 
The theory of the amended bill and of the 
tnter'l'enlng petitions ls thut In Fehruary, 
1884, Blersdorf, the principal defendant, 
11old and delivered to the co-defendnnts, 
Simon. Joseph, and Rudolph Delmel, com-
posing the firm of Delmel & Bros., 209 
pleres of Tlngue plushes, at$1.65 per yard, 
and of the ascj[rr.gatevalue of $14,700; and 
that stild $14,700 remains tlnpald and ow· 
lni: from the co-<lefendants to Blt•rsrlorf: 
and that they, for the purpose of keeping 
eald money out of the reach of the credit-
ors of Rlersdorf, falsely claim an<l pretend 
thut the purehase price of said Tlngue 
plu11heH haK been paid and disci1arged, bnt 
that In fact the claimed payment was 
Jlctitlous and colorahle merely, anrl a part 
of a Rrheme to defraud the creditors of 
Blersdorf, and tht1t Aln<~e flflld money stilt 
remains unpaid, It mui;ht to be flpplled in 
satlsractlou of the Jmlgments of the &e\'· 
eral appelleee a1tah1At Bleredori. The 
principal dt>fendaot and the co-defendants 
were called upon to answer undt>r oath. 
The answer of Bleradorf states that for 
nearly three yeat"H prior to bis failure he 
was, and Hince bas beeo, confined to bis 
bed hy slcknt>~H. and thereby com1,ellt>tl to 
Jea'l'e the management of bis bu11lne&11 lo 
tbe handA of one Max Berg," and thel"f'fore 
has little or no knowledge of thecondltlon 
or character of Raid acconuts or other 
matters connected with 11ald business or 
its a1Jeets." It further Rte tee that he bas 
neither posAeselon uor control nor knowl-
edge of his books of account. It admits 
that Rudolph l>elmel, Joseph Delm••I, and 
Simon J>elmel hall numerou11 bu1dnl'l!s 
transactions with him In the way of pur-
rhaslng good!$ of him, but denies that at 
the tlmeof the filing of the bill of complaint 
a large part or any part of the purehase 
price or said g;oods remained unpaid, or 
thllt the Delmels were then or are owing 
him on al'count of said purchases f15,000 
or any other sum. Tbe 1tnbstance of tbe joint and several auswer11 of Simon, Jo-
seph. find Rudolph Delmel ls as follows: 
'l'hat Rome time In the month of February • 
1884, they bought n lurge quantity of plm~h 
from Jacob Bieredorf, amounting In all to 
about 209 pie<•es. The. plush was received 
In the month of Februury, 1884, and wns 
what lt1 known In the comuiel'l'lul world as 
"Tln1rue" plush. and was of the 'l'alue of 
abont f14,700. The l'lu11h was paid for In 
the following manner: On th11 29th day of 
January, 188-l, Jacob Blersdorf bad pur-
cl11u1ed from the defendants lumber and 
men·hnn1ll11e to the amonnt of $12.7is7,and 
on Fchruury 7, l!!X4, to the amount of 
about $5,502.50, and afterwards became In-
debted to them upon other tran11actloos 
In the sum of about $1.000, and that said 
accounts were adjudgedauclset offai;talnst 
t>acb other, and the difference paid these 
defendants In cash or notes, which were 
afterwards paid by Blenulorf; that said 
settlemt>nt was made In September, 1884, 
and that at that time Blersdorf was ln-
dt>bte<l to the defendants In the sum of 
$19,000. They further answered that they 
were not, nor are either of them, lo any 
wlKe or to itny extent Indebted to Jacob 
Blersdorf, nor were they su Indebted at 
the time of the filing of the original bill lo 
said cause. and that they did not then 
have or have they now In their poKSeS11lon. 
cnstody, or control any propP.rty of any 
kind or nature belonging to Jacob Blf'r&-
dorf, or In which he hati or had any Inter-
est, claim, or demand whatsoe'°er, and 
that they hold no sucb property In trust 
for him. either directly or tncllrectly. The 
matter to cllari;r;eappellanta-the purt'haee 
by them in February, 1884, from Blen1dorf 
of a lot of 1'1ngue plu11bes for $14,700-ls 
claimed In the bill and petitions and ad-
mitted In the answer. The rule IK that 
where a fact le alleged to a blll and aclmlt-
ted by the answer, such admission ls c:ou-
cluslve of the exlst1mce of the fact, and 
other evidence to e11tahllsb such fact 1111 un-
neecssary. Insurance Co. 'I'. Myer, 93 Ill. 
271; .Morgan v. Cornes, 81 Ill. 72. The 
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ma tter in discharge of appellants. as stated
in t|lPil‘8llFlW8l'.i8 that on January 29, I884,
Biersdori bought: of them “lumber and
merchandise" to the amount oi‘ $12.78",
and on February 7, 1984, to the amount of
$5,502.50, and afterwards became indebted
to them in the further sum of about $1,000,
and that in September, 1884, a settlement
was made between tl1em,and theaccounts
l~it'l. off against. each other, and the differ-
ence paid by Biersdorl to them. It is ad-
mitted that these statements are respon-
sive to the charges and interrogatories
contained in the bill and petitions, but
appeilees deny the truth of such state-
ments. 'i‘hc material issue in the case.
tin-n.is whether or not appellants paid
and settled for the $14,700 worth ofplushes,
as is represented by them in their sworn
.an.~=wer.
What weight have the sworn answers
as evidence for appellants? The general
rule is that. where an answer to a bill in
chancery is required to be made under
-oath, and an answer is filed which is re-
sponsive to the allegations of the bill, then
all material averments of the bill that are
denied by such answer must he proved
by the testimony of two witnesses. or by
evidenee which is equal to the testimony
of two witnesses. This rule, however,has
no application to averments dcnicd upon
information and belief, or where the de-
fendant himself refutes the sworn state-
ments in his answer. It is only when a
defendant states facts within his own per-
sonal knowledge that his answer has to
-be overcome by evidence equivalent to the
testimony of two witnesses. Fryrear v.
Lawrence,5 Gilmau. 325. in the case cited
this court said: “ While a defendant's an-
swer, which is required to be sworn to, is
made evidence in the cause by the com-
plainant, it is only entitled to weight when
it is entitled to belief; and if he chooses to
swear to that which the court sees becau-
not,or which headmits he does not know.
he is entitled to no morecredit.and is sub-
ject to the same censure and condemna-
tion as any other reckless witness, who
the court sees is trying to impose upon it
his belief, when he should only speak of
his knowledge. The court is not a mere
machine to weigh everything that is of-
fered without examining its value, any
more when the defendant's oath is put
into the scale than when examining tne
testimony of any other witness." The an-
swer of the defendant liiersdorfstates that
in September, l.\‘:s‘-l, and for nearly three
years prior thereto, he was, and for the
greater part of the time since then has been.
confined to his bed by sickness. and was
compelled to leave the management of his
business to one Max Berg, “and therefore
has little or no knowledge of the condition
or character of said accounts or other
matters connected with said business or
its assets.” This admission thoroughly
impeaches his answer as evidence, and
renders hisdenial contained therein of any
indebtedness from Deimei & Brothers to
him of no probative force whatever. It is
manifest that at the most such denial is
based upon mere information and helief.
'I‘he joint and several answer of the ap-
pelluriis is sworn to by all three of them.
The statements in said answer are nizule
in positive and unqualified terms. But
there is in evidence in the cause the record
in a garnishment suit prosecuted in the
circuit court of (‘ook county in the name
of Biersdorf for the ~use of Marshall Field
&Co. against said Deimei & Bros.; and
it appears therefrom that in said suitit was
sought to reach by garnishment the same
fund thatis here involved, and that the
written interrogatories there filed covered
the same transactions and facts that are
embraced in the answer now under con-
sideration. It further appears from said
record that, while all three of the appel-
lants joined in the answers made in said
garnishee proceeding, yet that the tru th oi
such answers was sworn to by Joseph
Deimei alone: that said Joseph there
made affidavit that he was the only incin-
ber of the firm who is personally familiar
with all the matters and things referred
toin the several interroga torles; and that.
said Rudolphand Simon Deimei also made
affidavit that they are not personally fa-
miliar with all the matters referred to in
the 3d. 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th interrogato-
ries asked of them as garnishees, and are
unwilling to swear to the answers filed to
the same; and that, as to the matters re-
ferred to in said interrogatories, they were
business transactions in the special charge
of their copartncr, Joseph Deimei, who is
personally familiar with the sume. The
purchase of the $l4.700 worth oi Tingue
plushes, and the supposed settlement there-
for, all transpired during the year 1-‘4-*4. if
in November. 1885, they had no such per-
sonal knowledge of the transactions re-
lating thereto as would authorize them to
make oath in respect thereto, it is impos-
sible that in March, 1886, said matters
were within their own knowledge. We
think that the fact that Rudolph and Si-
mon Deimel have sworn to the answer
gives it no weight as evidence in favor of
appellants.
Joseph I)eimel also made oath to the an-
swer. This made it competent evidence
for the lirm. and imposed upon appellees
the burden of overcoming it, so far as it
states matters in discharge of appellants,
by evidence equivalent to that of two wit-
nesses. Did the superior court err in its
findings that this has been done? In the
answers sworn to by him in the Marshall
Field 8: (*0. garnishee proceedings, Joseph
Deimei gave an uccountof the purchase by
Deimei & Bros. in the month of February,
1884, oi the lot of Tingue plushcs here in-
volved; and also stated that Bier-sdorf
was indebted to Deimei & Bros., in Febru-
ary,1.\il\‘~i, and prior to the time of purchas-
ing said plushes, in a sum considerably in
excess of the amount or price of said
plushes. and the same was applied in pay-
ment of said indebtedness of Biersdorf to
Deimei & Bros. so lar as the purchase price
of said plushes would extend in payment
thereof; and to these answers added this:
“All the foregoing matters appear upon
the hooks of said R. Deimei 8: Bros." The
deposition of Joseph Deimei was taken at
the instance of nppeilees. We have read
this deposition at length. as it appears in
the record itself. and it impresses our
minds as being evasive and disingenuous.
In respect to almost all of the material
questions asked him by appellees he shields
himself behind the pica that he does not
remember. When questioned in regard to
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CORROBORATIVE EVJDE~CE. (Case No. 145 
mntter tndl11chargeofappellanta, nutated 
In tht>lranawer, Is th11t on January 29, 1884. 
Blt>rsdorf bought of them "lumber and 
mt>rehanrllRe" to the amount of f12.787. 
.and on February 7, 1~. to the amount of 
$5.50~.50. aud afterwards became lndPhted 
to them In the further aum or about fl ,000, 
.and that In Reptember, 1HR4, a settlement 
waamade between them, and theaccount.e 
Ht'L off ag11t11st eal'h f•tht'r, and the dltter-
encti paid by Blersdorf to them. It Is ad-
mitted that these atatementil are reHpon-
elve to the charges and lnterrogotorlM 
-contained in the · blll anti petitions, but 
11p1,ellees deny the t1·uth of such state· 
ments. The material Issue In the ('8Se, 
tlwn. 111 whether or not appellants palcl 
.and settled fur the $14. 700 worth of pluehes, 
.as le represented by them In their nvorn 
.amc\'l·er. 
What weight have the sworn anaweJ"M 
.as evidence fur a1Jpellaote? The general 
rule ls that. where an answer to a bill tu 
ehnncery la required to be JJ.iade under 
-<>ath, and an ttnRwer le ftle!l which 111 re-
sponsive to the allegations of the bill, theP 
all rnhterlal avermcnte of the bl!! that ar .. 
df'nled by such anawer must be 11rov('(l 
by tllA tf'Rtlmony of two w1tne1111l's, or h~· 
~vldence which le equal to the teatlmon.v 
-01 two wltnesHee. ThlH rule, however, huK 
no application to averments denied upon 
Information and belief, or where the de-
fendnnt Jilmet'lf refutes the sworn state-
ments fn hie answer. It Is only when a 
defendant states fact11 within hie own per-
•onal knowle1lge that hlM anewr.r has to 
-be overcome by evidence t>qulvalt>nt to the 
tf-sthnonyof two wltnes .. t'8. Jo'ry1·eHr T. 
Lawrence,5 Gilman. !l2ii. Jn thti case l'ite1l 
this court 11ald: "While a defendant'11 an-
•wer, which Is l'f'qulred to bt' sworn to, IM 
made evidence lo the cauHe by the com-
plalnant, It 111 only entl tied to weight whf'u 
it le entltled to belief; and If he choo11es to 
swear to that which the 1•ourl seeH heco11-
not, or which he all mite be doeH out know. 
he le entitled to no more credit, and Is suh-
Ject to the 11ame ('en11ure and condemn&· 
tlon BK any other reckl<'"I! wltnes111, who 
tbe court aee11 Is trying to lm11ose upon it 
bf11 helit'I, when he should only spcak or 
bis knowledge. The court fs not a mere 
ma<~hlm.• to weigh everything that ls of-
fe.red without examining; Its value, an~· 
more when the defendant's oath Is put 
tnto the &l'ale th1m wht>n PX a mining the 
teetlmon.~· or an~ other witness." The an· 
ewer or the dcfemhmt Hlersdorfatutes the t 
1n Septembe:-, 1~4. and for nearly three 
y('arR prior tht>reto, he was, and tor the 
-gn-11terpartor the time i,ilncethenhasbeen. 
-confined ti) his bed by sil'knes11, and was 
i!Ompr.lled to lea,·e the managt>mP11t of hl11 
business to one Max Berg. "al"ld therefore 
has little or no knowledge of the con<litlou 
-or character or aald accountH or other 
mattf'l'8 connected with said business or 
1te as11ets." This admle11lon thoroughly 
1mpt>acbee his an11wer as evidence, and 
renden hlK denial contalnPd therein of any 
lndebtedne1111 from DL•lmel & Brothers to 
him of no prohuth·e force whatt>ver. It la 
mantre11t that at the most such denial Is 
basPd upon mPl'f" Information anll hf'lief. 
The Joint and several answer of the ap-
flf'l111nt11 111 11worn to by all three of them. 
'l'he Htn h•nwnt11 In Kaid a1111wer are nrn1l1• 
in positive and anquallfte<l terms. .But 
there la In evidence In the r11uee the record 
In a garnh1hment snit prn1:1eeuted In the 
circuit court of C'ook county In the name 
of Blersdorf tc.r the ·Ul!e of Mftl'Rhall FleM 
& Co. agatn11t Raid Uetmel & Bro11.; and 
ltoppf'arstherefrom that lnsahlllultltwa11 
sought to reach by garnlehment the same 
fund that Is here Involved, and thut the 
written Interrogatories there filed r.overed 
the same trana11ctlons and t11ct11 that are 
embraced ID the an~wer now under con-
slder11tlon. It further Hppeare from eald 
record that, while all three of the appel-
lants joined In the anawers made In sold 
garnl1:1hee proceeding, yet that the truth of 
each answeN was eworn to by Joeeph 
Delmel alone: that said Jo11eph tlll're 
made affidavit that he was the only mem-
ber of the firm who Is per11onally f1'mlllar 
with all the matters and things referred 
tolnthe se\'erlll lnterrogatorlee; and that 
said Uudolph anrl Hlmon Delmel alMo madl'I 
affidavit that they are not penmnally fa-
mlllar with all the matters referred to In 
the 8d, 4th, oth, 6th, nnd 7th lntcrro~ato­
rles aHkE'd of them as garoleheea, and are 
unwilling to swear to the answf'l'B flied to 
the same; and that, ae to the matterH re-
ferrt>1l to In 11ald Interrogatories, they w el't! 
business transactions In the special ('harge 
of their copartner, Jueeph Delmel, who le 
persunall:v famlllar with the 11ame. 'rhe 
purchafle of the fl4,700 worth of Tlngue 
plushes, and the supposed settll'ment there-
for, nil trans1>lred during the year 1~ii4. If 
In Novemb<>r, 11®>, they had DO such JIPr· 
sonal knowledge of the truneactlonM re-
lating thE>reto as would authorize them to 
make oath In reHpect tbP.reto, It le lmpoi!-
elble that In .Murch, 1886, said matters 
we!"-' within their own knowll'dge. We 
think that tht> fact thn t Hudolph and Si-
mon Delmel have sworn to the answer 
gives It n9 weight as evidence In favor of 
appellants. 
Joseph Delmel also made oath to the an-
11wer. This maile It competent evlilem·e 
for the tlrm. anrl Imposed upon appellee• 
the burden of ove1·comlng It, so fur as It 
states matters !n discharge of oppellants, 
by evidence equivalent to thut of two wlt-
nesHe11. I>ld th"' supHlor court err In Its 
findings th11t thl11 has been done? In the 
an1:1wl'rs eworn to by him In the Marshall 
Field &: C'o. :i:arni11hee proceedlngM, Jusl'l.lh 
Dehnel 1ruve an uccountof the purchase by 
Dl'lmel & Bro111. In the month of 1''ebrt1a1·y, 
1~4. of the lot of Tlngue plushl'I! here ln-
voJv .. d; anti aleo stated that BlerMdorf 
was lmlebted to Th-Imel & Bros .. In 1''ebru-
ary, lHRt, and prior to the time of purchas-
ing eald pluHbes, In a sum con111!1erably In 
excees of the amount or price or said 
plushe11, and the same wae applied In pay-
ment of said lndehtednt>11e of Blersdorf to 
Dehne! & Bro11. eo far 011 the purchase prlr!e 
of said plu11hee would extend In payment 
thereof; and to th<:>MP answeni added this: 
"All thl' foreP:olng mattel"ll appear upon 
the books of said R. Delmel & Bros.·· The 
depoeltlon of Joseph Delmel was token at 
the Instance of appl'lleee. We ha \'e read 
this df'po11ltlon at length, aH It u1111ears In 
the rt'cord ltRelf, and It lmpre1tses our 
minds aA being eva11IV'e and dlelngenuone. 
In reRpect to almoet all or the material QlleRtlona a11ke<l him by appellees he ehlelde 
blm1wlf behind the p)Pu that he does not 
remember. When oueetloned In regard to 
Case No. ‘145]
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the details of the dealings of his firm with
Biersdorf, he answers, time and time
again. and almost uniformly,thut he does
not remember; that he can tell nothing in
reference to the particular matter inquired
about without his books; that his ledger
would show the transactions, that his
bookswould show the transactions; that
his ledger was in New York, and mostoi the
other books destroyed by fire. An analy-
sis of his testimony would require more
time and space than the reasonable limits
of an opinion would allow; but suffice it
to say that it is manifest therefrom that
he has but little knowledge or recollection
in respect to the dealings with Biersdorf,
and that most of that was predicated
upon what appeared upon the ledger and
other books of his firm. He even states in
his examination that he does not remem-
ber that he ever read the answer in chan-
cery which is here under consideration.
but that, if he signed it. he supposes that
he read it. Upon the whole, his deposi-
tion has not favorablyimpresscd us; and,
in our opinion, it goes far to impeach the
force of his sworn answer. He afterwards,
in obedience to a subpcena, produced the
ledger before the master in chancery; and
it was then desired by appellee “ to exam-
ine him with reference to the items con-
tained in the ledger, which he here pro-
duces, and which in his former examina-
tion he cluimed his inability to testify
about on account oi‘ the absence of the
books;" but both he and his counsel re-
fused to submit to such examination.
The account of Biersdorf. as it appears
upon the ledger produced by Deimei &
Bros., is as follows:
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The items which appcllees claim tobe
false and fraudulent are the charges
“I984. .lan'_v 29. Reg. 1-557, $l2.7N7.00."
and “ISQ4. Feb’_v T. l—:'iTl, $-'>.:'i‘l'_'_:'i I. ” and
the credit, “Sept. 11. By cash, 61. $18.-
289.:'i3.” It is supposed that the order-
book and impression or bill book of the
firm would throw light upon the above
items of charge: but they were not pro-
duced h_v appellants. It is stated by Jo-
seph Deimel in his deposition that most of
the books, other than the ledger, were lost
by fire; but in this he is contradicted by
Taylor, who was book-keeper. and by
Drown. who was assistant book-keeper.
of the firm, and the substance of their ev-
idence is that the books were preserved in
the vault, and that they did not know of
any books having been lost or destroyed
by the fires. it appears from the testi-
mony oi’ Taylor, which is corroborated
by that of DroWn,and by that of Jenkins,
an employs of a firm of book-binders and
printers, that he (Taylor) in 1885, by direc-
tion of Joseph Deimel, removed some S0
leaves from the order book OI Deimei &Co.,
which included a large part of the year
ifi8~i, and covered the transactions with
Bicrsdorf, and caused to be ruled and
paged and bound in the book an equal
number of blank pages of like paper. and
on which were written up orders for
goods, including fictitious orders of goods
for Biersdorf; and at the ame time pages
containing copies of pages of bills to pur-
chasers of goods were removed from the
bill-hook, covering a. part of 18$-1, and
blank leaves corresponding to those re-
moved were inserted therein, and the
book rebound; and that bills were entered
therein to correspond with the orders en-
tered in the mutilated order-book ; and that
a solution of coffee was used to give the
substituted leaves the appearance of age.
This evidence is wholly uncontradicted;
and its truth was further made manifest
by the production in court by Taylor. un-
der an order of court, oi the leaves which
had been removed from the order-book.
Upon page 29 of the loose sheets produced
by Taylor appears a. supposed Biersdorf
order, as follows:
“J. D. ” January 28.
4749, Jacob Biersdori’, 362 Canal St., Ciiy.
475$ 50 pieces Olive, 1 U. I. Tingue plush, em-
bossed Franklin.
50 “ Gold 0, Tingue plush, embossed
Franklin.
25 “ Blue 4, Tingue plush, embossed
Franklin, $1.55 per yard.
25 “ Green 2, Tingue plush, embossed
Franklin.
50 “ Red 2, Tingue plush, embossed
Franklin.
Terms, net 60 days, to be delivered Jan‘y 20th,
or 5 p. oft 10 days. J.
It appears from the testimony oi Taylor
that in the order-book as altered, lumber
was substituted for plushes, and that the
same change was made in the bill-book.
The charge in ledger, January $12,787.
is based on the order of January 28th, and
corresponding entry in bill-book. He also
states that the items which constitute the
charge oi $5,502.50 were changed in the or-
der-book and in the bill-book. These mn-
tilations of their booksarc admitted by ap-
pellants; but it is claimed in their behalf
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Cue No."145) PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
the details or the df'allngs of his ftrm with 
BlerRdorf, he ennrers, time and time 
11goln. Anet almoHt uniformly, tbllt he does 
not remt>mher; that be ean tell nothing lo 
reference to the particular mutter inquired 
about without his books; that bis ledger 
would show the transactions, that his 
books would show the transat>tloos; that 
blHledgerwae In New York, and most of the 
other books deetroyt'd by fire. An analy-
sis of his teHtfmony would require more 
time mul 11pal'e than the l'f'asonable limits 
of an opinion would alluw; but 11uflke It 
to Htty thut It is manife11t therefrom that 
he has but little knowlo<lge or recollection 
In respect to tlle deallnire with Blersdorf, 
ar.d that most of that was predicated 
upon what &J>peart-d upon the ledger and 
other boo\(R of hlH tlrm. He even states In 
bis examination that he doe>1 not remem-
ber that he e\'(:r read the answer in chan-
cery which la here under coualderatlnn, 
but thttt, if he signed it, he euppoeee that 
be read It. U11on the whole, hie deposi-
tion has not favorahlylmpreeaed us; and, 
In our opinion, it goes far to Impeach the 
fo~e of his -iworn anHwer. He arterwarils, 
In obedience to a subpama. produced the 
led~er bt>fore the master In chancery; and 
It was then desired by appellee "to e:tRm-
lne him with reference to the items con-
tained 111 the Jpcfg;er, which he here pro-
duces, and which in bis former examlmt-
tlon he claimed his Inability to testify 
about on account of the absence of the 
books;" but both he and his counsel re-
fm1erJ to submit to Roch examination. 
The ac<·ount of Bleredorf. as it appears 
upon the ]edger produced by Delwel & 
Brue., 18 as follows: 
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The Items which appcllcea claim to be 
fal111e and fraudulent are the charges 
"18.~.J. Jan'.v 29. Reg. 1-5.'l7, $12.71'17.00. • 
and "1~~- Jo'eh'.v 7. 1-f>71, fa.n112.;, 1." •11111 
the credit, "Sept. 11. By cash, 61, f 18,· 
289.53." It le supposed that the order-
book and 1mpre881on or bUI book of the 
firm would throw llgbt upon the above 
items of charge: but they were not pro-
duced hy ap1,ellants. It 18 stated by Jo-
&eph Delmel In his depoHltlon that most of 
the books, other than the ledger, were lost 
by tire; but to this he lit contradicted by 
Taylor, who was book-keeper, and by 
Drown, who wuH aBl!IHtant book-keeper, 
of the tlrm, and the substance or their ev-
idence ls that the books were pr('llerved In 
the vault, and that they did not know of 
any books ha vlng been lost or destroyed 
by the fires. It appe!trH from the teRtl· 
mouy of Taylor, which le corroborated 
by that of Drown,anrl by that of Jenkins. 
an emoloye of a ftrm of book-blodt-rs and 
printers, that be (Taylor) in 1S85, by dil"t'C· 
tioo of Joseph Delmel, removPd some 80 
leaves from the order book ot Delmel &Co .• 
which included a large part of the yf'ar 
1R84, and covered the tranaactlonH with 
Blersdorf, ttnd caused to be ruled and 
puged and bound In the book an equal 
number of blank pages or like paper, and 
on whleh were written up ordettJ for 
goo1ls, Including fictitious orders of goods 
for Blersdorf; a·nd at the same time pag~ 
containing copies of paites of bUls to 1iur-
chaRel'R of goo<111 were removed from the 
blll-linok, covering a part of 18.~. and 
blank leaves corresponding to those re-
moved were inserted therein, and the 
book rebound; and tbat bills were entered 
therein to corte11pond with the ordeni t>U· 
tered In the mutilated order-book; and that 
a 11olutlon or rorree was used to give the 
Aubstltuted leAves the appearance of age. 
Thia evidence le wholly uncontradlcted; 
and Its truth was further made manifest 
by the produetlon In court by Taylor, un-
der an order of court, of the leaves which 
h11d been remove.I from tbe order-book. 
Upon lJOge 29 or the loose sheets produced 
by Taylor appears a supposed Bleradorf 
order, as follows: 
"J. D." January 28.. 
4749, Jacob Bleradorf, ll6S Canal St., City. 
'758 50 plecea Olive, 1 U. I. Tlngue plu.ab, em-
boased Franklin. 
llO " Gold 0, Tingue plnab, emboued 
Franklin. 
211 " Blue 4, Tingne pluab, emboell8d 
Franklin, 11.5.5 per yard. 
211 " Green 2, Tingue plush, emboaeed 
Franklin. 
llO " Red 2, Tiogue pluah, emboaeed 
Franklin. 
Terms, net flO days, to be delivered Jan•y 29th, 
or 5 p. oft 10 daya. J. 
It appears from the testtmonyof Taylor 
that In the order-book as altered, lumber 
was Hubstltnted for plushes, and that the 
same cbangP waa made tu the bill-book. 
Tho charge in led11:er, Janual'y 29, $12,7!"<7. 
la b&11ed on the order of January 28th, aod 
currespoudlug entry In bill-book. He alHo 
states that the Items which constitute the 
charge ol f5,502.50 were changed In the or· 
der-book and In the blll-book. These ma· 
tllattons of their books are admitted by ap-
pellants; but it 111 claimed In their behalf 
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that the object in view was not to defraud
the creditors oi Biersdorf, but to defraud
liiarshall Field & (‘o.in a suit ior damages
brought in New York by Dcimsl & Bros.
against said i\Iarshall Field & Co. for
breach of a contract to deliver in the
month oi February, 1884, a large quantity
oi Tingue plushes. It is suggested that, if
the charges against Biersdori for $12,787
and $5,502.50 were just cliai-gvs, it is im-
material to said creditors whether they
were predicated upon items ior plusbes
sold or items ior lumber sold. It is read-
ily perceived how it might have been for
the interest of appellants, in said damage
suit, to show that in order to supply the
demands of their business they had been
compelled to go into the market and buy
from Biersdori $l~l,'i'0ii worth oi Tingue
plushes at $1.65 ayard; and so also it
might have been for their boneiitin said
suit, for the purpose oi enhancing dam-
ages or creating a fictitious price ior such
goods, to have manipulated their books
to show fictitious and unreal sales oi
plushes by them. But here the falsifica-
tion oi their books is not explainable up-
on either oi these theories. The purchase
of plushes from Biersdori was not shown
by the books, either before or alter the.
mutilation; and by the alterations
charges which before that indicated sales
of plushes by them were changed to sales
oi lumber. It is diliicult to see what bear-
ing the sale oi lumber by appellants to
Biersdori would have in the litigation for
the non-delivery of silk plushes to appel-
lants by Marshall Field 6’: Co. it is more
reasonable to suppose that ior some ren-
son it was deemed unadvisable that the
books should show such very large sales
oi plushes to Biersdorf, or that at or
about the time they were buying plushes
for Biersdorf at $1.65 per yard they were
also selling him many thousands ofdol-
lars worth oi the same quality of plushes
at $1.55 a yard; and that the charges
made were in furtherance oi a plan to still
further cover up the iund of$l4.700. and
conceal it from the creditors oi Biersdorf,
said Iiiersdorf having failed in business
some months beiore. That \\‘hlch we have
above said proceeds upon the theory that
the entries upon the ledger oi $i2,T.\7 and
$.'>.5U3.50 were made prior to the changes
made in the books; but that such was the
case is not at all clear from the evidence.
Taylor, in his evidence taken beiore the
master, says: “The entries $12,787 and
$3.502.5‘)iu January and February, 1884,
were not made at those dates, but a con-
siderable time afterwards, and after the
mu tilatlon of the books, and not from act-
ual transactions occurring in lieimel‘s
business.” Subsequently, on his cross-ex-
amination, he states that the entries on
the ledger were made according to the
dates there shown. but that the items
which constituted the'charges oi $12,787
and $5.:'ill2.50 were altered, changed in the
order-book and in the bill-book, which
were made over and leaves putin. Itis
evident from the testimony oi Taylor that
he was an unwilling witness ior appellees,
and desired to tell as little as possible that
was injurious to appellants; that he was
quite considerably under the influence of
Joseph Deimel; and that the latter inter-
viewed him frequently prior to and pend-
ing his several examinations as a witness
in respect; to his testimony, and sought to
influence him in regard to the evidence he
should give. We are inclined to think that
it would be conducive to a just result to
take his statements most strongly against
appellants. In respect to the credit. Sep-
tember llth, oi $ls,2.s'9.:'»3, Taylor testifles,
among other things. that it represents no
real transaction of thatdate; that to pre-
serve the balance cash was debited with
that amount, and credited with merchan-
dise charged to Biersdorl: that it ap-
pcared as though the amount had been
paid in cash, and charged to merchandise,
and to Moses L. Miller, a brother-in-law oi
Dcimel’s; and thatJoseph Deimelinstruct-
ed him to credit Biersdori for cash, and
charge it up to somesucb account, whereit
would not attract attention. On June 2,
1885,—-about the time that the hooks were
mutilated and changed.—-Joseph Deiniel
telegraphed irom New York to Charles L.
Miller, who was his brother-in-la w, and a
son-in-law oi Biersdorf, as follows: “ Don’t
neglect to see Max as per my letter to
Rudo. li any one should ask him am’-
thing he can say he remembers nothing,
and his books are lost. but ii they give
him time he will try to refresh his mem-
ory. \\'|ite me if any one has been to see
him. Do so to-day, as it is important.
Look him up wherever he is. Jon.” The
reasonable presumption is that the “ Max ”
mentioned in the telegram was Max Berg,
who was a brother-in-law oi Iiiersdorl,
and the book-keeperund business manager
of said Biersdori. It is signilicant. when
taken in connection with this telegram,
that Biersdori states in his sworn an-
swer “that he has neither possession
nor control nor knowledge oi his hooks oi
account, " and that, notwithstanding the
efforts which the record shows were made
in that behalf, said books oi account were
not obtained and brought into court.
There is nothing whatever in the record
to suggcst that the charges oi January 29
and Ft.-bruury 7, 1884. were for any iner-
chandise or consideration other than lum-
ber or plnshes. There. is no evidence ex-
cept that oi the sworn answer tending‘
to show that appellants sold lumber to
Bicrsdorl. '1‘hed1-position oi Henry Stab],
who was foreman ior Bicrsdorf, and the
other evidence in the case, renders it rea-
sonably certain that no lnmber was so
sold. The testimony of Rudolph Deimel,
oi C. L. Dietrich, who in 1h-‘<4 was shipping
clerk oi Diemel & Bros., and oi E. G. Mar-
kus, a. teamster in the employment of the
firm. tends to show the sale and delivery
of plushes by appellants to Biersdori in
the early part of l.\‘8-i. The statements oi
the first are impeached by the affidavit
which he made and filed in the Marshall
Field & Co. garnishment proceeding. ii
we should assume the matters staled by
all three of them to be true. yet they are
not inconsistent with the theory of appel-
lecs that shortly before the failure of Biers-
dori, and in contemplation thereof, said
Bicrsdorf. through Max Berg, purchased
large quantities oi plushes from his credit-
ors, and resold them to appellants, and
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CORBOBORATIVE EVIDENCE. [Oise No. 14:> 
that the object In '°lew wa11 not to <1erratJd 
the Cl"Pditors of Biers1lorf, but to defraud 
Marshall Fle!d & Co. In u Hult for d11magee 
brought In New York by Delmel a: Brus. 
agalnHt said Marshall Field & Co. for 
breacb of a contract to deliver In the 
month of February, 1884, a lnrge quantity 
of Tlngue plutihes. It Is suggested that, If 
the charges agahu~t Blenulorf for 112.787 
and f.'l,502.50 were just ebargt>s, It bs Im-
material to aalcl creditors whether they 
were predlrated upon Items for plu11het1 
eold or ltP.ms for lumber sold. It Is read-
ily percelve1l how It might have been for 
the Interest of appellants, In said damage 
suit, to show thut lo order to supJ>ly the 
demands of their boMIOCRS they had been 
compelled to go Into the market and buy 
from BIEirsdorf $14,700 worth or Tlngue 
plushes at fl.65 a yard; and so also It 
might have been for tbtdr hcneHt In said 
ault, for the purpvse or enhancing dam-
ages or creating a fictitious price for sucb 
goods, to have manipulated their books 
to show fictitious and unreal sales uf 
plu11het1 by them. But here the faltdOca-
tion of their books Is not explainable up. 
on either of these theories. 'l'he purchase 
of plushes from Blersdorf W&B not sho<vn 
by the books, either before or after the 
mutHatlon; and by the alteratloms 
chu.rgeM which before that Indicated sales 
of plushes by them were r.hanged to i<all'H 
of lamber. It ls di1Dc111t tc ere what beur-
iog the sale of lnmber by ap11ellnnts to 
Blersdorf would ha f'e In the litigation for 
the non-<JPllvery or 11ilk plushes to uppel-
lants by MarMlmll Field & Co. Jt I& more 
reasonable to "oppose that for some r<>n-
.ion It was deemed unadvlitable that the 
books shoald show such very large sales 
of ploRhes tu Blel'l!dorf, or that at or 
about the time they were buying olu11he& 
for Blenitlorf at fl.65 per yard they were 
also selling him mauy thou1umds of dol-
larR worth of the same quality of plushes 
at $1.55 a yard; aod that the l'hargeR 
made were In furtherance of a plan to still 
further cover up the hml1 of $14.iOO. uod 
~once11l It from the creditors or BlerHdurf, 
said Hlersdorf ha vlnp: fallt?d In buslnt?HS 
ifome mouths before. That which we have 
above said proce<>ds npon the theor;v that 
thr. Pntrlea apon the ledger of $1:.!,ix7 and 
.$:J,i>O:J.50 wero made 1n·lor to the chnngPs 
made lo the books; hut that such WHM the 
~ase ls not at all clt?ar h'om the evidence. 
'Taylor, In his evidence taken bpfore the 
maHtPr, Rays: "1'he e11trle11 $12,iS7 nnd 
f:>.502.5') In January and J<'ehruary, 18S4, 
were not made at those dates, hut a con-
~hlerable time afterwardM, and after the 
mutilation of the books, an<l not from act-
ual tram~actlons Ot'currlng In lleimel's 
busfneHs." Subsequently, on his croHs-e:r.-
amlnatlon, be states that the entries on 
the ledger were ma1le according to the 
datt>A there shown, but that the Items 
whkh <'OnRtltutrd the.charges or $12,787 
and fj,502.50 were altered, chnngPd In the 
order-book and In the bill-book, whkh 
wrre made over and lea"reM put In. It 111 
-evident from the testimony of Taylor thu.t 
he was an nowllllug witness for appellees, 
and deslrPd to tell as little as po11slble that 
waR lnJurlouM to a11pcllnnts; that he wtts 
41ulte considerably under tbe Influence of 
Joseph l>Plmt>l; aud that the latter Inter-
viewed him frpqut>ntly prior to and IJl"od-
lng his tlf!\'eral examlnn tlnn& as a w1toete11 
In respPct to his teMtlmony, uml MOllll'ht to 
Influence him In regard to tbe evidence he 
11hoold give. Wl" are Inclined to think that 
It would be conducive tu a Juiit result to 
take hi& statementR moMt strongly against 
appellants. Jn rPl!lpect to the credit, l:ie1>-
temher 11th, of $11'.~9.fi3, '.raylur tt>stlties, 
amuog other tblnl(tl, that It represents 110 
real tran11actlon of that date; that to pre-
serve the balanc" cash wa11 dt!blted with 
that amount, and t'redlted with mercban· 
dllle' charged to BlerMdorf: that It ap-
peared as thouKh the amount hod brPo 
paid to <'&sh, and charged to merchamli11e, 
and to Mose11 L. Miller, a brother-In-law of 
I>elmel's; and that Joseph Delmellustruct-
ed him to credit Blt>r'i!dorf for caBh, and 
l'harge It up to 11omesuch account, where It 
would uot attract uttentloo. On .June 2, 
1885,-aboot the time that the books were 
mutilated and changecl,-Jo11e11h Delnll'I 
tt>legruphed from New York tu Charles L. 
Miller, who was his brother-In-law. and a 
Hon-in-law ol Blel'lldorf, as follows: "Don't 
neglect to aiee Max as per my lettPr to 
Rodo. If any one should ask him an.v-
tblng he can 11ay he remember'i! nothln,;, 
aud his book" are lost, hut If they give 
him time be will try to l't'freRh hlM mem-
ory. W1lte me U nny one ht111 been to Mee 
him. Do so to·dny, a11 it Is lmportn 11 t. 
Look him up wherever he Is. Jm:." The 
reasonable presumption Is that the" Max• 
Dlt'ntloned In the tt>legram was Max Bi>r~. 
who was a brother-lo-lnw of Rler111lorf, 
and the book-keeper and bu•fness mana1&er 
of Raid lllet"Mdorf. It Is Hlgnillcnut, wlll'o 
tRken In connection with this telegrum, 
that BlerBdorf stntPS lo his sworn an-
swer "that be hns neltht'r J>OMReMsion 
nor t'ontrol nor knowlt•1lge or hlR hookM of 
acconnt, •· nnd that, notwlth11t11ndiug the 
enorts which the record Rhows were made 
In that hehdlf, sttld books of account were 
not obtained anll brought Into rourt. 
There 111 nothing wllate\·er lo the record 
to sn~grst that the charires of January 29 
and :F~l.Jruary 7, ISS-1. were for any nwr-
chandiMe or consideration other than 111111-
ber or plushes. 1'1Jere is no evhlt-m·e ex-
cept that of the Mworn anHwer tPndlng 
tu show that apJ>t>llitntR 110111 lum her to 
Blr.rsdorl. 1'hedt•positlon of HPnry8tnhl, 
who was foreman for lliei"Hdorf, uud the 
other evidence lo the l'ttlle, renders It re1t-
sonably certain that no lumber wRs 110 
solll. The teKtlmony of R1alolph Di>lmel, 
of C. L. llletrlch, who lo 1>-S-1wuR11hi1111ing 
clerk of Dlemel & Bros., and of E. H. l\fllr-
ku<J, a tea1m1ter to the employmrnt or the 
firm. tends to Rhow tht> s11Je and dt•live,.y 
of plu11heR by a p111?llan ts to lllerHdorf In 
the early part of 1SS4. Tlw sta temt>nt1o1 of 
the HrRt are lrupeoched by the nfflcln \"It 
which he made and filed In the Mnniball 
Field & Co. ~arulshment vroceetling. If 
'1;e Hhould assume the mnttPl'!I staled by 
all three or them to be trne, yet they are 
not lncom11Htt'nt with the throry of appel-
lees that shortly before the fullure of Blers-
dorf, and to l'onterupl1ttlon thereof, said 
Bler11dorf, throuJrb Max Berg, purch11Rud 
larKe quanth.les of pluMhes from his credit-
ors, and rasold them to appellants, and 
429 
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with the intention of depriving such cred-
itors oi the fund realized from such
plushes; that Delmel & Bros. were active
participants in the contemplated fraud;
and that the hauling oi‘ plushes to and fro
between the places of business of Deimel &
Bros. and Biersdori was simply part and
parcel oi the plan to cover up and conceal 1
l place in February, 1584. This is not a. bill
the actual facts. Under all the circum-
stances of the case, we are unable to say
that it was error in the superior court to
arrive at the conclusion that the other
evidence in the case was suliicient to suc-
cessfully impeach and overcome the sworn
answer of Joseph l)eimel.
Some minor points seem to require brief
attention. It is objected—citing in that
behalf Durand -v. Gray, 129 ill. 9, 21 N. E.
Rep. fil0—that in respect to some of the
judgment creditors it does not suliiciently
appear from thepleadimzs and proofs that
legal remedies have been exhausted, since
the residence of the judgment debtor at
the time of the issuance and delivery oi.’
execution is not stated. it is both averred
and proven that the judgments were re-
covered in courts of record in (‘ook coun-
ty. and that the executions were issued to
and returned by the sheriff of that county.
In the absence of averment or evidence to
the contrary, the presumption is that the
defendant resides in the county where the
suitis brought and judgment recovered.
It appears from the record that on No-
vember 25, 1885, the summons herein was
served on Biersdorf in Cook county, and
the presumption is that he then resided
there. It abundantly appears from the
evidence that in the latter part of March,
1889, said debtor was a resident of said
county. The maxim probatis ext:-emis
pr.-csumuntur media. has application to the
case. The objection was not made in the
court below. and it is now too late to
chancery for want of specirlr averlnents in
the pleadings of some of the creditors of
the place of residence oi the judgment
debtor at the dates when executions were
sued out.
it is immaterial that the bill fails to
state that the complainants were credit-
ors when the Biersdorf transaction took
to set aside the sale of the plnshes to
Deilncl & Bros. as being a voluntary con-
veyance of property without considera-
tion, and u fraud against claims of then
existing creditors, but the case of appcllces
admits and recognizes the validity of the
sale. and proceeds upon the theory that
the indebtedness thereby created was
frandulentI_v covered up and concealed.
and that such indebtedness was a fund
which really belonged to the judgment
debtor. if there are assets of the debtor
in the hands oi appellants. they can be
reached b_v the creditors, no matter when
the debts due to the latter were con-
tracted. The court, ill its decree, found
that the $14,700 had not been paid. and
that said indebtedness. with interest there-
on at 6 per cent. per annum, amounted to
$17.6-i0. and that said sum of $17,640 cou-
stituted a fund to which the creditors had
a right to resort for the collection of their
claims against Biersdorf, and rendered
judgments and awarded executions in
favor of the several appellees, aggrejxating
$11,370.21. The finding" that interest was
due on the $14,700 is assigned as error. A
fraudulent vendee or trustee is chargeable
with 6 per cent. interest on the value of
the property or fund. Steere v.1-ioagland,
50 lll. 377. in respect to the remaining ob-
jections urzed by appellants, we may say
that we think them without merit. and
that they do not call for special notice.
The judgment of the appellate court is
question the jurisdiction of the court of l affirmed.
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with thn lott>ntlon of depriving such cre1J- <'hancery for want or spee:nr a \"erments tn 
1tol'8 or the fund realized from snch the pteadlnirs of some of the creditors or 
plushes; that DP-Imel & Bros. were nl'tlve thti place of re1ddenr.e of the Judgroc·nt 
participants in the contemphlted fraud; debtor at the dateit when execution& went 
and that the hauling of plushes to and fro , sued out. 
betWo!ell the plttces or business or Delmel & ' It lt1 immaterial that the blll fallR to 
Bro11. and Blersdorf was simply part and state that the complalnants were credit-
parcel of the plan to cover up and conceal or11 when the Bler11dorf trnn11actlon took 
the al'tual fnct11. Under all the clrcum- place In February, 1~. This is not a bill 
stances or the case, we al't' unable to say to set ao;illle the sale of the plm1hes t~ 
that it wus error in the superior court to Dt:hnel & Bros. as being a voluntary con-
arrlve at the conclu1don that the other veyance of property without conslders-
nvldence In the cuse was sufficient to sue- tlon, and o fraud against claims of theu 
cessrully Impeach and overcome the sworn exl11ting creditors, but the cose of appellees. 
anMwer of Joseph Delmel. admits and recop:nlzes the validity of the 
:Some minor point1111eem to require brief sale, and proceeds upou the theory that 
attention. It ill objected-citing lo that the inllebtednE'BH thereby crented was 
behlllf Durand .v. Gra~·. 129 Ill. IJ, 21 N. E. frandulently covered up and concealed. 
Rep. IUO-that In reMpeet to 1mme of the a111l that sul'h lndebtednell8 wa11 a fund 
Judgment creditors it doe11 not sntHclently which re1tlly belonged to the Judr;unent 
appear from theplea11ln1ts and p1·oofs that debtor. If there are nesets of the debtor 
legal remedies ha'l"e been exhausted, 11lnce in the hands of a(1pellants, they cau b& 
the re;ildence of the ju1lirment debtor at reache1l by the creditors, no matter wbeo 
the time of the f11suaoce and delh·ery of the debts due to the latter were con-
execu tlon Is not stated. It ls both averred t1·acted. The <'ourt, in its decree, found 
and pronn that the jmtgments \Vere re- that the $14,700 bacl not been paid. and 
covered In courts of !'('Cord In ('o•lk coun- that said lndebtedne11R, with lnteretit there-
ly. and that the exec11tfon1:1 were Issued to on at 6 per cent. per annum, amounted to 
an:l returned by the sheriff of that county. $17,640, and that said sum of $17,IUO coo-
Jn the ah11ence of averment or t!Vldl!ul'e to stltuted a fund to which t.he creclltors had 
the contrary, the pre11umptlo11 ls that the a right to resort for the coJlection of their 
defendant resides In the county where the claims against Blersdorf, and rendered 
suit is brought and judgment reco,·ered. Judgments and awarded executions lo 
It appears from the record that on No- fa \•or of the 11everal appellees, aggregating 
vt-mber ~. 1885, the summons herein was $11,370.21. 'l'he finding that lntel'f"Bt was 
st-rved on Blenidorf In Cook county, end due on the '14,700 ls assIJtned as error. A 
the presumption Is that he then resllled fraudnlent vendee or truRtee 19 cbergenble 
there. It abunctantly appeani from th" wltll 6 per cent. lnte!"Pfft on the value of 
evlllence that In the latter p1\l't or March, the property or fund . 8teere v . Hoagland. 
1~, said debtor was a retildent of said 50 111. 377. In respect to the remalnlo~ ob-
county. The maxim probatls extn:m1ls jectlons nri;red by av11ellants, we may say 
prR!sumuntur medln has application to the that we think them without merit, and 
caee. '!'he objection was not made In the that they do not call for special notice. 
court below, nnd it fit now too htte to The judgment of the appellate court la. 
qneHtlon the jurlRdlctlon of the <·ourt of affirmed. · 
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noanvson et ill. v. UNITED STATES.
(13 \\'all. 363.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec.,
1871.
Error to the circuit court of the United
States for the district of California.
Action by the United States against Rob-
inson & Co., merchants of San Francisco, on
a contract with the assistant quartermaster
of the United States “to deliver” on his or-
der “1,000,000 bushels of first quality clear
barley" between the 1st of July, 1867, and
the 30th of June, 1868, at such points as
might be deignated, and at such times and
in such quantities as might be requh-ed. The
contract did not provide as to whether the
barley was to be delivered in sacks or in
bulk. The first barley delivered was deliver-
ed in sacks, but, on being required to de-
liver 30,000 pounds more, defendant tender-
ed the quantity in wagons which the oflicer
at the post where it was tendered refused to
accept, and the contractor abandoned his con-
tract. The United States asked a witness
shown to have been engaged in the grain
business in California as to his knowledge of
the usage of the trade in delivering barley.
An objection that it was incompetent for
plaintiff to vary the terms of a contract by
evidence of a usage was overruled, and the
witness testifled that it was the custom to
deliver grain in sacks, and had always been
the custom. There was no other evidence of
usage, and the court found that it was the
usage, and always had been in California, to
deliver barley in sacks, unless expressly stip-
ulated otherwise, and that the tender in bulk
was not sufficient under the contract. Judg-
ment for the United States, and defendants
bring error.
E. L. Goold, for plaintiffs in error. G. H.
Williams, Atty. Gen., and B. H. Bristow, Sol.
Gen., for the United States.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of
the court.
In Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, this
court decided that proof of a custom or usage
inconsistent with a contract, and which either
expressly or by necessary implication contra- .~
dicts it, cannot be received in evidence to af-
fect it; and that usage is not allowed to sub-
vert the settled rules of law. But we stated
at the same time that custom or usage was '
properly received to ascertain and explain
the meaning and intention of the parties to
a contract, whether written or parol, the
meaning of which could not be ascertained
without the aid of such extrinsic evidence,
and that such evidence was thus used on the
, a single witness.
theory that the parties knew of the existence
of the custom or usage and contracted in
reference to it. This latter rule is as well
settled as the former (1 Smith, Lead. Cas.
[Tth Ed.] p. 386), and under it the evidence
was rightly received.
It is obvious by the steps which the defend-
ants took to perform their contract, that there
are two modes in which barley may be deliv-
ered, for they delivered part in sacks and
tendered part in bulk. And it is equally ob-
vious, on account of the additional cost, that
they would not have delivered the barley in
sacks for a period of six months, if the con-
tract on its face was satisfied by a delivery
in bulk. The contract, by its terms, is silent
as to the mode of delivery, and although
there are two modes in which this can be
done, yet they are essentially diflerent, and
one or the other, and not both, must have been
in the minds of the parties at the time the
agreement wa entered into. In the absence
of an express direction on the subject, ex-
trinsic evidence must of necessity be resorted
to in order to find out which mode was adopt-
ed by the parties, and what extrinsic evi-
dence is better to ascertain this than that of
usage? If a person of a particular occupa-
tion in a certain place makes an agreement
by virtue of which something is to be done
in that place, and this is uniformly done in a
, certain way by persons of the same occupa-
tion in the same place, it is but reasonable to '
assume that the parties contracting about it,
and specifying no manner of doing it differ-
. ent from the ordinary one, meant that the
ordinary one and no other should be followed.
Parties who contract on a subject-matter con-
cerning which known usages prevail, by im-
plication incorporate them into their agree-
ments, if nothing is said to the contrary.
The evidence in the present case did not
tend to contradict the contract, but to de-
fine its meaning, in an important point,where,
by its written terms, it was left undefined.
This, it is settled. may be done.
It is objected that the usage was proved by
But we cannot assert, as
a rule of law governing proof of usages of
trade. that if a witness have a full knowl-
edge and a long experience on the subject
about which he speaks, and testifies explicit-
ly to the antiquity, duration, and universality
of the usage, and is uncontradicted, the usage
cannot be regarded by the jury as established.
On the contrary, the authorities are that in
such a case it may be. See 1 Smith, Lead.
Cas. (7th Ed.) 782; Vail v. Rice, 5 1\‘. Y. 156;
Marston v. Bank of Mobile, 10 Ala. 28-i; Part-
ridge v. Forsyth, 29 Ala. 200.
Judgment affirmed.
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CORHOBOHATIVE E\"lDE~CE. [Case No. 14& 
ROBINSON et al. v. UNITED STATES. 
(18 Wall. 363.) 
Supreme Court of the United StateJI. Dec., 
1871. 
theory that the parties knew of the existence 
of the custom or usage and contracted In 
reference to lt. This latter rule ls as well 
settled as the former (1 Smith, Lead. cas. 
[7th Ed.) p. 386), and under It the evidence 
Error to the circuit court of the United was rightly received. 
States tor the district of California. It Is obvious by the steps which the defend-
.Action by the United States against Rob- ants took t.u perform their contract, that there 
lnaon & Co., merchants of San Francisco, on are two modes In which barley may be dellv· 
a contract with the assistant quartermaster ' ered, tor they delivered part in sacks and 
ot the United States "to deliver" on his or- tende1·ed part in bulk. And It Is equally ob-
der "1,000,000 bushels of first quality clear vtous, on account or the additional cOBt, that 
barley" between the 1st of July, 1867, and they would not ban delivered the barley in 
the 30th of June, 1868, at such points as sacks for a 1>ertod of six months, It the con-
might be designated, and at such times and , tract on its face was satisfied by a delivery 
in such quantities as might be required. The 11 tn bulk. The contract, by its terms, ls silent contract did not provide as to whether the as to the mode of delivery, and although 
barley was to be delivered in sacks or in I there are two modes in which this can be 
bulk. The first barley delivered was deliver- done, yet they are essentially different, and 
ed in sacks, but, on being required to de- one or the other, and not both, must llave been 
liver 30,000 pounds more, defendants tender- In the minds of the parties at the time the 
ed the quantity in wagons which the officer agreement was entered into. In the absence 
at the post where It was tendered i·efused to of an express direction on the subject, ex· 
accept, and the contractor abandoned his con- I trlnslc evidence must of uP.cessity be resorted 
tract. The United States asked a witness i to in order to find out which mode was adopt-
shown to have been e]1ftnged In the grain ed by the parties, and what extrinsic evi-
buslness in California as to his knowledge of deuce ls better to ascertain this than that of 
the usage of the trade In delivering barley. usage? If a person of a particular occupa-
An objection that it woe incompetent for tlon in a certain place makes an agreement 
plaintiff to vary the terms of a contract by by virtue of which something ls to be done 
evidence of a usage was overruled, and the In that place, and this Is uniformly done In a 
witness testified that It was the custom to . certain way by pel'80ll8 of the same occupa-
dellver grain In sacks, and had always been I tlon in the same place, It ls but reasonable to · 
the custom. There was no other evidence of aseume that the parties contracting about It, 
uaage, and the court found that it was the and specifying no manner of doing it ditfer-
usage, and always had been In California, to ! ent from the ordinary one, meant that the 
deliver barley In sacks, unless expressly stlp- I ordinary one and no other should be followed_ 
ulated otherwise, and that the tender in bulk Parties who contract on a subject-matter con-
was not sufficient under the contract. Judg- cernlng which known usages prevail, by Im· 
ment for the United States, and defentlants plication incorporate them into their agree-
bring error. ment11, if nothing is said to the contrary. 
E. L Goold, for plalntltrs in error. G. H. The evidence in the present case did not 
Williams, Atty. Gen., and B. H. Bristow, Sol. tend to contradict the contract, but to de-
Gen., for the United States. ftne Its meaning, in an important point, where. 
by its written terms, It was left undeftned_ 
Mr. Justice DA VIS delivered the opinion of I This, it Is settled, may be done. 
the court. I It is objected that the usage was proved by 
In Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, this a single witness. But we cannot assert, as 
court decided that proof of a custom or usage I a rule of law governing proof of usages of 
inconsistent with a contract, and which either I trade, that if a witness have a full knowl-
expreBBly or by necessary Implication contra- ! edge and a long experience on the subject 
diets It, cannot be received ln evidence to af- j about which he speaks, and testUles expllclt-
fect It; and that usage Is not allowed to sub- Jy to the antiquity, duration, and universality 
vert the settled rules of law. But we stated i of the usage, and ls uncontradieted, the usage 
at the sam-e time that custom or usage was ' cannot be regarded by the jury as established_ 
properly received to ascertain and explain On the contrary, the authorities are that in 
the meaning and Intention of the parties to such a case it may be. See 1 Smith, Lead. 
a contract, whether written or parol, the Cas. (7th Ed.) 782; Vail v. Rice, 5 N. Y. 100; 
meaning of which could not be ascertained Marston v. Bank of l\Ioblle, 10 Ala. 2!U; Part-
without the aid of such extrinsic evidence, 1 ridge v. Foniyth, 29 Ala. 200. 
nncl that sueh evidence was thus used on the Judgment amrmed. 
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Case No. 147]
PRODU.C'1‘iON AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
WHISKY CASES.
(99 U. S. 594.)
UNITED STATES v. FORD (two cases).
SAME v. ONE STILL. SAME v. FIFTY
BARRELS OF DISTILLED SPIRITS.
SAME v. THREE HUNDRED AND NINE-
TEEN BARRELS OF WHISKY. SAME
v. FOUR HUNDRED BARRELS OF DIS-
TILLED SPIRITS. SAME v. FOUR
HUNDRED PACKAGES OF DISTILLED
SPIRITS. SAME v. ONE HUNDRED
AND FIFTY BARRELS OF WHISKY.
Supreme Court of the United States. Oct.,
1878.
Error to the circuit court of the United
States for the Northern district of Illinois.
The first two of these cases were actions
of debt to recover the penalties imposed by
sections 3296 and 3452 of the Revised Stat-
utes. The remaining cases were by way of
information under sections 3281, 3299, 3453,
and 3456. The defence in the first case, and
it is substantially the same in ail, consists
of the general issue and the following spe-
cial plea:
“And for a further plea in this behalf said
defendants say actio non, because they say
that heretofore, to wit, on the twenty-sev-
enth day of December, A. D. 1875, at Chi-
cago, at, to wit, said northern district of Il-
linois, the said plaintiffs and the said de-
fendants entered into an agreement by
which it was, among other things, agreed
that if the said defendants would testify on
‘behalf of the piaintiifs frankly and truth-
fully, when required, in reference to a con-
spiracy among certain government oiiicials
in the revenue service and other parties.
then known to exist, whereby the honest
manufacture of spirits and payment of the
tax had been rendered practically impossi-
ble, and should plead guilty to one count in
an imiietnient then pending against them in
the district court, in and for said northern
district, and should withdraw their pleas in
a certain condemnation case then pending
against them in said district court, the said
plaintiffs would recall any and all assess-
ments under the internal-revenue laws then
made against said defendants, and that no
more assessments under said law should be
made against said defendants, and that no
proceedings other than said condemnation
case should be prosecuted against said de-
fendants, and that no new proceedings
should be commenced against.said defend-
ants on account of transactions then past;
and these defendants aver that they and
each of them have fully performed said con-
tract on their part, and defendants further
aver that this suit is a proceeding other than
said condemnation case, and that this suit
is for the recovery upon transactions prior
to the entering into said agreement; and
this the said defendants are ready to verify.”
A demurrer to the special plea was over-
ruled, and judgment rendered for the de-
fendants, ahd the judgment of the district
court aflirmed.
The Attorney General, for the United
States. Mr. Edward'Jussen and Mr. Charles
H. Reed, contra. '
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opin-
ion of the court.
Accomplices in guilt, not previously con-
victed of an infamous crime, when separate-
ly tried are competent witneses for or
against each other; and the universal usage
is that such a party, if called and examined
by the public prosecutor on the trial of his
associates in guilt, will not be prosecuted
for the same oflence, provided it appears
that he acted in good faith and that he tes-
tified fully and fairly.
\Vhere the case is not within any statute,
the general rule is that if an accomplice,
when examined as a witness by the public
prosecutor. discloses fully and fairly the
guilt of himself and his associates. he will
not be prosecuted for the offence disclosed;
but it is equally clear that he cannot by law
plead such fact in bar of any indictment
against him, nor avail himself of it upon his
trial, for it is merely an equitable title to
the mercy of the executive, subject to the
conditions before stated, and can only come
before the court by way of application to
put off the trial in order to give the prisoner
time to apply to the executive for that Dur-
pose. Rex v. Rudd, 1 Cowp. 331.
Snflicient appears to show that the follow-
ing are the material proceedings in the sev-
eral cases: 1. That the first two were ac-
tions of debt commenced in tne circuit court
to recover the double internal-revenue tax
imposed, as fully set forth in the respective
declarations. 2. That the other six cases
are informations filed in the district court to
forfeit the properties therein described for
acts done in violation of the internai-rev-
enue laws.
Service was made in the first two cases.
and the defendants appeared and pleaded
the general issue and the special plea set
forth in ‘the transcript. Issue was joined
upon the first plea, and the United States de-
murred to the special plea. Hearing was
had, and the court overruled the demurrer
and gave judgment for the defendants.
Like defences in the form of answers or
pleas were filed in the other six cases com-
menced in the district court, to which the
United States demurred; but the district
court overruled the deniurrers. and finally
rendered judgment in each case for the de-
fendants. Prompt steps were taken by the
district attorney to remove the cases into the
circuit court, where the respective judg-
ments rendered by the district court were
aiiirmed.
Sufiiee it to say in this connection, without
entering into detail, that the United States
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Case No. 147] PRODUCTIO~ AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
WHISKY CASES. 
(99 u. s. 594.) 
UNITED STATES v. FORD (two Cllllell). 
SAME v. ONE STILL. SAl\IE v. FIFTY 
BARRELS OF DISTILLED SPIRITS. 
SAME v. THREE HU~'DRED AND NINE-
TEEN BARRELS OF WHISKY. SAlIE 
v. FOUR HUNDRED BARRELS OF DIS-
TILLED SPIRITS. SAME v. FOUR 
HUNDRED PACKAGES OF DISTILLED 
SPIRITS. SAME v. ONE HU.NDUED 
AND FIFTY BA.URELS OF WHISKY. 
Supreme Court of the United States. Oct., 
1878. 
Error to the circuit court of the United 
States for the Northern district of Illlnole. 
The first two of these cases were actions 
of debt to recover the penaltles Imposed by 
sections 3296 and 3452 of the Revised Stat-
utes. The remaining cases were by way of 
information uniter sections 3281, 3299, 34:>3, 
and 3456. The defence ln the first case, and 
lt is substantially the same in all, consists 
of the general l88ue and the following spe-
cial plea: 
"And for a further plea lo this behalf said 
defendants say actio non. because they say 
that heretofore, to wit, on the twenty-sev-
enth day of December, A. D. 18ia, at Chi-
cago, at, to wit, said northern district of 11-
llnoie, the said plaintiffs and the said de-
fendants entered into an agreement by 
which it was, among other things, agreed 
that if the said defendants would testify on 
behalf of the plaintiffs frankly and truth-
fully, when required, In ref Prl•nce to a con-
spiracy among certain government ofticials 
In the revenue service and other partle11, 
then known to exist, whereby the honest 
manufacture of spirits and payment of the 
tax had been rendered practically Impossi-
ble, and should plead guilty to one rount In 
an lo<lict'llleot then pending against them In 
the district court, in and for said northern 
distric>t, and should withdraw their pleas In 
a certain condemnation case then pending 
against them in said district court, the said 
plalotltts would recall any and all asePsB-
mente under the Internal-revenue laws then 
made against said defendants, and that no 
more assessments under said law should be 
made against said defendants, and that no 
proceC'dings other than said condemnation 
.case should be prosecuted against said de-
fendants, and that no new proceedings 
should be commenced against. said defend-
ants on account of transactions then past; 
and these defendants aver that they and 
each of them have fully performed said con-
tract on their part, and defendants further 
avE>r that this suit ls a proceeding other than 
said c·ondemnatlon case, and that this suit 
le for the recovery upon transactions prior 
to the entPrlng Into said agreement; and 
thls the said defendants are ready to verity." 
A demuner to the special plea was over-
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ruled. and judgment rendered tor the de-
fendants, ahd the judgment of the district 
court atDrmed. 
The Attorney General, for the United 
States. Mr. Edward Juseen and Mr. Charles 
H. Reed, contra. 
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opin-
ion of the court. 
Accomplices In guilt, not previously con-
victed of an Infamous crime, when separatt>-
ly tried are competent witnesses for or 
against each other; and the universal usage 
is that such a party, It called and examined 
by the public prosecutor on the trial of his 
associates In guilt, will not be prosecuted 
for the same offence, provided It appears 
that he acted in good faith and that he tes-
tified fully and fairly. 
Where the case Is not within any statute, 
the general rule ls tha.t If an accomplice, 
when examined as a wltneSB by the public 
prosecutor. discloses fully and fairly the 
guilt of himself and his associates. be will 
not be prosecuted for the o11ence disclosed; 
but It Is ('<]Ually cl~ar that he cannot by law 
plead such tact 1n bar of any Indictment 
against him, nor avail himself of it uI>on his 
trial, for It ls merely an equitable title to 
the mercy of the executive, subject to the 
conditions before stated, and can only come 
before the court by way of application to 
put off the trial In order to give the prisoner 
time to apply to the executive for that nur-
pose. Rex v. Rudd, 1 Cowp. 331. 
Sufficient appears to show that the follow-
ing are the material proceedings In the sev-
eral cases: 1. That the first two were ac-
tions of debt commenced In tne circuit court 
to recover the double lnternal-revenm~ tax 
Imposed, as fully set forth in the respective 
declarations. 2. That the other six cases 
are Informations filed In the district court to 
forfeit the properties therein described for 
acts done ln violation of the ioternal-rev-
enue laws. 
Service was made In the first two caaes. 
and the defendants appeared and pleaded 
the general Issue and the special plea set 
forth in °the transcript. Issue was joined 
upon the first plea, and the United States de-
mun·ed to the special plea. HE>aring was 
had, and the court overruled the demurrer 
and gave judgment for the defendants. 
Like defences ln the form of answers or 
pleas were filed lo the other six cases com-
mencro lo the district court, to whl<'h the 
United States demurred; but the district 
court overruled the demurrers, and finally 
rendered jmlgmeot In each ease for the de-
fendants. Prompt steps were taken by the 
district attorney to remove the cases into the 
circuit court, where the respective judg-
ments rendered by the district court were 
afll.rmed. 
Sutnc>e It to say In this connection. without 
euterlog into detail, that the United Stat.ea 
CORROBORATIVE E Vi DEN CE.
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sued out a writ of error in each case and
removed the same into this court. Both
parties agree that the questions presented
for decision are the same in each case, in
which the court here fully concurs.
Two errors are assigned as causes for re-
versing the judginent, which present very
clearly the matters in controversy as uls-
cussed at the bar. 1. That the plea or an-
swer set up as defence is bad because it is
too general and does not set forth the sup-
posed agreement in traversable form. When
filed, the first assignment of error also ob-
jected to the plea or answer that it did not
designate the oiiicer who made the alleged
agreement, which was plainly a valid objec-
tion to it; but that was obviated at the ar-
gument, it being conceded by the lfnited
States that the plea or answer should be
understood as alleging that the supposed
agreement was made by the district attor-
ney. 2. That the plea or answer is bad be-
cause the ofiicer representing the govern-
ment ln these prosecutions had no authority
to make the agreement pleaded, and that the
court cannot enforce it, as it is void.
As amended, it requires no argument to
show that the plea or answer cannot be un- '
derstood as alleging that the president was
a party to any such agreement, as the dis-
tinct allegation is that it was made by the
district attorney; nor could any such impli- =
cation have arisen even if the pleading had
suits of the kind to recover municipal for-
feitures must be prosecuted in the subordi-
nate courts by the district attorney, and in
this court, when brought here by appeal or
writ of error, by the attorney general. Con-
fiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454. Suppose the
plea to be amended as stipulated at the ar-
gument, the first question is. whether as
amended it sets up a good defence to the
several actions. Taken in that view, it al-
leges in substance and effect that the dis-
trict attorney promised the defendants that
if they would testify in behalf of the Unit-
ed States frankly and truthfully when re-
certain government otiicials in the internal-
revenue service, and other parties then
known to exist. whereby the honest manu-
facture of distilled spirits and the collection
of the tax thereon had been rendered prac-
tically impossible, and would plead guilty
to one count in an indictment then pending
against them in said district court, and
would withdraw their pleas in certain con-
demnation cases then pending against their
property in said district court, for the pur-
pose only of insuring their good faith in so
testifying on behalf of the United States,
then the United States would recall an_v and
all assessments under the internal-revenue
law made against them, and that no more
assessments under said law should be made
against them, that no more proceedings
wn.ous,n'.v.—28
. same offence;
quired, in reference to a conspiracy among 1
against them should be commenced on ac-
count of violations of the internal-revenue
laws then passed, and that no penalties or
forfeitures should in any manner be enfor-
ced or recovered against them or their prop-
erty, that all suits for penalties and for for-
feitures then pending against them and their
property should be dismissed, and that full
and complete indemnity should be granted
to them as the said claimants.
(‘omplete performance on their part is al-
leged by the claimants, and they allege that
the pending suits are for the condemnation
and confiscation of their property, which
was seized by the United States on the
ground of the alleged violation of the inter-
nal-revenue law, prior to entering into the
said agreement. Assessments made against
the claimants or their property are to be re-
called, and they and their property are to
be free of internal-revenue taxation. Pro-
ceedings pending against them for violations
of the internal-revenue laws are to be dis-
missed and no more are to be instituted, and
the claimants are promied full and com-
plete indenmity, civil and criminal, if they
will consent to testify.
Considering the scope and comprehensive
character of the supposed agreement, it is
not strange that the district attorney deem-
ed it proper to demur to the plea. He took
two objections to it; but the court will ex-
_~ amine the second one first, as if that is sus-
not been amended, as it is settled law that '
tained, the other will become immaterial.
Waiving for the present the question
whether the district attorney may contract
with an accomplice of an accused person
on trial, that if he will testify in the case
his taxes shall be abated, or that he and his
property shall be exempt from intcrnal-reve-
nne taxation, the court will consider in the
first place whether the district attorney, as
a public prosecutor, may properly enter in-
to an agreement with such an accomplice,
that if he will testify fully and fairly in
such a prosecution against his associate in
guilt he shall not be prosecuted for the
and if so, whether such an
agreement, if the witness performs on his
; part, will avail the witness as a defence to
the criminal charge in case of a subsequent
prosccut ion.
Considered in its full scope, the agreement
is that in consideration of the defendants
testifying against their co-conspirators who
were indicted for defraurling the revenue,
they, the defendants, should have a full
and complete discharge, not only from all
criminal liability, but from all penalties and
forfeitures they had incurred, and from lia-
bility for their internal-revenue taxes which
they had fraudulently refused to pay, giving
them full and complete indemnity, civil and
criminal, for all their fraudulent and illegal
acts in respect to the public revenue.
(‘ourts of justice everywhere agree that the
established usage is that an accomplice duly
433
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
09
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CORROBORATIVE EVIDE:SCE. (Case ~o. 147 
sued out a writ of error in each case and 
removed the same into this court. Both 
parties agree that the questions presented 
for dedslon are the same In each case, in 
whl<•h the court here fully concurs. 
Two t'n-ors are assl;::nE'd as caulll's tor re-
'l"Nslng the judgment, which present very 
dearly the matters In controvPrsy as ms· 
<·ussed at the bar. 1. That the plea or an-
swer set up as defence ls bad because It Is 
too gPnernl and doe8 not set forth th<• 1-mp-
posed agreemE>nt In tl'a'l"ersable form. "'hen 
filed, the first assignment or error also ob-
jected to the plea or answer that It did not 
de11ignate the officer who made the alleged 
agr<><•ment, whl<'l1 was plainly a valid objec-
tion to It; but that was obviated at the ar-
gument, It being conceded by the Cnlted 
!'tates that the plea or answer should be 
understood as alleging that tht> supposed 
ugr1>ement was made by the district attor-
ney. 2. That the plea or answer is bad be-
cam~e the ofHcer representing the govern-
ment In these prosecutions hrul no authority 
to make the agreement plPadi>tl, and thnt tlw 
court cannot enforce It, as It Is void. 
against thf'm should be comml'ncecl on ac-
count of violations of the lnternul-reYenue 
laws then passed, and that no penalties or 
forfeitures should In any manner be enfor-
ced or reco"l""ered against them or their prop-
Prty, that all suits tor penalties and for !or-
!Pltures then pending against them and their 
property should be dismissed, and that run 
and complete Indemnity should be gi·nnh•d 
to them as the said claimunts. 
Complete performance on their part Is al-
leged by the claimants, uml they allege that 
the pending suits are tor the condemnation 
and confiscation of their property, which 
was seized by the United States on the 
ground of the alleged violation or the Inter-
nal-revenue law, prior to entering Into the 
said agreement. Assessments made against 
the claimants or thl•lr propPrty are to be re-
called, and they and tbelr 111·operty are to 
be tree or lntemal-revenui> tnxatlon. Pro-
ceedings pending against them tor violations 
of the Internal-revenue laws are to be dle-
mlseed and no more are to be Instituted, and 
the claimants are promised full and eom-
plete Indemnity, civil and crlmlnul, It they 
will comwnt to testify. 
Conslde1·tug the ecope and comprehensive 
character of the supposed agreement, It is 
not strange tbnt the district attornPy deem-
ed it proper to demur to the plea. HP took 
two objections to It; but the court will ex-
amine the se<'Ond one first, as If that ls su11-
tnlned, the other will become Immaterial. 
Waiving for the present the question 
whether the district attorney mny contract 
with an accomplice or an nec•used }Wrson 
on trial, that It he will testify in the case 
his taxes shall be abut<>d, or thut he and his 
property shall be exempt from internal-1-eve-
nue taxation, the court will 1.'0nslder In the 
first place wht>tht>r the district attorney. as 
a public prosecutor. may properly t>nter in-
to an agrP<•ment with such an ac<'ompllce, 
that tr he wlll testify fully and fairly In 
SU('h a prosecution 11galm1t his RRsoC'lnte In 
guilt he shall not be proRec:·utPd tor the 
same otre1w-e; and If so, whether such an 
agreement, if the witness pN·forms on his 
part, will avnll the witness ae a defpnce to 
the criminal clmrl!"e In case or a subsPquent 
pros<>entlon. 
Consldt>red In Its full scope, the agreement 
Is that In eons!dpratlon of thE> dcfPndants 
testifying against their co-conspll'lltors who 
were Indicted tor defrauding the revemw, 
they, the defendants, should have a run 
and complete discharge, not only from nil 
criminal liability, but from all penalties and 
forfeitures they had lncurr<>d, and from lla-
hlllty fm· their lnternal-revt-nut> tnxPs which 
thpy had !nmdult>ntly refnsl'd to pay, giving 
tlwrn full and complete indPmnlty, civil und 
As amended, It requires no ar~"l.twent to 
show that the plea or answer cannot be un-
dt-rstood as alleging that the president wae 
a party to any such agreement, as tht> dis- i 
tlnct allegation le that It Wll8 made by the 
district nttomey; nor could uny such Impli-
cation ha¥e nrlsPn e¥en It the plm<llng had 
not been amended, as It ls settled law that 
suits or the kind to recover municipal for-
feitures must be prosecutPd In the subordi-
nate courts by the db1trlct nttornPy, and ln 
thie court, when b1·ought here hy n1111t'ul or 
writ or e1TOr, by the attorney genPral. Con-
fiscation Cases, 7 Wall. ·t:'i4. Huppose the 
plea to be amendt->d as stipulated at thP ar-
gument, the first qttE>Rtlon ls. whether as 
amended It setR up a good defence to the 
seyeral actions. Taken In that view, It al-
leges In substance and elf Pct that the dis-
trict attorney promised the dPfendantR thut 
It they would testify In lwhnlf of the {;nlt-
ed States !rankly and truthfully when re-
quired, In reference to a conspiracy among 
certain government ottlclals In the Internal-
revenue service, and othPr pnrtl(•" then 
known to Pxlst. wherPhy the houPst mnnu-
!acture or dlstllled spirits and the collection 
of the tax therPon had hPPn rend('rrd prac-
tically Impossible, and would (>lead guilty 
to one COUnt in an lndlCtlllt>llt thPn lll'Wlillj.t 
against thl'lll In said district court, and 1 
would withdraw their plt>us In <'f•1·taln con-
demnation cases then J>l>ndlng n1ml111it their 
property in sai<l dll"trid eourt, for thP pur- ' 
pose only of Insuring their good faith In so 
testifying on behalf or the United ~tntf'S, 
then the United State11 would recall uny and 
all assessments under the Internal-revenue 
law made against them, and that no more 
asseMmPntfl under said law should be made 
against them, that no more proceedings 
1 criminal, tor all their frauduli>nt and illt>gal 
WILGUS,EV.-28 
I acts In respect to the public re\·emtl'. Courts or justice everywhere agree that the I established usage ls that an accomplice duly 
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admitted as a witness in a criminal prose-
cution against his associates in guilt, if he
testifies fully and fairly, will not be prose-
cuted for the same offence, and some of the
decided cases and standard text-writers give
very satisfactory explanations‘ of the origin
and scope of the usage in its ordinary ap-
plication in actual practice. Beyond doubt,
some of the elements of the usage had their
origin in the ancient and obsolete practice
called “approvement," which may be briefly
explained as follows: \\'hen a person in-
dicted of treason or felony was arraigned, he
might confess the charge before plea plead-
ed, and appeal, or accuse another as his
accomplice of the same crime, in order to ob-
tain his pardon. Such approvement was on-
ly allowed in capital oflences, and \vas equiv-
alent to indictment, as the appellee was
equally re'quired to answer to the charge;
and if proved guilty, the judgment of the
law was against him, and the approver, so
called, was entitled to his pardon ex debito
justitiae. On the other hand, if the appellee
was acquitted, the judgment was that the
approver should be condemned. 4 Bl. Comm.
331 .
Speaking upon that subject, Lord Mans-
field said, more than a century ago, that
there were three ways in the law and prac-
tice of that country, in which an accomplice
could be entitled to a pardon: First, in the
case of approvement, which, as he stated,
then still remained a part of the common
law, though he admitted it had grown into
disuse by long discontinuance. Secondly, by
discovering two or more oifenders, as re-
quired in the two acts of parliament to which
he referred. Thirdly, persons embraced in
some royal proclamation, as authorized by
an act of parliament, to which he added,
that in all these cases the court will bail the
prisoner in order to give him an opportunity
to apply for a pardon.
Approvers, as well as those who disclosed
two or more accomplices in guilt and those
who came within the promise of a royal proc-
lamation, were entitled to a pardon: and
the same high authority states that besides
those ancient statutory regulations there was
another practice in respect to accomplices
who were admitted as witnesses in criminal
prosecutions against their associates, which
he explains as follows: Where the accom-
plice has made a full and fair confession of
the whole truth and is admitted as a wit-
ness for the crown, the practice is, if he act
fairly and openly and discover the whole
truth, though he is not entitled of right to
a pardon, yet the usage, the lenity, and the
practice of the court is to stop the pl'useCl1—
tion against the accomplice, the understand-
ing being that he has an equitable title to a
recommendation for the king‘s mcrc_\'.
Subsequent remarks of the court in that
opinion showed that the ancient statutes re-
ferred to were wholly inapplicable to the
case, and that there remained even at that
date only the equitable practice which gives
a title to recommendation to the mercy of
the crown. Explanations then follow which
prove that the practice referred to was adopt-
ed in substitution for the ancient doctrine
of approvement, modified and modelled so as
to be received with greater favor. As mod-
iflcd it gives, as the court said in that case,
a kind of hope to the accomplice that if he
behaves fairly and discloses the whole truth,
he may, by a recommendation to mercy, save
himself from punishment and secure a par-
don, which shows to a demonstration that
the protection, if any, to be given to the
accomplice rests on the described usage and
his own good behavior; for if he acts in bad
faith, or fails to testify fully and fairly, he
may still be prosecuted as if he had never
been admitted as a witness. Rex v. Rudd,
1 Cowp. 331. 1 Leach, 115.
Great inconvenience arose from the pra.c-
tice of approvement, in consequence of which
a mode of proceeding was adopted in analogy
to that law, by which an accomplice may be
entitled to a recommendation to mercy but
not to a pardon as of legal right, nor can he
plead it in bar or avail himself of it on his
trial. 2 Hawk. P. C. p. 532, note 3; 3 Russ.
Crimes (9th Am. Ed.) 596.
In the present practice, says .\Ir. Starkie,
where accomplices make a full and fair con-
fession of the whole truth, and are in con-
sequence admitted to give evidence for the
crown, if they afterwards give their testi-
mony fairly and openly, although they are
not of right entitled to a pardon, the usage,
lenity, and practice of the court is to stay
the prosecution against them and they have
an equitable title to a recommendation to
the king's mercy. 2 Starkie, Ev. (-ith Am.
Ed.) 15.
Participes criminls in such a case, when
called and examined as witnesses for the
prosecution, says Roscoe, have an equitable
title to a recommendation for the royal mer-
' cy; but they cannot plead this in bar to an
indictment against them, nor can they avail
themselves of it as a defence on their trial,
though it may be made the ground of a mo-
tion for putting ofi the trial in order to give
the prisoner time to present an application
for the executive clemency. Roscoe, Cr. Ev.
(9th Am. Ed.) 597.
Authorities of the highest character al-
most wlthout number support that proposi-\
tion, nor is it necessary to look beyond the
decisions of this court to establish the cor-
rectness of the rule. Ex parte Wells, 18
How. 307.
Special reference is made in that case to
the three ancient modes of practice which au-
thorized accomplices, when admitted as wit-
< nesscs in criminal prosecutions, to claim a
pardon as a matter of right; and the court
having explained the course of such proceed-
ings. remarked that, except in those cases.
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admitted as a wltnesa In a criminal prose-
cution against bis aBBOClates In guilt, 1f he 
testltit>s fully and fairly, will not be prose-
cuted for the same otfenl'e, and some of the 
decided cases and standard text-writers give 
very satisfactory explanations· of the origin 
and scope of the u11&ge in it11 ordinary ap-
pllcatiou In actual practice. Beyond doubt, 
some of the elements of the u11&ge had their 
01igln in the ancient and obsolete practice 
called "approvement,'' which may be briefly 
explained as follows: ""hen a p<'rson In-
dicted of treason or felony was arraigned, he 
might confess the charge before plea plead-
ed, and appeal, or accuse another as his 
accomplice of the same crime, ln order to ob-
tain his pardon. Such approvement was on-
ly allowed in capital otrences, and was equiv-
alent to Indictment, as the avpeDee wBB 
equally required to answer to the charge; 
and If pro"'ed guilty, the judgment of the 
law was against blm, and the approver, so 
called, was entitled to hls pardon ex deblto 
justitlre. On the other hand, lf the appellee 
wa11 acquitted, the judgment was that the 
1111111·0\·er should be condemtu~d. 4 Bl. Comm. 
3~;:). 
case, and that there remained even at that 
date only the equitable practice which gives 
a title to recommendation to the mercy of 
the crown. Explanations tl1en follow which 
pl'ove that the practice referred to was adopt-
ed In substitution for the ancient doctrine 
of approvement, modified and modelled so as 
to be rt'<·elvl'd with greater favor. As mod-
ified It gives, as the court 881d In that case, 
a kind of hope to the accomplice that If hr 
behaws fairly and discloses the whole truth, 
he may, by a recommt>ndatlon to mercy, save 
himself from 1mnlshment and sec.·ure a 1ml"-
don, whkh Hhows to a demonstration that 
the prote<>tlon, lf any, to be gh-en to tlw 
accompll<"e rests on the described usage and 
bis own good behavior; for If he acta ln bad 
faith, or falls to testify fully and fairly, he 
may still be prosecuted as If he had never 
been admlttPd as a witness. Rex v. Rudd, 
1 Cow1>. a:n. 1 Leach, 115. 
Speaking upon that subject, J.ord Mans-
field Sllld, more than a <'entury ago, that 
titer~ were three ways In the law and prac-
tice of that country, In which an accomplice 
could be entitled to a pardon: First, In the 
Cflse of approvement, which, as he stated, 
then still i·emalned a part of the common 
law, though he admitted It had gt"Own Into 
disuse by long discontlnuanc('. Secondly, by 
dlsco\·eriug two or more otTenders, as re-
quired In the two acts of parliament to which 
he referred. Thirdly, persons embraced In 
some royal llt"OClamatlon, as authorized by 
an act of parliament, to which be added, 
that In all these cases the court will ball the 
prisoner In order to glve him an opportunity 
to apply for a pardon. 
Great ln(•onvenl('nce arose from the prac-
tice of appro\"t>ment, In l'Onsequence of which 
a mode of proceeding was adopted In analogy 
to that law, by which an accomplice may be 
entitled to a recommendation to mercy but 
not to a pardon as of legal right, nor can he 
plead It In bar or avail himself of lt on his 
trial. 2 Hawk. P . C. p. 532, note 3; 3 RU88. 
Crimes (Dth Am. Ed.) 596. I In th(' present practice, says Mr. Starkie, 
I where ae<.ompllces make a. full and fair con-fession of the whole truth, and are In con-
1 sequence admitted to give ('Vldence for the 
' crown, If they afterwards give their testi-
mony fairly and openly, although they are 
not of l'lght entitled to a pardon, the usage, 
lenlty, and practice of the court ls to stay 
the pl'08ecutlon against them and they have 
an equitable title to a recommendation to 
the king's mercy. 2 Starkie, Ev. (4th Am. 
Ed.) 15. 
Particlpes crlmlnls In sucb a <.'ase, when 
called and examined as wltneBBes for the 
prosecution, 1111ys Roscoe, have an equitable 
title to a recommendation for the royal mer-
1 cy; but they C'annot plead thl11 In bar to an 
1 Indictment against them, nor can they avail 
! themseh-eH of It as a defenl>t> on their trial, 
; though It may be made the ground of a mo-
! tlon for putting olf the trial in order to glve 
Approvers, as well as those who disclosed 
two or more accomplkes In guilt and those 
who cnme within the promise of a royal pro<'-
lamatlon, were entitled to a pardon: and 
the same high authority states that besides 
those ancient statutory regulations tht'l"e was 
anothPr practice ln respect to a<"compllces 
who were admitted as witnesses In criminal 
prose<>utlons against their associates, which 
he explains as follows: WhPre the accom-
pllce has made a full and fair confeBSlon of 
the whole truth and Is admltt<'d as a wlt-
neRS for thP crown, the practice ls, If be act 
fnlrly and openly and dl11roTer thP whole I 
truth, thoUlith be ls not entltlecl of rlgl1t to I 
a pardon, yet the U88ge, the lenlty, and the 
practice of the court Is to stop th<' 11ro>1rcu- I 
tlon against the a<'cmnpllce, the und1•rHt111.d-
lng J"'lnl? that he has an equltnhle tltil• to a 
l"t'<'ommendntlou for the king's mer<"~'. 
8ubHequrut remarks of the court In that 
opinion tthowE>d that the ancient statuh•11 re-
ferred to were wholly lnappll1•able to the 
the prisoner time to present an application 
for the exe<·utlve clemency. Ros(•oe, Cr. Ev. 
(9th Am. Ed.) 597. 
Authorftl('B of the highest character al-
most without number su11port that pl'<'p<n'li-' 
tlon, nor ls lt neceBRary to look beyond the 
decl11lons of this court to Htabllsh the cor-
rectness of the rule. Ex parte Wells, 18 
How. 307. 
~p<>«'lal ref1>ren<'e ls made In that <'ftNe to 
the three an<-lt>nt modes of pra(•tfee which au-
thorized ac1•ompllces, when admitted as wlt-
nesse-s In criminal prosecution11, to claim a 
pardon as a matter of right; and the court 
hUYlng <'XPlllined the COUMff> of such proceed-
ings. remarked that, exct'pt In those cases. 
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accomplices, though admitted to testify for
the prosecution, have no absolute claim or
legal right to executive clemency.
Much consideration appears to have been
mven to the question in that case, and the
court held that the only claim the accom-
plice has in such a case is an equitable one '
for pardon, and that only upon the condi-
tion that he makes a full and fair disclosure
of the guilt of himself and that of his as-
sociutcs. that he cannot plead it in bar of
an indictment against him forthe offence, nor
use it in any way except to Support a mo-
tion to put ofl the trial in order to give him
time to apply for a pardon.
Three-quarters of a century before that,
ten of the twelve judges of England decided
in the same way, holding that the accom-
plice in such a case cannot set up such a
claim in bar to an indictment against him,
nor avail himself of it upon his trial, that
such aclaim formercy depends upon the con-
ditions before described, and that it can only
come before the court by way of application
to put off the trial in order to give the party
time to apply for a pardon. Rex v. Rudd,
1 Leach, 125; 1 Chit. Cr. Law (Ed. 1847) 82;
Mass. Cr. Law, 175.
Attempt was made sixty years later in the
same court to convince the judges then pre-
siding that some of the remarks of the chief
justice in Rex v. Rudd, before cited, justi-
fied the conclusion that the accomplice in
such a case was by law entitled to be ex-
empted from punishment; but Lord Den-
man replied that the organ of the court on
that occasion was not speaking of legal
rights in the strict sense, nor of such rights
as would constitute a defence to an in-
dictment or an answer to the question why
sentence should not be pronounced, saying,
in substance and effect, that the right men-
tioned was only an equitable right, and that
the court would postpone the trial or any ac-
tion in the case to the prejudice of the pris-
oner, in order to give him an opportunity to
apply to the crown for mercy. Rex v. (lar-
side, 2 Adol. & E. 2'75; Rex v. Lee, Russ.
& R. 361; Rex v. Hunton, Id. 454.
Other text writers of the highest repute,
besides those previously mentioned, atfirm
the rule that accomplices, though admitted
as witnesses for the prosecution, are not of
right entitled to a. pardon, that they have
only an equitable right to a recommendation
to the executive clemency; and they all hold
that prisoners under such circumstances can-
not plead such right in bar of an indictment
against them, nor avail themselves of it as a.
defence on their trial.
None of those propositions can be success-
fully controverted; but it is equally clear
that the party, if he tcstiiies fully and fairly,
may make it the ground of a motion to put
off the trial in order that he may apply to
the executive for the protection which imme-
morial usage concedes that he is entitled to
at the hands of the executive. 3 Russ.
Crimes (9th Am. Ed. ) 597.
Certain ancient statutory regulations, as al-
ready remarked, gave unconditional promise
to accomplices of pardon and complete ex-
emption from punishment, and in such cases
it was always held that the accomplice, if he
was called and examined for the prosecution,
was entitled as of right to a pardon, provid-
ed he acted in good faith, and testifled fully
and fairly to the whole truth. Instances of
the kind are adverted to by Mr. Phillipps in
his valuable treatise on Evidence; but he,
like the preceding text writer, states that ac-
complices, when admitted as witnesses, un-
der the more modern usage and practice of
the courts, have only an equitable title to be
recommended to mercy, on a strict and am-
ple performance, to the satisfaction of the
presiding judge, of the conditions on which
they were admitted to testify, that such an
equitable title cannot be pleaded in bar nor
in any manner be set up as a defence to an
indictment charging them with the same of-
fence, though it may be made the ground of
a motion for putting off their trial ‘in order
to allow time for an application to the par-
doning power. 1 Phil. Ev. (Ed. 1868) 86.
‘ Offenders of the kind are not admitted to tes-
tify as of course, and sufilcient authority ex-
ists for saying that in the practice of the
English court it is usual that a motion to the
court is made for the purpose, and that the
court, in view of all the circumstances, will
admit or disallow the evidence as will best
promote the ends of public justice. Id. 87;
3 Russ. Crimes (9th Am. Ed.) 598.
Good reasons exist to suppose that the
same course is pursued in the courts of some
of the states, where the English practice
seems to have been adopted without much
modification. People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. 707.
Such offenders, everywhere are competent
witnesses if they see fit voluntarily to ap-
pear and testify; but the course of proceed-
ing in the courts of many of the states is
quite different from that just described, the
rule being that the court will not advise the
attorney general how he shall conduct a
criminal prosecution. Consequently it is re-
garded as the province of the public pros-
ecutor and not of the court to determine
whether or not an accomplice, who is will-
ing to crlminate himself and hi associates in
guilt, shall be called and examined for the
state.
Of all others, the prosecutor is best qual-
ified to determine that question, as he alone
is supposed to know what other evidence can
be adduced to prove the criminal charge.
Applications of the kind are not always to
be granted, and in order to acquire the in-
formation nccessary to determine the ques-
tion, the public prosecutor will grant the ac-
complice an interview, with the understaml-
iug that any communications he may make
to the prosecutor will be strictly confidential.
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accomplices, though admitted to testify for I at the hands of the executive. 3 Russ. 
the prosecution, have no al111olute chllm or Crimes (9th Am. Ed.) 59i. 
legal ~ht to executive clemency. Certain ancient statutory regulations, as al-
Much consideration apvears to have been ready remarked, gave unconditional promise 
given to the question In that case, and the to accomplices of pardon and complete ex-
court held that the only claim the accom- 1 emption from punishment, and ln such cases 
pllce has In such a case ls an equitable one ,. lt was always held that the accomplice, lf he 
for pardon, and that only upon the condl- was called and examined for the prosecution, 
tlon that he makes a full IUld fair disclosure 1' was entitled as of right to a pardon, provld-
of the arullt or nimself and that of bis ae- ed he acted In good faith, and testlfted fully 
soclates, that he cannot plead lt In bar of 1 and fairly to the whole truth. Instances of 
I 
an lndlctmentagalnst hlm for the offence, nor I the kind are adverted to by Mr. Phllllpps In 
use It ln any way except to support a mo- I his valuable treatise on Evidence; but he, 
tlon to put off the trial In order to give blm llke the preceding text writer, states that ac-
tlme to apply for a pardon. compllces, when admitted as witnesses, un-
Three-quarters of a century before that, ; der the more modern usage and practice of 
ten of the twelve judges of England decided / the courts, have only an equitable title to be 
In the same way, holding that the accom- , reeorumeQded to mercy, on a strict and am-
pllce In such a case cannot set up snch a i pie performance, to the satisfaction of the 
claim ID bar to an Indictment against him, I presiding judge, of the conditions on which 
nor avail himself of It upon his trial, that : they were admitted to testify, that such an 
such aclalm for mercy depends upon the con· : equitable title cannot be pleaded In bar nor 
dltlons before described, and that It can only i In any manner be set up as a defence to an 
come before the court by way of application i Indictment charging them with the same of-
to put off the trial ID order to give the party j fence, though it may be made the ground of 
time to apply for a pardon. Rex v. Rudd, a motion for putting off their trial ln order 
1 Leach, 125; 1 Chit. Cr. Law (Ed. 18-17) 82; j to allow time for au application to the par-
Mass. Cr. Law, 175. I donlng power. 1 Phil. Ev. (Ed. 1868) 86. 
Attempt was made slxty years later in the Offenders of the kind are not admitted to tes-
same court to convince the judges then pre- I tlfy as of course, and sutll.clent authority ex-
aldlng that some of the remarks of the chief lats for saying that ID the practice of the 
Justice ID Rex v. Rudd, before cited, justl- English court It ls usual that a motion to thP 
11.ed the conclusion that the accom1lllce In court ls made for the purpose, and that the 
such a case was by law entitled to be ex- court, In view of all the circumstances, will 
.empted from punishment; but Lord Den- admit or disallow the evidence as will best 
man replied that the organ of the court on I promote the ends of public justice. Id. 87; 
that occasion was not speaking of lPgal I 3 Russ. Crimes (9th Am. Ed.) 598. 
rights In the strict sense, m_>r of such rights ' Good reasoDB exist to suppose that the 
as would constitute a defence to an In· I same course Is pursued ID the courts of some 
dlctment or an answer to the question why ! of the states, where the English practice 
sentence should not be pronounced, saying, I seems to have been adopted without much 
in substance and effect. that the rl&'ht men- modlftcatlon. People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. 707. 
tloned was only an equitable right, and that I Such offenders. everywhere are competent 
the court would postpone the trial or any ac- I witnesses 1f tl1ey see tit voluntarily to ap-
tlon in the case to the prejudice of the prls- j pear and testify; but the course of proceed· 
oner, in order to gtve him an opportunity to , Ing In the conrts of many of the states Is 
apply to the crown for mercy. Rex v. Har- I quite different from that just described, the 
side, 2 Adol & E. 275; Rex v. Lee, RuAS ; rule being that the court will not advise the 
A R. 361; Rex v. Hunton, Id. 454. · attorney general how be shall conduct a 
Other text writers of the highest repute, criminal prosecution. ConfK'quently It ls re-
besldes those previously mentioned, atllrm garded as the province of the public pros-
the rule that accomplices, though admitted eeutor and not of the court to determine 
.as witnesses for the prosecution, are not of whether or not an accomplice, who Is will-
right entitled to a pardon, that they have Ing to crlmlnate himself and bis associates In 
only an equitable right to a recommendation guilt, shall be called and examined for the 
to the execu.tlve clemency; and they all hold state. 
that prisoners under such cfrcumstan<>cs can- Of all others, the prosecutor ls best qual· 
not plead such right In bar of an Indictment Uled to determine that question, as he alone 
against them, nor avail themselves of It as a ls supposed to know what other evidence can 
defence on their trial. be adduced to prove the criminal charge. 
None of those propositions can be success- Applications of the kind are not always to 
fully controverted; but It ls equally clear be granted, and In order to acquire the ln-
that the party, If he testifies fully and fairly, fonnatlon D<'<"f'ssary to determine the ques-
mny make it the ground of a motion to put tlon, tlw pnhll<· pros<'<"lltor will grant the ac· 
otr the trial In order that he may a[lply to rom11lke an interview, with the un(}prstand-
tlie executive for the protel"tlon whl<-h Imme- Ing that nny communications he may wake 
morlal usage concedes that he Is entitled to to the pro11ecutor will be strictly conftdential. 
4:1:> 
Case No. 147]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDEXIJE.
Interviews for the purpose mentioned are
for mutual explanation, and do not absolute-
ly commit either party; but if the accom-
plice is subsequently called and examined,
he is equally entitled to a recommendation
for executive clemency. Promise of pardon
is never given in such an interview, nor any
inducement held out beyond what the be-
fore-inentioned usage and practice of the
courts allow.
Prosecutors is such a case should explain
to the accomplice that he is not obliged to
crimlnate himself, and inform him just what
he may reasonably expect in case he acts
in good faith, and testifies fully and fairly as
to his own acts in the case, and those of his
associates. When he fulfils those conditions
he is equitably entitled to a pardon, and the
prosecutor, and the court if need be, when
fully informed of the facts, will join in such
:1 recommendation.
.\lodiiications of the practice doubtless ex-
ist in jurisdictions where the power of par-
don does not exist prior to conviction; but
every embarrassment of that sort may be 1
removed by the prosecutor, as in the absence
of any legislative prohibition he may nol.
pros. the indictment if pending, or advise
the prisoner to plead guilty, he, the prisoner.
reserving the right to retract his plea and
plead over to the merits if his application
for pardon shall be unsuccesst’ul. 1 Bish.
Cr. Proc. (2d Ed.) 5 1076, and note.
Where the power of pardon exists before
conviction as well as after, no such- diiiicul-
ties can arise, as the prisoner, if an attempt
is made to put him to trial in spite of his
equitable right to pardon, may move that
the trial be postponed, and may support his
motion by his own afiidavit, when the court
may properly insist to be informed of all
the circumstances. Power under such cir-
cumstances is vested in the court in a proper
case to put off the trial as long as may be
necessary, in order that the case of the pris-
oner may be presented to the executive for
decision.
Centuries have elapsed since the judicial
usage referred to was substituted for the
ancient practice of approvement, and ex-
perience shows that throughout that whole
period it has proved, both here and in the
country where it had its origin, to be a
proper and satisfactoryt protection to the ac-
complice in all cases where he acts in good ‘
faith, and testifies fairly and fully to the
whole truth. Cases undoubtedly have arisen
where the accomplice, having refused to
comply with the conditions annexed to his
equitable right, has been subsequently tried
and convicted, it being first determined that
he has forfeited his equitable title to pro-
tection by his bad faith and false representa-
tions. Com. v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 477. Such
offenders, if they make a full disclosure of
all matters within their knowledge in favor
of the prosecution, will not be subjected to
punishment; but if they refuse to testify,
or testify falsely, they are to be tried, and
may be convicted upon their own confession.
Nothing of weight by the way of judicial
authority can be invoked in opposition to the
views here expressed, as is evident from the
brief filed by the defendants, which exhibits
proof of research and diligence. Decided
cases may be cited which contain unguarded
expressions, of which the following are
striking examples: People v. Whipple, su-
pra; U. S. v. Lee, 4 McLean, 103, Fed. Gas.
No. 15,588.
Neither of those cases, however, support
the proposition for which they are cited.
Enough appears in the first case to show
that it was objected on behalf of the accom-
plice that the usage gave him no certain as-
surance of a pardon, inasmuch as the power
of pardon -was vested in the governor, and
the authority of the court extended no fur-
ther than the recommendation for mercy;
to which the court responded. that the legal
presumption was that the public faith will
be preserved inviolate, and that the equitable
claim of the party will be ratified and al-
lowed.
Public policy and the great ends of jus-
tice. it was said in the second case, reduirc
that the arrangement between the public
prosecutor and the accomplice should be car-
ried out; and the court proceeded to remark.
that if the district attorney failed to enter
a nolle prosequi to the indictment, "the
court will continue the cause until an appli-
cation can be made for a pardon,” which of
itself is a complete recognition of the usage
and practice established in the place of the
ancient proceeding of approvement. More
evil than good flowed from that regulation,
and in consequence the practice now ac-
knowledged was subst_ituted in its place,
under which the accomplice acquires only
an equitable right to the clemency of the ex-
ecutive. which. as Lord .\Iansiield said, rests
on usage and the good behavior of the ac-
complice. who in a proper case will be bail-
ed by the court in order that he may apply
for the pardon to which he is equitably en-
titled. .
Should it be objected that the application
may not be successful, the answer of the
court must be in substance that given by
Lord Denman on a similar occasion. that we
are not to presume that the equitable title
to mercy Wil-it'll the humblest and most
criminal accomplice may thus acquire by
testifying to the truth in a federal court will
not he sacredly accorded to him by the pres-
ident, in whom the pardoning power is vest-
ed by the federal constitution.
Having come to the conclusion that the
district attorney had no authority to make
the agreement alleged in the plea in bar.
it follows that the circuit court erred in the
two cases instituted there, in overruling the
demurrer to it, and that the judgment must
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Interviews for the purpose mentioned are punishment; but lf they reCUlle to testily, 
for mutual explanation, and do not absolute- or testify falsely, they are to be tried, and 
ly commit either party; but lf the accom- may be convicted upon their own confession. 
pllce is subsequently called and examined, Nothlng of weight by the wny of judicial 
he is equally entitled to a recommendation authority can be Invoked ln opposition to the 
for executive clemency. Promise of pardon views here expressed, as la evident from the 
111 never given in such an interview, nor any brief flied by the defendants, which exhibits 
Inducement held out beyond what the be- proof of research and diligence. Decided 
fore-mentioned usage and practice of the cases may be cited which contain unguarded 
courts allow. expl'esslons, of whkh the following al'e' 
Prosecutors la such a case should explain I striking examples: People v. Whipple, au-
to the accomplice that he ls not obllged to pra; U. S. v. Lee, 4 McLean, 103, Fed. Cas. 
crlmlnate himself, and Inform him just what No. 15,!'iSR. 
he may reasonably expect In case he acts ! Neither of those cases, however, support 
In good faith, and test111.es fully and fairly as I the proposition for which they are cited. 
to bis own act11 In the case, and those of his Enough appears ln the drat case to show 
IUl80<'lates. When he fultlls those conditions thtlt it was objected on behalf of the accom-
he ls equitably entitled to a pardoo, and the pllce that t™' usage gave him no certain as-
prosecutor, and the court lf need be, when surance of a pardon, inasmuch as the power 
fully Informed of the facts, will join In such of pardon ·Was vested In the governor, and 
a recommendation. the authority of the court extended no tur-
llodlftcatlons of the practice doubtless ex- ther than the recommendation for merry; 
lat In jurladlctlons where the power of par- to which the court responded, that the legal 
don does not exist prior to conviction; but presumption was tlrat the public faith will 
every embarra88tnent of that sort may be be preserved lnvlolate, and that the equitable 
removed by the prosecutor, as ln the absence I claim of the party will be ratlded amt al-
of any legislative prohibition be may nol. lowed. 
pros. the indictment lf pending, or advise Publlc policy and the great ends of JWl-
the prisoner to plead guilty, be, the prisoner, tlce. lt was said ln the second case, require 
reserving the right to retract his plea and that the arrangement between the publle 
plead over to the merits If hl11 application prosecutor and the accomplice should be car-
for pardon shall be unsuN•essfnl. 1 Bish. rled out; and the court proceeded to remark. 
Cr. Proc. (2d Ed.) t 1076, and note. that It the di.strict attorney failed to enter 
Where the power of pardon exists before a nolle prosequl to the lndktment, "the 
conviction as well aa after, no such dlmcul- co011 will continue the cause until an appll· 
ties can arise, as ~ prisoner, lf an attempt ! <'ation can be made for a pardon," which of 
ls made to put him to trial In spite of bis ! Itself ls a complete recognition of the usa11:e 
equitable right to pardon, may move that and practice establl.ahed In the place of the 
the trial be postponed, and may support hie ancient proeeedlng of approvement. Yore 
motion by hi.a own a.ftldavit, when the court evil than good ftowed from that regulation, 
may properly Insist to be Informed of all and In consequen<'e the pra<'tlcP now ac-
the circumstances. Power under such cir· knowledged was substituted in lta place, 
cumstances I.a vested In the court In a proper under which the accomplice acquires only 
case to put otf the trial as long as may be an equitable rl~ht to the <'lemeuc·y of the ex· 
nece88ftrY, ln order that the <'Ilse of the pris- ecutlve. whi<'h. as I.ord llansfteld said, rests 
oner may be presented to the executive for on usa~e and the good behavior of the ac-
declslon. compll<'E!. who In a propt>r case will be ball· 
Centuries have elapsed 1dnce the judl<.'lal ed by tht' court ln order that be may appl;r 
usage referred to wa11 sub11tltuted for the for the pardon to wbklt he ls equitably en-
anclent practice of approvement, and ex· tltled. 
pertence shows that throughout that whole Should It be objected thnt the application 
period it has proved, both here and In the may not be successful, the answer of the 
<'Ountry where lt had Its origin, to be a <'OUrt must be In substance that given by 
proper and satisfactory, protection to the ac- ' J..ord Denman on a similar ()('ceslon. that we 
compll<'e In all cases where he acts ln good are not to presume that tlK' Pqultable title 
faith, and testifies fairly and fully to the to mercy whh•b tht> humblest and most 
whole truth. Cases undoubtedly have arisen <'rlmlnal accomplice may thus acquire b;r 
where the accomplice, having refused to testifying to the truth In a federnl court will 
<'Omply with the conditions annexed to bis not be sacredly ac<'orded to him by the pl't'14-
equlta ble right, hes been subsequently tried ldent, In whom the pardoning power la \'M-
and convicted, It being first determined that eel by the federal constitution. 
he has forfeited hls equitable title to pro- mn1ng come to the conclusion that the 
tectlon by bls bad faith and false representa- district attorney bad no authority to makP 
tlona. C-0m. v. Knu1ip, 10 Pick. 477. Such the agreement alleged In the plea In bar, 
offenders, If they make a full disclosure of It follows that tile c•lrcult court erred In tilt> 
all matters wltlrln their knowledge In fal'or two cases Instituted there, In overruling the 
of the prosecution, will not be subjected to dt'murrer to it, and that the judgment must 
4:w 
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE. [Case N0. 147
be reversed, and the causes remanded for other cases, and that the judguiont in each
further proceedings in conformity with the ot’ those cases must be reversed, and the
opinion of the court. causes remanded with directions to reverse
Tested by these considerations, it is clear the judgment 01' the district court, and for
thut the circuit court also erred in afiirming further proceedings in conformity with the
the judgment of the district court in all the opinion of the court; and it is so ordered.
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CORROBOUATl YE EVIDENCE. (Case No. 147 
be revel'lled, and the causes remanded for 
further pl'O(.'t't'(llngs ln conformity with the 
opinion of the court. 
'rested by these considerations, It Is clear 
that the circuit court also erred In a11lrmlng 
the judgment of the district court In all the 
other cases, and that the judgment In each 
of· those cases must be reversed, and the 
t>auses remanded with directions to reverse 
the judgment of the district court, and for 
further pr0<•t-edlngs ln conformity with the 
opinion of the court; and It Is so ordered. 
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HRONECK v. PEOPLE.
(24 N. E. 861, 134 Ill. 139.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. June 12, 1890.
Error to criminal court, Cook county.
J ulius Goldzler, for plaintiff in error.
Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen., for the People.
BAKER, J. The plaintiff in error, John
Hroneck, was indicted with Frank Chapek,
Frank Chleboun, and Rudolph Sevic for
violation of an act of the legislature of
this state entitled “ An act to regulate the
manufacture, transportation, use, and
sale of explosives, and to punish an im-
proper use of the same,” approved June
16, 18%, and in force July 1. 1887. Rev. St.
1889. c. 38, §§ 54h-54n. The first count
charged the defendants with unlawfully
making dynamite, with the unlawful in-
tention of destroying the lives of certain
persons therein named ; and in the five re-
maining counts the defendants were
charged successively in such several
counts with manufacturing,compoumiing, '
buying, selling, and procuring dynamite.
with the same unlawful purpose and in-
tent. The defendant Hroneck was alone
put upon trial, and that trial resulted in
a verdict of guilty, and fixing his punish-
ment at 12 years‘ imprisonmentin the peni-
tentiary. Motions for a new trial and in
arrest of judgment were severally over-
ruled, and the said defendant was sen-
tenced on the verdict. Numerous grounds
are urged for reversal,which we shall con- .
sider, substantially, in the order they are
made.
Itls insisted thatthe statute upon which
the prosecution is based is unconstitu- ,
tional in that it is obnoxious to section 13 *
of article 4 of the constitution of the state,
which provides “that no act hereafter
passed shall embrace more than one sub- .
ject, and that shall be expressed in the ti-
tle." The specific objection is made that
two distinct subjects are expressed in the i
title. That objection is without merit.
The act is entitled “An act to regulate the I
manufacture, transportation, use. and
sale of explosives, and to punish an im-
proper use of the same.” The regulation
of the use necessarily implies the right to
punish an improper use. To“regula.te"
means to adjust by rule or regulation;
and any attempt to fix rules forthe man-
ufacture, transportation. use. and sale of
explosives that did not also prescribe pun-
ishment for violation of such rules and
regulations would necessarily be imperfect.
Two different subjects are not included or ,
expressed in or by the title; for the pun-
ishment of an improper use flows necessa-
rily and legitimately from the main or
substantive object as stated in the title,
i. e., to regulate. the use, etc., of explo-
sives. It is not necessary that the title
shall express all of the minor divisions of
the general subject to which the act re-
lates; and it is sufficient if it express the
general subject of the act, and all the mi-
nor subdivisions germane to the general
subject will be held to be included in it.
But, if the title E.'Xpl'csses such minor sub-
divisions, which without such expressions
would be held to be included within the
general subject, such expression will not
render the title obnoxious to the constitu-
tional provision. Plummer v. People, 74
Ill. 361 ; Fuller v. People. 92 Ill. 182: Magner
v. People, 97 Ill. 320; Cole v. Hall. 103 Iii.
30; Prescott v. City of (‘hicago, 60 lll. 121;
Potwin v. Johnson, 108 ill. 71; Timm v.
Harrison, 109 Ill. 593; Hawthorn v. Peo-
ple, Id. 302; People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 389;
City of Vlrden v. Allan, 107 ill. 505.
The contention that the statute itself
treats of two separate and well-defined
subjects is not tenable. It is said that the
first three sections of the act relate to
the “manufacture and use of explosives
for illegal purposes,” while the four re-
maining sections relate to “ the manufact-
ure. sale, and transportation of explo-
sives for legitimate purposes. ” It is there-
foreclaimed that theformersectionsshould
properly he found in the Criminal Code.
and that they are not germane to the oth-
er scctions of the act, which are mere po-
lice regulations. The general subject of
the statuteis the manufacture, transporta-
tion, use, and sale of explosives; and it
cannot be said that because one section
provides for a license or permit to be oh-
tained for their manufacture, and another
prohibits the storing of explosives within
a certain distance of inhabited dwellings,
and another punishes fraudulent acts to
procure the transportation of explosives
in public conveyances. that still another
section. or other sections. making it un-
lawful to manufacture or procure such ex-
plosives with the intent to use the same
for unlawful destruction of life or proper-
ty, and affixing a penalty therefor. would
. not be within the same general subject of
legislation. It can no more be said that
the prohibition, under a penalty, against
storing explosives in dangerous proximity
to a. dwelling, is a police regulation. than
that-a like prohibition against manufactur-
ing or procuring the same for an unlawful
use or purpose is a police regulation. All
of the provisions of the act are within the
subjectexpressed in the title, and are ger-
mane to each other, and to the general
scope and purpose of the act.
it is next claimed that the section of the
statute under which this indictment was
prosecuted is not sufficiently definite to
authorize imprisonment in the_ penitentia-
ry. Section 1 ofthe act provides that who-
ever shall be guilty of the acts therein de-
nounced “shall be deemed guilty of felony,
and upon conviction thereof shall be pun-
lshed by imprisonmentfora term of not less
than five years. nor more than twenty-five
years.” It is urged that as it is not stated
the imprisonment shall be in the peniten-
tiary, and the statute is highly penal,
and requires strict construction, a sen-
tence thercmider to the penitentiary can-
not be sustained. We are not prepared to
adopt this view. The offense is by the act
declared to be a felony. A felony is by the
Criminal Code of the state declared to be
an offense punishable by death or confine-
ment in the penitentiary. Rev. St. 1859. c.
38. § 277. While the legislature undoubt-
edly may provide for the punishment of
misdemeanors by imprisonment in the
penitentiary, and undoubtedly might, if
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HRONECK Y. PEOPLE. 
(24 N. E. 861, 184 111. 189.) 
Supl't'mt> Court of Illinol1. June 12, 1890. 
Error to criminal court, Cook county. 
Jull11s Gold•ler, for plalntlH tn t>rror. 
Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen .. for the People. 
BAKER, J. The platntlft tu error, John 
Hroneck, W88 tndktecl with Jo'rauk <.'hapek, 
l<'rank Chleboon, and Rudolph lSevlc for 
violation of an act of the leglslu.ture of 
this stl\te entitled" An act to regulate the 
manufttcture, transportation, use, and 
sale of explo11lves, and to pllnlsh an Im-
proper use of the same," approved June 
16. lS.'\i, and In force July l, 1887. Rev. St. 
1889, c. 38, H Mh-Mn. The first count 
charged the defendants with unlawfully 
making dynamite, with the unlawful In-
tention of destroylog the lives of certain 
pel'Hons therein named; and lo the ftvc re-
maining counts the defendants were 
charged succes1dvely in such sevE>ral 
counts with manufacturing, componndlng, 
buying, Relllng, and procuring clynnrulte, 
with the same unlawful purpose anc.l ln-
tent. The defendant Hroneck wa11 nlonei 
put npon trial, and that trial resulted in 
a verdict of guilty, and fixing his punish-
ment at 12 years' Imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary. Motions for a new trial and In 
arrest of Judgment were severally over-
ruled, and the said dPfendant was sen-
tenced on the verdict. Numerous grounds 
are urged lor 1-e\·ersal, which we shall con-
sider, substantially, lo the order they are 
made. 
It Is Insisted that the eta tote upon which 
the prosecution ls based Is unconHtltu-
tlonal In that It ls ohnuxlons to 11ectlou 13 
of article 4 olthe constitution of thE' Rtate, 
which pro\·ldes "that no act herel:llter 
padlled shall embrace more thnn one 11ub-
Ject, and that shall be expressed In the ti-
tle." The Rpeclflc objection tR made that 
two distinct sub)L'Cts are expreHscd In the 
tit.le. That objection ls without merit. 
The act ls entitled "An act to ~ula.te thr 
manufacture, transportation, use, and 
sal_, of explmdves, and to punish an im-
pro1>er use of tho same." The n>11:ulatlon 
of the use neceHsarily Implies the right to 
puni11h an Improper use. To "regulate" 
means to adjust by rule or regulntlon: 
aml an.v attelllpt to flx rules for the man-
ufacture, tran1<portatlon, use, and sale of 
explosives thutdld not also preticrlbe pun-
lt1hme11t for violation of such ruleR and 
regulations would nece11sarlly be Imperfect. 
Two different subjects are not included or 
ex11resscd In or by the title: for the pun-
ishment of an Improper use flows nec.·e1~sa­
ril)' and lep;ltlmntely from the main or 
substantive object as eta ted In the title, 
I. e., to regulntP. the use, etc., of explo-
RlveH. It 111 not necessary that the title 
shall ex11ree11 all of the minor divisions of 
the gener!ll subj('('t to which the act re-
h1.tPH; and tt Is 1:1ufficient If It express the 
general suhjPCt of the act, and all the mi-
nor Huhdh·lelonH germane to the general 
RuhJect wtll be held to be tncludrd In tt. 
Bnt, If the title exprrHHt>H Ruch minor sub-
dlvhiloos, which without such E'Xl>reRHionR 
4:18 
would be held to be locludrd within tbe 
general subject, such expression will not 
rt-nder the title obnoxious to the constitu-
tional provlRlon. Plummer v. People, 74 
Ill. 361: Fullerv. PE>ople.92 llJ. 1R2; Magner 
v. People, 97 Ill. 320; Cole v. Hall, 103 llL 
30; Prescott v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. 121; 
Potwin v. Johnson, 108 111. n; Timm v. 
Harrison, 100 Ill. 593; Hawtliorn v. Peo-
ple, Id. 802; People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 389; 
City of Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 605. 
The contention that the statute ttst>tr 
treats of two separate and well-defined 
subjects ts not tenable. It is said that the 
first three sections of the act relate to 
the "manufacture aml use of explosives 
for Illegal purposCR," while the four re-
maining sections relate to "the manufact-
ure, sale, and trunMportatlon of explo-
sives for 1.-gitlmate purposes." It ts there-
foreclatmed that the former sectlonsshould 
properly be found in the Criminal <.'ode, 
l\Dd that they are not ge-rmc..ne to the oth-
er sectlous of the al't, which are mere po-
lice regulations. The general subject of 
the statutetsthemanufacture, transporta-
tion, use, and sale of explosives; and tt 
cannot be said that because one section 
provldl'tl for a llcense or permit to be oh-
tatnl'd for their manufacture, and another 
prohibits the storing of explo11lves within 
a certain distance of Inhabited dwellings, 
and another punishes fraudulent acts to 
procure the transportation or explosives 
In public conveyances. tilat Rtlll another 
section. or other sections, making It un-
lawful to manufacture or procure such e~ 
plostves with the intent to use the same 
for unlawful destruction of life or proper-
ty, and afHxln.r a penalty therefor, would 
not be within the same general suhjel't of 
IE>gl11laUon. It can no mt>I'(> be said that 
the prohibition, under a penalty, against 
storing explosives In dunJterous proximity 
to a dwelllog, ill a. police regulation, than 
that a like prohibition agalnHt nm.nuractur-
tn.r or procurln~ the same for an uola wful 
uHe or purpose ts a police regulation. All 
of the provisions or the act are within the 
snbject.expreMsed tn the title, and are ger-
mane to each other, and to the general 
scope and purpose of the 8('t. 
It ts next claimed that the section of the 
statute under which this Indictment was 
prm1ecu ted Is not eufHclently defl nite to 
authorize Imprisonment in the peottentta.-
ry. S<.>etlon 1 ofthe act provides that who-
ever t1ball be 11:uilty of the act.It therein de-
nuunced "shall be deemed guilty of felony, 
and upon com·lction thereof shall be pun-
ished by lmprlflonment for a term of not ll'Bll 
than ft,·e yettl'H, nor more than twenty-five 
years." It is urged tlmtM It Is not stated 
the imprisonment shnll be in the peniten-
tiary, and the statute Is highly pPoal, 
and req ulrcs strict <·onstructlon, u sen-
tence thereunrler to thE' penitentiary can-
not be sustuined. We art• not prepared to 
adopt this view. The offE>nse ts Ly the act 
declared to be a felony. A felony ts by the 
Criminal Code of the stttte declared to be 
an offense punishable by death or confine-
ment In the penitentiary. Rev. St. 1889. c. 
3R. § 2i7. While the legislature undoubt-
edly may prol"ide for the pnntshmE'nt or 
mlHdemc:llnors by Imprisonment tn tht> 
penitentiary, and Dndoubtedly might, if 
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they saw proper, punish felonies other-
wise than byimprisonment in the peniten-
tiary, yet there is nothing in these sec-
tions of the act which indicates an inten-
tion to do the latter. Applying the well-
known rule that acriminal statuteis to be
strictly construed. and that nothing is to
be taken by intendment or implication
against the accused beyond -the literal and
obvious meaning of the statute, it is nev-
ertheless clear, we think, when this stat-
ute is considered in connection with the
general Criminal Code, which it must be
presumed the legislature had in contem-
plation when passing it, the punishment to
be inflicted for violation of said sections
of the act is by imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary. '
It is insisted that the verdict is void for
uncertainty, in that it simply finds “the
defendant” guilty, without specifying the
plaintiff in error by name. Before plain-
tiff in error was put upon trial a separate
trial had been awarded to the defendants
Chapek and Sevic. The defendant Chie-
boun was not put upon trial. but was
used as a witness on behalf of the people.
The record shows that on the 26th day of
November, 1888, at the term of the crim-
inal court then being held, the following
proceedings were had and entered of rec-
ord. to-wit: “The People of the State of
Illinois v. John Hroneck, impleaded, " etc.
“This day come the said people by Joel M.
Longnec-ker,state‘s attorney, and the said
defendant, as well in his own proper per-
son as by his counsel, also comes. And
now, issue being joined, it is ordered that
a jury come,” etc. Then follows the im-
paneling of a jury. It is manifest from the
foregoing‘ that no one was put upon trial
other than the defendant Hroneck, and
the verdict finding “the defendant" guilty
could not refer to any other defendant.
There was no uncertainty in the verdict.
Complaint is made of the second instruc-
tion given on behalf of the people. That
instruction told the jury that any person
abetting or assisting in the perpetration
of the offense mentioned in section 1 of the
act was upon conviction to be punished
as provided in said first section. This
was not error. The statute provides that
any person abetting or in any way assist-
ing in making. manufacturing, buying,
procuring, etc., such explosives, etc., know-
ing or having reason to believe that the
samearcintended to be used by any person
or persons in any way for the unlawful in-
jury to or destruction of life or property,
shall he deemed a principal, and upon con-
viction shall besubject to thesume punish-
ment as provided in section 1 of the act.
Under this statute a defendant, if guilty as
an accessory before the fact, is to be indicted
and punished as a principal. In view of
the evidence tending to show the connec-
tion of plaintiff in error with the other de-
fendants in the perpctration of the offense,
the instruction was entirely proper.
It is objected that the court erred in re
fusing an instruction that the evidence of
private detectives and of the police" should
be received with a large (lcgrec of can tion. ”
This instruction does not contain acor-
rect proposition of la\v. All the circum-
stances connected with a witness, or that
might tend to affect his credibility or bias
his judgment, are competent to be shown
to and considered by the jury in determin-
ing the weight and credit to be given to
his testimony. In view of the facts and
circumstances thus shown, it is for the
jury to determine its weight as matter of
act.
It is urged that the court erred in modi-
fying an instruction asked by the defend-
ant. The instruction as asked was as fol-
lows: “The jury are instructed that, to
constitute the crime charged against the
defendant in the indictment, two things
are necessary, namely: First, the mak-
ing, lnuiiufacturing, compounding, buy-
ing, sclling, or disposing of the dynamite,
or some portion thereof, described in the
indictment, on or subsequent to the lst
day of July. A. D.18S7. " To this the court
added the following: “Therefore the jury
must disregard any evidence as to the
making or compounding or procuring
of any dynamite at Chapek's house or
elsewhere prior to said date.” 'l‘he in-
stI‘iiCi.i0Ii then proceeds: “Second, ” etc.
Hroneck’s defense in part consisted in ac-
counting for the dynamite found in his
possession by testifying that it was lcft
in his house in the fall oil-‘I86 by one Kara-
fiat; and it becameimportant for the jury
to consider testimony tending to show
that he was in possession of dynamite in
the spring of 1887 prior to the law under
which he was prosecuted goinginto effect,
on the 1st day of July of that year. It is
insisted that the effect of the modification
was to take from the consideration of the
jury this evidence offered by the defendant
of prior possession of theexplosives. It is
conceded that such was not the purpose,
and it is clear to us that such was not the
effect, of the modification. The instruc-
tion related solely to the elements neces-
sary to constitute the crimecharged. The
jury were told that. to constitute the
crime, it was necessary that the making,
etc., of the dynamite must have been on or
subsequent to the lst day of July, 1887.
and that therefore the jury must disregard
the making or procuring, etc., prior to
that date. It must he presumed that the
jury were men of reasonable intelligence,
and would understand that whntfollowed
the introductory part of the instruction
related to what was necessary to consti-
tute the crime. and not to the defense set
up, that the dynamite was in the posses-
sion of the defendant prior to the date
fixed by the instruction. Moreover the
jury, by a lengthy series of instructions,
were fairly instructed as to the law of the
case,—fully as favorably to the defendant
as he could rightfully ask. They were
told that they must consider all the facts
and circumstances proven, and determine
therefrom whether the defendant procured,
etc., the explosives in question after the
law went into force, and that his posses-
sion prior thereto would raise no presump-
tion of guilt. It is, we think, impossible
that the jury could have been misled to
the prejudice of the plaintiff in error by
the modification. It is not contended
that the instruction. when considered as
defining what would constitute guilt of
the crime charged, and what the jury
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they saw proper, punish felunlei! other-
wll1e than by Imprisonment In the peniten-
tiary, yet there le nothing In these sec-
tions of the act which lndi<"atee an Inten-
tion to do the latter. Applying the well-
known rule that acrlmlnal statute le to be 
strictly com1trued, and that nothing is to 
be tak .. n by lntendment or Implication 
11galm1t the accuee<l beyond . the literal and 
ob\·loue meaning of the statute, It Is nev-
ertheless clear, we think, when this stat-
ute Is coneldered In connection with the 
general Criminal Code, which it must be 
presumed the legislature bad in contem-
plation when pm111lng It, the punishment to 
be Inflicted fol' violation of said sections 
of the act le by Imprisonment In the peni-
tentiary. · 
It is insisted that the verdict le void for 
uneertulnty, In that It simply flnde "the 
defendant" guilty. without sprclfylng the 
plalntlH In error by name. Before plain-
tiff In error was put upon trial a separate 
trial bad been awarded to the defendants 
Chapek and Sevlc. The defl>ndant Chle-
bonn was not put upon trial, but w11e 
used as a wltneBR on behalf of the people. 
The record 11hows that on the :l6th day of 
Nnvember, Ixx~. at the term of the crim-
inal court then b1>l11g held, the following 
pr1x·eedings were bad and enteretl of rec-
ord. tu-wit: ••The People of the State of 
Illlnob1 v. John Hroneck, hnpleaded," etc. 
'"l'hlH day cume the said people by Joel .M. 
Longnecker,state's attorney, and the said 
defendant, as well In his own proper per-
son as by bis counKel, ah-io comes. And 
now. ls11ue being joined, It 11:1 ordered that 
a Juri come," etc. 'l'hen follows the Im-
paneling of a Jury. It Is ma111fe11t from the 
foregoing tha.t no one was put upon trial 
other than the defendunt Hroneck, and 
the verdict finding" the defendant .. guilty 
could not refer to any other defendant. 
There was no uncertainty In the vertllct. 
Complaint le made of the second Instruc-
tion given on behalf of the people. That 
l111o1t rnc tlon told the Jury that any person 
abetting or a11sl11tlng In the per1Jetratlon 
of the offense mentioned In sectloQ 1 of the 
act was upon conv:ction to be punished 
a11 provided In 11ald first Election. This 
was not error. Thf' statute provides that 
any person abetting or In any way atiHist-
lng In making. manufacturing, buying, 
procuring, etc., such explosives, etc., know-
ing or having reason to believe thut the 
samearelntended to be u;ied byanyper1w11 
or persons In any way for the unlawful In-jury to or tlestructlon of life or pru1•erty, 
shull he dN>med 11. prlncip!ll , and u1ion con-
viction sh!lll he11uhject to thetmme punish-
ment aH provided In section 1 of the net. 
Under this statute a defendant, If guilt.v aK 
1tn accee11ory before thefal't, ls tu be indicted 
anu vunlsherl as a principal. In \"lew of 
the evidence tE"11dlng to show the connec-
tion of plaintiff In error with the other de-
f1>ndant11 In the perpetration of the offense, 
the Instruction wns entirely proper. 
It Is ol>jcctP1l thut the court erred In re 
h11o1l11sc an im~truction thnt the evidence of 
lJrlvate fletecti\"CS and Of the police '0 l:lhouJd 
be received with a lurg'e dl'~reeokaution." 
'l' hls Instruction rloeH not contaiu a cor-
rect 11ropo1:1ltlon of law. All the circum-
stnnces connet·ted with a witn:•Hs, or that 
might tend to anect blR credibility or bias 
his Judgment. are competent to be Hhown 
to a11d conHlrlt>red by the jury In detcl'lnln-
lng the wei11;ht and credit to be given to 
his testimony. In view of the fucts and 
clrcumstanres thus shown, it Is for the jury to determine Its weight as matter of 
fact. 
It Is urged that the court erred In modi-
fying an inHtructlon asked l>y the defend-
ant. The Instruction as askeci was aH fol-
lows: "The Jury are Instructed th·ut, to 
constitute the crime charged against the 
defendnnt 111 the Indictment, two things 
are necessary, namely: First, the mak-
ing, manufacturing, compounding, buy-
ing, sl·lling, or dlspoRing of the dynamite, 
or some portion thereof, described in the 
Indictment, on or 11ubsequent to the 111t 
dny of July, A. D. 18::!7." To this the court 
aclded the following: "Therefo1·e the Jury 
n•uHt disregard any evidence as to the 
making .,pr ~ompoundlng or prol'urlng 
ot any aynamlte at Chapek's house or 
elsewhere p11or to said date." The in-
struction then proceeds: "Seco11d," etc. 
Hroneck's defense In part consisted In ac-
counting for the dynamite found In his 
poMsestilon by testifying that It wa11 left 
in hlH house In the fall of 1~6 by one Kara-
flat; and it became Important for the Jury 
to consider testimony tending to tihuw 
thnt he waH In pus11e11i1lon of dynamite in 
the Rprlng of 18S7 prior to the law under 
wbkh he was prosecuted going Into enect, 
on the l11t day of July of that year. It Is 
Insisted that the effect of the modification 
was to take from the con11lderatlon of the jury this evlrlence offered by the defendant 
of prior pos11e11!!lon of theexploslves. It Is 
concN1Pd that 1mcb was not the purpose, 
anrl It Is clear to us that such was not the 
effect, of the modification. 'l'he Instruc-
tion related 1mlely to the elements neces-
sary to conHtitute the crime charged. '!'he 
Jury we1·e told that. to constitute the 
crime, it was necessary that the making, 
etc., of the dynamite must ba'\"e been on or 
subsequent to the let day of July, 1887, 
and that therefore the jury must disregard 
the making or procuring, etc., prior to 
that date. lt must he presumed that the jury were men of t"f'asonable lnt('lligence, 
and would understand that whatfollowt:d · 
the Introductory part of the Instruction 
related to what was neces1mry to con11ti-
tute the crime, and not to the defem1e set 
up, that the dynumlte was In the po11ses-
slon of tho defendant prior to the date 
fixed by the in11tructlon. Moreover the jury, by a lengthy series of hJstructions, 
were fnlrlv lnHtructetl as to the law of the 
case,-fully us favorably to the defendant 
ns he could rightfully 11.sk. They were 
told that they must consider all the f!lcts 
und clrcunu1tunces proven, and <leternslne 
therefrom wtaether the defendant procured, 
etc., the explo&lves In question after the 
law went into force, and that his posse11-
slon prior thereto would raise no presump-
tion of guilt. It Is, we think, lmpo11r1lhle 
thu t the jury could ba.\·e bet>n mhded to 
the prejudice of the plaintiff In error by 
the modification. It is not contended 
that the in11tructlon, when t•unRlden•d as 
rk•Hning whut would comctltute guilt of 
the crime charged, and what the jury 
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might properly consider in respect thereof,
is not a. substantially accurate statement
oi the law. As the jury were not misled
by the modification to the prejudice of the
plaintiff in error, he has no cause of com-
plaint.
Objection is made to the competency of
Frank Chleboun. a witness for the people,
who was permitted to testify over the
objection of the defendant. He was ex-
amined upon his voir (lire, and avowed
his belief in the existence of God and "a
hereufterz" that he believed, if he swore
falsely, he would be punlslied under the
criminal laws of the state; that he had
never thought seriously of whether God
would punish him either in this world or
the next, and had never considered the
question whether he would be punished
for false swearing in any other way than
by that inflicted by the law. He had. it
seem s. no religious belief or conyiction of
his accountability to the Supreme Being,
either in this world or in any after life.
The test of the competency of a witness
in respect to religious belief. as generally
held, is, does the witness believe in (lod,
and that he will punish him if he swears
falsely? It is stated by Rupaije in his
Law of Witnesses (section ll) that “the
great weight oi authority in this country
now is that it is immaterial whether the
witness believes God ‘s vengeance will over-
take him before or after death.” This
doctrine was approved in Railroad Co. v.
Rockafcllow. 17 ill. 541, where, after a coii-
sideratiun of the autiiorities, it was lieid
that all persons are competentto besworn
as witnesses who believe there is a God,
and that he will punish them.either in
this world or the next, if they swear false-
ly. and that a want of such belief rendered
them incompetent to take an oath as wit-
nesses. This case, seemingly, overruled
the doctrine of the earlier case of Noble v.
People. Breese. 54. Without pausing here
to determine whether the court erred in
subjecting the witness to an examination
touching his religious belief. (Rap. Wit.
§ 12, and cases cited,) it may be said that
the better practice, and that which now
prevails, forbids the examination of the
witness in respect thereof on his voir
dire. Ii there was error in this regard. it
was committed at the instance of the de-
fendant. and in his interest; and he can-
not complain.
Returning to the questiun of the coiiipe-
tency of the witness. the rule seems to be
as above stated, unless changed by con-
stitutional provision or legislative enact-
ment. The tendency of modern times by
the courts and inicgisiation is towards lib-
eralizing the rule, and in manyjurisdictions
incompetency for the want of religious
belief has been abolished. See Rap. Wit.
§ 13, and Whart. Ev. §395. Has therule an-
nounced by this court in Railroad Co. v.
Rockafellow been changed in this state?
By section 3 of article 2 of the constitu-
tion of1is‘70, it would seem that a. radical
change was effected in respect to the mat-
ter under coiisideration. This section
guaranties non-interference of the state
with the religious faith of its citizens. In
Chase v. Cheney, 58 Iii. 509, it was said:
“The only exception to uncontrolled lib-
:rty is that acts oi licentiousness shall not
be excused, and practicesinconsistent with
the peace and safety of the state shall not
be justified.” The section provides: “No
person shall be denied any civil or political
right, privilege, or capacity on account of
his religious opinions: but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be con-
strued to dispense with oaths or affirma-
tions, excuse acts of licentiousness. or jus-
tify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the state. " No religious belief
is required to qualify a. citizen to take an
oath. and no citizen can be excused from
taking an oath or affirmation because of
his religious belief. The liberty of con-
science secured by the constitution is not
to be construed as dispensing with oaths
or affirmations in cases where the same are
required by law. No man, because of his
religious belief. is to be excused from tak-
ing the prescribed oath oi office before en-
tering upon the discharge of the public du-
ty; nor can he be permitted to testify be-
cause of such rellgiousbeliei or opinion ex-
cept upon taking the oath. or making the
affirmation, required by law. Now, as be-
fore the adoption of this provision, oaths
are to be taken, and aiiirniations made,
whenever required by law; but the right
to take such oath or make such affirma-
tion, if such right be a- civil right, privi-
lege, or capacity, cannot be denied to any
citizen. It is said that one who lioids pro-
scribed religious opinions is incompetent—-
that is. has not the legal capacity—to tes-
tify. The incapacity, if it exists. grows
out of, and is based upon. his failure to
hold certain religious beliefs and opinions
in accord with the prevailing religious
opinions of the people; and ilie contention
is that he should not, by reason of such
incapacity, be permitted to testify, how-
ever great and important the interest at
stake to himself, his family, his neighbor,
or the stn te. It is clear from the authori-
ties that the rule contended for does not
apply when the witness is testifying in his
own behalf; but if the life, liberty, reputa-
tion. or property of his family or neighbor
be involved. or his testimony be necessary
to the protection of society. he is. under
such rule, to be excluded from the privilege
of testifying in courts of justice because of
such incapacity. If it exists at all, the in-
capacity is created by law, and it is there
fore a civil incapacity. The constitution
provides that no person shall be dcnied any
civil or political right, privilege, or capac-
ity on account of his religious opinions.
In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, capacity is
defined to be “ ability. power, qualification,
or competency of persons, natural or arti-
ficial, for the performance of civil acts de-
pending on their state or condition as de-
fined or fixed by law. " It is also defined
as follows: “ Power; competency; quali-
fication; ability, power, or qualification
to do certain acts." 2 Amer. & Eng. (‘y-
clop. Law, 722. The obvious meaning of
the provision in the constitution is that
whatever civil rights, privileges, or capac-
ities bclong to or are enjoyed by citizens
generally, shall not be taken from or denied
to any person on account of his religious
opinions. As said by the supreme court
of l\'entucky in construing a similar pro-
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might properly consider In respect thereof, 
ls not a substauthtlly acP.urate statement 
or the law. As the Jury were not mt11led 
by the modification to the prejudice of the 
plalntln In error, be has no cause or com-
plalut. 
Objeetlon ts made to the competency of 
l•'rank Chleboun, a wlt11es11 for the rieople, 
wt.o was permitted to testify over the 
obJet·llon of th'"' defendant. He was ex-
amined u1W>n his ,·otr dire, and avowed 
hle belief In the existence or Hod and "a 
h<'renfter:" that he belle\•ed, If be swore 
falsely. he woulcl he punished under the 
criminal lawR of the KtRte; that he had 
nevttr thought 11erl111111ly of whether God 
would puul11h him either in this world or 
the next, and had never considered the 
question wlwtber he would be punished 
tor false Mweartna In any other way than 
by that Inflicted by the law. He had. it 
ROOms. no religious belief or con,l'.ictlon or 
bis accountuhlllty to the Suprewe Ht-Ing, 
P.ltber In thl11 world or tu any after life. 
The test of the competency of a witness 
In respect to religious belief, as grnero.lly 
held, Is, does the witness bellP\"e In God, 
and that he will punlRh him if he swenrs 
falsely? It le stated by Rar>alje In hie 
Law of WitneHSee (section 11) that" the 
great weight of authority in this country 
now le that It 111 immaterial whether the 
witness hellevee Go it 'a vengeance will over-
ta.ke him hefore or after death." Thie 
doctrine was approved In Railroad Co. v. 
Rockafellow, 17 Ill. Ml, where, after a con-
.iideratlon of the aut110rities, It wae held 
that all pereoneare com1>etentto be sworn 
a11 wltne11ee11 who belll•ve there le a God, 
and tho.t he wlll punish them. either In 
thts world 01· the next, If they 11wear false-
ly. and that a want of such belief rendered 
them incompetent to take an oath ae wit-
nesses. This caH<>, set>mlngly, overruled 
the doctrine of thP earlier case of Noble v. 
People, Breese. 54. Without pau11lng here 
to deter1nlne whether tbe court erretl In 
subjecting the wltneee to an exnminatlon 
touching bis religious belief, (Hap. Wit. 
§ 12, and caeee cited,) It may be eaid that 
the bettP.r practice, and that whkh now 
prevails, forbids the exnmlnntlon of the 
witness In reMpect thereof on hhi volr 
dire. If there wa11 error in this regard. It 
WM committed at the Instance of the de-
fendant. aud In bis interest; and he can-
not complain. 
Returning to the questhn of the compe-
teoc.v of the witness, the rule seems to bo 
as above stated, unless changed by con· 
stl tu tlonnl proYislon or legleb1 tive enact-
men t. 'l'he tendency of moclern times by 
thecourteand lull:'gislatlou letowardH lib-
eralizing the rule, and In many jurisdictions 
Incompetency for the want of rell){lous 
bE>llef bas been aholh1hed. l::iee Rap. Wit. 
§ t:i, and Whart . .i-;,-. § :J95. Has tbrrule an-
nomwed by this court In Railroad Co. v. 
Rocko.fpllow bt>en changed In this state'? 
By section 3 of article 2 of the constitu-
tion of 1870, it would seem that a radical 
change wae efft•<'tl'd in rel!llf'Ct to the mat-
ter under consideration. •.rbls section 
guaranties non-lnterferenl'e of the state 
with the religious faith of Its citizens. In 
ChaMe v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 009, It was 11ttld: 
"'l'he only exception to uncontrnlkd lib-
440 
Jrty ls that ach1 or Ucen tlouenese shall not 
be excused, and practl('esfnconelstent with 
the peace and 1J1tfet.v of the Rtate shall not 
be justified." The section provides: "No 
pel'llon shall be denied any ch·ll or political 
right. prl\"llege, or capacity on account of 
hie religious opinions: but the llbert¥ or 
eoneclence hereby secured shall not be con-
~trued to dispense with oaths or amrma-
tlons, excuse acts or llcentlousneea, or jus-
tify practices lncon11l11tcnt with the peace 
or safety of the state. " No reltgtoos belief 
le re11ulred to qualify a citizen to take an 
oath, and no cltb:e.n can be excused from 
taklu" an oath or atHrmatlon because of 
bis religious belief. The liberty of con-
srlence secured by the constitution Is not 
to be construed ae dl11penslng with oaths 
or aflh'matlonslncaHeH where the eame are 
re11ulred by law. No man, bl'Cause of bis 
rellgloue bPllef, le to bE:' excused from tak-
ing the pre11crlbed oath of office before en-
tering upon the dlscbaf1te of the publle du-
ty; nor can hP be perml1 tl'd to tt>stlfy be-
cauHe of such reltglousbellef or opinion ex-
cept upon taking the oath, or making the 
affirmation, required b.v law. Now, as be-
fore the adoption of this provision, oaths 
are to be taken, and attlrmatlonit made, 
whenenr required by law; but the right 
to take such oath or make such afftrma-
tlon, If such right be a civil right, privi-
lege, or capacity, cannot be tleniecl to any 
citizen. It le said that one who holds pro-
scribed religious oplnll•ns ls ln~um1>et.ent­
thnt 111, has not the legal capaf'lty-to tes-
tify. The incapacity, If It exists. grows 
out of, and le based upon, hie failure to 
hold cert1tln religious hellefB and opinions 
In accord with the prevaillnir rellglous 
opinions of the people; and the contention 
le tho.t he should not, by reason or such 
fncapaclty, be permitted to testify, how-
e\"er great and important the lntP.rest at 
stake to bhneelf, his family, his neighbor, 
or the 11tnte. It le clear from the authori-
ties that the rule contended for does not 
11pply when t11e witnese le testlfylnir In hta 
own heh a.If; but If the life, liberty, reputa-
tion. or property of hie fnmlly or neighbor 
l>e involved. or hie testimony be necessary 
to the r>rotectlon of society. he ls, under 
such rule. to be flxcluded from the privilege 
of teRtlfylug In courts of Justice because of 
such Incapacity. If it exlstll at all, the in-
ca1>aclty 111 ct'l"ated by law, and It is there-
fore a civil tncupacity. The constitution 
provides that no person shall be denied any 
civil or political right, privilege, or capac-
ity on account of hie rellgluue opinions. 
In Bouvier's Law Dictionary, capacity la 
defined to be" ability. power, qualification, 
or eompt>tency of persona, natural or nrtl-
flclnl, for the performance of Ci\'il acts dt'-
pendlng on their state or condition ae de-
fined or fixed by law." It lfl aleo defined 
as follows: "Power; coml>f"tenr.y; quali-
fication; ability, power, or qualification 
to do certain acts. " 2 Amer. & Eng. f'y-
clop. Law, 722. The obvious meaning of 
the provision In the constitution ls that 
whatever civil rights, privileges, or ca)laC· 
ltiee belong to or are enjoyed by cltlzen11 
generally, Hball not be taken from or denied 
to any person on account of hl11 reJlgloas 
opinions. As eaid by the supreme court 
of Kentucky In construing a almlhtr pro-
U.\'I‘l[.
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vision of the constitution of that state in
Bush v.C0m., 80 Ky. 2-i-4: “ It is a declara-
tion of an absolute equality, which is vio-
lated when one class of citizens is held to
have the civil capacity to testify in a court
of justice because they entertain a. certain
opinion in regard to religion, while anoth-
er class is denied to possess that capacity
because they do not conform to the pre-
scribed belief." it is manifest that, if the
legislature may prescribe the test of belief
in rewards and punishments, they may
impose any other test or qualification
that. in the judgment of those entertain-
ing the dominant belief, may be necessary
to afford the requisite sanction. In Perry's
('a.se, 3 Grat. 632, a like conclusion was
reached in construing a constitutional pro-
vision that “all men shall be free to pro-
fess, and by argument maintain, their opin-
ions in matters oi religion; and the same
shall in no wise affect, diminish, or enlarge
their civil capacities. ” We are of the opin-
ion that the effect of this constitutional
provision is to abrogate the rule which
obtained in this state prior to the consti-
tution of 1870. and that there is no longer
any test or qualification in respect to re-
ligious opinion or belief, or want of the
same. which affects the competency of cit-
izens to testify as witnesses in courts of
justice. It follows that there was no er-
ror in permitting the witness to testify.
The only remaining question which we
deem it necessary to consider is the claim
thatthe evidence is insufficient to warrant
a. conviction. It is insisted that there is
no proof of the corpus dellcti. The corpus
delictf of the offense charged in the indict-
mentis the making, procuring. etc.,ofd_vna.-
mite with intent to use the same for the un-
la wful destruction of the lives of the persons
named in the indictment. At the time of
the arrest of plaintiff in error, a large
quantity of dynamite, and a number of
bombs of different make and material,
were found in his possession. 1t was
proved that he said, as indicating his in-
tent. that he must kill Gary, Grinnell. and
Bonfield, and that he would throw the
bombs at them. in his statement made
to the oflieers after his arrest, which was
reduced to writing, and which he intro-
duced in evidence at the trial, it appears
that he went with Chleboun and (Jhapek
to Airline square for the. purpose of finding
Grlnncll’s residence, and that the intent of
his companions, as expressed at the time.
was to find (irinne-ll‘s house. and that
they were talking of killing Boufield. It
appears, also, that he pointed out to said
persons Grinnell's house, or what he
thought to be his house. It is also shown
that, on different occasions, he threatened
to take the lives of the three persons
named in the indictment, and said that he
would throw the bombs at them in the
court-rooms, or on the street, or wherever
he might meet them. Indeed, it is not
-questioned that there is sufficient evidence
of the intent of plaintiff in error to destroy
he lives of said persons b_v means of such
xplosives. if it was believed by the jury
£0 be true. It is insisted, however, that
there can he no presumption that I-I roneck
had procured the dynamite with the un-
lawful intent indicated from the fact that
such d_\ namite was found in his posses-
sion.
sion of explosives. and has the avowed in-
tention of using them for a particular pur-
pose, the presumption would arise that he
procured the same for such unlawful use.
it is to be remarked that there was noth-
ing in the business or vocation of Hroneck
that would call for or require the use or
possession of explosives. Moreover, it
was shown by the witness Chleboun that
he was at H1-oneck's house theiast Sunday
in May, 1888, when Hroneck showed him
some unfilled bombs, and Hroneck then
said that he would get dynamite with
which to load them. He at that time
spoke of an opportunity he had to kill
Bonfield, that he did not do it because he
didn't have the necessary weapon, but
that he regretted it very much. The wit-
ness saw no dynamite that day. In June
following the witness again saw Hroneck
at his req nest, and Hroneck had a number
of bombs which were charged. Some of
them had fuses attached. and others had
fulminating caps. (‘an it be questioned
that, ifuo explanation had been offered by
Hroneck as to when and how he came
into the possess‘-on of the dynamite, the
fact of its being in his possession in the
month of June with the avowed intent of
using it in the particular unlawful way
charged, coupled with his declaration in
May that he would procure dynamite for
the accomplishment of such unlawful pur-
pose, would be sufficient to maintain a
conviction for unlawfully procuring the
explosive with the intent to use the same?
In other words, would not the jury be jus-
tified in finding therefrom that the corpus
delicti had been proved? The fact that he
procured the explosive is shown by his
having it in his possession. The unlawful
intent is manifested by the character of
the substance itself, his concealment of it.
and his contemporaneous declaration of
his intent. A jury, from the necessity of
the case, must be allowed to draw conclu-
sions from the facts proved; and intent
can ordinarily be shown only by inferences
drawn from the acts of the party, and
from his declarations. Hroneck is here
shown to have been in the actual posses-
sion oi the dynamite in June, 1888, and
subsequently, by unquestioned evidence;
and the fact of his intention is shown by
his declare tions and acts. If, from the
facts proved.the conclusion is irresistible,
if the testimony is believed, that the offense
was com mittcd, then the corpus delicti is
established.
Some question is made in respect of the
evidence of the date when the dynamite
was procured by Hroneck. He testified
that one Karafiat left it at his housein
the fall of 1886, and had never called for it.
Without entering into a discussion of the
evidence, it must be said that there was
much in his own testimony, as there was
also in the testimony of the witness (‘hie-
boun, that tended to discredit his evidence.
Thequestion wasfully andfalrly submitted
to the jury as to whether or not he procured
the dynamite with the unlawful intent
charged, after the lst day of July, 1387,
when the statute went into effect. They
were told in numerous instructions that
Where a party is found in posses- -
4-11
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vision of the rom1tlt11tlon of that Rtate In 
Bush v.Com .. 80 Ky. :?44: "lt Is a tleclura-
tlon of nn abHolutf' t~quallty, which 111 vlo-
Jated when one claMs or cltb:ens ls held to 
have the civil capacity to testlfyln a court 
<>f justice because they entertain a certain 
<>pinion In regard to religion, while anoth-
~r claes Is denh•d to po1111{'MH thut capacity 
hecause the)· do not conform to the ·pre-
~crlbed belief." It IR manHe11t that, It the 
lcghdature may preRcrllie thl" te11t of bellt>f 
In reward11 and punl11hmentH, they may 
Impose any other test or qualltlcHtlon 
that. In the jutlgu1ent of thoRe entertain-
ing the dominant belief, lllll)' be nece11Rury 
to afford the requisite sunctlon. In Ptlrry's 
-<'ase, 3 Grat. "112, a like conelu11lon was 
reached In construing a con11tltutlonal Pt"O-
\"l&lon that" all men tthall be free to pro-
fess, and by argument maintain, their opln-
10011 In matters of religion; and the Rn me 
~hall In no wise affect, dlmlnlRh, or enlarge 
their civil cape.citit>e." We a.re of the optn-
lon that the effect of thh1 constitutional 
prod1don Is to abrogate the rule which 
-0btalned in this state prior to the contttl-
tutlon of 1870. and that there Is no longer 
.an)' test or qualification In J"eHpect to re-
ligious opinion or belief, 01· wuot of the 
same. which affects the com1>eteocy or cit-
izens to teHtlfy as witnesses In courts of 
justice. It follows that there was no er-
;ror lo permttting the witness to testify. 
The only rem1dning queHtion which we 
dt'f>m It nPCeHHe.ry to comdder Is the <'lnlm 
that the evh.lt'nce IH lnsnfflclt>nt to wn rrant 
a conviction. It i"' ioMh~tccl that there Is 
no proof of the corpus de/let/. The corpus 
<IElictl or the offenRe charge<} lo the Indict-
ment Is the making, procurln11:. etc.,uf il)·ne.-
mlte with Intent to 1111ethesa.me for the un-
lawful detitruction of the lives of the r1et'Kons 
nRmerl In the Indictment. At the time of 
the arrest of plldntlH In error, a lnrge 
-qtJantlty of dynamite, and a nmnht'r of 
bombR of iltfferent make and material, 
were found In his posst'sslon. It was 
proved that he saltl, 88 lmllcatlng his In-
tent. that be must kill Gary, Grinnell. an<l 
llonHehl, and that he would throw tlw 
bombs at them. Jn hltt Htutl•ment made 
to the offlcel'll after bis Rrrcst, which was 
redut'ed to writing. and which he intro-
·ducecl In evidence at the trluJ, It appeo.rH 
that he went with Chlehoun and Cha11ek 
to Airline square for the purpoHe of tlmllng 
-01innell's residence, and thut the Intent of 
hie companions, as expreel!ed at the time. 
was to find Grlnrll'll'H ho1111P. and that 
tht\\' were talklnµ. ol kiliing EunHt>ld. It 
a111wars, also, that he (JOlnted out to snld 
pl•r1<011s Grlnnt'll's houHe, or what Ill' 
thought to be his houHe. Ith~ ahm 11hown 
that,"on different occaelons, he threatened 
t:o take the lives of the three perHons 
named In the Indictment, and s11ld that he 
would throw the bomlJH ut them In the 
-court-rooms, or on the strPet, or wherever 
he mlp:ht meet them. Indeed, It b1 out 
-quetttlonerl that there Is sufficient evidence 
of the Intent of plnintlff In l·1-rorto destroy 
1ie llveR of said pt'rHons h~· means or such 
xploslves, If It wu11 hl'llen~tl by the Jur.r 
to be true. It Is lnHIHtt!d, however, that 
therf' can be no presumption that Hroneck 
bad procured the dyne.mite with the 110-
Jawful intent Indicated from the fact that 
[Case No. 14'3 
~uch d~ namlte was fouutl In hlR po11ses-
11lon. Where a party 111 found In posses-. 
Rion of exploHlveR, and bas the avowed In-
tention or using them for a. particular pur-
pose, the pre8umptlon would arhie that he 
pr·ocured the same for 11nch unlawful use. 
It Is to be remarkf'd that there was noth-
ing In the hmllnees or vocation of Hroneck 
that woul<l call for or r<>qulre the use or 
po8Hl'f!11lon of explosives. ~Joreover, It 
was Rh own hy the witness Chleboun that 
he was at Hroneck's house the last Sundtt,v 
In .May, l~SS. when HronE!l'k showed him 
some unttlled bombs, and Hroneck then 
said that he would Ket dynamite with 
which to load them. He at that time 
s11oke of an opportunity he bad to kill 
Bonfield, that he <.lid not du It because he 
didn't have the necessary weapon, hut 
that he rea:retterJ It \"er.v much. 'J.'hP wlt-
neRR saw no dynamite that day. Ju ;Ju111> 
following the witnl'HH again 1:111 w H roneck 
at his requeRt,a.ntl Hroneck had a. number 
of bombs which were charged. Some of 
them had fUl!eB attarhed. and others had 
fulminntlnJ; l'apH. Cun It be questlunf'd 
that, tr no ex pin notion hatl bt>en oftpred by 
Hroneck as to when and how he r•ame 
Into the JJOHSt'llH~'>n of the rlynumlte, the 
fact of Its heln11: In his 11uRMPRSlon In the 
month of Junt> with the avowed Intent of 
using It In the 1111rtil"ulur unlawful way 
charged, coupled with his declaration In 
May that he would procure dynamite for 
the accomplishment of such onla wful pur-
pose, would be sufficient to ma.lute.In a 
con\"lctlon for unlawfully procuring the 
ex1>lo11lvewith the Intent to use the Hnme'! 
In other words, wou!IJ not the jury be Jus-
tlftt•d In tlndlng therefrom that the corp11s 
delicti had been proved? The fact that he 
procured the exoloRlve Is shown by hie 
ha\·lng It In his posMeHslon. The unlawful 
Intent is manlfesfoll by the charRcter of 
the substance Itself, hie concealment or It. 
and his contemporaneous declarations or 
his Intent. A jury, frvm the necessity of 
the c&Re, must hP allowr>d to draw conclu-
sions from thl' facts proved; and Intent 
can ordinarily he Hhown only hy Inferences 
lira wn from the nets of the party, and 
from his declarations. Hrom~ek le hel."t' 
11hown to have het>n In the actual posEles-
slon of the dynumlte In June, 1888, and 
subsequently, by unq11<>11tloned evidence; 
and the fact or his Intention is shown b)' 
hlR declaratlon11 and acts. If, from the 
facts prove!], the t•o1wl11slon Is lrreelstlhle, 
If the testlmon)' IH helirved, t lrn t the oftl•nse 
wae t'ommlttl'd, then the corpus delicti ls 
estn bllHhed. 
Home q1wRtlon Is made In respect of the 
evidence or the elate when the dynamite 
was 11roc11re1I by Hrom~ck. He tt>Htlfil'd 
that one Karallat left it at hlR house In 
the fall of 1886, and had never called fur It. 
Without entering Into a dlACussion of the 
evldenee, It must be Raid that the1'l! was 
much In h!R own testimony, a11 there wns 
also lu the testimony of the witness Chle-
boun, that tended to db1cre!llt his evidence. 
The queBtion waH fully und fairly suhmittctl 
to the Jury as to wlwtherornot he procured 
the dynamite with the unlawful Intent 
rharged, after the 1st day of Jnly, 11'~7. 
when the statute went Into eftt>et. 'l'hey 
were told In numerous Instructions that 
441 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
unless they believed irom the evidence, be-
yond a.reusonahledoubt,that he procured
the same, with the specific intent charged,
on or subsequent to that date, they must
acquit.
Withoutextendingthisopinion—ulready
too long—by an analysis of the evidence,
it must suflice for us to say that we have
carefully considered the record, and the
iacts and circumstances proved, and are
unable to say that the jury were palpably
wrong in the conclusion reached by them.
It is not enon1_-;h that we, sitting as a. jury,
might have found diflerently. They saw
H2
the witnesses. had means of determining
their credibility which we do not possess:
and, helore we would be justilied in set-
ting aside their verdict for error in finding
of fact. the error must be palpable.
Other minor objections are urged, which
We have carefully considered, and there is
no reversible error in them: and no good
purpose would be served, either to the de-
fendant or the profession, by their discus-
sion. We find no error in this Pt :ord ior
which the judgment oi’ the court below
should be reversed, and it is accordingly
afiirmed.
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Case No. 148] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
unless they believed from the e\·ldenc·e. be-
yond areasouahledoubt, that be procured 
the eame, with the epedflc Intent charged, 
on or subsequent to that date, they must 
&CtlUlt. 
Without extending thlH opinion-already 
too Jong-by an analysis of the e\·idence, 
It roust suffice for us to say that we ha,·e 
carefully considered the record , and the 
facts Bnd circumstances proved, end are 
unable to say that the Jury were pel11ably 
wrong In the conclusion reached by them. 
It Is not enough that we, slttlnga-s a jury, 
mlg?lt have round dltterently. They saw 
'42 
the wltnl:'R&eB, had meat.DB Of determining 
their cl'f'dlblllty which we do not p088e88; 
and, bt-fore we would be JustlHed In eet-
ttng &Hide their verdict for error In finding 
of fact, the error must be palpable. 
Other minor obJectloue are urged, which 
we have carefully considered, and there la 
no reversible error In them ; and no ~ood 
purpose woulct ht. served, either to the de-
fendant or the profession, by their dlecua-
elon. We find no error In this rt:ord for 
which th11 Jullgment of the court below 
should be reversed, and It le accordlngl7 
amrmed. 
DEPO.:'lTlONS.
[Case No. 149
' BLAKESLEE v. DYE.
(27 Pac. 881, 1 Colo. App. 118.)
Court of Appeals of Colorado. Oct. 12, 1891.
Error to Otero county court: C. W. Bom-
gardner, Judge. ,
James H. Dye sued Wilmot Blakeslee for
commissions for selling defendant’s prop-
erty. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant
brings error. Reversed.
James Hotfmire, for plaintiff in erorr.
F. Thompson, for defendant in error.
A.
BISSELL, J. Dye brought this action
against Blakeslee before a justice in Otero
county to recover $125, which he claimed as
a. commission upon the sale of certain prop-
erty belonging to Blakeslee. After a trial
before the justice an appeal was taken to
the county court, where the action was tried
by a jury, which found a verdict of $50 in
favor of the plaintiff, on which the judgment
was entered whereon error is assigned.
During the progress of the litigation in the
county court, the plaintitl, Dye. sued out a
dedimus to take testimony of one Desent in
Fayette county, Iowa. Divers errors are in-
sisted upon and argued by counsel in their
briefs, but the only one important to con-
sider is that predicated upon the form of the
dedimus under which the testimony was
taken.
was apparently issued by the judge of the
county court acting as his own clerk. It is
without a seal or any other form of au-
thentication. A motion was made prior to
the trial to suppress the deposition because
of this irregularity. The error is well as-
signed. The statute requires (Code 1887, 5
349) that the deposition of a witness resid-
ing out of the state must be taken upon a
commission to be issued by the clerk under
the seal of the court. This statute is but
declaratory of the law as it existed prior to
this enactment. The seal of the court was
always a necessary and essential part of
every writ issued at the common law. In
no other manner did a court of record au-
thenticate its process. It is clear under the
‘ authorities that a dedimus is a writ, and
~ that it is a process requiring a seal.
Free-
man v. Lewis, 5 Ired. 91; Ford v. Williains,
' 24 N. Y. 359; Tracy v. Suydani, 30 Barb.
The writ appears in the record, and .
110; Churchill v. Carter, 15 Hun, 385; By-
ington v. Moore, 62 Iowa, 470, 17 N. W. (H4.
The statutory provision is in harmony with
the general law upon the subject. It must,
therefore, be true that the specific require-
ment of the statute upon the subject must
be observed in order to render the process
available as an authority to an ofiicer to
take the testimony, and that without it the
writ would be a nullity, and a deposition
taken under it would be inadmissible as evi-
dence. The motion to suppress the deposi-
tion should have been sustained, a11d for the
error of the court in this particular the
cause must be reversed and remanded.
443
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DEPO.~JTIO~S. [Case No. 149 
• BLAKESLEE v. DYB. I 
(27 Pac. 881, 1 Colo. A.pp. 118.) 
Court of A[lpenls of Colorado. Oct. 12, 1R91. I 
Error to Otero county court: C. W. Bom- ! 
gardm~r. Jud&'e. ; 
James H. Dye sued Wilmot BlakP.Slee for I 
commlsslons for selling defendant's prop-
erty. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant . 
brings error. Reversed.. 
James Hofrmlre, for plaintiff lo erorr. A. 
F. Thompaon, for defendant lo error. 
BISSl<.:LL, J. Dye brought this action 
against Blakeslee before a justice lo Otero 
county to recover $125, which he claimed as : 
a commlsRlon upon the sale of certain prop- · 
erty belonging to Blakeslee. Aftt>r a trial 
before the justice an appeal wu taken to 
the county court, where the action waR tried 
by a jury, which found a verdict of $f">O In ' 
favor of tht> plaintiff, on which the judgment 
was enterecl whereon error ls assigned. 
During the progress of the litigation In the 
county court, the plalntllr, Dye. sued out a · 
dedlmua to take testimony of one Desent In 
Fayette county, Iowa. Divers errors are ln-
slflted upon and argued by coull8el in their 
briefs, but the only one Important to ron- . 
sider ls that predicated upon the form of the : 
dedlmus under which the teRtlmony was ' 
taken. The writ appears In the record, and , 
was apparently ISBued by the judge of the : 
county court acting as his own clf~rk. It ls : 
without a seal or &Ill' other form of au-
thentication. A. motion was made prior to 
the trial to suppresa the deposition because 
of this Irregularity. The error ls well as-
Rlgned. The statute requires (Code 1887, I 
349) that the deposition of a witness resid-
ing out of the state must be taken upon a 
commission to be Issued by the clerk under 
the eeal of the court. This statute ls but 
declaratory of the law as it existed prior to 
this ensctruent. The seal of the court was 
always a necessary and ess.-ntlal part of 
every writ Issued at the common law. In 
no other manner did a court of record au-
thentl<•ate Its process. It ls clear under the 
authorities that .a dedlmus ls a writ. and 
that It ls a process requiring a seal. Free-
man v. Lewis, 5 Ired. 91; Ford v. Williams, 
24 N. Y. 3,;9; Tracy v. Suyclaw, 30 Bnrb. 
110; Churchill v. Cnrter, 15 Hun, 385; By-
ington v. Moore, 62 Iowa, 470, 11 ~- W. 644. 
Tht> statutory provision Is In harmony with 
the general law uvon the subject. It wust, 
therefore, be true that the specific require-
ment of the statute upon the subject must 
be observed In order to render the proce88 
available as an authority to an oftlcer to 
take the testimony, and that without It the 
writ wouhl be o. nullity, and a deposition 
taken under it would be Inadmissible as evi-
dence. The motion to suppress the deposi-
tion should have been sustained, anct for the 
error of the court lo this particular the 
cause must be reversed and remanded. 
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CHASE v. GARRl'I'l'.'\‘().\'.
(23 At]. 353, 54 N. J. Law, -L2.)
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Jan. 22. 1892. '
On rule to show cause why a new trial
should not be granted. Cause tried in the
Essex county circuit court before Justice De-
pue and a Jury.
Action by Selon H. Chase against Garret
Garretson to recover on a note. Verdict for
defendant. Rule to show cause why a new
trial should not be granted. Rule dismissed.
Argued February term. 1891. before BEAS-
LEY, C. .T., and MAGIE, DIXON, and GAR-
RISON, JJ.
F. E. Bradner, for plaintiff. John S. Voor-
hees, for defendant.
GARRISON, J. This is an action on a
promissory note, the making and indorse-
ment of which were admitted at the trial.
The defense was that the note had been ob-
tained by false representations, of which
there was some proof. The plaintiff offered i
in evidence certain depositions which had
been received by the trial court, properly
sealed. What these depositions contained
we do not know, as the state of the case is
silent upon that point. The justice before
whom the case was tried excluded these dep-
ositions, upon the ground that the supreme
court commissioner before whom they had
been taken had not certified any reason for
taking them; and upon the further ground
that, whereas they were taken upon short
notice, it did not appear by the certificate of ‘
the commlsioner that the case. in his opin- I
ion, required such short notice. The ver-
dict was for the defendant, whereupon this
rule to show cause why a new trial should
not be granted was allowed. The question
is whether the depositions should have been
received in evidence. The aflidavits in ques-
tion had been taken’at Newark, N. J ., before
a supreme‘ court commissioner, upon short
notice. in the absence of the adverse party.
The certificate of the oflicer who took them
was in these words: “I, A. B. C. Salmon,
supreme court commisioner, do hereby cer-
tify that the witnesses above named herein 1
appeared personally before inc. were duly
sworn by me, and examined by plaintiff's
attorney, and gave evidence as is set out
above; that such other and further proceed-
ings were had as shown by this transcript.
A. B. C. Salmon, Sup. Ct. Comm'r." The
notice stated that the witnesses to be ex- .
amlned were about to leave this state, but
the certificate of the connnissioner is silent
as to the reasons why he took the atiidavits,
or whether. in his opinion, the case was one
requiring short notice. In this condition of
affairs the party who had procured the. tak-
ing of the depositions offered to supply by
oral proof evidence as to the reasons which
moved the commissioner to take thc nifid:1-
vits, and that the commissioner had fixed the
time for taking the same, and had authorized
the giving of the notice. The overruling of
this offer raises the only question before us.
The privilege of producing. upon the trial of
an issue of fact, affidavits taken elsewhere,
is so marked a departure from the ordinary
course of trials that every safeguard thrown
by the legislature around the extraordinary '
procedure should be upheld. Upon this
point there is entire unanimity of judicial
sentiment. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick, in the
case of Hendricks v. Craig, 5 N. J. Law, speaking of commissions to take testimony,
said: "As the power to take the testimony
of absent witnesses is a new power, created
by statute, the rule is that it must be pursued
strictly." 'i‘o the same effect is the language
of ityerson, J., in Sayre v. Sayre, 14 N. J.
Law, -187-492: “The statute is an innova-
tion on a great and valuable principle of the
common law that the witness shall be pro-
duced before the jury, who are to judge. as
well from his manner as otherwise, of the
credit to which he i entitled.” “I do not
think," said this learned judge, with marked
discrimination. “that this is a case where
the legislature have ingrafted a new prin-
ciple on the common law which the court are
to regard as a principle, and give efliciency
to it in practice. They have only made an
exception, and the party has not brought
himself within it.” “This statute," said
Chancellor Zabriskie, speaking of the same
act, “creates a new power contrary to the
settled practice, and should therefore be
strictly construed and st1'lct.lyco1nplied with."
Parker v. Hayes, 23 N. J. Eq. 186, 187. In
the case of .\Ioran v. Green, 21 N. J. Law,
5132-562.», Chief Justice Hornblower, while re
laxing the rule as to the directory parts of
the statute in reference to the filing of the
aflidavits, says: "For the due observation
of everything relating to these matters, the
party suing out the commission is alone re-
sponsible; but when he has got it back into
the hands of a judge of the court, out of
which it issued, he has done all the law
requires him to do.”——an exception which, it
will be observed. instead of loosening the
rule, rather einphasizes it. so far as the pres-
ent case is concerned. lf we are to be guid-
ed by the views thu expressed, there will
be no diiiiculty in givim: a construction to
the statute under which these depositions
have been taken. The section in question is
this (Revision, p. 382. 25): "If any mate
rial witness in an action or suit of a civil na-
ture," ctr-.. “is about to leave the state,
[his deposition may be taken dc bcne esse]:
provided. that the oiiicer before whom the
deposition is to be taken shall cause notice
to he given to the adverse party immediately.
or at such short day as the case, in the opin-
ion of the said oflicer, may require, to attend
and be present at the taking thereof, and to
put questions and cross-examine. if he shall
think lit.” As has been shown, the con-
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(23 Atl. 353, M N. J. I .. aw, 42.) 
~upreme Court of New .TPl'lll.'y. Jan. 22. 1892. 
On rule to show cause why a new trial 
should not be granted. Cause tried In the 
Essex county circuit court before .Tustl<oe De-
pue and a jury. 
Action by Selon H. Chase against Garret 
Garretson to recover on a note. Yerdlct for 
defendant. Rule to show cause why a new 
trial should not be granted. Rule dlsmlsl!e<l. 
Argued February tt.>rm, 18Ul, before BI<~AS­
LEY, C .• J., and MAOIE, DIXON, and UAR-
RISON, JJ. 
F. E. Bradner, for plalntltr. John S. Voor-
hees, for defendant. 
I 
I 
\"ltM, and that the commissioner bad fi.I.ed the 
thue for taking the same, and had authorized 
the giving of the notice. The overruling of 
this otrer raises the only question before ua. 
The privilege of producing, upon the trial of 
an Issue of fact, affidavits taken elMewhel"t', 
18 so marked a departure from the ordinary 
<.'Ourse of trials that every saft>guard thrown 
by the legislature around the extraordinary · 
procedure r.«hould be upheld. Upon tlll<c 
lM>lnt there Is entire unanimity of judicial 
sentiment. Chief JU8tlce Kirkpatrick, In the 
case of Hendricks v. Craig, 5 N. ;J. Law, 568. 
speaking of commissions to take testimony, 
said: "As the power to take the testimony 
of absent witnesses ls a new power, created 
by statute, the rule Is that It must be pursued 
strictly." To the same eft'eet Is the language 
of Uyerson, J., In Sayre v. Sayre, 14 N. J. 
Law, -187-492: "The statute 18 an lnnon-
GARRISON, J. This ls an action on a tlon on a great and valuable principle of tht> 
promissory note, the making and lndorse- common law tlla.t the witness shall be pro-
ment of which were admitted at the trial. ducetl before the jury, who are to judge, as 
The defense was that the note had been ob- well from his manner as otherwise, of the 
talned by false representations, of which I credit to which he ls entitled." "I do not 
there was some proof. The plalntlft' oft'ered , think," said this learned judge, with marked 
In evidence certain depotdttons which had 'I <llS<·rlmluatlon, "that this ls a case where 
been received by the trial court, properly the ll'glshltttre have lngrafted a new prln-
sealed. What these depositions contained ' clple on the common law which the court are 
we do not know, as the state of the C88e 111 to re~rard as a principle, and give etllclency 
silent upon that point. The Justice before to It lo practice. They have only made an 
whom the case was tried excluded tht>se dep. exception, and the party has not brought 
osltlons, upon the ground that the supreme himself within it." "This statute," said 
court commissioner before whom they had Chancellor Zabriskie, speaking of the same 
been taken bad not certified any reason for act, "cn>ates a new power cootl"ary to the 
taking them; and upon the further ground settled practice, and should therefore be 
that, whereas they were taken upon short 1 11trlctly construed and strictly complied with.'" 
notice, It did not appear by the certlfi("llte of ' Parker \"'. Hayes, 23 N. J . .Eq. 18G, 187. In 
the commissioner that the ease, In hlM opln· 1' the 1"a11t• of l\loran v. Green, 21 N. J. Law, 
Ion, required such short notice. The ver- lil.t.!-;i(l9, Chh•f Justiee Hornblower, while re-
dlct was for the defendant, whereupon this laxlng the mlt> as to the directory parts of 
rule to 11how <'lluse why a new trial should the statute In reference to the filing of the 
not be granted was allowed. The question afftdavlts, says: "!<'or the doe observation 
ls whether the dt>posltlons should have been of everything relating to these matters, the 
received In evidence. The affidavits In ques- party suing out the comml11slon Is alone re· 
tlon had been taken'at Newark, N. J., bt>fore spon11lble; but when be has got It back Into 
a suprt>me · court comml11Sloner, upon short the hands of a juige of the court, out of 
notice, in the absence ot the advt>rse party. which It lRBued, be has done all the law 
The certificate of the ofHl'er who took tht>m requh"f's him to do,"-an exception whl<"h, It 
was In these words: "I, A. B. C. Salmon:, will be observed, lnst<>ad of loosening the 
supren1t> court comml881oner, do hen>hy ('('r- rult>, rather emphaslzt>s It. so far as the pres-
tlty that the wltnt>BSes abo\"'e nauwd heri>ln 'I t>nt caSt> ls concerned. If WI' are to be guld-
nppt>ared personally before Ult>. were duly ed by the views thus t•xprPBSt>ti, there will 
.-:worn by me, and examlnP<l by plalntlll's be no dltHculty In giving a construction to 
attorney, and gave evl<lt>nce as Is set out I the statute under which theMe de110Sltions 
above: that snl'h other and further proceed- have l)('t>n taken. The section In question Is 
lugs were had as shown by this transcript. I this {He\"'lslon, p. 382. § :?a): "'If any matt>-
A. B. C. Salmon, Hu1>. Ct. Comm·r." The rial wltnt>11s In an action or suit of a <'lvll DB· 
notice stated that the witnesses to be ex- , ture.'' et<'.. "Is about to leaYe tht> state, 
arnlnetl wPrt> ahout to leave this state, but (hlR deposition ma~· be takt>n 11<• bt>nt> esst>): 
the <.>t>rtlfl('8te of thP comml1111loner Is silent pro\•lclt>tl, tllnt the ofH(•t>r beforP whom tbt> 
as to the l"('llsons why he took the attldavlts, '. dt•poi;ltlon 111 to be taken shall <'llllll<' notke 
or whether, In his opinion, the cast> was one · to ltt• irl\"'t>n to the adn~r11e party lmmedlatt>ly. 
requiring short noti~. In this condition of i or at 1ml'l1 short clay as tht> cnMf'. In the oplu· 
al'falrs the party who had 1m>c:ured the tak· ; Ion ot the said oftkt>r, may requlr1>, to attt-nd 
lnir ot the depositions oft'ered to supply by I and bt> 1>rt>sent at the taking thereof, and to 
orul proof t>vlden<'e as to the reasoni; which put qut>Rtlons and <'l'OSS·examlm~. If be shall 
moved the commls11loner to take tlw atHda- think ttt." AB hns been shown, the con· 
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scnsus of judicial opinion favors that con-
struction of this statute which gives to the
language employed its plain and unmistak-
able meaning. The act says that there shall
be a certificate by the ofiicer who took the
atlidavits of the reasons for their being tak-
en, and of the notice given to the adverse
party. Revision. p. 382, § 27. The entire
matter is a creature of legislative enactment,
so that it is diflicult to see by what power
these statutory provisions um be altered by
this court, even if it were deemed advisable
to dispense with them. Apart, however, from
authority, there are cogent reasons why these
jurisdictional matters should appear to the
trial court by ofliciai certificate rather than
by oral proofs. In the first place, they con-
cern matters resting in the bosom of the <.tli-
cial who makes the adjudication, and hence
cannot safely be the subject of oral testi-
mony from the mouths of others. The rea-
sons which move the oflicer to take the ath-
davlts, and his opinion as to the facts re-
quired by the exigencies of the case before
him, are known to himself. The best evi-
deuce, therefore, is his own statement. All
else is hearsay or surmise. Further, it is
evident that the cases in which contention
will arise are those in which the depositions
have been taken in the absence of the ad-
verse party: for, if he appear and cross-e.\'-
amine the wituesses, his presence or his con-
duct may be such as to waive his right to
insist upon the statutory provisions designed
for his protection. In this respect each case
must be determined upon the gcneraliprln-
clpies applicable to its peculiar features.
But where the return of the otiicer shows
that the affidavits were taken in the presence
only of the party procuring them, the ad-
verse party has a right to insist that they
shall become evidence against him only when
delivered to the trial court, with the juris-
dictional facts proved in the manner pre-
scribed by the statute. To hold otherwise
would be to place it within the power of the
party who had procured the proofs, and who
alone was represented at their taking, to ad-
(luce testimony in their support, which, under
the circumstances, it would be entirely be-
yond the power of the absent party to gain-
say, or even to verify, except by calling the
otlicer himself; thus shifting the burden of
proof in an oppressive and unwarranted
manner. When we consider that the matters
to he proved are the reasons which operated
upon the mind of the ofiiclal, and his opin-
ion as to the necessity of short notice, we
shall see the diiiiculty and danger of per-
mitting such matters to rest in oral proofs
offered by an interested party during the
course of a trial,—diiilculties and dangers
which are incurred solely by an arbitrary
disregard of the provisions of the statute,
which plainly enacts that these matters are
to be shown by the certificate of the ofliccr.
As between these two lines of practice, if
the language of the statute was open equally
to either construction, I should deem the con-
struction indicated most consonant with cor-
rect principle and sound policy. When to
this conclusion is added the weight of judi-
cial opinion as to the spirit in which acts of
this kind are to be construed, and the legis-
lative intent is expressed in unambiguous
language, I can see neither reason nor au-
thority for permitting the substitution of oral
testimony for the oflicial certificate required
by the statute under review.
Section H of an act concerning evidence
(Revision, p. 385) does not reach the infirm-
ity of the certificate now before us. That
section provides that any deposition may be
overruled upon objections to the competency
of witnesses or of testimony, or to the regu-
larity of questions, but “shall not be exclud-
ed for any irregularity or informality in tak-
ing or returning the same, if the court in
which the same is offered shall be satisfied
that the testimony of the witneses has been
fairly and truly taken and returned.” The
taking of testimony here mentioned refers
to the mode in which the witness is inter-
rogated, and to the form in which his testi-
mony is transcribed, and the returning of the
depositions refers to their custody from the
time they are sealed by the commissioner
until they are delivered to the court. But
nothing in this act alters the previous provi-
sions as to what the certificate shall contain.
Moreover, these irregularities are to be over-
looked only when the court is satisfied con-
cerning the fairness with wliich the testi-
mony was taken. But. under the views
above expressed. it would be petitl-.> prin-
cipii to say that depositions which cannot be
received, because not properly accredited,
may be used to satisfy the mind of the court
by their internal evidence concerning the
manner in which the testimony was taken.
Such a course would not be overlooking an
irregularity; it would be abrogating a legis-
lative provision._ The rule to show cause
should be dismissed, with costs.
445
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
09
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
DEPOSITIONS. [Cua& No. 150 
sensus of judlclal opinion favors that con-
struction of this statute whlcb gives to the 
laupage employed Its pla.ID and unmistak-
able meanlng. The a<.1 says that there shall 
be a certificate by the officer who took the 
affidavits of the reasvns tor tht>lr being tak-
en, and of the notlre given to the adverse 
party. RevlRion. p. 382, I 27. The entire 
matter la a creature of legislative enactment, 
so that lt ls dlt!kult to see by what pvwer 
these statutory p1·ovlslons can be altered by 
this court, even lf It were deemed advisable 
to dispense with them. Apart, however, from 
authority, there are cogent reasoDB why thetie 
jurl&dlcttonal matters should appear to the 
trial court by official certlfteate rather than 
by oral proofs. In the flt"St place, tht>y eon-
cern matters resting ID the bosom of tilt> 1.tll· 
clal wbo makes the adjudication, and hence 
ennnot safely be the subject of oral tl'lltl-
mony from tbe mouths of others. The rea-
sons which move the oftlcer to take the attt-
da vtts, and his opinion aa to the facts re· 
quired by the exigencies of the case before 
Wm, are known to himself. The best evi-
dence, therefore, 111 his own statement. All 
el&e Is heal"llBy or surmise. 1''urther, It 111 
evident that the cases In which contention 
will arise are those lo which the depositions 
have been token ID the al18em·t> ()f the ad-
verse party; for, If he appe11r and cro811-ex-
amlne the witnesses, his preRenee or his <'OD· 
duct may be such as to waive bis right to 
lnsltrt upon the Rtatutory provisions deslpt"'l 
for his protection. In this respect eaeb case 
must be determined upon the general . prin-
ciples applicable to Its pe<•ullar feoturt>S. 
But where the return of the otHeer shows 
that the aftidavlts were taken lo the presem•e 
only of the pa11y procuring them, tbe ad-
verse part)' has a right to Insist that they 
shall become evidence agalDBt blm only when 
delivered to the trial court, with the Juris-
dictional facts proved In the manner pre-
scribed by the statute. To hold otherwise 
would be to place It within the powpr of the 
party who had procured the proofs, and who 
alone was represented at their taking, to ad-
duce testimony ln their su1iport, which, under 
the circumstances, It would be PDtlrely be-
yond the power of the absent pnrty to galn-
My, or even to verify, ex<'Ppt by ealllng the 
offtcer himself; thus shifting the burden of 
proof lo an oppressive and unwarranted 
mnnner. When we consider that the matters 
to be proved are the reasons which operated 
upon the mind of the official, and his opln-
Ion as to the necessity of short notice, we 
shall &e\! the dltUculty an1l dunger of per-
mitting sueb matters to rest In 1.11'1ll proofB 
offered by an Interested party during the 
course of a trlal,-dltllcultles and dangers 
which ai-e hll'urred solely by an arbitrary 
disregard of the provisions of the statute, 
which plainly enacts that these matters are 
to be shown by the certlflcate of the officer. 
As between these two lines of p1"Uctlce, tf 
the language of the statute was open equnlly 
to either coDBtructlon, I should deem the con-
struction Indicated most consonant with cor-
rect principle and sound policy. When to 
this t·oncluslon Is added thP Wt>lght of judi-
cial opinion as to the spirit lo which acts of 
this kind are to be coDBtrued, and the legis-
lative IDtent ls expre88ed In unambiguous 
language, I can see neither ren1mn nor au-
thority for permitting the substitution of oral 
tPsthnony for the otftclal certi.lkate required 
by the statute under review. 
Section 43 of an act concerning evldPnce 
(ltevlslon, p. 38.>) does not reach the infirm-
ity of the certitlcate now before us. That 
section provides that any depo11ltloo may be 
overruled upon objections to the competency 
of witnesses or of testimony, or to the regu-
larity of questloDB, but "shall not be exclud-
ed for any Irregularity or IDformallty In tak-
ing or returning the same, If the court In 
which the same ls olf Pred shall be satisfied 
that thP testimony of the wltneuee has been 
fairly an<l truly taken and returned." The 
taking of teatlmony here mentioned ref PrK 
to the mode In which the wltDPRS Is lntPr-
rogatt'<l, ancl to the form in which bis testi-
mony Is transcribed, and the returning of thP 
depm1ltlons refers to their custody from the 
time they are sealed by the commissioner 
until they are <lPUvered to the rourt. But 
nothing ln tblB t\t't altPrs the preYlous provi-
sions as to what the eertltlcate shall contain. 
Moreover, these Irregularities are to be over-
looked only when the court Is MtlRtled con-
cerning the falmeRll with whleh the testi-
mony waR taken. But. under the views 
above expressed. It would hP petftl,, p11n-
clpll to say that depositions whl<'h cnnnot be 
received, lM>cause not properly a1•c•n>11lted, 
may be usPd to satisfy thP mind of thP caurt 
by their lntProal evlllenc•p <"oneernlng the> 
manner In which thP testimony wns tak<'D. 
Su<"h a course would not hP ovPrlooklng an 
Irregularity; It would be abrogating a le1otlR· 
latlve provision. The rule to show cnus1• 
should be dismissed, with costs. 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFEG1‘ OF EVIDENCE.
CITY OF SANDWICH v. DOLAN.
(42 Ill. App. 53.)
Appellate Courts of Illinois. Dee. 7, 1891.
Appeal from circuit court, Dekalb county;
Charles Kellum, Judge.
VV. & WV. D. Barge, for appellant. C. A.
Bishop and Samuel Alschuler, for appellee.
CARTWRIGHT, J. This case has been
before this court and the supreme court on
former appeals by the present appellant. and
is reported in 3-1 Ill. App. 199, and 133 lll.
177, 2-1 N. E. 526. The case ha been again
tried in the circuit court, resulting in a some-
what increased verdict for appellee in the
sum of $000. That the sidewalk upon
which the accident occurred was, and for a
long time had been, out of repair and in very
bad condition is not denied, but is admitted
by appellant; nor is it denied that the acci-
dent of appellee, falling upon it by reason of
its defective conditlonyoccurred as claimed
by her; but it is contended on the part of ap-
pellant that the jury were not justified in
finding that the injuries complained of re-
sulted from the fall, nor that appellee was in
the exercise of ordinary care, and that the
court erred in refusing to admit certain evi-
dence olfered by appellant and in giving and
refusing instructions. The circumstances
under which the accident happened are de-
tailed in the former opinion of this court.
and need not be repeated here. The facts
proven upon the retrial appear to be sub-
stantially the same as stated in that opinion,
except that the health and bodily condition
of appellee was shown to be worse than at
the time of the first trial. The record shows
some contradiction among the doctors as to
ivhether the eighth rib was broken at the
time of the fall or at a subsequent time. and
those testifying for appellant say that the
twelftli rib was not broken. but that \vhere
there was a bunch on the side of appellee,
the attaching cartilage from the ninth rib.
several inches in length, was broken or torn,
which fact they do not regard as of much
consequence. A consideration of all the evi-
dence on those subjects satisfies us that the
injuries to appellee resulted from the fall,
and that injurious consequences. permanent
and progressive in their nature, have already
taken place, and are to be reasonably ap-
prehended in the future. With respect to
the question of the degree of care exercised
by appellee, the evidence shows that in the
manner of using the walk she exercised ordi-
nary care, and that the accident resulted
from no act or omission on her part, but
from her son stepping on a board which flew
up in front of her and tripped her so that she
fell; and the main contention of appellant i.-
that she was negligent in using the walk at
all. Considering this proposition as a qucs
tion of fact, it appear‘s that this walk wn:
Ihc direct route from the Congregational
Church, where appellee had been, to her
home, where she was going; that it was an
ordinary walk, and its infirmity consisted in
loose boards on account of decayed stringers;
that she was accustomed to travel upon it
frequently; that it was used by the public
without notice or prohibition by appellant;
that it was not palpably dangerous to use it
at ail, and that, so far as appears. the previ-
ous use of the walk in its existing condition
had been without accident.
There was some evidence that a portion of
the walk on the opposite side of the street.
which it is said she should have used. was
in about the same condition as this. She
was certainly not obliged to take a more cir-
cuitous route if she thereby would encounter
equal danger. We think that she was not
negligent in exercising her undoubted right
to the use of the walk in going to her home.
Upon the trial appellant called as a witness
Harold M. Moyer, a doctor, who testifled that
he examined appellee at the instance of ap-
pellant to ascertain the existence or nonexit-
ence of injuries claimed to exist, and their ex-
tent. The object and purport of his testimony
was to show, so far as nervous, spinal. and
muscular symptoms of injury were concern-
ed, that she was exaggerating or feigning.
He testifled that such was his belief as to
symptoms relative to the spine, and that he
examined the spine and muscles and meas-
ured the arms. He thought she did not ex-
perience the syxnptoms which she stated. He
further stated that he wanted to examine the
muscles with a battery, but that she objected
to it. He gave as a reason for wanting to
make such a test that the battery would show
the amount of electricity required to produce
contraction of a muscle, and would show,
apart from any statement of the patient, indi-
cations of health or disease. Appellant after-
wards examined as a witness G. W. Nesbit,
another doctor, who was present and assisted
at .\[oyer's examination of appellee; but no
testimony was elicited from Nesbit about any
proposal to examine appellee with a battery.
or any refusal on her part. After appellant
had completed its defense, Mrs. M. P. John-
son, Dr. Bryant. James Dolan, and appellee.
all of whom were present at the examination
by Moyer, testifled in rebuttal that Meyer did
not propose to examine appellee with a bat-
tery, and that she did not refuse to permit
such an examination. After the evidence in
rebuttal, appellant recalled Dr. Nesbit, and
proposed to have him testify that Dr. Meyer
had a battery there, and that appellee said
that he could not use it on her. On objection
this was not permitted, and it is insisted that
this was error. The well-settled rule of prac-
tice is that when a plaintiff, holding the af-
firmative of the issue. as in this case, has
ziven all the evidence he proposes to offer in
‘-upport of the issue, the defendant shall then
'ntr0duce all proof in contradiction of thi-
proof adduced by the plaintifl and establish-
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Case No. UH] PRODUOT!ON AND E~~FEo·r OF EVIDENCE. 
CITY OF SANDWICH v. DOLAN. 
(42 m. App. 53.) 
Appellate Courts of Illinois. Dec. 7, 1891. 
Appeal from cl.rcult court, Dekalb county; 
Charles Kellum, Judge. 
W. & W. D. Barge, for appellant. C. A. 
Bishop and Samuel Alschuler, for appellee. 
CARTWRIGHT, J. This case bas beell 
before this court and the supreme court on 
fot'Dler appeals by the present appellant. and 
ls reported In 34 Ill. App. 199, and 133 Ill. 
177, 2-l N. E. 526. The case bas been again 
tried In the circuit court, resulting In a some-
what Increased verdict for appellee In the 
sum of '3,000. Tba.t the sidewalk upon 
which the accident occurred was, and for a 
long tlme had been, out of repair and In vert 
bad condUlon le not denied, but ls admitted 
by appellant; nor Is It denied that the acci-
dent of appellee, falling upon It by ree.son of 
Its defective condition,· occurred as claimed 
by her; but It ls contended on the part of ap-
pellant that the jury were not justified In 
finding that the injuries complained of re-
sulted from the fall, nor that appellee was In 
the exercise of onllnary c:are, anll that the 
court erred In refusing to admit certain evi-
dence offered by appellant and In giving and 
refusing instructions. The clreumstanccs 
under which the accident happened a.re de-
tailed In the former opinion of this court. 
and need not be repooted here. The facts 
proven upon the retrial appear to be sub-
stantially the same as stated In that opinion, 
except that the health and bodily condition 
of appellee was shown to be worse than at 
the time of the first trial. The record shows 
some contradiction among the doctors as to 
whether the eighth rib was broken at the 
time of the fall or at a subsequent time, and 
those testifying tor appellnnt say that the 
twelfth rib was not broken, but that where 
there was a bunch on the side of appellee, 
the attaching l'8.rtllage from the ninth rib, 
several Inches in length, was broken or torn, 
which fact they do not regard as of much 
consequPn1·P. A consideration of all the evi-
dence on those subjel"ts aatlsftes us that the 
Injuries to appellL>e resulted from the rail, 
and that Injurious eonsequenees. pt>rmauent 
and progressive in their natu1-e, have already 
taken place, and are to be reasonably ap-
111·ehended in the future. With respect to 
the question o! the degree of care exercised 
by aJJpellee, the evidence shows that In thc-
manner of using the walk she exerel.8E'd ordi-
nary care, and that the accident resulted 
Crom no act or omission on her part, but 
from her son stepping on a board which dew 
up in !ront of her and tripped her so that slu-
fell; and the main c-ontention of a1>pello.nt i; 
rhnt she was negligent In mdng the walk 111 
all. C'onRlcle1·lng this pro)>ORltion as a qnP~ 
tlon of fact, lt ap1>ear8 that this walk wai 
the direct route from the Congregationa ~ 
·446 
Church, where appellee bad been, to her 
home, wbPre 8he was g'()lng; that It was an 
ordinary walk, and Its lnftrmlt;y consisted In 
loose boanls on al'C'Ount of decayed stringers; 
that she was accustJOmed to travel upon it 
frequently; that It was used by the public 
without notice or prohlbltlon by appellant; 
that It was not palpably dangerous t.o use it 
at all, and that, so far as apJ>Pm'S, the preri-
ous use of the walk In Its existing condition 
bad been without Rl'l'ldent. 
'l'here was some evidence that a portion ot 
the walk on the opposite side of the street, 
which it ls aid she should have used, was 
ln about the same condition as this. She 
was certainly not obllgecl to take a JIM>re cir-
cuitous route if she thereby would encounter 
equal danger. We think that she was not 
negligent In exercising her undoubted right 
to the use of the walk In going to her home. 
Upon the trial appellant called as a wltnesB 
Harold M. l.'tloye1·, a doctor, who testlfted that 
be examined appellee at the Instance of ap-
pellant to ascertain the existence or nonexist-
ence of injuries claimed to exist, and their ex-
tent. The object and purport of his testimony 
was to show, so far as nervous, spinal, and 
mus<'ular symptoms of Injury were concern-
ed., that she was exaggerating or feigning. 
He testlfted that such was hie belief as to 
symptoms relative t.o the spine, and that he 
examined the spine and muscles and meas-
ured the arms. He thought she did not ex· 
perience the symptoms which she stated. He 
further stated that be wanted to examine the 
muscles with a battery, but that she objected 
to It. He gave as a reason for wanting to 
make such a test that the battery would show 
the amount of electricity required to produce 
contraction of a muscle, and would show, 
apart from any statement of the patient, Indi-
cations of health or disease. Appellant after-
wards examined as a witness G. W. Nesbit, 
another doctor, who was present and aBBlsted 
at Moyer's examination of appellee; but no 
testimony was elicited from Nesbit about any 
proposal to examine appellee with a battery. 
or any refusal on her part. After appellant 
had completed Its defense, Mrs. M. P. John-
son, Dr. Bryant. James Dolan, and appellee. 
all of whom were present at the examination 
by Moyer, testified in rebuttal that Moyer did 
not propose to examine appellee with a bat-
tery, and that she did not refuse to permit 
such an examlnntton. After the evidence in 
rebuttal, appellant recalled Dr. Nesbit, and 
proposed to have him testify that Dr. Moyer 
had a battery there, and that appellee said 
that be could not Ulile It on her. On objection 
this was not permitted, and It le Insisted that 
this was error. The well-settled rule of pra<'· 
tlce is that when a plalntltf, holding the af-
firmative of the Issue, as In this ease, ba11 
~lven all the evidence he proposes to offer In 
~upport ot the Issue, the de!endnnt shall then 
"ntroduce all proof In contradiction of th" 
proof adduced by the plalntl1f and establish-
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, IN CHIEF.
[Case No. 151
ing matters of defense, and the plaintiff may
then rebut aflirmative evidence introduced by
defendant. If new and aflirmative matter is
introduced in rebuttal, the defendant may
meet and overthrow it, but that is the extent
of defendant's right in surrebuttal, and any
departure from the 1'ule is matter of indul-
gence and discretion in the court, not ordi-
narily subject to review. After the defend-
ant is fully apprised by plaintiffs evidence of
the ground upon which a recovery is to be
had, if at all, it is the plain duty of the de-
fendant to meet the case made by whatever
proof he may have and intend to use. Thomp.
Trials, §§ 344-347. It is true that neither
party is bound to maintain the credibility of
his witnesses until it is assailed by the
opposite party, and some attempt made to
impeach their credibility; and so at any
stage of the case, if evidence should be of-
fered for no other purpose than to impeach
their credibility, the party in interest may
support their credibility by additional tes-
timony. In the case of Wade v. Thayer,
40 Cal. 578, witnesses testified that several
persons who had testifled to an occurrence
were not present at the time of the occur-
rence. This was not testimony as to any fact
material to the issue, but was manifestly of-
fered only to impeach witnesses by showing
that their testimony was manufactured.
The court say: “The evidence on behalf of
the plaintiff to the effect that these witnesses
of the defendants were not present, could
have been offered for no other purpose than
to impeach their credibility, and was compo.»
tent for this purpose." It is a well-settled
rule that a party whose witnesses are sought
to be impeached by proof of this character
may support their credibility by rebutting ev_-
idence, and it was held that defendants had a
right to show that the witnesses were present.
In the case of Richardson v. Lessees of Stew-
art, 4 Bin. 198, evidence tending to show an
interest of a witness in the subject-matter of
a suit was offered, and could have been for
no other purpose except to affect his credibil-
ity. He had testifled that he had no interest,
and the court say that the evidence was an
attack on his character and that the party
had a right to introduce a deed showing that
he parted with hi interest before he testi-
fled. In the present case appellee introduced
her evidence of the nature and extent of her
injuries. If appellant claimed that she ex-
aggerated or feigned the symptoms which
she manifested and related, it was important
and substantial matter of defense. If she
had refused to submit to an examination
which would disclose the truth it would tend
to show that the symptoms were exaggerat-
ed or feigned. Appellant had no right to
present that defense b_v piecemeal. The evi-
dence rebutting the testimony of Dr. .\ioyer
as to the material fact was not impcar-hing
evidence in any sense. and did not tend to
discredit him in any diiferent manner than
that in which any contradiction discredits a.
witness. Mere contradiction among witnesses
as to facts furnishes no basis for attempting
to prove the fact over again by new wit-
nesses. If upon each contradiction a party
would be entitled to produce a new witness
there would be practically no limit to their
production. Nor was there any element of
surprise in the production of the rehutting
testimony. When appellant was introducing
testimony so damaging to appellee as that of
Dr. Moyer, it would necessarily be antici-
pated that appellee would meet and contra-
dict it if in her power to do so, and the pres-
ence of the other witnesses at that examina-
tion who could testify as to what occurred
there was well known. There was no error
in the exclusion of the olifered evidence. Its
admission at that time rested in the discre-
tion of the court.
The court refused two instructions prepared
by appellant's counsel, both of which de-
clared that if the evidence showed the side-
walk to be unsafe, and that appellee knew it
to be unsafe, then it was her duty to keep
off the sidewalk and not go upon it. These
instructions were clearly not in accordance
with the law. The question whether appel-
lee was negligent in going upon this walk
was one of fact for the jury, and any knowl-
edge on her part of its condition was to be
taken into account in deciding that question;
but the question itself was for the jury.
The court, at the instance of appellant, gave
several instructions presenting in varying
language the question upon the evidence
whether she was in the exercise of reasona-
ble care and caution in going upon and using
the sidewalk; and these were correct. In
City of Flora v. Nancy (Ill. Sup.) 26 N. E.
645, error was assigned, upon the refusal of
an instruction stating that the plaintiff would
be precluded from a recovery if she went up-
on the sidewalk, or continued to walk there-
on, after she had observed that it was out of
repair. The court say: "But if the plaintiff
knew that the sidewalk was out of repair,
the law did not require her to go out into the
street and pass around the walk. Although
a person goes upon a sidewalk knowing it to
be out of repair, recovery may be had for an
injury received, if ordinary and reasonable
care has been used.” It was held not error to
refuse the instruction. When the present
case was before the supreme court it was
said: “\\-'hether it was obligatory on plain-
tilf to travel over one walk or the other was
a question which it was not the province of
the court to determine as a matter of law."
City of Sandwich v. Dolau, 133 lll. 177, 24
N. E. 526.
It is insisted that the court erred in giving
an instruction prepared by appellee as fol-
lows: “lf the jury believe from the evidence
that any witness has willfully sworn falsely
on this trial, as to any matter or thing mate-
rial to the issues in the case, then the jury
447
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EXA.lUNATION OF WITNESSES. IN OHIEF. (Case No. 151 
ing matters of defense, and the plaintiff may 
then rebut afll.rmatlve eYidence Introduced by 
defendant. If new and affirmative matter Is 
introdu('ed lD rebuttal, the defendant may 
meet and overthrow It, but that ls the extent 
of defendant's right lD surrebuttal, and any 
departure from the rule ls matter of Indul-
gence and discretion in the court, nc>t ordi-
narily subject to review. After the defend-
ant Is fully apprised by plalntltr's evidence of 
the ground upon which a ~covery ls to be 
had, If at all, It ls the plain duty of the de-
fendant to meet the case made by whatever 
proof be may have and Intend to use. Thomp. 
Trials, H 344-347. It ls true that neither 
party ls bound to maintain the credibility of 
his witnesses until It la all88lled by the 
opposlte party, and some attempt made to 
Impeach their credlblllty; and so at any 
stage of the case, If evidence should be of-
fered for no other purpose than to Impeach 
their credibility, the party in Interest may 
support their credlbl1lty by additional tes-
timony. In the case of Wade v. Thayer, 
40 Cal. 578, wltnes11es testified that several 
persons who bad testified to an occurrence 
were not present at the time of the occur-
rence. This was not testimony as to any fact 
material to the IBSue, but was manifestly of-
fered only to Impeach witnesses by showing 
that their testimony was manufactured. 
The court say: "The evldenre on bt'half of 
the plaintiff to the effect that thPSe wltne88es 
of the defendants were not present, could 
have been offered for no other 1mrpose than 
to Impeach their credibility, and was compe-
tent for this purpose." It Is a well-settled 
rule that a party whose witnesses are sought 
to be Impeached by proof of this character 
may support their c1·edlblllty by rebutting ev-
idence, and It was held that defendants had a 
right to show that the witnesses were present. 
In the case of Richardson v. Lessees of Stew-
art, 4 Bln. 198, evidence tending to show an 
Interest of a wltne88 lD the subject-matter of 
a suit was offered, and could have been for 
no other purpose except to street his cre1llbll-
lty. He had testified that he had no lntere8t, 
and the court say that the evidence was an 
attack on bis character and that the party 
had a right to Introduce a deed showing that 
he parted with his Interest before he testi-
fied. In the present case appellee Introduced 
her evidence of the nature and extent of her 
Injuries. If appellant claimed that she ex-
aggerated or feigned the symptoms which 
she manifested and related, It was Important 
and substantlal matter of defense. If she 
had refused to submit to an examination 
which would disclose the truth It would tend 
to show that the symptoms were exaggerat-
ed or feigned. Appellant bad no right to 
present that defense by piecemeal. The evi-
dence rebutting the testimony of Dr. :Moyer 
as to the material far t was not impen<"hlng 
evidence In any sen11e. and 11111 not ten<l to 
discredit him in any dlffereut manner than 
that In which any contradiction discredits a 
witness. Mere contradiction among wltne88es 
as to facts furnishes no basis for attempting 
to prove the fact over again by new wit-
nesses. It upon each contradiction a party 
would be entitled to produce a aew witness 
there would be practically no Umlt to their 
production. Nor was there any element of 
surprise in the production of the rehuttlng 
testimony. When appellant was lntrodurlng 
testimony llO damaging to appellee as that of 
Dr. Moyer, It would necessarily be antici-
pated that appellee would meet and contra-
dict It if in her power to do !50, and the pres-
enre of the other witnesses at that examina-
tion who could testify as to what occurred 
there was well known. There was no error 
In the exclusion of the otrered evidence. Its 
admission at that time rested in the discre-
tion of the court. 
The court refused two instructions prepared 
by appelbµ1t's counsel, both of which de-
clared that if the evidence showed the side-
walk to be unsafe, and that appellee knew It 
to be unsafe, then It was her duty to keep 
off the sidewalk and not go upon It. These 
Instructions were clearly not in accordance 
with the law. The question whether appeJ. 
lee was negligent in going upon this walk 
was one of fact for the jury, and any knowl-
edge on her part of Its condition was to be 
taken Into account In deciding that question; 
but the question Itself was for the jury. 
The court, at the Instance of appellant, gave 
several Instructions presenting in varying 
language the question upon the evidence 
whether she was in the exercise of reasona-
ble care and caution In going upon and using 
the sidewalk; and these were correct. In 
City of :nora v. :Saney (ID. Sup.) 26 N. E. 
645, error was 888lgned, upon the refusal of 
an instruction stating that the plaintiff would 
be precluded from a recovery If she went up-
on the sidewalk, or continued to walk there-
on, after she had observed that it was out of 
repair. The court say: "But If the plaintiff 
knew that the sidewalk was out of repair, 
the law did not require her to go out Into the 
street and pa88 around the walk. Although 
a person goes upon a sidewalk knowing It to 
be out of repair, recovery may be had for an 
injury received, If ordinary and reasonable 
care has been used." It was held not error to 
refuse the Instruction. When the present 
case was before the supreme court It was 
said: "Whether It was obligatory on plain-
tiff to travel over one walk or the other was 
a question which It was not the pro\•ince of 
the court to determine as a matter of law." 
City of Sandwich v. Dolan, 133 lll. 17i, 24 
N. E. 526. 
It ls iD1!lsted that the court erred In giving 
an Instruction prepared by n1>1:iellee as fol-
lows: "If the jury believe from the evidence 
that any witness has wlHfully sworn falsely 
on this trial, as to any matter or thing mnte-
rlal to the Issues in the case, then the jury 
447 
Case No. 15l_]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
are at liberty to disregard the entire testi- | ness or class of witnesses.
mony of such witness except in so faras it
has been corroborated by other credible evi-
dence or by facts and circumstances proved
on the trial." The objections made to this
instruction- are: First, that the jury would
understand it to apply to the witnesses for de-
fendant only, and that it was therefore erro-
neous as only applying to the witnesses on
one side and as an intimation that in the
judgment of the court they were more to be ‘
suspected than those on the other side; and,
second, because it did not mention the name
of any witness or witnesses. The instruction
is not subject to the first objection. It has
no more application to the witnesses for one
party than the other, and could not be drawn
in more general terms. The second objection
is not tenable. While instructions alluding
din-ectl_\' to a witness have been sustained.
the better practice is doubtless not to direct i
such an instruction against a par,ti(-ular wit-
448
Insurance C0. v.
La Pointe. 118 Ill. 384, 8 N. E. 3-")3; Thomp.
Trials, § 2421.
The jury might readily understand that in
the judgment of the court there was some-
thing in the testimony of the witness or wit-
nesses named upon which to base the instruc-
tion, and to make the general rule peculiarly
applicable to such witness or witnesses as
distinguislled from the others. It is certain-
l_\' not an objection that the court has failed
to make such direct application of the rule to
some witness or witnesses. In Martin v.
People, 5-1 Ill. 225. it is said: “A court can
hardly err in refusing to give any instruction
which seems designed to influence a jury as
to the credit to be given to particular wit-
nesses.” Some other minor objections are
made to the language oi.‘ instructions given,
but we think the instructions were properly
given. The judgment will be aflirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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Case No. 15~] PRODUCTlON AND EFFECT OF EVIDES'CE. 
are at llherty to disregard the entire test!- I 
mony of such witness except 1n so far ·as It 
has been corroborated by other credible evl-
den<'P or by facts and circumstances proved 
on the trial." The objections made to this 
lnetn1ctlon- ore: First, that the jury would 
understand It to apply to the wttnPllses for de-
f endant only, and that 1t was therefore erro-
neous as only applying to the wltneRaes on 
one side and as an intimation that In the 
judgment of the court they were more to be ; 
suspected than those on the other side; and, ' 
second, because it did not mention the name 1 
of any witness or witnesses. '.rhe Instruction 
Ill not subject to the tlret objection. It hoe 
no more appllcatton to the witnesses for one 
party than the other, and could not be drawn 
In more general terms. The second objection 
111 not tt>nable. While lnlltructtons alluding 
dlrt>etly to a wltneBB hove been suetnlnPll. I 
the better practice Is doubtless not to 11lrt•l't 
such an Instruction against a pni:tl<'ular wlt-
448 
nes11 or <'laBB of wltnl'&see. Insurance Co. v. 
l.a Pointe, 118 Ill. 384, 8 N. E. 35.1; Thomp. 
Trials, § 2421. 
'.rbe jury might readily understand that In 
the judgment of the court there was some-
thing In the telltlmony of the witness or wlt-
ne11F.es named upon which to base the fnstrul'-
tfon, and to make the geneml n1le peculiarly 
applh·able to su1•h witness or wltnP118ell as 
dh~tlngull1hl'd from the others. It ill <"ertaln-
ly not on obje<•tlon that the rourt bas failed 
to make such direct applll'atlon of the rule to 
110me wltne88 or witnesses. In :Martin v. 
People, 54: Ill. 225. It ls 881d: "A court l'8D 
hardly err in refusing to give any Instruction 
which seems designed to lntluence a jury as 
to the credit to be given to parti<-ular wit-
nesses." Some other minor objP<•tlons are 
made to the language of tn11tru1•tlons given, 
but we think the lnstrn<'tions were properly 
given. The judgment wlll be amrmed. 
Judgment afflrmed. 
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. IN CHIEF.
[Case No. 152
ROBERTSON v. CRAVER.
(55 N. W. 492, 88 Iowa, 381.)
Supreme Court of Iowa. May 20, 1893.
Appeal from district court, Poweshiek coun-
ty; A. R. Dewey, Judge.
Action for breach of promise of marriage.
Jury trial. Verdict and judgment for plain-
tiff. Defendant appeals.
John T. Scott and H. S. Winslow, for ap-
pellant. Haincs & Lyman, for appellee.
KINNE, J. 1. It is averred that plaintiff
and defendant, in January, 1891, entered into
a marriage engagement; that the marriag
was to take place about December 25, 189 ;
that in April, 1891, the defendant married
another woman, and thus put it out of his
power to perform his contract with the plain-
tifi. The answer admits the marriage of the
defendant, and denies the other allegations
of the petition. .
2. Plaintiff was asked, “Do you know
whether or not he [the defendant] bought his
father's homestead?" The question was ob-
jected to as leading, suggestive, incompetent,
and calling for a conclusion. She answered:
“Yes, sir; he told me he had bought his fa.-
t.her's place the first time I saw him after he
was married.” Defendant moved to strike
out the answer as incompetent and immate-
rial; the statement having been made since
the defendant‘s marriage, and referring to
matters occurring after his marriage. The
motion was overruled. Questions so framed
are not necessarily leading. Woolheather v.
Risley, 38 Iowa, 486; State v. Watson, 81
Iowa, 383, 46 N. W. Rep. 868.‘ It is some-
times permissible to direct the attention of
the witness to the particular fact about which
information is sought. Graves v. Insurance
Co., S2 Iowa, 637, 49 N. W. Rep. 65. The
purchase of a homestead was a fact. The
question did not call for a conclusion. The
ruling was without prejudice, as the same
fact was testifled to by another witness, and
was not disputed.
3. Plaintiff was also asked, on direct exam-
ination, this question: “When you heard that
he was married, how did it affect you?" It
was objected to as incompetent and immate- _
rial, and the objection overruled. She an-
swered, “I hated it awful bad." The ques-
tion, we think, was proper. It called for
facts touching her condition, mental and
physical, as a. result of the marriage. The an-
swer, though not in good form, was but one
way of expressing the mental condition of
the witness. Besides, in the course of the
trial, the answer was withdrawn from the
jury. Other witnesses were asked questions
relathig to plaintiff's condition after she had
heard of defendant's marriage, thus: “You
may state to the jury how it alfected her, or
how it seemed to affect her.” The court held
the question was not incompetent, and the
witness answered, “She didn’t talk about the
matter, only she was downhearted." It was
wmous, Ev. -29
competent to show how, if at all, the de-
fcndant’s marriage affected the plaintiff. Her
wounded feelings, mortiiication, and pain, if
any. resulting from defendant's breach of the
contract, were all proper to be shown as ele-
ments of damage.
4. Error is assigned on the ruling of the
court excluding evidence as to plaintiff's dec-
larations made after the marriage contract
was broken. We think there was no error in
these rulings. The questions asked did not in-
dicate that they related to expressions of
\ plaintilf as to her feelings towards defend-
ant before the breach of the contract. How
she felt towards the defendant after he had
deceived her, and put it out of his power to
fulfill his contract with her, could in no way
tend to show what her feelings towards him
were while the engagement lasted. It was
not proposed to show that these declarations,
though made after defendant's marriage, re
lated to her feelings towards or affection for
him during the time the engagement. subsist-
ed. Moreover, the objection that the matter
inquired about was not proper cr0ss-examina-
tion was well grounded.
5. A witness was asked what the plain-
tiff was doing in the way of getting ready to
be married. “Do you know anything about
Rosa making preparations for marriage?"
These questions were objected to as assuming
a fact not proven, and the objection was
overruled, and the witness answered: “Yes,
sir; piecing quilts, and doing fancy work."
Prior to the examination of this witness, tes-
timony had been introduced, wlthout objec-
tion, which showed these and other prepara-
tions for marriage. Indeed, there appears to
be no conflict in the evidence touching prep-
arations on part of plaintiff for a marriage.
In that respect, and in view of the undisput-
ed evidence in the case, the ruling was cor-
rect. But defendant urges that the questions
assumed the existence of the contract of mar-
riage, and cites Jones v. Layman, (ind. Sup.)
24 N. E. Rep. 363. The question in that case
was: “What declaration, if any, did he
make in regard to her disappointment, and
refusal of defendant to marry, at the time
she showed you the letter?" It will be ob-
served that the entire inquiry was based up-
on the thought expressed in the question, that
defendant had refused to marry the plain-
tiff. Again, the question related to a declara-
tion made by plaintiff in the absence of de-
fendant, after the engagement had been
broken. The court held the question objec-
tlonablc for the latter reason, as well as be-
cause lt assumed a. breach of the contract.
In the case at bar the evidence called for and
elicited related to preparations which plain-
tifl was making for a marriage during the
continuance of the engagement. Evidence of
I the conduct of the plaintiff. if it relates to the
time covered by the engagement, or to a time
when first informed of the fact that her in-
_ tended husband has married another, is ad-
I missible to prove her consent to the alleged
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EXAMINATION OF WlTNESSE5, IN CHIEF. (Caae No. 152 
ROBERTSON v. CRAVER. 
(55 N. W. 492, 88 Iowa, 381.) 
Supreme Court of Iowa. May 20, 1893. 
Appeal from district court, Poweablek coun-
ty; A. R. Dewey, Judge. 
Action for breach ot promise of marriage. 
.Jury trinl. Verdict and judgment tor plaiD.-
wr. Defendant appeals. 
John T. Scott and H. S. Wl.nalow, for ap-
pellant. Haines & Lyman, for appellee. 
KINNE, J. 1. It 18 avelTed that plalntlft 
and defendant, ln January, 1891, entered Into 
a :marriage engagement; that the marriagi' 
was to take place about December 26, 1891; 
that In April, 1891, the defendant married 
another woman, and thus put lt out ot his 
power to perform his contract with the plaiD.-
wr. The 'l.DSWer admits the marriage of the 
defendant, and denies the other allegations 
et the petition. 
2. PlalntUf was asked, "Do you know 
whether or not he [the defendant) bought his 
father's homestead?" The que111cton was ob-
jected to as leading, suggestive, Incompetent, 
and calling for a conclusion. She answered: 
"Yes, sir; he told me he had bought his fa-
ther's place the ftret time I saw him after he 
was married." Defendant moved to strike 
out tl•e answer as Incompetent and Immate-
rial; the statement having been made since 
the defendant's marriage, and referring to 
ma ttere oocurrlng after his mnlTlnge. The 
motion wu overruled. Questions so framed 
are not necessarlly leading. Woolheatl1er v. 
Risley, 38 Iowa, 486; State v. Watson, 81 
Iown, 383, 46 N. W. Rep. 868.' It ls some-
times permissible to direct the attention of 
the witness to the particular fact about which 
lntormntlon ls sought. Graves v. Insurance 
Co., 82 Iowa, 637, 49 N. W. Rep. 65. The 
purchase of n. homestead was a fact. The 
question did not call for a conclusion. The 
ruling was without prejudice, as the same 
fact was tcstlfl.ed to by another witness, and 
was not disputed. 
competl'nt to show how, It at all. the 'd&-
fendant's marriage a1l'ected the plalnwr. Her 
wounded feelings, mortlft.catlon. and pain, tf 
any, resulting from defendant's breach of the 
oontrnct, were all proper to be shown as ele-
ments of damage. 
4. Error ts assigned on the rullng ot the 
court excl.udlng evidence as to plalntUf's deo-
laratlons made after the marriage contract 
wns broken. We think there was no error In 
these rulings. The questions asked did not ln-
dlcn te that they related to expressions of 
plalntl1l' as to her feelings towards defend-
ant before the breach of the contmct. How 
she fclt towards the defendant after he had 
dec{'h·cd her, and put lt out of his power to 
fulfill his contract with her, could In no way 
tend to show what her feelings towards him 
were while the engagement lasted. It was 
not proposed to show that these declarations, 
though made after defendant's marri:ige, re-
lated to her feelings towards or atl'ectlon for 
him during the time the engagement subsist-
ed. Moreover, the objection that the matt.er 
Inquired about was not proper croes-examina-
tlon was well grounded. 
G. A witness was asked what the plaln-
t:Ul' was doing In the way of getting ready to 
be married. "Do you know anything about 
Rosa making preparations for mnrrlnge?" 
'l'hese questions were objected to as assuming 
a fnct not proven. and the objection was 
overruled, and the witness answered: "Yes, 
sir; piecing quilts, and doing fancy work." 
Prior to the examination of this witness, tes-
timony had been Introduced, without objec-
tion, which showed these and other propara· 
tlons for marringe. Indeed, there appears to 
be no conflict In the evidence touching prep-
arn tlons on pnrt of plalntl1l' tor a marriage. 
In that respect, and In view of tlle undisput-
ed evidence in the case, tlle ruling was cor-
rect. But defendant urges that the questions 
assumed the existence of the contract of mar-
riage, and cites Jones v. Layman, (Ind. Sup.) 
24 N. E. Rep. 363. The question In that case 
was: "What declaration, If any, did she 
make In regard to her disappointment, and 
refusal of defendant to marry, at the time 
she showed you the letter?" It will be ob-
served that the entire inquiry was bnsed up-
on the tllought expressed ln the question, that 
defenclant hnd refused to marry the plaln-
tUr. Again, the question related to a declara-
tion made by plalntifl' In tlle absence of de-
fendant, Rfter the engagement hnd been 
broken. The court held the question objeo-
tlonnble for the latter reason, as well as be-
cause lt assumed a breach ot the contract. 
In the case at bar the evidence called for an(l 
elicited related t<> preparations which plaln-
wr was making for a marriage during the 
contlnunnce of the engagement. Evidence ot 
3. 1•1n1ntUl' was also asked, on direct exam-
ination, this question: "When you heard that 
he was married, how did It affect you?" It 
was objected to as Incompetent and lmmate-
rlnl, and the objection ovelTnled. She an- · 
awered, "I hated it awful bad." The ques-
tion, we think, was proper. It called for 
fncts touching her condition, mental and 
physical, as a result of the marriage. The an-
swer, though not In good form, was but one 
way of expressing the mental condition of 
the witness. Besides, In the course ot the 
trlal, the answer was withdrawn fl'om the 
jury. Other witnesses were asked questions 
rel:1tb1g to plalntltT's condition after she had 
heard of defendant's marrlnge, thus: "You 
may state to the jury bow It a1l'ected her, or 
how It s~med to atl'ect her." The court held 
the question was not lncompetrnt, and the 
witness answered, "She didn't talk about the 
matter, only she was downhearted." It was 
1 the conduct of the plalntltl', It It relates to the I time covered by the engag<'ment, or to 11 time when first informed of the 1'nct tbnt her In-
tended husband hRs married another, ls ad-j missible to prove her consent to the alleged 
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marriage and contract. \Ve do not think the
questions, as asked, were objectionable.
6. A brother of plaintiif who had testified
on direct examination that, while the defend-
ant was keeping company with his sister, no
one else was going with her, was asked: “Did
you not, then, at that house on your father's
farm, tell Mr. Graver, the defendant in this
case, that yo\..- sister (plaintiff) had made a
mash on Shadley there, at John Stllwell's?”
An objection to the question was sustained
on the ground that it was incompetent, im-
material. and irrelevant. The evident drift of
this question was to show that the witness
had made statements to defendant inconsist-
ent with his testimony on direct examination.
The question was clearly proper. What the
answer would have been, of course, we can-
not say; but it was proper for defendant to
show if he could, on the cross-examination,
that he was mistaken in his statements made
in his examination in chief. The ruling of
the court placed an undue restriction on the
right of cross-examination.
7. On cross-examination a witness testified
that plaintiff had kept company with one
Mackey a short time before she began going
with defendant. The court, on motion of
plaintiff, struck out this evidence as imma-
terial and irrelevant. This action is as-
signed as error. We think the ruling was
right. Defendant‘s claim seems to be that
the conduct of plaintilf in receiving the at-
tention of young men prior to the time the
defendant began keeping company with her
is material to the question of damages. Coun-
sel say: “The ease with which the affections
became enlisted. the readiness with which
she laid down the old to take up the new,
and like matters, were proper subjects to be
considered, if the amount of damages to be
allowed ever becomes important." If such ev-
idence, relating to a time anterior to that
when defendant began to seek plaintiff's so-
ciety, is ever admissible, surely it is not
under the circumstances developed in this
examination. There was no evidence that
the relations existing between plaintitf and
Mackey were other than those usually inci-
dent to mere friendly association. It does
not appear that it was a case of love at
first sight, or otherwise. Their intercourse,
so far as appears, was not diiferent from
that which exists in all cases of friendship
between persons of the opposite sex who do
not contemplate marriage. To show such
friendly association between plaintiif and oth-
er men at a time prior to defendant's seek-
ing her society is not material to any ques-
tion involved in the case.
8. On cross-examination,
asked several questions in relation to his
property. All of them were objected to as not
being proper cross-examination. The objec-
tions should have been sustained. Nothing
was asked him on direct examination relat-
ing to his property. The questions were for-
eign to the examination in chief.
9. Complaint is made that the court ad-
defendant was ,
mltted certain evidence in rebuttal which
was a part of plaintli’f’s case ill chief. As
there was no ruling, we must presume that
the objection was waived.
10. Witness Linn Graver testified with ref-
erence to having had a conversation with
plaintiif after defendant’s marriage. He was
asked: “Now you may state whether or not,
in that conversation, she said anything in
| regard to whether she had cared for your
1 brother; that all she wanted was his money."
Ollie Graver also testified to a similar eon-
versatlon. She was asked the following ques-
tions: “You may state whether or not, in
that conversation, she did or did not say she
had never cared anything for the defend-
ant, but all she was after was his money '1"
“I will ask you whether or not Rosa Robin-
‘ son did or did not say, in this conversation,
that she did not care if he was married?"
“What did she say was her feeling towards
the defendant?” These questions were all
objected to as incompetent and immaterial.
and one of them was also objected to as
leading. The objections were sustained. The
ruling was proper as to the last two ques-
i tions. Evidence of the plaintiffs statements
or declarations, made soon after hearing of
the defendant's marriage, and relating there-
to, and expressive of her feelings towards
: the defendant, as they existed during the
term of the engagement and before it is ter-
minated, is admissible when it tends to show
such feelings as are “inconsistent with any
purpose to fulfill the engagement in a spirit
befitting the relation contemplated by it."
One possessed of such feelings would suffer
little or no injury by reason of the breach
, of the contract. But evidence tending to
show the feeling of the plaintifl‘.' towards the
defendant after the breach of the contract.
and relating only to that time, is never ad-
missible. Miller v. Hayes, 34 Iowa. 496: Mil-
ler v. Rosier, 31 Mich. 475. A declaration of
a woman who claims to have had an \-rlg.igt--
ment of marriage, whether made during the
existence of the engagement, or after slu-
learns of its breach, that she had not cared
for aflianced; that all she wanted was his
. money,—certainly has a tendency to show
that her object in seeking the engagement
was of a mercenary character; that that love
! and affection so necessary to the enjoyment
of the married state were wholly wanting;
| and that an engagement consummated lili-
' tler such circumstances would be unprofitable.
unendurable, and full of contention and sor-
row. The first two questions clearly refer
to the feeling plaintiff had for the defend-
ant beforc his marriage. \\-'hether she “had
cared" or “had never cared" for the defend-
‘ ant calls for the condition of her feelings to-
wards him as they existed when she had rea-
son to believe that the marriage would in
, due time be consummated. The last two
3 questions may be said to relate to her feel-
I ings as they were at the time she made the
statements, if any, and hence were properly
excluded.
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Case No. 152] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
marriage und contract. We do not thlnk. the 
ciuestions, as asked, were objectionable. 
6. A brother of plaintUf who had testlfted 
on direct examination that, while the defend-
ant was keeping company '\\1th his sister, no 
one else w11B going wlth her, was asked: "Dld 
you not, then, at that house on your father's 
farm, tell Mr. Craver, the defPndant 1n this 
case, that YOl •• " sister (plalntl11') had made a 
mllBh on Shadley there, at John Stllwell'e?" 
An objection to the question was BUStalned 
on the ground that lt was Incompetent, Im-
material, and irrelevant. The evident drift of 
this qul'Stion was to show that the wit.Dees ' 
bad made statements to defendant inconsist-
ent with hie testimony on direct examlnatlon. 
The question was clearly proper. Whnt the 
answer would have been, of course, we can-
not say; but lt was proper for d<>fendant to 
show lf he could, on the cross-examtnatlon. 
that he was mistaken 1n his statements made 
1n his examination 1n chief. The ruling of 
the court placed an undue restriction on the 
right of croes-examtnatton. 
7. On cross-examination a witness testifted 
that plalntltf had kept company wlth one 
Mackey a short tlme before she began going 
with defendant. The court, on motion of 
pla1ntltf, struck out this evidence as tmma-
terlal and Irrelevant. Tbls action le as-
signed as error. We think the ruling was 
right. Defendant's claim seems to be that 
the conduct of pla1ntltf 1n receiving the at-
tention of young men prior to the time the 
defendant began keeping company with her 
ls material to the queetlon of damages. Coun-
sel BRy: "The ease with which the affections 
became enlisted, the readiness with which 
she laid down the old to take up the new, 
and llke ma ttere, were proper subjects to be 
considered, 1f the amount of damages to be 
allowed ever becomes important." If such ev-
idence, relating to a time anterior to that 
when defendant began to seek pla1ntlff"s so-
ciety, ls ever adml.sslble, surely it ls not 
under the cl.rcumstnnces developed In this 
examination. There was no evidence that 
the relations existing between plnlntltf and 
Mackey were other than those usually incl-
dent to mere friendly aSllOciutlon. It does 
not appc.>.ar that it was a case of love at 
firet sight, or otherwise. 'lbelr intercourse, 
eo far as appears, was not dl1ferent from 
that which exists in all cases of frlemlshl.p 
between persons of the opposite sex who do 
not contemplate marriage. To show such 
friendly association between plaintiff and oth· 
er men at a time prior to defendant's seek-
ing her society ls not material to any ques-
tion Involved in the case. 
8. On cross-examination, defendant was 
asked several questions in relation to his 
property. All of them were objected to as not 
being proper cross-examination. The objec-
tions should have been sustained. Nothing 
was asked him on direct examination relat-
ing to his property. The questions were for-
eign to the exa1nlnntion in chief. 
9. ComplalDt 1.8 made that the court ad-
'50 
mltted certain evidence 1n rebuttal which 
was a part of plalntltT's case m chi<>f. As 
there was no ruling, we must presume that 
the objection was wal'rnd. 
10. Witness Unn Craver testifted wlth ret-
erence to having had a conversation with 
plaintltf after defendant's marriage. He was 
asked: "Now you may state whether or not. 
In that conversation, she said anything in 
regard to whether she had cared for your 
brother; that all she wanted was his mouc.>y.'' 
Ollie Craver also testified to a slmllnr <'On· 
versntton. She was asked the following qul• 
tions: "You may state whether or not, In 
that conversation, she did or did not say sh<> 
b.nd never cared anything for the defend· 
:int, but all she was after was his money?'" 
"I will ask you whether or not Rosa Robin-
son dld or did not say, In this conversation. 
that she did not care lf he was married?" 
"What did she say was her feeling towards 
the defendant?" These questions were all 
objected to as incompetent and Immaterial. 
and one of them WRB also objected to as 
lending. The objections were sustained. Tht-
ruling was proper as to the last two ques-
tions. Evidence of the plalnillr's statements 
or declarations, made soon after hearing of 
the defendant's marriage, and relating there-
to, and expressive of her feelings towards 
the def Pndant, as they exlsted during thE' 
term of the engagt.>ment and before It ls t<>r· 
mlnated, ls ndmlselble when It tends to show 
l'llCh feelings as are "Inconsistent with any 
purpose to fulfill the engagement in a spirit 
befitting the relation contemplated by It." 
One po88e88ed of such feelings would suffer 
little or no injury by reason of the breach 
of the contract. But evidence tending t<> 
show the feeling of the plalntiff tC>wards the 
defendant after the bren.ch ot the contract, 
and relating only to that time, le never n.d· 
ml.sslble. Miller v. Hayes, 34 Iowa. 400: Mil· 
ler v. Rosier, 31 Mich. 475. A declarntlon of 
a woman who claims to have hnd nu 1•11g.1i;,•-
ment of marriage, whether made during th!' 
existence of the engagement, or after sh1-
learns of lts breach, that she had not caft'(! 
for a111.anced; that all she wanted was hl8 
money,-certalnly has a tendency to show 
that her object in seeking the engagement 
was of a mercenary character; that that love 
and affection so necessary to the enjoyment 
of the married state were wholly wanting; 
and that an engagement col18Ummated 1Dl· 
der such circumstances would be unprofitable, 
unendurable, and full of contention and sor-
row. The first two questions clearly refer 
to the feeling pla1ntlff had for the defeild· 
ant before his marriage. Whether she "bad 
cared" or "had never cared" for the defend-
ant calls for the condition of her feelings to-
wards him as they existed when she had l'Ml-
son to believe that the marriage would In 
due tlme be consummated. The 11111t two 
questions may be said to relate to her feel-
ings as they were at the time she made the 
statements, if any, and hence were properq 
excluded. 
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, IN CHIEF.
[Case No. 152
11. Error is assigned on the giving of an
instruction to the effect that, if the jury found
that the parties had entered into a marriage
contract, the admission by the defendant
of his marriage to another woman would
constitute a breach of it, and plaintiff would
be entitled to recover. It is said that there
was evidence tending to show that the en-
gagement had been broken, and that the in-
struction assumed that the evidence failed
to establish that fact. There was no issue
under which it would have been proper to
submit to the Jury the question of the
abandonment of the contract. It was aver-
ted by plaintiif that a marriage contract
was made, and it was denied by the de-
fendant. Defendant rested his whole case
upon the fact that no contract of marriage
ever existed. The case was tried by the
defendant upon that theory. Furthermore,
the letter which is claimed shows the aban-
donment did not reach defendant until after
his marriage. The instruction, under the 18- .
sues, was correct.
12. Exception is also taken to an instruc-
tion of the court wherein he told the jury
that in assessing damages they might con-
sider, among other things, “personal pain"
suifered by plaintiff by reason of the breach
oi’ the contract. It is insisted that “personal
pain" means physical suflering, instead of
mental distress or mental suffering, and it
is said the question of “personal pain” was
not in issue. The petition avers “that the
plaintiff has been, by the defendant, made to
suifer great grief, shame, and mortification, and
her affections have been greatly wounded,"
etc. This court has said that in this class
of cases “the distinction between injury to
the feelings and aifections and personal pain
and mortifieation for disappointment is too
shadowy to receive practical recognition."
Royal v. Smith, 40 Iowa, 618. Webster de-
fines pain as “mental distress; anxiety; grief;
anguish." It may well be said that the pain
would be "personal,” as much so as if it was
purely physical. The instruction is unob_Iec-
tionable.
The many other errors assigned we find
to be without merit. For the reasons given,
the judgment of the district court is re-
versed.
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EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, IN CHIEF. [Case No. 152 
ll. Error Is 888lgned on the giving of an 
instruction to the etrect that, l! the jury found 
th.at the parties had entered into a marriage 
contract, the adml.~lon by the defendant 
of his marriage to another woman would 
constitute a breach of It, and plnlntltr would 
be entitled to recover. It Is said that there 
was evidence tending to show that the en-
gagement hnd been broken, tlDd that the In-
struction 888Urued that the evidence failed 
to establish that fact. Tbere was no issue 
under wblch it would hn ve been proper to 
submit to the jury the question of the 
abandonment of the contract. It was aver-
red by plnintlfT that a m111·rlllge contract 
was made, and it was d1mlcd by the de-
fendant. Defendant rested h1s whole case 
upon the fact that no contract of marriage 
ever existed. The case wns tried by the 
defendant upon that theory. }1lrthermore, 
the letter wblch Is claimed shows the aban-
donment did not reach defN1dnnt untll after 
h1s marriage. The instruction, under the i. 
sues, was correct. 
12. Exception ls also taken to an lnstruo-
tlnn of the court wherein he W..d the Jttr7 
that in tu1Se88lng damages they might con-
sider, among other things, "personal p:iln" 
eutrered by plalntitr by reason Qf the bn•nch 
tr the contract. It Is Insisted that "personul 
pain" means J>hyslcnl sutrerlng, instead of 
mental distress or mental sutrerlng, and lt 
Is said the question of ''personal pain" was 
not In issue. The petition avem "that the 
plnlntltr has bt-en, by the defendant, made to 
suffer gre:i t grief, shame, and mortltlcatlon, and 
her atrectlons b.ave b~n greatly wounded," 
etc. This court hns snid that In this class 
of cases "the distinction between Injury to 
the feelings and aft'ectlons and personal pain 
and mortlf\c>ntlon for disappointment Is too 
shadowy to receive pm.ctlcnl recognition." 
Royal v. Smith, 40 Iowa, 618. Webster de-
fines pain as "mentnl dh1trl'SS; anxiety; grlet; 
angul~b." It may well be said that the pain 
would be "personal," as much so as If it was 
purt.>ly physical. The lnstructlon ls unobJec-
tfonnble. 
The many other errors nsslgned we find 
to be without merit. For the reasons given, 
the Judgment of the district court ls re-
versed. 
4fi1 
Case No. 153]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
COM.\IONVVEALTH v. CHANEY.
(18 N. E. 572, 148 Muss. 8.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Essex. Nov. 27, 18:88.
Exceptions from superior court,
county; John W. Bacon, Judge.
Complaint against John Chaney for main-
taining, in Gloucester, a building used for
the illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating
liquors. A witness for the government
(Burns) testifled that he never had bought
cider to be drank upon tl1e premises, and
that he never had bought any cider and
drank the same upon the premises; and he
was then asked, subject to defendants ex-
ception, “whether he had ever drank cider
upon the premises," and “how often he got
cider upon the premises." Boyle, another
witness, called by the government, testifled
that he never had bought and drank cider
upon the premises; and the court thereupon,
against defendant's objection, allowed the
witness to be asked “how often he drank
cider upon said premises,” and "how often
he paid for cider which he got there, and
which he said he carried away." The wit-
nesses were unwilling ones. and the ques-
tions were asked by the district attorney as
on cross-examination. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty, and defendant excepted.
11‘. L. Evans, for defendant. A. J. Water-
man, Atty. Gen., and H. A. Wyman, Second
Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
452
Essex
i to these witnesses.
FIELD, J. One issue of fact was whether
the defendant sold in his tenement, during
the time alleged in the complaint, cider or
native wine, “to be drunk on the premises."
Pub. St. c. 100, §§ 1, 27. Evidence that cider
and wine were drunk on the premises, by
various persons, during this time, was com-
petent, in connection with evidence that cider
and wine were sold there during the same
time, although the occasions were different.
The evidence, taken together, had some tend-
ency to prove that the tenement was used
both for selling and for drinking intoxicating
liquor, and the whole evidence may have
been suificient to warrant the jury in find-
ing that some of the liquor drank on the
premises had been sold there by the defend-
ant. The answers given to the questions
put to Burns and Boyle do not appear in the
exceptions, and therefore it does not appear
that the defendant has been prejudiced by
the admission of the evidence, even if the
questions should have been excluded. The
questions were competent in substance, as
they called for testimony relating to the
drinking or the obtaining of cider upon the
premises, presumably during the time alleg-
ed. The court could permit the attorney for
the commonwealth to put leading questions
The objection does not
appear to have been taken that the questions
assumed facts of which there was no evi-
dence, and apparently the exceptions were
not drawn for the purpose of presenting this
objection. Exceptions overruled.
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COllMO~"'WEALTH v. CHANEY. FIELD, J. One Issue of fact was whether 
(18 N. E. 572, 148 Mnss. 8.) the defendant sold In hie tenement, during 
. the time alleged In the complaint, cider or 
Supreme Judicial Court of Mnssachusette. native wine, "to be drunk on the preml&e11." 
Essex. Nov. 27, lf!SS. Pub. St. c. 100, ff 1, 27. Evidence thut cider 
Exceptions from superior court, Eesex and wine were drunk on the premises, by 
county; John W. Bacon, Judge. various pereone, during this time, was com-
Complaint against John Chaney for main- petent, in connection wlth evidence that cider 
talnlng, In Gloucester, a building used for and wine were sold there during the same 
the Illegal sale or keeping of Intoxicating time, although the occasions were dl1ferent. 
liquors. A witness for the government The evidence, taken together, had some tend-
(Burns) testified that he never had bought ency to prove that the tenement was used 
cider to be drank upon the premises, and both for selling and for drinking intoxicating 
that he never had bought any cider and liquor, and the whole evidence mav hav~ 
drank the same upon the premises; and he been sufficient to warmnt t»e jury in llnd-
was then a1:1ked, subject to defendant's ex- Ing that some of the llquor drunk on the 
ceptlon, "whether he had ever drank cider premises had been sold there l>y the defend-
upou tbe premises," and "how often he got ant. The answers giYen to the questions 
cider upon the premises." Boyle, another put to Burne and Boyle do not appear In the 
witness, called by the government, testified exceptions, and tberefore It does not appear 
that he never had bought and drank elder that the defendant has been prejudiced by 
upon the premises; and the court thereupon, the admission of the evidence, even lf the 
against defendant's objection, allowed the questions should have been excluded. The 
witness to be asked "how often he drank questions were competent In substance, as 
cider upon said premises," and "how often they called for testimony relating to the 
he paid for elder which he got there, ancl drinking or the obtaining of elder upon the 
which he sald he carried away." The wit- premises, presumably during the time alleg-
uesses were unwilllng ones. and the ques- ed. The court could permit the attorney tor 
tlons were asked by the district attornev 88 : the commonwealth to put leading questions 
on cross-examination. The jury returned a 
1
. to these witnesses. The objection does not 
verdict of guilty, and defendant excepted. appear to have been taken that the questions 
assumed tacts of which there was no evi-
1''. L. Evans, for defendant. A. J. Water- 1 dence, and apparently the exceptions were 
man, Atty. Gen., and H. A. Wyman, Second not drawn for the purpose of presenting thJs 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth. objection. Exceptions overruled. 
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EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, IN‘ CHIEF.
[Case No. 154
CURTIS v. BRADLEY.
(31 At]. 591, 65 Conn. 99.)
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Oct.
4, 1894.
Case reserved from superior court, Fairfield
county.
Action by Lewis F. Curtis against Frederick
H. Bradley to recover for moneys advanced
by plaintiff to defendant for labor and mate-
rials used in the construction of defendant's
building. Judgment for plaintiff, and motion
for a new trial by defendant. Motion denied.
J. C. Chamberlain and Elbert O. Hull, for
appellant. Allan W. Paige and George P.
Carroll, for appellee.
HA.\IERSLl'~}Y, J’. In the summer of 1890
the plaintiff sold the defendant a building lot.
In September of that year the defendant de-
cided to have a house erected on the lot. It
was then understood that one Simeon E.
Plumb, a builder, should build the house, and
that the plaintiff, a merchant, should advance
the money for the cost of construction. The
decision of this case depended on the actual
terms of the agreement then made, the de-
fendant subsequently claiming that his only
agreement was with the plaintiff, and that by
such agreement the plaintiflf undertook to
have the house built for the agreed price of
$1,700. Plumb built the house under the di-
rections of the defendant. The plaintiff paid
to Plumb the amount of all bills for labor and
materials as they came due. The house was
finished in March, 1891, and the defendant
accepted and occupied it. At the time the
house was completed, Plumb and the plaintifl
went over the labor and other bills, and the
account of money paid for the cost of con-
struction as charged on the plaintli’f’s ledger,
and at the foot of that account Plumb wrote
the following: "I have examined the above
account, and find it correct. S. Plumb." The
14th of t-he same month, the plaintiff made
a copy of this ledger account, and gave it to
the defendant as the bill due from him to
the plaintiff, in pursuance of their agree-
ment. The defendant examined the bill. ob-
tained the labor and material bills, made in-
quiries among the men who furnished mate-
rials whether the prices of the materials were
correct, and found t-hat they were correct.
The defendant made no objection to the bill
rendered as regards amount or price, except
the claim that one item of 32 cents was
charged twice; but the defendant did object
to the total amount of the bill, and refused
payment. Subsequently Plumb, as an orig-
inal contractor, placed a mechanic's lien on
the land upon which the house stood, to
enforce payment for its construction, and
brought an action against the defendant for
the foreclosure of said lien. The plaintiff
then brought an action against Plumb to re-
cover the money paid for the cost of the
house, and garnished the defendant as the
debtor of Plumb. Subsequently, Plumb as-
signed to the plaintiff his interest in said me-
chanic's lien, and in the sum due from the
defendant to Plumb for the construction of
the house; and the plaintiff then withdrew
his action against Plumb, and became substi-
tuted as party plaintiff in the action to fore-
close said lien. The action of foreclosure was
tried, and in December, 1892, judgment was
rendered in favor of Bradley, the present de-
fendant. By the record of the judgment, it
appeared that the court found that the lien
had been made and recorded, and had been
assigned to the plaintiif, who became sole
owner, and was the actual and bona tide hold-
er and owner of the chose in action; but that
the contract for the building of the house had
not been made with Simeon Plumb, as al-
leged in the complaint; and that neither he
nor the plaintiff, as his assignee, was entitled
to foreclose the same. After this judgment
was rendered, the plaintiff brought the pres-
ent action.
The complaint follows the form called the
“common counts,” authorized for the com-
mencement of an action. The counts relied
on are those for money paid, goods sold and
delivered, goods bargained and sold, and
Work performed and materials furnished, un-
der which counts a. bill of particulars was
flied, detailing each item that the plaintiff
claimed entered into the cost of the house,
and also the count for money due on ac-
count stated, undcr which count the bill ren-
dered the defendant in March, 1891, was
filed as the bill of particulars. The answer
is a general denial. Upon the trial there ap-
pears to have been no contest as to the fact
that the plaintiff had paid for the construc-
tion of the house, and no serious contest as
to the accuracy of his account as rendered.
The claim of the defendant appears to have
been in the alternative,—either the defend-
, ant’s contract was made with the plaintifl
for a fixed price, or the contract was made
only with Plumb, and therefore the plain-
tilf has no cause of action against the de-
fendant; the position of the defendant un-
der the latter claim, which was the one
mainly relied on in argument, being that,
having induced the court in the former ac-
tion to hold that the contract was not with
Plumb, he had escaped all liability on that
ground, and, if he now induced the court to
hold that the contract was made with
Plumb, he would escape all liability what-
ever, and secure his house without any pay-
ment. obtaining judicial sanction for the
practical theft, under two contradictory
judgments. So far as the record shows, the
main question at issue was: What agree
ment, if any, had the defendant made with
the plaintiff? It was not claimed on the
trial that any question of law was involved
in the determination of this issue, and the
court found from the evidence that there was
an agreement between the plaintiff, Plumb,
and the defendant “that Plumb should per-
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EXAMINATION 01!' WITNESSES, L.""f· CHlEF. [Cl\Se No. lM 
CURTIS v. BRADLEY. 
(31 Atl. 591, 65 Conn. 99.) 
Supreme Court of Errol'll of Connecticut. Oct. 
4, 1894. 
Case reserved from superior court, Fairfield 
county. 
Action by Lewis F. Curtis against Frederick 
H. Bradley to recover tor moneys advanced 
by plaintiff to defendant for labor and mate-
rials used in the construction of defendant's 
building. Judgment for plaintift', and motion 
tor a new trial by defendant. Motion denied. 
1. C. Chamberlain and Elbert O. Hull, for 
appellant. Allan W. Paige and George P. 
Carroll, for appellee. 
BAllERSLEY, J'. In the summer of 1890 
the plaintlft' sold the defendant a building lot. 
In September of that year the defendant de-
cided to have a house erected on the lot. It 
was then understood that one Simeon E. 
Plumb, a builder, should build the house, and 
that the plalntltf, a merchant, should advance 
the money for the cost of construction. The 
decision of this case depended on the actual 
terms of the agreement then made, the de-
fendant subsequently claiming that his only 
agreement was with the plaintiff, and that by 
such agreement the plaintiff undertook to 
have the house built for the agreed price of 
$1,700. Plumb built the house under the di-
rections of the defendant. The plaintiff paid 
to Plumb the amount of all b1lls for labor and 
materials as they came due. The house was 
ftnlebed In March, 1891, and the defendant 
accepted and occupied it. At the time the 
house was completed, Plumb and the plaintiff 
went over the labor and other bills, and the 
account of money paid for the cost of con-
struction as charged on the plaintiff's ledger, 
and at the foot of that account Plumb wrote 
the following: "I have examined the above 
account, and find It correct. S. Plumb." 'l'be 
14th of t-he same month, the plalntilf made 
a copy of this ledger account, and gave It to 
the defendant as the bill due from him to 
the plaintiff, In pursuance of their agree-
ment. The defendant examined the bill, ob-
tained the labor and material bills, made In-
quiries among thP. men who furnished mate-
rials whether the prices of the materlals were 
correct, and found t-hat they were correct. 
The defendant made no objection to the bill 
rendered as regards amount or price, except 
the claim that one item of 3:! cents was 
charged twice; but the defendant did object 
to the total amount of the bill, and refused 
payment. Subsequently Plumb, as an orig-
inal contractor, placed a mechanic's lien on 
the land upon which the house stood, to 
enforce payment tor Its construction, and 
brought an action against the defendant for 
the forel'losure of said lien. The plalntllf 
tben brought an action against Plumb to re-
cover the money paid for the cost of the 
house, and garnlshed the defendant as the 
debtor of Plumb. Subsequently, Plumb .. 
lll&:ned to the plaintiff his Interest in said me-
chanic's lien, and In the sum due trom the 
defendant to Plumb for the construction of 
the house; and the plaintltf then withdrew 
hls action against Plumb, and became substi-
tuted as party plaintilf in the action to fore-
close safd lien. The action of foreclosure wu 
tried, and In Det.>ember, 1892, judgment wu 
rendered In favor of Bradley, the present de-
fendant. By the record of the judgment, It 
appeared that the court found that the lien 
had been made and recorded, and had been 
assigned to the plalntllf, who became sole 
owner, and was the actual and bona fide hold· 
er and owner of the chose In action; but that 
the contract for the building of the house had 
not been made with Simeon Plumb, as al· 
Jeged In the complaint; and that neither be 
nor the plalntUf, as his assignee, was entitled 
to foreclose the same. After this judgment 
was rendered, the plalnt11T brought the pres-
ent action. 
The complaint follows the focm called the 
"common counts," authorized for the com-
mencement of an action. 'l'he counts rellecl 
on are those for money paid, goods sold and 
.delivered, goods bargained and sold, and 
work performed and materials furnished, un-
der which counts a bill of particulars was 
flied, detalllng each Item that the plalntlft 
claimed entered into the cost of the house, 
and also the count for molft!y due on ac-
count stated, under which count the bill ren-
dered the defendant In March, 1891, was 
flied as the blll of particulars. The answer 
ls a general denial. l'pon the trial there ap-
pears to have been no contest as to the fact 
that the plalntilr had paid for the construc-
tion of the house, and no serious contest as 
to the accuracy of his account as rendered. 
The claim or the defendant appears to have 
been In the alternatlve.~lther the defend· 
ant's contract was made with the plalntlft 
for a fixed price, or the contract was made 
only with Plumb, and therefore the plain-
tiff ha8' no cause of action against the de-
fendant; the position of the defendant un-
der the latter claim, which was the one 
ma.Inly relied on In argument, being that, 
having induced the court In the former ac-
tion to bold thnt the contract was not with 
Plumb, he had escaped all liability on that 
ground, and, If be now Induced the court to 
hold that the contmct was made with 
Plumb, he would escape all liability what-
ever, and secure his house without any pay· 
ment. obtaining judicial sanction tor the 
practical theft, under two contradictory 
judgments. So far as the record shows, the 
main question at Issue was: What agree-
ment, If any, had the defendant made with 
the plaintiff? It was not claimed on the 
trial that any qul'Stion ot law was involvoo 
In the determination of this Issue, and the 
court found from the evidence that there was 
an agreement between the plaintiff, Plumb, 
and the defendant "that Plumb should per-
m 
Case No. 1-54]
PRODUCTION AND EFFE./"l‘ OF EVIDENCE.
form work h.\ erecting a house for the de-
fendant on this lot. Plumb, as carpenter,
was to work by the day, under the defend-
ant’s directions, at twenty-five cents an hour,
anti was to employ other carpenters at the
same rate. He was also to order materials
and work other than carpenter w°ork for the
house, and have the bills for the same char-
ged to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, at the
request of the defendant, agreed to be re-
sponsible and liable for all such materials
and other work as Plumb should order for
the house, and advance the money for the
payment of them, and also to advance
money to Plumb from time to time as he
might require to meet l1is weekly pay rolls.
The defendant agreed that on the comple-
tion of _the house, in consideration of the
money thus to be advanced by the plaintiif
for the building of said house, and in consid-
eration of the building of the same. he would
repay the plaintiff the total amount of the
moneys so paid out by the plaintiff.” Upon
these facts. the court rendered judgment
that the pialntiil’ recover of the defendant
the sum of $2974.51, such sum being, as the
court found, the total amount paid by the
plaintifi in pursuance of that agreement,
with interest. From this judgment the de-
fendant appeals.
The appeal contains two distinct grounds
for an appeal from the judgment:
1. Because the evidence introduced on the
trial, and printed in the record, does not sup-
port the facts found by the court below, but
does support a different state of facts claim-
ed by the defendant, and which the court
below found were not proved by the evi-
dence. The law does not authorize an ap~
peal from the judgment of a trial court for
such reasons, and this court will not take
Jurisdiction of such appeal. Styles v. Tyler,
64 Conn. 432, 30 Atl. 165. The record dis-
closes no reason for the correction of the
appeal on the ground that the finding of
facts does not fairly present the questions of
law actually raised and decided.
2. Because the defendant is entitled to a
new trial on account of errors alleged to
have been made in the admission of evidence.
Under this ground of appeal four errors are
assigned:
First. The plaintiff offered in evidence cer-
tain slips of paper, testifying that Plumb
came to the store each Saturday during the
building of the house, and gave him the
names of the men employed by him during the
week, and their time; that the plaintiff wrote
down at the time, in the presence of Plumb, on
these slips, these names, the hours of time,
the amount due each man, the total amount
due, and the date; that he paid Plumb the
total amount of money called for by each
slip, and tiled the slip on a spindle; and
that he had no personal knowledge of the
facts so stated to him by Plumb, and so
written by him on the slips, but that he made
such memoranda correctly as Plumb then
stated the facts to be. Plumb had already
testifled that he had employed these men on
the Bradley house, and that the slips of
paper were correct statements of the facts
of each case as far as he could recollect;
that he knew them to be correct when made;
and that he had given the names, hours of
time, and the amounts to the plaintiff, in the
manner that the plaintiff subsequently tes-
tifled; and that, after deducting his own
wages, he paid each man the amount due
him. This evidence was ofilered to prove
that the plaintiff had incurred liabilities and
paid out moneys upon the order of and as
required by Plumb, as agent for the defend-
ant, in the manner agreed upon by the par-
ties, and to prove the correctness of the items
and prices. The defendant objected to the
introduction of these slips, and to the testi-
mony of the plaintiff and of Plumb as shown.
The court admitted the slips, not as them~
selves evidence apart from the oral testi-
mony, bnt as memoranda made at the time
and in the manner shown, and to be used
by the witnesses Plumb and Curtis in the
manner indicated, the witnesses reading the
contents of the slips, and admitted the tes
timony of Curtis and Plumb in connection
with them as stated. Said slips were marked
as exhibits.
Second. The plaintiff offered in evidence
certain bills, testifying that they were ren-
dered him from time to time, and that he
went over the bills with Plumb, in the de-
fendant's absence, at various times as they
came due, while the house was building or
upon its completion; that some of these bills
were exclusively for materials and work for
the defendant Bradley's house. and some con~
tained other items not for that house, and
Plumb picked out the items of material and
work that went into the Bradley house, and
stated that the items and prices were correct;
that when the designation “Bradley house"
was not in the body of the bill when rendered,
as it was in many bills, he (the plaintiff)
wrote it in at the time in Plumb’s presence,
and correctly as given to him, and that he
also made the check marks appearing on the
bills when offered in evidence, to indicate
Plumb’s assent to the correctness of the items
and prices; that these check marks were
made in Plumb’s presence, and correctly,
as then stated by him to the plaintiff; and
that he could not recall those items or prices
without referring to the bills and memo-
randa made on them at the time. Plumb had
already testifled that he had given the or-
ders to the persons thus rendering bills to
the plaintitf, and that he had gone over these
bills in the manner that the plaintiff testi-
fled, and that he had stated to the plaintifl
that the items and prices as picked out were
correct, and that these items represented ma-
terials and labor that had gone into the
house, and that he had no recollection of the
details of those items independently of the
bills and the memoranda upon them, which
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Case No. 1!>4] PRODUCTION AND EFFEJ1' OF EVIDENOE. 
torm work 1n erecting a house for the de-
fendant on this lot. Plumb, as carpenter, 
was to work by the day, under the defend-
ant's directions, at twenty-five cents an hour, 
and was to employ other carpenters at the 
same rate. He was also to order materials 
and work other than carpenter wbrk for the 
house, and have the bills for the satne char-
ged to the plalntur. The plalntUr, at the 
request of the defendant, agreed to be re-
sponsible and liable for all ltllch material& 
and other work as Plumb should order for 
the house, and adyance the money for th& 
payment of them, and also to advance 
money to Plumb from time to time as he 
might require to meet his weekly pay roll11. 
The defendant agreed that on the comple-
tion of the house, lo consideration of the 
money thus to be ndYanced by the plaintiff 
tor the bulldlng of said house, and In consid-
eration of the building of the same, he would 
repay the plalntllf the total amount of the 
moneys so paid out by the plalntilf." Upon 
these facts, the court rendered judgment 
that the plalntllf recover of the defendant 
the eum of $2,974.51, such sum being, as the 
court found, the total amount paid by the 
plaintll'l In pursuance of that agreement. 
with Interest. I<'rom thle judgment the de-
fendant appeals. 
The nppeal contains two distinct grounds 
for mi appeal from the judgment: 
1. BC'cause tile evidence Introduced on the 
trial, and printed In the record, does not sup. 
port the facts found by the court below, but 
does support a different state of facts claim-
ed by the defendant, and which the court 
below found were not proved by the evi-
dence. The law does not authorize an ap. 
peal from the judgment of a trial court for 
such reasons, and this court wlll not take 
jurisdiction of such appeal. Styles v. Tyler, 
64 Conn. 432, 30 Atl. 165. The record dis-
closes no reason for the correction of the 
appeal on the ground that the finding of 
facts does not fairly present the questions of 
law actually raised and decided. 
2. Because the defendant Is entitled to a 
new trial on account of errors alleged to 
have been made In the admission of evidence. 
Under this ground of appeal four errors are 
assigned: 
First. The plalntltr offered In evidence cer-
tain slips of paper, testifying that Plumb 
.came to the store each Saturday during the 
building of the house, and gave him the 
names of the men employed by him during the 
week, and their time; that the plalntllf wrote 
down at the time, In the presence of Plumb, on 
these slips, these names, the hours of time, 
the amount due each man, the total amount 
due. and the date; that he paid Plumb the 
total amount of money called for by each 
slip, and filed the slip on a spindle; and 
that be bad no personal knowledge of the 
facts so stated to him by Plumb, and so 
written by him on the slips, but that he made 
such memoranda correctly as Plumb then 
4M 
stated the facts to be. Plumb had already 
testified that be bad employed these men on 
the Bradley house, and that the slips of 
paper were correct statements of the facb 
ot each case as far as be could recollect: 
that he knew them to be correct when made; 
and that he bad given the names, hours of 
time, and the amounts to the plalntilf, In the 
manner that the plaintiff subsequently tes-
tified; and that, after deducting hie own 
· wages, he paid each man the amount due 
him. This evidence was olfered to pr:>ve 
that the plalntltr had lncw·red llabllltles and 
paid out moneys upon the order of and as 
required by Plumb, as agent for the defend-
ant, In the manner agreed upon by the par-
ties, and to prove the correctness of the Items 
and prices. The defendant objected to the 
Introduction of these slips, and to the test[. 
mony of the plalntll'l and of Plumb as shown. 
The court admitted the slips, not as them-
selves evidence apart from the 01·al testl· 
mony, but as memoranda made at the time 
and In the manner shown, and to be used 
by the witnesses Plumb and Curtis In the 
manner Indicated, the witnesses reading the 
contents of the slips, and admitted the tes-
timony of Curtis and Plumb In connection 
with them as stated. Said slips were marked 
as exhibits. 
Second. The plalntltr offered lo evlden<"8 
certain bills, testifying that they were ren-
dered him from time to time, and that he 
went oYer the bllls with Plumb, In the de-
fendant's abst>nce, at various times as they 
came due, while the house was building or 
upon Its completion; that some of these bills 
were exclusively for materials and work tor 
the defendant Bradley's house. and some con-
tained other Items not for that house, and 
Plumb picked out the Items of material and 
work thnt went Into the Brndley house, and 
stated that the Items and prices were correct; 
that when the 1lE'Rlgnatlon "Bradley house" 
was not In the body of the blll when rendered, 
. as It was In many bills, be (the plaintiff) 
wrote It In at the time In Plumb's presence, 
and correctly ae given to him, and that he 
also made the check marks appearing on the 
bills when offered In evidence, to Indicate 
Plumb's assent to the correctness of the Items 
and prices; that these check marks were 
made ln Plumb's presence, and correctly, 
as then stated by him to the plaintiff; and 
that he could not recall those Items or prices 
without referring to the bills and memo. 
randa made on them at the time. Plumb had 
already testified that he bad. given the or· 
ders to the persona thus rendering bills to 
the plalnt!IT, and that be bad gone uver these 
bills In the manner that the platntltr testJ. 
fled, and that he had stated to the plaintiff 
that the Items and prices as picked out were 
correct, and that these Items represented ma-
terials and labor that bad gone Into the 
house, and that be bad no recollection of the 
details of those Items Independently of the 
bills and the memoranda upon them, which 
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he had seen at the time, and which he then
knew to be correct. This evidence was of-
fered to prove that the plaintiff had in-
curred liabilities and paid out money as re-
quired and ordered by Plumb as agent for
the defendant, in the manner agreed by the
parties, the correctness of the items and
prices, and that the materials went into the
Bradley house. The defendant objected to
the introduction of the bills, and to the tes-
timony of the plaintiff and of Plumb as above
set forth. The court did not admit the bills,
marked and designated as stated, as them~
selves evidence apart from the oral testi-
mony, but admitted them as memoranda made
or seen by witnesses who at the time either
had knowledge of their truth or made them
upon the statements of one who had such
knowledge at the time, and to be used by
witnesses in the manner shown, the witnesses
reading their contents as marked, and their
value depending upon the oral testimony ac-
companying them, and admitted the testi-
mony of the plaintifl and Plumb as stated
above.
There is no error in the above rulings. The
court found that Plumb was authorized by
the defendant to perform and to employ the
labor on the house, and present his weekly
pay rolls to the plaintiff; also, to order other
work and materials for the house, and pre
sent the bills for such materials and work to-
zhe plaintifi; that the plaintiff was author-
ized by the defendant to pay to Plumb such
weekly pay rolls, and to pay such bills for
materials and work so ordered by Plumb,
and charge the amounts of the pay rolls and
bills so paid by him against the defendant.
The court was bound to admit the testimony
of the plaintiff and of Plumb as to the liabil-
ities incurred and the payments made under
such authority. The use of the slips and
bills made at the time of the transaction, and
known to the witnesses to have been correct-
ly made, as memoranda to be used by them
in connection with their oral testimony, comes
within the settled rules of evidence. “A wit-
ness may, while under examination, refresh
his memory by referring to any writing made
by himself at the time of the transaction con-
cerning which he is questioned, or so soon
afterwards that the judge considers it likely
that the transaction was at that time fresh in
his memory. The witness may also refer
to any, such writing made by any other per-
son, and read by the witness within the time
aforesaid, if, when he read it, he knew it to
be correct.” Steph. Dig. Ev. art. 136. “How
far papers not evidence per se, but proved
"to have been true statements of fact at the
time they were made, are admissible in con-
nection with the testimony of a witness who
made them, has been a frequent subject of
inquiry. and it has many times been decided
that they are to be received. And why should
they not be? Quantities and values are re-
tained in the memory with great diiiiculty.
If, at a time when an entry of aggregate
quantities or values was made, the witness
knew it was correct, it is hard to see why
it is not at least as reliable as the memory of
the witness.” Insurance Co. v. \Veide, 14
\\'all. 380; Town of Bridgewater V. Town
of Roxbury, 54 Conn. 213, 6 Atl. -115.
The defendant also claims error in marking
the slips as exhibits, on the ground that, if
they might properly be read by the witness,
they are not themselves admissible as evi-
dence. Courts in other jurisdictions have
made different rulings as to the admissibility
of such a writing. In England it is excluded.
In Massachusetts and some other states it is
excluded. Costelo v. Crowell,' 133 Mass. 355;
Morrison v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 72; Duggan v.
Mahoney, 11 Allen, 572. In Vermont it seems
to be treated as evidence. Lapham v. Kelly,
35 Vt. 195. In New York and some other
states the writing is admitted as evidence.
Guy v. Mead, 22 N. Y. 462, 465; Mayor, etc.,
v. Second Ave. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 572, 7 N.
E. 905; Haven v. Wendell, 11 N. H. 112;
Kelsca v. Fletcher, 48 N. H. 282; State v.
Rawls, 2 Nott & McC. 331; Pearson v. Wight-
man, 1 Const. (S. C.) 336; Owens v. State, 67
Md. 307, 10 Atl. 210, 302; Milling (Jo. v.
Walsh (Mo. Sup.) 18 S. W. 905. In the fed-
eral jurisdiction the question is still open.
In Insurance Co. v. Weide, supra, the court
indicates the admissibility of the evidence;
but the opinion in Bates v. Preble, 151 U. S.
155, 14 Sup. Ct. 277, shows that the court is
not committed to the general doctrine that
such memoranda are admissible for any other
purpose than to refresh the memory of the
witness. We do not attempt to cite all the
cases bearing on the question, or to weigh
the conflicting authorities; for we are satis-
fied, on principle, that the evidence in ques-
tion is admissible. The discussion would be
endless, unless confined to the precise ques-
tion presented, which may be stated as fol-
lows: The litigated question ls, did the plain-
tiff pay to the agent of the defendant a. cer-
tain sum on a certain date, as wages due for
labor performed by a certain man employed
by the agent? Theplaintiff and the agent
testify that a sum was paid for such purpose;
that at the time of payment the agent gave
to the plalntiif the exact amount due, and
the name of the employé entitled to the same,
and the plaintiff then. in the presence of the
agent, wrote on a piece of paper the date,
the amount, and the name; that these items,
as then written by the plaintilf, were correct;
that the paper produced in court is the iden-
tical paper then written upon by the plaintiff,
and since unchanged; that they have no
recollection, either before or after examining
the paper, of the date, the amount, or the
name. Is that paper admissible as evidence?
All courts concur in holding that the witness
may read the statement of such paper to the
jury, and that the jury may draw the con-
clusion that the statement so read to them
is a true statement of the facts; but some
courts hold that the paper is not evidence.
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Ile had seen at the tJme, and which he then 
knew to be correct. This evidence was ot· 
fered to prove thnt the plnintltT had In. 
curred llabllltles and paid out money as re-
quired and ordered by Plumb as agent for 
the defendant, ln the mnnner agreed by the 
parties, the correctness of the Items and 
prices, and that the materials went Into the 
Bradley house. The defendant objected to 
the Introduction ot the bills, and to the tes-
timony of the plaintitT and of Plumb as above 
set forth. The court did not admit the bills, 
marked and designated aa stated, as them. 
selves evidence apart from the oral tesu. 
mony, but admitted them as memoranda made 
or seen by witnesses who at the time either 
had knowledge of their truth or made them 
upon the statements of one who had such 
knowledge at the time, and to be used by 
witnesses In the manner shown, the witnesses 
reading their contents as marked, and their 
value depending upon the oral testimony ac-
companying them, and admitted the test!· 
mony of the plaintl.!r and Plumb as stated 
.above. 
There is no error 1n the above rulings. The 
{:ourt found that Plumb was authorized by 
the defendant to perform and to employ tlle 
lnbor on the hcuse, and present his weekly 
pay rolls to the plaintUf; also, to order other 
work and materials for the house, and pre-
sent the bllls for such materials and work to 
the plaintiff; that the plalntltT was author-
ized by the defendant to pay to Plumb such 
weekly pay rolls, and to pay such bills for 
materials and work so ordered by Plumb, 
and charge the amounts of the pay rolls and 
bills so paid by him against the defendant. 
'ThP. court was bound to aclmlt the testimony 
-0f the plalntltr and of Plumb as to the liabil-
ities incurred and the payments made under 
.such authority. The use of the slips and 
bills made at the time of the t1·nm•nctlon, and 
known to the witnesses to have been correct· 
ly made, ns memornndn to be used by them 
ln connection with theit· oral testimony, comes 
within the settled rules of evidence. "A wit-
ness may, while under examination, refresh 
his memory by referring to any writing made 
by himself at the time ot. the transaction con-
.cernlug whlch he ls questioned, or so soon 
.afterwards that the judge considers It likely 
that the transaction was at that time fresh In 
hls memory. The witness may also refer 
to any; such writing made by any other per· 
son, and read by the witness within the time 
aforesaid, It, when he read It, he knew It to 
be correct." Steph. Dig. Ev. art. 136. "How 
far papers not evidence per se, but proved 
to have been true statements of fact at the 
time they were made, are admissible In con-
nection with the testimony of a witness who 
made them, has been a frequent subject of 
Inquiry, and It has many times been decided 
that they are to be received. And why should 
they not be? Quantities and ¥Blues are re-
tained In the memory with great difficulty. 
U, at a time when an entry of aggregate 
quantities or values was made, the wltneBS 
knew It was correct, It ls hard to see why 
It ls not at lenst as reliable as the memory of 
the witness." Insurance Co. v. Welde, 14 
Wall. 380; Town of Bridgewater v. Town 
ot Roxbury, 54 Conn. 213, 6 AU. 415. 
The defendant also claims error In marking 
the slips as exhibits, on the ground that, If 
they might properly be read by the witness, 
they are not themselves admissible as evl· 
dence. Courts in other jurisdictions have 
made dUl'erent rulings as to the admissibtllty 
ot. such a writing. In England It ls excluded. 
In Massachusetts and some other states It la 
excluded. Costelo v. Crowell; 133 l\Iass. 355; 
l\Iorrlson v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 72; Duggan v. 
Mahoney, 11 Allen, 572. In Vermont it seems 
to be treated as evidence. Lapham v. Kelly, 
35 Vt. 195. In New York and some other 
states the writing ls admitted as evidence. 
Guy v. Mead, 22 N. Y. 462, 465; Mayor, etc., 
v. Second Ave. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 572, 7 N. 
E. 905; Haven v. Wendell, 11 N. H. 112; 
Kelsea v. Fletcher, 48 N. H. 282; State v. 
Rawls, 2 Nott & McC. 331; Pearson v. Wight-
man, 1 Const. (S. C.) 336; Owens v. State, 67 
Md. 307, 10 Atl. 210, 302; Milling Co. v. 
Walsh (Mo. Sup.) 18 S. W. 005. In the fed· 
eral jurisdiction the question ls still open. 
In Insurance Co. v. Welde, supra, the court 
Indicates the admlsslblllty of the evidence; 
but the opinion 1n Bates v. Preble, 151 U. S. 
lM, 14 Sup. Ct. 277, sho'l\a that the court Ill 
not committed to the general doctrine that 
such memoranda are admissible !or any other 
purpose than to refresh the memory of the 
witness. We do not attempt to cite all the 
cases bearing on the question, or to weigh 
the condlctlng authorities; tor we are satis-
fied, on p11nclple, that the evidence ln ques· 
tlon ls admissible. The discussion would be 
endless, unless confined to the precise ques-
tloh presented, which may be stated as fol-
lows: The litigated question Is, did the plain-
tlfl' pay to the agent of the defendant a cer-
tain sum on a certain date, as wages due tor 
labor performed by a certain man employed 
by the agent? The plalntlff and the agent 
testify thnt a sum was paid tor such purpose; 
that at the time of payment the agent gave 
to the plnlntlll' the exact amount due, and 
the name of the employi; entitled to the same, 
and the plaintiff then, In the presence of the 
agent, wrote on a piece of paper the date, 
the amount, and the name; that these Items, 
as then written by the plaintiff, were correct; 
that the pnper produced In court ls the Iden-
tical paper then written upon by the plalntltr, 
and since unchanged; that they have no 
recollection, either before or after examining 
the paper, of the date, the amount, or the 
name. Is that paper admissible as evidence? 
AU courts concur 1n holding that the witness 
may read the statement of such paper to the 
jury, and that the jury may draw the con· 
cluslon that the statement so read to them 
ls a true statement ot. the tacts; but some 
courts hold that the paper 18 not evidence. 
400 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
It seems to us to be pressing the use of a
legal fiction too far for a court to permit the
statement made by such paper to be read as
evidence, while holding that the law forbids
the admission as evidence of the paper which
is the original and only proof‘ of the state-
ment admitted. In other words, it would
seem as if, in admitting the paper to be so
read, the court, of necessity, admitted the
paper as evidence, and therefore, by the con-
current authority of all courts, the paper is
itself admissible. But, waiving the question
whether, in admitting such paper to be read,
the courts have gone so far as to make the
denial of its admissibility no longer tenable,
we will deal with the matter as if wholly
undecided. Is the paper itself admissible as
evidence? Its admissibility, in the first in-
stance. depends on its relevancy. Of this
there can be no doubt. Being relevant, it
must be admitted, unless excluded under
some legal principle or rule of public policy
which forbids the admission of certain classes
of evidence, no matter how relevant and ma-
terial. It cannot be said that the paper is
not capable in its nature of being treated as
competent evidence. Legal evidence is not
confined to the human voice or oral testi-
mony; it includes every tangible object cap-
able of making a truthful statement, such evi-
dence being roughly classified as documen-
tary evidence. In oral evidence the Witness
is the man who speaks; in documentary evi-
dence the witness is the thing that speaks.
In either case the witness must be competent,
—i. e. must be deemed competent to make a
truthful statement. And in either case the
competency of the witness must be proved
before the evidence is admitted; the differ-
ence being that in oral evidence the compe-
tency is proved by a legal presumption, and
in documentary evidence the competency
must be proved by actual testimony, and the
further difference that in oral evidence the
credit of the witness is tested by his own
cross-examination, while in documentary evi-
dence the credit of the witness is tested by
the cross-examination of those who must be
called to prove its competency.
The competency of this paper is clearly
established by the testimony, and it would
seem to follow, of necessity, that it should
be admitted on the same ground that any
relevant and material documentary evidence,
proved to be competent, is admitted. The
doubt has arisen from the complication of
the admissibility of such paper with the
right of a. witness to refresh his memory.
In fact, the two questions may be entirely
distinct. The right of a witness to refresh
his memory is a settled and necessary rule
of evidence. The application of that rule is
often diificnlt, involving delicate distinctions.
We are not called upon now to draw the line
which limits the right of a witness to the
use of such aids as, under the subtle laws
of association, serve to refresh his memory.
All courts recognize that right, and right-
ly hold that the thing used to refresh the
memory is not, by reason of such use. itself
admissible as evidence. When, in the ap-
plication of the rule, a. document like the
one in question was presented to the wit-
ness, and absolutely failed to refresh his
memory, its exclusion as a means of refresh-
ing his memory became imperative; but the
evidence of the document was so clearly es-
sential to a fair and just trial that its use
in some form seemed also imperative. In-
stead of treating the paper as itself com-
petent documcntary evidence, resort was
had to a palpable fiction. The paper is read
by the witness, and the knowledge the wit-
ness once had of the facts stated by the
paper is imputed to him as still existing, and
the statement of the paper is received as the
testimony of the witness. and the paper it-
self, the only witness capable of making the
statement, is excluded. The use of such a.
fiction in the administration of justice can
rarely, if ever, be justified. It is certainly
uncalled for in this instance. The princi-
ples of law invoked to justify the fiction are
amply suflicient to support, indeed to de
inand, the admission of the document as evi-
dence. There ls no occasion to sacrifice
truth in order to secure justice. As regards
its admissibility as evidence, there is no sub-
stantial difference between this papcr and
any other tangible object capable of making
a truthful and relevant statement. It is
true that a writing may be a mere decla-
ration, and practically equivalent to a spoken
declaration, and so be excluded as hearsay
evidence. This possibility has played a con-
spicuous part in the discussions that have
finally resulted in the admission as evidence
of account books, whether kept by a clerk
or by a party to the suit (a subject closely
related to the one in hand, but involving too
large a field to justify an attempt to define
that relation). But it is also true that a
Writing may, by reason of the circumstances
under which it was made, be a documentary
witness to the fact the paper itself tends to
prove, and this, although the particular writ-
ing may also in a certain sense be a declara-
tion. Indced, nearly all documentary evi-
dence ls in a certain sense a declaration;
yet it is admitted as a witness, not of a dec-
laration, but of a fact. We think this pa-
per is admissible as a. documentary witness.
Suppose the litigated question turns on the
dimensions of a man's foot. A witness pro-
duces a plaster cast of the foot. The testi-
mony conclusively shows that the cast was
so taken that it can state accurately the
dimensions of the foot. Another witness
produces a paper on which the exact meas-
urements are written. The testimony con-
clusively shows that the paper also was so
made that it can state accurately the dimen-
sions of the foot. Is it not evident that the
paper and the cast is each a. witnes to the
fact that each tends to prove? How does
the paper now in question differ? Upon this
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Case No. lt4:] PRODUCTION AYD EFl!'ECT OF EVIDENCE. 
It seems to us to be pressing the use of a 
legal fiction too tar for a CO\lft to permit the 
statement made by such paper to be read as 
evidence, while holding that the law forbids 
the admission as evidence of the paper which 
ls the original and only proof of the state-
ment admitted. In other words, It would 
seem as if, in admitting the paper to be so 
read, the court, ot necessity, admitted the 
paper as evidence, and therefore, by the con-
current authority of all courts, the paper ls 
Itself admissible. But, waiving the question 
whether, In admitting such paper to be read, 
the courts have gone so far as to make tbe 
denial of Its admlsslblllty no longer tenable, 
we will deal with the matter as If wholly 
undecided. 11 the paper itself admissible as 
evidence? It.I admisslbllity, in the first in-
stance, depe.nds on Its relevancy. Of this 
there can be no doubt. Being relevant, lt 
muat be admitted, unless excluded under 
some legal principle or rule of public policy 
which forbids the admission of certain classes 
of evidence, no matter how relevant and ma-
terial. It cannot be said that the paper ls 
not capable In Its nature of being treated as 
competent evidence. Legal evidence ls not 
confined to the human voice or oral testi-
mony; it includes every tangible object cap-
able of making a. truthful statement, such evi-
dence being roughly classified as documen-
tary evidence. In oral evidence the witness 
ts the man who speaks; In documentary evi-
dence the witness ls the thing that speaks. 
In either case the witness must be competent, 
-l. e. must be deemed competent to make a 
truthful statement. And in either case the 
competency of the witness must be proved 
before the evidence ls admitted; the dllfer-
ence being that in oral evidence the compe-
tency is proved by a legal presumption, and 
in documentary evidence the competency 
must be proved by actual testimony, and the 
further dUTerence that In oral evidence the 
credit of the witness Is tested by his own 
cross-examination, while ln documentary evi-
dence the credit of the witness Is tested by 
the cross-examination of those who must be 
called to prove its competency. 
The competency of this paper ls clearly 
established by the te8tlmony, and lt would 
seem to follow, of necessity, that It should 
be admitted on the same ground that any 
relevant and material documentary evidence, 
proved to be competent, ls admitted. The 
doubt has e.rlsen from the complication of 
the admissibility of such paper with the 
right of a witness to refresh his memory. 
In fact, the two questions may be entirely 
distinct. The rlglit of a witness to refresh 
his memory Is a settled and necessary rule 
of evidence. The application of that rule is 
often difficult, Involving delicate distinctions. 
'Ve are not called upon now to draw the line 
which limits the right of a witness to the 
use of such aids as, under jhe subtle laws 
ot aesoclatlon, serve to refresh his memory. 
All courts recognize that right, and rigbt-
.W 
ly hold that the thing used to refresh the 
memory Is not, by reason of such use, Itself 
admissible a11 evidence. When, in the ap-
plication of the rule, a. document llke the 
one In question was presented to the wit-
ness, and absolutely failed to refresh his 
memory, Its exclusion as a means of refresh-
ing his memory became Imperative; but the-
evidence of the document was ao elearly es-
sential to a fair and just trlal that Its use 
In some form seemed all!O Imperative. In-
stead of treating the paper as Itself com-
petent documentary evidence, resort wu 
had to a palpable fiction. The paper ls read 
by the witness, and the knowledge the wit-
ness once had of the facts stated by the 
paper ls imputed to him a.a still existing, and 
the statement of the paper la recetnd aa the 
testimony of the witness, and the paper It-
self, the only witness capable of making the 
statement, ls excluded. The use of such a. 
fiction in the administration of justice can 
rarely, If ever, be justified. It ls certainly 
uncalled for In this Instance. The princi-
ples of law invoked to justify the fiction are 
amply sumclent to support, Indeed to de-
mand, the admission of the document as evi-
dence. There ls no occasion to sacrUlce 
truth In order to secure justice. As regards 
Its admisslblllty as evidence, there ls no sub-
stantial difference between this paper and 
any other tangible object capable of making 
a truthtul and relevant statl"ment. It ls 
true that a wrlting may be a mere decla-
ration, and practically equivalent to a spoken 
declaration, and so be excluded as heal"Blly 
evidence. This posslblllty has played a con-
spicuous part In the discussions that have 
ftnally resulted in the admission as evidence 
of account books, whether kept by a clerk 
or by a party to the suit (a subject closely 
related to the one In hand, but involving too 
large a field to juetlty an attempt to define 
that relation). But it is also true that a 
writing may, by reason of the circumstances 
under which It was made, be a documentary 
witness to the fact the paper itself tends te> 
prove, and this, altbough the particular writ-
ing may also in a cP.rtaln sense be a declara-
tion. Indeed, nearly all documentary evi-
dence ls In a certain sense a declaration; 
yet it Is admitted as a witness, not of a dec-
laration, but of a fact. We think this pa-
per Is admissible as a documentary witness. 
Suppose the litigated question turns on the 
dimensions of a man's foot. A witness pro-
duces a plaster <'&St of the foot. The testi-
mony conclusively sliows that the cast was 
so taken that It can state accurately the 
dimensions of the f'lOt. Another witne11s 
produces a pape1· on which the exact meas-
urements are written. The testimony con-
clusively shows that the paper also was so 
made that it can state accurately the dimen-
sions ot the toot. le It not evident that the 
paper and the cast ls each a witness to the 
fact that each tends to prove? How does 
the paper now ln question differ? Upon this 
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, IN CHIEF.
[Case No. 154
paper was stamped an accurate delineation
of existing facts. In the one case the fact
stated by the document relates to a physical
object, and in the other to a mental object;
but in both cases the fact is clearly rele-
vant and accurately stated by the document.
It is immaterial whether or not a critical
analysis may impute to these documents, to
a greater or less degree, some element of a
declaration; the controlling principle of law
is not based on such refinements. If the1'e
is any element of a declaration, it does not
make the document in a legal sense a decla-
ration. The conditions required by law to
make such documents legal evidence are:
The substance offered as a witness must be
proved to have been made or found and pre-
served in such manner that it states direct-
ly, accurately, and truly a fact relevant and
material to the issue. The paper claimed
as evidence in this case fulfills these condi-
tions.
In the discussions on the admissibility oi‘
account books, it has often been assumed
that such books are declarations, and are
admitted as exceptions to the class of hear-
say evidence. Without stopping to consid-
er whether such ground for the admission of
account books is logically accurate, and, if
so, whether the same reasoning applies to
this paper, we will assume that it may be
classed as hearsay evidence. It should then
be admitted as an exception to the rule ex-
cluding such evidence. The limits of the
ticld covered by the term “hearsay evi-
dence" are so uncertain. and the exceptions
are so many and important, that it is often
very diflicult to draw the distinction be
tween those matters that are admitted as
not subject to the rule and those that are
subject to the rule, but excepted from its
operation. It is significant that most mat-
ters supposed to be covered by the rule.
whose relevancy and materiality come to be
recognlzed as so close and clear that their
admission seems essential. come to be class-
ed as exceptions to the rule. If this paper
must be classed as a declaration and hear-
say evidence, it must also be classed as an
exception to the operation of the rule. The
reasons on which the rule is founded plain-
ly do not apply to such evidence, and the ar-
guments adduced in support of the admis-
sibility of this paper as original evidence are
suflicient to demonstrate that it does not
come within the reason of the rule exclud-
ing hearsay evidence. Whether this paper
is not within the scope of hearsay evl(len(-c.
or, being hearsay evidence, is excepted from
the operation of the rule, as not within its
reason, is immaterial so far as concerns the
question of admissibility, though the distinc-
tion may be quite material as affecting the
symmetry of the law of evidence, and the
clear understanding of the underlying prin-
ciples that must control the development of
that law. It does not, however, necessarily
follow from the admissibility of such evi-
i
4
I
deuce that the document should be sent to
the jury room. Under the general ru-le of
practice, the jury must depend on their mem-
ory in the case of oral testimony, but may
take documentary evidence to their consul-
tation. But there is a difference in docu-
mentary evidence. Some is not given to the
jury, either because its possession is agreed
to be of no consequence or is inconvenient,
or the document is of such a nature that it
testifies to facts not relevant, in addition to
the relevant facts. It might be claimed in
the case of some writings ofiered in proof
of the facts stated by the writing that a
jury would confuse the efi’ect to be given
such writing with the peculiar eflect some-
times given to a record or a deed, and so
give an illegal weight to the evidence.
Possibly. some such consideration may have
had influence in keeping such writings from
the jury; but, whatever force such a consid-
eration may once have had, it is entitled to
little weight under the present policy of the
law, which tends to submit to the jury all
relevant and material evidence, and even
trusts them to discriminate the allowance
to be made for the interest of a party to the
suit, or the character of a convicted felon.
If the writing admitted in evidence clearly
tends to prove nothing but the fact that it
was admitted to prove, it should go to the
jury. If, by reason of peculiar circumstan-
ces, it clearly may be treated by the jury
as evidence of other facts not admissible,
it should not go to the jury. Between the
two extremes the question is largely one of
discretion in the trial judge.
In the present case it is clear that the writ-
ing could only be used for its legitimate pur-
pose, and that the court did not err in mark-
ing it as an exhibit. The conditions under
which the general question we have dis-
cussed may arise are so various, and the dif-
ferent principles that may be involved in
each case are so related, that there is special
need to confine the application of the views
expressed strictly to the particular question
presented in this case. The only point now
decided is: A memorandum of details which
are essential to the full proof of a transac-
tion at issue, proved to have been made sub-
stantially at the time of the transaction, and
under such circumstances that the memo-
randum can make a correct statement of such
details as they were then known to the per-
son who made the memorandum or saw it
made, and who is himself a witness and tes-
tlfles to the transaction, but has lost all rec-
ollection of such details, is, in connection
with the testimony of such witness, admis-
sible as evidence, because such memorandum
is in itself evidence of a fact closely rele-
vant, plainly material, and essential to a just
trial, and because no principle of the law of
evidence or rule of public policy justifies its
exclusion; and such memorandum may prop-
erly be marked as an exhibit.
Third. The persons rendering the bills
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paper was etamped an accurate delineation 
ot existing tact& In the one case the tact 
stated by the dOC'Ument relates to a physical 
object, and In the other to a mental object; 
but In both cases the tact 18 clearly rele-
vant and accurately stated by the document. 
It ls Immaterial whether or not a critical 
analysts may Impute to these documents, to 
a greater or le811 degree, some element of a 
de<'laratlon; the controlling principle ot law 
ls not baaed on such refinements. It there 
• la any element ot a declaration, It d()(lll not 
make the document in a lepl sense a decla-
ration. The conditions required by law to 
make such documents legal evidence are: 
The substance offered as a witness must be 
proved to have been made or found and pre-
11erved In such manner that it states direct-
ly, accurately, and truly a tact relevant and 
material to the Issue. The paper clnlmed 
as evidence In this caae fulfllls these condi-
tions. 
In the discussions on the admissibility of 
account books, It has often been assumed 
that such books are declarations, and are 
admitted aa exceptions to the clau ot hear· 
say evidence. Without stopping to (.'(maid· 
er whether such ground for the 11dml&11lon or 
account books ts logically accurate, and, If 
so, whether the same reasoning applies to 
thla paper, we will assume that It may be 
classed as hearsay evidence. It should then 
be admitted ae an exception to the rule ex-
cluding such evidence. The limits ot the 
field covered by the term "hearsay evi· 
deuce" are so uncertain, and the exceptloni; 
are eo many and Important, that It ts often 
very dlmcult to draw the distinction be-
tween those matters that are admitted a11 
not subject to the rule and those that arl' 
eubject to the rule, but excepted from lti-: 
operation. It ta significant that most mat-
ters supposed to be covered by the rule. 
who11e relevancy and materiality come to be 
recognized as so close and clear that their 
admission seems essential, come to be class-
ed as exceptions to the rule. It this pap<>:· 
must be classed as a declaration and hear-
say evidence, It must also be clns11ed as a1: 
exception to the operation ot the rule. Thi' 
reasons on which the rule ls founded plain-
ly do not apply to such evidence, and the ar-
guments addur~ed In support of the admis-
sibility ot this paper 1111 original evidence are 
sumclent to demonstrate that It does not 
come within the reason of the rule exclud-
ing henr11ny evidence. Whether this pape:· 
ts not within the scope of hearsay evldcn<'I'. 
or, being hearsay evidence, Is excepted from 
the operation of the rule, as not within !ti-: 
reason, ls Immaterial so far as concerns the 
question of admissibility, though the distinc-
tion may be quite material as atrectlng the 
symmetry of the law of evidence, and the 
clear understanding of the underlying prin-
ciples that must control the development ot 
that law. It does not, however, necessarily 
follow from the admlsslblllty ot such evl-
dence that the document should be sent to 
the jury room. Under the general rule ot 
practice, the Jury must depend on thefr mem-
ory In the case ot oral testimony, but may 
take documentary evidence to their consul-
tation. But there ls a difference In docu-
mentary evidence. Some is not given to the 
jury, either because Its possession ls agreed 
to be of no consequence or Is Inconvenient, 
or the document ls of such a nature that It 
testifies to facts not relevant, In addition to 
the relevant facts. It might be claimed In 
the case of some writings offered in proof 
ot the facts stated by the writing that a 
jury would confuse the effect to be given 
such writing with the peculiar effect some-
times given to a record or a deed, and so 
ctve an lllep.1 wetcht to the evidence. 
Possibly, some such consideration may have 
had lnfiuence In keeping such writings from 
the Jury; but, whateyer force such a consid-
eration may once have bad, It ls entitled to 
little weight under the present pollcy of the 
law, which tends to submit to the jury all 
relevant and material evidence. and even 
trusts them to dlecrimlnate the allowance 
to be made tor the Interest of a party to the 
suit, or the character of a coo:vlcted felon. 
If the writing admitted In evidence clearly 
tends to prove nothing but the fact that It 
was admitted to prove, It should go to the 
jury. If, by reason of peculiar circumstan-
ces, It clearly may be treated by the jury 
as evidence ot other tacts not admissible, 
It should not go to the jury. Between the 
two extremes the question ls largely one ot 
discretion In the trial judge. 
In the present case It Is clear that the writ-
ing could only be used tor Its legitimate pur-
pose, and that the court did not err In mark-
ing It as an exhibit. The conditions under 
which the general question we have dis-
cussed may arise are so various, and the dif-
ferent principles that may be Involved In 
each case are so related, that there Is special 
need to confine the appllcntlon or the views 
expressed strictly to the particular question 
presented In this case. The only point now 
decided Is: A memorandum of details which 
are essential to the tun proof of a transac-
tion at Issue, proved to have been made sub-
stantially at the time of the transaction, and 
under such circumstances that the memo-
randum can make a correct statement of such 
details as they were then known to the per-
son who made the memorandum or saw It 
made, and who Is himself a witness and tes-
tifies to the transaction, but has lost all rec-
olll'ction of such details, Is, In connertlon 
with the testimony of such witness, admis-
sible as evidence, because such memorandum 
ls In itselr evidence of a fact closely rele-
vant, plainly material, and essential to a just 
trial, and because no principle of the law ot 
evidence or rule of public policy justifies Its 
exclusion; and such memorandum may prop-
erly be marked as an exhibit. 
Third. The persona rendering the bills 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
above mentioned testified that the bills as a
whole were correct as regards amounts and
prices, and that, when the body of the origi-
nal bill indicated what items went to the
Bradley house, those items of material and
labor were ordered for that house by Plumb.
The defendant excepted to the admission of
the testimony of these persons. The error
assigned by the defendant is that the court
erred in allowing the evidence of the par-
ties furnishing this material, to the effect
“that, where the body of the original bill in-
dicated what item went to the Bradley house,
these items of materials and labor were or-
dered for that house by Plumb." The fact
that the money paid by the plaintiff was
paid for materials used in building the house,
and ordered for that purpose by Plumb, as .
the agent of the defendant, was a fact in is-
sue; and the testimony of the persons from
whom it was claimed that Plumb had so or-
dered such materials, that he had in fact or-
dered the same, was relevant to that issue.
The use by such witnesses in their testimony
of the bills made by them at the time, in
pursuance of such orders from Plumb, and
of the written memoranda made by them at
the time to the eflect that Plumb, the agent
of the defendant, ordered the materials speci-
fied for the defendant's house, is plainly au-
thorized by law.
Fourth. The plaintiff oifered the record of
458
the judgment above mentioned, in the case
of Curtis, assignee of Plumb, against Brad-
ley, for the purpose of showing that in this
case the defendant was estopped from claim-
ing that the contract for the erection of the
house was made with Plumb. The court
admitted the record against the objection of
the defendant. The fact that the contract
for the construction of the house was not
made with Plumb was one material fact at
issue in this case, and the plaintiff was en-
titled to show that the defendant was es-
topped from claiming that the contract was
made with Plumb. It is not claimed that
the record of a judgment in a. case between
' the same parties, which appears on its face
to have adjudicated a matter in issue be-
tween them in a subsequent action, is not
admissible in the latter suit in support of a
claim of estoppel; but the claim is that in
this case the parties to the record oifered
were not the same as the parties to the pres-
ent suit. This claim has no foundation in
fact. The plaintiff in this suit was the ac-
tual plaintiff in the former action, and, more-
over, was substituted for the nominal plain-
tiff, and by such substitution became also
the plaintiff of record. Gen. St. §§ 981, 887-
889; Buckingham’s Appeal, 60 Conn. 143, 22
Atl. 509.
A new trial is denied. The other judges
concurred.
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Case .Yo. lM] PUODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVJDE:S-CE. 
above mentioned testified that the bllls as a 
whole were correct as regards amounts and 
prices, and that, when the body of the origi-
nal blll indicated what items went to the 
Bradley house, those Items of material and 
labor were ordered for that house by l'lumb. 
'.rhe defendant excepted to the admission of 
the testimony of these persons. The error 
assigned by the defendant ls that the court 
erred In allowing the evidence of the par-
ties furnishing this material, to the "'ft'ect 
.. that, where the body of the original bill In-
dicated what Item went to the Bradley house, 
these Items of materials and labor were or-
dert'(\ for that house by Plumb." The fact 
that the money paid by the plaintiff was 
pnld for materials used In building the house, 
and ordered for that purpose by l'lumb, aa 
the ag.:?nt of the defendant, w!ls a fact In ls-
.sue; and the test!mony of the persons from 
whom It was claimed that Plumb bud so or-
dered such materials, that he had In fact or-
dered the same, was relevant to that issue. 
'l'he use by such witnesses In their testimony 
of the bills made by them .it the time, 1n 
pttrimance of such orders from Plnmb, and 
of the written memoranda made by them at 
the time to the effect that Plumb, the agent 
of the defendant, ordered the materials speci-
fied for the defendant's house, is plainly au-
thorized by law. 
Fourth. The plaintiff offered the record of 
4i""i8 
the judgment above mentioned, In the case 
of Curtis, assignee of Plumb, against Brad-
ley, for the purpose of showing that In this 
case the defendant was estopped from claim-
ing that the contract for the erection of the 
house was made with Plumb. 'l'be court 
admitted the record against the objection ot 
the defendant. The fact that the contract 
tor the construction of the hoUBe was not 
m!lde with Plumb was one material tact at 
Issue In this case, and the plaintiff was en-
titled to show that the defendant was es-
topped from claiming that the contract was 
mnde with Plumb. It Is not claimed that 
the record of a judgment In a case between 
the same parties, which appears on Its face 
to have adjudicated a matter In Issue be-
tween them In a subsequent action, ts not 
admissible ln the latter suit In support of 11. 
dahn of estoppel; but the claim Is that In 
thls case the parties to the record offered 
were not the same as the parties to the pn:-s-
ent suit. This claim bas no foundation 1n 
tact. The plalntltr In this suit was the ac-
tual plalntlfl' In the former action, and, more-
over, was substituted for the nominal plain· 
tl!'t, and by such substitution b<•came al110 
the plaintiff of record. Gen. St. H 981, 8..'fl-
889; Buckingham's Appeal, 60 Conn. 14:-l, 22 
Atl. l'\00. 
A new trial ls dented. The other Judgca 
.:oncur1·ed. 
CRt)SS—EXA MINATION.
[Case No. 155
BOI-IAN v. BOROUGH OF AVOCA.
(26 Ati. 60-1, 154 Pa. St. 40-l.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 1, 1893.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Lu-
zerne county; Rice, Judge.
Action in trespass by Paul Bohan against
the borough of Avoca for damages to plain-
tifl’s lot resulting from the construction of
gutters along defendant's street, and thus
conducting the surface water from a large
territory to the lot. Plaintiff had judgment,
and defendant appeals. Aflirmed.
The Points Which were Submitted in Writ-
ing to the Court Below, and the Answers
Thereto.
"The plaintiff asked the court to charge
the jury as follows: ‘(1) If the jury believe
that the defendant borough, in constructing
its gutters. caused the surface water of a
large territory, which did not naturally flow
in that direction, to be gathered into a body,
and precipitated on plaintiffs premises, to
the injury of the plaintiff, defendant is lia-
ble, and plaintiff is entitled to recover’ We
answer that point in the affirmative.
“Defendant's counsel request us to charge:
“ ‘(1) That no recovery can be had in this
case unless the jury are convinced by the
testimony presented that the quantity of
water flowing down Main street through the
culvert upon the property of the plaintiff
has been increased, and that such increase
has given to it a greater force of destruc-
tiveness, and that in consequence of the
same the plaintiffs property has been in-
jured.‘ This point is aflirmed.
" ‘(2) That, if the increase in the volume
and destructiveness of said water is due to
the change of the grade of the street. and
not to the construction of the gutters, the
piaintitf is not entitled to recover.’ This
point is aflirmed.
“ ‘(3) That in determining whether or not
there has been any increase in the volume
of water since the construction oi.’ the gut-
ters, it is the duty of the jury to make com-
parison upon the theory that the street and
‘its gutters were kept in proper order, and
unobstructed, before the paved gutters were
constructed.’ As explained by the counsel
in his argument to us. we aflirm that point.
What we understand is meant by this is that
a comparison is to be made between the flow
of water in the present condition of the gut-
ter with the flow of water ordinarily, prior
to the placing of the gutters there. In other
words, the comparison is not to be made be-
tween the present flow of water in the gut-
ter and through the culverts, with the flow of
water when the street or water courses, pri-
or to the placing of the gutters there, were
temporarily obstructed.
“ ‘(4) The allegation in this case being that
the alleged injury to the property of plain-
tiff was caused by paved gutters constructed
by the borough, plaintiff was bound to prove
that said gutters were constructed pursuant
to legislation on part of said borough, and,
there being no legitimate proof presented to
establish any such legislation, the plaintiff is
not entitled to recover.’ We decline to charge
as requested in that point. We think there
is evidence from which a jury would be war-
ranted in finding that the gutters were con-
structed by the borough. .
“ '(:'>) That the plaintiff cannot recover any
damages for any injury to his property which
he might have avoided by the exercise of or-
dinary care, either in respect to the past or
to the future.‘ This is atiirmed.
“ ‘(6) That the jury, if they find that the
defendant is liable in this action, may adopt
as the measure of damages the expense of
protecting the property with a wall or pipe
from injury on account of the water flow-
ing through the ravine.’ This is ailirmed.”
Specifications of Error.
“First. The court erred in overruling the
defendant's objection to questions of plain-
tli'.f’s counsel on the cross-examination of de-
fendant's witness as to who authorized the
work of constructing the gutters,—-a fact not
alluded to in chief, and provable by the rec-
ord of council proceedings a1one,—which said
ruling, testimony, and questions are as fol-
lows: ‘Question. Done by the borough while
you were burgess? A. No, sir. (Objected
to. Objection overruled.) Defendant's coun-
sel states the objection as follows: (1) Be-
cause it is not cross-examination. (2) It is
a part of piaintiifs case in chief, and can be
proved only by the records of the council,
whether it was done by the borough or not.
(Objection overruled, and bill sealed for de-
fendant.) Q. Do you swear that it was not
done by the borough,—that the borough did
not employ Mr. Westfleld to do the work? A.
It was done under the jurisdiction of the bor-
ough, but the people paid the money. Q.
Who employed Mr. Westfleld to do it? A.
The town council.’
“Second. The court erred in refusing to af-
flrm defendant's point number four, which
reads as follows: ‘Point 4. The allegation
in this case being that the alleged injury to
the property of plaintiff was caused by paved
gutters constructed by the borough, plaintiff
was bound to prove that said gutters were
constructed pursuant to legislation on the
part of said borough, and,there being no legit-
imate proof presented to establish any such
legislation, the plaintiff is not entitled to re-
cover. Answer of the Court: We decline
to charge as requested in that point. We
think there is evidence from which a jury
would be warranted in finding that the gut-
ters were constructed by the borough.' "
P. A. O'Boyle and F. M. Nichols, for appel-
lant. C. F. Bohan and John T. Lenahan, for
appellee.
S'l‘I<}RRETT, O. J. One of the specifica-
tions in this case is refusal of the court to
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CROSS-EXAMINATION. [Case No. 155 
BORA~ v. BOROUGH OF AVOCA. 
(26 At!. OOI. 154 Pu. St. 404.) 
Supreme Court of PenDBylvania. May 1, 1893. 
Appeal from court of common pleas, Lu-
?.erne county; Rice, Judge. 
Action In trespass by Paul Bohan against 
the borough of Avoca for damages to plain-
tiff's lot resulting from the construction of 
gutters along defendant's street, and thus 
<.-onductlng the surface water from a large 
territory to the lot. Plalntltl had judgment, 
and defendant appeals. Afftrmed. 
The Points Which were Submitted In Writ-
ing to the Court Below, and the Answers 
Thereto. 
"The plaintiff asked the court to charge 
the jury as follows: '(1) It the jury believe 
that the defendant borough, In constructing 
its gutters, caused the surface water of a 
large territory, which did not naturally flow 
in that direction, to be gathered Into a body, 
and precipitated on plaintiff's premises, to 
the Injury of the plalntllT, defendant Is lia-
ble, and plaintiff ls entitled to recover• We 
:answer that point In the nJftrmatlve. 
"Defemlunt's eounsel request us to charge: 
" '(l) That no recovery can be had In this 
case unless the jury are convinced by the 
testimony presented that the quantity of 
water :tlowlng down Main street through the 
culvert upon the pr<>verty of the plaintiff 
has been Increased, and that such Increase 
ha11 given to It a greater force of destruc-
tlvene11s, and that In consequence of the 
same the pl:.intlff's property has been In-
jured.' This point ls afftrmed. 
•• '(2) That, If the Increase In the volume 
and destmctlveness of said water ls due to 
the change of the grade of the strP.Pt. and 
not to the construction of the gutters, the 
plaintiff Is not entitled to recover.' Tills 
point ls umrmed. 
" '(3) That In determining whether or not 
there has been uny lnci:ease In the volume 
of water since the construction of the gut-
ters, It Is the duty of the jury to make com-
parison upon the theory that the street and 
"its gutters were kept In proper order, and 
unobstructed, before the paved gutters were 
constructed.' As explained by the counsel 
in his argument to us, we atllnn that point. 
What we understand Is meant by this Is that 
a comparison Is to be made between the :tlow 
of water in the present condition of the gut-
ter with the 1low of water ordinarily, prior 
to the placing of the gutters there. In other 
words, the comparison Is not to be made be-
tween the present :tlow of water In the gut-
ter 11Dd through the culverts, with the :tlow of 
water when 1!be street or water courses, prt· 
o()r to the placing of the gutters there, were 
temporarily obstructed. 
" '(4) The allegation In this case being that 
the alleged injury to the property of plaln-
tltl' was caused by paved gutters constructed 
by the borough, plaintltl was bound to prove 
that said gutters were constructed pursuant 
to legislation on part of said borough, and, 
there bt.>lng no legitimate proof presented to 
establish auy such legislation, the plaintltl la 
not entitled to recover.' We decline to charge 
as requested In that point. We think there 
Is evidence from which a jury would be war-
ranted In finding that the gutters were con-
strm·ted by the borough. . 
" '(ri) That the plaintiff cannot recover any 
damnges tor llDY Injury to bis property which 
he might have avoided by the exercise of or-
dinary care, either In respect to the past or 
to the future.' '.fhls ls ntlirmed. 
" '(6) That the jury, If they find that the 
defendant Is liable In this action, may adopt 
as the measure of damages the expense of 
protecting the property with n wall or pipe 
from injury on account of the water flow-
ing through the ravine.' This Is atDrmed.'' 
Speclttcatlons of Error. 
"First. The court erred In ove1TUllng the 
defendant's objection to questions of plain-
tltr's counsel on the cross-examination of de-
fendant's witness as to who authorized the 
work of constructing the gutters,-tl fact not 
alluded to In chief, and provable by the rec-
ord of council proceedings alone,-whlch said 
ruling, testimony, and questions are as fol-
lows: 'Question. Done by the borough wblle 
you were burgess? A. No, sir. (Objected 
to. Objection overruled.) Defendant's coun· 
eel states the objection as follows: (1) Be-
cause It Is not cross-examination. (2) It Is 
a part of plaintiff's case in chief, and cau be 
proved only by the records of the council, 
whether It was done by the borough or not. 
(Objection overruled, and bill sealed for de-
tendru1t.) Q. Do you swear that It was not 
done by the borougb,-that the borough did 
not employ Mr. Westdeld to do the work? A. 
It was done under the jurisdiction of the bor-
ough, but the people paid the money. Q. 
Who employed Mr. Westfield to do It? A. 
The town council.' 
"Second. The court erred In refusing to af-
firm defendant's point number four, which 
rends as follows: 'Point 4. The alleg11tlon 
In this case being that the alleged lnjury to 
the property of plulntltr was caused by paved 
gutters constructed by the borough, plalntltr 
was bound to prove that said gutters were 
constructed pursuant to legislation on the 
part of said borough, and, there being no leldt-
lmate proof presented to establish any such 
legislation, the plaintiff Is not entitled to re-
cover. Answer of the Court: We decline 
to charge as requested In that point. We 
think there Is evidence from which a jury 
would be wammtell In finding that the gut-
ters were constructed by the borough.' " 
P. A. O'Boyle nnd F. M. Nichols, for appel-
lant. C. F. Bohan and John T. Lenahan, for 
appellee. 
STERRETT, 0. J. One of the specl:tlca-
tlons In this case is refusal of the court to 
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sustain objections to questions put, on cross-
examination of defendant’s witness, for the
purpose of showing that the gutters alleged
to have caused the injury complained of
were constructed by the defendant borough,
or under its authority. The objections were
(a) that the questions were not proper cross-
examination, and (b) that the fact sought to
be proved was part of plaintiff's case in chief.
and could be proved only by the records of
the borough council. The court having over-
ruled said objections, the witness testifled in
substance that the work of constructing said
gutters was done under the supervision of
the borough authorities, and paid for by the
property owners. In his examination in
chief the witness was not asked, nor did he
expressly say, by whom the grading and gut-
tering in question were done, but he testifled
as to the physical nature of the street along
which the gutters were made, the effect of
their construction on plaintifs property, etc.; "
and such was the general character and
scope of his testimony in chief that it might
be fairly inferred that the work was done by
or under the direction of the municipal au-
thorities. In view of the circumstances, we
cannot say there was error in permitting the
cross-examination complained of. While, as
a. general rule, it is improper to permit a. de-
fendant to interject his defense under guise
of cross-examination of plaintiffs witness,
and vice versa, the range of a cross-examina-
tion must, to a very great extent, be left to
the sound discretion of the trial judge; and
unless that discretion has been plainly
abused, to the injury of the party complain-
ing, it ls not ground for reversal. In Jack-
son v. Litch, 62 Pa. St. 451, it was held that,
in order to reverse for this cause, it must be
an extreme case in which the discretion has
been abused, and in which it is apparent the
party has been injured; and also, where a
witness has stated a. fact, he may be asked
by the other party to detail all the circum-
stances within his knowledge which qualify
it, though they may be new matter and form
part of his own case. As was said in Bank
v. Fordyce, 9 Pa. St. 277: “A party is enti-
tled to bring out every circumstance relating
to a fact which an adverse wltnes is called
to prove.” In this case there was no abuse
of the discretion with which the trial judge
was invested; nor do we think the defend-
460
ant was prejudiced by the fact elicited on
the cross-examination. An examination of
plaintiff's testimony shows that fact was ei-
ther recognized or assumed by witnesses as
well as the parties. One of plaintiffs wit-
nesses was asked if he remembered "when
Main street was graded by the borough,” and
“when they paved the gutters along there."
and his answer was, “Yes, sir." Even if the
plaintiff had closed his case without intro-
ducing any testimony from which the jury
would have been warranted in finding the
fact, the court, in order to prevent a miscar-
riage of justice, would not have refused to
permit the plaintiff to call witnesses out of
order and prove it.
The only other specification of en-or is the
refusal of the court to afllrm defendant's
fourth point for charge recited therein. In
declining to charge as requested, the learned
judge rightly held there was “evidence from
which a jury would be warranted in finding
that the gutters were constructed by the bor-
ough." The authority of the borough to do
so was not, and could not have been, ques-
tioned. In view of the evidence, it was for
the jury to say whether the proper borough
authorities did or did not _construct or su-
perintend their construction, etc. It is well
settled that the acts of a municipal corpora-
tion may be proved otherwise than by its rec-
ords or some written document. Dill. Mun.
Corp. § 300; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat.
64. In aflirming plaintiffs first point, the
learned judge rightly instructed the jury
that, if they believed the “defendant bor-
ough, in constructing its gutters, caused the
surface water of a large territory, which did
not naturally flow in that direction, to be
gathered into a body, and precipitated on
plaintiff's premises, to the injury of the plain-
tiff, defendant is liable, and plaintiff is enti-
tled iao recover.” The evidence tended to
prove the facts of which this proposition is
predicated, and by its affirinance plaintiff's
case was fairly presented to the jury. On
the other hand, by the atflrmance of defend-
ant’s first, second, third, fifth. and sixth
points, every necessary precaution was tak-
en to properly indicate the limits within-
whlch the jury should act. An examination
of the record discloses no error that would
warrant us in disturbing the judgment.
Judgment aflirmed.
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sustain objections to questions put, on cross- ant was prejudiced by the fact elicited on 
examination of defendant's witness, for the the croBS-examlnation. An examination of 
purpose of showing that the gutters alleged plaintur's testimony shows that fact was el-
to have caused the Injury complained of ther recognized or assumed by witnesses 8.8 
were constructed by the defendant borough, well as the parties. One of plalntl!T'a wlt-
or under Its nuthorlty. The objections were nesses was asked 1t he remembered "when 
(a) that the •1uestlons were not proper cross- :Main street was graded by the borough," and 
examination, and (b) that the fact sought to "when they paved the gutters along there," 
be proved was part of plalntilf's case In chief, and his answer was, "Yes, sir." Even If the 
and could be proved only by the records of plalntltr had closed bis case without lntro-
the borough council. The court having over- duclng any testimony from which the jury 
ruled said objections, the witness testified 1n would have been warranted In finding the 
substance that the work of constructing said fact, the court, in order to prevent a miscar-
gutters was done under the supervision of rlage of justice, would not have refused to 
the borough authorities, and paid for by the permit the plaintltr to call wltneBBes out of 
property- owners. In his examination ln order and prove It. 
chief the witness was not asked, nor did he The only other specification of error ls the 
expressly say, by whom the grading and gut- refusal of the court to atD.rm defendant's 
terlng ln question were done, but he testtfied fourth point for charge recited therein. In 
as to the physical nature of the street along declining to charge as requested, the learned 
which the gutters were made, the effect of judge rightly held there was "evidence from 
their construction on plalntltr's property, etc.; J which a jury would be warranted lf\tlnding 
and such was the general character and that the gutters were constl"Ucted by the bor-
scope of his testimony In chief that It might ough." The authority of the borough t9 do 
be fairly Inferred that the work was done by so was not, and could not have been, quee-
or under the direction of the municipal au- tloned. In view of the evidence, 1t was for 
thoritlee. In view of the circumstances, we the jury to say whether the proper borough 
cannot say there was error In permitting the authorities did or did not ,construct or su-
cross-examlnatlon complained of. 'Vblle, as perlntend their construction, etc. It ls well 
a general rule, It ls Improper to permit a de- settled that the acts of a. municipal corpora-
fendant to Interject bis defense under guise tion may be proved otherwise than by Its rec-
of cross-exnmlnatlon of plaintltr's witness, ords or some written document. Dill. Mun. 
and vice versa, the range of a cross-examlna- Corp. § 300; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 
tton must, to a very ~at extent, be left to 64. In aOlrming plaintitr's first point, the 
the sound discretion of the trial judge; and learned judge rightly Instructed the juq 
unless that discretion has been plainly that, If they believed the "defendant bor-
abused, to the Injury of the party compla1n7 ough, in constructing Its gutters, caused the 
Ing, It Is not ground for reversal. In Jack- surface water of a lurge territory, which did 
son v. Lltch, 62 Pa. St. 41'.>1, It was held that, not naturally tlow in that direction, to oo 
In order to reverse for this cause, it must be gathered Into a body, and precipitated on 
an extreme case In which the discretion has plaintitr's premises, to the injury of the plaln-
been abused, and In which It ls apparent the titr, defendant ls liable, and plaintiff la enti-
party has been Injured; and also, where a tled to recover." The evidence tended to 
witness has stated a. fact, he may be llllked prove the facts of which this proposition ls 
by the other party to detail all the clrcum- predicated, and by its aftlrmance plalntltf'a 
stances within his knowledge which qualify case was fairly presented to the jury. On 
It, thouirh they may be new matter and form the other band, by the afftrmance of defend-
part of his own case. As was said In Bank ant's first, second, third, fifth, and sixth 
v. Fordyce, 9 Pa. St. 277: "A party is entl- points, every necessary precaution was tak-
tled to .bring out every circumstance relating en to properly Indicate the limits within• 
to a fact which an adverse witness ls called which the jury should act. An examination 
to prove." In this case there was no abuse of the record discloses no error that would 
of the discretion with whkh the trial judge warrant us in disturbing the judgment. 
was Invested; nor do we think the defend- Judgment afftrmed. 
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[Case No. 156
PHILLIPS et al. v. TO\VN OF MARBLE-
HEAD.
(‘l9 N. E. 5-17, 148 Mass. 326.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massacliusctts.
Essex. Jan. 4, 1889.
)xceptions from superior court, Essex coun-
ty; John Lathrop, Judge.
Petition by Emily A. Phillips and others for
the assessment of damages for taking their
land in the town of Marblehead for a street;
the taking being alleged to have occurred
March 6, 1886, and July 27, 1886. Mason. a
witness for petitioners, who was about 45
years of age, and had always lived in that
town, testiiied that he did not own real estate
in the town, nor had he bought or sold real
estate therein; that he had for several years
advised his father, or, rather, his father, who
had bought and sold real estate in the town,
had advised him; that he had heard of a
great many of the sales of real estate in the
town in the last flve or ten years, and at the
time of such sales he heard of some of the
prices paid; that he heard of the sale of the
Gerry-Street lots, and other land near that of
petitioners, and of similar character, and had
heard of some of the prices, but could not
now give the price at which any particular
lot sold; that he had been a collector of taxes
in said town, and had in one instance acted
as an appraiser of real estate; that he was
familiar with petitioners’ land, having known
it all his life; that he had heard of sales and
prices of land upon Chestnut street, which ex-
tends north and south the entire length of the
petitioners’ land, and is about 100 feet dis-
tant therefrom, but could not tell of any par-
ticular saie; that he thought he had a judg-
ment as to the fair market value of real es-
tate in said town, and as to the fair market
value of the land taken from the petitioners
for said street, as aforesaid; and thereupon
the petitioners asked him what, in his judg-
ment, was the fair market value upon July
27, 1886, of the land taken from the petition-
ers for the laying out of the street. The court
excluded the question, upon the ground that
the witness was not qualified as an expert
to express an opinion as to the market value
of the land, remarking that “there must be
better evidence to be had.” Wyman, who
owned a considerable tract of land known
as the "Bessom Farm," adjoining the peti-
tioners’ tract, and of the same general char-
acter, testitied to the value of the land taken
from petitioners; and upon cross-examina-
tion testified that the Bessom farm, adjoin-
ing that of the petitioners, was worth $2,000
or $2,500 per acre. Thereupon respondents,
against the petitioners’ objection and excep-
tion, were allowed, solely as bearing upon
the Question of the bias or fairness of the
witness, to place in his hands a written
statement dated about June, 1886, and di-
rected to the assessors, signed and sworn to
by witness, and to ask him from that to
say what in that he valued his said land ad-
‘ ers’ land.
joining that of petitioners; and he replied,
“One hundred dollars per acre," and added
that he so valued it, and it was so under-
stood, for its agricultural purposes only.
Respondents called as a witness one Martin,
a member of the board of selectmen of the
town in the year 1886. Martin, upon direct
examination, testifled that the petitioners’
land, including that taken, was worth $200
to $300 per acre, and no more; and that the
petitioners’ remaining land was largely ben-
efited by the laying out of the street. Up-
on cross-examination he testifled that the
petitioners had, in his judgment, sustained
' damage to the amount of $300, and no more.
Petitioners then offered in evidence, solely
for the purpose of contradicting him, the
record of the board of selectmen made Ju-
ly 27, 1886, showing the laying out of the
street, and the damages therefor, signed by
Martin, together with the remaining mem-
bers oi’ the board; which record contained
the statement that petitioners had sustained
damage by the taking of their land to the
amount of $553, and awarded to them that
sum. The record was excluded, and peti-
tioners excepted. Verdict for respondents,
and_ petitioners filed exceptions.
F. L. Evans, for petitioners. W. D. North-
end, for respondents.
FIELD, J. lVliether a.person who is of-
fered as a witness is shown to be qualified to
give an opinion upon the value of land must
be left largely to the discretion of the pre-
siding judge. We cannot say, upon the evi-
dence recited in the exceptions, that Mason
was not rightly excluded as a witness to
value. The case shows that there was no
difllculty in obtaining witnesses whose quali-
fications were unquestioned, and this fact
was properly considered by the presiding
judge in deciding to exclude him. Tucker
v. Railroad Co., 118 Mass. 548. It was also,
we think, within the discretion of the pre-
siding judge to admit the question which
was put to Wyman by the respondents, on
cross-examination, to which the petitioners
objected. As Wyman’s land was adjoining
to and of the same general character as
that of the petitioners, sales of it would be
competent to prove the value of the petition-
ers’ land, but the opinion of witnesses upon
the value of Wyman's land would not be
competent to prove the value of the petition-
Wyman v. Railroad C-0., 13 Metc.
(Mass) 316, 327; Shattuck v. Railroad Co.,
6 Allen, 115. When, therefore, the respond-
ents asked the witness Wyman his opinion
of the value of his own land, the question
might have been excluded. The inquiry
was innnaterial and irrelevant, except, per-
haps, for the purpose of testing the weight
oi.’ the opinion of the witness as to value.
The question, however, having been answer-
ed without objection, the respondents could
not have been permitted to contradict the
461
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CROSS-EXAMINATION. (Case No. 156 
PffiLLIPS et al. T. TOWN OF MARBLE-
HEAD. 
(19 N. E. 547, 148 M888. 326.) 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
Essex. Jan. 4, 1889. 
Exceptions from superior court, EBSeX coun-
ty; John Lathrop, Judge. 
Petition by Emlly A. Phillipa and others tor 
the assessment ot damages tor taklDg their 
land ID the town of Marblehead for a street; 
the taklDg being alleged to have occurred 
March 6, 1886, and July 'n, 1886. Mason, a 
witness !01· petitioners, who was about 45 
years of age, and had always lived In that 
town, testified that he did not own real estate 
In the town, nor had he bought or sold real 
eat.ate therein; that he had tor several years 
advised his father, or, rather, h1e father, who 
had bought and sold real estate In the town, 
had advised him; that he had heard of a 
great many of the sales of real estate ID the 
to,vn In the last five or ten years, and at the 
time of such sales he heard of some ot the 
prices paid; that he heard of the sale of the 
Gerry-Street lots, and other land near that of 
petitioners, and of slmllar character, and had 
heard of some of the prices, but could not 
now irtve the price at which any particular 
lot solcl; that he had been a collector of taxes 
In said town, and had ln one Instance acted 
as an appraiser of real estate; that he was 
famlllar with petitioners' land. having known 
It all hla life; that he had beard of sales and 
prices of land upon Chestnut street, which ex-
tends north and south the entire length of the 
petitioners' land, and ls about 100 feet dis-
tant tllerefl'om, but could not tell of any par-
ticular sale; that he thought he had a judg-
ment as to the fair market value of l"eal es· 
tate In said town, and as to the fair market 
value of the land taken from the petitioners 
for said street, as aforesaid; and thet·eupon 
the petitioners asked him what, In his judg-
ment, was the fair market value upon July 
27, lSSG, of the lond taken from the petition-
ers for the laying out of the street. The court 
excluded the question, upon the ground that 
the witness was not qualified as an expert 
to express nn opinion as to the market vnlue 
of the land, remarking that "there must be 
better e'l-idence to be bud." 'Vyman, who I 
owned a considerable tract of land known 
as the "Bessom Furm," adjoining the peti-
tioners' tract, and o:I' the same general char-
acter, testltled to the value of the land taken I 
from petitioners; and upon cross-exnminn- ·1 
tlon testltletl thnt the Bessom farm, adjoin-
ing that of the petitioners, was worth $2,000 
or ~2,GOO per acre. Thereupon respondents, 
ngnlnst the petitioners' objeetlon and excep-
1
1 
tion, were allowed, solely as bearing upon 
the question of the bias or :l'nlrness of the 
witneAs, to place in his bands a written j 
stutmnent dated about June, 188fi, and di-
rected to tbe assessors, signed and sworn to I 
by witness, and to ask him from that to 
say what in that be valued bis said land ad-
joining that of petltlonere; and he replied, 
"One hundred dollars per acre," and added 
that he so valued It, and 1t was so under-
stood, for its agricultural purposes only. 
Respondents called n.e a wltneBB one Martin, 
a member o:I' the board of selectmen of the 
town in the year 1886. Martin, upon direct 
examination, testltl.ed that the petitioners' 
land, Including that taken, was worth $200 
to $300 per acre, and no more; and that the 
petitioners' remaining land was largely ben-
efited by the laying out of the street. Up-
on croBB-examlnation be testitl.ed that the 
petitioners bad, in his judgment, sustained 
damage to the amount of $300, and no more. 
Petitioners then offered in evidence, solely 
for the purpose ot contradicting him, the 
record of the board of selectmen made Ju-
ly 27, 1886, showing the laying out of the 
street, and the damages theret1>r, signed by 
Martin, together with the remaining mem-
bers of the board; which record contained 
the statement that petitioners had sustained 
damage by the taking of their land to the 
amount of $553, and awarded to them that 
sum. The record was excluded, and peti-
tioners excepted. Verdict tor respondents, 
and. petitioners ftled e.-,:ceptlons. 
F. L. Evsns, for petitioners. W. D. North-
end, tor respondents. 
FIELD, J. Whether a. person who is of-
fered as a witness Is shown to be qunll1led to 
give an opinion upon the value of land must 
be left largely to the discretion of the pre-
siding judge. We cannot say, upon the evi-
dence recited In the exceptions, that Mason 
was not rightly excluded as a witness to 
value. The case shows that there was no 
dltDculty in obtaining witnesses whose quall-
tl.catlons were unquestioned, and this tact 
was properly considered by the presiding 
judge In deciding to exclude him. Tncker 
v. Railroad Co., 118 MaBB. 548. It was also, 
we think, within the discretion of the pre-
siding judge to admit the question which 
was put to Wyman by the respondents, on 
croSB-examinatlon, to which the petitioners 
objected. As Wyman's land was adjoining 
to and of the same general character as 
that of the petitioners, sales of It would be 
competent to prove the value of the petition-
ers' land, but the opinion of witnesses upon 
the value of ·Wyman's land would not be 
competent to prove the value of the petition-
ers' land. Wyman v. Railroad Co., 13 Mete. 
(Mass.) 316, 327; Shattuck v. Railroad Co., 
6 Allen, 115. When, therefore, the respond-
ents asked the witness 'Vymnn bis opinion 
of the value of his own land, the question 
might have been excluded. The inquiry 
was immaterlnl and irrelevant, except, per-
haps, :l'or the put11ose of testing the weight 
of the opinion of the witness as to value. 
The question, however, having been answer-
ed without objection, the respondents could 
not have been permitted to contra.diet tb• 
481 
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answer by the testimony of other witnesses, I
or by other evidence than the testimony of
the witness himself. Immaterial or irrele-
vant issues cannot be raised and tried in
this manner. Shurtlefl! v. Parker, 130 Mass.
293; Fletcher v. Railroad Co., 1 Allen. 9.
But the extent to which the cross-examina-
tion of a witness as to credit may be carried
must be left largely to the judge presiding
at the trial, and if matters which are merely
immaterial, or which tend to how the rea-
sons of the witness for his opinions or his
fairness of mind. are admitted in cross-ex-
amination, there is, as a general rule, no ex-
ception. Considerable latitude should be
allowed in cross-examining witnesses to val-
ue, in order that the grounds of their opin-
ion may appear. Prescott v. Ward, 10 Al-
len, 203; Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray, 108.
The record of the board of selectmen, of
whom Martin was one, was oifered for the
purpose of contradicting the testimony of
Martin. The fact that the record or certifi-
cate was signed by Martin, as well as by
the other selectmen, did not show that the
amount of the damages awarded was the
sum which Martin, acting on his own judg-
ment, thought ought to have been awarded.
Selectmen have no clerk, and their doings
can only be certified by their own signa-
tures, and the certificate purported to give,
not the opinion of the selectmen individual-
ly. but the judgment of the board, which
might be the judgment of a majority only
of a quorum of the board. Besides, in ev-
ery judiciai or quasi judicial determination
462
of damages by a board composed of more
than one person, there must be compromises
of individual opinion, in order that any re-
suit may be reached; and a judicial body
must give some weight to evidence, and can-
not act solely upon the personal knowledge
of its members, when evidence is produced
before them. Either, then, the record should
have been excluded, or, if admitted, Martin
and the other selectmen should have been
permitted to testify to the part taken, and
to the opinions expressed by Martin in the
deliberations of the selectmen which result-
ed in the award. While the deliberations of
legislative bodies are usually public, the de-
liberations of judicial or quasi judicial bod-
ies are private; and there are reasons of
public policy why they should not be made
public, particularly when the purpose to be
served is comparatively unimportant. Grand
and petit jurors are not permitted to testi-
fy to opinions concerning the case, expressed
in their consultations with each other, and
arbitrators are not permitted to testify to
the grounds on which they reached the con-
clusions declared in the award. Com. v.
White, 147 Mass. 76, 16 N. E. 70'; Wood-
ward v. Leavitt. 107 Mass. 458; Bigeiow v.
Maynard, 4 Cush. 317.
For the purpose of contradicting a. wit-
ness, we think that evidence ought not to be
received of the deliberations of selectmen
acting in a quasi judicial capacity, and that
the certiiicate of the doings of the board of
selectmen was rightly excluded.
Exceptions overruled.
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answer by the testimony of other witnesses, I 
or by other evidence than the testimony of I 
tile witness himself. Immaterial or Irrele-
vant Issues cannot be raised and tried ln I 
this manner. Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 1 
293; Fletcher v. Railroad Co., 1 Allen. 9. 
But the extent to which the cross-examina-
tion of a witness as to credit may be carried 
must be left largely to the judge presiding 
at the trial, and If matters which are merely 
Immaterial, or which tend to show the rea-
sons of the witness for his 01>lnlons or his 
fairness of mind, are admitted In cross-ex-
amination, there Is, as a general rule, no ex-
ce1>tlon. Considerable latitude should be ! 
allowed In cross-examining witnesses to val-
ue, In order that the grounds of their opln- 1 
Ion may appear. Prescott v. Ward, 10 Al- I 
len, 203; Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray, 108. 
The record of the board of selectmen, of 
whom Martin was one, was ollered for the 
purpose of contradicting the testimony of 
Martin. The fact that the record or certifi-
cate was signed by Martin, as well as by 
the other selectmen, did not show that the 
amount of the damages awarded was the 
sum which Martin, acting on his own judg-
ment, thought ought to have been a warded. 
Selectmen have no clerk, and their doings 
can only be certified by their own signa-
tures, and the certificate purported to give, 
not the opinion of the selectmen Individual-
ly, but the judgm_ent of the board, which 
might be the judgment of a mujorlty only 
of a quorum of the board. Besides, In ev-
ery judicial or quasi judicial determination 
462 
of damages by a board composed of more 
than one person, there must be compromises 
of Individual opinion, In order that any !"('-
suit may be reached; and a Judicial body 
mm1t gl"l"e some weight to e~tdence, and can-
not act solely upon the personal knowledge 
of its members, when evidence Is produced 
before them. Either, then, the record should 
have been excluded, or, If admitted, Martin 
and the other 11electmen should have been 
permitted to testify to the part taken, and 
to the opinions expressed by Martin in the 
deliberations of the selectmen which result-
ed In the award. While the deliberations or 
legislative bodies are usually public, the de-
liberations of judicial or qu'.lsl judicial bod-
ies are private; and there are reasons or 
public policy why they should not be made 
public, particularly when the purpose to oo 
seITed Is comparntl"l"ely unimpo1·tnnt. Grand 
and J.)etlt jurors are not permitted to testi-
fy to opinions concerning the case, expressed 
in their consultations with each other, and 
arhltrntors nre not permitted to testify t<J 
the ground11 on which they reached the con-
clusions tlc!"luri>d In the award. Com. '"· 
White, 147 1\lass. 76, 16 N. E. 707; Wood-
ward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453; Bigelow v. 
Maynard, 4 Cush. 317. 
For the purpose ot contradicting a wit-
ness, we think that evidence ought not to oo 
received of the deliberations of selectmen 
acting In a quasi judicial capacity, and that 
the certificate of the doings of the board of 
selectmen was rightly excluded. 
Exceptiona overruled. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
[Case No. I57
\
HOME BENEFIT ASS'N v. SARGENT.
(12 Sup. Ct. 332, 142 U. S. 691.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 26,
1892.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the Southern district of New York.
Action by Henrietta P. Sargent against
the Home Benefit Association on a policy of
life insurance. Verdict and judgment for
plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirm-
ed.
A. G. Fox and Francis Lawton, for plaintifl
in error. Miron Winslow, for defendant in
error.
.\Ir. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the
opinion of the court.
This is an action at law, brought in the
circuit court of the United States for the
Southern district of New York by Henrietta
P. Sargent, a citizen of Massachusetts
against the Home Benefit Association, a life
insurance association incorporated by the
state of New York, to recover the sum of
$5.000, with interest from Mar -h 15, 1887.
upon a policy of life insurance issued by the
defendant September 5, 1885, on the life
of Edward F. Hall, J r., for the benefit of the
piaintiif, who was his sister.
Hall was made by the policy an accept-
ed member of the life department of the de-
fendant. By one of the conditions in the
policy it was provided that “death of the
member by his own hand or act, whether
voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane at
the time," was a risk not assumed by the
defendant under the policy.
The complaint alleged that the policy was
in force on the 19th of October, 1886, when
Hall died at the city of New York, and that
his death was not caused by any of the
causes excepted from the operation of the
policy. It was setup in the answer as a
defense that the death of Hall was brought
about by his own hand and act, in that he
died from the immediate effect of a shot
from a pistol fired by his own hand, such
shot having been fired by him with the in-
tention of taking his own life.
The case was tried before Judge Coxe and
a jury, which rendered a verdict for the
plaintifi‘ for $5,350. A motion for a new
trial was made before Judge Coxe. and was
denied,—the opinion of the court thereon be-
ing reported in 35 Fed. 711,—and a judgment
was thereafter rendered in favor of the
plaintiff for $5,350, with interest and costs;
the whole amounting to $5,517.99. To re-
view that judgment the defendant has
brought a writ of error.
By the bill of exceptions it appears that,
after the plaintiff rested her case, the de-
fendant moved the court to direct a verdict
for it, on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to.show that she ever had presented
to it, in accordance with the provisions of
the policy, satisfactory evidence of Hall's
death; but the court denied the motion.
The defendant excepted, and then proceeded
to put in evidence on its part. After it had
rested, the plaintifl put in rebutting evi-
dence on her part, and then the defendant
put in further evidence. It is not stated in
the bill of exceptions that it contains all the
evidence; but it is set forth at the close of
what does appear that the defendant moved
the court to direct a verdict for the defend-
ant, on the ground that the evidence showed
that Hall died by his own hand. The court
refused to do so, and the defendant except-
ed.
Parts of the charge of the court to the jury
are set forth, and it is stated that the court
charged the jury as to all other features
of the case fully and in such manner that
no exception was taken thereto, and that
the portions of the court's charge to the
Jury which are not set forth did not in any
wise bear on or relate to any matters eon-
tained in the defendant's requests to charge,
hereinafter referred to.
Among the instructions of the court to the
jury were the following: “The only ques-
tion upon this proof is, did Edward F. Hall
commit suicide? If he did, the policy is
void. If he died in some other way—by
accident or assassination—lt would be other-
wise. Upon that issue, the burden is upon
the defendant to satisfy you by a fair pre-
ponderance or proof of the truth of this dc-
feuse. " * " When the policy of insur-
ance was introduced with evidence or ad-
missions that the premiums had been paid,
and proof was given of the death of the as-
sured, the plaintifi’, if no further evidence
had been produced, would have been entitled
to a verdict; but the defendant comes into
court, and asserts that the contract under
which the action is brought has not been ful-
filled, but has been violated by the assured.
Being an aflirmative defense, the onus is
upon the defendant to satisfy you by evi-
dence which, in your judgment, outweighs
the evidence of the plaintifif, that that de-
fense has been established."
The court, after stating that the defendant
had introduced in evidence proofs of death
furnished to it by the plaintiff; that the de-
fendant insisted that the plaintiff, having
produced those proofs, was estopped from
saying that the cause of death there assign-
ed was not truly assigned; and that such
proofs asserted generally that Hall met his
death by suicide, while laboring under tem-
porary aberration of mlnd,—-also instructed
the jury that such proofs were proper evi-
dence for them to consider, but were by no
means conclusive evidence, and were to be
taken by them in connection with the other
testimony in the case, and given such weight
in determining the main question as the jury
might see fit to give them. ‘
The court further instructed the jury, that
the plaint.lfi's position was—First, that the
463
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
09
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CROSS-EXAMINATION. (Case No. 157 
HOYE BENEFIT ASS'N v. SARGENT. 
(12 Sup. Ct. 332, 142 U. S. 691.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Jan. 26, 
1892. 
In error to the circuit court of the United 
States tor the Southern district of New York. 
Action by Henrietta P. Sargent against 
the Home Benefit Association on a policy of 
life Insurance. Verdict and judgment for 
plaintur. Defendant brings error. Affirm-
ed. 
A.G. Fox and Francie Lawton, for plalntur 
in error. Miron Winslow, for defendant In 
the policy, satisfactory evldenre of H1tll's 
death; but the court dented the motion. 
The defendant excepted, and then proceeded 
to put In evidence on Its part. After it bad 
rested, the plalntur put In rebutting evl· 
dence on her part, and then the defendant 
put In further evidence. It ls not stated lo 
the bill of exceptions that It contains all the 
evidence; but It ls set forth at the close of 
what doee appear that the defendant moved 
I the court to direct a Yerdlct for the defend-
ant, on the ground that the evidence showed 
that Hall died by hie own hand. The court 
refm~ed to do so, and the defendant except-
ed. 
error. Parts of the charge of the court to the jury 
are set forth, and It le stated that the court 
l!r. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the charged the jury as to all other features 
opinion of the court. of the case fully and In euch manner that 
Thia le an action at law, brought In the no exception wae taken thereto, and that 
circuit court of the United States for the the portions of the court's charge to the 
Southern district of New York by Henrietta jury which are not eet forth did not In any 
P. Sargent, a citizen of Maesnchueettl\ wise bear on or relate to any matters C!On-
agalnet the Home Benefit Association, a life tained In the defendant's requeete to charge, 
insurance association Incorporated by the I hereinafter referred to. 
stetf~ of New York, to recover the 11um of Among the tnstructlone of the eourt to the 
Sl).000, with tntert>st from March Hi, 1887, jury were the following: "The only ques-
upon a policy of life Insurance Issued by the I tion upon this proof is, did Edward F. Hall 
defendant September 5, 1885, on the life commit suicide'! It be did, the policy ltr 
of Edward F. Hall, Jr., for the benefit of the void. It be died In some other way-by 
plalntirr, who was hie sister. accident or aesasslnatlon-lt would be other-
Hall wae made by the policy an accept- wlS<'. Upon that Issue, the burden ls upoo 
ed member of the life department of the de- the defendant to satisfy you by a fair pre-
tend.ant. By one of the conditions In the ! pondernnce or proof of the truth ot this de-
pollcy It was proYlded that "death of the tense. • • • When the policy of Insur-
member by his own hand or act, whethe1· \ ance was introduced with evidence or ad-
;:!u~:?,:. o~~:v:l~~~~;>t~~~u~e~111:;e ~~ 1 !~~:"~o::rt1::s t~~;:~l:h~sd::~ ~7~h~a~:~ 
defendnnt under the policy. sur!'fl, the plalntlft', If no further evlden<'e 
The complaint alleged that the policy was J' had been produced, would have been entitled 
in force on the lUth of October, 1886, when to a verdict; but the defendant comes Into 
Hall died at the city ot New York, and tnat j court, and asserts that the contract under 
hie death was not caused by any of the which the action le brought has not been ful-
causes excepted from the operation of the ,. 1Uled, but bas been violated by the assured. 
policy. It was set . up In the answer as a Being an aturmatlve defense, the onus Is 
defense that the death of Hall was broug-ht upon the defendant to satisfy you by evl-
about by his own hand and act, In that he I deuce which, In your judgment, outweighs 
died trom the Immediate elTe<"t of a shot the evidence of the plalntift', that that de-
from a pistol fl.red by bis own band, such tense has been establlshed." 
shot having been fl.red by him with the In- The court, after stating that the detend:mt 
tentlon of taking his own life. bad Introduced In evidence proofs of death 
The case was tried before .Judge Coxe and furnished to It by the plalnttrr; that the de-
a jury, which rendered a verdict for the fendant Insisted that the plalntltl', having 
plalntlft' for $5,350. A motion for a new produced those proofs, was estopped trom 
trial was made before Judge Coxe. nnd was saying that the cause of death tnere n111111m-
denled,-the opinion of the eourt thereon be- ed was not truly assigned; and that s11e11 
Ing reported In 35 Fed. 711,-and a judgment proofs asserted generally that Hall met his 
was thereafter rendered In ta,·or of the death by suicide, while lnborln.i.r under h•m-
plalntift' for $5,350, with Interest and costs; porary aberration of mlnd,-illso Instructed 
the whole amounting to $5,517.00. To re- the jury that such proofs were proper evl-
vlew that judgment the defendant has dence for them to consider, but were by no 
hrought a writ of error. means conclusive evidence, and were to be 
By the bill of exceptions It appears that, taken by them In connection with the other 
after the plalntlft' rested her case, the de- testimony In the case, and given euch weight 
fendnnt moved the court to direct a verdlr.t In determining the main question ae the jury 
for It, on the ground that the plalntift' bad might see fit to give them. 
falled to . show that she ever had presented Tlw <'ourt turthn Instructed the jury, that 
to it, In accordance with the provisions of the plalnUfl"s po11ltlon was--Flm, that the 
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burden being upon the defendant to satisfy
them that Hall met death by his own hand,
intending to kill himself, the plaintilf had a
right to rely upon the alleged failure of the
defendant to prove that fact; second, that
it was asserted by the plaintiif that Hall's
death might have been occasioned simply
and solely by accident; and, third, that it
might have been the result of assassination;
and that, if the jury found that there was a
failure on the part of the defendant to prove
that Hall committed suicide, (whether he
was in his right mind or laboring under tem-
porary insanity being wholly immaterial)
or if they found upon the proofs that his
death was caused by accident and nothing
else, there must be a verdict for the plain-
tifl.
The defendant excepted (1) to the instruc-
tion that, on the question whether Hall com-
mitted suicide or not, the burden of proof
was on the defendant to satisfy the jury by
evidence which in their judgment outweigh-
ed that of the plaintiff that his death was by
suicide; (2) to the charge that the proofs of
death were proper evidence in the case, but
by no means conclusive; (3). to the submis-
sion to the jury of the question whether Hall
died as the result of assassination, and to
the charge that the evidence must be such
as satisfied the jury of the truth of the fact
in dispute.
Before the case was summed up to the
jury by counsel—which was done before the
giving of the chargokthe defendant present-
ed to the court 15 several written requests to
charge the jury. These requests are inserted
in the bill of exceptions after the statement
of the charge and the exceptions thereto,
and it is stated in regard to each of the re-
quests that the court refused so to charge
“except as already charged," and that the
defendant excepted to each refusal to
charge.
Although there are 25 alleged errors set
forth in the assignment of errors filed in the
court below, yet, as the brief of the plain-
tilf in error relies on but a few of them.
we confine our attention to those thus relied
on.
1. One Andrew S. Brownell was examined
as a witness for the defendant. At the time
he was examined-—in February, 18S8—he
was one of its directors, and had been its
secretary in 1885. in December, 1886, he
received, on behalf of the defendant, from
one John Sherman Moulton, as agent of the
plaintiff, certain proofs of death in the case.
He testifled that on that occasion he had a
slight conversation with said Moulton on the
subject of such proofs of death; that he
(Brownell) looked at them, and said they
were incomplete,—that the coroner’s verdict
did not accompany them,—and that Moulton
said it would be supplied in a few days.
Brownell was then asked by the defendant:
“Question. What was the substance of the
understanding between you as to the man-
ner in which .\Ir. Hall met his death, if that
was mentioned between you?” His answer
was: “Answer. That he had met his
death by his inflicting a pistol-shot; and
that we must have the coroner’s verdict.
which he said would be furnished in a few
days; and it came a few days later." Brown-
ell was then asked by the plaintiff: “Q.
Did you say to Mr. Moulton that you had
known Mr. Hall well, in California; and
that, if it depended upon you, the loss should
be paid without any delay? Did you state
that in that conversation or in any subse-
quent conversation?" This was objected to
by the defendant as irrelevant, but the ques-
tion was allowed, and the defendant ex-
cepted. The answer was: "A. I think that
I expressed such a personal feeling in the
matter.” He was then asked by the defend-
ant: “Q. You say that you expressed such
a personal feeling for Mr. Hall. What was
your feeling as to your obligations to the de-
fendant, in view of the risk excluded from
the policy, and the fact of the wound being
self-inflicted? A. In view of the policy of
the company, as shown in the certificate
that has been presented here, the company
could not pay it. It was against the policy
of the company to assume the risk of a
man’s death by shooting or by self-inflicted
wounds. Q. When you say that it was
against the policy of the company, what do
you mean by that? A. Against the decision
of the managers of the company as to the
best interests of the company, taken as a
whole. I did not mean the mere terms of
the policy, but the settled course of business
of the company."
It is contended by the defendant that the
declaration by Brownell to Moulton that, if
it depended upon him, (Brownelh) the loss
should be paid without any delay, was_ir-
relevant, and the admission of it in evidence
constituted error. But we think the evi-
dence was admissible. Brownell was a wit-
ness for the defendant, and the evidence in
question was brought out on his cross-ex-
amination. He had stated on his direct ex-
amination that the substance of the under-
standing between him and Moulton, at the
time the latter brough-t in the proofs of
death, as to the manner in which Hall me:
his death, was “that he had met his death by
his inflicting a pistol-shot;” and the evidence
in question. being drawn out on cross-exam-
ination. had a bearing upon the testimony
which Brownell had given on his direct ex-
amination, implying that Moulton had stated
that Hall met his death_“by his inflicting a
pistol-shot." The evidence was as to a part
of the same conversation, and we think it
was relevant and competent.
2. On the direct examination of .\Ir. Brown-
ell as a witness for the defendant he was
asked the substance of a conversation which
he had with one Charles W. Moulton, the
agent or attorney of the plaintiff, in Novem-
ber, 1886, on an occasion when said Moulton,
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Cue No. 157) PRODL7CT10N A~D EFF.ECT OF EVIDENCE. 
burden being upon the defendant to satiety 
them that Hull met death by his own hand, 
Intending to klll himself, the plaintiff had a 
right to rely upon the alleged failure ot the 
defendant to prove that fact; second, that 
It was asserted by the plaintiff that Hall'& 
death might have been occasioned etmply 
and solely by accident; and, third, that It 
might have been the result ot a8811118lnatlon; 
and that, If the jury found that there was a 
failure on the part of the defendant to prove 
that Hall committed suicide, (whether he 
was In hie right mind or laboring under tem-
porary IDBanlty being wholly Immaterial,) 
or It they found upon the proofs that his 
death was caused by accident and nothing 
else, there must be a verdict tor the plaln-
tltr. 
The defendant excepted (1) to the Instruc-
tion that, on the question whether Hall com-
mlttt'd suicide or not, the burden ot proof 
was on the defendant to satisfy the jury by 
evldf'nce which In their judgment outweigh-
ed that ot the plaintiff that his death was by 
suicide; (2) to the charge that the proofs ot 
death were proper evidence 1n the case, but 
by no means conclustve; (3) to the submis-
sion to the jury of the question whether Hall 
died as the result of 8881188lnatlon, and to 
the charge that the evidence must be auch 
.as t1atisfted the jury of the troth of the tact 
ID dispute. 
Before the case was summed up to the 
jury by counsel-which was done ~tore the 
giving ot the charge-the defendant present-
ed to the court 15 several written requests to 
charge the jury. 'l'hese requests are Inserted 
In the bill of exceptloDB after the statement 
ot the charge and the exceptions thereto, 
and it ls stated ID regard to each of the re-
quests that the court refused so to charge 
"except as already charged," and that the 
defendant excepted to each refusal to 
<:harge. 
Although there are 25 alleged errors Ret 
forth ID the assignment of errors ftle<J In the 
court below, yet, as the brief of the plaln-
tltr in error relies on but a tew ot them, 
we confine our attention to those thus relied 
on. 
1. One Andrew 8. Brownell was examined 
as a witness for the defendant. At tlle time 
he was examined-In February, 1888-he 
was one of Its directors, and had been its 
secretnry In 188:), In December, 1880, he 
recei\'ed, on behalf of the defendant, from 
one John Sherman Moulton, as agent of the 
plaintiff, certain proofs ot death in the case. 
He testified that on that occasion he bad a 
slight conversatlou with said Moulton on the 
subject of such proofs of death; that he 
(Brownell) looked at them, and said they 
were lncomplete,-that the coroner's verdict 
did not accompany them,-and that Moulton 
said It would be suppllro in a tew days. 
Brownell was then asked by the defendant: 
"Question. What was the substancf" of the 
und,.rstandlng between you as to the man-
~ 
ner In which llr. Hall met hie death, ll that 
was mentioned between you?'' His answer 
was: "Answer. That he had met hls 
death by his lnAlctlng a pistol-shot; and 
that we must have the coroner's verdict. 
which lie said would be furnlshed in a few 
days; and It came a few days later." Brown-
ell was then asked by the plalntl.lr: "Q. 
Did you say to Mr. Moulton that you had 
known Mr. Hall well, in California; and 
that, 1f lt depended upon you, the loas should 
be paid without any deluy? Did you state 
that ID that conversation or In any subse-
quent convel'B&tlon ?" This was objected to 
by the defendant as Irrelevant, but the ques-
tion was allowro, and the defendant ex-
cepted. The answer was: "A. I think that 
I expressed such a personal feeling in the 
matter." He was then asked by the defend-
ant: "Q. You say that you expressed auch 
a personal feeling for Mr. Hall. What waa 
your feeling as to your obligations to the de-
fendant, in view of the risk excluded from 
the policy, and the fact of the wound being 
self·lnfilcted? A. In view of the policy of 
the company, as shown in the certificate 
that has been presented here, the compaDJ' 
could not pay it. It was against the policy 
of the company to assume the risk of a 
man's death by shooting or bj self-lnfilcted 
wounds. Q. When you say that it was 
against the policy of the com1iany, what do 
you mean by that? A. Against the decision 
of the managers of the company as to t.he 
best interests of the <.'Ompany, taken u & 
whole. I did not Wt>an the mere terms of 
the policy, but the settled course of buslnetlB 
of the co1npnny." 
It ls contended by the defendant that the 
declaration by Brownell to Moulton that, it 
It dE"pE"nded upon him, (Brownell,) the loss 
should be paid without any delay, was Ir-
relevant, and the admission of It In evldeoce 
constituted errcr. But we think the evi-
dence was admissible. Brownell was a wit· 
ness for the defendant, and the evidence in 
qu<.>stlon was brought out on his cros~x· 
amluatlon. He had stated on his direct ex-
amination that the substance of the undef'· 
standing between him and Moulton, at the 
time the latter brought ID the proofs of 
death, as to the manner ID which Hall met 
his death, was "that he had met his death by 
his inftlctlng a pl9tol-ehot;" and the evidence 
1D question, being drawn out on cross-exam· 
!nation. he.d a lx>Uring upon the testimony 
which Brownt•ll had given on his direct ex· 
aminatlon, lmply!ng that Moulton had stated 
that Hall met ht.s death. "by his l.nfilctlng a 
pistol-shot." '.fhe evidence was as to a pa.rt 
of the same conversation, and we think It 
was relevant and competent. 
2. On the direct examination of :Mr. Brown· 
ell as a witness for the defendant he wu 
askro the substance of a conversation whk!I 
be had with one Charles W. )loulton, the 
ageut or attorney of the plalnttrr, In Novem-
ber, 1886, on an occas1on when said Moulton, 
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
[Case No 157
on behalf of the plaintiff, visited Brownell
at the otfice of the defendant. The question
was objected to by the plaintiff as immate-
rial, and was excluded, and the defendant ex-
cepted. A sufficient answer to this assign-
ment of error is that the bill of exceptions
does not state what the subject of the con-
versation \\"as, or what was intended to be
proved by it.
(J-"harles W. .\Ioulbon was the father of John
Sherman Mouiton. Subsequently, when Brown-
ell had been recalled by the defendant, and
it had been proved that Charles \V. Moulton
was the plaintiifs agent, the question was re-
peated by the defendant as to what Charles
W. Moulton said to Brownell when he visit-
ed the latter to make a claim on the defend-
ant for the payment of the $5,000. The in-
quiry was again ruled out, it not being stat-
ed what the subject of the conversation was,
or what was sought to be proved. The
proofs of death were furnished to the defend-
ant after this alleged conversation; and, even
if the conversation related to the cause or
manner of Hall's death, it could not bind the
plaintiff, in the absence of any authority by
the plaintiff to Moulton to make any state-
ment on the subject.
3. It is contended by the defendant that
the proofs of death, including the coroner’s
inquest, constituted an admission by plaintiff
that Hall came to his death by his own hand,
and that such admission was suflicient to
create a legal right in the defendant to have
a verdict directed for it. One of the defend-
ant's requests to charge was that, the plain-
tiff, in her proofs of death, having stated to
the defendant that the death was by suicide,
it was incumbent upon her to prove by s
preponderance of evidence that the state-
ment was mlstuken, and that the death was
the result of accident; and another was that,
the plaintiff's proofs of death having been
presented in her name, and by her agent iii
the matter, and constituting the essential
preliminary to her action, they must stand as
her acts, and the representations made there-
in must be taken as true, until at lmst some
mistake was shown to have occurred in them.
The facts of this case are thus stated in
the charge of the court to the jury, and there
was no exception to such statement: “It ap-
pears to be undisputed that Edward F. Hall
had lived about twenty years of his life in
San Francisco. He frequently—habitual1y,
perhaps—carried a pistol. He some time
during his life kept a pistol under his pillow.
He was a man of genial, sanguine tempera-
ment; hopeful,—making plans as to the fu-
ture; proud of his only son. But it also ap-
pears that for a long series of years he had
been suffering from severe headache,—to
such an extent that it created depression so
strong at times that the doctor describes it
as melancholia. It appears, further, that up-
on the evening prior to-his death he was with
a party of friends at the residence of Mr.
Johnson, and there, in the presence of two or
wn.ous,sv. -30
three witnesses, complained of suffering in-
tense pain in his head, frequently placing his
hands to his head, and complaining of the
severe pain which he suffered. The pecun-
iary circumstances of Hail have not been dis-
closed here further than the evidence as to
borrowing money of his sister. It is in proof
that he had a wife and son, his son in col-
lege, and that he took great interest in his
future. But it is also proper that I should
call your attention to the fact that at the mo-
ment of his death his wife was seriously ill—-
thonght to be hopelessly ill—in a distant city.
Upon the morning of the 19th of October,
1886, at 139 East Twenty-First street, in this
city, and between 7 and 7:30 o'clock of that
morning, Edward F. Hall was found in the
back hall bedroom of the fourth story, with
a severe wound in his right temple. The
wound was so severe that it caused a com-
minuted fracture of the frontal bone, and
fractures radiating up and down and back-
ward from the hole in the right temple, suffi-
cient, unquestionably, to produce his death.
He was found lying upon his bed, with the
clothes drawn up under the armpits, his
limbs relaxed, no evidence of any struggle
having taken place, and near his right hand
—\vithin a few inches, or very near it——was
the pistol, probably, which has been shown
in your presence, with three of its chambers
discharged. There was also found upon his
stand or desk a letter to his physician, in
substance stating that he has been suffering
terribly with headache; that he has had it
for several days; that it is growing worse,
and has become well-nigh unbearable."
In the proofs of death furnished to the de-
fendant, and signed by the plaintiif, was this
question: “Was the death of deceased caus-
ed by his own hand or acts, or in consequence
of a duel, or in violation of any law?" Her
answer to this was: “See statement of coro-
ner‘s physician, Dr. Jenkins.” In the state-
ment of Dr. Jenkins was this question:
“State the immediate cause of death." His
answer was: “Shock from penetrating pis-
tol shot; wound of head, (right tempie;) men-
tal aberration, superinduced by chronic head-
ache.” There was also this question to Dr.
Jenkins: “Was the death of deceased caused
or accelerated or aggravated by his own hand
or acts?" His answer was: “I examined the
deceased only as coroner's physician, and
therefore am unable to make any further
statement than above, other than from the
history. His mental condition was probably
due to chronic headache, which was caused
either by chronic meningitis orr tumor of
brain.”
It is contended for the defendant that, be-
cause of the contents of the proofs of death,
the plaintiff is estopped from claiming that
IIal1's death was caused otherwise than by
suicide; and that, at least, the court should
have held that the burden originally upon the
defendant was shifted, by the introduction
of the proofs of death, to the plaintiff, and
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CROSS-EXA.MIN ATIO!i. [Case No 151 
on behalt of the plaintiff, vl61ted Brownell 
at the omce of the defendant. The question 
was objected to by the plalntUf as lmme..te-
rlal, and was excluded, and the defendant ex-
cepted. A suftlclent answer to this assign-
ment of error Is that the bill of exceptions 
does not state what the subject of the con-
versation was, or what was Intended to be 
proved by It. 
Obe.rlee W. MoultlOn was the father of John 
Sherman Moulton. Subeequently, when Brown-
ell had been recalled by the defendant, and 
It had been proved that Oharlee W. Moulton 
was the platntltr's agent, the question was re-
peated by the defendant as to what Cbarlus 
W. Xoukon 81lld to Brownell when he visit-
ed the latter to make a claim on the defend-
ant for the payment of the '5,000. The in-
quiry was again ruled out, It not being stat-
ed what the subject of the conversation was, 
or what was sought to be proved. The 
proofs of death were furnished to the defend-
ant atter this alleged conversation; and, even 
1t the conversation related to the cause or 
manner of Hall's dee.th, It could not bind the 
plalnttfr, In the absence of any authority by 
the platntUf to Moulton to make a.ny state-
ment on the subject. 
3. It Is contended by the defendant that 
the proofs of death, Including the coroner's 
lnqueet, constituted an adml.sslon by plalntltr 
that Hall ca.me tlO his death by his own hand, 
and that mch admission was sumctent to 
create a legal right In the defendant to have 
a verdict directed for It. One of the detend-
$Dt's requests to charge was that, the plalu-
tlft', In her proofs ot death, having stated to 
the defendant that the death was by suicide, 
It was Incumbent upon her to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that rhe state-
ment was m18taken, and that the death was 
the result of accident; and another was that, 
the plaintiff's proofs of dea.tb having been 
presented In her name, and by her agent lb 
the me.tter, and constituting the eBBeDtlal 
preliminary to her action, they mu!tt stand aa 
her acts, and the representations made there-
in must be taken 88 true, until at 1'01LBt some 
mistake was shown to have oceurred. ln them. 
The tacts of this case are thus stated In 
the charge of the court to the Jury, and there 
was no exception to such statement: "It ap-
peal'B to be undisputed that Edward F. Hall 
bad llved about twenty years of his life tn 
San Francl:eco. He frequently-habitually, 
perhap&--<Brrled a pistol. He some time 
during his life kept a pistol under his plllow. 
He was a man of genial, 11BJ1gulne tempera-
ment; hopeful,-maklng plans as to the fu-
ture; proud of his only son. But 1t also ap-
pears that for a long series of years he had 
been su~rlng from severe headnche,-to 
such an extent that lt created depre&Slon HO 
strong at times thnt the doctor describes It 
as melancholia. It appears, further, that up-
on the evening prior to· his death he was wltll 
a pRrty ot friends at the residence of l\lr. 
Johnson, and there, In the presence of two or 
.... _ ........ ..., ....... on 
three witnesses, complained of suffering ln-
tenge pain In hie head, frequently placing hla 
hands to his head, and complaining of the 
severe pain which be suffered. The pecun-
iary circumstances of Hall have not been dis· 
closed here further tbe.n the evidence as to 
borrowing money of his sister. It ls in proof 
that he had a wife and son, his son lo col-
lege, and that he took gn!ftt Interest in his 
future. But It Is also proper that I should 
call your attention to the fact that at the mo-
ment of bis death his wife was seriously 111-
thought to be hopele881y Ill-In a dlstnnt city. 
Upon the morning of the 19th of October, 
1886, at 139 East Twenty-Flnrt street, In tbts 
city, and between 7 and 7:30 o'clock ot that 
morning, Edward F. Hall wu found tn the 
back ball bedroom of the fourth story, with 
a severe wound in his right temple. The 
wound was so severe that It caused a com-
mtnuted fracture of the frontnl bone, and 
fractures radiating up and down and back-
ward from the bole In the right temple, sum-
clent, unquestionably, to produce his death. 
He was found lying upon his bed, with the 
clothes drawn up under the armpits, bis 
limbs relaxed, no evidence of any struggle 
having taken place, and near hie right hand 
-within a few Inches, or very near It-was 
the pistol, probably, which has been shown 
In your presence, with three of Its chambers 
discharged. There was also faund upon his 
stand or desk a letter to hie physician, In 
substance statlng that he has been wrrerlng 
terribly wH:h headache; that he baa had It 
for several days; that It is growing worse, 
and has become well-nigh unbearable." 
In the proofs of dea.th furnished to the de-
fendant, and signed by the platntltT, was this 
question: "Was the death of deceased caus-
ed by his own hand or iwm, or in consequenee 
ot a duel, ar In violation of any law?" Her 
answer to this W88: "See statement of coro-
ner's pbyelclan, Dr. Jenkins." In the state-
ment of Dr. Jenkins was this queetlon: 
"State the Immediate cause of death." His 
answer was: "Shock from penetrating pis-
tol shot; wound of head, (right temple;) men-
tal aberration, superlnduced by chronic head-
ache." There was also this question to Dr. 
Jenkins: "Was the death at deceased caused 
or accelerated or aggravated by his own hand 
or acts?" His answer was: "I examined the 
deceased only 8!J coroner's physician, and 
therefore am unable to make any further 
statement than above, other than from the 
bbltory. His mental condition was probably 
due to chronic headache, which Wll8 ooused 
either by chronic meningitis ar tumor of 
braf.n." 
It Is contended for the defendant that, be-
cause of the contents of the proofs of dee.th, 
the plaintiff Is estopped from <'lalmlng that 
llnll's clcnth was caused otherwli;e than by 
suicide; anrl that, at lee.st, the court should 
have held that the burden originally upon the 
defendant was shifted, by the Introduction 
of the proofs of death, to the plaintiff, and 
Case No. 157]
PRODUCl.‘lON' A-ND EFFECI‘ OF EVIDENCE.
it became her duty to satisfy the jury, by
a preponderance of evidence, that Hall died
otherwise than by his own hand.
But the defendant was not prejudiced by
the statements and opinions contained in the
proofs of death, and the plaintiff wasnot
estopped thereby, as a matter of law. When
the court was asked to charge the jury that
by the introduction of those proofs the bur-
den was shifted, the evidence was all before
the jur_v, and was much more full and com-
plete than that upon which Dr. Jenkins had
based his opinion. He himself had been ex-
amined as a witness, and had testified as to
what he knew or did not know at the time
he made his certificate; and all the facts of
the case. so far as they were known, had
been explained in view of the contents of the
proofs of death. It appeared that most of
the statements in the certificate of Dr. Jen-
kins were based on hearsay. The instruc-
tion-s asked for in that respect, therefore,
would have been erroneous.
Nor did the declarations in the proofs of
death, when all taken together, necessarily
amount to an admission that Hall committed
suicide. The facts, or what Dr. Jenkins at
the time supposed to be the facts, were stat-
ed in the proofs of death; and, although the
defendant might have drawn therefrom the
conclusion of suicide, they ought to be scru-
tinized carefully when they are sought to be
used as amounting to an admission by the
plaintiff that the policy was void. The lan-
guage used by Dr. Jenkins in his certificate
is not inconsistent with the theory of death
by accident, especially in view of the fact
that, when he came to the direct question as
to whether Hall's death was caused by his
own hand or acts, he answered it by stating
that he was "unable to make any further
statements than above, other than from the
history;" the statements he had made above
being that the “immediate cause of death"
was “shock from penetrating pistol-shot;
wound of head, (right temple;) mental aber-
ration, superinduced by chronic headache.”
The jury were en-ti-rely at liberty to properly
find that that wound, although self-inflicted,
466
was accidental. The proofs of death, and
the entire evidence at the trial, left it in
doubt how Hall’s death was caused, and it
was for the jury to determine by their ver-
dict. The court charged the jury that, if
they should find that Hali’s death was caus-
ed by accident, they should find for the plain-
tiff. There was no exception to that in-
struction, and the case was cried on the theo-
ry that that was a correct construction of
the policy. The sixth request of the defend-
ant to charge was that, if the jury should
find that Hall shot himself “in any manner
except as by mere accident.” the defendant
was entitled to a verdict; the tenth request
was that the plaintiff had failed to give any
evidence that the death was accidental; and
the twelfth request was that the defendant
was not bound to exclude every theory of
accident.
. 4. As to the exceptions to the charge of the
court to the jury. we see no error therein.
It i-s contended that there was no evidence
from which the jury could find. as an a.tiirn1-
ative fact, that Hall died by accident or as-
sassination. In regard to this, as before re-
marked, the bili of exceptions does not pur-
port to set forth all the evidence in the case.
It was conceded that, if Hall’s death was by
accident or assassination, the policy covered
it, and, on the evidence given in the bill of
exceptions, we think the jury were fully
warranted in finding that it was by accident.
The defendant having alleged in its answer
that Ha1l’s death was due to one of the
causes excepted from the operation of the
policy, it was not error for the court to
charge the jury that the defendant was
bound to establish such defense by evidence
outweighing that of the plaintiff.
We think the court properly refused to
charge in accordance with the requests made
by the defendant, except as it had already
charged, and that it had already charged in
terms sufliciently full and correct as no the
particulars now insisted upon to have been
erroneous. Judgment aflirmed.
Mr. Justice BROWN dissenting.
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C1&Se No. 167] PRODUCflO:S- AND EFFECl' OF EVIDENCE. 
It became her duty ro lllltlsfy the jury, by 
a preponderance of evidence, t11at Hall 'llled 
otherwl.se than by hls own hand. 
But the defendant was not prejudiced by 
the statements and opinions contained In the 
proofs of death, and the plalntltr was · not 
estopped thereby, as a matter ot la.w. When 
the court was asked to chaI"ge the jury that 
by the Introduction of those proofs the bur-
den was shifted, the evidence was all before 
the Jury, and was much more full and com-
plete tllan that u1'°n wlllch Dr. Jenkins bad 
based his opinion. He himself had been ex-
amined as a witness, and had testified as to 
what lie knew or did not know at the time 
be made his certificate; and all the tacts of 
the ('8.Se, so tar as they were known, batl 
been explained lo view ot the contents ot the 
proofs of death. It appeared that most of 
the statements In the ceTtlficate of Dr. Jen-
kins we1·e based on hearsay. The lnstruc· 
tlons l!Bked tM In that respect, therefore, 
would ha\·e been erroneous. 
:Sor did the declaratloDS In the proofs ot 
death, wllen all taken together, nece88ftrlly 
amount to an adm188lon that Hall commltte<l 
suicide. The tacts, or what Dr. Jenkins at 
the time supposed to be the facts, were stat-
ed In the pro1>fs of death; and, although the 
detemlant might have drawn therefrom the 
conclusion ot suicide, they 1>ught to be scru-
tinized carefully when they a.re B1>ught to be 
used as amounting to an adml881on by the 
plalntltr that the policy was void. The lan-
guage used by Dr. Jenkins In bis certificate 
ls not Inconsistent with the theory of death 
by accident, especially In view of the fact 
that, when he came to the direct question as 
to whether Hall's death was caused by bis 
own hand or acts, he answered it by stating 
that he was "unable to make uy further 
statements than above, other than from the 
history;" the statements he bad made above 
being that the "Immediate cause or death" 
was "shock from penetrating pistol-shot; 
wound of bead, (right temple;) mental aber-
ration, superlnduced by chronic headache." 
The jury were entirely a.t liberty to properly 
find that that wound, although self-lntllcted, 
466 
wa..s accldental. The proofs of dath, and 
the entire e\"ldence at the trial, left it iB 
doulJt bow Hall's death was caused, and it 
wa..s for the jury ro determine by their ver-
dict. The court charged the jury that, if 
they should find that Hall's death was caus-
ed by a.ccldent, they should 1lnd for the p.laln-
tltr. There was no exception to ttiet In-
struction, and the case was tried on the theo-
ry that that was & correct construction of 
the pollcy. The sixth request ot the defend-
ant to charge was that, If the jury should 
find that Hall shot himself "In any manner 
except as by mere accident," the defendant 
was entitled ro a verdict; the tenth request 
wa.s tba.t the plaintiff bad tailed to give any 
evidence that the death was accidental; and 
the twelfth request was that the defendant 
was not bound to exclude every theory or 
accident. 
. 4. As to the exceptloDS to the charge ot the 
court to the jury, we aee no error therein. 
It Is contended tba.t there was DO ev1dence 
from which the jury could find, as an a.fllrm-
at!Ye tact, that Hall died by accident or as- 1 
saaslne.tlon. In regard to this, as before re-
marked, the bill of exceptions does not pur-
port to set forth all the evidence in the C88e. 
It was conceded that, If Hall's death wu by 
accident or ll888S8inatlon, the policy covered 
It, and, on the evidence given In the bill ot 
exceptions, we think the jury were fully 
warranted In finding that It was by accident. 
The defendant having alleged In Its answer 
that Hall's death was due to one of the 
causes excepted from the operation ot the 
policy, It was not error for the court to 
charge the jury that the defendant W8.8 
bound to establish such defense by evidence 
outweighing that of the plaintltr. 
We think the court property refused to 
charge In accordance with the requests made 
by the defendant, except as It had alre8dy 
charged, and that it had already charged Dl 
terms sumclently full and correct as to the 
particulars now Insisted upon to have been 
erroneous. Judgment aftlrmed. 
Mr. Justice BROWN dlsaentlng. 
CROSS—EXAMINATION.
[Case No. 158
ANHEUSER-BUSCH BREWING CO. v.
HUTMACHER.
(21 N. E. 626, 127 Ill. 652.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. April 5, 1889.
Appeal from appellate court, Third district.
The plaintitT’s first instruction, referred
to in the opinion, was as follows: “The court
instructs the jury that if they believe from
the evidence that the plaintiff, Hutmacher,
at the request of the defendant, performed
the services and did the work and labor
for the defendant in and about the pur-
chase of ice, and also in and about the con-
struction of an ice-house at Tompkins, or
Busch, in Missouri, as claimed by him, and
that in addition thereto the said Hutmacher
filled the said ice-house, or partly filled the
same, and also certain barges of defendant,
with ice, at the request of the defendant, and
that such filling with ice was done by the
said Hutmacher for the defendant under a
contract with the defendant that the said de-
fendant should pay said Hutmacher ten cents
per ton for all the ice so put in said ice-
house and said barges by said Hutmacher.
then the said Hutmacher would be entitled,
in addition to his compensation for services,
work. and laborin the purchase of ice, as afore-
said, and in the construction of the said ice-
house, whatever amount the amount of ice
so tilled in the said ice-house and said barges,
by said Hutmacher, would amount to at ten
cents per ton, so far as the same maybe
shown by the evidence, deducting whatever
the jury shall believe from the evidence has
been paid to the said Hutmacher; unless the
jury shall believe from the evidence that the
said Ilutmacher has been fully paid for his
said services, work, and labor, and the filling,
or part filling, of the said ice-house and
barges, or has accepted from the defendant
a certain sum of money in full satisfaction
and discharge of all of the said claims and
demands of the plaintiff.” The objection
urged to said instruction was that the court
thereby told the jury that, unless they should
believe that the said Hutmacher had accept-
ed of defendant a certain sum of money in
full satisfaction and discharge of all his
claims and demands, he would be entitled to
.a verdict for whatever the ice, so placed in
said ice-house and barges, would amount to,
at ten cents per ton. The instructions on
behalf of defendant which were refused by
the court were as follows: “(1) The court in-
structs the jury that long delay, in claiming
or demanding a money debt, by one in ne-
cessitous circumstances, and where, if it
was honestly due, it could be had for the
asking, would be a circumstance tending to
prove that no such indebtedness, in fact, ex-
isted between the parties; and that, in de-
termining whether the demand, in any case,
is well founded or not, the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the claim, in view of
all the surrounding facts and circumstances,
should be taken into account. (2) The court
instructs the jury that, where the testimony
of a witness is so extraordinary as to be man-
ifestly contrary to all human observation and
experience, and so manifestly repugnant to
right reason as to appear, when taken in con-
nection with its related facts and surround-
ing circumstances, incredible and unnatural,
—as if one should say he had, in the open
market, of a sane and intelligent person, pur-
chased agcnuine coin of the value of five
dollars for a penny,— then. in that event,
such testimony may be by them wholly dis-
regarded and for naught held, as being con-
tradicted by human reason and the common
experience of mankind.”
George W. Fogg, for appellant.
Govert, for appellee.
Carter dz
BAILEY. J. This was a suit in assumpsit,
brought by Rudolph Hutmacher against the
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association, acor-
poration organized and doing business at St.
Louis, Mo., to recover for work, labor, and
services of the plaintiff in superiutending
the erection of an ice-house, and cutting,
storing, and purchasing ice for the defendant.
The trial in the circuit court resulted in a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $1,640
and costs, which judgment was afiirmed by
the appellate court on appeal, and by a fur-
ther appeal the record has been brought to
this court. To the declaration, which con-
sisted of only the common counts, the de-
fendant pleaded no/n as-sumpsit and the pay-
ment by the defendant to the plaintiff of cer-
tain sums of money, which were received by
the plaintiff in full satisfaction and discharge
of the indebtedness sued for. Upon the is-
sues thus formed the evidence was to a con-
siderable degree conflicting. But, as all
questions of fact have been conclusively set-
tled by the appellate court, we must accept
the verdict and judgment as the only proper
result of the evidence, it being open to this
court to review the record only so far as it
may be shown to contain errors of law.
Error is assigned upon the refusal of the
court to grant the defendant’s motion for a
continuance. Said motion was supported by
an aihdavit showing the absence of five wit-
nesses, all residents of St. Louis, and all be-
ing otiicers or employés of the defendant,
\'iz.: Adolph Busch, its president; Erwin
Spraul, the general superintendent of its out-
door business; Gustav Housman, its assist-
ant secretary; George Krug, its general and
comrnercial agent; and Henry Jacobs, its
master carpenter and builder. The mate-
riality ol’ the testimony of each of these wit-
nesses seems to be suiiiciently shown, and
the only question is whether there is surfi-
cient proof of diligence in endeavoring to
procure_ their attendance. The atiidavit
shows that at a prior day of the same term
the defendant had all of said witnesses in
court ready to testify, but that at the time of
making the aifidavit for a continuance they
were all absent from the state, Krug and Ja-
cobs being temporarily in Nebraska, Hous-
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CBOSS-EXAMIN ATION. (CJlS6 No. 158 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH BREWING CO. v. 
HU'.rM:ACHER. 
(21 N. E. 626, 127 Ill. 652.) 
Supri>me Court of Illinois. April 5, 1889. 
Appeal from appellate court, Third district. 
The plaintiff's first Instruction, referred 
to in the opinion, was as follows: "The court 
instructs the jury that If they believe from 
the evidence that the plaintiff, Hutmacher, 
at the request of the defendant, performed 
the services and did the work and labor 
for the defendant in and about the pur-
ehase of ice, and also in and about the con-
struction of an ice-house at 'fompkins, or 
Busch, in Misi1omi, as claimed by him, and 
thRt in addition thert-to the said Hutmacher 
filled the said ice-house, or partly filled the 
same, and also certain barges of defendant, 
with lee, at the request of the defendant, and 
that such filling with ice w11s done by the 
eaid Hutm1tcher for the defendant under a 
~ontract with the defendant that the said de-
fendant should pay said Hutmacher ten cents 
per ton for all the ice so put in said ice-
bouse and said barges by said Hutmarher, 
then the said Hutmacher woulrl be entitled, 
in addition to bis compensation for services, 
work, and labor in the p11 rchase of ice, as afore-
said, and in the construction of the said ice-
honse, whatever amount the amount of ice 
so fl lied in the said ice-house and said barges, 
by said Hutmacher, would amount to at ten 
cents per ton, so f1tr as the same may be 
shown by the ~vidence, deducting whatever 
the jury shall believe from the evidence has 
been paid to the said Hutmacher; unless the 
jury shall believe from the evidence that the 
s11id Hutmacher has been fully paid for his 
said services, work, and labor, and the filling, 
or part lilling, of the said ice-house and 
barges, or has accepted from the defendant 
a cei·taln sum of mom•y in full sati!lfaction 
and discharge of all of the said claims and 
demands of the plaintiff." The objection 
urge•! to said instruction was that the court 
thereby told the jury that, unless they should 
believe that the said Hutmach~r had accept-
-ad of defendant a certain sum of money in 
tun satisfaction and discharge or all his 
claims and demands, he would be entitled to 
a verdict for whatever the ice, so placed in 
said ice-house and barges, would amount to, 
at ten cents per ton. The instructions on 
behalf of defendant which were refused by 
the con rt we1·e a.'I follows: "(1) The court in-
-strncts the jury that long delay, in claiming 
or demanding a money debt, by one in ne-
cessitous circumstances, and where, if it 
was honestly due, it could be had for the 
asking, would be a circumstance tenrling to 
prove that no such indebtedness, in fact, ex-
isted between the parties; and that, in de-
termining whether the demand, in any case, 
is well founded or not, the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the claim, in view of 
all the surrounding facts and circ11mi1tances, 
should be taken into account. (2) The court 
instructs the jury that, where the testimony 
of a witnes.'I is so extraordinary as to be man-
ifestly contrary to all human observation and 
experience, and so manifestly repugnant to 
right reason as to appear, when taken in con-
nection with its related facts and surround-
ing circumstances, incredible and unnatural, 
-as if one should say he had, in the open 
market, or a sane and intelligent person, pur-
chased a genuine coin of the value of 11 ve 
dollars for a penny,- then, in that event~ 
such testimony may be by them wholly dis-
regarded and for naught held, as being con-
tradicted by human reason nnd the common 
experience of mankind." 
George W. Fogg, for appellant. Ca1·ter cf 
Gof!et·t, for appellee. 
BAILEY, J. Thill was a suit in ass11mpsft, 
brought by liudolph Hutmacher against the 
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association, a cor-
poration organized and doing business at St. 
Louis, .Mo., to recover for work, labor, and 
services of the plaintiff in superintending 
the erection of an ice-house, and cutting, 
storing, and purchasing Ice for the defendant. 
'.rhe trial in the circuit court resulted in a 
judgment in favor ol the plaintiff for $1,640 
and costs, which judgment was affirmed by 
the appellate court on appeal, and by a fur-
ther appeal the record has been brought to 
this court. To the declaration, which con-
sisted of only the common counts, the de-
fendant pleaded non aasumpsit and the pay-
ment by th1i defendant to the plaintiff of cer-
tain sums of money, which were received by 
the plaintiff in full satisfaction and discharge 
of the indebtedness sued for. Upon the is.; 
sues thus formed the evidence was to a con-
siderable dt>gree conflicting. But, as all 
questions of fact have been conclusively set-
tled by the appellate court, we must accept 
the verdict and judgment as the only proper 
result of the evidence, it being open to this 
court to review the record only so far as it 
may be shown to contain errors of law. 
Error is assigned upon the refnsal of the 
court to grant the defendant's motion for a 
continuance. Said motion was supportecl by 
an afttllavit showing the absence of five wit-
m~sses, all residents or St. Lonis, and all be-
ing officers or employes of the defendant, 
viz.: Adolph Busch, its president; Erwin 
Sprau], the general superintendent of its out-
door business; Gustav Housman, its assist-
ant 11ecretary; George Krug, its general and 
commercial agent; and Henry Jacobs, its 
master carpentE>r and bnilder. The mate-
riality of the testimony of each of these wit-
nesses seems to be sulticiently shown, and 
the only question ls whether there Is suffi-
cient proof of diligence In endeavoring to 
procure. their attendance. The affidavit 
shows that at a prior day of the same term 
the defendant had all of said witnesses in 
court ready to testify, but thRt at the time of 
making the affidavit for a continuance they 
were all absent from the state, Krug and Ja-
cobs being t.emporarily in Nebraska, Hous-
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mun being in attendance upon the circuit
court at linnsus City, l\lo., as a witness. and
Busch and spraul being both coniined to
their houses in St. Louis by sickness. The
court held the atiidnvit suilicient so far as it
related to witnesses Busch and Spranl, but
insnificient as to the others, and, the plain-
tiff electing to admit the ailid.-wit in evidence
so far as it related to the testimony of Busch
and Sprani, the motion for a. continuance
was overruled. The rule is too familiar to
require the citation of authorities that, to
entitle a party to a continuance on account
of the absence of material witnesses, it must
be shown that due diligence has been used to
obtain their testimony. That the aiiidavit in
this case fails to show such diligence is too
plain for argument. All of the absent wit-
nesses were in court one day during the ear-
lier part of the same term, and were there-
fore within reach of process, but neither was
served with subpcena, nor is it pretended
that any attempt was made to subpoena
them. All were officers or empioyés of the
defendant, and subject to its orders, and it
will be presumed that their attendance before
a commissioner might'have been procured
at any time, yet no eiforts are shown to have
been made to obtain their depositions, al-
though the suit had been pending more than
eight months, and had been once continued
at the instance of the defendant on account
of the absence of witnesses. Upon such a
showing as to diligence, the motion for a con-
tinuance was properly overruled.
Complnint is made of various rulings of
the court in relation to the admission of evi-
dence. While the plaintiff was on the stand
as a witness in his own behalf, the defend-
ant's counsel, on cross-examination, put to
him questions as to the defendant’s solvency
and his own insolvency during the period
which intervened between the accruing of
the indebtedness sued for and the commence-
ment oi the suit. These questions were ob-
jected to on the ground that they were not
proper cross-examination, and the objection
was sustained. N0 questions had been put
to the witness, on his direct examination, as
to the solvency of the defendant, or his own
insolvency, or in any way involving those
subjects, and therefore, according to the
well-settled practice in this state, it was not
open to the defendant to put to the plaintiif
questions in relation to them on cross-exam-
ination. Stafford v. Fargo, 35 Ill. 481; Bon-
net v. Glattfeldt, 120 ill. 166, 11 N. E. Rep.
250; Lloyd v. Thompson. 5 Ill. App. 90;
Waller v. Carter, 8 Ill. App. 511. See, also,
Railroad Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448; Floyd
V. Bovard. 6 Watts & S. 75; 1 Greenl. Ev.
§ 445. If the defendant deemed the inquiry
material, it should have introduced evidence
in relation thereto, either by recalling the
plaintiff. or by the production of other testi-
inony, after the plaintiff had closed his case.
Complaint is also made of the ruling of the
court sustaining an objection to questions
put to the plaintiii on cross-examination,
calling for the contents of a certain letter
written by Spruul to the plaintiff, and which
appears to have been lost. These questions
were excluded, on the ground that they were
not proper cross-examination, but it is sul'li-
cient to say that no exception to the ruling
was preserved, and its propriety is therefore
not open to review.
The court also sustained objections to ques-
tions put to the plaintiff on cross-exa1uina-
tion, as to the gross cost of putting up the
ice, for which he claims a. commission by
contract of 10 cents per ton. The witness
was not examined on that subject on his di-
rect examination, and for that reason the
questions objected to were improper. More-
over, the plaintiff was seeking to recover
upon an express contract with the defendant
as to the amount of his compensation, and
under such contract the amount of the gross
cost of cutting and putting up the ice would
seem to be immaterial.
A number of telegrams in relation to the
labor and services sued for, and purporting
to have been sent by the defendant to the
plaintiff, were produced by the plaintiif,
and, on proof that they were received by him
from the telegraph company in the usual
course of business, they were admitted in
evidence,against the objection and exception
of the defendant. Several letters of dates
contemporaneous with the telegrams written
by the defendant to the plaintiff were also
read in evidence, in which the defendant ad-
mitted having communicated with the plain-
tilf by telegraph, and in some of which let-
ters copies of the telegrams sent were given,
the same being exact copies of telegrams of
the same date, read in evidence. The posi-
tion now taken is that the papers delivered
by the telegraph company to the plaintifi are
only copies, the originals being the telegrams
signed by the defendant, and delivered by it
to the telegraph oillce from which the mes-
sage was sent, and it is urged that such
0l'igin:\ls' should have been produced, or some
proper foundation laid for the introduction
of secondary evidence of their contents. The
application of the rule of evidence here con-
tended for must depend upon whether the
messages delivered by the telegraph company
to the plaintiff, or those delivered by the de-
fendant to the telegraph operator, are. as be-
tween the parties in this suit, to be deemed
the originals. In Durkee v. Railroad Co., 29
Vt. 127, the rule which we consider the most.
reasonable one is laid down, viz.: That the
original, where the person to whom it is sent
takes the risk of its transmission, or is the
employer of the telegraph, is the message de-
livered to the operator; but where the person
sending the message takes the initiative, so
that the telegraph company is to be regarded
as his agent, the original is the message aci-
ually delivered at the end of the line. See,
also, Savelund v. Green, 40 Wis. -131; Tele-
graph Co. v. Shotter, 71 Ga. 700; Wilson v.
Railroad Co., 31 Minn. 481, 18 X. W. Rep.
291; Dunning v. Roberts, 35 Barb. 4615;
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m:m being in attendance upon the circuit 
court at Kilnsas City, ~Jo., as a witness, and 
Busch and Spraul being both confined to 
thelr houses in St. Louis by sickness. The 
court held the affidavit sufficient so far as it 
related to witnesses Busch and 8praul, but 
Insufficient as to the others, and, the pluin-
titf electing to admit the atlidavit in evidence 
so far as it i·elated to the testimony of Busch 
and Spraul, the motion for a continu1tnce 
was overruled. The rule Is too familiar to 
require the citation of authorities that, to 
entitle a party to a continuance on account 
of the absence of material witnesses, it must 
be shown that due diligence has been used to 
obtain their testimony. That the affidavit in 
this case fails to show such diligence is too 
plain for argument. All of the absent wit-
nesses wPre in court one day during the ear-
lier part of the same term, and were there-
fore within reach of process, but neither was 
served with subpcena, nor is it pretended 
that any attempt was made to subprena 
them. All were officers or employes of the 
defendant, and subject to its orders, and it 
will be presumed that their attendance before 
a oommissloner might •have been procured 
at any time, yet no efforts are shown to have 
been made to obtain their depositions, al-
though the suit had been pending more than 
eight months, and had been once continued 
4&t the instance of the defendant on account 
of the absence of witnessPs. Upon such a 
showing as to diligence, the motion for a con-
tinuance was properly overruled. 
Complaint is made Qf various rulings of 
the court in relation to the admission of evi-
dence. While the plaintiff was on the stand 
as a witness in his own behalf, the defend-
ant's counsel, on croBB-examination, put to 
him questions M to the defendant's solvency 
and his own insolvency during the period 
which intervened between the accruing of 
the indelJtedness sued for and the commence-
ment of the suit. 'fhese q uestion1:1 were ob-
jected to on the ground that they were not 
proper cross-examination, and the objection 
wa.s sustained. No questions bad been put 
to the witness, on his direct examination, as 
to the solvency of the defendant, or his own 
insolvency, or in any way Involving th.ose 
subjects, and therefore, according to the 
well-settled practice in this state, it was not 
open to the defendant to put: to the plaintiff 
questions in rPlation to them on cross-exam-
ination. Stafford v. Fargo, 35 111. 481; Bon-
net·•· Glattfeldt, 120 lll. 166, 11 N. E. ltep. 
250; Lloyd v. Thompson, 5 Ill. App. 90; 
Wallu v. Carter, 8 Ill. App. 511. See, also, 
Railroad Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448; ~'loyJ 
v. Bovard, 6 Watts & S. 75; 1 Greenl. Ev. 
~ 445. If the defendant deemed the inquiry 
material, it should have introtluced evidence 
in relation thereto, either by recalling the 
plaintiff. or by the production of other testi-
mony, after the plaintiff had closed his case. 
Complaint is also made of the ruling of the 
court switaining an ubjection to questions 
put to the plaintiff 011 cross-examination, 
468 
calling for Lhe contt>nts of a certain letter 
written by Spraul to the ptaintitT, and which 
appears to have been lost. '.rl1Pse questions 
were exclud<>d, on the ground that they were 
not proper cross-examination, but it is sufli-
cient lo say that no exception to the ruling 
was preserved, and Its propriety is therefore 
not open to review. 
The court also sustaine1l objections to quPs-
tions put to the plaintiff 011 cross-examina-
tion, as to the gross cost of putting up the 
ice, for which he claims a commission by 
contract of 10 cents per ton. The witness 
was not examined on that. subject on his di-
rect examination, and for that reason t:he 
questions objected to were improper. More-
over, the plaintiff was seeking to recover 
upon an expres!I contract with the defendant 
1U1 to the amount of hi& compensation, and 
under such contract the amount of the gros.~ 
cost of cutting and putting up the ice would 
seem to be immate1·ial. 
A number of teh•grams in relation to the 
labor and services sued for, and purporting 
to have been sent by the defendant to the 
plalntitT, were produced by the plaintiff. 
and, on proof that they were received by him 
from the telegraph company in the usual 
conrse of business, they were admitted in 
evidence, against the objection and exception 
of the defendant. Several letters of date$ 
contemporaneous with the telegrams written 
by the defendant to the plaintiff were also 
read m evidence, in which the defendant ad-
mitted having communicated with the plain-
tiff by telegraph, and in some of which let-
ters copies of the telegrams sent were given. 
the 11ame being exact copies of telegrams of 
the same date, read in evidence. The posi-
tion now taken is that the papers delivered. 
by the telegt"aph company to the plaintiff are-
only copies, the 01·iginals being the telegram& 
signed by the defendant, and delivered by it. 
to the telegraph office from which the mes-
sage was sent, and it is urged that such 
originals shonld have been prn.luced, or som& 
proper foundation laid for the introduction 
of secondary evidence of their contents. The 
application of the rule of evidence here con-
tended for must depend upon whether the 
messages delivered by the telegraph company 
to the plaintiff, or thosfl delivered by the de-
fendant to the telegraph operator, are, as be-
tween the parties in this suit, to be deemed 
the ori!{inals. In Durkee v. H.ailroad Co., 29 
Vt. 1<!7, the rule which we consider the most. 
reasonable one is laid down, viz. : That the 
original, where the person to whom it is sent 
takes the risk of its transmission, or is the 
employer of the telegraph, is the message de-
livered to the operator; but where tl1e person 
sending the message takes the initiative, B<> 
that the telegraph company is to L>e regarded 
as his agent, the original is the message acl-
ually deli ve1·ed at the end of the Ii ne. ~. 
also, 8aveland v. Green, 40 Wis . .i;H; Tele-
graph Co. v. Sholter, 71 Ga. 700; Wilson v. 
Hailroad Co., 31 Minn. 481, 18 X. W. Hl'p. 
291; Dunnin11: v. ltoberts, 35 Barb. 4tH; 
CROSS—EXAM[NATlON.
[Case No. 158
Gray, Tel. §§ 104. 129. The same rule was
adopted by this court in Morgan v. People, 59
Ill. 58.
The fact that the defendant took the ini-
tiative in sending the tEl€gl"r\ll'lS, thus em-
ploying the telegraph company as its agent,
is clearly shown by its letters to the plaintiff,
read in evidence. Having thus employed
such agent to convey communications to the
plaintiif, in must be held to be bound by the
acts of its agent to the extent at least of
making the messages delivered originals,
thereby constituting them primary evidence
of the contents of the messages sent. It
should be observed that there is no sugges-
tion that any of these messages were errone-
ously transmitted, and the case, therefore,
does not present the question, upon which
there is some conflict in the authorities,
whether the sender of a telegram makes the
telegraph company its general agent so as to
become responsible for the acts of such
agent, where there is a departure from the
authority actually given, by transmitting the
message incorrectly.
Some criticisms are made upon the rulings
of the court in giving the plaintiffs first in-
struction, and in refusing two instructions
asked by the defendant. The plaintiff's first
instruction is a correct stateinent of the law
applicable to the case, and the objection
urged to it is not well taken. Both the de-
feuda.nt’s instructions refused are clearly er-
roneous. We find no error in the record,
and the judgment of the appellate (‘~.‘l.".‘l5 will
therefore be aliirmed.
469
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
09
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CBOSS-EXAMIN ATIOY. [Case No. lb8 
Grny, Td. ~§ 104, 129. The same rule was 
adopted by tbis court in Morgan v. People, 59 
111. 5tl. 
'fhe fact that the defendant took the lnl-
tiat.ive in sending the telegrams, thus em-
ploying the telegraph company as its agent, 
is clearly shown by its letters to the plaintilT, 
read in evidence. Having thus employed 
sud1 agent to convey communications to Lhe 
pl11i11titf, it must be held to be bound l>y the 
acts of its agent to the extent at least of 
making the messages delivered orlginals, 
therel.ly constituting them prim11ry evidence 
of the contents of the messagPS sent. It 
Rhould be ol.lserved that there is no sugges-
tion that any of these messages were errone-
ously transmitted, and the case. thertifore, 
does not present the question, upon which 
there is some conflict in the authorities, 
whether the sende1· of a telegram makes the 
telegraph company Its general agent so as to 
become responsible for the aets of such 
agent, where there Is a departure from the 
authority actually given, by transmitting the 
message incorrectly. 
Sotoe criticisms are made upon the rulings 
of the court in giving the plaintiff's first in-
stt-uction, and in rf'fnsing two instructions 
askt>d by the defendant. The plaintiff's first 
instruction is a correct statement of the law 
applical.lle to the case, and the object.ion 
urged to it is not well taken. Both the de-
fendant's instructions refused are clearly er-
roneous. We find no error in the record, 
and the judgment of the appellate <'Ill' ;t will 
the1·eCore be alllrmed. 
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_ James Artery
CHICAGO, M. 8:. ST. P. RY. CO.v. ARTERY.
(11 Sup. Ct. 129, 137 U. S. 507.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 22,
1890.
In error to the circuit court of the
United States for the northern district of
Iowa.
John W. Cary, for plaintiff in error. H.
B. Fouke and D. E. Lyon, for defendant in
error.
BLATCHFORD, J. This is an action at
law, hrought in the district court of Du-
buque county, in the state of Iowa-, by
against the Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Railway Company, a
Wisconsin corporation, to recover dam-
ages for a personal injury, and removed
by the defendant into the circuit court of
the United States for the northern district
oi Iowa. The petition alleges that the
defendant owns and operates aline of rail-
road from Dubuque, in Iowa, to La
Crosse, in Wisconsin, and St. Paul, in Min-
nesota, and in the operation of it uses lo-
comotives propelled by steam, hand-cars
propelled by hand, and cars drawn by its
locomotives; that the plaintiff, on March
5, 1883, and for several months prior there-
to, was in the employ of the defendant in
the use and operation of the road in the
county of Allamakee, in Iowa, in working
upon its road and road-bed, in keeping
the tics in good order, in keeping the road
well and properly bailasted, in removing
obstructions from its track, in keeping its
culverts and crossings in repair, in keep-
ing the iron on the road properly spiked
and fastened, and in keeping the road-bed
fit for use and operation along its line of
road and right oi wayin the county of Al-
iamakee; that in doing such work, cars
propelled by steam and hand-cars were
used by the plaintiff and others. the cars
being furnished by the defendant; that
while in such employ, the plaintiff left the
village oi Harper's Ferry, in said county,
with other employes, under a foreman of
the defendant, named Iiellehan, and went
north somel0 miles, making repairs on the
road; that, after doing such work, and
towards evening, the foreman ordered a
start to return to I-Iarper’s Ferry, on a
small hand-car, on which were placed sev-
en or eight men, and more than the car
could or ought to carry; that. when the
hand-car was ordered by the foreman to
start to Harper's Ferry. it was started at
the time that a train of cars was due, of
which the plaintiff then had no knowledge‘,
that the snow had been falling, and there
was snow on the rails,and theforeman or-
dered the plain tiff to get a shovel and seat
himself on the front of the hand-car, and
hold the show el on the top of the rail, in
order to remove the snow as the hand-car
went forward; that on the hand-car there
were no places provided for the feet to rest
upon while performingsuchduty; that the
plaintiff was compelled, in order to hold
the shovel, to exert all his strength, and
by muscular exertion hold up his icct and
at the same time guide and hold the
shovel; that the hand-car was run ahead
of the train, then due, at the rate of more
than 10 miles an hour, being a dangerous
speed: that while it was so running, and
the plaintiff was holding the shovel, and
while it was crossing over a cattle-guard
in the road. and without any fault or
negligence on his part, his foot was caught.
and he was thrown off and under the
hand-car, his body doubled up, his spine
injured, and his backbone broken; that by
reason thereof he has been confined to his
bed ever since, unable to work, and sui-
fering great pain in body and mind; and
that all this happened by the negligence of
the defendant in furnishing unfit and im-
proper hand-cars, in requiring onerous
and dangerous duty from the plaintiff, in
running the hand-car at a dangerous rate
of speed, and in overloading it. Damages
are claimed in the sum of $20,000, besides
the sum oi $1,000 for money paid for
board, care, and surgical and medical
treatment. The petition was afterwards
amended by alleging further that the
hand-car was not constructed with rea-
sonably saie appliances to push the snow
off from the rails, which appliances could
, easily have been furnished by the defend-
ant; that it was wanting in the proper
kind of a brake, and the proper kind of a
ioot-rest for doing the kind of work which
the plaintiff was ordered to do; that,
when the plaintiff was ordered by the fore-
man to sit down on the front of the hand-
car and hold the shovel, he was unaware
of any danger therefrom, and had reason
to believe and did believe that the hand-
car would be run by the foreman at a safe
rate of speed: that it was run at an un-
reasonable and unnecessary fast and dan-
gerous speed, which the plaintlff could not
control, nor could he leave the car while
it was in motion: that the cattle-guard
was made of three-cornered pieces of
wood. placed negligently on top of the ties,
across the track instead of lengthwise.
and some of the three-cornered pieces stood
higher than the surface ofthe rail, of which
fact the plaintiff was not then aware;
and that, by reason of such negligent con-
struction of the cattle-guard, the speed
of the hand-car, and the dangerous and
tiresome position in which the defendant
placed the plaintiff, he was injured either
by his foot or feet coming in contact with
the rail or the three-cornered pieces, or by
the shovel getting caught on the rail or
on such pieces, or by all of such circum-
stances. The answer of the defendant con-
tains a general denial, and an allegation
of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff. The case was tried by a
jury, which rendered a verdict for the
plaintiff of $13,500, for which, with costs,
he had judgment, to review which the
defendant has brought a writ of error.
One of the principal points taken by the
defendant is that this was a. case of an in-
jury rcsulting from the negligence of a co-
employe, namely, the foreman Rcllehan, in
the management and running of the hand-
car, and did not fall within the provisions
of the statute oi Iowa. on the subject. On
the Sth of April, 1862, a statute was en-
acted in Iowa (Laws 1862, c. 16!), § 7. p.
198,) as follows: “Sec. 7. Every railroad
company shall be liable for all damages
sustained by any person, including em-
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Case No. 159] PHODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDE~CE. 
CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. v. ARTERY. 
(11 Sup. Ct. 129, 137 U. S. 507.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 22, 
1800. 
In error to the circuit court of the 
United States for the northern district of 
Iowa. 
John W. Cury, for plaintiff In error. H. 
B. Fouke and D. E. L,yon, for defendant lo 
error. 
BLATCHFORD, J. Tbl1 ls an action at 
law, hrongh t In the district court or Du-
buque connty, In the state of Iowa, by 
James Artery agaloHt thA Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Railway Cou1pnny, a 
"\\'h~consln corporation, to recover dam-
ages for a personal Injury, and remo,·ed 
by the defend1mt Into the circuit court of 
the United States for the northern dh1trlct 
of Iowa. The petition alleges that the 
defendRnt owns and operate1:1 a. line of rall-
roBd from Dubuque, In Iowa, to La 
Crosse, In Wisconsin, and St. Paul, In Min-
nesota, end In the operation of It uses lo-
comotives propelled i,y steam, hand-cars 
propelleli by hnnd, and ca~ drawn by Its 
locomotives; that the plaintiff, on March 
5, 1'*'3, and for several months prior there-
to, was In the employ of the defenliant In 
the use and operation of the road In the 
county of Allamakee, In Town, In working 
upon lb~ road and road-bed, In keeping 
the ties In good order, In keeping the road 
well and properly ballasted, In removlDlt 
obstructions from Its track, In keeping its 
culverts and cro11slngs In repair, In keep. 
Ing the Iron on the road properly spiked 
and fastened, and In keeping the ronli-bed 
flt for use and operation along Its line of 
ro1td and right of way In the county of Al-
lamakee; that In doing 11urh work, cars 
propelled by steam and hund-cars were 
used by the plaintiff and others. t11e cars 
being furnished by the defendant; that 
while In f',Jch employ, the plaintiff lert the 
village of Harper's Feny. in t1nid county, 
with other employe11, under a forem11n of 
the defendant, named Rellehan, and went 
north some 10 miles, mnkln~ repairs on the 
road; thut, after doing such work, and 
towards evening, the foreman ordered a 
start to return to Harper's Ferry, on a 
small band-c1tr, on which were placed se\"-
en or eight men, and more than the car 
could or ought to carry; that. when the 
baud-car was ordered by the furem1tn to 
start to Harper'R Ferry, It was started at 
the time that a. truin of cars wa111 due, of 
which the plaintiff then ha<l no knowledge~ 
that the snow had been fnlllng, and there 
was snow on the rails, and the foreman or-
dered the 11laln tiff to get a sho\'el and seat 
himHclf on the front of the hnncl-cnr, and 
hold the shu~ el on the top of the rail, In 
order to remove the snow as the hand-car 
went forw1ud; thut on the hund-cnr there 
were no places provided for the feet to re11t 
upon while perrormingimchduty; tbatthe 
plaintiff was compelled, In order to hold 
the shovel, to exert all his strength, and 
hy mui;culnr exertion holll up his feet anti 
at the same time guide and bohl the 
shovel; that the hand-car wus run ahead 
of the truln, then due, at the rate of more 
4i0 
than JO miles an hour, being a dnnget'ous 
11peed: that while It was so running, and 
the plalntln was holding the sho\•el, and 
while It waR crossing over a cattle-guard 
In the roa11. und without any fault or 
negligence on his part, hl1:1 foot wnscaught, 
and be was thrown off and under the 
hand-car, his body doubled up, his spine 
Injured, and bis backbone broken; that by 
reason thereof he has been confined to his 
bed ever since, unable to work, and suf-
fering great pain In body and mind; and 
that all this happened by the negligence of 
the defendant In furnishing untit and hn-
proper hand-cars, In requiring oneroutJ 
and dangerous duty from the plalntlll, lo 
running the hand-car at a dangerous rate 
of speed, and in overloading it. Damages 
are claimed In the sum or $20,000, bee!dee 
the sum of $1,000 for money paid for 
bourd, care, and surgical and medical 
treatment. The petition was afterwards 
amended by alleging further that the 
hand-car was not constructed with rea-
sonably safe appliances to push the snow 
off from the rails, which appliances could 
eu11lly have been furnished by the defend-
ant; that It was wanting in the proper 
kind of a brake, and the proper kind of a. 
foot-rest for doing the kind of work which 
the pllllntlff was ordered to do; that. 
when the pluintlft was orderecJ by the fore-
man to sit down on the front of the hand-
car end hold the shovel, he was unaware 
of any danger therefrom, and had reason 
to belle\·e nod did believe that the hand-
car would be run by the foreman at a safe 
rate of speed: that ft was run at an un-
reasonable Rod unnecessary faRt and dan-
gerous speed, which the plaintiff could not 
control, nor could he leave the rar '''bile 
It was in motion; that the cattle-guard 
was made of three-cornered pieces of 
wood. plnred negligently on top of the ties. 
, across the track instead of lengthwlst", 
a nil some of the three-cornered plPCes stood 
higher than the surface of the rail, of which 
fact the plaintiff was not tbeo awnl'I'; 
and th1tt, by reason of such negligent con-
struction ur the cn.ttle-gu1uc.1, the spee<l 
of the hand-car, and the dangerous and 
tlret1ome position In which the defendant 
placed the plaintiff, he was Injured either 
IJy his foot or feet coming In contuct with 
the rnll or the three-cornered pieces. or by 
the shovel getting caught on the rail or 
on such pieces, or by all of such circum-
stances. 'l'he answer of tbede(endaut cun-
tal1111 a J!;enernl denial, and an ullegutlon 
or contributory negligence on the p1trt of 
the plaintiff. The case was t11t:>d by a 
Jury, which renclered a verdict for the 
pluintlH or $13,500, for which, with coi1ts, 
he had Judgment, to review which the 
defE>ndant has brought a writ of error. 
One ol the princlp11l points taken by the 
defendant ls that this was a case of an In-jury r1•sulting from tho negligem•p of a co-
empluye, namely, the foreman lh•llehan, lu 
the mun1tgementand running of the hmtd-
car, und did nut fall within the pro,·lsions 
or the stutute or Iowa on the subject. On 
the 8th of April, 1Sli2, a statute w11R en-
acted In Iowa (Laws 11'62, c . Hi!J. § i, p. 
Ill~.) as follows: "~ec. 7. Every rullroad 
company 11bttll be liable for all c1nma~ea 
su1:1tulued by any person, tncludlng em-
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ployes of the company. in consequence oi
any neglect oi the agents or by any mis-
management oi the engineers or other em-
ployes oi the corporation to any person
sustaining such damage.” This provis-
ion was afterwards modified by section
1307 of the Code oi Iowa oi 1873,which was
in force at the time oi this accident, and
read as follows: “Sec. 1307. Every corpo-
ration operating a railway shall be liable
for all damages sustained by any person,
including employes oi such corporation,
in consequence oi the neglect oi agents. or
by any mismanagement oi the engineers,
or other employes oi the corporation, and
in consequence oi the willful wrongs,
whether oi commission or omission, oi
such agents, engineers, or other employes,
when such wrongs are in any manner
connected with the use and operation oi.’
any railway, on or about which they
shall be employed, and no contract which
restricts such liability shall be legal or
binding." The modification introduced
by the later statute is that the wrongs
for which the corporation is to be liable
must be wrongs connected with the use
and operation oi the railway on or about
which the employes are employed. ltis
contended by the defendant that, under
the decisions oi the supreme court oi Iowa
upon this statute, only employes en-
gaged in operating and moving trains,
and who are injured by such trains. and
employes who, while in the discharge oi
their duty, are injured by trains used in
operating the railway, are within the
statute. and that, in the present case, the
plaintiff was not engagedin operating and
moving a train, and was not injured by a
train used in operating the railway. But
we cannot concur in this view.
In Deppe v. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa, 52, it
w'us held, under the act oi 1862. that the
statute included the case oi‘ an employe
who was engaged in connection with a
dirt-train, and was injured, while loading
n car, by the falling oia bank oi earth.
and in Frandsen v. Railroad Co.. Id. 372,
that a person employed asa section-hand,
in the business oi keeping a certain part
oi‘ the road in repair, and going with his
co-employes on the track on a. hand-car
ior that purpose, was within the act oi
1862, he being injured through a collision
with theengine oi a passenger train,which
struck the hand-car, and threw it against
the plaintlfl while he was on the ground,
and engaged in trying to remove the hand-
car out of the way oi the engine.
The ease oi Schroeder v. Railroad Co., 41
Iowa, 344, arose under section 1307 oi the
Code. It was said in that case that that
section applied only to accidents growing
out oi the use and operation oi the road,
and did not appl_v to all persons em-
ployed by the corporation without re-
Eard to their employment, and it was
held, therefore, that it did not cover the
case oi Schroeder, who was not connected
with the operation oi the road, but who,
while engaged in removing the timbers of
an abandoned bridge, and loading them
on cars. was injured by some of the tim-
bers which -fell from a car. The same
view was held in Potter v. Railroad Co.,
46 Iowa, 399, where Potter, a laborer in
the machine-shop oi the company. was
injured by a locomotive driving-wheel,
which he and other employes were mov-
ing by hand.
It was held, in Schroeder v. Railroad
Co., 4? Iowa, 375, that where a person
was required in the course oi his employ-
ment by the lailroad company to get
upon a train, and did so, he was to be
regarded as being engaged in its opera-
tion, although his employment might
not be connected with the running oi the
train; and that the company wasliable
to him iorinjuries resulting irom the negli-
gence oi a. co-employe.
In Pyne v. Railroad Co., 54 Iowa, 223,
6 N. W. Rep. 281, Pyne was employed by
the railroad company as o private detect-
ive, and, while walking on the track, in
the periormance oi his duties, and in obe-
dience to the orders oi the company, was
injured, without negligence on his part,
through the negligence of the engineer oi
a passing train, and it was held that his
case fell within the provisions oi section
i307, and that he was entitled to recover
from the company for the injuries received
by him.
In Smith v. Railroad Co., 59 Iowa, 73,
12 N. W. Rep. 763, where it appeared that
the plaintili was only a section-hand,and,
when injured, was engaged in loading a
car, and it did not appear that his serv-
ice pertuined to the operation of the road.
it was held that he could not recover for
an injury which occurred through the neg-
ligence oi a co-empioye, the court remark-
ing that under section i307 oi the Code it
must be shown that his employment was
connected with the operation of the rail-
way.
It was held, in Malone v. Railway Co.,
61 Iowa, 326, 16 N. W. Rep. 203, that a per-
son whose duty it was to wipe the com-
pany’s engines, and do other work about
the round-house, and to open the doors oi
that house so as to allow the engines to
pass in and out, and who,while endeavor-
ing to shut those doors, was injured by
the carelessness of his co-employes who
were at the time engaged with him in the
same cflort, could not recover under sec-
tion 1307 for the injury, because it was
not "in any manner connected with the
use and operation "oi the railway, :.~.:;. con-
templated by that section. -
In Foley v. Railroad Co.. 64 Iowa. 644,
21 N. W. Rep. 124, it was held that a car-
repairer, whose duty it was to repair cars
on the track, but who had nothing to do
with cars in motion,except to ride on pas-
senger or ireight trains to and irom the
places where his services were required,
was not engaged in the operation oi a rail-
way, within the meaning oi section 1307,
and could not recover oi the company for
an injury received while in the discliarge
oi his duties. through the negligence oi u.
co-employe. Foley was engaged at the
time in making repairs on a car, and was
injured while under the car, through its
being moved improperly.
The Malone (fuse came up again, in 65
Iowa, 417, 21 N. W. Rep. 751;, and it was
there held, that Malone, whose duty it
was to wipe engines, open and close the
doors oi an engine-house, and remove
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CHOSS-EXAMJN ATION. [Case No. 159 
ployes of the company. tn consequence or 
any neglect of the agents or by any mis-
management of the eu~neers or other em-
ployee of the corpora tloo to any person 
sustaining such damage." This provis-
ion was afterwards modified by seetlon 
1807 of the Code of Iowa of 1878, which was 
In foree at the time of this accident, and 
read asfollowa: "Sec.1307. Every corpo-
ration operating a rbllway shall be ltable 
for all damages sustained by any penion, 
lncl11dlng employee of aucb corporation, 
In consequence or the neglect or agents. or 
by any mismanagement of the engineers, 
or other 1>ruployes of the corporation, and 
in conseq11ence of the wlllful wronp, 
whether of commls11lon or omission, of 
such agents, engineers, or other employee, 
when such wrongs are In any manner 
connected with the use and operation of 
any railway, on or about which they 
11ball be employed, and no cont1·act which 
restricts such liability shall hfl legal or 
binding." 1.'he modiftcatlon Introduced 
by the later statute Is that the wrongs 
for wblcb the corporation ls to be liable 
most be wrongs connet-ted with the use 
and operation of the railway on or about 
which the employee are employed. It Is 
contended by the dc>fendant that, under 
the dedslons of the supreme court of Iowa 
upon this statute, only employes en-
Jr;aged In operating and moving traf11s, 
and who are Injured by such trains, and 
employee who, while In the dlschurge or 
their duty, are injured by trains used In 
operating the railway, are within the 
stntote. and that, In the preMf'nt case, the 
plaintiff was not enJ(aged In operating and 
movlu11: a tralo, and was not Injured by a 
train used In operating: the railway. But 
we cannot concur In this view. 
In Deppe v. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa, 52, It 
was held, on<lf'r the act of 1862, that the 
statute Included thll caRe Qf an employe 
who was engaged In connection with a 
dirt.train, and was injured, while loading 
a car, by the falling of a bank of earth. 
and In Frandst>n v. Ralll'Oud Co .. Id. 372, 
that a person employed asa section-hand, 
In the b111dnPSB of keeµlng a cPrtaln part 
of the road In repair, and going with hl1:1 
co-eniployes on the track on a hand-car 
for that purpoire, was within the act of 
1862, bA being Injured through a colli11lon 
with the engine of a p1111Renger train, 'vhlch 
etrock the hand-car, and threw It against 
the plaintiff while he was ou the ground, 
ancl Pogaged In trylngtoremovetbe hand-
car out of the way or the engine. 
The case of 8cbroeder v. Railroad Co., 41 
Iowa, 344, arose muter section l::J07 of the 
Code. It was snld in that cm;e that that 
section apfJlled only to accidents growing 
out of the uRe and opera tlon of the road, 
and did not apply to nll personf! em-
ployed by the corporation without re· 
11:ard to theh· employment, and It was 
held, therefore, that It did not cover the 
caRe of Schroeder, who was not connected 
with the operation of the road, bnt who, 
while f'ngagcd In removing the tlmbeni of 
an abandoned hrlllge, and loading them 
on cars. wa11 lnj11re1l by Home of the tim-
bers which lell from a car. The same 
view was held In Potter v. Railroad Co., 
46 Iowa, 399, where Potter, a laborer in 
the machine-shop or the company, was 
Injured by a locomotive driving-wheel, 
which be and other ernploye8 wero mov-
ing by hand. 
It was held, lo Schroeder v. Railroad 
Co., 47 Iowa, 375, that where a person 
wa1:1 required in the course of bis employ-
ment by the tallroad company to gt:t 
upon a train, and did so, be was to be 
regarded as belnit engaged In Its opera-
tion, although bis employment mlghl: 
not be connected with the running of tbe 
train; and that the company was liable 
to him forlnJurles l't'Sultlng from the negli-
puce of a co-employe. 
In Pyne v. Railroad Co., 54 Iowa, 223, 
6 N. W. Rep. 2!11, Pyne was en11Jloyed by 
the railroad company as a private detect-
ive, a11d, while walking on the track, In 
the performance of hbt duties, and In obe. 
dleoce to the orders of the company, wat1 
Injured, wlthont negligence on his part, 
through the negllg;ence of the engineer of 
a passing train, and It was held that hits 
case fell within the provisions of section 
1307, and that he was entitled to recover 
from the company for the injuries received 
by him. 
In Smith v. Railroad Co., 59 lo\\·a, 78, 
12 N. W. Rep. 768, where tt appeared that 
the plaintiff was only a St!Ctlon-hond,and, 
when Injured, was engaged In lua1llng a 
~ar, and it did not appear tbut hiH eerv. 
lee pertained to the operation of the roact. 
It was held that be conld not recover for 
an Injury which occnrred through the neK-
llgence of a. co-employe, the court remark-
ln1t th11 t under section 1307 of the Code it 
must be shown that hlH employment wuH 
connected with the operation of the rail· 
way. 
It wu held, In Malone v. Rall way Co., 
61 Iowa, 826, 16 N. W. Rep. 203, that a per-
son whose duty It WWI to wipe the com-
pany's eoglueH, and do other work about 
the round-house, and to open the doors of 
tbut. house so as to allow the engines to 
paBS ln and out, and wbo,wblle endeuvor. 
lug to shut those doorK, was Injured by 
the carelt'Ssness of his co-employee who 
were at the time engaged with him In the 
same effort, could not recover under tiec-
tlon 1307 for the Injury, because It wwi 
not "lo any manner connected with the 
use and operation "of the railway,::.:; con· 
tern plated by that section. 
In l<'oley v. Railroad Co., 64 Iowa. 6.U, 
21 N. W. Hep. 12.f, it waR held that a car-
rl'palrer, whose outy It was to repair cars 
on the track, but who had nothing to do 
with cars in motlou,except to ride on pas-
senger or freight trains to and from the 
placeH where his services wl're required, 
was not engaged In theoperatlonof a rail-
way, within the meaning of section 1307, 
and could not recover of the company for 
an Injury received while In the dbichnt·ge 
of his tlutles, thro11gh the nPgl!gence ur a 
co-employe. Foley was engaged at the 
time In making repalrH on a car, ancl was 
Injured while uncter the car, through its 
being moved Improperly. 
'!'he Malone l'asP. cnme up again, in 65 
Iowa, 417, 21 N. W. Hl•p. 756, and ft was 
there held, that Malone, whose duty It 
was to wipe engln1'fl, open and clost> the 
doors of an engine-house, and remove 
471 
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snow from a turn-table and connecting
tracks, was not, by reason of such duties,
employed in the operation of the railroad,
within the meaning of section 1307; and
that, for an injury received by him while
performing such duties, and through the
negligence of a co-employe. he could not
recover against the company. although he
might have had other duties to perform
which did pertain to the operation of the
road.
It was held, in Luce v. Railroad Co., 67
Iowa, 75. 24 N. W. Rep. 600, that a person
employed in a coal-house of the railroad,
and injured by the negligence of a co-em-
ploye while loading coal upon a car,could
not recover from the company under sec-
tion 1307, because the injury was not in
any manner connected with the use and
operation of the railway.
In Maison v. Railroad Co., 68 Iowa, 22,
25 N. W. Rep. 911, the plaintiff was a mem-
ber of a construction gang on the road,
and his duties required him to ride upon,
and to Work upon and about, the com-
pany's cars and tracks. He was injured
by the negligence of a co-employe in
throwing a heavy stone upon his hand,
while he was‘ engaged in placing stones
under the ends oi the ties. it was held
that the injury was not connected with
the use and operation of the railway. as
contemplated in section 1307, and that
the company was not liable. -
It was held, in Stroble v. Railroad Co.,
70 Iowa. 555, 31 N. W. Rep. 63, that a per-
son whose sole duty it was to elevate coal
to a platform convenient for delivering it
to the tenders of engines, was not em-
ployed in the use and operation of the rail-
way, within section 1307, because he was
in no way concerned with the moving and
operation of trains.
In Pierce v. Railway Co., 73 Iowa, 140,
34 N. W. Rep. 783, a mechanic from a shop
of the company was working. under or-
ders, upon a ladder which leaned against
one of the cars of a. train. The tralnmcn
moved the train backward, without no-
tice to him, the ladder fell, and he was in-
jured. It was held that the negligence.
whether that of the trainmen or of the
foreman in not giving the requisite informa-
tion to the trainmen, was connected with
the use and operation of the railway, and
was the negligence of some one employed
on it, so as to make the company liable,
under section 1307,for the injury sustained
by the plaintiff, and this although he was
not engaged in the operation of the rail-
way.
it was held, in Nelson v. Railroad Co.,
73 Iowa, 576, 35 N. W. Rep. 611, that the
working, on the railway, of a ditching
machine which was operated by the move-
ment along the track of the train of which
it formed a part, was an employment con-
nected vsith the use and operation of the
railway, within the meaning of section
1307, and made the company liable for in-
jury to an employe through the negligence
of a co-employe, although the plaintiff
was not engaged in the actual movement
of the train, but was only one of the crew
necessary for the performance oi the work
intended to be done by the train and its
machinery and appliances.
In Rayburn v. Railway Co., 74 Iowa.
637, 35 N. W. Rep. 606, and 38 N. W. Rep.
520, the plaintiff and others were section-
hands of the company, engaged in remov-
ing snow and ice from the track, when a
train of cars loaded with slack came
along. moving slowly, and the conductor
and others in charge of the train directed
them to get upon the train to unload the
slack. They requested that the train be
stopped, but were told that if it was
stopped it could not be started again.
In attempting to obey the order, the
plaintiff ws thrown down by a jerk of the
train and injured. lt was held that he
was not precluded from rccoveringagainst
the company under section 1307, on the
ground that the negligence complained of
was not connected with the use and oper-
ation of the railway.
From this statement of tho decisions of
the supreme court of Iowa, we are clearly
of opinion that, in the present case, the
defendant was liable, under section 1307
of the Code, for the injury to the plaintiff
caused in the manner set forth in the peti-
tion, and in the evidence contained in the
bill oi exceptions. The plaintiff was upon
a moving car propelled by hand-power.
The movement of the car. its speed, the
position of the plaintiff upon it, and the
duties he had to discharge in that posi-
tion, were under the direction of the fore-
man, who was upon the same car. The
injury was directly connected with the use
and operation of the railway, in whose
common service theforenian and the plain
tiff were, and they were co-employes. The
injuries to the plaintiff were, by the peti-
tion and the evidence, sought to be attrib-
uied to the smallness of the hand-car, its
being overcrowded. the failure to provide
it with contrivances for removing snow
from the track, the absence of a proper
brake, the want of foot-rests. and the ar-
rangement of the cattle-guard. The rail-
way was being used and operated in The
movement of the hand-car quite as much
as if the latter had been a train of cars
drawn by a locomotive. If a single loco-
motive be on its way to its engine-house,
after leaving a train which it has drawn,
or if it be summoned to go alone for serv-
ice to a point more or less distant, and. in
either case, by the negligence of one em-
ploye upon it, another empioye is injured,
the injury takes place in the use and oper-
ation of the railway, under section 1307,
quite as much as if it takes place while
the locomotive is drawing a train of cars.
This we understand to be the manifest
purport and effect of the decisions of the
supreme court of Iowa on the subject, as
well as obviously the proper interpreta-
tion of the statute. But, although this is
so, we are of opinion that a new trial
must be granted, on account of errors in
the exclusion of evidence offered by the
defendant.
At the trial, one Jerry Artery, a brother
of the plaintiff. was called as a witness by
him. He was on the hand-car with the
plaintiff at the time of the accident. and
saw all that occurred. He testified as to
the speed of the car, and as to its size, and
its cramped and crowded condition, and
as to the fact that there was nothing on
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Case No. la9] PH OD UC rION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
snow from a turn-table and conne<-ting 
tracks, was not. by reusun of Huch du ties, 
employed In the operation of the railroad, 
within the meaning of section 1307; and 
that, for an Injury received by him while 
performing such duties, and through the 
negligence of a. co-employe, he could not 
recover against the compnny, altliough he 
might have had other duties to perform 
which did pertain to the operation of the 
roud. 
It Wl\H held, In Luce v. Railroad Co., 67 
Iowa, 75. 2-l N. W. Rep. 600, that a person 
employed in a coal-hom1e of the railroad, 
and Injured hy tht> nt>gligence of a co-em-
ploye while loadlug coal upon a cur,cuuld 
not recover from the company und~r sec-
tion 1307, because the Injury wa11 not In 
any manner connt>eted with the uHe aud 
operation of the rnllway. 
In Matson v. Railroad Co., 68 Iowa, 22, 
20 N. W. Uep. 911, the plaintiff was a mem-
ber of a construction gang on the road, 
and his duties required him to ridti upon, 
and to work upon and about, the com-
pany's care and track~. He was Injured 
hy the negligence of a co-employe tn 
throwing a heavy stone upon hl11 hand, 
while he was engaged iu placing 11tones 
under the end11 of the ties. It was held 
that the Injury was not connected with 
the use and 01Jeratlun of the railway. as 
contemplated In Rectlon 1307, and that 
the l 0 omr1any was nut liable. 
It wail held, in Stroble v. Railroad cf)., 
70 Iowa, 5.'\5, :n N. W. Rep. 6.3, that a per-
son whose Role duty It wne to elevate coal 
to a platform convenient for delivering It 
to the te111Jers of engines. was not em-
ployed In theuseand operation of the rail-
way, within section 13117, becamie he was 
In no wa.v concerned with the moving and 
oper1t tion of trains. 
In .f>lerce v. Railway Co., 73 Iowa, 140, 
34 N. W. Rep. 783, a mechanic from a shop 
of the company was working, under or-
del'!I, urum a lttdder which lt>aned a.a"alnst 
one of the cal"!! of a. train. 'l'he tralnnum 
moved the train backward, without no-
tice to him, the ladder fP.11, aud he was ha-jured. It wa11 held that the negligence. 
whether that of the trainmen or of the 
foreman In not gt vlng the req ul11lte Informa-
tion to the trainmen, was connected with 
the URe and operation of the rallwa..v, and 
was the negligence of some one emplo;ved 
on It, 110 al! to make the company lluhle, 
ut1der sec tlon 130i, for the Injury suHtalned 
by the plaintiff, and this although he was 
not engaged in the operation of the rail-
way. 
It was held, in Ne111on v. Railroad ('o., 
73 Iowa, 576, 35 N. W. Hep. 611, that the 
working, on the railway, of a ditching 
machine which wus operated by the move-
ment along the track of the train of which 
It formed a part, was an employment con-
nected "Ith the use an1l operation of the 
railway, within the meaning of section 
1307, and made the company llablf' for In-
jury to an employe through the negllgem·1· 
of a co-emplo.re. although the plaintiff 
waR n•it engugecl In the actual movement 
of the train, but waH only one of the crew 
necessnry fur the tlerformance of the work 
Intended to he done by the train and it11 
machinery and uppliuncef!. 
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In Rayburn v. Hallwoy Co., 74 Iowa, 
637, 35 N. W. Rt>p. l!OU, and 38 N. W. Rep. 
5:.!0, the plaintiff and othel'H were Heetlon-
hauds of the comp1tny, engagt!d in remo,·-
lng snow nnd Ice from the track, when a 
train of care louded with slack came 
a.long, moving slowly, and the conductor 
and others In chari.te of the train directed 
them to get upon the train tu unload the 
elack. They requested that the train be 
stopped, but were told that if It was 
etop11ed it could not be started agate. 
In attempting to ohey the order, the 
plaintiff ws thrown down by a jerk of the 
train and injured. It was held that he 
was not precluded from rrcoverlng against 
the company under section 130i, on th~ 
ground that the negligence cum11lalned of 
was not connected with the use and oper-
ation of the railway. 
From this statement of tho decisions of 
the supreme court of Iowa, we are clearly 
of opinion that, in the pre11ent case, the 
defendant was liable, under Hectlon l30j' 
of the Code, for the Injury to the plain tin 
caused In the manner Bl't forth In the peti-
tion, and In the evidence contained to the 
bill of exceptions. The plal11t1n wnR upon 
a moving car propt>lleod by hand-power. 
The mo\•ement of the car, Its speed, the 
position of the plaintiff upon It, and the 
duties he had to dl11charjl;e In tha.t posi-
tion, were under the direction of the fore-
man, who was upon the same car. The 
Injury was directly connected with the use 
and operation of the railway, In whose 
cummon service the foreman and the plain 
tiff were, and they were co-employee. The 
injuries to tht plalutln were, by the petl· 
ti on and thu evldeuce, sought to be a ttrlb-
u ted to the t1mallness of the hand-ear, Its 
heing overcrowded, thP. failure to providP 
It with contri'l"ances for removing snow 
from the track, the absence of a proper 
brake, the want of foot-restR. and the ar-
rangement of the cuttle-guard. The rail· 
way was being used and operated In th .. 
movement of the hand·car quite at1 much 
as If the latter 1111.d been a train of cars 
drawn by a locomotive. If a single loco-
motive be on ltH way to Its englne·house, 
alter IP.a ving a train which It has drawn, 
or If It be 11ummoned to go abne for serv-
ice to a po~nt mul't' or less distant, and. In 
either ct1ee, by the negligence of one em-
ploye upon it, another employe 111 injured, 
the Injury takP.R place In the use and oper-
a tlon of the railway, under section Ia07, 
quite as much as If It takes place while 
the locomoth·e Is drawing ft train of carH. 
This we under11tancl to be the manifest 
purport and effect of thP. deciHions of the 
supreme court of Iowa on the subject, as 
well as ob\•iously the f>roper lnter11reta-
tlon of the litatute. But, although this 111 
so, we are of opinion that n new trial 
must be granteu, on account of er1·ore In 
the exclmo1lun of evidence offered by the 
defendant. 
At the trial, one Jerry Artery, a brother 
of the plaintiff. was c1tlled as a wltneRs by 
him. He was un the 11antl-c1tr with the 
plaintiff at the time of the accident. nnd 
saw all thtt.t occurred. He te11tilied nH to 
the S(leed of the car, and as to ltll size, nnd 
Its crn111pe1l and crowdPd condition. and 
as to the fact that there was nothing on 
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
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it in front upon which the plaintitf could
rest his feet while he was holding the
shovel, and as to the arrangement of the
cattle-guards. In the course of his cross-
examination, the following proceedings
occurred: “Question. (in the 23d of
March, 1886, at Harper's Ferry, in the
presence of Mr. Buell, did you sign a. writ-
ten statement. stating what you know
about this case, and about the accident to
your brother, after the written statement
had been read over to you? Answer.
Yes, sir. Q. I will show you now the
written statement. and ask you whether
that is your signature? (Written state-
ment shown tbe witness hereto attached
and marked ‘ Exhibit A.’) A. That is my
signature there. Q. In the Written state-
ment which I have just shown you you
state as follows: ‘At the time Jim got
hurt we were running from 4); to 5 miles
an hour—certainly not to exceed 5 miles.’
Is that statement correct? (Objected to
by plaintiff; objection sustained.) The
grounds upon which the court sustained
the objections to interrogatories to this
and other witnesses,based upon a written
statement signed by the witness, and to
the introduction of the written state-
ments themselves, were that it appeared
that the statements were not volunteered
by the witnesses, but that the company
had sent its claim agent,after the happen-
ing of the accident, to examine the em-
ployes oi the company who were present
nt the time of the accident, in regard to
the transaction: that the statements
made by the witnesses were not taken
down in full, but only a synopsis thereof
made by the agent, the correctness of
which is questioned by the witnesses in
some particulars. although such written
statement was signed by the witness;
that, upon the trial of this case, these
statements, thus obtained, were sought
to he used not alone as a means of im-
peachlng the witness, but as evidence of
the matters therein recited; that it is ap-
parent to the court that, whether so in-
tended or not, these statements become a
ready means of confusing and intimidat-
ing witnesses before the iury, and that, if
it be permitted to parties to thus procure
written statements in advance from wit-
nesses, and then use the same in examin-
ing such witnesses, it will enable parties
to shape and control the evidence in a.
cause by committing the witnesses to
particular statements, couched in the lan-
guage not of the witness. but of the per-
son carrying on such exparte examina-
tion: that these growing abuses can only
.be prevented by entirely excluding such
statements thus procured from neingin-
troduced in evidence for any purpose;
that, if the party desired to impeach a
witness by showing contradictory state-
ments made by him, the person to whom
or in \vhose presence such alleged contra-
dictory statements were made should be
culled as a witness, so that opportunity
might be afforded of placing before the
. jury the statements actually made by the
witness sought to be impeached, and not
a mere synopsis thereof made by another
person, and the accuracy of which, in
some particulars, was challenged. Excep-
tion by defendant." The following fur-
ther proccedings took place on the cross-
examination of the same witness: “Ques-
tion. On the occasion I have referred to,
didyou make this statement: ‘Six men on
a hand-carhave plenty of room. We often
had 8 and 10 men on a hand-car of the
same size?‘ (Objected to by plain tiff; oh-
jection sustained; exception by defend-
ant.) Q. Did you, on the occasion I have
referred to, at Harper‘s Ferry. say as fol-
lows: ‘I am a larger man than Jim ever
was, and my legs are a great deal longer.
I have never had any troublein keeping my
feet up when I sat on the front of the car?’
(Obiected to by plaintiff; objection sus-
tained; exception by defendant.) Q. On
the occasion referred to, did you state
as follows: ‘ if a man is holding a shovel
on the rail and he is sitting on the front
of a hand-car there is no way for him to
get hurt unless he forgets himself and lets
his feet drop down ‘I’ (Objected to by
plaintiff; objection sustained, exception
by defendant.) Q. On the occasion re-
ferred to, did you state: ‘The hand-car
was in good condition, nothing broken
about it in any way. It was an ordinary
car, full size?’ (Objected to by plaintiff;
objection sustained; exception by defend-
ant.) Q. Did you, on the occasion re-
ferred to, state as follows: ‘ I am foreman
at present on section No. 20. The top of
the ribbons on the ties of the cattle-guard
was about level with the ball of the rail?’
A. Well, sir, I don’t remember whether I
did or not say that. Q. If you did say
that,_was it the truth or not? {Obie-cted
to by plaintiff; objection sustained; ex-
ception by defendant.) " Subsequently,
while the defendant was putting in its evi-
dence, the bill of exceptions says: “There-
upon the defendant offered in evidence. for
the purpose of impeachment, the state-
ment under date of March 23, 1886, shown
the witness Jerry Artery, and hereto ai-
tached, marked ‘Exhibit A,’ which,on ob-
jection by plaintiff, was ruled out by the
court; to which ruling the defendant at
‘ the time excepted. " The court, in sustain-
ing the objection, stated that it deemed
the proper method to be to produce the
person to whom the alleged statement
was made, and to prove by him what the
witness may have said on the occasion.
Exhibit A, thus referred to, is a paper
signed by the witness, and contains the
statements set forth in the six questions
thus excluded, as above.
That the evidence covered by the six
questions was material to the issue, is ap-
parent. They related to the speed of the
car. to the question of its size and wheth-
er it was crowded or not, to the question
whether the plaintiff could have kept up
his feet without a foot-rest. and to the
question of the condition of the cattle-
guard. It is an elementary principle of
the law of evidence that if a witness is to
be impeached,in consequence of his having
made, on some other occasion, different
statements, oral or written, from those
which he makes on the witness-stand, as
to material points in the case, his atten-
tion must first be called. on cross-exam-
ination, to the particular time and occa-
sion when, the place where, and the per-
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CROSS-EXAMINATION. [Case No. 159 
It In front upon which the plaintiff could 
re11t hl11 feet while he w11s holding the 
shovel, and 118 to the 11rraogeruent or the 
cattlP.-guerds. In the course of his croB.6-
examloation, tile following proceedings 
occurred: "Question. On the l!'dd of 
March, 18~6, at H11rper's Ferry, lu the 
presence of Mr. Buell, did you sign a writ-
ten statement, 11tating wbat you know 
abo11t this case, and about the accident to 
your brother, after the written statement 
had been read over to you? Answer. 
Yes, sir. Q. I will show yon now the 
written statement, and ask you whether 
that ls your Mignature? (Written state-
ment shown the wltnen hereto attached 
und marked' Exblblt A.') A. That 18 my 
silrnature there. Q. In the written state-
mPnt which I have just. shown you you 
state as follow11: 'At the time Jim got 
hurt we were running from 4" to 5 miles 
an hour--(!ertaloly not tu exceed 5 miles.' 
111 that statement correct? (Objected to 
by plniotiH; objection sustained.) The 
grounds npon which the court 11ustalned 
the objections to lnterroga tories to this 
and other wltnesse11, bused upon a written 
statement 1dgnetl by the wltneBB, and to 
the Introduction of the written state-
ment11 themsel\•e11, were that It appeared 
that the statemenbl were not volunteered 
b,v the wltne1111es, bot that the com,1any 
bad 11ent Its claim agent, after the happen-
ini.t of the accident, to l'Xa mine the em-
1110,\'es of the company who were present 
at the time of the accident, in regard to 
the tram1actlon; that the statement.a 
made by the witnesses were not taken 
down in full, but only a synopsis then..>0f 
made by the agent, the correctness or 
which Is questioned by the wltne1111....s In 
some particulars, elthoul{b such wrltteJJ 
Htatement was signed by the witneRS; 
that, upou the trial of thlK case, these 
t1tatement11, thus obtained, were suught 
to he used not alone as a means of im-
peaching the wltnes11, but as evidence of 
the matters therein rer.lted; that U ts ap-
parent to the court that, whether so ln-
tt"uclt>d or not, theKe statements become a 
reucly means of confusing and intimidat-
ing witnesses before the Jury, and that, if 
it be permitted to partlet1 to thus procure 
written st11temeotH In advance from wlt-
llf'HHes, and then u11e the 11ame in exuruln-
ing 1mch wltneR11e11, It will enable parties 
to 11hape and control the e\"hlence lo a 
eaUHl' by committing the wltne11ses to 
purti1·ular statements, couchetl In the lan-
guage not or the wlt.ne11s, but of the per-
son carrying on such ez parte examina-
tion; that these growln11: abnse11 can only 
. be prevented by entirely exclutllng 11ui:h 
statements thu11 procured from uelng In· 
troduced In evidence for any purpose; 
that, If the party desired to ltnpeal!b ll 
witness by showing contrarllctory state· 
ments made by him, the p1?rson to whom 
-0r In whose presence such alleged contra-
dictory statements Wt're made should be 
enllt'd as a wltne1111, so that opportunity 
might be afforderl of plAclng before the 
. jury the statements actuully mode by the 
wltnt>HS sought to be lmpeache<I, noel not 
a mere synopsis thereor made by nuother 
per1mn, and the uccuracy or which, In 
Mome particulars, was challenged. Excep-
tton by defendant." The following fur-
ther ['roceedlng~ took place on the crollft-
examloa tlon of the 11ame witness: "Ques-
tion. On thE> occasion I ha \"e 1eferretl tu, 
did you make this statement: •Six men on 
a hand-car have plenty or room. We often 
had 8 and 10 men on a hand-car of the 
same size?' (Objected to by plaintiff; oh-jectiou sustained; exception by defend-
aut.) Q, Did you, on the occnslun I ha'\"e 
referrrd to, at Harper's Ferry. say as fol-
lows: 'I am 8 larger man than .Jim ever 
was, and my legs ere A great deal lonJi;er. 
I have never had any trouble in kf'eplng my 
feet up when I sat on the front of the car?' (Objected to by plalutlff; objection sus-
tained; exception by deren1lnnt.) Q. On 
the occasion rt?ftorred to, did you 11tate 
as follows: 'If a man ls holding a shovel 
on the rail encl be ls sitting on the front 
of a hand-car there ts no way for blm to 
get hurt unless he forget& himself and lets 
bis feet drop down?' (ObjPcted to by 
plaintiff; objection sustained, exce11tloo 
by defendant.) Q. On the occasion re-
ferred to, did you state: 'The l1and-cnr 
was In JCOOd condition, nothing broken 
about It In any way. It was an ordinary 
car, full size?' (Objected to by plaintiff; 
objection sustained; exception by defend-
nnt.) Q. Did you, on the occa11lon re-
fer~d to, 11tate as follows: •I am foreman 
at preRent on 11ectlon No. 20. The top of 
the ribbons on the ties of tht> cattle-p,uard 
was about level with the bull of the rail?' 
A. Well, sir, I dnn't remember whether I 
did or not say that. Q. If you did say 
that, wns It the truth or not? {Objected 
to by plain UH; objection Rustalned; ex-
ception by defendant.)" Sub!!equently, 
while the defendant was putting In Its e"l-
dence, the bill of exceptions say11: "There-
upon the defendant offered lo evidence, for 
the purpose of Impeachment, the statt>-
ment nod2r date ot March 23, 1~6, obown 
the wltne11s Jerry Artery, and hereto nt-
tach~1J, marked 'Exhibit A,' "'•blcb, on ob-
Jectlon by plaintiff, was ruled out by the 
court; to which ruling the defendant at 
the time excepted." The court, in RUHtaln-
lng the objection, stated that It deemed 
the proper method to be to produce the 
person to whom the Blleged statement 
was made, and to prove by hlm whtJt the 
w1tnes11 may have said on the occasion. 
Exhibit A, thuH referred to, Is a paper 
signed by the wltneHs, am1 contains the 
stl\tements set forth In the six questlonK 
thu11 exclude<I, ns above. 
'fha.t the e\'ldence l'overed by the six 
queAtlon11 wa11 material to the Issue, Is ap-
)laren t. The.v rel a tell to the speed of the 
car. to the que11tlon of Its size 1.111d wheth-
er It wnH crowded or uot, to the que11tlon 
whether the plalntlH could have kept up 
hlH feet without a foot-reiit, anrl to the 
que11tlon or the condition of the cattle. 
guard. It IK a.n elementury principle of 
the law of evidence that If a wltne1111 Is to 
be lmpenche<l, In conHe11uence of his havini.t 
madP, on some other occmlion, different 
etateru~:nts, oral or written. from tho11e 
w!:lch he muke11 on the wltneHs-11tand, us 
to material 11oln ts In the case, his atten-
tion must Hr11t be called, on croF;11-exam-
lnatlon, to the particular time and occa-
sion when, the place where, and the per-
473 
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son to whom he made the varying state-
ments. In no other Way can a founda-
tion be laid for putting in the impeaching
testimony. In the present case, it is ap-
parent that the views of the court, as set
forth in the bill of exceptions immediately
after the exclusion of the first question
which is above stated to have been ex-
eluded on the cross-examination of the
witness .Ierry Artery, must have been
founded, not only upon what had at that
time transpired. but also upon the subse-
quent proceedings at the trial, and were
the views of the court upon additional
and kindred questions which arose in the
case, because. at the time such first ques-
tion was asked upon cross-examination
and excluded. it had not yet appeared in
evidence under what circumstances the
written statement was made by the wit-
ness. Moreover. it was stated by the
court that the written statements of the
witnesses “ were sought to be used not
alone as a means of lmpeaching the wit-
ness, but as evidence of the matters there-
in recited ;" whereas, when the statement
signed by the witness Jerry Artery was
offered in evidence and excluded, it was
distinctly offered “for the purpose of im-
peachment, ”and it is not otherwise stated
in the bill of exceptions that it was offered
for any other purpose; and, in excluding
it, the court excluded it as so offered. We
think the circuit court erred in laying it;
down as a. rule that a written statement
signed by a witness and adlnitted by him
to have been so signed. cannot be used in
cross-examining him as to material points
testified to by him; and in announcing it
as a further rule that the only way to im-
peach a witness by showing contradictory
statements made by him is to call as a
witness the person to whom or in whose
presence the alleged contradictory state-
ments were made. The foundation mu at
be first laid for impeaching a witness, by
calling his attention to the time, place,
nnd circumstances of the contradictory
statements. whether they were in writing
or made orally; and the court,in the pres-
ent case, excluded that from being done.
The written statement having been pre-
sented to the witness, and he having ad-
mitted that what purported to be his sig-
nature to it was his signature, it was per-
fectly open to him to read it. and he could
have been inquired of as to the circum-
stances under which it was taken down
47-1
and signed. so as to advise the iur,v as to
its authenticity, and the credit to be given
to it. The bill of exceptions does not
show that the plaintiffs counsel asked the
witness to read the statement, or asked
the court to have it read to him, or that
the witness did not read it, or did not
have it read to him. The exclusion of the
first question put to him and excluded,
namely, “Is that statement correct?"
did not refer to the entire written state-
ment. but to the statement in it as to the
speed at which the car was running.
That inquiry was directly pertinent to the
issue that was being tried.
The rule oi evidence invoked by the
plaintiff. and laid down in The Queen's
Case, 2 Brod. & B. 284, 288, is that ii, on
cross-examination, a witness admits a let-
ter to be in his handwriting, he cannot be
questioned by counsel as to whether state-
ments, such as the counsel may suggest,
are contained in it, but the whole letter
must be read as the evidence of the exist-
ence of the statements. This principle is
not applicable to the present case, because
the plaintiff did not take the objection
that the whole statement was not. but
should have been. read as evidence; and
the court, with the assent of the plaintiff,
excluded it from being read in evidence.
The case of Railroad v. O'Brien, 119 U.
S. 99, 7 Sup. (It. Rep. 118, is not in point.
In that case, which was a. suit against a
railroad company to recover for personal
injuries received by an accident to a train,
a written statement as to the nafure and
extent of the injuries, made by the plain-
t1ff’s physician while treating him fo_r
them. was held not to be admissible as
affirmative evidence for the plaintiff, even
.though it was attached to a deposition of
the physician. in which he swore that it
was written by him and that it correctly
stated the condition of his patient at the
time referred to. The question was not
one which arose on the cross-examination
of a witness or in regard to his impeach-
ment.
Nor was the present case one involving
the well-established proposition. that in-
competent questions are not allowable on
cross-examination in order to predicate
upon them an impeachment or contradic-
tion of the witness. The judgment is re-
versed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court, with a. direction to grant a
new trial.
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Case No. 159] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDE:S-CE. 
i;on to whom he me.de the Yarying state-
ments. In no other way can a founda-
tion be laid for putting In the impeaching 
testimony. In the present case, it leap-
parent that the views of the court, as set 
forth In the blll of exceptions lmmedintely· 
nfter the exclu11lon of the first question 
which 111 above stated to have boon ex-
cluded on the croee-examlnatlon of the 
witness .Jerry Artery, must have been 
founded, not only upon what bad at that 
time transpired, but also upon the e11bee-
quent proceedings at the trial, and were 
the views of the court upon addltloual 
and kindred questions which arose in the 
case, becam1e, at the time such first ques-
tion was aHked upon crose-examlnatlon 
and excluded, It had not y11t appeared In 
evltlence under what circumstances the 
written statement was made by the wlt-
neee. ~lort'over, It was stated by the 
court that the written statements of the 
witnesses "wer11 eo1 ght to be used not 
alone as a means of Impeaching the wit-
ness, hut 8.11 evltlencc of the matters there-
in recited;" whereo11, when the statement 
signed by the wltueee Jerry Artery was 
offP-re<l ln evidence and excluded, It was 
dhctlnctly offered "for the purpo!!e of Im-
peachment," and lt le not otherwise 11tnted 
In the bill of exceptions that it wa11 offered 
for any other purpose; and, In excluding 
it, the court ex<·luded it as so offered. We 
think the circuit court erred ln laying It 
down as a rule that a written statement 
signed by a wltne8s and admitted by him 
to have been so slgnei.l, cannot be used In 
croHR-examlnlnghlm a~ to material points 
testified to by him; and in announcing it 
as a further rule that the only way to lm-
pettch R wltne11s by 11howlng contradictory 
statements made by him ls to caJI ae a 
wltnei,iH the person to whom or ln whm1e 
pre1:1e11ce the alleged contradictory etn te-
m«>nts were made. The foundation mu it 
he ttrHt laid for Impeaching a wltnt'!!ll, by 
calling his attention to the time, place, 
und circumstances of the contrnlllctory 
Htn tenwn tH, wlwther they were In wrlttng 
or m1u.le orally; and the court, in the prei,i-
ent case, excluded that from l.Jelng done. 
The written statement ha\·ing bet>n pre-
sented to the wltne1:1s, and he having ad-
mitted that what purportt>d to be hie Hig-
nnture to it was hl1:1 Hignature, it was per· 
fectt.v open to him to read It, nnrl he coulrl 
h11ve heen lnquil'ed of ae to thl.l circum-
etnnces under which It wne taken down 
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and ehrned. so ae to advise the fury ne to 
lt11 au then tic! ty, and the crerllt to he gt nm 
to it. The bill of exceptions does not 
show thttt thP plaintiff's rouneel asked the 
witness to l'ead the statement, or asked 
the court to hR ve It read to hi 111 1 or that 
the witness did not read it, or did not 
have It read to him. The exclusion of the 
first question put to him and excluded, 
namely, "le thRt statement correct?" 
did not refer to the entire written state-
ment, but to the statement In it as to the 
speed at which the car was running. 
ThH.t lnqulr.l' was directly pertinent to the 
ltieue that was being tried. 
The rule of evidence Invoked by the 
plaintiff, and laid down in The Queen's 
Case, 2 Rrod. & B. 284, 288, le that If, on 
croee-examlnatlon, a witness 11dmlte a let-
ter to be In hie handwriting, he cannot be 
quP.etloned by counsel a11 to whether etate-
men te, such as the counsel may Huggest, 
are contained In It, but the whole letter 
must be l'ead aH the evidence of the exi1:1t-
ence of the statements. Thie principle le 
not applicable to the present l'aee, bPCau11e 
the plaintiff did not take the objection 
that the whole statement wae nut, hut 
should have been, read as evlden<'e; Rnd 
thl' court, with the assent of the plalntift, 
excluded it from being rea«t in evidence. 
'l'he case or Railroad v. O'Brien, 119 U. 
S. 99, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, le not In point. 
In tl)at case, which wae a suit against 11 
railroad comp1m~- to reco\'er for personal 
injuries Tf>Ceived by an accident to a. train, 
a written statement as to the nature and 
extent of the lnJDriee, made by the plaln-
t1ff'e phyekian whlle treating him fo,r 
them, was held not to be admissible aK 
atHrmat!\'e evidence for the plolntlff, even 
.thou~h It was attachf'd to a depo11itlon of 
the physician, In which he swore that It 
was written b,v him and that it correctly 
stated the condition of his patient at the 
time referrl'll to. The que11tlnn wu11 uot. 
one which arose on the cross-examination 
of a wltneee or in regard to hie impeach-
ment. 
Nor was the present case one Involving 
the well-e11tahllehect propoRltlon, that In-
competent quPstione are not nllownble on 
croes-examina tlon In order to prei.llcate 
upon them an Impeachment or contl'ndlc· 
tlon of the witness. The judgment le re-
\'ereed, and the ca11e le rem1rnde<l to the 
clrcul t court, with a dll'el'tion to grant a 
new trial. 
CROSS—EXAMlNATl0N'.
[Case No 160'
In re SNELLI.\'G’S WILL.
(32 N. E. 1006. 136 N. Y. 515.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 17, 1893.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Second department.
Application for the probate of the will of
Mary Snelling, deceased. Probate was con-
tested by Mary Gorden and others, on the
ground, among others, of incapacity of tes-
tatrix to execute a will by reason of ad-
vanced age, impaired faculties, and undue
influence. From a judgment of the general
term (17 N. Y. Supp. 683) aflirming a decree
of the surrogate's court admitting the will
to probate, contestants appeal. Reversed.
L. R. Beckley, for appellants.
Young, for respondents.
Thomas
O'BRIEN, J. The will of .\Iary Snelling,
who died in the year 1890, was admitted to
probate, after a contest before the surro-
gate, wlrich was instituted by her nephews
and nieces, her only next of kin, on the
ground of incapacity and undue influence.
She was about 84 years of age, and possessed
of a small personal estate, which she be-
queathed to the persons, husband and wife,
with whom she lived at the time of the exe-
cution of the will, which was but a few
months before her death-. The property
came to her from her husband, who died in
1885. Subsequent to his death she lived
with various persons in the neighborhood as
a boarder, and during this time it appears
that she made several other wills in favor of
parties with whom she lived or boarded for
short periods of time. Her management of
the property, and the frequent change of
purpose on her part in disposing of it by
will, from time to time, in favor of different
persons with whom she temporarily resided,
and to whom she was more or less attached
for the time, would seem to indicate that
she had no fixed plan with reference to her
estate, and possessed no great intelligence
in business affairs. Still it was not shown
conclusively that she lacked the capacltynec-
essary in a person of her age and condition in
life to dispose of her property by will, or that
the will in question was the result of undue
influence. The fact that the deceased was a
woman of advanced age, somewhat enfeebled
in body and mind, and that she gave her
property to strangers, instead of her collateral
relatives, from motives of gratitude or person-
al attachment, does not show that she was
wanting in intelligence sufficient to compre-
hend the condition of her property and the
scope and effect of the testamentary provi-
sions. So long as her mental powers en-
abled her to understand and appreciate the
amount and condition of her property, and to
comprehend the nature and consequences of
her act in executing the will, she was at lib-
erty to dispose of her own in such manner
as seemed best to her, providing the disposi-
tion was her own free act. What the law
terms “undue influence” is not established
by proof tending to show that the testator
acted from motives of aflection or gratitude,
though the objects of her bounty were stran-
gers to her blood. The influence or moral
coercion, or by whatever other term desig-
nated, must be such as to overpower the will
of the testator, and subject it to the will and
control of another, in which case it assumes
the character of fraud. Horn v. Pullman, 72
N. Y. 276; Clapp v. Fullerton, 3-L N. Y. 190;
Hollis v. Tlieological Seminary, 95 N. Y.
166; Marx v. l\IcGlynn, 88 N. Y. 37!).
The evidence given upon the trial before
the surrogate, viewed in the most favorable
light for the contestants, was conflicting;
and the findings that the deceased was pos-
sessed of sufficient capacity to make a will,
and that the will was not the result of undue
influence, are conclusive upon us with re-
spect to the objections made against its pro-
bate. But the record discloses certain rul-
ings by the surrogate in the course of the pm-
ceedings before him which, in view of the
nature of the questions involved in the trial,
cannot be overlooked. On the hearing two
witnesses were produced by the contestants
for the purpose of sustaining the objections
made to the probate of the will, who testified
at great length to various acts, conver.~:a-
tions, and transactions of the testntrlx, tend-
ing to establish undue influence and inca-
pacity. This tcstimony extended over some
years prior to the execution of the will, and
much of it had no bearing upon the issues,
as may well be inferred from the fact that it
covers over 50 printed pages in the record.
The proponents then called two physicians,
who both testified that they had read the
whole of the testimony of the two witnesses
referred to above, giving the names of these
witnesses, and to each of them in succession
the following question was propounded:
“Assuming their testimony to be true, and
basing your opinion upon such testimony,
what would you say as to the mental condi-
tion of Nancy Snelling, say in June, 1890?"
This question was objected to by the counsel
for the contestants, and, while the form in.
which the objection was made is quite in-
artistic, there can be no doubt as to what
was intended, and we think it was sufficient
to challenge the competency of the testimony
sought to be elicited. The surrogate over-
ruled the objection, and an exception was
taken. The witness in each ease then an-
swered: “I should say she was perfectly
sane." It is needless to enter upon any rea-
soning or discussion to show that this ques-
tion was improper, as this court has more
than once condemned this method of elicit-
ing opinions from experts. Reynolds v. Rob-
inson, (A N. Y. 589, 595; People v. 1\IeEl-
vaine, 121 N. Y. 250, 24 N. E. 465; Link v.
Sheldon, 136 N. Y. 1, 32 N. E. 696. And it
would be diflicult to imagine a plniner breach
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CROSS-EX AMIN .A'rlON. [Case No 160' 
tn re SNELLI!\G'S WII.L. 
(32 N. E. 1006, 136 N. Y. 513.) 
Court of Appeala of :Sew York. Jan. 17, 1893. 
Appeal from supreme court, general term, 
Second department. 
Application for the probate of the will of 
Mary Snelling, decea.eed. Probate was con-
tested by :\lary Gorden and others, on the 
ground, among others, of Incapacity of tes-
tatrix to execute a will by reason of ad-
vanced age, Impaired faculties, and undue 
ln1luence. From a judgment of the general 
term (17 N. Y. Supp. 683) a1!lrmlng a decree 
of the aurrogate'a court admitting the will 
to probate, contestants appeal Reversed. 
L. R. Beckley, for appellants. Thomas 
Young, for respondents. 
O'BRm~. J. The will of Mary Snelling, 
who died In the year 1800, was admitted to 
probate, atter a contest before the surro-
gate, whtch was Instituted bf her nephews 
and olecea, her only next of kin, on the 
ground of Incapacity and undue loftuence. 
She was about 84 years of age, and posseSBed 
of a small personal estate, which she be-
queathed to the persons, husband and wife, 
with whom she lived at the time of the exe-
cution of the will, which was but a few 
months before her death. The property 
came to her from her husband, who died lo 
1885. Subsequent to his death she lived 
with various persons lo the neighborhood as 
a boarder, and du11ng this time It appears 
that she made several other wills lo favor of 
parties with whom she lived or boarded for 
short perlod11 of time. Her management of 
the property, and the frequent change of 
purpose on her part In disposing of It by 
will, from time to time, lo favor of dltrereot 
persons with whom she temporarily resided, 
and to whom she was more or leSB attached 
for the time, would seem to Indicate that 
she had no fixed plan with reference to her 
estate, and poSBessed no great Intelligence 
lo business alralrs. Still It was not shown 
conclusively that she lacked the ca1>aC'lty nec-
essary in a person of her age and condition In 
life to dispose of her property by will, or that 
the will in question was the result of undue 
lntluence. The fact thnt the deceased was a 
woman of advanced age, somewhat enfeebled 
In body and mind, and that she gave her 
property to strnng(•rs, lnstead of her collateral 
relatives, from motives of gratitude or person-
al attachment, does not show that she was 
wanting in Intelligence sufticlent to compre-
hend the condition of her property and the 
scope and etrect of the testamentary provi-
sions. So long as her mental powers en-
abled her to understand and appreciate the 
amount and condition of her property, and to 
comprehend the nature and consequences of 
her act In executing the wlll, she was at lib-
erty to dispose of her own In such manner 
as seemed best to her, providing the disposi-
tion was her own free act. What the law 
terms "undue influence" ls not established 
by proof tending to show that the testator 
acted from motives of affection or gratitude. 
though the objects of her bounty were stran-
gers to her blood. The lo1luence or moral 
coercion, or by whatever other term desig-
nated, must be such as to overpower the will 
of the testator, and subject It to the will and 
control ot another, In which case It a.esnmes 
the character of fraud. Horn v. Pullman, 72: 
N. Y. 27ll; Clapp v. Fullerton, 3-1 N. Y. 190; 
Hollis v. Theological Seminary, 95 ~. Y. 
166; :Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 3'1t>. 
The eYldence given upon the trial before 
the surrogate, viewed In the most favo1·a:ble 
light for the contestants, was contllctlng~ 
and the findings that the decell8ed was pos-
sessed of sutllclent capacity to make a will. 
and that the will was not the result of undue 
lntluence, are conclusive u1>0n us with re-
spect to the objections made against Its pro-
bate. But the record discloses certain rul-
ings by the surrogate In the course of the pro-
ceedings before him which, In view of the 
nature of the questions Involved In the trial. 
cannot be overlooked. On the hearing two 
witnesses were produced by the contestants 
for the purpose of sustaining the objections. 
made to the probate of the will, who testified 
at great length to various acts, convena-
tions, and transactions of the testatrix, tend-
ing to establish undue Influence and Inca-
pacity. This testimony extended over some 
years prior to the execution of the will, and 
much of it had no bearing upon the Issues. 
as may well be loferred from the fact that It 
covers over 00 printed pages In the record. 
The proponents then called two physicians. 
who both testified that they had read the 
whole of the testimony of the two witnesses 
referred to above, giving the names of these 
witnesses, and to each of them In succession 
the following question was propounded: 
"Assuming their testimony to be true, and 
basing your opinion upon such testimony, 
what would you say as to the mental condi-
tion of Nancy Snelling, say in June, lSUO?'' 
This question was objected to by the counsel 
for the contestants, and, while the form In 
which the objection WIUI made Is quite In-
artistic, there can be no doubt as to what 
was Intended, and we think It was snftletent 
to challenge the com1>etency of the testimony 
sought to be elicited. The surrogate o\·er-
ruled the objection, and an exception was 
taken. The witness In each case then an-
swered: "I should say she was perfectly 
sane." It ls needless to enter upon any rea-
soning or discussion to show that this ques-
tion was Improper, as this court has more 
than once condemned this method of elicit-
ing opinions from experts. Ueynolds v. Rob-
inson, M N. Y. f>89, 50:i; Peopl<> v. !\l<'El-
valoe, 121 N. Y. 2:)(), 2-! N. E. 4-0J; Link v. 
Sheldon, 136 N. Y. 1, 32 N. E. tl9G. And It 
would be dlfticult to imagine a plainer breach 
Case No. 160]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
of the rule than is presented by the question
propounded to the witness in this case. The
principle is not changed by the circumstan-
ces that all the testimony embraced within
the sweeping terms of the question was be-
fore the court, or by the fact that the mass of
testimony upon which the opinion was based
came from witnesses of the opposite party.
The necessity of a specific question, at the
time of the examination of the witnesses,cov-
ering all the facts, or assumed facts, upon
wh-lch the opinion of the expert is required,
is as apparent in such a case as in any other.
One of the subscribing witnesses to the
execution of the will was a neighbor of the
persons, husband and wife, in whose favor
the will was made, and she attended at the
time the will was executed, at the request
of the wife, who was one of the beneficiaries
under the will. About the time of the hear-
ing upon the contest before the surrogate
this subscribing witness was visited by a wo-
man who, under an assumed name, and with-
out disclosing her real purpose, had been
procured by the contestants or their counsel
to elicit admissions from her for use upon
the trial. The subscribing witness, after
having testified to what took place at the
execution of the will, and that the testatrix
was at the time apparently rational, was
subjected to a long cross-examination with
reference to the interview with the visitor
above referred to, for the purpose of laying
a foundation for impeaching her testimony.
Many of the questions put to the witness in
the course of this exceedingly prolix and
discursive examination were properly exclud-
ed by the surrogate. She was asked, how-
ever, in substance, if Mrs. Cook, who was
one of the beneficiaries under the will, and
interested in its probate, and who had pro-
cured her to attend as a witness to the will,
had not promised her money or some reward
in the case, and she answered the question
in the negative. Subsequently the woman
who sought the interview in the interest of
476
the contestants was called as an impeaching
witness, and in various forms was asked if
the subscribing witness had not so stated in
the interview, and other questions tending
to impeach her, which were excluded under
exception. The interest whichv a witness has
in the subject of the controversy is a mate-
rial inquiry, as it bears upon the question of
credibility; and where a witness has re-
ceived, or has been promised, any reward for
giving testimony in a case, the fact may be
shown upon cross-examination, and, if de-
nied, admissions or declarations out of court
to that efl'ect may be proved. The relations
which the witness bears to the case are so
far relevant to the issue as to admit proof of
contradictory statements by way of impeach-
ment, when the proper foundation is laid. 1
Greenl. Ev. § 450; Newton v. Harris, 6 N.
Y. 345; Starks v. People, 5 Denlo, 106. Many
of the questions propounded to the impeach-
ing witness were so framed that their pur-
pose or meaning was not quite clear, or they
were so intermingled with other matters that
they were properly excluded; but with re-
spect to the interest which the subscribing
witness had in the establishment of the
will, the contestants were not permitted to
make such inquiry as they were entitled to.
The very questionable methods used to pro-
cure the impeaching testimony might well
affect its credibility with the surrogate, but
could not affect its competency. An error
in admitting or excluding evidence in such a
case is not suflicient to reverse the decree
of the surrogate, unless it appears that the
party against whom the ruling was made
was necessarily prejudiced thereby. Code,
§ The rulings referred to related to
important testimony in the case, and, at
least in some degree, must have been preju-
dicial to the contestants. For these reasons,
the judgment of the general term and the
decree of the surrogate should be reversed,
and a new trial granted; costs to abide the
event. All concur.
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Case No. 160] PRODUCTION AND EFFECT o·F EVIDENCE. 
()f the rule than ls preeented by the question 
propounded to the witness in this case. The 
principle ls not changed by the clrcumstan-
-ces that all the testimony embraced within 
the sweeping terms ot the question was be-
fore the court, or by the tact that the mass of 
testimony upon which the opinion was baaed 
-came from witnesses of the opposite party. 
The necessity of a specific question, at the 
time of tlie examination ot the wltnesses,cov-
~ring all the tacts, or assumed facts, upon 
wh4ch the opinion ot the expert ls required, 
is as apparent In such a case as In any other. 
One ot the subscribing witnesses to the 
-executloa of the wlll was a neighbor ot the 
persons, husband and wife, In whose favor 
the will was made, and she attended at the 
time the will was executed, at the request 
-0! the wife, who was one of the beueflclarles 
under the wlll. About the time of the hear-
ing upon the contest before the surrogate 
this subscribing witness was visited by a wo-
man who, under an assumed name, and with-
.out disclosing her real purpose, had been 
procured by the contestants or their counsel . 
to elicit admissions from her tor use upon 
the trial. The subscribing witness, after 
having testified to what took place at the 
execution ot the will, and that the testatI1x 
was at the time apparently rational, was 
subjected to a long cross-examination with 
reference to the interview with the visitor 
above referred to, for the purpoee of laying 
a toundntlon tor impeaching her testimony. 
Many of the questions put to the witness In 
the course of this exceedingly prolix and 
-discursive examination were properly exclud-
ed by the surrogate. She was asked, how-
ever, In substance, It Mrs. Cook, who was 
one of the beneficiaries under the will, and 
Interested In Its probate, and who had pro-
cured her to attend as a witness to the will, 
bad not promised her money or some reward 
In the case, and she answered the question 
in the negative. Subsequently the woman 
who sought the interview in the Interest of 
476 
the contestants was called as an Impeaching 
witness, and In various forms was asked It 
the subscribing witnese had not so stated In 
the Interview, and other questions tending 
to Impeach her, which were excluded under 
exception. The Interest which a witness has 
In the subject of the controversy ls a mat.e-
rlal Inquiry, as 1t bears upon the question of 
credlb111ty; and where a witness bas re-
ceived, or has been promised, any reward for 
giving testimony In a case, the fact may be 
shown upon cross-examination, and, If de-
nied, admissloll8 or declarations out ot court 
to that effect may be proved. The relatloll8 
which the witness bears to the case are so 
far relevant to the issue as to admit proof of 
contradictory statements by way of Impeach-
ment, when the proper foundation ls laid. 1 
Greenl. Ev. § 450; Newton v. Harris, 6 N. 
Y. 345; Stark!! v. People, 5 Denio, 100. Many 
of the questions propounded to the Impeach-
ing witness were so framed that thel,r pur-
pose or meaning was not quite clear, or they 
were so intermingled with other matters that 
they were properly excluded; but with re-
spect to the Interest which the subscribing 
witness had In the establishment of the 
will, the contestants were not permitted to 
make such Inquiry as they were entitled to. 
The very questionable methods used to pro-
cure the impeaclnng testimony might well 
artect Its credibility with the surrogate, but 
could not affect Its competency. An error 
In admitting or excluding evideuce In such a 
case ls not suftlclent to reverse the decree 
of the surrogate, unless It appears that the 
party against whom the ruling was made 
wus uecesl!arlly prejudiced thereby. Code, 
I 254:i. The rulings referred to related to 
important testimony ln the case, and, at 
least in some degree, must bave been preju-
dicial to too contestants. For these reasons, 
the judgment of the general term and the 
decree ot the surrogate should be reversed, 
and a new trial granted; coats to abide the 
event. All concur. 
CliOSS—EXAMlNATlON'.
[Case No. 161
WELCH v. STATE.
(3 N. E. 850, 104 Ind. 347.)
Supreme Court of Indiana. Dec. 15, 1885.
Appeal from circuit court, Monroe county.
Landen & Miers, for appellant. J . E. Hen-
ley, for appellee.
MITCHELL, J. The indictment in this
record charges, with proper formality, that
on the fourth day of January, 1885, William
Welch did feloniously, etc., kill and murder
one Louis Fedder, by then and there feloni-
ously, etc., “striking him, the said Louis Fed-
der, upon his head with a dangerous and
deadly weapon, to-wit, a large heavy club,
which he, the said William Weich, had and
held in his hands.” The only objection made
to the indictment is that, by the omission of
the words “then and there" after the name
of the accused, as last above set out, it fails
to allege that the defendant had the club
in his hand at the time of the beating and
striking. Within the ruling in Dennis v.
State, 2 N. E. 349, there is no force in this
objection.
The accused was found guilty of murder
in the first degree, and his punishment fixed
at imprisonment for life. His conviction
rests largely, if not entirely, upon the testi-
mony of one Matthew James, whose evidence ‘
relates wholly to alleged confessions or ad-
missions made by the defendant to him. Be-
sides the testimony of James are some crim-
inating circumstances of more or less weight.
The evidence of the alleged confession, as
detailed by this witness, is not altogether
free from suspicion; and the circumstances
under which it is said to have been made,
and the not altogether unblemished reputa-
tion of the witness, as it is made to appear
in the record, detract somewhat from the
force and reasonableness of the confession as
related by him. Notwithstanding this, con-
sidering the other circumstances which ap-
pear, since the jury have passed upon it, we
should hesitate to disturb their finding on
the evidence. The witness testified that the
defendant made admissions to him, indica-
tive of his guilt, in the presence of Andrew
Cooper, and Charles Young. Both of these
persons were called as witnesses for the de-
fense, and both denied having heard any-
thing of the kind testified to by James.
Cooper, having testifled on his direct ex-
amination that he heard no confession made
by the defendant to James, and no talk be-
tween them about the murder of Fedder. was
asked, on cross-examination by counsel for
the state, this question: “I will ask you if,
in the barber shop of William Profit here in
Bloomington, you did not say there that
morning that you knew Bill Welt-h was the
man that killed Louis Fodder?" To this
question the appellant objected. for the rea-
son that lt was asking the witness for an
opinion expressed by him out of hearing of
defendant, and was not asking for a fact,
and was not a cross-examination, which ob-
jection was overruled, _and defendant ex-
cepted, fllltl the witness answered, “I did
not.” The state then asked the witness,
“And if you did not say there that you were
willing to bet $250 that Bill Welch was the
guilty man?” To this question the appellant
again objected, for the reason stated. The
objection was again overruled and the wit-
ness answered, “I did not.” The state then
called William Profit, and asked him the fol-
lowing question: “State to the jury whether
you heard him [Andy Cooper] make the re-
mark that ‘William Welch or Bill Welch is
the man who murdered old man Fedder. I
am not guessing at it; I know it.’ " To this
the appellant objected, for the reason that
the question was illegal and incompetent,
and was hearsay evidence, and was an effort
to impeach a. witness on irrelevant and im-
material matter, and that the question re-
ferred to the opinion of an outside party;
which objection the court overruled, and ap-
pellant excepted, and the witness answered:
“Yes; he said that.” The state then asked
the witness the following question: “I will
ask you if he said then, at the same time and
"place, ‘l will bet,’ or ‘I am willing to bet,
$250 that he is the man '." " To which question
the appellant again objected, for the same
reasons, which objection was again over-
ruled, and defendant excepted, and the wit-
ness answered: “Yes, sir; he said that."
The same question was asked the witness
Harry Innes, by the state, to which the ap-
pellant objected, for the same reasons. These
rulings of the court were presented, among
others, as causes for a new trial.
We know of no principle or authority upon
which to maintain the rulings of the court
in admitting the testimony of Profit and In-
nes. The conversation about which inquiry
was made of Cooper on cross-examination
was so remotely, if at all, connected with the
subject of his direct examination, and of the
matter in issue, that the rule was put to its
utmost tension in allowing the question to
be asked him, over the defendant's objection.
Mclntire v. Young, 6 Blackf. 496. As, how-
ever, if the witness had admitted that he
made the declarations imputed to him by the
cross-examining question such admission
might have formed the basis for further in-
quiry as to the sources of his knowledge, or
the grounds upon which he based his opinion
of the guilt of the accused, with a view of
driving him ultimately to an admission that
he heard the alleged confession, we think it
was within the discretion of the court to al-
low the question. Having denied the imput-
ed declarations, we think the state was bound
by the denial. The subject about which the
witness was inquired of was new, and col-
lateral to the main issue. Seller v. Jenkins,
97 Ind. 430. It did not come within the rule
that a witness may be shown to have made
statements out of court inconsistent with
his testimony given upon the trial. The con-
477
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
09
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
CROSS-EXAM:IN ATJON. [Case No. 161 
WELCH•· STATE. 
(3 N. E. BrlO. 104 Ind. 347.) 
Supreme Court of Indiana. Dec. 15, 1885. 
Appeal from circuit court, Monroe county. 
Landen & Miers, for appellnnt. J. E. Hen-
ley, for appellee. 
MITCHELL, J. The indictment ln this 
record charges, wlth proper formality, that 
on the fourth day of January, 1885, William 
Welch did feloniously, etc., kill and murder 
one Louis Fedder, by _then and there felonl· 
ously, etc., "striking him, the said Louts Fed· 
der, upon his head with a dangerous and 
deadly weapon, to-wit, a large heavy club, 
which be, the said Wllllam Welch, had and 
·held In his hands." The only objection made 
to the Indictment ls that, by the omission of 
the words "then and there" after the name 
of the accused, as last above set out, it falls 
to allege that the defendant had the club 
ID his band at the time of the beating and 
striking. Within the ruling In Dennis v. 
State, 2 N. E. 349, there ls no force In this 
objection. 
The accused was found guilty of murder 
In the first degree, and his punishment fixed 
at lDiprlsonment for life. His conviction 
rests largely, 1t not entirely, upon the testi-
mony of one Matthew James, whose evidence · 
relates wholly to alleged confessions or ad-
miulons made by the defendant to him. Be-
sides the testimony of James are some crlm· 
inatlng circumstances of more or less weight. 
The evidence of the alleged confession, aa 
detailed by this witness, Is not altogether 
free from suspicion; and the circumstances 
under which It Is said to have been made, 
and the not altogether unblemished reputa-
tion of the witness, as it ls made to appear 
In the record, detract somewhat from the 
t:orce and rea80nableness of the confession as 
related by him. Notwithstanding this, con· 
slderlng the other circumstsnces which ap-
pear, since the Jury have passed upon it, we 
should hesitate to disturb their finding on 
the evidence. The witness testified that the 
defendant made admissions to him, lndlca-
tlve of his guilt, In the presence of Andrew 
Cooper, and Charles Young. Both of these 
persons were called as witnesses for the de-
fense, and both denied having heard any-
thing of the kind testified to by James. 
Cooper, having testified on his direct ex-
amination that be beard no confession made 
by the defendant to James, and no talk be-
tween them about the murder of Fedder, was 
asked, on cross-examination by counsel for 
the state, this question: "I wlll ask you It, 
In the barber shop of Wllllam Profit here In 
Bloomington, you did not say there that 
morning that you knew Blll Wek'h was the 
man that killed Louis Fedder?" To this 
question the appellant objected, for the rea-
son that It was asking the witness for an 
opinion expressed by him out of hearing of 
defendant, and was not asking for a fact, 
and was not a cross-examination, which ob-
jection was overruled, and defendant ex-
cepted, and the wltnes8 answered, "I did 
not." The state then asked the witness, 
"And if you did not say there that you were 
wllllng to bet '2fl0 that BUl Welch was the 
guilty man?" To this question the appellaDt 
again objected, for the reason stated. The 
objection was again overruled and the wit-
ness answered, "I dld not." The state then 
called William Profit, and asked him the fol-
lowing question: "State to the Jury whether 
you heard him [Andy Cooper] make the re-
mark that 'WUliam Welch or Blll Welch is 
the man who murdered old man Fedder. I 
am not guessing at It; I know it.'" To this 
the appellant objected, for the reason that 
the question was Ulegal and Incompetent. 
and was hearsay evidence, and was an effort 
to impeach a witness on Irrelevant and im-
material matter. and that the question re-
ferred to the opinion of an outside party; 
which objection the court overruled, and ap-
pellant excepted, and the witness answered: 
"Yes; he said that." The state then asked 
the witness the following question: "I will 
ask you If he said then, at the same time and 
·place, 'l wlll bet,' or 'I am wllllng to bet. 
'250 that he Is the man?'" To which question 
the appellant again objected, for the same-
reasons, which ol>Jectlon was again over-
ruled, and defendant excepted, and the wit-
ness answered: "Yes, sir; he said that." 
The same question was asked the witness 
Harry Innes, by the state, to which the ap-
pellant objected, for the same reasons. These 
rulings of the court were presented, among 
others, aa causes for a new trial. 
We know of no principle or authority upon 
which to maintain the rulings of the court 
in admitting the testimony of Profit and In-
nes. The conversation about which Inquiry 
was made of Cooper on cross-examination 
was so remotely, 1t at all, connected with the 
subject of his direct examination, and of the 
matter in issue, that the rule was put to its 
utmost tension In allowing the question to-
be asked him, over the defendant's objection. 
Mcintire v. Young, 6 Blackf. 400. As, how-
ever, it the witness had admitted that he-
made the declarations imputed to him by the 
cross-examining question such admission 
might have formed the basis for further In-
quiry as to the sources of hls knowledge, or 
the grounds upon which be based bis opinion 
of the guilt of the accused, wlth a view ot 
driving him ultimately to an admission that 
he heard the alleged confesslon, we think it 
was within the discretion of the court to al-
low the question. Having denied the Imput-
ed declarations, we think the state was bound 
by the denial. '£he subject about which tile 
witness W88 Inquired of was new, and col-
lateral to the main Issue. Seller v. Jenkins, 
07 Ind. 430. It did not come wlthln the ntle 
that a witness may be shown to have made 
statements out of court Inconsistent with 
his testimony given upon the trial. The con-
471 
Case No. 161]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
versation or declarations imputed to him had
no relation, except by argument or inference,
to the testimony given by the witness in his
exaniiiiation in chief. They were not contra-
dictory of his testimony as given, nor were
they inconsistent with it so as to become the
-subject of an impeachment. 1 Whart. Ev.
§§ 55*, 559; Seller v. Jenkins, supra.
This case is complete in its analogy with
that of People v. Stackhouse, 49 Mich. 76, 13
l\'. W. In that case a witness was ex-
amined on behalf of the accused, who was on
trial for the crime of arson. On cross-exam-
ination she was asked if she had not said to
certain persons named, on the night the ac-
cused was arrested, that she always did sus-
pect that he did burn the mill. Having de-
nied the imputed conversation, two witnesses
were called who testifled that she had so
stated. Reversing this ruling, the court said:
“The opinion or suspicions of the witnes
out of court, although inconsistent with the
conclusion which the facts which she testifled
to on the trial would warrant, cannot be made
the basis of an impeachment. This is so
iii-mly settled by the authorities that the
question cannot be considered an open one."
Whether the matter inquired of on cross-
examination, and proved by the state in im-
peachment of Cooper, was collateral to the
main inquiry or not, is determined b_v this in-
quiry: Would the prosecuting attorney have
been permitted to introduce it in evidence as
part of the state's case? If he would not, it
was collateral. if it was collateral, it was
not competent to contradict it. 1 Whart. Ev.
§ 559; George v. State, 16 Neb. 318, 20 N. W.
.311; State v. Townsend (Iowa) 24 N. W. 535;
Sumner v. Crawford, 45 N. H. 416; Moore
v. People, 108 Ill. 484.
in 1 Greenl. Ev. § 449, the rule is stated
thus: “And if a question is put to a. witness
which is collateral or irrelevant to the issue,
his answer cannot be contradicted by the
party who asked the question, but it is con-
clusive against him.”
in 1 Starkie, Ev. § 200, the author says: “It
is here to be observed that a witness is not
to be cross-examined as to any distinct col-
lateral fact for the purpose of afterwards im-
peat-hing his testimony by contradicting
him." .
in \\'liart. Ev. 5 55!), the learned author
says: “In order to avoid an interminable
478
multiplication of issues, it is a settled rule of
practice that when a witness is cross-exanr
ined on a matter collateral to the issue, he
cannot, as to his answer, be subsequently
contradicted by the party putting the ques-
tion.” _
The ruling of the court in admitting this
evidence, and other rulings admitting evi-
dence of like character, was such error as
must reverse the judgment.
In the fifth reason assigned for a new trial
is also included an alleged error of the court
in excluding the evidence of James Kelley,
a witness for appellant. When James Kel-
ley was on the witness stand the counsel of
appellant asked him to state what he knew
of the intention of the defendant to leave
Bloomington, and for what purpose, etc.
To this question the state objected for the
reason that it was hearsay. Counsel for the
defendant stated that the defendant wanted
to show that defendant and this witness had
a conversation as to his going away to the
Air Line Railroad to get a job of work, in-
stead of going away to avoid a prosecution;
that the defendant made his going away pub-
llc; and that he made known his intention
and purpose to five or six other witnesses,
and that he went to get work. and got work.
The court sustained the objection, and ap-
-pellant excepted. Concerning the evidence
thus proposed, it may be said the record fails
to show that the state had introduced evi-
dence tending to show that the defendant
left Bloomington under circumstances which
might indicate a purpose to avoid a.rrest and
prosecution. Until some evidence was intro-
duced by the state upon which a claim of
flight or evasion of arrest might have been
based, the evidence offered was immaterial.
It may have been excluded for that reason.
We need not decide whether, under any cir-
cumstances, such evidence is competent.
Hamilton v. State, 36 ind. 280; Austin v.
Swank, 9 Ind. 109; Boone Co. Bank v. Wal-
lace, 18 Ind. S2.
The application for a new trial, so far a it
was asked on the ground of newly-discovered
evidence. need not, in view of the fact that,
for the reasons already given, the judgment
must be reversed, be further noticed. Judg-
ment reversed, with directions to the clerk
to make the proper order concerning the fur-
ther custody of the defendant.
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<::ase Yo. 161] PHODUCTION AND EFFECT OF E\'IDENCE. 
versation or declarations Imputed to him had 
no relation, except by argument or Inference, 
to the testimony given by the witness ln bis 
o(!xamlnatlon In chief. They were not contra-
dictory ot bis testimony as given, nor were 
they inconsistent with It so as to become the 
:aubject ot an Impeachment. 1 Wbart. Ev. 
§§ 55~, ::>59; Seller v. Jenkins, aupl'll.. 
This case ls complete In Its analogy with 
tbnt ot People v. Stackhouse, 40 Mich. 76, 13 
N. W. 364. In that case a witness was ex-
.amlned on behalf of the accused, who wns on 
trial tor the crime of arson. On cross-exam-
inntlon she was asked if she had not sa.ld to 
-certain persons named, on the night the ac-
cused was a1Tested, that she always did sus-
pect that he did burn the mlll. Having de-
nied the Imputed conversation, two witnesses 
were called who testified that she bad so 
8tated. Reversing this ruling, the court said: 
''The opinion or suspicions ot the witness 
out of court, although incollfllstent with the 
conclusion which the facts wblch she testltted 
to on the trial would warrant, cannot be made 
the basis ot an Impeachment. This ls so 
iil'mly settled by the authorities that the 
(1uestion cannot be considered an open one." 
'Yhetber the matter inquired of on croBB-
exawlnntlon, and proved by the state In Im-
peachment of Cooper, was collateral to the 
main Inquiry or not, ls determined by this ln-
(]Ulry: Would the prosecuting attorney have 
been permitted to introduce it In evidence as 
part of the state's case? It be would not, it 
was collateral. If it was collateral, It was 
not competent to contradict It. 1 Wbart. Ev. 
t 559; George v. State, 16 Neb. 318, 20 N. W. 
.311; State v. Townsend tiowa) 24 N. W. 535; 
.Sumnet· v. Crawto1·d, 45 N. H. 416; Moore 
v. People, 108 Ill. 484. 
In 1 Greenl. Ev. I 449, the rule le stated 
thus: "And if a question ls put to a wltneSB 
which Is collateral or Irrelevant to the Issue, 
bis answer cannot be contradicted by the 
party who asked the question, but It ls con-
clusive ngnlnst him." 
Ju 1 Hturkle, Ev. § :.>oo, the author says: "It 
is here to be observed that a witness la not 
to be cross-examined as to any distinct col-
lo tl't·ul fa('t !or the lmrpose ot atterwa1·ds lm-
pea<·hlng bis testimony by contradicting 
him." 
In Wbart. Ev. § 05!), the learned author 
says: "In 01·der to avoid an Interminable 
478 
multiplication of Issues, it is a settled rule of 
practice that when a witness la crou-exam-
lned on a matter collateral to the issue, he 
cttnnot, as to bis answer, be subsequently 
contradicted by the party puttiJlg the qu~ 
tlon." , 
The ruling of the court In admitting thla 
evidence, and other rulings admitting evi-
dence of like character, was such error aa 
must reverse the judgment. 
In the fifth reason 8.88lgned for a new trial 
ls also included an alleged error of the court 
In excludlng the evidence of James Kelley, 
a witneSB for appellant. When James Kel-
ley was on the witness stand the counsel of 
appellant asked him to state what he knew 
of the intention ot the defendant to leave 
Bloomington, and for what purpose, etc. 
To this question the state objected for the 
i·eason that it was hearsay. Counsel for the 
defendant stated that the defendant wanted 
to show that defendant and this witness had 
a conversation as to bis going away to the 
Air Line Railroad to get a job ot work, In-
stead ot going away to avoid a prosecution; 
that the defendant made hie going away pub-
lic; and that be made known bis intention 
and purpose to five or six other witnesses, 
and that be went to get work, and got work. 
The court sustained the objection, and ap-
. pellant excepted. Concerning the evidence 
thus proposed, It may be Bald the record falls 
to show that the state had introduced evi-
dence tending to show that the defendant 
left Bloomington under circumstances which 
might lndlcate a purpose to avold arrest and 
prosecution. Until some evidence was intro-
duced by the state upon which a claim of 
flight or evasion of arrest might have been 
l.Jased, the evidence otrered was Immaterial. 
It may have been exduded for that reason. 
We need not decide whether, under any cir-
cumstances, such evidence is competent. 
Hamilton v. State, 36 Ind. 280; Austin v. 
Swank, 9 Ind. 109; Boone Co. Bank v. Wal-
lace, 18 Ind. 82. 
The application for a new trial, so far as It 
was asked on the ground of newly-dlacovered 
evidence, need not, In view ot the fact that, 
tor the reasons already given, the Judgment 
must be reversed, be further noticed. Judg-
ment reversed, with dlrections to the clerk 
to make the proper order concerning the fur-
ther custody of the defendant. 
RE—EXAMlNATlON.
[Case No. 162
ANEALS et al. v. PEOPLE.
(% N. E. 1022, 134 Ill. 4-01.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 1, 1890.
Error to circuit court, Adams county;
w|i.i.lAM Msssn, Judge.
Indictment for assault with intent to
commit murder. The instructions referred
to in the opinion were as follows: “The
court instructs the jury that in determin-
ing the question whether the defendants
William Aneals and Louis Stormer were
or were not at another place, or at other
places. at the time of the alleged assault,
they should not be governed alone by the
testimony of the witnesses introduced to
prove an alibi, but that it is the duty of
the jury to consider all the evidence in the
case before them, and unless the iury. after
considering all the facts and circum-
stances ln evidence before them, have a.
reasonable doubt as to the presence of the
defendants William Aneals and Louis
Stormer at the home ofJames Knox at
the time of the assault, that then the iury
should not permit the defense of an alibi
to avail said last-named defendants. ”
“The court instructs the jury that the
theory of an alibi in this case is that the
defendants were so far removed from the
scene oi the alleged assault at the time of
its commission as to make itimpossible
that they could have committed it; and
even although the jury may believe from
the evidence in the case that the defend-
ants were at other and different places
than the scene of the assault 'on the samc
evening such assault, if any, was made,
nevertheless, if the jury further believe
from the evidence in the case beyonda rea-
sonable doubt that the defendants could
have reasonably been at the place of such
assault at the time thereof, and also at
such other place or places, on the same
evening. and at the time or times men-
tioned by the witnesses in the case, that
then the defense of an alibi cannot avail
the defendants."
John H. Williams and Charles M. Gil-
mer, for plaiitiffs in error. George Hunt,
Atty. Gen., for the People
SHOPE, C. J. At the May term, 1889,01
the Adams circuit court, Francis Asbury
Aneals, William Aneals, and Louis Storm-
er were indicted for an assault upon James
Knox, with intent to commit murder. At
the September term.1889,the trial resulted
in averdict of guilty. fixing the term of
Asbury and William Aneals, severally, at
18 months in the penitentiary, and the de-
fendant Stormer at 1 year. A motion for
a new trial was sustained as to Asbury
Anenls. but overruled as to the other de-
fendants, and they were severally sentenced
on the verdict. They prosecute this writ
of error.
The first contention is that the verdict
should have been set aside because the
proof failed to sustain it. No question is
made that there is ample proof of the cor-
pus delicti. The only question of fact is
as to the identity of the persons who com-
mitted the assault. On April 27, 1889,
about 8 o'clock in the evening, while
James Knox and his family were at the
supper tabie,two masked men entered the
house, and saying only, “ Hold, ” fired two
shots at Knox from a revolver, each firing
one shot, one taking effect in the nose of
Knox, the other missing him and passing
out through a window. The assailants
then backed out of the house, drew shut
the door, and disappeared. There were
present James Knox, his wife, Samuel
Knox, a brother of James, Miss Agnes
Lagee, and Miss Hattie Wibble. The lat-
ter two had just risen from the table.»
Miss Lagee was within four feet, and pos-
sibly nearer the smaller, of the two assail-
ants. One of the assailants was consid-
erably larger than the other. The larger
one came in first. but the smaller one
stepped furthest into the room. Samuel
Knox was 10 or 12 feet from the door at
which the assailants entered, which was
on the south side of the room. winding the
clock which hung on the west wall of the
room. James Knox was unable to iden-
tify either oi the assailants, and unable to
give any description of them. except that
the smaller of the two was a man from 5
feet 6 to 8 inchesliigh, weighing 130 or 140
pounds, “longish neck,” shoulders not
broad but square. Miss Lngee, who was
nearer than the others, says that one was
quite alittle smaller than the other in size,
build, and height: that she noticed the
eyes of the smaller one particularly
through his mask. She also noticed that
the hair of one of the assailants was dark.
and the other light. On the following
Saturday morning, this witness and oth-
ers went to Aneais’und Stormer's to see if
they could identify any one. She says
that Stormer’s build and size resembled
very much the size and build of the small-
er of the assailants. He had light blue
eyes, and a peculiar stare about them
“ that I noticed particularly that night.”
She also states that the eyes were rather
small, and through the mask they seemed
rather round than oval. The larger of the
two men had dark eyes and hair. Both
wore light, brown-gray suits, and hats
the same color. The larger one had a
large hat; the other a small one. The
larger one had square shoulders, was firm-
ly built, and straight. -She testified that
the description of the larger one answers
to that of William Aneals “very well.”
She was unable to recognize any one as
the assailant, but testifled that the two
defendants, William Aneals and Louis
Stormer. resembled the parties who made
the assault. (H1 the motion for a new
trial,sheflled an afiidavit stating that she
did not believe that the defendants were
the assaulting parties, and did not intend
to be so understood in giving her testi-
mony. Miss Wibble was unable to identi-
fy any one, while she agrees with the oth-
er witness in the main as to the descrip-
tion of the persons who made the assnult.
Samuel Knox testified that he had known
William Aneals from infancy, and was
familiar with his size, form, and general
appearance. He describes particularly the
clothing and hats of the assailants, and
says he saw William Aneals wear a hut
like the one described by him, on May 6th,
in Quincy. He saw him clearly at the time
of the shooting. Saw none of his face but
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BE-EXAMINATION. (Case No. 162 
AXEALl'I et al. '"· PEOPLE. 
(2:> N. E . 1022. 134 Ill. 401.) 
Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 1, 1890. 
Error to circuit court, Adams county; 
Wu,1,1AM MARSH, Judge. 
Indictment for a11Rault with Intent to 
commit murder. The ln11tr11ctlons referred 
to In the opinion were a11 folio we: "The 
court Instructs the jury that In determln-
inar tbA question whether the defendants 
Wtlllam AnealR and Louis Stormer were 
or were not at another place, or at other 
ploces. at the time of the alleged assault, 
they should not be govemed alone by the 
teHtlmony of the wJtuesRes Introduced to 
11rove an alibi, but thnt It 111 the dnty of 
the jury to consider all the evidence in the 
case before them, and unle11.s the jury. after 
considering all the ract11 and ch'Cum-
11tance11 In evidence before them. have a 
reasonablt> doubt as to the presence of the 
dPfendant11 William Ant>ttlH nnd Louis 
Stormt>r at the h1Jme of Jn.mes Knox at 
the time of tht' osst1ult, that then the jury 
should not permit the defense of an alibi 
to avail said laHt-named defendantR." 
"Tiu.• court instructs the jury that the 
theorv of an a/lbi In thl11 ca11e Is that the 
defendants were so far removed from the 
scene of the alleged assault 11t the time of 
its commission as to make It impossible 
that they could have committed It; and 
even although the Jury may believe from 
the evidence in the case that the defend-
ants were at other and lllflerent places 
than the 11cene of the aRRault ·on the 11amo 
evt"nlng snch a11sault. If any, was made, 
neverthele11K, If the Jury further belie,·e 
from the evidence in the ca11e beyond a rca.-
som1ble doubt that the deftondants could 
have reasonably been at the pince of 11uch 
aesunlt at the time thereof, umJ al110 at 
each other place or )llace11, oo the SH me 
evening, and at the time or times men-
tioned by the wltneRse11 In the ca11e, that 
then the defense of an alibi cannot a vall 
the defendantH." 
John H. Wllllams ancl Charles Al. Gil-
mer, for plall:ltiffs in error. George Hunt, 
Atty. Gen., for the People. 
SHOPE, C. J. At the May term, 1889,of 
the A<lams circuit court, Francis Asbury 
Aneals, William Aneals, and Louis Storm-
er were lncllcted for an as11aultuponJamee 
Knox, with Intent to commit murder. At 
the September term, 18!:!9, the trial resulted 
In a verdict of guilty, fixing the tPrm of 
Asbury and William Aneule, severally, at 
18 months in the penitentiary, and the de-
fendant Stormer at 1 year. A motion for 
a new trial was sustained a11 to Asbury 
_.\neal11. but overruled nH to the other de-
fendonts, and they werc11eYerally Heutenced 
on the ,·erdlct. 'fhey pro11ecute this writ 
of error. 
The first contention Is that the verdict 
11hould have been set aside because the 
proof fulled to rmstain It. No question le 
made that there ls am11le proof or the cor-
pus delicti. The onl.v question of foct is 
as to the Identity of th1• per11ons who com-
mitted the 11.t111ault. On April ~. 1889, 
about 8 o'clock in the r\·cnlng, while 
James Knox and hl11 rumlly were at the 
supper table, two masked mPn ~ntered the 
house, and saying only, "Hold," fired two 
shots at Knox from a revolver, each tiring 
one 11hot, one taking effect in the no11e of 
Knox, the other mls11lng him and pa~lng 
out through a window. The assailants 
then barked out of the house, drew shut 
the door, and disappeared. There were 
present James Knox, his wife, Samuel 
Knox, a brother of James, Mls11 Agne11 
Lagee, and Mis11 Hattie Wibhle. 'file lat-
ter two had just risen from tbe table.' 
Ml11s La.gee w1111 within four feet, .ancl pos-
sibly nearer the smaller, of the two a1111all-
ant:R. One of the assailants was consid-
erably larger than the other. The larger 
one came in first, but the smaller one 
stepped furthest Into the room. Samuel 
Knox waR 10 or 12 feet from the door at 
which the nesallant8 entered, which was 
on the south side of the room. winding t11e 
clock which hung on the west wall of the 
room. James Knox was unable to Iden-
tify either of the assallanh, and unable to 
give any description of thew, exeept that 
the smaller of the two was a man from 5 
feet 6 to 8 Inches.high, welghlnir 130 or 140 
pounds, "loniz:l11h neck," shoulders not 
l.Jrouu tmt square. Miss Lagee, who wus 
nearer than the othP.rs, says tlta.t one wa11 
quite a little smaller than the other in size. 
build, and height: tba t 11he noticed the 
eyes of the smaller one particularly 
through his mask. She also noticed that 
the hair of one of the aseallt1nt11was dark. 
and the other light. On the following 
Saturday morning, this witness an•l oth-
ers went to Aneals' u.nd Stormer·R to see If 
they could Identify any one. She 11ay11 
that Stormer's build and size resembled 
very much the size and build of the small-
er of the assailants. He had llgbt blue 
eyeR, o.nd a peculiar stare about them 
"that I noticed particularly that night. " 
She 11.1110 states that the eyes were rather 
smnll, and through the mask they seemed 
rath~r round than oval. The largf'r of the 
two men bad d1.1.rk eye8 and hair. Both 
wore light, brown-gray suits, u.nd hate 
the 11ame color. The larger one had a 
large hat; the other a small one. The 
larger one hod square shoulders, was firm-
ly built, and straight. ·She testltled that 
the desm·l11tton of the larger one answers 
to that of William Aneals "very well." 
She was unable to recognize any one tts 
the as11allant. hut te11tltlcd that the two 
defendants, William Anea.ls nnil Louis 
Stormer. resembled the parties who made 
the aReaolt. On the motion for a new 
trial, 11be flied &11 amdavit Rtatlnit that she 
did not believe that tho defeudants were 
the assaulting parties," a.ud did not In tend 
to be 110 understood in gl vlng her testl-
monv. MIRs Wlbble was uuot.le to Identi-
fy any one, whlle she agrees with thr. oth-
er wltne1111 In the main as to the de11crip-
tlon of the persons wbo made thP. assault. 
Samuel Knox teetlfte1l that he had known 
Wlllhtm Aneals from Infancy, and was 
familiar with hi11 size, form, and gerwral 
appParance. He describes 11artlcularly the 
clothing and hats of the as11allnnb1, and 
says he 11aw William Aneals wear a hut 
like the one deserlbed by him, on May 6th, 
In Qnlney. He saw him clearly at the time 
or the 11bootlng. Saw none of his face but 
479 
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his chin, and that resembled the chin of
William Aneals. He testified that he
thought he knew these men, and was sat-
isfied from what he saw that William
Aneals was one of them. On cross-exam-
inafion of this witness. much occurred
that might very properly Weaken the force
of his testimony.
It is made to appear with reasonable
certainty that no one came out onto the
road or public highwayin front of the
house immediately after the shooting;
but back of the house, near the hedge. it
was found that two horses had been
hitched, and an opening had been made
through a rail fence. and that horses had
passed through the same going north.
The rails had been recently let down, and
horses led or ridden over them. On the
fence werejlound prints of horses‘ feet, and
black and bay horse-hair. The horse
tracks led in the general direction of
where Aneals and Stormer lived; that is,
northerly. One of the horses that made
these tracks had two shoes behind, and
one in front. The other was shod in front
only. The large tracks were made by the
horse having three shoes. Knox lived on
the east side of section 15. To go to
Aneals’ through the fields would be from
a mile and a half to two miles north, and
a half mile west. The witness Carroll had
heenat Ingraham’s,substantiallya half a
mile west from William Aneals‘, and was at
the gate “at the corner” about 200 yards
from Aneals’ house, where the road turns
north to Bloomfield. At about 8:30 o’clock
he saw two persons on horse-back coming
from the south, and which would be from
the general direction of Knox’s going
north. At the corner mentioned the rid-
ers turned east. He thought he recog-
nized one of them as the defendant Will-
iam Aneals, and called to him by name,
but received no reply. He also thought
that he recognized the horse next to him,
the larger of the two horses, and it was,
as he thought, the horse that William
Aneals had shortly before that purchased
of Louis Fogle. It was moderately dark,
and the moon not shining. The persons
were riding in a “fair lope.” Two wit-
nesses examined the horse tracks found
near Kn0x‘s house, and in the field. Sub-
sequently, the witnesses Carroll and Hunt-
er examined William Aneals‘ horses, and
found a large mare belonging to him,
with two shoes behind and one in front,
which Carroll testifies was the Fogle
mare, and whose feet, they -testify, com-
pared exactly with the larger tracks found
at the fence and in the field near Knox’s
house. Unc witness, at least, went to As-
bury Aneals’ barn, and found 0. horse,
shod in front, and bare behind, the tracks
of which were apparently the same as the
trucks of the other horse found back of
Knox’s house, and in the field. The horse-
hair found at the fence was of the same
general color as the hair upon the legs of
the two horses mentioned by the wit-
nesses. On Thursday following the shoot-
ing. Carroll saw the Fogle mare at Will-
iam Aneals’, and the hair had been cut off
her legs, When. however, does not appear.
The evidence shows that, a short time
prior to the assault, Asbury Aneals and
James Knox had had some difficulty over
local political affairs. Much illfeeling seems
to have been engendered at and before the
caucus, which nominated hoth of these
men for office; Aneals for supervisor, and
Knox for assessor. Knox was elected,
and Aneals defeated. William Aneals is
the son of Asbury; Louis Stormer lived
near the Aneals, and, at the time of the
assault, was in William Aneals’ employ.
About a. week after the election, the wit-
ness Altenheim testifies that Asbury An-
eals said, when it was remarked tha.t Mr.
Knox was elected, that “he would never
serve. " The witness Gould, who claims
to have been present, corroborates the
statements of Altenheim,which are denied
by Aneals. The defense was an alibi.
In respect of the evidence, of which the
foregoing is an‘ imperfect epitome, it must
he said the jury heard the descriptions
given of the assailants, particularly of the
one alleged to ha \'e been Stormer, and had
the opportunity of comparing it with the
defendants as they appeared on the trial.
They saw the witnesses, could observe
their demeanor, and thereby judge of the
weight and credit due to each; all of
which is denied to us. If the description
of fhesmaller of the two assa.ilanls,in con-
nection with the other facts and circum-
stances proved, satisfied them bcyond a
reasonable doubt as to his identity, they
were justlfied in finding him guilty. In
respect of the defendant William Aneals,
if they believed his identification by the
witnesses. Samuel Knox and Carroll, was
sufficiently certain, when taken in connec-
tion with the very strong circumstances
proved tending to connect him with the
commission of the offense, to remove all
reasonable doubt as to his identity, they
were likewise justified in their verdict, un-
less a reasonable doubt of the guilt of said
defendants, or oneof them, was created by
the evidence of good character of the ac-
cused, and of that tending to prove an
alibi. No motive in respect of the defend-
ant Stormer is shown, unless it can be
traced to the fact that he was the friend
of, and working for, the Aneals. In re-
spect, however, of William Aneals, it can-
not be said that evidence of motive was
altogether wanting. James Knox had de-
clined to run for office on the ticket with
his father, and the brother of said Knox
had stated in open caucus that he was
ashamed to have his brother run on the
same ticket with Asbury Aneals. Both.
however. ran. and Aneals was defeated.
and Knox elected. It seems that Asbury
Aneals was much incensed. Knox was
also a school director, and Asbury Aneals
said, to the witness Whitler, that he
wanted Knox out; he wanted “the scoun-
drel out.“ In view of the facts and circum-
stances prored. itcannot be said that there
was not sufficient evidence upon which to
predicate a verdict of guilty, if the jury be-
lieved it to be true. And, as to the alibi, it
must be said, when the evidence is all con-
sidered, that the defense is not established,
and the jury were, we think, justified in
concluding that the presence of the plain-
tiffs in error at the store in Bloomfield, at
from about8o’clock to about 10 o’clock,on
the night of the assault, was not neces-
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hl11 chin, aml that resembled the chin of 
WllUam Aneale. He testltled that he 
thought be knew tbeae men, and wae eat· 
lefled from what be saw that William 
Aneala was one of thP.m. On cross-exam· 
tuatlo11 of this witness. much occurred 
that might very properly weaken the force 
of his tei!tlmony. 
It le made to appear with reasonable 
certainty that no one re.me out onto the 
roud or pulJllc hlghw1ty In front of the 
house lmme<llately after the shooting; 
hut back of the house, near the hedge, it 
was found that two horses had been 
hltchl'd, and an opening had been made 
through a rail fence. and that horses had 
paest'd through the same goln.ir north. 
The rails had been recently let down, and 
horses led or ridden over them. On the 
fence were:found prints of horset1' feet, 1md 
black and bay horse-ha.Ir. The horse 
tt'ackR led In the .ireneral direction of 
where Aneals and Stormer ll\'ed; that le, 
northerly. One of the horse11 that made 
these tt'ackll had two shoes behind. and 
one In ft'ont. The othPr was shod In front 
only. 'l'he large tracks were made by the 
horse having thrPe shoes. Knox llve<l on 
the east side of section 15. To go to 
Aneale' through the fteldH would be from 
a mile and a. half to two miles north, and 
a half mUe wellt. The witness Cat'roll had 
been at Ingra ham's. eubetantlaJly a hRlf a. 
mile west from Wllllam A nee.hf, ond was at 
the gaw "at the corner" about 200 yards 
from Anenls' house, where the road turna 
north to Bloomfield. At about 8:30 o'clock 
he ea w two persona on horse-back coming 
from the south, and whtcb would he from 
the genera.I direction or Knox's .going 
oot'th. At the comer mentioned the rid-
ers turned east. He thought he reeog-
ntzed one of them aa the defPndant Will· 
lam Aneale, and called to him by name, 
but received no reply. He also thought 
that be recognized the horse next to him, 
the larger of the two horses, and It was, 
as he thought, the hone that William 
Aneals hail shortly before that purchased 
or Louie Fogle. It was moderately dark, 
and the moon not shining. The Pf'rBOns 
were riding In a "fair lope." Two wlt-
nt~BSee examined the hone tracks found 
near Knox's house, and In the ftehJ. Sub-
sequently, the wltneMsee Carroll and Hunt-
er ex11.mincd Wllllam Anenle' bf)reee, and 
found a. large mare belonging to him, 
with two shoes behind and one In front, 
which Carroll testifies was the Fogle 
m1tre, a11d whose feet, they -testify, com-
par .. >d exactly with the larger tracks found 
at the fence and In the field neat' Knox's 
house. One witness, a.t least, went to As-
bury Aneah~' barn, and found o. horse, 
shod In front, and bare behind, the tracks 
of which were apparently tho same as the 
tracks of the other horse found ba.:k of 
Knox's house, and In the field. The horse-
ha.It' round at the fence WIUI of thti same 
general color as the halt' upon the legs of 
the two horHeH mentioned by the wlt-
neseeK. On Thut'sday following the shoot-
ing, Cnt'roll snw the Fogle mare at Wlll-
lam AnenlH'. and the hair had been cut on 
her leA"H, when, howe\·er, does not appear. 
The nvtdencli shows thnt, a short time 
prior to the assault, Asbury Anea.ls and 
-'SO 
Jamea Knox had had l!Ome dlmculty over 
local political affairs. Much Ill feeling seems 
to have been engendered at and before the 
caucus, which nominated both of these 
men fur oftlce; Aneala for supervisor, and 
Knox for aHseMor. Knox was elected, 
and Aneala defeated. William Aneals ls 
the SOD or Asbury; Loni!! Stormer lived 
neat' the Aneale, and, at the time of the 
assault, was In William Aneals' employ. 
About a week after the election, the wlt-
nes11 Altenhl'lm testlftea that Asbury An-
eals said, when It was remarked that Mr. 
Knox was elected, that "he would never 
serve." The witness Gould, who claims 
to have been preHent, corroborates the 
statements of Altenhelm, which are denied 
by Aneals. The defense was an alibi. 
In respect of the evldE'nre, of which the 
foregoing ls an· tmperlect epitome, it must 
be said the jnry heard the desct'lptlons 
given of the asitnllante, partlcuh.tt'ly of the 
one alleged to have been St(Jrmer, and had 
the opportunity of comparing It with the 
rlefendantR as they appeat'ed on the tt·lal. 
Tht>y aa w the witnesses, could obtte?\'e 
their demeanor, and thereby jut\ge of the 
weight and credit due to each; all of 
which Is denied to us. If tbe description 
of the smaller of the two assallan ts, In con· 
nectlon with the other' facts and <'h'Cum-
stunces proved, satisfied them bl'yond a 
re1U1unable doubt a11 to his Identity, they 
were justlHed In finrllng ltlm guilty. In 
respect of the defendant William Aneala, 
if they believed hie idE'ntlfkatlon by the 
wltncsseR, Samuel Knox and Carroll, was 
sufficiently certain, when taken in eonnee-
tlon with the very strong clrcumetances 
proved tending to connect him with the 
commission of the oneniie, to 1-emove all 
reasonable doubt as to his identity, they 
were likewise justified In their verdict, un-
less a reasonable doubt of the guilt of said 
defendantK, or one of them, was created by 
the evidence of good character of the ae--
cused, and uf that tending to prove an 
a/Jhl. No moth·e In respect of the defend-
ant Stormer is shown, unless It can be 
traced to the fact that he wae the friend 
of, a.ml working for, the Aneals. In re-
spect, however, of Wtlllam Aneals, It can· 
not be said that evidence of motive was 
altogether wanting. James Knox had de-
clined to run for office on the ticket with 
bis father, and the brother of said Knox 
had stated In open caucus that he was 
ashamed to have hie brothPr run on the 
same ticket with Asbu!'y Aneals. Iluth. 
however, ran, uncl AnealK was defeated, 
and Knox elected. It seems that Asbury 
Aneals was much Incensed. Knoi: was 
also a school director, and Asbury Aneala 
said, to the witness Whitler, that he 
wanted Knox out; be wanted "the scoun-
drel out." In view of the facts and clrettm· 
stances proved, It cannot be said that there 
was not sufficient evidence upon which to 
predicate" verdict or guilty, If the jury be. 
lleved It tu be true. And, R8 to the ulibl, It 
must be euld, when the evidence is all con-
sidered, that the defense 111 not estuhlbihed, 
a.nd the jury were, we think, jm:1tifted In 
concluding that the pt'esenee of the plain· 
tiffs IQ error at the store In Bloomfield, at 
h'om about8o'clock to about 10 o'clock, on 
the night of tbe assault, was not necee-
RE—EXAMlNA'I.‘lO N’.
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sariiy inconsistent with their being pres-
ent at the time and place of the as-
sault. Perhaps the weight of the testi-
mony in support oi the alibi is that William
Aneals came to Davis’ store in Bloomfield
about 8 o'clock,-some oi the witnesses for
defendants, however, put it later,—and
that Stormer reached the store 5 to 10
minutes later than Aneals. To illustrate:
John Carlin came to the store between
7:30 and 8 o’t-lock, and says: “IsawAneals
when he came in. I was there .quitea
whilebeiore became in ; ” and furthersays:
“To the best oi my opinion. it was some-
where about 8:30 when I first saw Will-
iam Ancals at the store.” Henry Nedick,
who was at Davis’ store on the evening
in question, was produced by the plaintiffs
in error, and lived about three-fourths of
a mile from Bloomfield. He says: “I
looked at the clock beiore I went. It was
just 8 o'clock. It struck while I was look-
ing.” Ho then says he started with a lit-
tle boy. and walked to the store, taking
about 15 minutes‘ time. Aueals was then
at the store, and Stormer came about 10
minutes later, which would indicate that
Aneals had just arrived. The difference
oi time oi the coming of Ancals and
Stormer, as shown by all the proof.wouid
indicate that Aneals. as beiore said. bud
just arrived at the store. so thatitis possi-
ble, if not quite probable, in view oi all
this testimony, that the arrival oi Aneals
‘was later than 8 o‘cioek. The distance
from Knox‘s house to Aneais’, by the
road that Carroll saw the parties men-
tioned by him coming, would be from 2%
1:03 miles; and from Ancals' to the store,
about three-fourths oia mile: and from
b‘tormer's to the store. but n few hundred
‘yards. When the persons described by
Carroll passed him, the horses were on
a “ fair lope. ” it is apparent that if these
plaintiffs in error were escaping from the
scene oi their crime. but a very few mo-
ments would be required to coverthese dis-
tances. lt appears, from the testimony
introduced by plaintiffs in error, that
they ate supper together at William An-
eals' house, and Stormer’s presence is
unaccounted for, by any evidence, save
that of plaintiffs in error, from that time
until he reached the store, except from
2 to 6 minutes that he was at his iather’s,
beiore walking the five or six hundred
yards from his father’s house to the store.
It is also to be remembered that no one
at Knox‘s pretends to have looked at any
time-piece, or to give any more definite
statement. of the time than thatit was
about 8 o’clock. N0 data is iurnisin-<1
from which that conclusion is reached.
And, taking into consideration the time
intervening before any person left the
house to send for a doctor, the time they
were gone when they did go, and the dis-
tance traveled. in connection with the tes-
timony oi the physician that he was called
at 9 o'clock, started to Knox’s l5 minutes
thereafter, and arrived there at about 10
o’clock. or a few minutes later, would seem
to very clearly indicate that the assault
might have been committed some time
before 8 o'clock. Some of the persons had
just risen from the slipper table, and Knox
and his wife were still at the table when
W1LGUS,EV.—31
the assault occurred. On the one side,
t-hose witnesses who seemed to have
looked at time pieces place the arrival at
the store ‘in Bloomfield later than 8
o'clock; while on the other no one pre-
tends to have known the exact time oi the
assault. It is very clear that a half hour,
or even less, would have sufficed for the
commission oi the offense, and the arrival
of the plaintiffs in error at the store in
Bloomfield. We cannot say, in view of
this evidence, and the circumstances
proved, that there was necessarily such
inability for the plaintiffs in error to com-
mit the offense as would create a reason-
able doubt of their guilt.
It is objected the court erred in not per-
mitting the plaintiff in error to show, by
the witness Gould. that the witness Hunt-
er offered him $50 to testify to certain
facts. after Hunter was informed that the
supposed facts were not true. No founda-
tion had been laid in the examination of
Hunter, who wasu. witness for the people,
and the evidence was therefore improper,
and the court properly excluded it. For
the same reason. like questions asked of
the witness Dudley, and others, were held
to be improper, and objection thereto sus-
tained. In like manner. the plaintiffs in
error produced Mr. Jody, who was fore-
man of the grand jury, and he was asked
if Samuel Knox did not testify before the
grand jury, in respect of ‘certain material
matters. in a particular way; that is, as
to whether or not he did not then state
that he did not know, and could not rec-
ognize, either of the men making the us-
sault. etc. No foundation whatever was
laid, in the testimony of Knox, for the in-
troduction of this testimony. And pre-
cisely the same is true in respect of the
offered testimony of the witness Perccli
and others. No good purpose can be sub-
served by noticing these objections in
detail; they all rest upon the same basis,
and the ruling of the court was for the
same reason proper. It is not proper to
call witnesses to contradict or impeach a
witness in respect to matters occurring out
of court, as by showing that he has made
some statement out oi court inconsistent
with his testimony. unless the attention
of the witness is firstcalied to thetime and
place of the alleged statement or declara-
tion, and he is afforded an opportunity
for explanation in respect thereof. 'l‘his
rule is so familiar as to require the cita-
tion of no authorities in its support.
Numerous other objections are made in
respect of the rulings oi the court on the
introduction of testimony, some oi winch
may properly be considered. The defend-
ants produced n large number of witnesses,
who testified to the previous good char-
acter of the defendants,—some to all, and
others to one or more of them.--of whom
the state's attorney inquired if they had
not heard of an assault by Asbury Ancais,
who it will be remembered was also on
trial, upon one Sigsby; and whether they
had not heard of his being accused of
poisoning Sign-1by‘s horses. Some of these
witnesses stated they had heard ofthe sup-
posed assault on Sigsby. and others that
they had seen the occurrence. Tl|ereup-
on, counsel for defendants insisted upon
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surily Inconsistent with their being pres-
ent at the time and place of the M-
sault. Perhaps the weli:bt of the tel!tl-
n10ny In support of theallb1111 that William 
AneHlR cume to Da'l"ls' store In Bloomfield 
about 8 o·clock,-some of the witnt'Sl!t'S for 
defendants, bowe\"Pr, put It later,-and 
that Stormer reached the store 5 to 10 
minutes luter than Aneals. To Illustrate: 
.John Carlin cume to the store between 
7:30and 8 o'rlock, and1mye: "I saw Aneuls 
when be came In. I was there .quite a 
while before hecamti In;" end further says: 
"'To the best of my opinion, It wus some-
wheni ubout 8:30 when I first saw Will-
:lnm Ancals at the store." Henry Nedick, 
who was at Davis' store on the evening 
in <1uestlon, waR produced by the plaintiffs 
in error, anil lived about three-fourths of 
a mile from Bloomfield. HP says: "I 
looked at the clock before I went. It waa ju11t 8 o'clock. It struck while I was look-
ing." He then snys he started wltb a lit-
tle boy. and walked to the store, taking 
about 15 minutes' time. Aneals was then 
at the store, an1l Stormer l'ame about 10 
minutes later, which would Indicate that 
.Aneale had just arrived. The difference 
of time of the comlnir of Ancals and 
8tormer, as shown by all the proof.would 
indicate that Aneale, as before enlrl. had just arrived at the store. eo that It le 11ossl-
ble, If not quite probable, In vlf'w of all 
this testimony, that the arrlrnl of Aneals 
wHs latclr than 8 o'clock. The diHtance 
from Knox's boost> to Aneals', by the 
road that Carroll saw the parties men-
tJoned hy him com lug, would be from 2"' 
to 3 miles; and from Aneal11' to the store, 
about three-folJ'1'ths of a mile; anti from 
:Stormer's to the store. bot a few hundred 
yards. When the persons descrlhed by 
Carroll pa11Hed him, the horses were on 
a "rulr lope." It 111 apparent that if th1•110 
plaintiffs In error were eHCaptng from the 
•cene of their crime. bot a very few mo-
ments would be required to cover these <lls-
tance11. It avpears, from the tl"Btlruony 
Introduced by plaintiffs In eITor, that 
tht'y ate supper together at WllllRm An-
.eals' house, and Stormer's pJ'PSence le 
nnaccoonted for, by any e\"ldence, sRve 
that of plaintiffs In error, from that time 
until he reached the store, except from 
.2 to 6 minutes tbut he was at hl11 father's, 
before walking the flve or six hundred 
yards frow hie father's house to the store. 
It la also to he remembered that no one 
at Knox's pretends to ha\"e looked at any 
time-piece, ur to give any more definite 
.11tatement of the time than that it .vas 
about 8 o'clock. No data le furnb1lw<J 
from wbkh that conclusion is reached. 
And, taking Into com1lderntion the time 
intervening before any pnson left the 
buu11e to send for a doctor, the time they 
were gone when they did go, and the dill· 
tance traveled. In connection with the tes-
timony of the ph.\•11iclan that he was called 
at 9 o'clock, started to Knox's Hi mlnutea 
thereafter, and arrived there at about 10 
o'clock, or a few minutes later, would seem 
to ver,\· clearly indlcute that the assault 
might h11.ve heen rommltted some time 
befol""l k o'clock. Some of the persons had just risen from the supper tuble, and Knox 
.and bis wUe were Htlll at tile table when 
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the a1:111a11lt occurred. On the one side, 
tl1011e wltneEIHCB who ee<-med to have 
looked 11.t time pieces place the arrlrnl at 
the 1:1ture 'fn Bloomfield later than 8 
o'clock; while on the other no one pre-
tends to bn\'e known the exact time or the 
a11eaul t. It le very clear that a half hour, 
or even 1P88, would ha\•e sufficed for the 
commission of the offen11e, and the arrival 
or the plaintll'111 In error at the store in 
Dloomfteld. We cannot say. In view of 
this evltlenre, and the cfrcnm11ta11cea 
proved, that there was necessarily such 
lnablllty for th•~ plaintiffs In error to com-
mit the ol'feni-e as would create a reason-
able doubt of their guilt. 
It is obJectt>d the court erred In not per-
mlttiu11; the plalntltf in error to show, by 
th~ wltne1111 Gould, thRt the witness Hunt-
er offered him $:>0 to te11tlfy to certain 
facts. after Bunter was Informed that the 
supposed facts were not true. N•)foun1la-
tlon bad b..en laid In the examination of 
Hunter, who waea witness for the Jll'ople, 
and the evidence was therefore lmp1·uper, 
and the court properly ex,clmled It. For 
the same retu1on. like qnestlone asked of 
the witnf'RS Du<lley, and others, were held 
to be lm11roper, and objection thereto eus-
tll.lned. In like manner, the pl11.lntlffH In 
error produced Mr. Jody, who was fore-
man of the gr11nd Jury, nnd he wue aHkecl 
If Hamnel Knox dhl not testify before the 
grand jury, In respect of ·certuln material 
matter11. in a particular way; thnt le, as 
to whether or not be did nut then state 
that he did not know, and could not rec-
ognize, either of the men makfoir the ae-
eault, etc. No foundation whatever was 
fold, In the teNthnon.v of Kuox, for the ln-
tro1luction of this testimony. Ant.I pre-
ch1ely the same IB true In rPRpect of the 
offered testimony of the wltne11e Percell 
and others. Nu good purpose con hf' 11uh-
serverl by noticing these objections In 
detatl; they all rest upon the same bnsl11, 
anrl the r1llln1r of the court waEI for the 
ea.me reason proper. Jt le not proper to 
call wltn~sse11 to contra•llct or Impeach a 
vt'ltnell8 ln respect to matters occurring out 
of court, 011 by showing that he bas made 
some statement out of court lncom1l11tent 
with bl11 testimony, m1le11e the att1mtlnn 
of the wltneeM le ftretcalled to tile time and 
place of the alleged 11tatt'ment or declara-
tion, and be le afforded au opportunity 
for explanation In respect thereof. 'J'his 
rule le so famlllor as to requlro the cita-
tion of no uuthorltles in its llupport. 
Nnmerou11 othl'r obje<~tlons are made In 
respect of the rullnJl,8 of the court on the 
l11t1·oductlon of testimony, some ol whiclJ 
may properly be con1ddered. The rlPfend-
11.ntK produced n larjte 11umbProfwitneHi;e11, 
who tl·etifl<.'rl to the previous guoil char-
acter of the defE:nlla11te,-some to oil, and 
otbern to one or more of them.-or who111 
the 11t11.te'e attorney inquired if tlwy bud 
not beard of au assault by A11tmry Aneule, 
who It will be renwmbert><l was also on 
trial, upon one Slgsby; and whether they 
had not heard of his being accused of 
poleonl11g Sigslly'e horses. Some of these 
witneHHesstated the,v had beard of the KUJ>-
poeed asHault on Higi;by, and otherR that 
they had seen the occurrence. The1·eup-
on. counsel for defendWltB lnelJJted upon 
481 
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their right to have the witnesses state
what did occur between Aneals and Sigu-
by. to which the court sustained an ob-
jection, and, we think,pi-operly so. 'l‘0
have permitted the witnesses to detail
what; occurred at that time would have
necessitated a. trial of a purely collateral
question. Trials would become intermina-
ble. It may safely be stated that there is
neither reason nor authority for the posi-
tion of counsel. Some of the witnesses
said they had heard of the charge of poi-
soning, after the assault in this case; that
it was first published in a. newspaper in
Quincy after the arrest of the defendant.
The defendants then offered to prove that
it was published at the instigation of the
witness Hunter, to which objection was
made, and objection sustained. No foun-
dation had beenlald in the examination of
Hunter for this character of proof. .\1ore-
over. the testimony in respect of both the
assault and poisoning related only to the
defendant Asbury Aneals. In no way was
the defendant William Aneals or Stunner
connected with either of said matters, or
the rumors in respect thereof. ln noevent
would it beerror of which they could com-
plain. We are of opinion that it would
have been proper to have permitted the
defendant Asbury Aneals to answer as to
whether he and the witness Aitenheini
were on friendly or speaking terms at the
time referred to by Altenheim, when he
says Aneals said that Knox would never
serve as assessor. as tending to show the
probability or improba bllity of his having
made thestatement imputed. But the de-
fendants received the iull benefit ofAsbnry
Aneuls' denial of the statement attributed
to him, and his testimony could not have
been made stronger by this additional
statement. It is impossible that the de-
fendants could have been prejudiced by
this ruling.
It is urged with great pertinacity that
the defendautsshouid have been permitted
to show as a substantive fact that the
witness Hunter had ill feeling and hatred
towards the defendants, and was actu-
ated by corrupt motive The witness
Hunter admitted on cross-examination
that a reward of $1,000 had been offered
for the arrest and conviction of the as-
sailants,and he was then asked, “Is it not
a fact that your interest in it was of the
money reward which was offered ? ” and
he answered, "Oi course, if I get the right
parties. If I get the right parties I expect;
to get the reward." Hethen testifled that
he had no ill feeling towards any of the
defendants, that he had not talked slight-
ingly or bitterly about them, had not;
called them names. or used expressions of
that kind. He was asked if he had not
made such statements to Mr.Colburn, and
he said, “No." As to matters purt y col-
lateral, where the party culls them out on
cross-examination, he is bound by the an-
sweroi the witness, but not so in respect of
matters relevant and material to theis-
sue being tried. The feeliiig and disposi-
tion of the witness towards the party is
held to be relevant and material; and, on
cross-examination. it is competent to test
the witness in respect of his feeling, and
if he has not done acts, or used expres-
sions, showing hatred or ill will against
the party against whom he is testifying,
and if he denies thesamc, tointroduce con-
tradictory evidence by way of impeach-
ment. ] Greenl. Ev. §45(); Phenix v. Cast-
ner, 10811]. 207, and authoritiescited. But
the rule in respect of the contradiction of
the witness in such matters is the same as
in respect to any other matters material
and relevant to the issue. Before witness-
es can be called to show that statements
have been made out of court, inconsistent
with those testifled to at the trial, it is
necessary, as before said, to lay the proper
foundation by calling; his attention to the
time, place, and person involved in the
supposed contradiction. Then. if he de-
nies having made the declaration, or done
the act imputed, the contradictory e\'i-
dence becomes proper. This we under-
stand to be the uniform practice, and to
which we are not aware of any exception.
1 Greenl. Ev.§ 462; The Queen's Case, 2
Brod. & B. 313; Conrad v.Griffey, l6 How.
38. As before stated, as respects the wit-
ness Percell and others.so in respect to the
witnesses Colburn and Gould, no proper
foundation is laid for the offered testi-
mony, although the attention of counsel
was called, during the examination of
Hunter, to the necessity therefor, by the
court, and of which they now complain.
In view of the fact: that the court called
the attention of counsel to the omission,
and the many inten-o,<.-ratories put to Hunt-
er upon tho subject of his feeling. we can-
not say that it was an abuse of the dis-
cretion lodged in the court to refuse to
permit Hunter to be recalled for the pur-
pose of laying the foundation for the in-
troduction oi other and different matters.
or statements alleged to be made at other
times and places. Hunter had been asked
respecting a statement at Colburn & Ba-
ker's store, and if he had not used certain
language. The witness testifled that he
had not used that language; but,in acou-
versa tion before Urban's saloon, some-
thing had been said by Hunter. Upon ob-
jection heing sustained. defendants asked
to recall Hunter to lay the foundation for
the conversation at Urban’s saloon, which
the court refused to permit. Ordinarily.
the discretion should, undoubtedly, have
been exercised; but, as before said, a rea-
sonable limit had been allowed, the atten-
tion of counsel had been called to the rule.
which they seemed to regard as an unjus-
tifiable interference on the part of the
court. and we cannot say that there was
any abuse of discretion.
We have thus carefully gone through the
evidence, and the many objections urged.
for the reason that the case is close, in
some respects; and if any error had inter-
vened prejudiciai to plaintiffs in error, or
that might have unduly prejudiced them
before the jury, however slightly, we
should have been disposed to reverse the
judgment. The character of plaintiffs in
error, previous to this charge, was shown
by a greater or less number of witnesses
to have been good; and such evidence was
competent to be taken into consideration
by the jury in dei:ern|ining' their guilt or
innocence. The probative forceof such evi-
dence in each case must always depend up-
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their right to have the wltneeSPS state 
what dlil occur between Ane:ils a1J1l Slb"t!· 
by, to whil'h the ('ourt euHtnl,ned an ob-
jection, anil, we think. properly so. 'fo 
have permitted the witnesHei;i to detail 
what occ11r1-ed at that time woulrt have 
nece11Rltated a trial of a purely collateral 
questlou. TrlalH woukt become Intermina-
ble. It m!ly safely be stated that the1·e Is 
neither reason nor authority for the IJOel-
tlon or counHel. Some of the wltneeeeR 
said they had heard or the charge of poi-
sonlnir. after the a88aolt In this cnee; that 
It wns first publlshet.I In a newspaper ln 
Quin<'y after the arrest of the defendant. 
The defendants tht.>n offered to prove that 
lt was 11ubllshed at the Instigation of the 
wltn<>eot Hunter, to which objection was 
made, and objection sustained. No foun-
dation had been laid In the examination of 
Hunter for this character of proof. More-
over, the lrstimony In respect of both the 
assault and poisoning related only to the 
defendant Asbury Aneale. In nlJ way was 
the defendant Wllllum A11eah1 or l:Hormer 
connlleted with elthtir of said matters, or 
the rumors in respectthereof. In no event 
would It beerror of which theycould com-
plalu. We are of opinion that tt would 
have heen proper to have permitted the 
defendant Asbury Aneale to answer 8R to 
wht>ther he 1md the wltnee11 Altenhelm 
were on friendly or speaklnK terms at the 
time referred to hy Altenhelm, when he 
says Aneale said that Knox would never 
serve as assessor. a11 tending to show the 
prohabllltyor lmprobablllty of hie having 
made theetatement Imputed. But the de· 
fend ante reccl ve<l the full benefit of Asbury 
Aneule' dfnlul or the statement attributed 
to him, and hie testimony could not have 
been made stronger by this ucldltional 
etat.ement. It Is lmpueslble that the de-
fendants could have been prejudiced by 
this ruling. 
It 19 urgl'd with great pertinacity that 
the defendantll shoolcl hu ve he~n pt'rmlt ted 
to show as a suhstanth•e fact tlrnt the 
wltneee Hunter had Ill feellnl( and hatred 
towards the defendants, and wall 1tctu-
ated by corr1111t motive The witness 
Hunter admitted on crose·examlnatlon 
that a reward of $1,000 harl been offerrd 
for the arrest and convktlon of the as-
sailants, and he waR then asked," IR it nnt 
a feet that your interest in It was of the 
money rew1u·d which was oUered?" and 
he answered, "Of course, if I get the right 
parties. If I get the right partleR I expect 
to get the reward." He then testified that 
he bad no ill feeling towards any of the 
defendants, that he had not talked slight-
ingly or bitterly about them, had not 
callerl them names, or used <>xpres1.1iom1 of 
that kind. He was a11ked If he had not 
made such statements to Mr. Colburn, and 
be Hald, "~o." As to matters pur~ y col-
lateral, whel'e the party culls them nut on 
cru1.1s-ex1uni11utio11, he Is bounil by the an-
eweruf the wltnesw, bot not110 In rei;pectof 
matters relevant and nmterlal to the Is-
sue bPlng tril'1L The feelinic und dls11uel-
tlon of the witneRs towards the party le 
held to be relevant nnd material; a.ad, on 
cro1<11-examl1111 ti on. It. le compl'ten t to test 
the wltne11s In respect or his feeling, and 
If he has not done acts, or used expres-
4l'!'~ 
slons, showing hatred or ill will &Ka Inst 
the party against whom be Is testifying, 
and if he denies these.me, tolutrodnce con-
tradictory evidence by way of lm(leach-
ment. J Green!. Ev. § 450; Phenix v. l'aRt-
ner, 1U8 Ill. 207, and authorltleeclted. But 
the rule In respect of the contradiction of 
the wltuese In 1-1uch matters le the same M 
In reA(>ect to any other matturs material 
and rele\•ant to the Issue. Before wltnesK-
es can be called to show that etatementg 
have bt'(.'n made out of court, inconsistent 
with those teetlfltld to at the trial, It is 
ne<"asHary, as befol'e Raid, to lay the )Jroper 
foundation by calling hie attention to the 
time, place, sud person Involved In the 
supposed contradiction. Then. If he de-
nies having made the declaration, or done 
the act Imputed, the contradictory e\·l-
dence becomes proper. Thie we under-
stand to be the uniform practice, and t(> 
which we nre not aware of any exception. 
1 Greenl. Ev.§ 462; The Queen's Case, 2 
Brod. & B. :il3; Conrad v.GrUfey, 16 Huw. 
38. As before stated, as l't'Rpects the wit-
ness Peref'll uni} others, eo In respect to the 
witnesses Colborn and Gould, no proper 
foundation le laid for the olfered testi-
mony, ultbouirh the attention or counRel 
was called, during the examination of 
Hunter, to the necessity therefor, by th~ 
court, and of which thPy now complain. 
In \'lew of the fact that the court called 
the attention of counsel to the omiRBlun, 
and the many Interrogatories pnt to Hunt-
er upon the subject of hie feeling. we can-
not say that It was an abuse of the dill-
cretlon lodged In the court to refuse to 
permit Hunter to be recalled for the pur-
pose of laying the foundation for the In-
troduction of other and dlllerent mattere. 
or statements alleged to b<> mude at other 
times and plare11. Hunter had been 1tske<I 
respecting a statement at Colburn & Ba-
ker's store, and If he had not used certain 
language. The witness tet1tlfted that h•• 
hod not u11e<l that hmgoaate; hut, In acun-
\'erHa tlon before Urban's saloon, eotnt'-
thlng had been said by Hunter. Upon ob-
j('('tlon heing sustained, defendants asked 
to recall Hunter to lay the foundatlm. for 
the convere11 tlon ut Urban's saloon, which 
the court refnHed to r1ermit. Ordinarily. 
the dh1cretlon should, undc)llhtedly, have-
heen exercised: tmt, aR before said. a rea-
eonnhle limit had hP.en allowed. the atten-
tion of counsel bad been called to the rule. 
wl1lch they seemed to regnrd as au unjus-
tifiable interference on the part of tht> 
court. and we <'annot say that there was 
an.v abuse of discretion. 
We have thus carefully gone through the 
e\'ldeuce, and the muny objectlon11 urJred. 
for the reason that the case 111 cloHe, In 
some reHpects; and 1f any error had Inter-
vened prejndlclnl to plulntllfs iu error, or 
that mlarht have unduly prejmllced thrm 
before the jury, however eligh ti~·, we 
ishonhl have been diHpo11ed tu reYerse the 
Jodgmen t. The chartlcter of plain ti Ifs In 
error, previous to this charge, was 1d1own 
by a greater 01· leeR number of witne1<sM 
to have bt>en good; and su·~h evldPnce wall 
cumpl'teut to he taken Into comll<lerutlun 
hy the Jury In detr,rmlnlng their guilt ur 
lnnot'l'nce. Theprohutlve force or such e\'l-
dence in each caeemuet always depl'ntl up-
RE—EXAMINAT1ON.
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on the nature and character of the incul-
patory evidence; and it may. and no
doubt often does, of itself properly create
such a reasonabledoubt in the mind of the
jury as will justify an acquittal. But it is
to be remembered that the weight to be
given to the evidence is peculiarly within
the province of the jury; and, unless we
can say that the finding is palpabiy
wrong, we ought not to intericre upon
the facts alone. This we cannot say in
this case. Not only may the jury consid-
er the evidence of good character upon the
question of guilt, but, if they feel con-
strained to find the defendant guilty, it is
proper to consider the same in Inltiza tion
of punishment. And it would seem that
the jury have done so in this case.
The jury were fairly and fully instructed
as to the law of the case, to which there
is no material objection urged. Objection,
however, is made to the instructions giv-
en for the people, printed on page 65 of
the abstract. The objection is “ that the
reasonable doubt in each of them ought
to be as to the guilt of the defendants.”
The criticism is not warranted. The in-
structions relate to the question of alibi.
Thejury must believe beyond a reasonin-
ble doubt, from a consideration of all the
evidence. that the defendants are guilty
before they would be justified in so find-
ing. But these instructions did not relate
to the question of guiltor innocence strict-
ly. By them the jury were told, in effect,
that if, after considering all the factsand
circumstances in proof, they had no rea-
* that such could have been the effect.
sonable doubt of the presence of the plain-
tiffs in error at the house of Knox at the
time oi’ the assault, then the defense of
alibi had not been made out, and was un-
availing. The instructions were entirely
proper, and not in conflict with the rule
stated.
It is also objected that one of the peo-
ple's instructions was marked “ For de-
fendants, " and it is urged that some infer-
ence might be drawn therefrom by the
jury different from what would have been
drawn had it been properly marked “For
the people.” The contention is without
merit. The practice of marking: instruc-
tions for the one side or the other is per-
nicious, and should not be tolerated. ii’
thereby inferences are to be drawn by the
jury. The instructions should go to the
jury as the instructions of the court, and
the better practice is to have nothing ap-
pearing on the instructions showing at
whose instance they are given. But there
is nothing here that in any way indicates
that any inference prejudicial to the plain-
tiffs in error was drawn by the juryimlzr
'.‘ e
instruction itself relates to what was
proper for the jury to take into considera-
tion, in considering of their verdict. and
was eminently proper to have been given
at the instance of either party, or by the
court itself on its own motion. We are of
opinion that no substantial error has in-
tervened, appearing upon this record.
Theludgmeut of the circuit court must
be atfi rmed.
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RE-EXAMINATION. [Case No. 162 
on the nA.ture and character of the lncul-
patory evltlence; ond It ma)'. and no 
doubt often dueH, of Itself properly create 
such a reasonable doubt In the 111hul of the jury a11 will Justify an acquittal. But It Is 
tu be remembere!l that the weight to be 
given to the evidence i11 peculia1·ly within 
the province of the Jury; and, unless we 
can 11ay that the finding le palpably 
wrong, we ought not to Interfere upon 
the facts alone. Thie we cannot say In 
thlM e1tse. Not only may the Jury consid-
er the evhleuce of good cbara1~ter upon tbe 
question of ,,:ullt, but, If they feel con-
strained to find the dPfeudant guilty, it la 
proper to consider the Kame In mitigation 
of punishment. And it would seem that 
the Jory have done so In this case. 
The Jury wrre fairly and folly ln11tructed 
aa to the law of the ca11e, to which theret 
le no material objection urged. Objection, 
however, 111 made to the instructions giv-
en for the people, printed on pa&"e 115 of 
the abstract. The objection Is "that the 
reasonable doubt In each of them ought 
to be as to the guilt of the defendnntll." 
The criticism Is not warranted. The ln-
Htrnctfons relate to the question of nlibl. 
The Jury must belleve beyond a rl•aHcmn-
ble doubt, from a consideration of all the 
evidence, that the defendantR are guilty 
before they would be Ju11tttlecl In so find-
ing. But these lnstructioufl did not relate 
to the queRtlon of guilt. or lnnoc>ence strict-
ly. By them the Jury were told, lo enect, 
that If, afte1· considering all the facts.and 
circumstances In proof, they bad DO rea-
snoable cloubt of the preAence of the plnln-
tlffs In error at the bom•e of Knox at the 
time of the aHsnnlt, then the clefense of 
alibi had not heeu molle out, and waK un-
avallln&'. Thet instructions were entirely 
pro1>er, and not In conflict with the rule 
statf>d. 
It Is also objected that one of the peo-
ple's Instructions was markell "1''or de-
fendants,'' nnd It Is urged that some infer-
ence might be rlrawn therefrom by tlu• jury different from whnt would h&Ye bren 
drawn bud It be«>n pro11erly mnrked "For 
tbe people." The content.ion b1 without • 
merit. 'l'he practice of marking h1stl'llc-
t101111 for the one slcle or the other IR per-
nicious, and should not be tolerated. If 
t herehy lnferencl!R are to be drawn by the 
Jury. The lnstructlor.s should go to the 
Jury as the lnRtructlonH of the (~ourt, and 
the better practice ls to huve nothln" nr>-
pearlng on the inHtrurtlons showing at 
whose h111tance they An> gh·en. But there 
IH nothing here that In ony way fndlcutrs 
that any Inference prejudicial to tbr plaln-
tlrfs In error was drawn by the jury. or 
th11 t such conld have been the effect. 'l'ht» 
Instruction ltRelf relates to what was 
proper for the jury t<> take Into consldern-
tioo, In comdderlng of their verdict. und 
was eminently proper to hu.ve been given 
at the Instance of either party, or by the 
court Itself on ltd owu motion. We are of 
opinion that Do substantial error has In-
tervened, appearing 01>00 this record. 
The Judgment of the circuit court muat 
be affirmed. 
Case No. 163]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
AYERS et al. v. WATSON.
(10 Sup. Ct. 116, 132 U. S. 394.)
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 9,
1889.
In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the northern district of Texas.
W. E. Earle, for plaintiffs in error. W’.
Hallett Phillips, for defendant in error.
MILLER, J. This is an action of eject-
ment brought by Watson, the original
plaintiff, in the district court for the coun-
ty of Bell, in the state of Texas, and after-
wards removed into the circuit court of the
United States for the northern district of
that state. It was twice tried before a
jury, which failed in each of these trials to
~ come to an agreement. It was tried a third
time, which resulted in a verdict and judg-
ment for the plaintiff. A writ of error was
taken to that judgment, by which it was
brought to this court and reversed. The
case is reported as Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.
S. 694, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641. It was thereup-
on remanded to the circuit court for a new
trial, where a verdict was again had for
the plaintiff, and the judgment rendered on
that verdict is before us for review. The
details of the controversy may be found in
the report of the case above mentioned.
While it was pending in the district court
of Bell county the following agreement be-
tween the parties was made, which simpli-
fies the case very much: “ A. E. Watson v.
Frank Ayers et al. It is agreed and ad-
mitted by the defendants, for the purpose
of this trial, at this term of the court, that
A. E. Watson, plaintiff in this cause, is en-
titled to all the right, title, and interest
granted by the state of Texas to the heirs
of Waiter W. Daws on September 16, A. D.
1850. said land patented being one-third of
a league, described in said patent No. 542,
vol. 8. and which said land is described in
plaintiff's petition; but defendants say
that said one-third of a league of land so
patented as aforesaid to the heirs of Walter
W. Dawsis covered by the grant of the gov-
ernment of Coahuila and Texas to Maximo
Moreno of eleven leagues of land, as set
forth more fully in defendants’ petition;
which said eleven-league grant is an older
and superior title to that of plaintiff's, and
the title to which is in the defendants in
this cause. X. B. SAUNDI-IRE, W. T. Ruck-
1-zn, F. H. Sm-:1~:m:u, and A. M. MONTEITH,
Attys for Defendants."
By this agreement it will be seen that
the sole question at issue was whether the
land in controversy was covered by the 11-
league grant to Maximo Moreno. A plat
of that survey is found in the bill of excep-
tions. On the trial, which resulted in the
judgment which we are now called to re-
consider, and which. as we understand it,
was the fourth time the case had been tried
by a jury, the defendant introduced the dep-
osition of F. W. Johnson, the surveyor
who had made the survey under the Moreno
grant. It seems that his deposition had
been taken twice in this action, and, though
t-he details of those trials are notbefore us,
it had no doubt been used in them. But
prior to the trial which we are now review-
ing he had died. It appears from the bill
of exceptions that ii. these depositions he
had been cross-examined by plaintiffs coun-
sel. Plaintiff, in rebuttal to this testimony
of Johnson, offered in evidence a deposition
of the said Johnson taken in 1860, in a suit.
between other parties, in which his testi-
mony with regard to the matters to which
he testifled in the depositions offered by de-
fendant varled materiallyfrom these latter
depositions. To the introduction of this
deposition of 1860 the defendants objected,
and, their objection being overruled, took
this exception. As we think the judgment
of the court below must be reversed on ac-
count of this ruling, all that relates to it in
the bill of exceptions is here reproduced:
“ it was admitted byboth parties that the
upper and lower corners on the river of the
Maximo Moreno 11-league grant are extant
as called for in the original grant to Maxi-
mo Moreno, and their corners are not in
dispute. The defendant read in evidence
the depositions of F. W. Johnson, taken in
1878 and 1880, in which he testifled that he
was principal surveyorfor Austin's colony.
“ ' ' The first survey made was the
Maximo Moreno 11-league survey. This sur-
vey was commenced at the point opposite
the mouth of the Lampasas river, as called
for in the field-notes of the grant, and ll.
line was run thence on the course called
for in the grant, the distance called for, the
chain being used to measure the distance.
The north-west or second corner called for
in the grant was thus established by him,
the distance giving out in the prairie. ‘In
running the west line I made an offset to
avoid crossing the Leon river, which was
about 50 or 60 varas wide. This offset was
made soon after leaving the beginning cor-
ner, there being a. peculiar bend in the river
at that point. From the north-west cor-
ner thus established the second line was
run the course and distance called for in
the grant. Several streams were crossed
on this line at distances not now recol-
lected, and the north-east corner estab-
lished on two small hackberries in Cow
Creek bottom. From the north-east or
third corner so established a line was run
in the course called for in the grant to Sun
Andres river. This last line was marked,
but not measured, because it was not usual
or necessary to measure the closing line.’ it
was admitted bythedeiendant thatthedis-
tance as measured on the ground from the
north-east corner to acreek called iorin the
grant was some four thousand vm-as more
than the distance called for.-—that is, the
distanccis 7,500, instead of 3,500 varas; and
on cross-cxaniination, being asked to ac-
count for the discrepancy, said the distances
called on that line were not measured, but
guessed at. No part of the east line was
measured. The exterior lines were marked
with blazes. The corner trees and bearing
trees, where there were such, were marked
with blazes, with two hacks above and two
below. In answer to a question. on cross-
examination, he said that he did not begin
the survey at the south-east corner, but he
began at the south-westcorner, at the three
forks, at the mouth of the Lainpasas, and
actually traced the lines in the order set
forth in the field-notes. ‘The field-book con-
taining the same, whichl kept, I examined,
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Case No. 163] PRODUCTION .AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
AYERS et aL T. WATSON. 
(10 Sup. Ct. 116, 132 U.S. 3W.) 
Supreme Court of the United States. Dec. 9, 
1889. 
In error to the circuit court of the United 
Sta tee for the northern district of Texas. 
W. E. Earle, for plaintiffs In error. W. 
Hallett Phillips, for defendant In error. 
MILLER, J. This IB an action of ejc>et-
• ment brought by WatBon, the original 
platntlft, In the district court for the coun-
ty of Bell, In the state of Texas, a.nd a.tt.er-
w a.rdK removed Into the circuit court of the 
United 8tates for the northern district of 
. that state. It was twice tried before a 
Jury, which failed to each of these trials to 
cometoan agreement. Itwastrleda third 
timt>, which resulted In a verdict and judg. 
ment for the plaintiff. A writ of error WM 
taken to that judgment, by which tt wa.a 
brought to this court and revereed. The 
cMe is reported as Ayers v. Watson, 113 U. 
8. 594, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641. It was therenP-
on remanded to the circuit court for a new 
trial, where a verdict was again had for 
the J>lalntlff. and the Judgment rendered on 
that verdict ls before us for review. The 
detaJls of the controversy m";r be found tn 
the report of the cMe above mentioned. 
While It WM pending In the district court 
of Bell county the following agreement be-
tween the parties wu made, which simpli-
fies the case very much: "A. E. Wat.eon v. 
Frank Ayers et al. It ls agreed and ad-
mitted by the defendants, for the purpose 
of this trial, at this term of the court, tJ;lat 
A. E . Watson, plalntift In this cause, ls en-
titled to all the right, title, and Interest 
granted by the state of Texas to the heirs 
of Walter W. Daws on September 16, A. D. 
1850. said land patented being one-third of 
a league, described In said patent No. 542, 
vol. 8, and which said land ls described In 
plaintiff's petition; but defendants say 
that said one-third of a league of land so 
patented as aforesaid to the heirs of Walter 
W.Dawslscovered by the grant of the gov-
ernment of Coahulla and Texas to Maximo 
Moreno of eleven leagues of land, M set 
forth more fully In defendants' petition; 
which said eleven-league grant 111 f~n older 
and superior title to that of plalutlft's, and 
the title to which ls In the defendants In 
thiff co.uRe. X. B. l:J.&UND~~as. W. T. Rucx-
KR, F. H. SI.EErtrn, and A. M . Mo!'ITEJTB, 
A ttys for DE'fendants." 
By this agreement It wlll be seen that 
the Mole question at ls1me was whether the 
Jantl In controversy WM covered by the 11-
league grant to Maximo Moreno. A plat 
of that 1mrvey le found lu the blll of excep-
tions. On the trial, which resulted In the 
Judgment which we are now called to re-
conHlder, and which, M we understand it, 
was the fourth time the ca11e had been tried 
by a jury, the defendant lntrouuced the dep-
osition of F. W. Johnson, the surveyor 
who had madethesurveyundertheMoreno 
grant. It seems that hi11 deposition had 
been taken twice In thi11 action, and, though 
the details of thoRe trials o.re not before us, 
It had no doubt been used In them. But 
prior to the trial which we are now revlew-
48' 
Ing he had died. It appears from the bill 
of exceptions that 1L these depoettlons he 
had bE'(>n cro~xamlned by plalntlft's coun-
8111.. Plalnttn. In rebuttal tQ this testimony 
of.lohnson,oftered In evidence a dep0&ltton 
of the said Johnson taken In 1800, In a suit 
between other parties, In which his testi-
mony with regard to the matters to whlcb 
he t.estifted In the depoaitlons offered by de-
fendant varied materlallyfrom tht'fle lo.tt4'.r 
4epo&ttlons. To the Introduction ot this 
deposition of 1860 the defendants objected, 
and, their objection being overruled, took 
t.bltt exception. As we think the Judgment 
of the court below must be reversed on ae> 
count of this ruling, all that relat.es to It In 
the bill of exceptions la here reproduced: 
"It was admitted by both parties that th€' 
upper and lower cornen on the river of the 
Maximo Moreno 11-league grant are exta.nt 
as called for In the original grant to Maxi-
mo Moreno, and their corners are not In 
dlapute. The dPfendant read In evidence 
the depositions of F. W. Johnson, taken ID 
1878 and 1880, In which he testified that he 
wa.Aprlnclpal surveyorfor Austin's colony. 
• • • The ftl'Rt survey made waa the 
Maximo Moreno 11-leaguesurvey. ThlsRUr-
vey was commenced at the point opposite 
the mouth of the Lampasas river, as called 
for In the field-notes of the grant, and a 
Uite WM run thence on the course called 
for In the grant, the distance called for, the 
chain being used to measure the distance. 
The north-west or second comer called for 
In the grant wM thuR established by him, 
tile distance giving out In the prairie. 'ID 
running the west llne I made an offset to 
avoid crossing the Leon river, which was 
about 50 or 60 vnras wide. This onset was 
made soon after leaving the beginning cor-
ner, there being a peculiar bend in the rh·er 
at that point. From the north-west cor-
ner thus establtshed the second line wns 
run the course and distance called for In 
the grant. Several streams were croll8ed 
on this line at distances not now recol-
lected, and the north-east corner estab-
lished on two small hackberrles In Cow 
Creek bottom. From the north-east or 
third comer so established a line was run 
In the course called for In the grant to Sun 
Andres river. This last Une was marked, 
but not meMured, because It was not usual 
or necessary to measuret!.te closing line.' It 
was admitted bythedefendant thatthedfs-
tance as measured on the ground from the 
north-e8.llt cornertoacreek called forln the 
grant was some four thousand vartUJ more 
than the dl~tance called for.-that ls, the 
~l11tanccls7,500, ln'ltead of 8,500 varas; and 
on croHH-ex11.mlnation, being aHketl to ac-
count for thedl~repancy,salu thedlRtancee 
called on that line were not meMured, but 
guessed at. No part of the eMt line was 
measured. ThP. exterior lines were marked 
with blazes. The corner trees and bearing 
trees, where thflre were such, w<'re marked 
with blazes, with two hackK above and two 
below. In anRwer to a question. on crofl&-
examtnatlon, he said that he did not b('Jtln 
the sur\'ey at the south-eMt corner, but he 
began at the south-we11tcorner, at thl' three 
forks, at the mouth of the LampMwi, and 
actually traced the lines In the ordE'r set 
forth in the field-note@. 'The field-book con-
taining the same, which I kept, I examined, 
RE-EXAMINATION.
[Case No. 163
which I don't remember to examine until a
month
The plaintiff. in rebuttal to J ohnson’stesti-
mony, as above set forth, it appearing t-hat
said Johnson died in]8S4, offered to read in
evidence a deposition of said J ohnson, taken
inl8(i0,in a certain suit then pendingin Bell
county, '.l‘ex., wherein David Ayers was
plaintiff and Lancaster was defendant, in
which he stated, in answer to a question
therein propounded, that he ‘began the
Moreno survey at the south-east corner,
and ran thence northerly. The north line
was then run westwardly, and the third,if
run at all, was run southwardly to the riv-
er. I am of the opinion that no western
line was run, but was left open; but the
eastern and northern lines were run and
measured. It was not usual to measure
the closing line.‘ To the reading of which
last-mentioned deposition, proven to be in
the handwriting of Johnson, taken in 1860.
the defendants objected, upon the ground
that the deposition had been taken in an-
other and different cause, between other
parties, before the institution of this suit;
and, the same witness having testifled in
answer to interrogatories and cr0ss-intcr-
rogatories propounded herein in 1877 and
1850, respectively, it was not competent as
original evidence, nor admissible to contra-
dict or impeach the testimony of the wit-
ness Johnson, as given in his deposition
read by the defendants, notwithstanding
the death of Johnson; which objection the
court overruled, and admitted the testi-
mony so objected to; to which ruling of the
courtthe defendants then and there except-
ed, and stillexcept, and the same is allowed
as exception No. 1.”
A very earnest and able argument is pre
sented to us to sustain this ruling, upon
the generalground of the liberality of courts
in admitting what would be otherwise
called “ hearsay evidence” in regard to
boundaries, such as tradition, general un-
derstanding in the neighborhood, declara-
tions of persons familiar with the hound-
aries and with the objects on the lines of the
survey, and others ofsimilarcharacter. An
opinion of Mr. Justice FIELD, delivered in
the supreme court of California in 1800, in
the case oi’ Morton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 277, is
much relied on in this case, and it is also
said that the courts of the state of Texas
have established the same principle, which
has thus become a. rule oi property in that
state, which should be followedinthiscase.
If the principles stated in the decision of the
California court, and in the decisions of the
supreme court of the state of Texas, were
indeed applicable to the case before us, we
would hesitate very much in reversing the
judgment on this ground, and, indeed,
should be inclined, on the weight of those
authorities, and in the belief that in the
main they are sound, to overrule the ex-
ception. But the objection in the present
case to the deposition ofJohnson, taken,in
1860, does not rest upon the ground that it
is hearsay testimony, or that it does not
come within the general principle which
admits declarations of persons made dur-
ing their life-time of matters important to
the location of surveys and objects show-
ing the line of those surveys. J 0hnson’s
deposition of 1860, if it stood alone and
ago. and as hereinbefore stated.’ '
was introduced upon the trial of this case
for the first time as independent testimony
in favor oi plaintiffs, might be a(1n|issible.
It is not necessary to decide that question
because such is not the character of the cir-
cumstances under which the testimony was
admitted. As we have already said there
‘had been three trials of this action, during
which Johnson was alive and was a com-
petent witness for either party. All his tes-
timony was given by way of deposition.
This only renders the manner of taking it
more deliberate, and if itwas to be contra-
dicted by anyt-hing he had said on former
occasions, made it the more easy and rea-
sonable that plaintiff should havecailed his
attention to the former statements which
they proposed to use. It will be observed
that the plaintiffs did not introduce, or
otfer to introduce, this deposition of John-
son of 1860 as a part of their case, when it
was their duty to introduce their testi-
mony. They, therefore, did not rely on it
as independent testimony in their favor.
But after J ohnson’s deposition had been
given in the case itself. and he had been
cross-examined by the plaintiffsinthat dep-
osition in regard to his testimony, and aft-
er he was dead and could give no explana-
tion of his previous testimony of 1860,
which might show a mistake in that depo-
sition, or give some satisfactory account of
it consistent with his testimony in the prin-
cipai case, this old deposition is for the first
time brought forward to contradict the
most important part of his testimony giv-
en on the present trial. The importance of
this matter, as it was presented to thejury,
will be readily understood when we revert
to the fact that the two southern corners
of the survey are established without ques-
tion, and are found on the San Andres
river, and the controversy concerns the
question whether the east line and the west
line of that survey, which are straight lines
almost due north,extend so far north that
the northern line between these lines is so
far north as to include the survey of Daws,
under which plaintiff claims. In the princi-
pal deposition of Johnson, as we have seen
by the bill of exceptions,he states that this
survey commenced at the southwestern
corner on the San Andres river, and was
run northward the distance called for in
the grant, and actually measured by the
chain. The north-west or second corner
called for in the grant was established by
him. the distance giving out in the prairie.
From the north-west corner thus estab-
lished, the second, the line was run for the
course and distance called for in the gran t,
and the north-east corner established on
two small hackberries on Cow Creek bot-
tom. From the north-east or third corner
thus established the course was run to the
San Andres river. This last line was ill nrkcd ,
but not measured, because it was not nec-
essary to measure the closing line. In an-
swer to questions on cross-examination,
he said he did not begin at the south-east
corner, but he began at the south-west cor-
ner, and actually traced the lines in the or-
der set forth in the field-notes. He said the
field-book, containing these notes, “ I kept
and examined, which I do not remember to
have examined till a month ago, as herein-
before stated.” The deposition offered by
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RE-.EXAMIN AT ION. (Case No. 16~ 
which I don't remember to examine until a 
month ago, wid as bereinbefore stu.ted.' ' 
The plaintiff. in rebuttal to Johnson'stestl-
mony, 88 above set forth, it 11.ppearing that 
said J ohnHon dierl in 1884, offered to read in 
evillence a de}JOR!tion of said Johnson, ta.ks · 
in 1800, in a certain suit then pending in Bell 
county, 'l'ex., wherein David Ayers waa · 
plaintiff and Lancaster was defendant, In 
which he stated, in answer to a question 
therein propounded, that he 'began the 
Moreno survey at the south-east comer, 
and ran thence northerly. The north line 
was thea run westwardly, and t.he third,U 
run at all, was run southwardlyto the riv-
er. I am or the opinion that no western 
line was nm, but was left open; but the 
eMtern and northeni lineH were run and 
measured. It wu~ not usual to measure 
the cldslng line.· To the reading of which 
last-mentioned deposition, proven to be in 
the handwriting of Johnson, ta.ken in 1860, 
the defendants objected, upon the ground 
that the deposition bad been taken in an-
other and different cause, between other 
parties, before the institution of this suii; 
and, the same witness having testified ill 
ani,:wer to interrogatories and cross-inter-
ro11;atoriee propounded herein in 1877 and 
1880, respectively, It was not competent as 
original evidence,noraumlsslble to contr• 
diet or Impeach the testimony of the wttr 
ness Johm1on, as given in his depoHition 
read by the defendants, notwithstan<ling 
the death of Johnson; which objection the 
court overruled, and admitted the testi-
mony so objected to; to which rullng of. the 
court the defendant.a then and there except-
ed, and still except, and the same is allowed 
as exception No. l." 
A very earnest and able argument Is pr&-
aented to us to sustain tWs ruling, upon 
the gcneralground of the liberality of courts 
in admitting what would be otherwise 
called "hearsay evidence" In regard to 
boundaries, such as tradition, general un-
dei·l!ttt.ndlng in the neighborhood, declara-
tions of persons familiar with the bound-
ariee and with the object.Bon the lines of the 
1mrvey,and otht>rs of&imilarcharacter. AD 
opinion of Mt-. Justice FIELD, delivered in 
the supreme court of California. in 1860, in 
the caHe of Morton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 'm, is 
much relied on In this case, and it is also 
said that the courts of the state of 'l'exas 
have establh1h£'d the same principle, which 
bas thtu1 become a rule of property in that 
state, which should be followed In thlecase. 
If theprlnclplee stated In thedecislonof the 
California court, and In the decisions of the 
supreme court of the state of Texas, were 
indeed applicable to the case before us, we 
would hesitate very much in reversing the judgment on this ground, and, indeed, 
should be inclined, on the weight of those 
authorities, and in the belief that in the 
me.In they are sound, to overrule the ex-
ception. But the objection in the present 
case to the deposition of Johnson, taken, In 
1860, does not rest upon the ground that it 
is hearsay testimony, or that It does not 
come within the general principle which 
admits declarations of persons made dur-
ing their life-time of matters Important to 
the location of surveys and object.B show-
ing the line of those surveys. Johnson's 
deposition of 1860, H It stood alone and 
WM Introduced upon the trial of this cMe 
for the first time as independent t.estimony 
in favor of plaintiffs, might be admlsRible. )t Is not necessary to decide that question 
because such is not the character of the cir-
cumstances under which the testimony was 
admitted. Ae we have already said there 
bad been three trials of this action, during 
which Johnson was alive and was a. com-
petent wttne&B for either party. All his tes-
timony was 11.'iven by way of deposition. 
'l'hls only renaer11 the manner of taking It 
more deliberate, and U It was to be contra-
dicted by anything he had said on former 
occasions, made It the more ea11y and rea-
sonable that plaintiff should ha.vecalll'd his 
attention to the former statements which 
they proposed to use. It will be observed 
that tJ1e plaintiffs did not introduce, or 
offer to Introduce, this deposition of John-
son of 1860 a.a a part of their cruie, when It 
was their duty to introduce their testi-
mony. They, therefore, did not rely on it 
as independent testimony in their favor. 
But after Johnson's deposition had been 
given in the case itseU, and he had been 
crosi;-examined by the plaintiffs in that dep-
osition In regard to his testimony, and aft-
er he was dead and could give no explnn~ 
tion of his previous testimony of 1860, 
which might; show a mistake in that depo-
sition, or give some satisfactory account of 
it consistent with his testimony in the prin-
cipal case, this old deposition Is for the first 
time brought forward to contradict the 
most important pa.rt of his testimony giv-
en on the present trial. The importance of 
this matter, as itwe.s presented to thejury, 
will be readily understood when we revert 
to the fa.ct that the two southern corners 
of the survey a.re established without ques-
tion, and are found on the San Andres 
riYer, and the controversy concerns the 
question whether the ea.st line and the west 
line of that survey, which are straight lines 
almost due north .extend eo far north that 
the northern line between tbeee lines le so 
far north as to Include the survey of Daws, 
under which plaintift claims. In the princi-
pal deposition of Johnson, as we ha\'"e seen 
by the bill of exceptions, he states that this 
survey commenced at the southwestern 
corner on the San Andres river, and W8.8 
run northward the distance called for in 
the grant, and actually merumred by ·the 
chain. Tbe north-west or second corner 
CRlled for in the grant was efltablished by 
him, the distance giving out in the prairie. 
From the north-west cornt'r thus e8tab-
llshed, the second, the line was nm for the 
course and distance called for In the grant, 
and the north-east corner established on 
two email hackberrles on Cow Creek bot-
tom. From the north-east or third corner 
thus established the course W88 run to the 
San Andres river. This last line was nmrked, 
but not measured, because It was not nec-
e&&ary to measure the closing line. In an-
swer to questions on cr0Rt1-0xamlnatlon, 
he said he did not begin at the south-east 
corner, but he began at the south-west cor-
ner, and actually traced the lfneg in the or-
der set forth In the field-notes. He said the 
field-book, containing these notes, "I kept 
and examined, which I do not remember to 
have examined till a month ago, aa herein-
before stated." The deposition offered by 
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plaintiff states distinctly that he began the
Moreno survey at the south-east corner,
and ran t-hence northerly. The north line
was then run westwardly, and the third,
if run at all, was run southward to the riv-
-er. And he further says: “ Iam of the opin-
ion that no western line was run, but was
left open, but the eastern and northern
lines were run and measured. It was not
usual to measure the closing line.” It was
admitted that the distance as measured on
the ground from the north-east corner to a
creek called forin the grant was some 4,000
val-as more than the distance called for,
and the witness on cross-examinations in
the principal depositions read by the defend-
ant in this case, being asked to account for
this discrepancy, said: “The distances
called on that line were not measured, but
guessed at. No part oi’ the east line was
measured.” The discrepancy between these
two depositions is manifest, and that dis-
crepancy is in a matter which relates direct-
ly to the question whether the Moreno
grant as it was surveyed included the land
embraced within the Daws grant, under
which plaintiff asserts claim. If the jury
believed in the truth of the deposit-ions of
Johnson taken by the defendant in this
case, at which he was cross-examined by
the plaintiff, it affords the strongest evi-
dence that the Daws claim was included in
the lines of the Moreno survey. This dep-
osition is supported by the field-notes and
by the reference of Johnson himself to those
-field-notes a very little while before he gave
his deposition. If, on the contrary, the
-eastern line was the one which was actual-
ly run and measured, beginning at the
south-east corner of the survey on the San
Andres river, then the fact that that line
was actually run and measured would
probably have a very great influence in
the mind of the jury on the question in is-
sue. And, whether this was so or not, the
contradictory statements of Johnson un-
der oath might destroy the value of his tes-
timony before the jury.
The circumstanca under which the for-'
mer statements of a witness in 1'cp;a1'd to
the subject-matter of his testimony, when
examined in the principal case, can be in- I
troduced to contradict or impeach his tes-
timony, are well settled, and are the same
whether his testimony in the principal case
is given orally in court before the jury, or
is taken by deposition afterwards read to
them. In all such cases, even where the
matter occurs on the spur of the moment
in a trial before a jury, and where the ob-
jectionable testimony may then come for
the first time to the knowledge of the op-
posite party, it is the rule that, before those
former declarations can be used to impeach
-or contradict the witness, his attention
must be called to what may be brought
forward for that purpose, and this must
be done with great particularityas to time
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and place and circumsta.nces,so thathecan
deny it, or make any explanation intend-
ing to reconcile what he formerly said with
what he is now testifying. Whilethecourts
have been somewhat liberal in giving the
opposing party an opportunity to present
to the witness the matter in which they
propose to contradict him, even going so
far as to permit him to be recalled and
cross-examined on that subject after he has
left the stand, it is believed that in no case
has any court deliberately held that after
the witness’ testimony has been taken,
committed to writing, and used in the
court, and by his death heis placed beyond
the reach of any power of explanation,
then in another trial such contradictory
declarations, whether by deposition or oth-
erwise, can be used to impeach his testi-
mony. Least of all would this seem to be
admissible in the present case, where three
trials had been had before a jury, in each
of which the same testimony of the witness
Johnson had been introduced and relied on,
and in each of which he had been cross-ex-
amined, and no reference made to his for-
mer deposition, nor any attempt to call his
attention to it. This principle of the rule
of evidence is so well understood that au-
thorities are not necessary to be cited. It
is so well stated with its qualifications and
the reasons for it, by Mr. Greenleai in his
work on Evidence, (volume 1, §§ 462-464, in-
clusive,) that nothing need be added to it
here except a reference to the decisions cited
in his notes to those sections. See, also,
Weir v. McGee, 25 Tex.Supp. 32. It will
thus be seen that the principle on which
counsel fo1-plaintiff in errorobjected to this
deposition of J ohnsonis not in conflict with
the case oi’ Horton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 277, nor
with any case to which we arecited. decided
by the supreme court of Texas. That
ground, as stated in the bill of exceptions. is
“that the deposition had been taken in an-
other and different cause, between other
parties, before the institution of this suit;
and thesamewitness havingtcstified in an-
swer to interrogatories and cross-interrog-
atories propounded herein in 1877 and 18910,
respectively, it was not competent as orig-
inal evidence, nor admissible to contradict
, or impeach the testimony of the witness
Johnson, as given in his deposition read by
the defendant, notwithstanding the death
of Johnson.”
We are very clear that the deposition of
1860 was improperly admitted, and its im-
portant relation to the issue tried by the
' jury was such that the judgment rendered
on it must be reversed, and the verdict set
aside, and a new trial granted. There are
other assignments of error, the considera-
tion of which is not necessary in the decision
of the case before us, which, with due ai-
tention to what we decided when the case
’ was here before, to which we still adhere,
may not arise in another trial.
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pla.fnttn states distinctly that he began the 
Moreno survey at the south-east corner, 
.and ran thence northerly. The north line 
was then run westwardly, and the third, 
if run at all, was run southward to the riv-
-er. And be further says: "I am of the opin-
ion that no western line was run, but was 
left open, but the eastern and northern 
llnM were run and measured. It was not 
uHual to meruiure tile closing Jtne." It was 
admitted that the distance as merumred on 
the ground from the north-east comer to a 
creek called forln the grant was some 4,000 
varas more than the distance called for, 
and the witness on croSB-examloatlons in 
the principal depositions read by the defend-
ant In this case, being asked to account for 
this discrepancy, said: "The distances 
called on that line were not measured, but 
guesRed at. No part of the east line was 
measured." The discrepancy between these 
two depoRltlons is manifest, and that dis-
crepancy ls in a matterwhlchrelatesdlrect-
ly to the question whether the Moreno 
grant WI it was surveyed Included the lantl 
embraced within the Daws grant, under 
which plaintiff asserts claim. If the Jury 
believed in the truth of the depositions of 
Johnson taken by the defendant in this 
case, at which he was cross-examined by 
the plalnttn, It affords the strongest evi-
dence that the Daws claim was Included In 
the lines of the Moreno survey. This dep-
-0sltlon is supported by the field-notes and 
byt.be reference of Johnson himself to those 
field-notes a very little while before he gave 
his deposition. If, on the contrnry, the 
eastern line was the one which was actual-
ly run and measured, beginning at the 
:11outh-enst comer of the survey on the San 
Andres river, then the fact that that line 
was actually run and measured would 
prollably have a very great influence In 
the mind of the Jury on the question in Is-
sue. And, whether this was so or not, the 
-contradictory statements of Johnson un-
der oath might destroy the value of hie tes-
timony before the jury. 
The circumstances under which the for-· 
mer statement.sofa witness in regard to 
the subject-matter of his testimony, when-
examined In the principal case, can be In-
troduced to contradict or Impeach his tes-
timony, are well settled, and are the same 
whether his testimony in the principal r.ase 
1s givPn orally lo court before thP Jury, or 
ts taken by deposition afterwards read to 
them. In all such cases, even where the 
matter ocrurs on the spur of the moment 
:In a trial before a jury, and where the ob-jectlonaule testimony may then come for 
the first time to the knowledge of the op-
posite party, it is the rule that, before those 
former declarations can be used to lmoeaeb 
<lr contradict the witness, his attention 
must he called to what may be brought 
forward for that purpose, and tl!ls must 
be done with great particularity as to time 
486 
and place and circumstances, so that he can 
deny it, or make any explanation tntend-
lng to reconcile what he formerly said with 
what he is nowteRtlfylng. Whllethecourts 
have been somewhat liberal in giving the 
opposing party an opportunity to present 
to the witness the matter In which they 
propose to contradict him, even going so 
far as to permit him to be recalled and 
croes-examloed on that subject after he has 
left the stand, ft is believed that in no ca11e 
hu any court deliberately held that after 
the witness' testimony has been taken, 
co1nmltted to writing, and used. in the 
court, and by his death heis placed beyond 
the reach of any power of explanation, 
then In another trial such contradictory 
declarations, whether by deposit.ton or oth-
erwise, can be used to impeach his testi-
mony. Least of all would this seem to be 
admissible in the present case, where three 
trials had been had lJefore a jury, In each 
ofwhlcb the same testimony of the witness 
Johnson had been Introduced and relied on, 
and In each of which he had been cross-ex-
amlned, and no reference made to his for-
mer deposition, nor any attempt to call hil! 
attention to It. This principle of thf' rule 
of evidence Is so well understood that au-
thorities are not necessary to be cited. It 
Is so well stated with its quallftcations and 
the reasons for It, by Mr. Greenleaf In his 
work on Evidence, (volume 1, §§ 462-464, In-
clusive,) that nothing need be added to It 
here except a reference tothedeclslonsclted 
In his notes to those sections. See, also, 
Weir v. McGee, 25 Tex.Supp. 32. It will 
thus be seen that the principle on which 
counsPI for plaintiff in error objected to this 
depoRltlon ofJohnsonls notlnconflictwith 
the case of Morton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 277, nor 
with any case to which w~ are cited, decided 
by the supreme court of Texas. That 
ground, 1U1 stated in the blll of exceptions. ts 
"that the deposition had been taken in an-
other and different cause, 8etween other 
parties, before the Institution of this suit; 
Md the same witness having testified In an-
swer to Interrogatories and cross-Interrog-
atories propounded herein in 1877 and 1880, 
respectively, It was not competent as orig-
inal evidence, nor admissible to contradict 
or impeR.Ch the testimony of the witness 
Johnson, as given In his deposition read by 
the defendant, notwithstanding the death 
of Johnson." 
We are very clear that the deposition of 
1860 was improperly admitted, and tt;s Im-
portant relation to the issue tried by tht' 
Jury was such that the judgment rendered 
on it must be reversed, and the verdict set 
aside, and a new trial granted. There are 
other assignments of error, the consldern ... 
tionofwhlchls notnecetiHary in the dedslou 
of the cat1e before UR, which, with dtJt' at-
tention to w Ila t we decf!letl w heu the ca11e 
was here before, to which we still adhere, 
may not arise In another trial. 
IMPEACHMENT.
[Case No. 1154
BECKER et al. v. KOCH, Sherifi, etc.
(10 N. E. 701, 10-1 N. Y. 394.)
Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1887.
Charles B. Wheeler, for appellant. Baker
& Schwartz, for respondents.
PECKHAM, J. This action was brought
by the plaintiffs, as assignees for the benefit
of creditors of one Exstein, to recover from
the defendant the possession of some per-
sonal property, amounting in value to about
$4,000, or, in default thereof, to recover such
value. The defendant justified the taking of
the property by virtue of a writ of attach-
ment issued to him as sheriff of Erie county
in an action in which Victor and others '
were plaintiffs, and Exstein was defendant,
and under which writ the sheriff had levied
upon this property as belonging to the said
Exstein. The assignment to plaintiffs was
made on the seventeenth of October, 1883,
and included the property in question. The
attachment was, on the fourteenth of No-
vember, levied on the property, and, after
the plaintiffs in the attachment suit recov-
ered Judgment against Exstein, the property
was sold on an execution issued thereunder
to the defendant. The answer in this ac-
tion set up these facts, and alleged that the
assignment to the plaintiffs was made with
the intent, on the part of Exstein, to hinder,
delay, and defraud his creditors. The action
came on for trial in the superior court of
Buffalo, and, after the evidence was all in,
the court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs
fora return of the property to them,or for the
value thereof, assessing the same at $3,800.
A stay of proceedings was granted, and the
defendant's exceptions were ordered to be
heard at the general term in the first in-
stance.
The general term, after argument of such
exceptions, overruled the same, and directed
judgment for the plaintiffs on the verdict.
Thereupon an order was entered which in
form treated the defendant as having made
a motion for a new trial on the exceptions
ordered to be heard in the first instance at
general term, and, after reciting such fact,
continued thus: "Ordered, that such motion
be, and the same hereby is, denied, with
costs; that the said exceptions be, and the
same hereby are. overruled, and judgment
for the plaintiffs on the verdict is hereby or-
dered.” Judgment in accordance with the
order was subsequently entered. The de
fendant then appealed from the order above
mentioned to this court, and also from the
judgment entered upon such order.
The plaintiffs now make the claim that the
appeal from the order should be dismissed,
and that the appeal from the judgment
brings up nothing for review but the ques-
tion whether the judgment appealed from is
in accordance with the order of the general
term, as there was no statement in the ap-
peal from the judgment that the appellant
intended to bring up for review any inter-
mediate order, as pointed out by sections
1301 and 1316 of the New Code. There is no
foundation for the claim. The exceptions of
the appellant were ordered by the trial court
to be heard, in the first instance, at the gen-
eral term, and it was pursuant to such di-
rection that the argument of such exceptions
was then had, and the decision of the court
upon such argument was made in the form
of-an order, and that order was simply a
written authority upon which to enter the
judgment, and was not such an intermediate
order as is referred to in section 1301 or
1316, and no appeal would lie from it to this
court. But, after the entry of judgment, an
appeal from such judgment brings up for re-
view the exceptions taken by defendant up-
on the trial. The appeal taken by defend-
ant from the order, as well as from the judg-
ment, was useless, but evidently taken from
more abundant caution; and, if that were
the only appeal in the case, it would have to
be dismissed as unauthorized; and yet, as it
is taken in connection with the appeal from
the Judgment, which brings up all the excep-
tions for review, there is no necessity to
formally dismiss the appeal from the order.
But upon the merits of the appeal quite an
important question arises in relation to the
law of evidence. The court directed a ver-
dict for the plaintiffs; and ii’, therefore,
there was evidence enough to authorize a
submission of the question of fraud to the
jury, the judgment must be reversed. We
think there was, and, had it not been for
the rule of law adopted by the court below,
we suppose that court would have been of
the same opinion. That rule was that, as
the defendant called a witness by whom he
attempted to prove the fraud, and as that
witness denied it, the defendant was bound
by that denial, in the absence of contradic-
tion by somc other witness, even though the
jury might think some parts of the evidence
of the witness clearly showed its existence.
To show exactly how the question arose, and
what was decided by the court, some refer-
ence must be made to the testimony, al-
though it will be unnecessary to allude to it
all.
The assignor, Exstein, was a merchant en-
gaged in a large business in Buffalo. He
kept regular books of account in his busi-
ness, which were produced upon the trial,
and he was called as a witness for the de-
fendant, and gave evidence in relation to the
books, and upon other matters. His assign-
ment was made on the seventeenth of Octo-
ber, and on the sixteenth of that month he
made entries in several accounts which he
kept, crediting quite large sum of money to
the different persons named in such ac-
counts, the result of which entries wa to
cause it to appear by the books that the as-
signor was in their debt to a somewhat
large amount, while if the entries as of the
sixteenth of October were stricken out it
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JMPEACHMENT. (Case No. lli4 
BECKER et al. v. KOCH, Sherilf, etc. 
(10 N. E. 701, 104 N. Y. 394.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1887. 
Charles B. Wheeler, for appellant. Baker 
& Schwartz, for respondents. 
PECKHAM, J. This action Wll8 brought 
by the plalnti1fs, as aSBlgnees for the benefit 
()f creditors of one Exsteln, to recover from 
the defendant the possession of some per-
sonal property, amounting In value to about 
$4,000, or, in default thereof, to recover such 
value. The defendant justified the taking of 
the property by virtue of a writ of attach-
ment IBBUed to him as sheriff of Erle county 
in an action in which Victor and otl.Jei·s 
were plaintiffs, and Exsteln was defendant, 
and under which writ the sheriff had levied 
upon this property as belonging to tl!e said 
J<;xstein. The assignment to plaintiffs was 
ma<le on the . seventeenth of October, 1883, 
and Included the property in question. The 
attachment was, on the fourteenth of No-
vember, levied on the property, and, after 
the plaintltrs In the attachment suit recov-
ered judgment against Exsteln, the property 
was sold on an execution IBSued thereunder 
to the defendant. The answer In this ac-
tion set up these facts, and alleged that the 
assignment to the plalntltrs was made with 
Ute Intent, on the part of Exsteln, to hinder, 
delay, and defraud his creditors. The action 
came on for trial ln the superior court of 
Butrnlo, and, after the evidence was all In, 
the court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs 
for a return of the property to them, or for the 
value thereof, assessing the same at $3,800. 
A 11tay of proceedings was granted, and the 
defendant's exceptions were ordered to be 
heard at the general term ln the first In-
stance. 
The general term, after argument of such 
exceptions, overruled the same, and directed 
judgment for the plalntUTs on the verdict. 
Thereupon an order was entered which In 
form treated the defendant as having made 
a motion for a new trial on the exceptions 
ordered to be heard ln the first Instance at 
general term, and, after reciting such fact, 
continued thus: "Ordered, that such motion 
be, and the same hereby Is, denied, with 
costs; that the said exceptions be, and the 
same hereby are. overruled, and judgment 
for the plaintltrs on the verdict ls hereby or-
dered." Judgment In accordance with the 
()rder was subsequently entered. The de-
fendant then appealed from the order above 
mentioned to this court, and also from the 
judgment entered upon such order. 
The plaintiffs now make the claim that the 
appeal from the order should be dismissed, 
and that the appeal from the judgment 
brings up nothing for review but the ques-
tion whether the judgment appealed from ls 
In accordance with the order of the general 
term, as there was no statement In the ap-
peal from the judgment that the appella.ut 
Intended to bring up for review a.uy inter· 
mediate order, as pointed out by sectlom 
1301 and 1316 or the New Code. There ls no 
foundation for the claim. The exceptions of 
the appellant were ordered by the trial court 
to be heard, In the first instance, at the gen-
eral term, and it was pursuant to such di· 
rection that the argument of such exceptions 
was then had, and the decision of the court 
upon such argument was made In the form 
of .an order, and that order was simply a 
written authority upon which to enter the 
judgment, and was not such an Intermediate 
order as is referred to In section 1301 or 
1316, and no appeal would lie from It to this 
court. But, after the entry of judgment, an 
appeal from such judgment brings up for re-
view the exceptions taken by defendant up-
on the trial. The appeal taken by defend-
ant from the order, as well as from the judg-
ment, was usele88, but evidently taken from 
more abundant caution; and, If that were 
the only appeal In the case, It would have to 
be dismissed as uoauthorlz~; and yet, as It 
Is taken In connection with the appeal from 
the judgment, which brings up all the excep-
tions for review, there is no necessity to 
formally dlsmlu the appeal from the order. 
But upon the merits ot the appeal quite an 
Important question arises ln relation to the 
law of evidence. The court directed a ver· 
diet for the plalntltrs; and If, therefore, 
there was evidence enough to authorize a 
submlBSlon of the question of fraud to the 
jury, the judgment must be reversed. We 
think there was, and, had It not been for 
the rule of law adopted by the court below, 
we suppose that court would have been of 
the same opinion. That role wa11 that, as 
the defendant called a witness by whom he 
attempted to prove the fraud, and as that 
witness denied It, the defendant was bound 
by that denial, In the absence of contradic-
tion by some other witness, even though the 
jury might think some parts of the evidence 
of the witness clearly showed Its existence. 
To show exactly how the question arose, and 
what was decided by the court, some refer· 
ence must be made to the testimony, al-
though It will be unneceBSary to allude to It 
all. 
The assignor, Exsteln, Wll8 a merchant en-
gaged In a large lluslne88 In Butralo. He 
kept regular books of account In hlfl busi-
neBS, which were produced upon the trial, 
and he was called as a witness for the de-
fendant, and gave evidence In relation to the 
books, and upon other matters. BIB 1188lgn-
ment was made on the seventeenth of Octo-
ber, and on the sixteenth of that month he 
wade entries In several accounts which he 
kept, crediting quite large sums of money to 
the different persons named In such ac-
counts, the result of which entries was to 
cause It to appear by the books that the as· 
signor was In their debt to a somewhat 
large amount, while If the ~ntrles as of the 
sixteenth of October were stricken out It 
487 
Case N o. 164]
PRODUCTiON AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
would then appear that the parties, instead | plaintiifs without delivering any written
of being creditors, were in reality debtors,
of the assignor. \Vhen on the stand, he sub-
stantially stated that, if those entries were
stricken out, the state of affairs between
himself and those persons would be as repre-
sented in the books; or, in other words,
that, excluding those entries and the circum-
stances upon which they rested, some of
these persons would be his debtors. He also
said that these entries did not in fact repre-
sent any actual transaction occurring at the
time when they were made, and that no val-
uable or other consideration passed between
him and those parties at such time. Stop-
ping with these facts, it would appear, then,
that credits were given these persons the
day before the assignment, upon which some
of them drew out moneys from him, and up-
on the basis of which one was made a pre-
ferred creditor in the assignment, and yet
such entries represented no actual, present
transactions happening at the time when
they were made. Unexplained, it would ap-
pear that as a result Exstein had provided
for the payment of large sums of money, or
had already, and in view of his assignment,
paid such sums to persons whom he did not
owe; or, in other words, he had paid, and
also made provision in his assignment for
the payment of, fictitious debts.
The defendant, however, proceeded with
his examination of this witness, and asked
for an explanation of these entries, and the
facts or circumstances upon which they were
based, and the witness proceeded to give it.
The explanation was, if true, sutlicient in
law, and showed that he did owe the per-
sons the amounts he claimed to, with the pos-
sible exception of one or two eases in which
the defendant claims that, even on the basis
of the general truth of the explanation, the
witness had charged himself in reality with
more than he owed. The defendant then
rested, and the plaintiffs, with the evidence
in this state. asked for a verdict in their fa-
vor by the direction of the court, and ob-
tained it.
The court held, in substance, that the books
of the witness Exstein showed a prima facie
case of an indebtedness of the witness in the
amounts therein appearing, and to the per-
sons therein mentioned, and the witness said
they were correct. He then stated what has
already been alluded to as to those entries
made on the sixteenth of October, and con-
tinued by explaining the facts upon which
they were based. This explanation the court
said was totally uncontradicted -by any other
witness, and defendant was therefore bound
by what Exstein said on that subject, for
the reason that he could not discredit or im-
peach him, and must take what he said as,
under the circumstances of the case, true.
If that were the true rule, the court was cor-
rect in directing a verdict. The general term,
it must be presumed, also took the same view
of the case in directing judgment for the
opinion.
The general rule prohibiting the impeach-
ment or discrediting of a witness by the par-
ty calling him was extended too far in this
case. llere was an issue of fraud in the
making of an assignment by the assignor;
and the defendant, in order to prove its ex-
istence, called the very man as a witness
whom he alleged was guilty of the fraud. He
might well be regarded, therefore, as an
adverse witness, whom the party, by the ex-
igencies of his case, was obliged to call.
With regard to such witnesses it is well set-
tled that all the rules applicable to the ex-
amination of other witnesses do not in their
strlctncss apply. An adverse witness may
be cross-examined, and leading questions
may be put to him by the party calling him,
for the very sensible and sufficient reason
that he is adverse. and that the danger aris-
ing from such a mode of examination by the
party calling a friendly or unbiased witness
does not exist.
What favorable facts the party calling him
obtained from such a witness may be justly
regarded as wrung from a. reluctant and un-
willing man, while those which are unfavor-
able may be treated by the jury with just
that degree of belief which they may think
is deserved, considering their nature and the
other circumstances of the case. Starkie,
one of the ablest and most philosophical of
English writers on this branch of the law,
in speaking of a reluctant or adverse wit-
noss, uses almost the precise language above
stated, and which has been substantially
quoted from him. Starkie, Ev. (9th Ed.)
marg. p. 248.
Sometimes rather loose language has been
indulged in, to the general effect that a party
cannot impeach his own witness; but, when
an examination is made as to the limits of
the rule, the result will be round to be that
it only prohibits thi impeachment in three
cases, viz.: (1) The calling of witnesses to
impcacli the general character of the wit-
ness; and (2) the proof of prior contradictory
statements by him; and (3) a contradiction
of the witness by another, when the only ef-
fect is to impeach, and not to give any
material evidence upon any issue in the ease.
Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 301-306;‘
People v. Saflord, 5 Denlo, 112; Thompson
v. Blanchard, 4 N. Y. 303-311; Coulter v.
Express Co., 56 N. Y. 585; 2 Starkie, Ev.
(9th Am. Ed.) marg. pp. 244-250; 2 Phil. Ev.
(C. & N. & Ed. notes) marg. pp. 981-983, and
note 602; 1 Greenl. Ev. 5 442.
In regard to the first class, the rule has
been stated to rest upon the theory that.
when a. party calls a witness, he presents
him to the jury as worthy of belief, and to
allow him to call witnesses thereafter to im-
peach his general character as a man would
be to permit an experiment to be made upon
the jury by producing a person as worthy
of belief, whom he knows, and has witnesses
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Case No. 164) PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
would then appear that the parties, instead 
of being creditors, were In reallty debtors, 
of the 11Bslgnor. When on the stand, he sub-
stantially stated that, 1! those entJ1es were 
stricken out, the state of al'falrs between 
himself and those persons would be as repre-
sented In the books; or, In other words, 
that, excluding those entries and the circum-
stances upon which they rested, some of 
these persons would be his debtors. He also 
said that these entries did not In fact repre-
sent any actual tmnsactlon occurring at the 
time when they were made, and that no val-
uable or other conskleratlon passed between 
him and those parties at such time. Stop-
ping with these facts, it woold appear, then, 
that credits were given these persons the 
day betore the assignment, upon which some 
of them drew out moneys from him, and up-
on the basis of which one was made a pre-
ferred creditor In the assignment, and yet 
such entries represented no actual, present 
transactions happening at the time when 
they were made. UnexplaJned, It would ap-
pear that as a result Exsteln had provided 
tor the payment ot large sums of money, or 
had already, and In view of bis assignment, 
paid such sums to persons whom he did not 
owe; or, in other words, be bad paid, and 
also made provision in his assignment for 
the payment of, flctltlous debt& 
The defendant, however, proceeded with 
his examination of this witness, and asked 
tor an explanation of these entries, and the 
facts or circumstances upon which they were 
based, and the witness proceeded to give It. 
The explanation was, If true, suftklent In 
law, and showed that be did owe the per-
sons the amounts he claimed to, with the pos-
sible exception of one or two cases In which 
the defendant claims that, even on the basis 
of the general truth of the explanation, the 
witness had charged himself In reallty with 
more than he owed. The defendant then 
rested, and the plaintil'fs, with the evidence 
in this state, asked tor a verdict in their fa-
vor by the direction of the court, and ob-
tained It. 
The court held, In substance, that the books 
of the witness Exstein showed a prima facle 
case of an Indebtedness of the witness In the 
amounts therein appearing, and to the per-
sons therein mentioned, and the witness said 
they were correct. He then stated what has 
already been alluded to as to those entries 
made on the sixteenth of October, and con-
tinued by explaining the facts upon which 
they were based. This explanation the court 
said was totally uncontradlcted ·by any other 
witness, and defendant was therefore bound 
by what Exsteln said on that subject, for 
the reason that he could not discredit or Im-
peach him, and must take what he said as, 
under the circumstances of the case, true. 
It t.hat were the true rule, the court wns cor-
rect In directing a verdict. The general term, 
It must be presumed, also took the Mme view 
of the case in dll'ectlng judgment for the 
488 
plaintiffs without delivering any written 
opinion. 
'l'he general rule prohibiting the impeach-
ment or discrediting of a witness by the par-
ty calling him was extended too far in this 
case. Here was an Issue of traud In the 
making of an assignment by the assignor; 
and the defendant, in order to prove its ex-
istence, called the very man as a witnCSI! 
whom be alleged was guilty of the fraud. He 
might well be regarded, therefore, as an 
adverse witness, whom the party, by the ex-
igencies of his case, was obliged to call. 
With regard to strcb witnesses It ls well set-
tled that all the rules appllcable to the ex-
amination of other witnesses do not in their 
strictness apply. An adverse witness may 
be cross-examined, and leading question& 
may be put to him by the party calling him, 
for the very sensible aml sufficient reason 
that be Is adverse. and that the danger aris-
ing from such a mode of examination by the 
party calling a friendly or unbiased witness 
does not exist. 
What favorable facts the party calllng him 
obtained from such a witness may be justly 
regarded as wrung from a reluctant and un-
willing man, while those which are unfavor-
able may be treated by the Jury with just 
that degree of bellef which they may think 
ls deserved, considering their nature and the 
other circumstances of the case. Starkie, 
one of the ablest and most philosophical ot 
English writers on this branch of the law, 
In speaking of a reluctant or adverse wit-
ness, us~s almost the prel'lse language above 
stated, and which has been substantln.lly 
quoted from him. Starkie, Ev. (9th Ed.) 
marg. p. 248. 
Sometimes rather loose language has been 
Indulged In, to the general el'fect that a party 
cannot lmpen.ch his own witness; but, when 
an examination Is made as to the limits of 
the rule, the result will be iound to be that 
It only prohibits this Impeachment tn three 
cases, viz.: (1) The calling of witnesses to 
Impeach the genernl C'haracter of the wit-
ness; and (2) the proof of prior contradictory 
statements by him; and (3) a contradiction 
of the witness by another, when the only ef-
fect Is to !mpelch, nnd not to give any 
material evidence upon any Issue In the case. 
Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 301-300;· 
People v. Satrord, 5 Denio, 112; Thompson 
v. Blanchard, 4 N. Y. 303-311; Coulter v. 
Express Co., 56 N. Y. 585; 2 Starkie, Ev. 
(9th Am. Ed.) marg. pp. 244-250; 2 Phil. Ev. 
(C. & N. & Ed. notes) mnrg. pp. 981-983, and 
note 602; 1 Green!. Ev. t 442. 
In regard to the first class, the rule has 
been stated to rest upon the theory that, 
when a party calls a witness, be presents 
him to the jury as worthy of belief, and to 
allow him to call witnesses thereafter to Im-
peach his general t•hnracter as o. man would 
be to permit an experiment to be made upon 
the Jury by producing a person as worthy 
of belief, wltom he knows, and has wltneSBeS 
IMPEACHMENT.
[Case No. 164;
to prove, to be the contrary, and, if his evi-
dence be favorable, to get the benefit of it,
and, if the reverse, to overwhelm it by the im-
peaching witnesses. in such a case as this,
however, there is no deception. The defend-
ant calls the very man he accuses of the
fraud as a witness to prove it, and says in
effect to the jury that such evidence as the
witness gives, which tends to show the per-
petration of the fraud alleged, is forced from
hlm by the exigencies of the case, and the
surrounding facts which cannot be denied,
while that which he gives which looks to-
wards au explanation of the fraud the jury
shall give such faith to as, under all the
facts in the case, they may think it entitled
to.
As to the second class in which an impeach-
ment is forbidden, the authorities in England
were in conflict, many of the judges think-
ing it allowable to prove prior contradictory
statements by a witness; but the weight of
authority was against it, thereby creating
the occasion for an interference by the leg-
islature with the law of evidence, which
passed an act permitting just such evidence
under certain restrictions. See common law
procedure act of 185-l (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, §
22). The non-admissibility of such evidence
in the courts of this state is, of course, not
open to discussion. It is alluded to only
to show the opinion of the English parlia-
ment (in matters of this nature almost ex-
clusively guided by lawyers) upon this ques-
tion of impeaching one's own witness, and
the readiness of that body to alter the law of
evidence in the direction of what seemed to
it greater opportunity of ascertaining and
administering that for which all courts are
instituted, viz., truth and justice.
The third of above classes where no im-
peachment is allowed, is plainly set forth in
several of the cases and text-books above
cited. It is not admissible, even in the case
of a witness called by the other side, to im-
peach him by proof of prior contradictory
statements on immaterial or collateral is-
sues; and there is not much difference in the
two cases, and therefore no reason why it
should be allowed with reference to one‘s
own witness. But all the cases concur in
the right of a party to contradict his own
witness by calling witnesses to prove a fact
material to the issue to be otherwise than as
sworn to by him, even when the necessary
effect is to impeach him.
Why should not the right exist to show
that a. portion of the evidence of your own
witness is untrue, by comparing it with an-
other portion of the evidence of the same
witness? The courts below say in effect
that, although a portion of I~ixstein’s evi-
dence shows that he provided for payment
in his assignment for fictitious debts, yet the
other portion of his evidence, if believed,
shows that such debts were not fictitious;
and, although the defendant was at liberty
to call other witnesses to prove that the ex-
planation was false, yet, as he did not do
so, the explanation must stand as matter of
law, and he cannot be heard to contend that
it is proved false by its own absolute and‘
inherent improbability. We do not believe.
at least in such a case as this, that the rule
goes to any such length.
The plaintiffs cite the case of Branch v.
Levy, 46 N. Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 428, as up-
holding the rule laid down by the trial court.
The plaintiffs there brought an action to re-
cover damages from defendants for the non-
delivery of coupons bought from the defend-
ants’ agent, as plaintiffs claimed; but de-
fendants denied the agency, and alleged they
had sold the coupons to the person who
plaintiffs alleged was their agent, and had no
liability for his subsequent acts. On the tri-
al the plaintiffs sustained their claim prima.
facie by certain letters and circumstances
which, as the court said, in the absence of
explanation by defendants, made a question
for the jury. The plaintiffs then, for some
inexplicable reason, called one of the defend-
ants, who swore that the person selling the
bonds to the plaintiffs was not the agent of
the defendants, but they had simply sold
him the bonds. The court held the plaintiffs
concluded by this evidence, and that they
must take it as wholly credible; that credibil-
ity could not be divided; and that it was at-
tache-d to the moral character. That case
comes very. near the one under discussion,
and it is hard to see why the plaintiffs should
not have been allowed to go to the jur_v up-
on the whole of their case,——letters, docu-
ments, and explanation,—and why they
should not have been allowed to ask the
jury to believe the documents and letters,
and reject the explanation as in their judg-
ment untrne. To say that credibility is a
part of the moral character, and indivislble,
is to run counter to the well-established rule
as to adverse witnesses above referred to,
whose testimony you may ask a jury to be-
lieve in part, and to disbelieve the residue.
The case ought not to be followed. It is a.
good general rule that the credibility of a
witness is matter for the jury, and the fewer
technical obstructions there are to the prac-
tical operation of that rule the better. ,
We think that the whole evidence of Ex-
stein in this case should have been submit-
ted to the jury for them to pass upon its
credibility, and that they were at liberty to
believe that portion which tended to show
the debts to be fictitious, and to disbelieve
the explanation, or that they might regard
it as sufflcient,—just as in their judgment,
intelligently and honestly exercised, they
might determine. Of course, we do not mean
by this decision to give any intimation as to
which view should be taken by the jury.
We only decide that it was a question for
them, and not the court.
The judgment should be reversed, and a
new trial granted; costs to abide the event.
All concur.
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l.MPEACH.ME~·r. [Cue No. !64: 
to prove, to be the contrary, and, If his evl· 
deuce be favorable, to get the benefit ot It, 
nod, 1t the revel'Be, to overwhelm it by the Im· 
peadllng witnesses. In such a case as this. 
however, there ls no deception. The defend· 
ant calla the very man he accuses ot the 
fraud as a witness to prove it, and says in 
etrect to the jury that such evidence as the 
witness gives, which tends to show the per-
petration ot the traud alleged, Is torced trom 
him by the exigencies ot the case, and the 
mrrounding tacts which cannot be denied, 
while that which he gives which looks to-
wards an explanation ot the traud the jury 
shall give such faith to as, under all the 
tacts In the case, they may think It entitled 
to. 
As to the second cla88 In which an impeach· 
ment Is forbidcleu, the authorities In England 
were In contHct, many ot the judges think-
ing It allowable to prove prior contradictory 
statements by a witness; but the weight ot 
authority was against it, thereby creating 
the occasion tor an lnterterence by the leg-
islature with the law ot evidence, which 
passed an act permitting just such evidence 
under certain restrictions. See common law 
procedure act of 1854 (17 & 18 Viet. c. 1.2j, I 
22). The non-admissibility ot such evidence 
in the courts of this state ls, ot course, not 
open to discussion. It Is alluded to only 
to show the opinion ot the English parlia-
ment (In matters ot this nature almost ex-
clusively guided by lawyers) upon this ques-
tion ot impeaching one's own wltnellS, and 
the readiness ot that body to alter the law ot 
evidence In the direction ot what seemed to 
it greater opportunity ot ascertaining and 
administering that tor which all courts are 
Instituted, viz., truth and justice. 
The third ot above classes where no Im-
peachment Is allowed, ls plainly set torth 1n 
several of the cases and text-books above 
cited. It Is not admissible, even In the case 
ot a witness called by the other side, to Im· 
peach him by proot ot prior contradictory 
statements on Immaterial or collateral Is-
sues; and the1·e Is not much difference In the 
two <·ases, and therefore no reason why It 
should be allowed with reference to one's 
own wltne88. But all the cases concur In 
the right ot a party to contradict his own 
witness by calllng witnesses to prove a tact 
material to the Issue to be otherwise than ae 
sworn to by him, even when the necessary 
etrect ls to Impeach him. 
Why should not the right exist to show 
that a portion ot the evidence ot your own 
witness ls untrue, by comparing It with an-
other portion of the evidence of the same 
witness? The courts below say In etred 
that, although a portion ot l'lxsteln's evl· 
deuce shows that he provided tor imyment 
In his assignment tor fictitious debts, yet the 
other portion ot his evidence, It believed, 
shows that such debts were not fictitious; 
and, although the defendant wns at liberty 
to call other witnesses to prove that the ex-
planatlon was false. yet, as be did not do 
so, the explanation must stand as matter ot 
law, and he cannot be beard to contend thl\t 
It ls proved false by its own absolute and' 
inherent lmprobabUlty. We do not believe, 
at least In such a case ss this, that the rule 
goes to any such length. 
The plalntllfs cite the case of Bmnch v. 
Levy, 46 N. Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 428, as up-
holding the l'ule laid down by the trial court. 
The plalnturs there brought an action to re-
coYer damages from defendants tor the non-
delivery of coupons bought from the defend· 
ants' agent, as plaintiffs claimed; but de-
fendants denied the agency, and alleged they 
had sold the coupons to the person who 
plalntltrs alleged was their agent, and had no 
liability tor his subsequent acts. On the tri-
al the plalntltrs sustained their claim prime. 
tacle by certain letters and ctrcmnstances 
wWch, as the court said, In the absence o! 
explanation by defendants, made a question 
tor the jury. The plaintltrs then, tor some 
Inexplicable reason, called one of the defend-
ants, who swore th.tt the person selling the 
bonds to the plalntltrs was not the agent o! 
the defendants, but they had simply sold 
him the bonds. The court held the plalnturs 
concluded by this evidence, and that they 
must take It as wholly credible; that credibil-
ity could not be divided; and that It was at-
tach(·d to the moral character. That case 
comes very. near the one under discussion, 
and it Is hard to see why the plalntltrs should 
not have been allowed to go to the jury up-
·on the whole of their case,-letters, docu-
ments, and explanatlon,-and why they 
should not haYe been allowed to ask the 
jury to belleve the documents and letters, 
and reject the explanation as In their judg· 
ruent untrue. •ro say that credibility le a 
part of the moral character, and lndivlslbl~. 
ls to run counter to the well-established rule 
as to adverse witnesses above referred to, 
whose testimony you may ask a jury to be· 
lleve In part, and to dlsllelleve the residue. 
The case ought not to be followed. It Is a 
good general rule that the credibility ot a 
witness ls matter tor the jury, and the fewer 
technical obstructions there are to the prac-
tical operation of that rule the better. , 
We think that the whole evidence ot Ex· 
uteln In this cnse should have been submit-
ted to the jury tor them to P888 upon Its 
credibility, and that they were at liberty to 
believe that pot'tlon which tended to show 
the debts to be fictitious, and to dlsbellen~ 
the explanation, or that they might regard 
It as sumclent,-just as In their judgment, 
intelligently and honestly exercised, they 
might determine. Of course, we do not mean 
by this decision to give any Intimation as to 
which view should be taken by the jury. 
We only decide that It was a question tor 
them, and not the court. 
The judgment should be reveJ'lled, and a 
new trial granted; costs to abide the event. 
All concur. 
-(Jase No. 16-5]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
SELOVER et al. v. BRYANT.
(56 N. VV. 58, 54 Minn. 434.)
Supreme Court of Minnesota. Aug. 21, 1893.
Appeal from municipal court of Minneapo-
lis; l-Elliott, Judge.
Action by George H. Selover and another,
copartners as Selover & Gould, against John
W. Bryant, administrator of the estate of
George M. Bryant, deceased, to recover for
professional services as attorneys. Plaintiffs
had judgment, and from an order denying a
new trial defendant appeals. Affirmcd.
George R. Robinson, for appellant. Board-
man & Boutelle, for respondents.
DICKINSON, J. The plaintiffs, as attor
neys at law, prosecuted an action for a. di-
vorce against the defendant and in behalf of
his wife. The action was settled between
the parties, and dismissed. The plaintiffs
prosecute this action to recover for their
legal services in behalf of the defendant's
wife, claiming that in the settlement of the
former suit the defendant agreed with his
wife to pay for such services. The defend-
ant denies that agreement. After a verdict
for the plaintiffs upon that issue, and the
refusal to grant a. new trial, the defendant
appealed.
The plaintiffs called the defendant's wife as
a. witness in their behalf. Her testimony
tended to refute the claim of the plaintiffs
as to the alleged agreement. After a pre-
liminary examination of the witness, as to
former contradictory statements made by her.
the plaintiffs were allowed to show that she
had made a statement of the fact to one of
the plaintlfls materially different from her
testimony. The case justitied the conclusion
of the court that the plaintiffs were surprised
by the adverse testimony. It is one of the
controverted questions in the law of evidence
whether a party calling a witness, and who is
surprised by his adverse testimony, may be
permitted to show that he had made previ-
ous statements contrary to his testimony. A
learned writer has said that the weight of
authority seems to be in favor of admitting
such proof. 1 Greenl. Ev. 5 444. We arc in
doubt whether the weight of authority is not
the other way; but we feel confident that
well-recognized reasons and principles of the
law of evidence support the proposition that,
at least hi the discretion of the trial court,
such evidence is admissible. It is perfectly
well settled, and upon satisfactory reasons,
that if the defendant had called the witness
to the stand, and she had testifled as she did
as to the fact in issue, the plaintiffs, after
proper preliminary proof, would have been
allowed to show by other witnesses that she
had made statements contrary to her testi-
mony. This rule, now everywhere recog-
nized, rests upon the obvious propriety and
necessity of informing the jury of circum-
stances so directly bearing upon the credi-
bility of the witness and the value of his
testimony as do contradictory statements by
him of the controverted facts concerning
which he testifies, and which the jury must
determine. But this controlling reason for
allowing such discrcditing evidence exists.
and with precisely the same force, whether
the witness has been called to the stand by
the opposite party or by the party who offers
the impeaching proof; and if the witness
may be thus discredited by the party who
did not 0311 him, but may not be discredited
by the party who called him, the reason must
be that by calling the witness to the stand
the party holds him forth as being worthy
of credit, and hence he should not be al-
lowed afterwards to impeach his credibility.
And this is the proposition which, in one
form or another, is generally assigned as the
reason of the rule disallowing m'C'h impeach-
ment wherever that rule has prevailed. This
rule and the reason for it has been so gener-
ally accepted and applied with reference to
an impeachment by a party of the general
reputation of a witness whom he has called
that it is perhaps not now to be questioned;
but, as respects the particular discrcditing
proof which we are considering, the practice
has been less uniform, and the excluding of
the dlscrediting proof has been more strenu-
ously opposed by the best authorities. The
reason upon which it rests is, we think. plain-
ly faliacious. The fault in the reason lies
in the premise that, by calling the witness.
the party presents him as being worthy of
credit, or, in any sense, vouches for his truth-
fulness. In some sense and measure this
may be true; but laying aside the subject of
general impeachment, and directing our at-
tention only to the question of allowing
proof of statements contrary to the testimony
by which a. party is surprised at the trial. the
above-stated reason is of no controlling force.
except as it includes and implies such a de
gree of responsibility for the credit of the
witness—such a personal voucher of his truth-
fulness—that it would be bad faith, double
dealing, trifling with the court, or something
akin thereto, for the party to afterwards
throw discredit upon his testimony. The
premise is not tenable. A party is not to be
held to have assumed any such responsibility
as to the tI'llthfl111lt-1'88 of a witness, and or-
dinarily, at least, there can be no imputation
of bad faith, or anything like it, when. the
party being surprised by his own witness tes-
tifying directly in favor of the adverse party,
he oifers to show his preliminary statements
to the contrary, as impcaching his credibil-
ity. One has not all the world from which
to choose the witnesses by whose testimony
he nmst prove his case. He has not the
freedom of choice that one has in the selec-
tion of an agent. He can only call those
who are supposed to know the facts in issue.
He is entitled to have their testimou_v placed
before the jury, not as the statements of his
agents or representatives by which he is to be
concluded. but as the testimony of witnesses
whose credibility he cannot be expected to
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Cue No. 165) PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
SEI,OVER et al. v. BRYANT. 
(56 N. W. 58, 54 Minn. 434.) 
Supreme Court of Minnesota. Aug. 21, 1893. 
Appeal from municipal court of Mlnneapo-
J.ls; mnott, Judge. 
Action by George H. Selover and another, 
<:opartners a'J Selover & Gould, against John 
W. Bryant, admlnlstrator of the estate ot 
George M. Bryant, deceased, to recover tor 
profrsslonnl services 88 attorneys. Plalntlfra 
bad Judgment, and from an order denying a 
new trial detendnnt appeals. Atllrmed. 
George R. Robinson, for appellant. Board-
man & Boutelle, for respondents. 
DICKJSSON, J. The plnlntltrs, aa attor 
neys at law, prosecuted an action for a di-
vorce aga.lnst the defendant and in behalf of 
bis wife. The action was settled between 
the pnrtles, and dlamiased. The plalntifra 
prosecute this action to recover for their 
legal services in behalf of the defendant's 
wife, claiming that in the settlement of the 
former suit the defendant agreed with his 
wife t.o pay for such services. The defend-
ant denies tbnt agreement. After a verdict 
for the plalntlfrs upon that issue, and the 
refusal to grant a new trial, the defendant 
appealed. 
The plalntlfrs called the defendant's wife 88 
a witness in their behalf. Her testlmony 
tended to refute the clnlm of the plaintl1fs 
as to the alleged agreement. After a pre-
llmln:iry examination of the witness, as to 
former contradictory statements made by her, 
the plnlntl1fs were o.llowed to show thnt she 
bad made a statement of the taet to one of 
the plalnt:Ufs materially dlfrerent from her 
testimony. The case justltll'd the conclusion 
of the court that the plnlntitrs were surprised 
by the adverse testimony. It ls one of the 
oontroverted questions in the law of evidence 
whether a p~rty caDlng a wltnest1, and who 1.8 
8Urprisl'd by his adverse testimony, may be 
pcm1ltted to show that he had made prevl-
o0us statements contrary to his testimony. A 
learned writer has said that the weight of 
authority seems to be ln favor of admitting 
.such proof. 1 Greeol Ev. t 444. We are in 
doubt whether the weight of authority ls not 
the other way; but we feel confident that 
well-recognized re&BOD8 and principles of the 
law of evidence support the proposition that, 
at least in the discretion of the trial court, 
such evidence ls admissible. It ls perfectly 
W(•Jl settled, and upon satisfactory reasons, 
thnt if the defendant had caDed the wltnees 
to the stnnd, and she had testlfted as she did 
as to the fact in Issue, the plaintltrs, after 
proper prelhninary proof, would have been 
all,)wed to show by other witnesses thnt she 
bad made .statements contrary to her testi-
mony. This rule, now everywhere recog-
nized, rests upon the ob\1ous propriety and 
necessity of informing the jury of clrcum· 
stances so directly bearing upon the credi-
bility of the witness and the value of hi.a 
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tE'Stlmony as do contradictory statements by 
him of the controverted tacts concerntng 
which he testlftes, and whlch the Jury must 
d('ter.111ne. But this controlling reason for 
allowing such dlacrl'dltlng evidence exl8ts. 
and with pr-:l<'lsely the same force, whether 
the wltnC'SS has been caDed to the stnnd by 
the opPo11ite party or by the pnrty who offers 
the impeaching proof; and If the witness 
may be thus discredited by the party who 
did not call him, but may not be discredited 
by the pnrty who called him, the reason must 
be that by calling the witness to the stand 
the pnrty holds him forth as being worthy 
of credit, and henoe he ahould not be al-
lowed afterwards to Impeach his credlbllit;y. 
And this ls the propoeltlon which, in one 
form or another, la generally aAAined as the 
reason of the rule dtsallowllljr Ml'C-b Impeach-
ment wherever that rule has prevailed. This 
rule and the reason for it has been so gener-
ally accepted and applied with reference to 
an impeachment by a pnrty of the general 
reputl.tlon of a wltneu whom he has called 
thn.t it ls perhaps not now to be questlf'ned; 
but, as respects the particular disa(:dit.1ng 
proof which we are considering, the pra-.,tice 
baa been less uniform, and the excluding of 
the dl&lredltlng proof hns been more strenu-
ously opposed by the best authorities. The 
reason upon which it rests la, we think, plaln-
ly fallacious. 'l'he fault in tbe reason llee 
in the premise that, by calling the wltneai, 
the party presents him as being worthy of 
c1·edit, or, in nny sense, vouches for his trath-
fulneSti. In some sense and measure this 
mny be true; but laying aslde the subject of 
genersl Impeachment, and directing our at-
tention only to the question of allowing 
proof of statements contrary to the testimony 
by which a party ls surprised at the trial the 
n.bove-stated reason ls of no controlling force. 
except n.s it includee and implles such a de-
gree of reeponslblllty for the credit of the 
wl tness--euch a personal voucher of his trath-
fulnes&-that lt would be bad faith. double 
dealing, trUling with the court, or something 
r.kin thereto, for the party to a.fterwanla 
throw discredit upon his testimony. The 
premise ls not tenable. A party la not to be 
held to have assumed any such responslblllty 
as to the trathfulneBS of a witness, and or-
dinnrily, at least, there can be no imputation 
of bnd faith, or anything like it, when, the 
party being surprised by his own witness tes-
tifying directly in favor of the adverse party, 
he otters to show his preliminary statemCDts 
to the contrary, as impeaching his credibil-
ity. One has not all the world from which 
to choose the witnesses by whose testiWOllT 
he must prove his case. He h88 not the 
freedom of choice that one h88 in the selec-
tion of an agent. He can only call thoee 
who are supposed to know the facts In lt!lme. 
He ls entitled to have their testimony pla('(_>(l 
before the jury, not as the statements of his 
agents or representatives by which he ls to be 
concluded, but as the testimony of wltnessea 
whose credlblllty he oannot be expected to 
IMPEACHMENT.
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vouch for, but which the jury are to deter-
mine. It is everywliere admitted that a
party whose witness testiiies against him is
not concluded thereby. He may prove the
fact to be contrary to such testimony, al-
though that does discredit a witness whom he
has called. We deny that, by calling a. wit-
ness to the stand, a party becomes responsi-
ble for his credibility in any such sense that
he is absolutely precluded, when su.rprised
by adverse testimony, from showing that the
witness had made statements of the facts
contrary to his testimony. It is at least with-
in the discretion of the court to allow this.
It has been suggested that this affords an
opportunity 10 fraudulently get before the
Jury the unsworn statement of a witness
which the j1n'y may accept as evidence of the
fact. But the same objection may be urged
in opposition to allowing a party to discredit
in this way a. witness calleii by the adverse
party; yet this is always allowed. The di-
rect, certain, and obvious effect of such evi-
dence, in enabling the jury to rightly weigh
the testimony, should prevail over the far
more remote, improbable, and collateral con-
siderations that opporttmity may be thus af-
forded to a dishonest party to collude with a
dishonest witness to make a. false statement
of facts, which the witness would not swear
to, in order that, after the witness shall have
testifled to the truth, the false unsworn state
ment to the contrary may be shown. There
are so many contingencies in the way of such
barely possible results that the remote possi-
bility is not of much weight, as against the
plain practical considerations opposed to it.
While, perhaps, the weight of authority is in
favor of excluding such evidence, we feel
that, in holding it to be within the discretion
of the court to receive it, we are justified,
not only by reason, but by a sufiicient array
of authority. In the English courts both
views have been sanctioned. A strong pres-
entation of the rule allowing such proof was
made by Lord Chief Justice Dennian in
ivright v. Beckett, 1 Moody & R. 414.
This view is preferred in Starkie, Ev. (Shara-
wood's Ed.) 245; 2 Phil. Ev. marg. pp. 985-
995; 1 Greenl. Ev. 44-1; Cowden v. Reynolds,
12 Serg. & R. 281, 288; Bank v. Davis, 6
\Vatts & S. 285; Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md.
561, 5 Atl. Rep. 334; Campbell v. State, 23
Ala. 44, 76; Hemingway v. Garth. 51 Ala.
530; Moore v. Railroad Co., 59 Miss. 243;
and see Johnson v. Leggett, 28 Kan. 590, 606.
See, also, a. discussion of this subject in 11
Am. Law Rev. 261. It may be added, as in-
dicating what it has been considered the rule
ought to be, that in England and in several
of our states statutes have been enacted al-
lowing such proof to be made. Our conclu-
sion on this point is that the court did not
err in receiving the evidence.
The only other assignments of error which
we deem worthy of specific mention are those
relating to the charge of the court that the
value of the services (of the plaintiif) “to
Mrs. Bryant” should be considered by the
jury. There was no error in this. The court
did not say that that consideration alone
should be taken as the measure of value.
The value of the services of an attorney is
necessarily to be determined by many con-
siderations besides the mere time visibly em-
ployed in the conduct of a suit. Among
other things, the importance and results of
the case are to be considered. The impor-
tance of the cause to the client affords to
some extent a measure of the skill, care, re-
sponsibility, anxiety, and eifort demanded of
and to be borne by the attorney, and should
not be disregarded in their bearing upon the
question of the value of such services.
Eggieston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14.
The seventh assignment of error—that the
. court erred in overruling tne motion for a
new trial—is too general to be available.
Order affirmed.
GILFILLAN, C. J’. On the point of the
admissibility of the evidence of contradictory
statements made by the witness Bryant, I
dissent.
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•ouch for, but which the jury are to deter-
mine. It ls eve17where admittf'd that a 
parcy whose wltneae testules agalDBt him ls 
not concluded thereby. He may prove the 
fact to be contrary to IOch otestlmony, al-
though that does discredit a witness whom he 
has called. We deny that, by calllDg a wit-
ness to the at.and, a party becomes responsi-
ble for his credlbWty In any such sense that 
be ls \bsolutely precluded, when surprised 
by adverse testimony, trom showing that the 
witness had made statements of the facta I 
oontrary to bis testimony. It ls at least wlth-
m the discretion of the court to allow this. I 
It bas been auggestf'd that this affords an 
opportunity to fm.udulently get before the 
Jury the uDBworn stntement ot a wltneaa 
which the JU17 may accept aa evidence of the 
fact. But the same obJt'Ctlon may be urgf'd 
1n opposition to allowing a vnrty to discredit 
1n this way a witness calleat Dy the adverse 
pa."ty; yet this la always allowed. The di-
rect, certain, and obvious effect of such evi-
dence, In enabling the ju17 to rightly weigh 
the testimony, should prevail over the far 
more remot1", Improbable, and collateral con· 
tddernttona that opportunity may be thus at-
:torded to a dishonest party to collude with a 
dishonest witness to make a false statement 
of facts, which the wltneae would not swear 
to. In order that, atter the wltneaa shall have 
teatl1led to the truth, the false unswom state-
ment to the contrary may be shown. There 
are 80 many contingencies In the way ot such 
bnrely polllible results that the remote pOSRt-
blllty Is not ot much weight, as against the 
plain practtcal consldernttons opposed to It. 
While, perhnps, the weight ot authority ls In 
favor ot excluding such evldf'nce, we feel 
that, In holding It to be within the discretion 
-ot the court to receive It, we are justified, 
not only by reoson, but by a lltlfticlent array 
ot authority. In the English courts both 
views have been sanctioned. A strong pree-
eitatlon ot the rnle allowing such proof was 
made b7 Lord Chief .Justice Denman In 
Wright v. Beckett, 1 Moody & B. '14. I 
This view ls preferred In Starkie, Ev. (Sban-
wood'a Ed.) 245; 2 Phil. Ev. marg. pp. 985-
995; 1 Greenl. Ev. 44-1; Cowc.len v. Reynolds, 
12 Berg. & B. 281, 283; BanJt v. l>-clvls, 6 
Watts & S. 285; Smith v. Briscoe, 60 Md. 
561, 5 Atl. Rep. 384; Campbell v. Stnte, 23 
A.la. 44, 76; Hemingway v. Garth, 51 Ala. 
630; Moore v. Rallrood Co., i>D Ylss. 243; 
and see Johnson v. Leggett, 28 Kan. 500, 600. 
See, also, a discussion of this subject In 11 
.Am. Law Rev. :?<."1. It may be added, na In-
dicating what it bas been considered the rule 
ought to be, that In England and In several 
of our states statutes have been enacted al-
lowing such proof to be made. our conclu-
sion on this point ls that the court did not 
err In ree.elvlng the evidence. 
The only other assignments ot error which 
we de<>m worthy of speclfl.c mention are those 
relating to the cbal"ge of the court that the 
value of tha servl<'M (of the plalntltr) "to 
Mrs. Bryant" should be considered by the 
jU17. There was no error In this. The court 
did not any that thnt oonslderatlon alone 
should be taken as the measure of value. 
The value of the services of an attorney ls 
neces.<mrlly to be determined by many oon-
slderatlona besides the mere Ume vlalbly em-
ployed In the conduct of a BUit. Among 
other things, the Importance and results of 
the case are to be constdered. 'Ille lm}>Ol"-
tance of the cause to the client affords to 
some f'xtent a measure of the Bldll, care, re-
sponsi.pWty, anxiety, and effort demanded ot 
and to be borne by the attorney, and should 
not be disregarded In their bearing upon the 
queatlon ot the value of such services. 
Eggleston v. Boardman, 87 Mich. 14. 
The seventh assignment of erro~that the 
court erred In overrnllng tne motion for a 
new trial-ls too general to be available. 
Order a.1ftrJDed. 
Gll,FILI,AN, 0. 1. On the point of the 
admlt!lllbillty ot thP evidence ot oonb;adlctory 
statements made by the wltneaa B17ant, I 
dissent. 
Case No. 166]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
GERTZ v. FITCHBURG R. CO. I
(137 Mass. 77.)
Supreme,Judicial Court of Massacliusetts. Suf-
folk. March 19, 1384.
J. J’. Myers, for plaintiff. C. A. Welch, for
defendant.
HOLMES. J. In this case, the plaintiff
having testified as a witness, the defendant
put in evidence the record of his conviction,
in 1876, in the United States district court,
of the crime of falsely personating a Unit-
ed States revenue ofiicer. The plaintiff then
offered evidence of his character and pres-
ent reputation for veracity, which was ex-
cluded, subject to his exception.
We think that the evidence of his reputa-
tion for truth should have been admitted,
and that the exception must be sustained.
There is a clear distinction between this
case and those in which such evidence has
been held inadmissible; for instance, to rebut
evidence of contradictory statements (Russell
v. Coflin, 8 Pick. 143; Brown v. Mooers, 6
Gray, 451), or where the witness is directly
contradicted as to the principal fact by other
witnesses (Atwood v. Dearborn, 1 Allen, 483).
In such cases, it is true that the result
sought to be reached is the same as in the
present,—to induce the jury to disbelicve
the witness. But the mode of reaching the
result is different; for, while contradiction
or proof of contradictory statements may
very well have the incidental effect of im-
peaching the character for truth of the con-
tradicted witness in the minds of the jury,
the proof is not directed to that point. The
purpose and only direct effect of the evi-
dence are to show that the witness is not
to be believed in this instance. But the rea-
son why he is not to be believed i left un-
touched. That may be found in forgetful-
ness on the part of the witness, or in his
having been deceived, or in any other possi-
ble cause. The disbelief sought to be pro-
duced is perfectly consistent with an ad-
mission of his general good character for
truth, as well as for the other virtues; and
until the character of a witness is assailed,
it cannot be fortified by evidence.
On the other hand, when it is proved that
a witness has been convicted of a crime, the
only ground for disbelieving him which such
proof affords is the general readiness to do
evil which the conviction may be supposed
to show. It is from that general disposition
alone that the jury is asked to infer a readi-
ness to lie in the particular case, and thence
that he has lied in fact. The evidence has
no tendency to prove that he was mistaken,
but only that he has perjured himself, and
it reaches that conclusion solely through the
general proposition that he is of bad char-
acter and unworthy of credit. 1 Gilb. Ev.
(6th Ed.) 126.
The conviction in the United States dis-
trict court was for a felony punishable with
imprisonment (St. U. S. March 2, 1867, § 28)‘,
and, assuming that it stands on the same
footing as a conviction in another state, it
would have been admissible, according to
the dicta in our cases, independently of
statute, not to exclude the witness, but to
impeach his credit. Com. v. Green, 1 Mass.
515, 5-11; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 4 6, 511;
Utley v. Merrick, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 302. See
Rev. St. c. 94, § 56. And'when a conviction
is admitted for that purpose, it always may
be rebutted by evidence of good character
for truth. Com. v. Green, ubi upra; Rus-
sell v. Coflin, 8 Pick. 143, 154; Rex v. Clarke,
2 Starkie, 2-11; Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St.
351.
It is true that a doubt is thrown upon this
doctrine in Harrington v. Lincoln, 4 Gray,
, 563, 568; but that case was decided on the
ground that the cross-examination which
showed that the witness had been charged
with a crime also showed that he had been
acquitted, and cannot be regarded as an
authority against our decision, whether the
ratio decidendi adopted be reconcilable with
later cases or not. Com. v. Ingraham, 7
Gray, 46.
The applicability of the foregoing reason-
ing is made clear by the language of our
statutes. By Pub. St. c. 169, 5 19, the only
purpose for which conviction of a crime
may be shown in any case is to affect cred-
ibility. Even if the conviction proved here
would have excluded the witness but for
the statute cutting down its effect, it could
not be maintained that evidence of reputa-
tion for truth remained inadmissible be-
cause lt would have been so when the wit-
ness was excluded. The statute puts all
convictions of crime on the same footing,—-
those which formerly excluded, those which
always have gone only to credibility, and,
it would seem, those which formerly would
not have been admissible at all. We as-
sume that the words “a crime" in Pub. St.
c. 169, § 19, mean the same as “any crime"
in St. 1870, c. 393, § 3; Gen. St. c. 131, §
13; St. 1852, c 312, § 60; St. 1851, c. 233, 5
97; Com. v. Hall, 4 Allen, 305. And there-
fore any evidence which was admissible to
rebut a conviction that only discredited be-
fore the statute must now be admissible to
rebut all convictions that may be put in evi-
dence. Whether any different rule would
apply when the fact is only brought out on
cross-examination we need not consider.
The exception to the exclusion of evidence
that the witness was innocent of the offence
of which he was convicted, and explaining
why he was convicted, is not much pressed,
and is overruled. Com. v. Gallagher, 126
Mass. 54.
Exceptions sustained.
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Cue No. 166) PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
GERTZ "· FITCHBURG R. CO. 
(137 Ma88. 77 .) 
Supreme1Judlcial Court of Massachusetts. Suf-
folk. March 19, 1884. 
J. J. Myers, for plalntUI.'. C. A. Welch, for 
defendant. 
HOLMES, J. In this case, the plalntiiT 
having testified as a witness, the defendant 
put In evidence the record of bis conviction, 
in 1876, in the United States district court, 
of the crime of falsely personatlng a Unit-
ed States revenue olfl.cer. The plalntltf tllen 
ottered evidence of his character and Pl'eS-
ent reputation for veracity, which was ex-
cluded, subject to bis exception. 
We think that the evidence of his reputa-
tion for truth should have been admitted, 
and that the exception must be sustained. 
There ls a clear distinction between this 
case and those In which such evidence has 
been held Inadmissible; for Instance, to rebut 
evidence of contradictory statements (Ruesell 
v. Colfl.n, 8 Pick. 143; Brown v. Mooers, 6 
Gray, 451), or where the witness ts directly 
contradicted as to the principal fact by other 
witnesses (Atwood v. Dearborn, 1 Allen, 483). 
In such cases, it is true that the result 
sought to be reached la the same as in the 
present,-to Induce the jury to disbelieve 
the witness. But the mode of reaching the 
result ls ditrerent; for, while contradiction 
or proof of contrndlctory statemen~ may 
very well have the Incidental effect of Im-
peaching the character for truth of the con-
trndlcted witness In the minds of the jury, 
the proof ls not directed to that point. The 
purpose and only direct etrect of the evi-
dence are to show that the witness ls not 
to be believed In this instance. But the rea-
son why he ls not to be believed ls left un-
touched. That may be found In forgetful-
ness on the part of the witness, or In bis 
having been deceived, or In any other possi-
ble eause. The disbelief sought to be pro-
duced is perfectly consistent with an ad-
mission of his geneml good character for 
truth, as well as for the other virtues; and 
until the character of a witness Is assalled, 
It cannot be fortifted by evidence. 
On the other hand, when It ls proved that 
a witness has been convicted of a crime, the 
only ground for disbelieving him which such 
proof atrords Is the general readiness to do 
evil which the conviction may be supposed 
to show. It Is from that general disposition 
alone that the jury ls asked to Infer a readi-
ness to Ile In the particular case, and thence 
that he has lled in fact. '.rhe evidence has 
no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, 
but only that he has perjured himself, and 
It reaeh~s that conclusion solely through the 
general proposition that he ls of bad char-
n<'ter and unworthy of credit. 1 Gllb. Ev. 
(6th Ed.) 126. 
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The conviction In the United States dis-
trict court was for a. felony punishable with 
imprisonment (St. U.S. March 2, 1867, I 28); 
and, assuming that it stands on the same 
footing as a conviction In another state, it 
would have been admissible, aerording to 
the dicta In our cases, · independently o! 
statute, not to exclude the witness, but to 
Impeach his credit. Com. v. Green, 11' Mass. 
515, 541; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 41l6, 511; 
Utley v. Merrick, 11 Mete. (Maes.) 302. See 
Rev. St. c. 9!, I 56. And ·when a conviction 
ls admitted for that purpose, It always may 
be rebutted by evidence of good character 
for truth. Com. v. Green, ubl supra; Rus-
sell v. Cotnn, 8 Pick. 143, 154; Rex v. Clarke, 
2 Starkie, 241; Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St. 
351. 
It la true that a doubt ls thrown upon this 
doctrine In Harrington v. Lincoln, 4 Gray, 
563, 508; but that case was deelded on !he 
ground that the cross-examination which 
showed that the witness had been charged 
with a crime also showed that he had been 
acquitted, and cannot be regarded as an 
authority against our decision, whether the 
ratio decidendl adopted be reconcilable with 
later cases or not. Com. v. Ingraham, 1 
Gray, 46. 
The appllcablllty of the foregoing reason-
ing is made clear by the language of our 
statutes. By Pub. St. c. 169, I 19, the _only 
purpose for which conviction of a crime 
may be shown in any case ls to atrect cred-
ibility. Even if the conviction proved here 
would have excluded the witness but for 
the statute cutting down its e1Tect, it could 
not be malntalned that evidence of reputa-
tion for truth remained inadmissible IJe-
cause 1t would have been so when the wit-
ness was excluded. The statute puts all 
convictions of crime on the same footlng,-
those which formerly excluded, those which 
always have gone only to credibility, and, 
it would seem, those which formerly would 
not have been admissible at all. We as-
sume that the words "a crime" In Pub. St. 
c. 169, § 19, mean the same as "any crime" 
In St. 1870, c. 393, § 3; Gen. St. c. 131, I 
13; St. 1852, c 312, § 60; St. 1851, c. 233, t 
97; Com. v. Hall, 4 Allen, 305. And there-
fore any evidence which was admissible to 
rebut a conviction that only dlscrecllted be-
fore the statute must now be admissible to 
rebut all convictions that may be put In evi-
dence. Whether any dltrerent rule would 
apply when the fact ls only brought out on 
cross-exnmlnntlon we need not consider. 
The exception to the exclusion of e,·lclence 
that the witness was innocent of the offence 
of which he was convicted, and explaining 
why he was convicted, Is not much pl't'ssed, 
and ls oven-uled. Com. v. Gallagher, 126 
Mass. 54. 
Exceptions sustained. 
IMPEACHMENT.
[Case No. 167
PEOPLE v. BROOKS.
(30 N. E. 189, 131 N. Y. 321.)
Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Fourth department.
Indictment of Rachel Brooks for arson.
Defendant was convicted, and the general
term aflirmed the sentence. Defendant ap-
peals. Affirmed.
Louis Marshall, for appellant. T. E. Han-
cock, Dist. Atty., and B. J. Shove, Asst. Dist.
.Atty., for the People.
EARL, C. J. The defendant was indicted
for setting fire to the store occupied by her
in the city of Syracuse on the 27th day of
October, 1890. She was brought to trial in
the court of sessions of Onondaga county in
February, 1891, and was convicted of arson
in the first degree, and was sentenced to the
Onondaga penitentiary for the term of 15
years. Her conviction having been aflirmed
by the general term of the supreme court,
she then appealed to this court.
The learned counsel for the defendant has
brought to our attention three grounds upon
which he claims the judgment should be re-
versed. Upon the trial the principal evidence
adduced against the defendant to show her
guilt was that of Charlotte Brooks, the
daughter of her husband by a former wife,
who was about 18 years old. She testified
that, three or four day before the fire, the
defendant required her to take an oath, by
kissing the Jewish Bible, that she would not
tell to any one what she was about to say to
her: and that. after she had taken the oath
and promised that she would not tell, she
said to her that she had bills for goods to set-
tie, and that there was a judgment against
her, and she was going to make a bonfire of
the goods in the store, and burn them up;
and that, after she had taken the oath, the
defendant told her, if she did tell what she
had said to her, she would be sent to prison
for 20 years for perjury. There was other
evidence pointing to the guilt of the defend-
ant, and corroborating the story related by
the witness Charlotte. The defendant was
called as a witness on her own behalf, and
these questions were put to her by her coun-
-sel: “Now state whether or not Charlotte
was friendly to you or unfriendly.” “Did
you and Charlotte have frequent difficulties
during that time?" (Meaning the time pre-
vious to the fire.) “Did Charlotte assault you
on other occasions previous to the fire ?” All
these questions were objected to on the part
of the prosecution as incompetent, because
Charlotte had not been examined as to the
particular matters inquired of on behalf of
the defendant. The trial judge sustained the
objection, and excluded the evidence, because
Charlotte had not been examined as to the
same matters, and her attention had not been
called to the particular matters inquired of.
In making the ruling the trial judge said:
“You have the witness here, and can ask
anything you wish of her that she has not
testified to, and, if you think she has not told
the truth, you can ask the witness about it;
and I think that is as far as you can go. I
think the rule is this: that a witness may be
cross-examined as to his or her attitude of
mind in regard to the defendant, and his at-
tention must be called to each and all the
transactions upon which the counsel for the
defendant desires to give evidence. If the
witness admits the acts and declarations that
the defendant claims were made and done,
that is the end of it. If the witness denies,
then I think it is competent to call other wit-
nesses to contradict those matters; but to let
a witness go off the stand, not having ques-
tioned the witness as to the particulars, and
then calling third parties to prove independ-
ent transactions showing the attitude of the
mind of the witness towards the party, I
think is not the rule. So I have allowed and
do allow this witness to testify as to any
transactions bearing upon that point in re-
gard to which the witness Charlotte was ex-
amined." And the judge said, further: “I
should say that the witness referred to is in
court now, so that there is no loss to the de-
fendant by the application of the rule as I
understand it.” But the counsel insisted up-
on his right to'exa1nine the defendant, for
the p1n'pose of proving Charl0tte’s hostility
towards her, without first examining Char-
lotte in reference to the same matter. We
think the rule of law laid down by the trial
judge was erroneous. The hostility of a wit-
ness towards a party against whom he is
called may be provedby any competent evi-
dence. It may be shown by cross-exnmina-
tion of the witness, or witnesses may be
called who can swear to facts showing it.
There can be no reason for holding that the
witness must first be examined as to his hos-
tility, and that then, and not till then, wit-
nesses may be called to contradict him, be-
cause it is not a case where the party against
whom the witness is called is seeking to dis-
credit him by contradicting him. He is sim-
ply seeking to discredit him by showing his
hostility and malice; and, as that may be
proved by any competent evidence, we see no
reason for holding that he must first be ex-
amined as to his hostility. And such we
think is the drift of the decisions in this
state and elsewhere. Hotchkiss v. Insurance
Co., 5 Hun, 90; Starr v. Cragln, 24 Hun, 177;
People v. Moore, 15 Wend. 419; People v.
Thompson, 41 N. Y. 6; Schultz v. Railroad
Co., 89 N. Y. 242; Ware v. Ware, 8 Greenl.
42, 53; Tucker v. Vvelsh, 17 Mass. 160; Day
v. Stickney, 14 Allen, 255: Martin v. Barnes,
7 Wis. 239; Robinson v. Hutchinson, 31 Vt.
443; New Portland v. Kingfleld, 55 Me. 172;
Hedge v. Clapp, 22 Conn. 262; Cook v.
Brown, 34 N. H. 460. So we think the trial
judge laid down an erroneous rule of law.
But we are still of opinion that no harm
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IMPEACHMENT. [Case No. 167 
PEOPLE v. BROOKS. 
(30 N. E. 189, 131 N. Y. 321.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. March 1, 1892. 
Appeal from supreme court, general term, 
Fourth department. 
Indictment of Rachel Brooks for arson. 
Defendant was convicted, and the general 
term affi.nned the sentence. Defendant ap-
peals. Amrmed. 
Louis Marshall, tor appellant. T. E. Han-
eock, Dist. Atty., and B. J. Shove, A.sat.. DlBt.. 
.Atty., tor the People. 
EARL, C. J. The defendant was indicted 
tor setting tire to the store occupied by her 
in the city ot Syracuse on the 27th day ot 
October, 1890. She was brought to trial In 
the court ot sessions of Onondaga county In 
February, 1891, and was convicted of arson 
in the tlrst degree, and was sentenced to the 
Onondaga penitentiary for the term of 15 
_years.. Her conviction having been amrmed 
by the general term of the supreme court, 
she then appealed to this court. 
The learned counsel for the defendant has 
brought to our attention three grounds upon 
which he claims the judgment should be re-
vereed. Upon the trial the principal evidence 
adduced against the defendant to show her 
guilt was that ot Oharlotte Brooks, the 
daughter of her husband by a former wife, 
who was about 18 years old. She testltl.ed 
that, three or four day11 before the fire, the 
<lefendant required her to take nn oath, by 
kissing the Jewish Bible, that she would not 
tell to any one what she was about to say t.o 
her: and that, after she bad taken the oath 
and promised that ahe would not tell, she 
aid to her that she bad bills for goods to set· 
tie, and that there was a judgment against 
her, and she was going to make a bonfire of 
the goods In the store, and burn them up; 
.and that, after she bad taken the oath, the 
-defendant told her, If she did tell what she 
had said to her, she would be sent to prison 
for 20 years tor perjury. There was other 
-evidence pointing to the guilt of the defend· 
ant, and corroborating the story related by 
the wltneBB Charlotte. The defendant was 
-called as a witness on her own behalf, and 
these questions were put to her by her coun-
11el: "Now state whether or not Charlotte 
wrui friendly to you or unfriendly." "Did 
_you and Charlotte have frequent dlmcultles 
<luring that time?" (Menning the time pre-
vious to the ti.re.) "Did Charlotte assault you 
-00 other occasions previous to the fire?" All 
these questions were objected to on the part 
-0f the prosecution as Incompetent, because 
Charlotte had not been examined as to the 
particular matters Inquired of on behalf of 
the defendant. The trial judge sustulned the 
-objection, and excluded the evidence, because 
<Jhnrlotte bad not been examined as to the 
same matters, and her attention had not been 
-called to the particular mattera Inquired of. 
In making the ruling the trtal judge said: 
"You have the witness here, and cnn ask 
anything you wish of her that she has not 
testified to, and, if you think 11be bas not told 
the truth, you can ask the witness about It; 
and I think that Is as far as you can go. I 
think the rule 18 this: that a wltneBB may be 
cross-examined as to his or her attitude of 
mind In regard to the defendant, and his at-
tention must be called to each and all the 
transactions upon which the counsel for the 
defendant desires to give evidence. If the 
witness admits the acts and declarations that 
the defendant claims w.ere made and done, 
that Is the end of it. If the witness denies, 
then I think It ls competent to caU other wlt-
nesse8 to contradict those matte1'8; but to let 
a witness go off the stand, not having quee-
tloned the witness as to the particulars, Rod 
then calling third parties to prove Independ-
ent transactions showing the attitude of the 
mind ot the witness towards the party, I 
think ls not the rule. So I have allowed and 
do allow this witness to testify as to any 
transactions bearing upon that point In re-
gard to which the witness Charlotte was ex-
amined." And the judge said, further: "I 
should say that the witness referred to ls In 
court now. so that there Is no loss to the de-
fendant by the application of the rule as I 
understand lt.." But the counsel Insisted up-
on his right to~ examine the defendant, for 
the purpose of proving Charlotte's hostility 
towards her, without Orst examining Char-
lotte In reference to the same watter. '"e 
think the rule of law laid down by the trlu: 
judge was erroneous. The hostility of a wlt-
neBB towards a party against whom he ls 
called may be proved ·by any competent evl· 
deuce. It may be shown by cross-exmnlna-
tlon of the witness, or witnesses may be 
called who can swear to facts showing It.. 
There can be no reason for holding that the 
wltneBB mW!t tl.rst be examined as to bis boa-
tlllty, and that then, and not tlll then, wit-
nesses may be called t.o contradict him, be-
cause it ls not a case where the party against 
whom the witness la called Is seeking to dis-
credit him by contradicting htm. He Is sim-
ply seeking to discredit him by showing bis 
hostlllty and malice; and, as that may be 
proved by any competent evidence, we see no 
reason for holding that he must ti.rat be ex-
amined llB to his hostlllty. And such we 
think is the drift of the decisions In this 
state and elsewhere. Hotchkiss v. Insurance 
Co., 5 Hun, 00; Starr v. Cragin, 2-l Hun, 177; 
People v. Moore, 15 Wend. 419; People v. 
Thompson, 41 N. Y. 6; Schult,; v. Rnllroad 
Co., 89 N. Y. 242; Ware v. Ware, 8 Green!. 
42, U3; 'l'ucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass. 160; Day 
v. Stickney, 14 Allen, 255; Martin v. Barnes, 
7 Wis. 239; Robinson v. Hutchinson, 31 Vt. 
443; New Portland v. Kingfield, r>-'> Me. 172; 
Hedge v. Clapp, 22 Conn. 2fl2: Cook v. 
Brown, 34 N. H. 4-00. So we think the trial 
judge laid down an erl'Oneous rule of lnw. 
But we are sUll of opinion that no harm 
Case No. 167]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
was done to the defendant. The extent to
which an examination may go for the pur-
pose of proving the hostility of a witness
must be, to some extent at least, within the
discretion of the trial judge. We said about
it, in Schultz v. Railroad Co., supra, that
“the evidence to show the hostile feeling of a
witness, when it is alleged to exist, should be
'direct and positive, and not very remote and
uncertain, for the reason that the trial of the
main issue in the case cannot be properly
suspended to make out the case of hostile
feeling by mere circumstantial evidence from
which such hostility or malice may or may
not be inferred." Before these questions
were excluded, the defendant's counsel, on
the examination of Charlotte. proved by her
that she and the defendant had had frequent
alter-cations; that the defendant “used to
whip her lots of times;" that on a certain oc-
casion when she was impudent to the de-
fendant, not long before the fire. the defend-
ant threw her down; that on that occasion
the defendant assaulted her, and bit her and
pushed and knocked he1' down on the floor,
and when she got up she said to the defend-
ant, “You will be sorry. What did I do to
you? My mother would not knock me down;"
and that her troubles with her step-mother
were frequent; that they had trouble on ev-
ery rainy day; that “she was disagreeable to
her on rainy days." And the defendant. be-
fore these questions were excluded, testified
that a few days before the fire she and Char-
lotte had an altercation, and that “Charlotte
got mad, and pulled her down and slapped
her in the face, and pounded her on her back"
so that she fell down, and came near fainting
away. We think there was ample evidence
to show the state of feeling between the de-
fendant and Charlotte, and, if the examina-
tion of the defendant upon that subject had
been much further prolonged, it could not
have added any weight to the evidence al-
ready given on that subject. Suiticient evi-
dence for every purpose of the trial had been
given to show difiiculties and hostilities be-
tween the defendant and Charlotte, and
therefore it is clear that the defendant was
not harmed by the exclusion of further evi-
dence on that subject. Besides, the jury ut-
terly disregarded the defendant‘ evidence.
She denied under oath all the evidence tend-
ing to implicate her in the crime, and ex-
plicitly denied that she had stated to Char-
lotte her intention to burn the goods in the
building, and gave some evidence tending to
cast suspicion upon Charlotte as the author
of the crime.
the rule laid down in section 542 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure should be applied.
'i‘hat section provides as follows: “After
hearing the appeal, the court must give judg-
ment without regard to technical errors or
dcfccts, or to exceptions which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties."
lt is also claimed by the defendant's coun-
sel that the judge erred in his charge to the
This is therefore a case where ~
jury. Upon the trial of the action the de-
fendant called several witnesses who testi-
fled to her good character. After fairly char-
ging the jury on the question of reasonable
doubt and the eflect of good character, he
used this language: “And in the trial of the
case, if that reputation has been shown to be
good, yet if the evidence on the trial indi-
cates corruptnes, fraudulent practice, bad
heart. dishonesty, fraud, it rebuts, so far as
it goes, the reputation for good character;
that is to say. positive testimony of the com-
mission of a crime extinguishes it altogether,
if you believe the testimony." After he had
finished his charge, the counsel for the dc-
fendant said: “The charge is very satisfac-
tory, and I do not rise to find any fault with
it. Your honor has charged that if the jury
find that there is reasonable doubt that they
must acquit. Now, I ask your honor to
charge that good character may be sufiicient
to raise that reasonable doubt which requires
the jury to acquit." And the judge so char-
ged. Then the counsel for the defendant fur-
ther said: “Your honor charged that if. on
the trial of a case, it is shown that the per-
son has been corrupt and guilty of fraudulent
practices, it rebuts the evidence, and the im-
portance attached to it, of good character,-
is an answer to it. I do not give your hon-
or's precise language, but that is the sub-
stance, and what your honor did charge upon
that question, and all, I take exception; and,
furthermore, I ask your honor to charge that
these remarks are not applicable to this
case." The judge refused to so charge. We
do not think these exceptions to the charge
were well taken. The judge had in his
charge given the defendant the full benefit
of the evidence as to her good character. He
did not charge that the evidence of good
character was not to be taken into account
with all the other evidence upon the ques-
tion of her guilt or innocence. He did in-
struct thein that, if there was positive testi-
mony of the commission of the crime by her
which the jury believe, it extinguished the
evidence of good character altogether. That
is literally true. If the jury upon any trial
find positive evidence, which they believe,
that the defendant committed the crime char-
ged. it must utterly overwhelm or destroy
the effect of the evidence as to good charac-
ter. If the judge had charged that the jury
had no right to take into account the good
character of the defendant in the case of pos-
itive evidence of her guilt, it would undoubt-
edly have been erroneous. If he had charged
them that they should not weigh the evi-
dence as to the defendant's character with
all the other evidence. however strong and"
positive, it would have been erroneous. The
evidence of character may, however stron-,7
the other evidence is. raise a doubt in the
minds of the jury which the defendant is eu-
titied to have the benefit of. if the instruc-
tions of the judge upon the question of char-
acter were not sufficiently explicit, the de-
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
was done to the defendant. The extent to 1 
which an examination may go tor the pur-
pose of p1'0ving the hostlllty ot a witness 
must be, to some extent at least, within the 
discretion of the trial judge. We said about 
It, In Schultz v. Railroad Co., supra, that 
''the evidence to show the hostile feeling of a 
witness, when it is alleged to exist, should be 
·direct lll)d positive, and not nry remote and 
uncertain, for the reason that the trial of the 
wain Issue In the case cannot be properly 
suspended to make out the case of hostile 
feeling by me1-e cll'cumstantlal evidence from , 
which such hostility or mallce may or may 
not be Inferred." Before these questions 
were excluded, the defendant's counsel, on 
the examination of Charlotte, proved by her 
that she and the defendant bad had frequent 
altercations; that the defendant "used to 
whip her lots of times;" that on a certain oc-
casion when she was Impudent to the de-
fendant, not long before the fire, the defend-
ant threw her down; that on that occasion 
the defendant assaulted her, and bit her and 
pushed and knocked her down on the fioor, 
and when she got up she said to the defend-
ant, "You wlll be sorry. What did I do to 
you? My mother would not knock me down;" 
and that her troubles with her step-mother 
were frequent; that they had trouble on ev-
ery rainy day; that "she was disagreeable to 
her on rainy days." And the defendant, be-
fore these questions were excluded, testified 
that a few days before the fire she and Char-
lotte bad an altercation, and that "Charlotte 
got mali. and pulled her down and slapped 
her In the face, and pounded her on her back" 
so that she fell down, and came near fainting 
away. We think there was ample evidence 
to show the state ot feellng between the de-
fendant and Charlotte, and, If the examina-
tion of the defendant upon that subject had 
been much further prolonged, It could not 
have added any weight to the evidence al-
ready given on that subject. Sum<'lent evi-
dence for every pmpose of the trial had been 
given to show difficulties and hostilities be-
tween the defendant and Charlotte, and 
therefore It ls clear that the defendant was 
not harmed by tile exclusion of further evi-
dence on tllat subject. Besides, tbe jury ut-
terly disregarded the defendant's evidence. 
She denied under oath all tile evidence tend-
ing to Implicate her In the crime, and ex-
plicitly denied that she had stated to Char-
lotte her lntt>ntion to bum the goods In the 
building, and gave some evidence tending to 
c·a11t suspicion upon ('barlotte as the author 1 
of the crime. This Is therefore a ease where 
the rule laid down In 11ectlon 54:? of the Code 
or Criminal Prll<'edure should be llPJ>lled. 
That section provides as follows: "After 
lu'llrlng the appeal, the court must give judg-
ment without regard to technical en·ors or 
dt>(('<'tA, or to eX<·eptlonA whlc'b do not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties." 
It ls also claimed by the defendant's coun-
sel that tile judge erred In his charge to the 
·~ 
jury. Upon the trial of the action the de-
fendant called several witnesses who testi-
fied to her good character. After fairly char-
ging the- jury on the queetton of reasonable 
doubt and the effect of good character, he 
used this language: "And In the trial of the 
case, If that reputation has been shown to ~ 
good, yet If the evidence on the trial Indi-
cates corruptness, fraudulent practice, bad 
heart, dishonesty, fraud, it rebuts, so far as 
lt gOetJ, the reputation for good character;. 
that Is to say. po~~ltlve testimony of the com-
mission of a crime extinguishes It altogether. 
lf you believe tile testimony." After he had 
11.nlshed his charge, the counsel for the de-
fendant said: ''The charge ls very satlsf&<."-
tory, and I do not rise to ftnd any fault with 
It. Your honor has charged that If the jury 
ftnd that there ls reasonable doubt that they 
must acquit. Now, I ask your honor U> 
charge that good charaC'ter may be sumclent 
to raise that reasonable doubt which requlretJ 
the jury to acquit." And the judge so char-
ged. Then the counsel for the defendant fur-
ther said: "Your honor charged that If, oa 
the trial of a case, It ls shown that the per-
son has been corrupt and guilty of fraudulent 
practices, It rebuts the evidence, and the Im-
portance attached to lt, of good character.-
ls an answer to It. I do not give your hon-
or's precise language, but that ls the sub-
stance, and what your honor did charge upon 
that question, and all, I take exception; and, 
turthermore, I ask your honor to charge that 
these remarks are not appllcable to this 
case." The judge refused to so charge. We 
do not think the11e exc~eptlons to the charge 
were well taken. The judge had In bis 
charge given the defendant the full benefit 
of the evidence as to her good character. He 
did not charge that the evidence of good 
character was not to be taken Into &<'COunt 
with all the other evidence upon the ques-
tion of her guilt or Innocence. He did In-
struct them that, If there was positive testi-
mony of the commission of the crime by her 
which the jury believe, It extinguished the 
evidence of good character altogether. That 
ls literally true. If the jury upon any trlat 
ftnd positive evidence, which they believe~ 
that the defendant committed the crime char-
ged, It must utterly overwhelm or destroy 
the etTect of the evidence as to good <'harac--
ter. It the judge had charged that the Jury 
had no right to take into a<'count the good 
character of the defendant In the cnse of pos-
itive evidence of her guilt, It would undoubt-
edly have been erroneous. If he had charged 
thew that they should not weigh the evl-
den<'e as to the defendant's <'hara<'ter with 
all the other evhlence, howen•r st1·ong an<f 
positive, It would have been erroneous. Tht-
evlden<'C of character may, however stroni:-
the other e\·lllen<'e Is. raise n tloubt In th~ 
minds of the jury which the tll•ft>nd:rnt 111 en-
titled to have the benefit of. It the lnstnl('-
ttons of the judge upon the question of char-
acter were not 11umelently explicit, the de-
IMPEACHMENT.
[Case N0. l67
fondant should have requested a further
charge calling attention to further instruc-
tions which he desired the jury to have.
After the judge had laid down the law quite
plainly pertaining to evidence of good char-
acter, and had at the request of the defend-
ant's counsel instructed the jury that good
character might be sutiicient to raise a rea-
sonable doubt which required the jury to ac-
quit, if the detendant’s counsel thought any
further instructions were needed to protect
his client he should have asked tor them.
So, we flnd no error in the charge to the
jury.
We are also asked to reverse the judgment
on account of intemperate language used by
the district attorney in his address to the
jury, to which no exception whatever was
taken. It is a suflicient answer to this claim
to say that this court has no jurisdiction to
grant a new trial in such a case as this, un-
less exceptions appear in the record which
present questions oi.’ law. The supreme court,
under section 527 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, could, in the exercise of its dis-
cretion, have granted :1 new trial in this case.
In the early part of that section provision is
made for a stay ot the execution of a judg-
ment in a criminal case upon an appeal to»
the supreme court, and in the last clause of
the section it is provided as follows: “The
appellate court may order a new trial if it be
satisfied that the verdict against the prisoner
was against the weight of evidence or against
law, or that justice requires a new trial,
whether any exception shall have been taken
or not in the court below.” That clause has
reference only, as we have held, to appeals to
the supreme court. People v. Hovey, 92 N.
'. I3-'3-l; People v. Guidici, 100 N. Y. 503, 3 N.
E. 493: People v. Donovan. 101 N. Y. 632, 4
N. E. 181. We see no reason to doubt that
this conviction was justiiied by the evidence,
and, finding no error of law prejutlicial to
the defendant, it should be aflirmed. All con-
cur.
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l.MPEACHMENT. (Case So. 167 
fendant should bnve requested a further 
charge call1ng attention to further lnetruc-
tlone which be desired the jury to have. 
After the judge bad laid down the Jaw quite 
plainly pertaining to evidence of good char-
acter, and had at the request of the defend-
ant"& counsel Instructed the jury that good 
character might be eutftclent to raise a rea-
sonable doubt which required the jury to ac-
quit, lf tbe defendant's counsel thought any 
further lnetruct1ons were needed to protect 
his client be should have asked for them. 
So, we find no error In the charge to the 
!ury. 
We are also asked to re'\"erse the judgment 
OD account of Intemperate lan.:nage used by 
the district attorney in bis addreBB to the 
Jury, to which no exception whatever wae 
token. It le a euftlcleut answer to this claim 
to l!lly that this court bas DO Jurisdiction to 
grant a new trial In such a case as this, un-
less exceptions appear In the record which 
present questloDB of law. The supreme court, 
under seetlon i>27 1>f the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, could, In the exercise of lt:B dis-
cretion, have ,.,'l"anted a new trial In this case. 
In the early part of that section provision ls 
made for a stay of the execution of a judg-
ment in a criminal case upon an appeal t<> 
the supreme court, and In the last clause of 
the section It la provided as follows: ''The 
appellate court may order a new trial If It be-
satlsfted that the verdict against the prleoner 
was against the weight of evidence or against 
Jaw, or that Justice requires a new trial, 
whether any exception 11\lall have been taken 
or not In the court below." That clause has 
reference only, as we have held, to appeals t& 
the supreme court. People v. Hovey, 92 N_ 
Y. ;;;;.i; People v. Guldlel, 100 N. Y. 503, 3 N. 
E. 493: People v. Donovan. 101 N. Y. 632, 4 
N. I<.:. 181. We Set' no reaM<in to doubt that 
this conviction was ju.,;tlfted by the evidence~ 
and, ftndlDg no error of law prejudlc·lal to· 
the defendant, It should be amrmed. All con-
cur. 
Case No. 168]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
DAVIS v. COMMONWEALTH.
(23 s. w. ass. 95 Ky. 19.)
dourt of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 12, 1893.
Appeal from circuit court, Lawrence coun-
fl‘.-
Samuel Davis was convicted of murder,
and appeals. Aflirmed.
R. '1‘. Burns and Stewart 8: Stewart, for
appellant. W. J. Hendrick, for the Com-
monweaith.
BENNETT, 0.1. The appellant having
been convicted of the crime of murdering
Viance Tack, in the Lawrence circuit court,
he appeals, and complains as follows:
First. That the court erred in not allow-
ing him to prove by G. W. Miller that Gran-
ville Pearl confessed to him on his death-
bed that he, Pearl, killed Viance Tack. It
seems to us that admissions and confes-
sions, as to competency, stand upon the same
footing. Admissions cannot be used in evi-
dence except against the person making
them in an issue between him and another
person, wherein the truth of the admission
is involved. or against his privies claiming
through him; and confessions are incompe-
tent evidence except against a person charged
with crime, or, in a proper state of case,
against his eonfederates. Nor is the pro-
posed evidence competent as a dying declara-
tion, because such evidence is oniy- com-
petent when it comes from a declarant whose
496
personal injuries by another have resulted
in death, and the declarations must be con-
fined to the manner and circumstances of
the injury and to the person that did it.
Second. In allowing evidence to go to the
jury impeaching witnesses who had testified
for the appellant, but who had not testi-
fied to any material fact for the appellant;
the material fact which the appellant de-
sired to prove by them having been exclud-
ed by the court. It seems to us that the
fact that the witness is sworn and testifies
entitles the adversary to impeach his gen-
eral reputation for truth, without reference
to the materiality of his evidence; other-
wise there would be constant strife and liti-
gation over the question as to the material-
ity of the witness’ evidence, in order to de-
termine whether or not the impeaching evi-
dence was admissible.
Third. It is contended that evidence of
the bad character of a witness sought to be
impeached, two years before the time that
he testifled, is incompetent. It is true that
the character of a witness at the time he
testiiies is in issue before the court or jury,
but it is equally true that his reputation be-
fore then may be inquired into, in order to
throw light upon his reputation at the time
he testifies. There is no doubt that Viance
Tack was assassinated, and we think that
the evidence authorized the jury to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appel-
iaut was the guilty party. The court com-
mitted no error. The judgment is aflirmed.
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Case No. 168] PUODUCTIO~ .A~D EFl'ECT OF EVIDENCE. 
DA VIS v. COllMONWEALTH. 
(23 S. W. 585, 9~ Ky. 19.) 
Court of Appenls of Kentucky. Oct. 12, 1893. 
Appeal from clrcult court, Lawrence cpun-
tJ.: ' 
S::unuel Davis was convicted of murder, 
an~ appeuls. Affirmed. 
R. T. Burns and Stewnrt & Stewart, for 
appellnnt. W. J, Hendrick, for the Com-
monwealth. 
BENNETT, C. J. The appellant hnvlng 
been convicted of the crime of murdering 
Vlance Tack, lo the Lnwrence circuit court, 
be appeals, and complains as follows: 
First That the court erred In not allow-
ing him to prove by G. W. Mllle1· that Gran-
ville Pearl coni'essed to him on his death-
bed that he, Pearl, killed Viance Tack. It 
:Seems to us that admissions and confes-
sions, llB to competency, stand upon the same 
tooting. Admissions cannot be used in evi-
dence except against the person making 
th<'m In an Issue between him and another 
person, wherein the truth ot the admission 
ts Involved, or ngnlnst his privies claiming 
through hiru; and confessions are Incompe-
tent evidence except against a person charged 
with crime, or, In a proper state of. case, 
against bbl confederntes. Nor is the prcr 
posed evidence competent as a dying declarn-
tlon, because suoh evidence is only. com-
petent when lt comes from a declarant whose 
400 
personal Injuries by another have resulted 
ln death, and the declarations must be con-
fined to the manner and circumstances of 
the Injury and to the person that did It. 
Second. In allowing evidence to go to the 
jury Impeaching witnesses who had testified 
for the appellant, but who had not testi-
fied to any material fact for the appellant; 
the material fact which the appellant de-
sired to prove by them having been exclud-
ed by tbe court. It seems to us that the 
fact that the witness ls sworn and testifies 
entitles the advel'!!ary to lm1>each his gen-
eral reputation tor trutb, without reference 
to the materlnllty of bls evidence; other-
wise there would be constnnt stt;fe and lltl-
gntlon over the question as to the material-
ity of the witness' evidence, in order to de-
termine whether or not the Impeaching evl-
d~nce was admissible. 
Third. It ls contended tbnt evidence of 
the bad character of a witness sought to be 
Impeached, two years before the time that 
he testified, ls Incompetent It ls true that 
the eharncter ot a witness at the time he 
testifies Is in Issue before the oourt or jury, 
but It ls equally true that his reputntlon be-
fore then may be Inquired Into, In order to 
throw light upon his reputation at the tlnw 
he testifies. There ls no doubt that Vlnnce 
Tack wu aSSflsslnnted, and we think that 
the evidence authorized the jury to believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appel-
lant was the guilty party. The court com-
mitted no error. The judgment ls alftrmed. 
CHARACTER FOR VERACITY.
[Case No. 169
NELSON v. STATE.
(13 South. 361, 32 Fla. 244.)
Supreme Court of Florida. July 15, 1893.
Error to circuit court, Mari-on county;
Jesse J . Finley, Judge.
John Nelson, .'Ir., was convicted of murder
in the first degree, and brings error. ite-
versed.
Miller & Spencer, for plaintiff in error.
William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.
TAYLOR, J’. The plaintiff in error was in-
dicted and tried at the fall term, 1892, of the
circuit court for Marion county, for murder
in the first degree of one Charles Davis, the
trial resulting in the following general ver-
dict, viz.: “We, the jury, find the defendant
guilty." Upon the refusal of the court be-
low to grant his motion for a new trial, the
defendant was sentenced to die, and brings
his case here by writ of error.
The insufficiency of the verdict in not
specifying the degree of murder of which it
finds the defendant guilty is assigned as error.
This court, at its last term. in the cases of
Hall v. State, 31 Fla. 176. 12 South, Rep. 449;
Lovett v. State, 31 Fla. iii-1, 12 South. Rep.
452; and Murphy v. State. 31 Fla. 166,
12 South. Rep. 453,—he1d that under the pro-
visions of section ‘.1333, Rev. St., such a ver-
dict is a nullity, and that no judgment or
sentence could legally be pronounced thereon.
This error is fatal to the judgment and sen-
tence appeaied from, and necessitates its re-
versal.
At the trial the defendant introduced sev-
eral witnesses for the purpose of impeaching
the character for truth and veracity of one
of the witnesses for tue'state, hy proof that
such witness’ reputation for truth and verac-
ity in the community in which he lived was
bad, and that no credence would be given to
his evidence under oath. After the defend-
ant’s witnesses, introduced for this purpose,
had testifled that they knew the state’s wit-
ness, and knew his general reputation in the
neighborhood in which he lived for truth and
veracity, the court, over the rh-fendant’s ob-
jection, permittcd the state attorney to break
into the examination in chief by a c1'oss-ex-
amination as to the sources and extent of
the knowledge of the parties as to the repu-
tation and character of the witness to be
impeached, which ruling of the court was
excepted to, and is assigned as error. The
case of Robinson v. State, 16 Fla. 835, settles
the practice in such cases. When the im-
wn.ous.av.—82
poaching witnesses had answered that they
knew the party to be impeached, and knew
his general reputation for truth and veracity
in the community where he lived, the founda-
tion for proving what that reputation was
had been sutiicicntly laid, and the court
should not, at this juncture, have permitted
the state attorney to interfere with the ex-
aminatlon in chief by a cross-examination as
to the sources and extent of their knowledge
and information as to such reputation, but
should have permitted the defendant to pro-
ceed with his examination in chief, and should
have allowed the witnesses to state what that
reputation was, and whether from that repu-
tation they would believe the party under
oath. \Vhen turned over for general cross-
examination in regular order, at the close
of the examination in chief, the state attor-
ney could then, by cross-examination, test
the extent of the information of the witnesses
and the sources of their knowledge. This
departure, however, from the proper practice
in such cases, we do not now decide to be
reversible error, as the court below necessa-
rily has awide discretioninall matters touch-
ing the order in which evidence shall be ad-
inltted.
On the cross-examination of one of the de-
fendant's witnesses, by whom the general
reputation and character of the defendant
as a. peaceful and law-abiding citizen had
been put in proof, the state attorney was
permitted by the court, over the defen_dant's
objection, to put the following question to
the witness: “Did you not hear or know,
about one week or ten days before the shoot-
ing of which the defendant is now charged,
that he was charged in your neighborhood
with shooting into a house with a lot of
women in it, and that the pistol was taken
away from him?” Exception was taken,
and this ruling was assigned as error. The
court erred in permitting this question.
When character for peacefulness or turbu-
lcnce is put in issue in such cases, the general
rule is that the proof thereof must be made
by evidence of the general reputation of the
party in the community for such character,
and not by evidence of specific acts or con-
duct on particular occasions, (Garner v. State,
2-*4 Fla. 113, 9 South. Rep. 835;) and, when
such cllaracter is put in issue, the proof in-
tcrposed in rebuttal must be confined also
to general reputation, and not allowed to go
into specific acts or conduct on particular
occasions.
For the error in the verdict rendered, the
judgment and sentence of the court below
are reversed, and a new trial ordered.
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CHAUACTEU FOR VER.\CaTY. [Case No. 169 
XEL~O~ v. STATE. 
(13 South. 361, 32 Fla. 244.) 
Suprt>me Court of Florida. July 1~, 1893. 
F:rror to circuit rourt, Marlon county; 
J~ J. Finley, Judge. 
John .l'leleon, J'r., was convicted of murder 
In the first degree, and brings error. Ue-
versed. 
Miller & Spe-neet", for plalntUr ln error. 
Wllllam B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., tor the State. 
TAYLOR, J'. The plalnttl'r In error was In-
dicted and tried at thP tnll term, 189'.?, ot the 
clrcult court tor llarlon county, for murder 
ln the flrst degree ot one Charlt.>8 Davts, the 
trial re8Ulttng ln the following gl•nernl ver-
dict, vlll.: "We, the jury, flnd the defpndant 
guilty." Upon the refusal of the court be-
low to grant bJB motion for a new trial, the 
defendant was sentenced to die, and brings 
hls case here by writ of error. 
The lnsu11lclency of the verdict ln not 
specltylng the degree of murdl'r of which 1t 
finds the defendant guilty ts al!l(lgned as error. 
This court, at Its lllllt term. In the cnllE'!l of 
Hall v. State, 31 Fla. 176, 12 South, Rep. 449; 
Lovett v. State, 31 Fla. 164, 12 Nouth. Rep. 
4.;2; and Murphy v. State, 31 Fla. 166, 
12 South. Rep. 45.'-l,-held that under the pro-
visions of IM'<'tion 2:i.-ia, ltE>v. St., such a ver-
dict ls a nullity, and that no judgment or 
sentence could legally be pronounced thereon. 
This error ls fatul to the judgmE'llt and sen-
tence appooled from, and necessitates lt8 re-
ver&al 
At the trial the defendant Introduced sev-
eral witnesses for the pUrpOfle of lmpenchlng 
the character for truth and veracity ot one 
of the wltn1~s.<1es for tne ·state, by proof that 
such wltneu' reputntlon for truth and verac-
ity ln the community In which he lived was 
bacl, and that no credence would be given to 
his evidence under oath. After the defend-
ant's witnesses, Introduced for this purpose, 
had testified that they knew the state's wlt-
nem, and knew bJB gl•nernl r ... putatton In the 
neighborhood In which be lived for truth and 
veracity, the court. over the d1•ft•ndant's ob-
jection, permitted the eta.te attorney to break 
Into the examination In chief by a cro1111-ex-
amlnatlon as to the sources und extent of 
the knowledge of the parties as to the repu-
tation and character of the wltneRS to be 
Impeached, which ruling of the cow·t was 
excepted to, and ls a&<1lgned as error. The 
case of RoblDBon v. State, 16 Fla. 83.;, settles 
the practice In such casea. When the tm-
WILGUB,BV. -82 
peaching wltnt'!!..'le& bad answered that the,' 
knew the party to be impeached, and knew 
bis genera.I reputation for truth and veracity 
ln the communJty where he lived, the founda-
tion for proving what that reputation was 
had been · suftlclPntly laid, and the court 
should not, at this juncture, have permitted 
the state attomey to Interfere with the ex-
nmlnatlon ln chief by a cross-examination as 
to the sources and extent of their knowledge 
and Information ae to such reputation, but 
should have permitted the defendant to pro-
ceed with bJB examination ln chief, and should 
have allowed the wltnt!H!lf's to state what that 
reputation was, and whether from that i·epu-
tatlon they would believe the party under 
oath. When turned over tor genernl ~ 
examination In regttlar order, at the close 
of the exnmlnntion In chief, tht state attor-
ney could then, by cro11.~ex.umlnatlon, test 
the extent of the Information of the witnesses 
and the eo11.ret-s of thf'lr knowledge. This 
departure, however, from the proper practice 
ln such cases, we do not now decide to be 
revel""ll.ble error, as the court below neceeea.-
rlly hue a wide discretion ln all matters touch-
ing the order In whlch evidence l!ball be ad-
mitted. 
On the cr088-{'X8mln11tlon of one of the de-
fendant's wltm'88e8, by whom the general 
reputation and character of the defendant 
as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen had 
been put ln proof, the state attorney wns 
permitted by till' court, over the defen.dnnt's 
objection, to put the following question to 
the wltnel!B: "Did you not hl'nr or know, 
about one week or ten days before the shoot-
ing of whlch the defendant ls now chnrged, 
that he was t'harged In your neighborhood 
with shooting Into a house with a lot of 
woanen In It, and that the pistol was taken 
away from him?" .Io~xceptlon was taken, 
and this ruling Wll8 ll881gned as error. The 
court erred ln permitting this question. 
When character tor pencefulnPllll or torbu· 
lence Is pnt In l88UP In such cases, the genera.I 
rule ls that the proof therPof must be made 
by evidence of the g<>nPrnl reputation of the 
party In the community for such character, 
and not by evidence of epeclflc acts or con-
duct. on particular occasions, (Gamer v. State, 
28 Fla. 113, 9 South. Rep. 8:tJ;) and, when 
e1wh <•haracter le put ln Issue, tht' proof in-
terposed ln rebuttal muet be con1lned also 
to gPUPral reputntlon, and not allowed to go 
Into speclflc acts or conduct on particular 
occasions. 
For the error ln the verdict rendered, the 
judgment and sPntence of the court below 
are reversed, and a new trlal ordered. 
Case N 0. 170]
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVlDENCE.
GRIFFIN v. STATE.
(9 S. \\'. 459, 26 Tex. App. 157.)
Court of Appeals of Texas. Oct. 13, 1888.
Appeal from district court, Polk county;
Edwin Hobby, Judge.
Crosson & Holshousen, for appellant. Asst.
Atty. Gen. Davidson, for the State.
HURT, J. This conviction is for murder
in the second degree, the punishment being
fixed at continement in the penitentiary for
five years. The record contains the follow-
ing bill of exceptions: “The state p;aced up-
on the stand Frank Waters, win testilied
that a short while before the killing of Van
Chambers the defendant told him, as he [the
defendant] was on his way to attend a party
that night, that he wa going to the party,
expecting to find the deceased there, and, if
he could get him, the said Chambers, out
by himself, he would kill him. Defendant
thereupon introduced 18 or 20 witnesses to
impeach the said Waters, by showing that
the general reputation of the said Waters
for truth and veracity in the neighborhood
where he lives was bad, and from that repu-
tation the said Waters was not entitled to
be believed under oath. The state then in-
troduced some 10 or more witnesses to sustain
the reputation of said Waters; among otlieis,
Dave Ballow, Polk Snow, D. S. Chandler, T.
J. Epperson, W. J. Wakefield, and L. F. Ger-
lock, of whom the state asked this question:
‘Do you know the witness Frank Waters?’
They said, ‘Yes.’ ‘Are you acquainted with
his reputation for truth?’ They said, ‘Yes,’
and that it was good. On cross-examination,
they were asked by defense: ‘Did you ever
hear his reputation discussed?’ They sad,
‘Never, until yesterday.’ The state then
asked each of said witnesses: ‘Have you
ever heard the reputation of said Waters for
truth and veracity impeached or impugned
before this?’ to which defendant, by counsel,
objected, because the question was improper,
and not confined to the knowledge of said
witnesses as to the general reputation of the
said Waters in the neighborhood or commu-
nlty where he lived. The state then asked
each of the following seven witneses. (nam-
ing them:) ‘Are you acquainted with the
reputation of the witness Waters for truth
and veracity?’ which being answered in the
aiflrmative, they were fuither asked if it was
good or bad, which being answered, ‘Good.’
they were further asked if he. the said
Waters, was entitled to be believed under
oath,—to each and all of which said ques-
tions the defendant excepted because they
were not proper in determining the general
reputation of said witness in the neighbor-
498
hood where he lives for truth and veracity,
and were permitting the witnesses to testify,
not as to the general reputation of Waters
for truth and veracity, but as to their own
opinion and belief, which objection was over-
ruled by the court, and to which defendant
excepts.”
Two objections are made to the questions
and answers: (1) That the witnesses did not
state that they were acquainted with Wa-
ters’ general reputation in the neighborhood
in which he lived. (2) That the witnesses
were induced to, and did, state their opin-
ions as to whether he was entitled to credit,
—not from hisgeneral reputation for truth,
but from their own knowledge or opinion of
the witness _ This question is very elaborate-
ly discussed by Justice Bell in the case of
Boon v. Weathered, 23 Tex. 675. He states
the rule to be that “the inquiry should be
practically restricted to the general character
of the impeached witness for truth. ' ' '
If the impeachlng witness states that he is
acquainted with the general reputation of
the impeached witness for truth in the com-
munity where he llves, he may then proper-
ly be asked whether that general reputation
is such as to entitle the witness to credit on
oath. ' * ' Any other form of words may
be used, which does not involve a violation
of the cardinal principles that the inquiry
must be restricted to the general reputation
of the impeached witness for truth in the
community where he lives or is best known,
and that the impeachlng witness must speak
from general reputation, and not from his
own private oplnion." We are of cplnion
that the questions propounded to the im-
peachlng witnesses were not calculated to,
nor did they elicit the proper answers; that
the questions and ahswers were violative of
the cardinal principles governing this sub-
ject: (1) The inquiry must be restricted to
the general character of the party sought to
be impeached. (2) The impeaching witness-
es must speak from general reputation, and
not from their private opinions as to wheth-
er the character of the impeached witness is
good or bad for truth, or as to whether the
general reputation of the impeached witness
is such as to entitle him to credit on oath.
Venue is not proved either by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence.
We call attention of the learned trial judge
to the fact that malice is not defined to the
jury. As to the necessity of defining malice,
see Jones v. State, 5 Tex. App. 397: Tooney
v. State, Id. 163; Pharr v. State, 7 Tex. App.
472; Harris v. State. 8 Tex. App. 90; McKin-
ney v. State, Id. 626; Hayes v. State. 14 Tex.
App. 330. The judgment is reversed, and
the cause remanded.
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Case No. 170] PRODUCTION A.ND EF~,EC'r OF EVIDENCE. 
GRIFFIN v. STATE. 
(9 S. W. 459, 26 Tex. App. 157.) 
Court of Appeals of Texas. Oct. 13, 1888. 
Appeal from dlstrlct court, Polk county; 
Edwin Hobby, Judge. 
Crosson & Holshousen, for appellant. Asst. 
Atty. Gen. Davidson. for the ~tate. 
HURT, J. This <.'Onvictlon Is for wm'lle1· 
In the second degree, the punishment being 
tixt'd ut confinement In the penlteutial'y for 
five years. The record contains tlll' follow-
ing bill of exceptions: "The state p:a<·ed up-
on the stand 1''rank Waters, wh.1 testified 
that a short while before the killing or Van 
Chambers the defendant told him, as he [the 
defendant] was on his way to attend a party 
that night, that he was going to the party, 
expecting to tlnd the deceased there, and, If 
he could get him, the said Chambers, out 
by himself, he would klll him. Defendant 
thereupon introduced 18 or 20 wltuesses to 
Impeach the Aid Waters, by showing that 
the general reputation ot thl:l said Waters 
for truth und veracity in the neighborhood 
where he lives was bad, and from that r1>pu-
tatlon the Nnid Waters was not entitled to 
be believed under oath. The state then In-
troduced some 10 or morewltnesses to sustain 
the reputation of said \Vaters; among others, 
Dave Ballow, Polk Snow, D.S. Chandler, T. 
J. Epperson, W. J. Wakefield, and L. I<'. Ger-
lock, ot whom the state asked this question: 
'Do you know the witness Frank Waters'/' 
They said, 'Yes.' 'Are you acquainted with 
his reputation for truth?' They said, 'Yes,' 
and that it was good. On cross-examination, 
they wel'e asked by defense: 'Did you ever 
hear hls reputation discussed?' They sa.d, 
'Never, untll yesterday.' The state then 
asked each of said witnesses: 'Have you 
ever hearo the reputation of said \Vatel's for 
truth and veracity Impeached or Impugned 
before this?' to which defendant, by counsel, 
objected, because the question was lmpro11er, 
and not confined to the knowledge of said 
witnesses as to the general reputation of the 
said Waters In the neighborhood or commu-
nity where he lived. The state then asked 
each ot the following seven wltneses, (nam-
ing them:) 'Are you acquainted with the 
reputation of the witness Waters for truth 
and veracity?' which being answered In the 
amrmative, they were fu1 ther asked If it wnR 
good or bad, which being answered, 'Good,' 
they were further asked If he, the said 
Waters, was entttled to be believed under 
oath,-to each and all of which said ques-
tions the defendant excepted because they 
were not proper In determining the general 
reputation of said witness In the nelghbor-
498 
hood where he lives tor truth and veracity, 
and were permitting the witnesses to testify, 
not as to the general reputation of Waters 
for truth and veracity, but as to their own 
opinion and bellef, which objection was over-
ruled by the court, and to which defendant 
excepts." 
Two objections are made to the questions 
and answers: (1) That the witnesses did not 
state that they were acquainted with Wa-
ters' general reputation In the neighborhood 
In which he lived. (2) 'l'hat the wltncs!le& 
were Induced to, and did, state their opin-
ions as to whether he was entitled to credit, 
-not from his · general reputation for truth, 
but from their own knowledge or opinion of 
the witness.. This question Is very elaborate-
ly discussed by Justice Bell In the case ot 
Boon v. Weathered, :!3 Tex. 670. lie siates 
the rule to be that "the inquiry should be 
pructlcally restricted to the general character 
ot the impeached witness for truth. • • • 
It the impeaching witness states that he ls 
acquainted with the general reputation ot 
the impeached witness for truth 1n the com-
munity where he lives, he way then proper-
ly be asked whether that general rt>putatlon 
Is such as to entitle the witness to credit on 
oath. • • • Any other form of words may 
be used, which does not Involve a violation 
ot the cardinal principles that the inquiry 
must be restricted to the general reputation 
of the Impeached witness for truth in the 
community where he lives or ls best known, 
and that the lmpenchlng witness must speak 
from general reputation, and not from his 
own private opinion." "'e are of cplnlon 
that the questions propounded to the Im-
peaching witnesses were not calculated to, 
nor did they elicit the proper answers; that 
the questions and ahswers were violative of 
the cardinal principles governing this sub-
ject: (1) The Inquiry must be restricted to 
the general character of the party sought to 
be impeached. (2) The impeaching wltneSB-
es must speak from general reputatlun, and 
not from their private opinions as to wheth-
er the character of the impeached wltness Is 
good or bad tor truth, or as to whether the 
general reputation of the Impeached witness 
ls such as to entitle him to eredlt on oath. 
Venue Is not proved either by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence. 
We call attention of the learned trial jud~e 
to the fact thn t malice ls not defint>d to the 
jury. As to the neeesslty of defining malice, 
see Jones v. State, 5 Tex. App. 39i; Tooney 
v. State, Id. 163; Pharr v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
4i2; Hnrrls v. Stnte, 8 Tex. App. 90; McKin-
ney v. Stnte, Id. 6'20; Hayes v. State, 14 TeL 
App. 3.10. The judgment Is reversed, and 
the cause rem1tnded. 
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McQUIGAN v. DELAVVARE. L. & W. R. C0.
(29 N. E. 235, 129 N. Y. 60.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 1,. 1891.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, fourth department.
Action by Michael McQuigan against the
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rail-
road Company. Defendant appeals from
an order refusing to compel plaintiff to
submit to a physical examination Af-
firmed.
Louis Marshall, for appellant. An-
dnsw Hamilton, for respondent.
Ai\'DRE\VS. J. The sole question pre-
sented by this record is whether the‘su-
preme court has power, in advance of the
trial of an action for a personal and phys-
ical iuiury, to compel the plaintiff, on an
application made in behalf of the defend-
ant. to submit to a surgical examination
of his person by surgeons appointed by
the court. with a view of enabling them
to testify on the trial as to the existence
and extent of the alleged injury. The
question is not new in the courts. al-
though. so far as we know, it was first
presented in 1868, before a judge of the
New York superior court at spccial term,
in the case of Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. Pr.
334, who affirmed the existence of the
power. The contrary was held by the
general term of the third depnrtinentin
Roberts v. Railroad Co., 29 Hun, 1.1-i. in
1877 the supreme court oi Iowa. in the case
of Schroeder v. Railway Co., 47 iowa. 375,
sustained the doctrine that the court had
an inherent jurisdiction to grant a com-
pulsory order that the plaintiff submit to
such examination, and this decision has
been followed by the courts of several of
the western and southern states. and in
others the power has been denied. The
samequestion wasconsidered in the United
States supreme court in the recent case
of Railway Co. v. Botsiord. 141 U. S. 250,
ll Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000, decided in May, 1891,
and the court (two judges dissenting) de-
cided adversely to the claim that thecourt
had power to compel such examination.
The opinions of the several courts which
have passed upon the question present
very fully the considers tions bearing upon
it. We concur in the view taken by the
supreme court of the state and the su-
preme courtof the United States, and we
can add very little to the full discussion
to be found in theopinionsof thosecourts.
The powers of courts are either statutory
orthose which appertain to thcm by force
of the common law, or they are partly
statutory and partly derived from imme-
niorial usage, which lattcr constitutes
their inherent jurisdiction. They are or-
ganized for the protection of public and
private rlzh ts and the enforcement of rem-
edies. Prcsumptlvely, therefore, wha.t-
everjudicial procedure is essential toen-
able courts to exercise their function is au-
thorized. 'l‘he maxim that there is no
right without n remedy justified the
courts, in the earlier periods oi the com-
mon law, in inventing writs and modes of
procedure adapted to prcscnt forndjudI-
cation in proper form every question of
judicial cognizance. The powers anilin-
risdictlon of the courts of common law
- and chaucer_r in lingiand are to he found
in the English statutes, and in the rules,
precedents, decisions, and procedure of
the courts. The power which the courts
actually exercised,suppicmcnted by statu-
tory powers, constitutes in ageneral sense
their jurisdiction. Upon the organization
here of the federal and state govern men ts.
courts were constituted, and in this state
they succeeded to the powers therctofore
exercised by the courts of law and chan-
cery in England. so far as they were ap-
plicable to our situation. It is a signifi-
cant fact that not a trace can be found in
the decisions of the common-law courts of
E1._zinnd.either beiore or since the Revolu-
tion, of the exercise of a power to compel
a party to a personal action to submit
his person to examination at the instance
of the other party. lf the power existed.
it is difficult to suppose that it would
not have been frequently invoked. Ac-
tions for assault and battery, for iniuries
arising from negligence, and generally for
personal torts. were among the most
common known to the law, and yet. so
far as we can discover. in no case was it
supposed or claimed that the court was
armed with this jurisdiction. The non-
exercise of B power is not conclusive.
‘ againstits existence, but it is inconceiv-
able that. if the power in question existed,
it should have been unused for centuries,
and never have been called into activity.
in two cases cited by Justice GRAY in his
opinion in iialiway Co. v. Botsford, su-
pra. the court of common bench in Eng-
land refused an order for the inspection of
a. building, on the application of the plain-
tiffin an action for work and labor per-
formed by him thereon, on the ground of
want of power. Ncwham v. Tate, 1 Arn.
244; Turquand v. Strand Union. 8 Dow,
201. These cases tend to negative the ex-
istence of the power in the English courts,
claimed for our courts in the case at bar.
The only authority in the Engiisli com-
mon-iaw courts in any degree analogous
is found in the power which the courts of
England have occasionally, though rarely,
exr-rcised,—to issue, on the application of
apparent heirs, the writ dc veutre suspi-
clendo, to compel a widow claiming to be
with child by her deceased husband to
submit her person to examination. The
practice in England is sui generis. and has
never been adopted here. it may have
originated in the peculiar favor shown to
heirs by the law of England. but, what-
ever its origin,it seems repugnant to com-
mon right, and the fact that in this in-
stance only have the courts of England
exercised the power to compel the exam-
ination of the person in a civil proceeding
tends to show that the power is not there
regarded as general, but special and pecul-
iar, and limited to the particular case.
The doctrine of the cases in chancery,
(Briggs v. Morgan. 2 Hagg. Const. 324;
Di-vanbagh v. ilevanbugh, 5 Paige,554;
Newell v. Neweli, 9 Paige. 25,) that in an
action to procure a decree of nullity of
marriage on the ground of imtotuice or
sexual incapacity the chancellor may com-
pel the defendant to submit to a surgical
examination, is a graft from the civil and
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McQUIGAN v. DELAWARE, L. & W. R. CO. 
(29 N. E. 235, 129 N. Y. 50.) 
Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 1~ 1891. 
AJ>peal from supreme court, general 
tA!rm, fourth department. 
Action by Michael McQulgan against the 
Delaware, Lackuwanna & Westeru Rail-
road Compauy. Defendant ap11eals from 
au order refusing to compel phtlntlff to 
BUbmlt tu 1t phy11lcal uamlnatlon Af-
firmed. 
Lo11/11 Marshall, for ap1>ellant. An-
drew Hamilton, for respondent. 
ANDREWS. J. The sole question pre-
sented by this record Is whether thti su-
preme court has J>ower, In advance of the 
trial of an action for a personal and phy11-
ical lnJnry, tu compel th" plaintiff, on an 
appllcatlou mnde In behalf of the defend-
ant, to submit to a surgical examination 
of hie pen1on l!y surgeons appointed hy 
the r.ourt, with a view of enabling them 
to testify on thA trial as to the existence 
and extent or the alleged Injury. The 
question le not new 111 the courts, al-
thuugh. so far ae we know, It was tlret 
.prest>ntftd In 186R, before a juflice of the 
New York superior court at 11peelal tl'rm, 
In the case of Wah1h v. Sayre, 62 How. Pr. 
834, who affirme<l the P:xlstl'nce or the 
power. The contrary Wl\B lleld by the 
general term of the third dPportmeut lo 
Roberts v. Railroad Co., 2U Hun, 154. Jn 
18i7thP. supreme court or Iowa, In the case 
of &hroeder v. Railway Co., 47 Iowa, 375, 
snHtalned the clnctrlne that the court bad 
an Inherent Jurisdiction to Krnnt a com-
pulsory order that the plaintiff 11ubmlt to 
such examination, aud this decision has 
been rullowed by the courts ur sevl'ral of 
the western and southern 11tates, and In 
others th" powAr hue been denied. ThA 
same question was considered In the United 
State11 1tupreme conrt In the recent case 
of Hallway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. M. 250, 
11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000, decided In May, 1891, 
and the conrt (two JudJ(es dlssentinjl') de-
cided adversely to the ch•lm that the court 
bad power to compel such t>xamlnation. 
Thl'I opinions or the Revera) courts which 
have passed upon the qut>11tlun preHeot 
Vf'ry fully the cum1ldera t10011 benrlnJi: upon 
tt. We co11cur In the view token by the 
suvremc court of the state and the Hu-
prt'we court.of the United Stat011, and we 
can add very little to the full dlscm~sloo 
to be found In the opinions of thosecourt11. 
The power11 of courts are either srntutory 
orth1111e which appertain to tllC'm by foree 
of tht> common law, or they are purtly 
statutory and pnrtly derh·ed trom Imme-
morial usai:e, which latter constitutes 
thf'lr Inherent Jurlsdlctl"n. 1'hey are or-
ll:'Hulze•I for the protectluo of 1mhllc and 
prh'ate rl~hb• and the eofm•cement of rem· 
edlea. Presumptively, therefore, what-
ever Judl•·lal proced11re is t>s11entlal to en-
able courts tu exerch1e tlJPlr fnuctloo Is au-
thorized. 1'he maxim thnt there Is no 
rlJ,t"ht without n. remerly jnHtiHefl the 
cuurts, In the earlier perlulle ol the com-
mon 111 w, in lnvl'11tlmr wrlt11 and morlt>s or 
procedure adupted to prt.'Hcnt for tHlJudl-
catlou lo proper form every quest10n of 
J1111lrlul r.ognlznnee. The powers nncl ju-
rl1111lctlun or thf' l'ourts or cum moo law 
111111 chuucery In Eui.cland are tu he found 
tu the Engllsli statutes, and In the rules, 
precedents, decisions, and proceliure of 
the courts. The po~er which tht> courts 
actually e:r.erclsed,suppll'mented by statu-
tory powers, constltntes In a general sen11e 
their juri1ullctlon. Upon the organization 
here of the focleral and state go\"l'rnmentH. 
courts \Vf're constituted, and lu this Rtt1 te 
they 1rncceeried to the powers theretofore 
exercised hy the courts of law and chan-
cery In Englancl, so far as they were ap-
plicn ble to our Rltua ti on. It Is a 11lgn1H-
cont fact that not a trace can bA fonnd In 
t "q derlsionK of the common-In w r.onrts or 
El...~hmd, either before or since the Revolu-
tiou, oft he exercise of a power to Cf)mpt>l 
a party to a personul action to auhmlt 
hb1 r1erson to examlnntlon at tile Instance 
of the other 11arty. If the power existed, 
It ls difficult to 11uppoea that It would 
not have been frequently Invoked. Ac-
tions for assault nnd battery, for Injuries 
orlslnar from uegllgenr.e, and generally for 
pe;sonal torts, were among t:he most 
common known to the law, and yet. eo 
far as we can dlKCover, In no c11se was It 
supposed or claimed that the court wae 
armed with this jurh1dlctlon. Thi' non· 
exercise or a power Is not concl1111lve 
aJralnst Its f'Xh1tenee, but It la tnconcl'lv-
able that, If the power In question extstf'd, 
It should have bet>n unused for ef"nturles, 
and never have hl'f'n coiled Into activity. 
In two cnses cited by J nstlce GRA v In his 
opinion In Hall \'\"BY l'o. v. Botsford, su-
pra, the court ur common bench In Eng-
land refused an order for the lnept>cllon or 
a building, on the opplicatlon of the plalu-
tln In an m·tlon for work and labor per· 
formed by him thereon, on the ground ur 
want or power. Nt>wham v. Tete, 1 Arn. 
~; Turquand v. Strand L'nlon, 8 Dow, 
201. 'I'hese cases tend to negative the ex-
b.tence or the power In the EnJ1:ll11h conrts, 
clalml'd for our courts In the ca11e nt bar. 
The only authority lu the Eni;:llsh l'om-
mon-law courts In any degree Rnal0Jr1JOS 
Is found In the power which thP conrts of 
England have ocraslunully, tho1111.h r11rely, 
exf'rch.'led,-to hurne, on the appllcntlon of 
apparent heirs, the writ de ventre suspJ-
clendo, to compel a widow claiming to be 
1 with r.hlld hy her derea11ed hm1baod to 
I 11ohmlt her person to examination. The practice In EnKland Is s11l lf{'ner/11, and has 
never been adopted here. It may bu ve 
originated In the peculiar favor shown to 
heirs by the law of EnJClaud, bot, what-
ever Its origin, It seemH repul{nant to com-
mon right, ti.nd tile fact thut In thlH ln-
etam·e only htt.ve the courts or F.ngland 
exP.rcl11ed the p~wer to comp~l the exttm-
lnatlon of the person In a civil proreedlng 
tend11 to show that the power Is not there 
re11;arded as JCeueral, but special and pl•cul-
lnr, and llmlted to the particular ca..e. 
1'he doctrine uf the cast.'8 In chancery, 
(Briggs v. MorKan, 2 Hagg. Const. 3:U; 
Dev1mbagh v. Hevanbegh, 6 Paige, 004; 
Newell v. Ne~ell, 9 Paige, 25,) that In an 
action tu prtK'ure a decrt'e of nulllt.y or 
mvrrlage on thto grounrl or lmt utrnce or 
sexuul iucnpuclty the ehancellur may com-
f>l'l the dt>ft!ndunt to s111>mlt to a 1rnrgical 
exumloation, Is a graft frorn the civil and 
"""' 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
common luw, and.as has becn said, “rests
upon the interest which the public. as well
as the parties, have in the question oi up-
holding or dissolving the marriage state,
and upon the necessity oi such evidence to
enable the court to exercise its jurisdic-
tion.” GRAY, J., in Railway Co. v. Bots-
iord, supra.
When we examine the history oi the
power oi common-law courts to compel
the production and inspection oi books
and papers in possession oi’ the opposite
party in a civil action, we find that
originally the courts disciaimed any
powerin the matter, and the remedy by
bill oi discovery was the only resource oi
the party desiring such discovery. Finally
the common-law courts assumed a limited
equitable jurisdiction over the subject,
and, in addition to the rule that a party
pleading a deed should make iorielt oi
the instrument which enabled the other
party to demand oyer, the courts by order
compelled a party who in his pleading re-
lied upon a written instrument, not a
deed, to give inspection to the other party
iirequircd, and so in other special cases.
The courts in this state. prior to any
statute,exerclsed a limited equitable ju-
risdiction oi the same character. Law-
rence v. Insurance Co., 11 Johns. 245;
Denslow v. Fowler.2 Cow. 592, note. But
this limited jurisdiction was exercised
sparingly and with hesitation, and it
was not until statutes were enacted in
England and in this state, conferring up-
' on common-law courts the same power
to compel the discovery and inspection oi
books and papers which was exercised
by courts oi chancery on bills oi dis-
covery, that courts oi common law
claimed or exercised iuli power over the
subject. St. 14 & l5 Vict. c. 99; St.1T &
18 Vict. c. 125; Rev. St. p. l99.§ 21. The
limited jurisdiction exercised by these
courts beiore the statute was in the nat-
ure oi a usurpation, and, so iar as we can
discover, it was never considered that
they possessed an inherent power in aid
oi justice to grant reiiei in cases outside oi
the narrow limit mentioned. 'l‘he power
to compel an inspection oi books and
papers relevant to the controversy, in
possession oi either party, is oi a similar
nature to thatinvoked in the present case,
and, ii the inherent power oi the court did
not extend to the one case,it is difficult
to suppose that it embraced the other.
The power to compel a. party to submit
to an examination oi his person has never
been conierred by any statute. The pro-
visions of the Revised Statutes authoriz-
ing the court to compel the production oi
books or papers have been re-enacted
in the Codes oi Procedure. The statutes
500
i in a limited sense.
also contain specific provisions ior the
examination oi a party on oath hciore
trial, at the instance oi the other party.
The omission in these statutes oiany reier-
ence to the power not underconsideration
is quite significant. We cannot say that
the exercise oi the power claimed might not
in some cases promote the cause oi justice,
and prevent the consummation of fraud.
On the other hand, unless carciully
guarded, it would he subject to grave ob-
jections. But we have to deal only with
the question oi the power oi the courts in
the absence oi any legislation. lt is very
clcar that the power is not a part oi the
recognized and customary jurisdiction oi
courts oi law or equity. The doctrine
that courts have an inherent jurisdiction
to mould the proceedings to meet new
conditions and exigencies is true, but
'l‘hey cannot. under
cover oi procedure or to accomplish jus-
tice in a particular case,invade recognized
rights oi person or property. .\'o court,
we suppose, can abrogateun established
rule of evidence, as. ior example, the rule
that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. or
the ruleoi the common law that parties
shall not be witnesses, or that interest
dlsqualifics. They may apply existiinz
rules to new circumstances. Nor is it, we
conceive. within the power oi the court
to create remedies unknown to the com-
mon iaw. or institute a procedure not
according to the course oi the common
law. It is most important that courts
should proceed under the sanction oi an
orderly and regulated jurisdiction. and
that as little as possible should be leit to
the discretion oi a judge. The exercise by
the court oi the power now invoked, as
has been shown, is not sanctioned by any
usage in the courts oi England or of this
state. Its existence is not indispensable
to the due administration oi justice. its
exercise, depending on the discretion oi
the judge, would be subject to great
abuse. We think the assumption by the
court oi this jurisdiction, in the absence
oi sta tute authority, would he an arbitrary
extension oi its powers. ltis a just in-
ierence that an alleged power which has
lain dormant during the whole period oi
English jurisprudence, and never attempt-
ed to beexercised in America until within a
very recent period. never in fact had any
existence. We have purposely omitted to
repeat the views and authorities upon
this question set forth in the opinions in
Roberts v. Railroad Co.. and in Railway
Co. v. Botsiord, and we reier to those opin-
ions for a iuller discussion oi the grounds
upon which the denial oi the power
claimed proceeds. The order should be
latfirmed. All concur.
G
en
er
at
ed
 fo
r 
fa
cp
ub
up
da
te
s 
(U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n)
 o
n 
20
14
-0
6-
12
 1
9:
10
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/m
dp
.3
51
12
10
49
25
78
1
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n,
 G
oo
gl
e-
di
gi
tiz
ed
  /
  h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
-g
oo
gl
e
• 
Case No. 171] PHODUCTJON AX D E1''FECT OF EVIDE:YCE. 
common luw,and.ns hns been 11nld, "rPsb1 
upon the Interest which the puhlie, ue well 
a11 the parties, have In tbe question of up-
holding or db1eulvlng the marriage state, 
and upon the necl'l!t!lt,v of 11uch evidence to 
enable the court to exercise Its Jurisdic-
tion." 0RAY, J., In Railway Co. v. Bots-
ford, supra. 
When we examine the hh1tory of the 
power of common-law courts to compPl 
the production and lnsper.tlon or books 
and papel'H lu 1iosee1-111lon of the oppo11lte 
party In a civil action, we Hnd that 
originally the courlM dlHclalmed an.v 
power In the matter, and the remedy b.v 
bill of dlecov£-ry was the only resource of 
the party de1drl11~ such discovery. Finally 
the common-law courts l:ls11umed a limited 
equitable JurlHdlctlon ovn the subject, 
and, In 11ddltlon to the rule that a party 
1>learllng a deed 11bould m11ke forfeit of 
the lnetrnment which en11hled the other 
party to demand oyer, the court11 by order 
compelled a party who In his pleading re-
lied upon a written Instrument, not a 
deed, to give Inspection to the other party 
If required, and so In other e1>eclal cases. 
The courts In this 11tate, prior to any 
etatutP., exercised a limited ec1ultable Ju-
risdiction of thP. same chru·al·ter. Law-
rence v. Insurance Co., 11 J ohne. 215; 
Oent!low v. Fowler.2 Cow. 592, note. But 
this limited jurisdiction wat1 exercised 
&JJ&rlngly and with hesitation, and It 
was not until statutes were enacted In 
England and In thl11 state, conferring up-
on common-law conrts the 11ame power 
to compel the discovery and Inspection of 
books 11rul papere wblcb wa11 Pxerdsed 
by courtH uf chancery ou bills of rlh1-
covery, that courts or common law 
clalmed or exeJ'('IHerl fnll power over the 
RUhJert. St. 14 & 15 Viet. c. SIU; St. ]j & 
18 Viet. c. 12':>; Rev. St. p. 199. § 21. The 
limited Jurlslllctlon exercised by these 
courtH before the Htatnte was in the nat-
ure of a us1irpatlon, and, so far ae we can 
discover, It wne never considered that 
they possessed an Inherent power In ~Id 
or justice to grant relief In cases outside of 
the narrow limit mentioned. 'l'he power 
to compel an ln11pectlon of bonktt and 
pa11el'!4 rele\•ant to th<> c11ntrover11y, In 
possession of either party. ls of a similar 
nature to that Invoked lu the pre11entcai;ae, 
anc1, If tho Inherent power of the court <lid 
not extend to the one case, It le difficult 
to 11uppose that it embraced the other. 
The power to compel a party to submit 
to un examination of Ills person b11s never 
been conferred by auy Htatute. The 11ro-
{ ftdonR of the RevlBed 8tatute11 authoriz-
ing the court to com1>el the production of 
book11 or paper11 have been re-eouctt'd 
In the Codes of Procedure. The 1:1tatutes 
000 
ahm contain specific 11rovlslone for the 
examination of a varty on oath hl•foro 
trial, at the Instance of the other pnrty. 
The omleslon In these etatutett or any rerer-
encl' to the power not underronslderation 
le quite slgnlHcant. We cannot l!ay that 
the exercise of the powerclai11'ed might not 
In eomti cael'B promote tile cause of j ustlro, 
and prel'ent the con111rn1mation of fraud. 
On the other hand. nnlee11 CHl"dully 
guarded, It would he subject to erave oh-
Jectlons. But we ha t'e to deal only with 
the question of the power of the courts In 
th" abst>nce of any leghdotion. It is ver.v 
clear tlutt the power h1 not a part of tile 
reco~nized an1I customary Jurh.dlctlon of 
court1:1 of law or equity. The doctrine 
that courts hove an Inherent jurisdiction 
to mould the proceedlng11 to meet new 
conditions and exla-encles le true, but 
In a lhnlt~d sense. They cannot:, under 
cover of procedure or to accom(Jllsh jus-
tice lo a partlc11lar case, In,. ade recoltnlzell 
rights or penion or pru1>erty. No court, 
we 1rnppo11e, can abrogute on establl11hed 
r11le of et'lclence, ae, for example, the rule 
thnt hearsay e\•ldeuce Ill lnarlmls1dble. or 
the rule or the common law that parties 
eholl not be wltnes.n•R, or that Interest 
dh1q nallflee. They nrny llpply exl11th11r 
rulet1 to new clreumstant·eM. Nor Is It, we 
conceive, within the power of tho l"Ourt 
to crea le remedies unknown to the com-
mon law. or Institute a procedure not 
according to the course or the common 
law. It ls most Important that courts 
should proceed under the sanction of nn 
or<lerls and regnlated Jurisdiction, and 
that u11 little as po111dhle should be left to 
the di<icretlon of a jndge. The eicerclire by 
the court of the power now Invoked, ae 
has been shown, le not 11anctloued hy any 
usage In the courts of Enghtn<l or of thht 
state. Its existence le not indispensable 
to the due administration of Justice. ltll 
exercise, depending on the discretion of 
the Judge, would be subject to irn-at 
abu1:1e. We think the a11Mumptlon by the 
court of this Jnrisdlctlon, In the ubsence 
ohta tuteauthorlty, would he an arbltrury 
extenHlon of lt11 powers. 1t 11:1 a jm1t In-
ference that an alleged power which baa 
lain dormunt during the whflle period of 
E11~l111h JnrlsprudencP, and never attempt-
ed to beexerch1ed In Ame11ra until within a 
vei·y recent period, never In fact bad any 
existence. We have purpo11ely omitted to 
repent the views nnd authorltleR upon 
thh~ question set forth In the opinions lo 
Hoberts v. Railroad Co .. and In Railway 
Co.'"· Bot,iford, and we refer to those opin-
ions for a fuller dlecnHi-loo of the gronndR 
upon which the clPnlnl of the power 
cl11 hued prort>ede. The orde1· Hhoultl be 
amrmed. All concur. 
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ARNOLD v. PA\\"I‘l'.\'E'[‘ VAL. \\'A'i‘ ER
C0.
(26 Ati. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Feb. 4, 1893.
' Assumpsit by John J. Arnold against the
Pawtuxet Valley Water Company. Plain-
tiff moves for an order requiring defendant
to produce a book containing the record of
its transactions. Motion granted.
George T. Brown, i:‘or plaintiff. Dexter
B. Potter, for defendant.
'1‘ILLIl\'(lIIAST, J. This is an applica-
tion under Pub St. R. I. c. 214. 5 -i-'1. -for an
order on the defendant to produce a cer-
tain document alleged to be in its posses-
sion, to be used by the plaintifif in the
preparation of his case for trial. The plain-
til! sets out in said application that he is
informed and believes that the defendant
is in the possession and control of a certain
document, to wit, the book containing a
record of the transaction and proceedings
of the association in the piaintiifs declara-
tion mentioned, prior to its incorporation,
and also containing a record of the transac-
tions and proceedings of said defendant cor-
poration since its incorporation and organi-
zation. The plaintiff further represents
that it is necessary for hlm to examine the
records contained in said book, in order to
prepare said case for trial, and to furnish
the bill of particulars asked for by the de-
fendant. He therefore prays the court to
order said defendant, or the treasurer, or
some other oiiicer, thereof, to answer on
oath as to what documents it has in its con-
trol relating to the matter in dispute be-
tween said parties. and what it knows re-
lating to the custody of any such documents,
and, if any such documents be in its posses-
sion or control, whether it objects to the
production of the same. and the grounds of
such objection. In response to an order to
show cause, the president and secretary of
the defendant corporation have filed an an-
swer under oath to said application. in
which they say “that said company is in
possession and control of the ‘book contain-
ing a record of the transactions and proceed-
ings of the association in the plaintiff's dec-
laration mentioned prior to its incorpora-
tion,’ which book also contains ‘a record of
the transactions and proceedings of said _
defendant corporation since its incorporation
and organiz:1tion;‘ that said hook is the pri-
vate property of said defendant, in which
its records are kept. and in which
kept the records of said association;
plaintiif is not entitled to the same.”
defendant therefore objects to the produc-
tion of said book upon the ground that it is
not a ‘document,’ in the language of the
statute, and that the plaintiff is not entitled
to the same.“ The plaintiff's declaration.
which is refcrentiaily made a part of said
were .
that .
said hook is not a ‘document,’ and that the =
“The '
application, sets out that the plaintiff, who
is an attorney at law. rendered and perform-
ed divers legal services for the defendant,
both before and since its incorporation, and
that it was agreed and stipulated that, upon
said association becoming incorporated, it
should assume and take upon itself the pay-
ment and fulfillment of all debts, contracts,
obligations, and undertakings contracted,
entered into, and undertaken by said asso-
ciation prior to the organization of said cor-
poration; and that, in pursuance of said
agreement and stipulation, the said corpora-
tion, after its organization, did assume upon
itself and promise to pay the plaintiff for
his services so rendered to said association
as aforesaid. At a former hearing of said
application, before a single justice in cham-
bers, it was held that the plaintiff was enti-
tled to the production of said record book
for the purposes mentioned in said applica-
tion, and an order was made accordingly,
whereupon. the defendant, upon petition, ob-
tained leave to reargue said question before
the full court, which has since been done.
The defendant contends that the record
book of the defendant corporation is not a.
“document," within the meaning of said
statute, and hence that the court has no au-
thority thereunder to grant the application.
We do not think that said statute should re-
ceive so narrow and purely technical a con-
struction as this. Indeed, to so hold would
be to render it largel_v useless and inopera-
tive, for it is a matter of common knowl-
edge that a very large proportion of the
written transactions of both public and pri-
vate corporations, as well as those of private
individuals. are either kept in book form in
the first instance, or are afterwards stitched
or bound together in such form, for preser-
vation and convenience.
dozen title deeds should thus be put togeth-
er in hook form, would the book be any the
less a “d0cument" than was each individual
deed before being thus brought together?
We think not. In the Revised Statutes of
the United States (section 869) the following
language is used. viz.: “And to bring with
him. and produce to such commissioner, any
paper or writing or written instrument, or
book, or other document,” etc.; thus class-
ing a hook as a document. In the case in
Re Shephard. 3 Fed. 12, documentary evi-
dence is held to include "hooks, papers. ac-
counts, and the like.” In Johnson Steel
Street-Rail Co.-v. North Branch Steel (‘0.,
—i-“4 Fed. 191, 19-i, the deiinition of the term
"document" as given by Mr. \Vhartnn in his
Law of Evidence (volume 1, p. G14) was
adopted. Said definition is as follows: “A
‘document’ is an instrument on which is re-
corded, by means of letters, figures. or
marks, matter which may be evidentiaily
used. In this sense the term ‘document’ ap-
plies to writings, to words printed, litho-
graphed. or photographed. to seals. plates,
or stones on which inscriptions are cut or
Suppose that a. .
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ARXOLD v. PAWTl'X1'~T VAL. WATER 
co. 
(2G A ti. :i5.) 
Supreme Court of RhoJe Island. Frb. 4, 1893. 
· Assump11lt by John J. Arnold against the 
Pawtuxet Valley \Ynter Company. Plaln-
tlrr moves for an order requiring defendant 
to produce a book containing the record of 
its transnctlons. Motion granted. 
George T. Brown. for plalntur. Dexter 
B. Potter, tor detendnnt. 
TILLINGHAST, J. This Is nn applil'n-
tion under PulJ St. R. I. c. 214. § 4;-;, .for an 
01·der on the defernlant to prmht<'P a C'er-
tnln document alleged to be In Its posses-
sion, to be used by the nlalutlf[ In the 
preparation of his case for trial. The t>laln-
titr sets out In said npplkntlon that he Is 
informed and believes that the defendant 
Is lu the po8l!et0111lon and l'Ontrol of a ce11aln 
document, to wit, the book containing a 
record of the tran1111ctlons and proceedings 
of the association In the plnlntltr's declam-
tlon mentioned, prior to Its Incorporation, 
and also containing a record of the transac-
tions u1111 proceedings of said defendant cor-
poration sin<-e Its Incorporation and organi-
zation. The plalntllT further rP11rest>11ts 
that it le nef'N!sary for him to rxumlne the 
records contained in said book, In ordPr to 
p1·epare said case tor trial, and to furnish 
the bill of pa1'tlculars asked for by the de-
fendant. He therefore prays the court to 
order flUld drft>ndant, or the treasurer, or 
;;ome other otttrer, thereof, to answer on 
oath as to what documents It bas In Its con-
trol rf'll\ ting to the mattf'r In dl1111ute be-
tween said pnrtlPR, and whut It knows re-
lating to the custody of any such doeuments, 
and, It any such documents be In Its posses-
sion or control, whether It ob,ll'<"ts to the 
pro<lul'tlon of tlle same. nml the grounds of 
1mch objection. In rPsponse to an ordPr to 
show l'Ut111e, the preshlPnt and sel'retury of 
the dPfendant corporation have filed an an-
swer under oath to said application. In 
which they sny "that snld compan~· Is in 
possession and control of the 'book contnln-
lng a record of the trnnsnl'tlonK and procet!d- ' 
ings of the association In the plulntllr's dec-
laration mentioned prior to Its Incorpora-
tion,' which book al110 rontnlns 'a re<>ocd of 
the transactlon11 nnd Jll'O<"eetllngs of said 
defendant co11mrntlon Rlll!'E' lt11 lneorpomtlon 
and orgnnlzntlon;' that Rnltl hook Is the prJ-
Ynte property of suM <l<'f<'mlant, In whkh 
Its rel'ord11 nrr kept. nnd In whlf'h were 
kept the re1·ord8 of 11nid nsiiodutlon; that 
snld book Is not n 'document,' nnd that the 
plnintilr Is not <'ntitled to the same." "The 
defendnnt therefore objE'<'tlil to the produc-
tion of said book upon the ground thnt It Is 
not a 'document,' In the lnngunge of the 
statute, and thnt the plnintllf Is not entltle1l 
to the same." The pluintilf'11 dPC'lnmtion. 
which ls referentially made 11 part of said 
appllcatlon, sets out that the plalntllT, who 
ts an attorney at law. rendered and perform-
ed divers lPgal servkes for the defendant, 
both before and since its incorporation, and 
that It was agreed and stipulated that, upon 
said association becoming Incorporated, It 
should assume and take upon Itself the pay-
ment and fulftllment of all debts, contracts, 
obligations, and undertakings contracted, 
entered Into, and undertaken by Mid asso-
ciation prior to the organization of said cor-
poration; and that, In pursuance of said 
agreement and stipulation, the said corpora-
tion, after Its organization, did assume upon 
Itself and promise to pay the plaintiff for 
his services 80 rendered to said association 
as aforrsald. At a former hearing of said 
a1>pllcntlon, before a single justice In cham-
bers, it was held that the plalntllT was enti-
tled to the production ot said record book 
for the purposes mentioned In said appllea-
tlon, and an order was made accordingly, 
whereupon. the defendant, upon petition, ob-
tained leave to reargue said question before 
the full court, which has since been done. 
The defendant contends that the record 
book of the defendant corporation Is not a 
"document," within the meaning of said 
statute, and hence that the court bas no au-
thority thereunder to grant the application. 
We do not think that said statute should re-
ceive so narrow and purely technical a con-
11tructlon as this. Indeed, to 80 hold would 
be to render it largely useless and lnopera-
tlvP, tor it is a matter of common knowl-
edge that a very large proportion of the 
written transactions of both public and pri-
vate corporations, as well as those of private 
lndlvillu11l11. nre either kPpt In book form In 
the ftr:-1t ln11tance, or nre afterwards stitched 
or bound together In sueh form, for preser-
vation nnd convenience. Suppose that o. . 
dozen title deeds should thus be put togeth-
er in book form, would the book be any the 
lPSs a "document" thnn was each lndlvldunl 
deed before being thus brought together? 
We think not. In the Revised Statutes of 
the United States (section 8G9) the following 
language Is used. viz:.: "And to lll'lng with 
him. nrnl 11rrnh1t·1• to ,.;:ll'h commii;:slonc1·, any 
paper or wi·ltlng or written Instrument, or 
book, or other document," etc.; thus class-
ing a book as n document. In the case In 
Re Shephard. 3 Frd. 12, documentary e\·l-
dem·e Is held to include "books, papers. ac-
1·01mts, and the like." In .Johnson 8tPel 
8tr1.•t>t-IW.ll Co. v . North Bmnch Steel ('o,, 
48 Fed. 191, l!l4, the definition of the term 
"doC'um<'nt" as given by Mr. \Vhnrtou In his 
Ln w of Evidence <volume 1, p. 614) was 
ndopt<'d. Said definition ls as follows: "A 
'document' Is an Instrument on which Is re-
corded, by means of letters, figures, or 
marks, mnrter which mny be e\•irientlully 
used. In thl11 sense the term 'document' ap-
plies to writings, to words printed, lltho-
graplwd, or photographed, to s1!11ls, plates, 
or stones on which Inscriptions are cut or 
Case No. 172]
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engraved, to photographs and pictures, to
maps and plans." “So far as concerns ad-
missibility, it makes no difference what is
the thing on which the words or signs of-
fered may be recorded. They may be
" " * on stone or gems or on wood as
well as on paper or parchment.” In Mer-
rick v. Wakley, 8 Adol. & E. 170, 172, Lord
Denman, C. J., refers to a book which was I
kept by the plaintiff as a medical ofiicer, g
and contained entries of professional visits, ‘
as a “document.” Mr. Stephen (Ev. 2, 3)
defines a “document" as “any matter ex-
pressed or described upon any substance '
by means of letters, figures, or marks. or by
more than one of these means, intended to
be used, or which may be used, for the
purpose of recording that matter." in the
statute 1~i & 15 Vict. c. 99, entitled “An act
to amend the law of evidence,” pased in
1851, it is provided that “whenever any
book or other document is of such a public
nature as to be admissible in evidence,
" " * a. copy thereof or extract therefrom
shall be admissible." See, also, Starkie, Ev.
(9th Ed.) 273, 274. The oftleial publications
of the state and national governments, al-
though generally in book form, are denomi-
nated “Public Documents." the term being
generally abbreviated “Pub. Doc.” We
therefore decide that a book is a “docu-
ment," within the meaning of the statute
now under consideration.
The defendant further contends that the
applicant has not shown that he is “enti-
tled” to said book within the meaning of
said statute, it not appearing that he has
any property interest or title therein. We
do not think it is necesary, in order to
warrant the court to order the production
of a document under said statute, that the
applicant should show a property title
therein, but that it is enough for him to
show that he is justly entitled thereto by
way of evidence in the preparation and trial
of his case, and that such evidence is neces-
sary to enable him i'ully to prosecute or de-
fend the same. It is not necessary, how-
ever, to aver or show that, \vithout the dis-
covery sought, the plaintiff will be unable
to prove his case. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. (12th
Ed.) § 1-183; Peck v. Ashley, 12 Metc. Glass.)
478.
The final and principal contention of the
defendant is that, as the plaintiff has not
shown that it is absolutely necessary for
him to have access to said book in order
to prepare his case for trial, his applica-
tion should be denied. We do not assent to
so strict a requirement. See Marsh v. Da-
vison, 9 Paige, 580, If, as alleged by
the plaintiff, the defendant corporation as-
sumed the debts of the association contract-
ed prior to the organization of said corpora-
tion, aud if, as is also alleged, the piaintiflf
was a creditor of said association at the
time of said organization. and is now also a
creditor of said corporation by reason of
services rendered to it since its organization,
then. and in such case, we think he is fair-
ly "entitled" to the production of the said
record book, which presumably contains the
doings of said corporation in the premises,
for the purpose of enabling him properly to
prepare his case for trial under the plead-
ings therein. Indeed, we do not well see
how he can establish the fact of the assump-
tion by the defendant corporation of the
debts of said association in any other way.
The application provided for by said stat-
ute (which statute is merely declaratory of
the common law upon the subject,—Ely v.
Mowry, 12 R. I. 570, 572) is evidently in-
tended as a substitute for the more ancient
and cumbersome method of a bill of dis-
covery for the accomplishing of the same re-
sult; and therefore. whenever the applica-
tion shows a case which would entitle the
plaintiff to relief under such a bill, he may
have such relief under the statute. 1 Pom.
Eq. Jur. § 194. Thus, in Georgia, under the
judiciary act of 1799, the superior and in-
ferior courts have power to require “either
party to produce books and other writings
in his, her, or their possession, power. or
custody, which shall contain evidence perti-
nent to the cause in question, under circum-
stances where either party might be com-
pelled to produce the same by the ordinary
rules of proceeding in equity.” In constru-
ing this act in Faircloth v. Jordan, 15 Ga.
511, 513, the court adopted the rule laid
down by Adams. in his Doctrine of Equity,
which is as follows: “A defendant is also
bound, if required by the plaintifl’, to set
forth a list of all documents in his posses-
sion, from which discovery of the matters
in question can be obtained; and if the pos-
session of such documents, and their cha.r-
acter, as fit subjects of discovery, can be
shown from the answer, he must permit the
plaintiff to inspect or copy them.” In Clif-
ford v. Taylor, 1 Tauut. 167, the defendant,
on application, was allowed to take out a
summons requiring the production of the let-
ters and papers mentioned in his aflidavlt.
Mansfield, C. J., starting in his opinion that
“this practice of compelling the delivery of
copies is very convenient, for it saves the
delay and expense of a bill in equity." In
lould v. McCarty, 11 N. Y. 575, it was held
that,_under a statute similar to the one
now under consideration in so far as the ob-
ject sought to be accomplished is concerned,
the court was authorized to compel a de-
fendant to make discovery of books, papers.
and document in his possession or power
relating to the merits thereof, and which
are necessary to the plaintiff to enable him
to prepare for the trial. See, also, Gold-
schmidt v. Marryat, 1 Camp. 559, 562; Hill
v. Railway Co., 10 C. B. (N. S.) 148. In
Townsend v. Lawrence, 9 Wend. -l-38, in
which the facts were quite similar to those
in the case at bar, the court said: "Accord-
_ ing to the principle and practice of the court
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engraved, to photographs and pictures, to services rendered to It since Its organJzatton, 
mape and plane." "So far aa concerns ad- then, and lo encb case, we think be Is falr-
mlsslblllty, It makes no difference what Is ly "entitled" to the production of the said 
the thing on which the words or signs of- record book, which presumably contains the 
fered may be recorded. They may be doings of said corporation in the preml.Bee, 
• • • on stone or gems or on wood as for the purpose of enabling him properly to 
well as on paper or parchment." In Mer- prepare \tis caae for trial under the plead-
rick v. Wakley, 8 Adol. & E. 170, li2, Lord In.gs therein. Indeed, we do not well see 
Denman, C. J., refers to a book which was j bow be Clln establish the fact of the aesump-
kept by the plalntltr as a medical officer, tlon by the defendant corporation of the 
and contained entries of professional visits, 1· debts of said association In any other wa7. 
as a "document." Mr. Stephen (Ev. 2, 3) The appllcat1on provided for by said stat-
deftnes a "document" as "any matter ex- 1 ute (which statute le merely declaratory of 
pre11sed or described upon any substance i the common law upon the eubject,-Ely v. 
by means of letters, figures, or marks. or by , llowry, 12 R. I. 570, S72) le evidently ln-
more than one of these means, Intended to tended as a substitute for the more ancient 
be used, or which may be used, for the and cumbersome method of a bill of dls-
purp08e of recording that matter." lo the <.'Overy for the accomplishing of the same re-
statute 14 & lS Viet. c. 00, entitled "An act suit; and therefore, whenever the appll<.'8· 
to amend the law of evldenCt'," passed In I tlon shows a case which would entitle the 
1851, It Is provided that "whenever any plaintiff to relief under such a blll, be may 
book or other document le of such a public j have such relief under the statute. 1 Pom. 
nature as to be admissible lo evidence, Eq .• Tur. f 194. Thus, in Georgia, under the 
• • • a copy thereof or extract therefrom I judiciary act of 1799, the superior and in· 
shall be admissible." See, also, Starkie, Ev. I ferlor courts have power to require "either 
(9th Ed.) 273, 274. The otHclal publications , party to produce books and other wrltlngs 
of the state and national governments, al- ' In hie, her, or their po8Besslon, power. or 
though generally In book form. are denoml- custody, which shall contain evidence perti-
nated "Public Documents," the term being nent to the cause in question, under clreum-
genernlly abbreviated "Pub. Doc." We stances where either party might be oom-
tberefore decide that a book Is a "docu- pelled to produce the same by the ordinary 
ment," within the met\nlng Qf the statute rules of proceeding In equity." In constru-
now under comd<leratlon. Ing this act in Faircloth v. Jordan, 15 Ga. 
The defendant further contends that the 511, 513, the court adopted the n1le laid 
, applicant has not shown that be Is "entl- down by Adams, in bis Doctrine of Equity, 
tied" to said book within the meaning of which Is as follows: "A defendant ls also 
said statute, It not appearing that he bas bound, If required by the plalntUl', to set 
any property Interest or title therein. We forth a list of all documents in hie poseee-
do not think It ls necessary, in order to elon, from which discovery of the matters 
warrant the court to order the production 1 1n question can be obtained; and If the poe-
of a document under said statute, that the eeBBlon of such documents, and their cbar-
appllcant should show a property title acter. as flt subjects of discovery, can be 
therein, but that It ls enough for him to shown from the answer, be must permit the 
show that be Is justly entitled thereto by plalntlll' to Inspect or copy them." In Cllf-
way of evidence in the prt•paratlon and trial ford v. Taylor, 1 Taunt. 167, the 4efendant, 
of hie case, and that such evidence Is neces- on application, was allowed to take out a 
eary to enable him fully to prosecute or de- summons requiring the production of the let-
fend the same. It le not necessary, how- ters and papers mentioned In bis a11ldavlt, 
ever, to aver or show that, without the dis- Mansfield, C. J., etnttnir In bis opinion that 
covery sought, the plalntltr wlll be unable "this practice of compelllng the delivery of 
to 1>rove his case. 2 Stoey, Eq. Jui-. (12th copies Is very convenient, for it eaves the 
Ed.) f 1483; Peck v. Ashley, 12 Mete. (:\lase.) delay and expense of a blll In equity." In 
478. Gould v. McCarty, 11 N. Y. 575, It was held 
The final and principal contention of the that,. under a statute similar to the one 
defendant ls that, as the plaintiff has not now under consideration in so far as the ob-
sbown that lt Is absolutely necessacy for ject sought to be accomplished le concerned, 
blm to have access to said book In order the court was authorized to compel a de-
to prepare bis case for trial, bis appllca- fendant to make discovery of books, papers, 
tlon should be denied. We do not assent to and documents In his POBSeBBlon 01· power 
so strict a requirement. See Marsh v. Da- relating to the merits thereof, and which 
vlson, U Paige, 580, 584. If, as alleged by are neet'seary to the plaintiff to enable him 
the plaintiff, the defendant corporation as- to prepare for the trial. See, also, Gold-
sumed the debts of the aeeoclatlon contract- ecbmldt v. Marcyat, 1 Camp. 559, 562; HJll 
ed prior to the organization of snld corpora- v. Railway <;o., 10 C. B. (N. S.) 148. In 
tlon, and If, as le also alleged, the plaintiff Townsend v. Lawrence, 9 \Yend. 4:'>8, In 
was a creditor of said association at the which the facts were quite shnllar to thoee 
time of said organization, and le now also a in the case at bar, the court said: "Accord-
credltor of said corporation by reason of Ing to the principle and practice of the court 
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of chanccry. a bill called a ‘bill of discovery’
may be filcd for the discovery of facts in the
knowledge of the adverse party, or of deeds
or writings or other things in his custody or
power; and is usually employed to enable
the complainant to prosecute or defend an
action. 1 Madd. Pr. 160; Lord Montague
v. Dudman, 2 Ves. Sr. 398. And if deeds,
letters, or other writings are referred to in
an answer. the same will, on the plaintiff's
motion, be ordered to be left with an oflicer
of the court for the inspection of the com-
plainant or his counsel. 2 Madd. Pr. 299;
Bettison v. Farringdon, 3 P. Wms. 364; Tay-
lor v. Mllner, 11 Ves. -i2; Atkyns v. Wright,
14 Ves. 214." The court further said: “The
object of the statute was to substitute the
rule of court in the place of a bill of discov-
ery where the evidence of which a discov-
ery is sought is of a documentary nature;
and the remedy is not confined to cases
where the evidence in itself constitutes a
cause of action, but extends to all books,
papers, and documents relating to the mer-
its of the suit or defense.” See, also, Post
v. Railroad Co., 144 Mass. 3-i1, 11 N. E. 540;
Nieury v. O'Hara, 1 Barb. 484. Had the
plaintifif in the case at bar filed a bill of dis-
covery to obtain the production of the rec-
ord book in question for the purpose set out
in his application. we think he would have
been clearly entitled to the relief thus
sought. See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. (12th Ed.) §§
14834501. And as, under the statute'be-
fore us for consideration, the application
therein provided for was intended to take
the place of a bill of discovery, as we have
already seen, we see no reason why the
plaintiff is not entitled to the same relief.
The cases cited by the defendant's coun-
sel do not controvert, in the main, the gen-
eral doctrine above enunciated, but princi-
pally have to do with what it is necessary
to show in the bill or application, in order
to warrant the granting thereof, and also
are to the effect that courts will not permit
parties to merely “fish for evidence" by such
a proceeding. This doctrine meets with our
entire approval. An application of this sort,
as said by this court in Ely v. Mowry, su-
pra, "should set forth particularly the rea-
sons which render it essential to the prepa-
ration of the defense, that the order asked
for should be made, so that the court may
determine whether or not the necessity ex-
ists.” If the application shows that it i
merely an attempt to “fish for evidence,” or
to “draw the fire” of the opposite party, for
the purpose of either making a case or of
“cooking up" a defense, or, to state it neg-
atively, if it does not show that the appli-
cant is fairly entitled to the evidence sought,
in order to enable him to properly prepare
and try his case, it should be denied. The
case of Woods v. De Figaniere, 25 How.
Pi-ac. S322, which is much relied on by the
defendant's counsel, was one in which the
facts were very different from those in the
case at bar. In that case the entries sought
for were not shown to be evidence, but only
to contain information by which evidence
might be obtained. It was not alleged that
they were in the defendant's handwriting,
or that he was in any way privy to them.
“Possibly, by inspection,” said the court,
“the plaintilfs may discover in whose hand-
writing they are, and obtain their author as
a witness to prove the facts contained in
them. ‘ * ' I apprehend the power of
discovering the contents of a written docu-
ment will hardly be stretched to cover those
which only furnish information to enable
the applicant to ferret out evidence or wit-
nesses, or where it is not shown'that wit-
nesses cannot establish the same facts with-
out the aid of such entries.” It is true
that the court in that case laid down the
rule now contended for by the defendant,
—that a discovery “ls not permitted in equi-
ty merely to enable a party to prepare for
trial or prevent surprise," but that "it must
furnish evidence to be used on the trial."
This statement, however, was not necessary
to the decision of the case, nor do the au-
thorities cited in support thereof sustain the
position taken. Moreover, the superior court
of the city of New York, in the case of
Gould v. McCarty, supra. had long before
decided that a defendant might be compel-
led to make discovery of books, papers, and
documents which were necessary to the
plaintiff to enable him to prepare for trial;
and this decision had been aiflrmed by the
court of appeals. See 11 N. Y. 575. In Ely
v. Mowry, supra, the discovery was sought
to aid in the preparation of the defense.
In Congdon v. Aylsworth, 16 R. I. 281, 18
Atl. 247, the discovery was asked in order to
enable the complainant “to prepare his case
for trial." The discovery of the evidence
sought in every case must necessarily pre-
cede the trial of the case in aid of which it
is sought, and if, therefore, a party is en-
titled to the evidence to be used at the
trial, we see no reason why he is not equal-
ly entitled to it to enable him to prepare
for the trial. If compelled to wait for the
production thereof until the trial should ac-
tually begin, more or less delay and incon-
venience would necessarily result therefrom.
We think the plaintiff shows a case for re-
lief under said statute, and we will there-
fore grant an order for the production of
said book.
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of chancery, a bill called a 'bill of discovery' ! 
may be filed for tbe discovery of facts In the 
knowledge of the adverse party, or of deeds 
or wrltlDM:B or other things In bis custody or 1 
power; and ls usually employed to enable 
the complainant to prosecute or defend an 
action. 1 Madd. Pr. 160; Lord Montague 
v. Dudman, 2 Vea. Sr. 398. And If deeds, 
letters, or other writings are ref~rred to in 
an answer. the same will, on the plulntlll"s 
motion, be ordered to be left with an omcer 
of the court for the Inspection of the com-
plainant or his counsel. 2 Madd. Pr. 299; 
Bettlson v. Farringdon, 3 P. Wms. 364; Tay-
lor v. Milner, 11 Ves. 42; Atkyns v. Wright, 
14 Vee. 214." The court further said: "The 
object of the statute was to substitute the 
rule of court in the place ot a bill of discov-
ery where the evidence of which a discov-
ery ls sought ls of a documentary nature; 
and the remedy is not confined to cases 
where the evidence in itself constitutes a 
cause of action, but extends to all books, 
papers, and documents relating to the mer· 
Its of the suit or defense.'' See, also, Post 
v. Rallroad Co., 144 :Mass. 341, 11 N. E. 540; 
Nleury v. O'Hara, 1 Bnrb. 484. Hild the 
plaintlft' In the case at bar filed a bill of dis· 
covery to obtain the prOlluctlon of the rec-
ord book In question for the purpose set out 
in bis application, we think he would have 
been clearly entitled to the relief thus 
sought. See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. (12th Ed.) H 
1483-UiOl. And as. under the 11tatute ·be-
fore us tor consideration, the aJlpllcatlon 
therein provided tor was intended to take 
the place of a bill of discovery, as we have 
already seen, we see no reason why the 
plalntift' is nc;>t entitled to the same relief. 
The cases cited by the defendant's coun-
sel do not controvert, lo the main, the gen· 
eral doctrine above enunciated, but princi-
pally have to do with what It ls necessary 
to show In the blll 01· application, in order 
to warrant the granting thereof, and also 
are to the eft'ect that courts will not permit 
parties to merely "fl.sh for evidence" by such 
a proceeding. This doctrine meets with our 
entire approval. An nppllcatlon of this sort, 
as said by this court in Ely v. :Mowry, su-
pra, "should set forth particularly the rea-
sons which render lt essential to the prepa-
ration of the defense, that the order asked 
for should be made, so that the court may 
determine whether or not the necessity ex-
ists." If the application shows that It is 
merely an attempt to "fish for evidenee," or 
to "draw the fire" ot the opposite party, for 
the purpose of either making 11 case or of 
"cooking up" a defense, or, to state It neg-
atively, If It does not show that the appli-
cant ls fairly entitled to the evidence sought, 
in order to enable him to properly prepare 
and try his case, it should be denied. The 
case of \Voods v. De Flganiere, 25 How. 
Prnl'. :;22, whkh Is much relied on by the 
defendant's counsel, was one In which the 
tacts were very dlll'erent from those in the 
case at bar. In that C'ase the entries sought 
tor were not shown to be evldenee, but only 
to contain Information by which evidence 
might be obtained. It was not Rlleged that 
they were in the defendant's handwriting, 
or that he was in any way privy to them. 
"PoBSlbly, by Inspection," said the court, 
"the plaintiffs may discover in whose hand-
writing they are, and obtain their author as 
a witness to prove the facts contained in 
them. • • • I apprehend the power of 
dlscO\·erlng the content.a of a written docu-
ment wlll hardly be stretched to cover those 
which only furnish information to enable 
the applicant to ferret out evidence or wit-
nesses, or where it is not shown"that wit-
nesses cannot establish the same tads with-
out the aid of such entries." It is true 
that the court in that case luld down the 
rule now c..ontended for by the defendant, 
-that a discovery "ls not permitted lo equi-
ty merely to enable a party to prepare for 
trial or preYent surprise," but that "It must 
furnish eYldem·e to be used on the trial." 
This l!ltatement, however, was not necessary 
to the decision of the case, nor do the au-
thorities cited In support thereof sustain the 
position taken. Moreover, the superior court 
of the city of New York, In the case of 
Gould v. McCarty, supra, had long before 
decided that a defendant might be compel-
led to make discovery of books, pa11l'rs, and 
documents which were necessary to the 
plalntlll' to enable him to prepare tor trial; 
and this decision had been amrmed by the 
court of appeals. See 11 N. Y. 575. In Ely 
v. Mowry, supra, the discovery was sought 
to aid In the preparation of the defense. 
In Congdon v. Aylsworth, 16 R. I. 281, 18 
Atl. 247, the discovery was asked in order to 
enable the complainant "to prepare his case 
for trial." The discovery of the evidence 
sought in every case must necessarily pre-
cede the trial of the case In aid of which It 
ls sought, and If, therefore, a party Is en-
titled to the evidence to be used at the 
trial, we see no reason why he Is not equal-
ly entitled to it to enable him to prepare 
for the trial. It compelled to wait for the 
production thereof until the trial should ac-
tually begin, more or less delay and incon· 
venlence would necessarily result therefrom. 
We think the plalntilr shows a case tor re-
lief under said statute, and we wlll there-
fore grant an order for the production of 
said book. 
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PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
_Circuit Court, \V. D. Pennsylvania.
.'I()H.\'SON STEEL STltl*IET-RAIL CO.
v. NORTH BRANCH STEEL (TO.
(-18 Fed. 191.)
Nov. 12,
1891.
In equity. Bill by the Johnson Steel
Street-Rail Company against the North
Branch Steel Company for infringement of
a patent. Heard upon a rule for attachment
of John Fulton for contempt in refusing to
obey a subpoena duces tecum.
John R. Bennett, for rule.
ing and P. C. Knox, opposed.
Geo. J . Hard-
REED, J. A bill in equity for infringe-
ment of certain letters patent having been
filed in the circuit court for the Eastern dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, and the defendant
having answered, Samuel Bell. Esq.. was ap-
pointed by that court as a special examiner,
upon the‘ application of the defendant, to
take testimony in this district. .lolm Ful-
ton, who is the general manager of the (‘am-
bria Iron Company, a corporation. not a
party to the suit, was duly served with a
subptena duces tecum, directing him to pro-
duce at the hearing before the examiner cer-
tain drawings and templates. .\lr. Fulton
refused to produce them, although appearing
at the hearing in person in obedience to the
filll)]lll‘ll2l. Upon the argument of the rule
taken by the defendant's counsel to show
cause why an attachment for contempt
should not issue, counsel for Mr. Fulton ap-
peared, and the several positions taken in
opposition to the rule will be considered.
It was argued that the subpoena had im-
properly issued.from the clerk's ofliee; that
a subpccua duces tecum, in such a case as
the present, could only be issued by order of
court, upon petition or application of one
of the parties. A circuit court in one dis-
trict has power, under the 67th rule in equi-
ty, to appoint a special examiner to take
testimony in another district (Railroad Co. -
v. Drew, 3 Woods. tiill, Fed. Gas. No. 17,-
43-1; In re Steward, 29 Fed. 813); and the
court in the latter district has power to is-
sue a subpoena commanding a person living
in its district to appear and testify before
an examiner or master who has been ap-
pointed by the court of the former district,
and who is discharging the duties of his
appointment in the latter district: and such
court also has power. under the 73th rule in
equity, to punish such person for refusing
to obey such subpmna (In re Steward,
supra). Nor do I think it necessary that, in
such a case. an application must be made to
the latter court for an order directing the
I-llli)])tl‘Ilfl. duces tecum to issue. but such a
subpo-na may issue in the usual manner
from the clerk's otiice, as in ordinary cases.
“if documents, the production of which is
desired, are in the possession of onc not a
party to the suit. he ma_v be compelled by a
subpoena duces tecum to produce them, and
if the subpoena is not obeyed he will be pun-
ished for contempt, on proof by afildavit
that the documents are in his custody." 3
Greenl. Ev. ii 30.’). And such a subpoena is
in ordinary and general use, and is of com-
pulsory obligation and effect, in courts of
law (Amey v. Long, 9 East, 473; Russell v.
.\IcLellan, 3 Woodb. & M. 157, Fed. C-as. No.
12,158), and also in courts of equity (1 Dan-
iell. Uh. I-‘rac. 906; U. S. v. Babcock, 3 Dill.
3645, Fed. Cas. .\'o. 14,484); and, by the 78th
rule in equity. 8lll)[)(PIl8S may be issued by
the clerk in blank, and filled up by the com-
missioner, master, or examiner, requiring
the attendance of the witness at the time
and place specified, and this applies as well
to subpoenas duce tecum. Section 869 of
the Revised Statutes, providing for an order
of court. upon which the subpoena duces
tecum shall issue, applies to cases- where
depositions de bene esse are taken under the
provisions of section or in perpetuam rel
memoriam and under a dedimus potestatem,
under section 866. Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.
S. T13, 5 Sup. Ct. 724. It does not apply
to testimony taken, as in the present case,
under the general powers of a court of equi-
ty, and in the mode prescribed by the equity
rules. An examination of the act of Janu-
ary 24. 1827 (-i Stat. 197), the second section
of which was re-enacted as section 869 of
the Revised Statutes. shows that it was not
intended to apply to all cases.
The subpmna having properly issued, the
remaining question is as to the validity of
the reasons given in support of the refusal
of the witness to obey the subpoena. The
affidavit of Cyrus Elder, Esq., attorney for
the Cambria Iron Company, which, it was
understood at the argument, should be treat-
ed as though it were the answer of Mr. Ful-
ton. says that lie instructed the witness not
to produce the article called for by the sub-
pu-na. and his instructions were intended
solely to prevent the disclosure of valuable
business secrets of said Pambria, lron (‘om-
pany. and that the. disclosures of the wit-
nesses called for, and which the witnesses
were required to answer and produce, re-
lated to a method of manufacturing a rail.
which method has been developed by the
Cambria Iron (‘ompany with great labor and
expense. and that it is said company's valu-
able private property. In the case of Bull
v. Loveland. 10 Pick. 9, the supreme court
of liiassachusctts discussed the question.
and held that the witness was bound to an-
swer a question pertinent to the issue, where
his answer will not expose him to criminal
proceedings, or tend to subject him to u
penalty or t'ori’eiture, although it may other-
wise adversely aifect his pecuniary inter-
ests. and said: “There seems to be no (litter-
ence in principle between compelling :1 \vit-
ness to produce a document in his posses-
sion, under a subpmna duces tecum, in a
case where the party calling the witness has
a right to the use of such document. and
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Case No. 11::] PRODUCTIO:S A~D EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. 
3'0HXSOX STEEL STRl<~ET-RAIL CO. 
v. NORTH BRANCH RTEKJ, CO. 
(48 Fed. 191.) 
, Circuit Court, W. D. Pennsylv:rniu. Xov. 12, 
1891. 
In equity. Bill by the Johnson Steel 
Street-nan Company against tht• North 
Bran<·h Steel Company for Infringement of 
a 11at<>nt. Heard upon a rule for attuchment 
ot John Fulton for contempt in refwilng to 
obey a subprena du<'es t.ecum. 
John R. Bennett, for rule. Geo. J. Hard-
ing and P. C. Knox, 011posed. 
If the subpama Is not obeyed be will be pun· 
lsb<>d for contempt, on proof by nftl.davlt 
that thP documents are In his custody." 3 
Greenl. Ev. I :«15. And such a subprena Is 
In ordinary antl gPnernl use, and ls of com-
pulsory obligation and Pll'ect, ID courts of 
law (Amey v. Long, 9 1'~ast, 473; RuBBell v. 
:McLellan, 3 Woodb. & M. 157, Fed. Cas. No. 
12,1;}8), and also In rourts of equity (1 Dan-
IE'll. Cb. Pree. 900; U. S. v. Bab<'<K'k, 3 Dill. 
:-1UU, I•'ed. Cas. No. 14,~); and, by the 18th 
rulP In equity, sub1><Pnas may be Issued by 
the elerk In blank, and filled up by the com-
missioner, master, or examiner, requiring 
the attendan<.-e of the witness at the time 
UEED, J. A bill ID equity for Infringe- and plac>e specified, and this applies as well 
nwnt of <'t'rtaln letters patent having ht!en to subprenas ducee tecum. Section 869 of 
filed In the circuit court for the Eastern dis· the Revls<>d Statutes, providing for au order 
trkt of PeDDSylvanla, and the dt•ft-udaut of <·ourt, upon which the sub1><Fna dUCf>S 
having answered, Samuel Bell. J~sq .. was ap- te<'um shall Issue, applies to <'8ses• where 
polntP<l by that court as a spedal Pxamlner, depositions de bene esse are taken under the 
upon the" applk'lltlon of the dt>fPudaot, to provisions of section 863, or ID perpetuam rel 
take testimony lo thta dlstrl<·t. John lt'ul- memoriam and under a dedlmus potestatem, 
ton, who Is the general manager of the ('am- under M'<'tlon 866. Ex parte lt'lsk, 113 U. 
hrla Iron Company, a corporation, not a S. 713, a Sup. Ct. 724. It dol'tl not n1>11ly 
11arty to the suit, was duly served with a to testimony taken, as ID the present ease, 
HUbI>cPna duce& tecum, directing him to pro- under the general powers of a court of ec.1ul-
duce at the hearing before the examiner cer- ty, and In the mode prescribed by the equity 
taln drawings and templates. Yr. lt'ulton rules. Ao examination of the act of Janu-
reCused to produce them, although appearing ary 24, urn (4 Stat. 197), the second section 
at the he.arlng In person In obedience to the of whlc•h was re-ena<•ted as seetlon 869 of 
subpu•na. Upon the argument of tbe rule the Revlf«'d Statutes, shows that It was not 
taken by the defendant's counsel to show lntentlt-d to npply to all c11ses. 
<'ft.use "·hy an attachment tor contempt The subPQ.'na having properly Issued, the 
should not Issue, counsel for Mr. lt'urton ap- remaining question le as to the validity of 
peal't'<l, and the several positions taken ID th~ reasons given In support of the refusal 
oppo1dtlon to the rule will be considered. of the wltneAS to obey the subprena. The 
It was arguetl that the subp!Fna had Im- amclavlt of Cyrus Elder, Esq., attorney for 
properly lSBued,from the clerk's oftl.c>e; that I the Cambria Iron Company, ~hlch, It was 
a subprena dncee tecum, In such a <.'BBe as undl'n1tood at the argument, should be creat-
the prt>sent, could only be Issued by order of Pd n11 though It were the answt>r of llr. J.<'ul-
court, upon petition or applleatlon of one ton. 88ys that be Instructed the witness not 
of the pnrtlt>s. A <'irc•ult rourt In one dis- to 11roduce the articles <.'ftlled tor by the sub-
trlct h88 power, under the 67tb rule In equl- JKPIUl, and bis Instructions were lntt>ndP<l 
ty, to appoint a special examiner to take 11ol<'ly to prevent the dlsl'losure of valunble 
testimony In another dlstrl<'t (Railroad Co .. 
1
. business He<'rets ot said Cambria Iron <'om-
v. Drew, 3 Woods. (\Ul, l•'ed. Coe. No. 17,- pany. and that the disclosures of the wlt-
434; In re Steward, 29 l<'ed. Sta); and the nes11es called tor, and whi<'h the wltnes11es 
<'()Urt In the latter dlstrl<'t has power to !s-1 were required to answer and produce, re-
11ue a 1mb11<Pna commanding a person lh·lng lated to a m<'thod of manufacturing a rail. 
In Its district to appear and testify lx•fore J whkh mPtbod has been developed by the 
an examiner or master who bas bt><>n a!>- Cambria Iron C'ompany with great labor and 
polntf'd hy the court of the former district, i <'Xpeuse. an1l that It le said company's valu-
and who ls dlsc·barjtlng the duties ot his i able prlnlte property. In the case of Bull 
ap11<>tnh11Pnt in the latter dlstrll•t: and slwh I v. Loveland, 10 Pick. 9, the supreme rourt 
«'()Urt also bas power, under the 7Sth rull• In of :MaSRn<•lmsetts dlscuss<>d tbl• question. 
•'<JUlty, to punish su<'l1 Jll~rson for refusing and held that the witness was bound to an· 
to obey such suhpmna (In re Steward. swer a question pertinent to the issue, Whl•1" 
11upra). Nor do I think It neeessnry thnt, In his answer will not expose him to criminal 
llU<'h a case, an appll<•atlon must lw mnde to procet•dlngs, or tend to subject him to a 
the latter eourt tor an order directing the 
1 
penalty or forfeiture, although It may oth1•r-
11ub111l'na duN•s tc>ctm1 to li:111w, but sul'b a wise advl'rsely affect his pecuniary lnter-
11uh1lfPna may Issue In tlw usual manner ests, and said: ''There seems to be no lllffer-
from the <'lerk's offi<'e, as In ordinary c·nsl'11: c>n<'e In prhwlple hetwe<>n compelling n wit· 
"If documl•nts, the produl'tlon of which Is ll<'SS to 11roduce a document In his 11ossN1-
d1•slred, nre In the pos1w11slou of one not a 11lon, under a subprena duce& tt>1·um, In a 
party to the suit. h<' mny be com11elled by a <'11."1e whl'l't' the party calllnp; the wltu.-ss ha11 
1111bprena duces tecum to produce them, and a right to the use of such document, and 
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1-ompelliu,<.: him to give testimony when the
facts lie in his own knowledge. It has been
decided, thou;.'h it was formerly doubted,
that a subpwna duces tecum is a writ of
compulsor_\' obligation. which the court has
power to issue, and which the witness is
bound to obey, and which will be enforced
b_v proper process to compel the production
of the paper, when the witness has no law-
ful or reasonable excuse for withholding it
(Amey v. Long, 9 East, 473; Corsen v. Du-
bols, 1 Holt, N. P. 239): but of such lawful
or reasonable excuse the court at nisi prius,
and not the witness. is the jud,-:e."
In Baird v. (‘ochran. 4 Serg. & R. 396, the
supreme court of l‘elms_\'lvani-a held that a
witness in a civil suit ma_v be compelled to
give evidence which may aifect his interest,
provided it does not tend to convict him of
a crime. or subject him to a penalty, saying:
“With these exceptions, every man may be
compelled, on a bill filed against him in
equity. to declare the truth, although it
affect his interest. Why. then, should he
not be compelled at law, except where he is
a party to the suit? [Parties could not then
under the laws of Pennsylvania testify or
be called to tcstify.] The court in which he
is examined will take care to protect him
from questions put through impertinent
curiosity, and confine his evidence to those
points which are really material to the ques-
tion in litigation. So far, his neighbor has
an interest in his testimony, and no further
ought he to be questioned."
In Ex parte Judson. 3 Blatchf. 89, Fed.
Pas. No. 7,561, the witnes objected to testi-
fying, for the reason that the suit was an
amicable and fictitious suit. got up to enable
the parties to examine the witness, to obtain
evidence from him to be used.not in tnat suit,
but in other cases, then pending, in which
the witness was interested. and in which
such evidence might be used to his preju-
dice; but the court held that the evidence
inight be material. that it was bound to as-
sume that the ease which, as in this case,
was pending in another court. must be pre-
sumed to be genuine litigation. and that the
witness must answer. in Wertheim v. Rail-
way, etc., Co., 15 Fed. 716. Jmlgze Wallace
held that a corporation, not a party to the
suit. might be compelled to produce its books
and papers in evidence, which might be nec-
essary and vital to the rights of litigants,
and that considerations of inconvenience
must give wa_v to the paramount rights of
parties to the litigation.
It was further contended by counsel for
the witness that the articles called for by
the subpoena were not such as could be the
subject of a Sllllllifinll duces tecum. The
subptt-na required the production of certain
drawings and templates. A template. as
stated upon the argument, is a piece of sheet
iron, the contour of which corresponds to
the opening between the rolls. It was held
in the (‘use of Shephard. 3 Fed. 12, that a
subpoena duces tecum can only be used to
compel the production of written instru-
ments, papers, books. or documents, and
that patterns for stove castimzs were not the
ubject of such a writ. l think that the
subpoena cannot be enforced as to the tem-
plates. A document, however. is defined as
“an instrument upon which is recorded, by
means of letters, figures, or marks, matter
which may evidentlailybe used. In this sense
the term applies to writings; to words print-
ed. lithographed, or photographed: to seals,
plates, or stones on which inscriptions are
cut or engraved; to photographs and pic-
tures; to maps and plans. So far as con-
cerns admissibility. it makes no difference
what is the thing on which the words or
signs offered may be recorded. 'i‘hey may
be on stones, or gems. or on wood, as well
as on paper or parchment.” 1 Whart. Ev. §
614. So far as material, then, the drawings
called for by the subptena should be pro-
duced, and the final question is how far they
are material.
The bill in this case is based upon an
allegation of infringement of a patent grant-
ed March 29, 1887. Defense is made that the
patent is void for insnificiency of invention,
in view of the prior state of the art. and
also that the invention claimed has been in
public use for more than two years prior to
the date of the application, which was made
August 12, 1886. It appears in testimony
that rails of the general character of that
covered by the patent in controversy were
rolled by the Cambria. Iron Company, under
an arrangement with the plaintiff company,
for the latter company, in 1882. and from
that time down to the date of the patent. It
would seem to be material and pertinent,
therefore, to the issue, to inquire into this
matter, and the defendant is entitled to the
production of such drawings as will show
the form of rolls used for that purpose,
down to the date of the patent. The form
of rolls used since has not been shown to be
material to the issue. My conclusion upon
this subject is based upon the presentation
of the case by counsel, upon only a part of
the testimony. and is not intended to. in any
manner, anticipate or influence the decision
by the circuit court for the Eastern district
of the materiality or relevancy of the testi-
mony, of which it alone must finally judge.
\\'hen the witness produces the drawings
called for by the subpoena. in accordance
with this opinion. and pays the costs of this
application, the rule will be discharged, it
appearing that no disobedience of the sub-
pucna was intended; but this mode was
taken by counsel to test the questions in-
volved.
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COMPULSORY PRODUCTION OF EVJDEYCE. (Case :No. 173 
c·ompPllln;.: him to jil'I\"(' tl'Rthnony whE'n the 
fll~ts lie In blR own knowlE'd"E'. It bas b~n 
dp1•idE'11. thou:.:-h It wns formerly doubted, 
tl111t 11 Kuh1111•1m d1we11 t('('lllll Is 11 writ of 
c·o111pnl:-1or~· ohllgntlon, whleh the court bas 
JIOWt>r to h•sne, uml whkb the wltneM ls 
hound to obey, nm! whleh will be t>uforced 
hy 11ro1wr proC('RK to <'OIUJ>Pl the production 
<>f the pn]K"r, wtwn the wltnl'BB has no law-
ful or 1·1·11Row1blP PXl'UBl' tor withholding It 
(Amey Y. I.ong, II Emit, 473; l'orsen v. Du-
bois, 1 Holt, N. P. :!:m1; but of such lawful 
or rP111101111hle eX<'US(' tlw court nt nlsl prlus, 
and not th!' wltuPss, Is thP jud:,.:-e." 
In Baird Y. Co<"hrnn, 4 ~prg. & R. 3Hll, the 
11uprl'mP 1·011rt of l'NmKylnrnlu held that a 
wltnPi;K In a civil 1rnlt may be eompPllPd to 
~lv1• l'\"l•ll'l1Pe whl<'h may af'l'ect bis Interest, 
11roviclt-1I It dol'R not tend to convict him of 
n erlnw. or subje<·t him to a p1•nalty, saying: 
•
0 \\'lth thPKP l'Xl'PJ1tiom1, everr mun may be 
<·ompdlc•cl, on a hill filf'd against him in 
t!qulty. to llP<.'lare the truth, although It 
ntrect hiK l11tn1·11t. \Vh;\-, then, should he 
not lw <·011111l'lled at law, except whl't'e he Is 
n party to tht> suit? [Partlel' eould not then 
under thP laws of Pem1sylnrnl11 testify or 
he callt>d to tPstlfy.] The court In whlt-h he 
Is examined will tnk<> <'Rrl' to protf'<·t him 
from <1uestlons put through lmpPt'tlnent 
<·urlosity, and confine bis evidence to those 
11olnt11 whi<·h 1n·p really material to the ques-
tion In lithmtlon. So fur, his neighbor hRs 
nn lnterPst ln bls testimony, and no further 
<night he to be questioned." 
In Ex 11arte Judson, 3 Blat<•hf. 89, Fed. 
•'us. No. 7,:iGl, the witness objPctt>d to testi-
fying, for the reason that the suit w1111 an 
nmieabl<' and fictltlom1 suit, got up to Plllthle 
the parties to examine the witnPss, to ohtnin 
evhh•ncP from him to beusE'd. not ln t1111t Hult, 
hut in oth<'I' <'UMPS, th<>n llPndlng, In whlc.-h 
the wltnPMR was lntt>l'f'l'lted, nnd ln whkh 
zmch evldPtll'P might be UBt>d to bis Jll'l'ju-
dlce; but the <'1mrt held that the M'hh•n<--e 
tuil.:'ht lw mntl'rlal, that It w1111 bound to a11-
tiume that thP ease:• whleh, as In thiK e1u1e, 
was pending In anothn court, muRt be pre-
Mumed to be genuhw lltlgntlon, and that the 
witness must answl't'. In WPrtheim v. Hnll-
way, etc., Co., 15 Fed. 716 .. Tt11Jg-p \V11lln1·e 
held that a corporation, not a 1mrt;\' to the 
Hult, might be co1111wl1Ptl to prod net• itM hooks 
and papers In evldPncP, which might be nec-
essary and vital to the rights of litigants, 
and that com1ldcr11tlo11s of lnconvPnlence 
must give war to the paramount rlgl.tts of 
p:trt les to tlw litigation. 
It was turtlwr contended by counRPl for 
the wltnPss that the artldPs callPd for by 
the sub11u•na wPrP not such as could be the 
t1uhjf'1•t of a Ruhp<ena dU<'E'B ti><·nm. The 
11uhpH•na reqnire!l the pro!lul'tion of certain 
drawings and h•mplates. A template. aK 
stnted upon the argument, Is a piece of shl'et 
Iron, the contour of whlcl.t <'Orresponds to 
tbe o)lenlng twtwPen the rolls. It was held 
ln th<' ('11M1• of l"h<'phurd, 3 I<'ed. 1'.!, thnt a 
subpu•nu dUl'PN tP<·nm 1·1111 only be usPd to 
compel the prochl<'tlou of written ln11tru-
ments, PllJ>Pl't'I, books, or dol'umentM, und 
thut patterns for stove caBting-s WPre not the 
subject of 1111<.'h a writ. I think thnt the 
subpu•na cannot be enforced us to the tem-
platt'S. A document, howen•r, Is definPd us 
"au Instrument upon wlllcb is rPPorded, by 
means of letters, figures, or mnrks, mutter 
wbil'b may evidentially be used. In this sense 
the tt>rm applies to writings; to words print-
ed, lithographed, or photogmphell: to seals, 
plates, or stonPs on which lnscrlp1lons are 
cut or en~'Tllved; to photographs and plc-
tlll't>R; to maps and plan11. :-<o fnr ns con-
e1!r1111 admissibility, It makt•s no 1Uf'l'erence 
what 111 the thing on wl.tldt tlw words or 
signs of'l'er1·d may bt> l'P1·or1l1'tl. They may 
he on stonl'K, or gpms. or on wood, as well 
as on papt>r or parc·hment." 1 \\'hart. Ev. I 
G14. So far as matP1111l, then, the drawings 
1•nlled tor hy the suhprena should be pro-
dueed, and the final question ls bow far th<'Y 
are materlul. 
• 
'I'hP hill In this case Is based upon an 
1tllPgatlon of lnfrlngemPnt of a patent grant-
t>d }larch 2D, 1887. Defense Is made that the 
patent Is void tor lnsumclency of Invention, 
In view of the prior state of the al't, and 
al!~o that the invention claimed bas b<>Pn In 
public use for more tbnn two years prior to 
the date of the application, whl<'h wnB made 
August 12, 188!l. It appears In testimony 
that rails of the general character of that 
covered by the patent ln controvt>rlly were 
rolled by the Cambria Iron Company, under 
1111 urrangement with the plnintift' company, 
for the latter compnn;\·, In 1882. u.nd from 
thnt time down to the dnte of the patent. It 
would seem to lw mntPrlnl nnd pertinent, 
therefore, to the lssui>, to Inquire into this 
matter, and the defendant Is t>utitled to the 
production of such drawing-s ns will show 
the form of rolls usPd for tlmt purpose, 
down to the date of the pat!'ltt. The form 
of rolls u11Pd slnl'e bas not lleeu shown to be 
mntPrlal to the issue. My con.cluslon upon 
this 1111\IJe<'t lK based upon the presentation 
of the case by counsel, upon only u. part of 
the t1>11timony, nnd is not Intended to, In any 
mtmnPr, anti<'lpate or lnfiuem·e the d!'chdon 
by the circuit court tor the Eastern district 
of the matP11ullt:r or relevanl'y of the testi-
mony, of which It alone must finally judge. 
\Vlwn the wltnPAS }lrodll<'PS the dmwlngs 
c;11lled for by the subp<Pnn, In al'eordunce 
with this opinion, nnd pays the cost!! of this 
11p11li<'ation, the rule will be disclmrged, It 
UJIJIPUl'lng that no dlsobedlPll<'P of the sub-
JICPlla was lntt>ndecl; but this mode was 
tnken by counsel to test the questions In-
volved. 
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INDEX.
A
Account books (Cases 44, 45, 59, 60-62).
Acconipliccs, evidence of (Case 147).
Admissions (Cases 12, 15, 28-35, 45, 90, 91,
163).
by agents (Cases 28, 32, 35).
by attorneys (Case 28).
by failing to deny statements (Cases 15,
28). ,
by offer of compromise (Case 34).
by person in possession (Case 29).
by person not in possession (Case 30).
by referee (Case 33).
in cases of fraud (Case 31).
in pleadings (Cases ‘J0 and 91).
Affidavits (Case 134).
Agent, admissions of (Cases %, 32, 35).
declarations of (Case 11).
Almanac, judicial notice of (Case 76).
Ambiguity, parol evidence to remove (Case
120).
Ancient documents (Cases 41, 104).
Attorney, admissions of (Case 28). '
communications to (Cases 135, 137-140).
B
Best evidence (Case 78).
Bill oi’ exceptions as evidence (Case 113).'
Books. account (Cases 59-62).
corporation (Cases 44, 45).
medical and scientific (Case 73).
Burden of proof (Cases 6, 83, 122-127, and
157).
C
Character (Cases 24, 25, 162, 166, 168-170).
Children as witnesses (Case 129).
Circumstantial evidence (Case 6).
Collateral facts (Cases 2, 7, 8, and 161).
Compulsory physical examination (Case 171).
Communications, privileged (Cases 135-142).
to attorneys (Cases 135, 137 -140).
to husband or wife (Cases 130-132).
to public oflicers (Cases 135, 136). I
Confessions (Cases 14, 18, 36, 37, 39, 40, 11:8).
before grand jury (Case 39).
facts obtained by (Case 38).
inducements to (Case 37).
Conspiracy (Cases 13, 17).
Contracts, parol evidence as to (Cases 114-
121).
Copies. certified (Cases 97, 105, 106).
deeds (Case 102).
letterpress (Cases 110-112).
WILGUB, E V.
Corporation, books oi.‘ (Cases 44 and 45).
Corroboration of witnesses (Cases 19, 144-
147).
Course ot business (Cases 16, 19, 59, 60, and
62).
Cross-examination (Cases 57, 72, 77, 155-161,
167).
Custom, evidence ot (Case 146).
D
Declarations, agent's (Case 11).
against interest (Cases 63. 140).
dying (Cases 57, 58, 134).
former (Case 163).
public rights (Case 65).
showing state of mind (Case 15).
self-serving (Case 9).
stranger's (Case 1.2).
testator’s (Case 64).
Deeds, ancient (Cases 41, 104).
oral evidence concerning (Cases 41, 102,
121).
Depoitions (Cases 24, 102, 122. 149, 150).
Direct evidence (Case 6).
Discovery (cases 171-173).
Documents, ancient (Cases 41, 104).
public (Cases 41, 97, 98, 105-107. See
writings).
inspection of (Cases 72. 98).
proof ot (Case 101-103).
Doubt, reasonable (Cases 6, 38).
Dying declarations (Cases 57, 58, 134).
E
Equity, answer in (Case H5).
discovery in (Case 172).
Estoppei (Case 127).
Evidence, best (Case 78).
circumstantial (Case 6).
corroborative (Cases 19, 14-1-147).
direct (Case 6).
incompetent (Case 11).
indirect (Case 6).
prima facie (Case 16).
primary (Cases 78, 97-100, 108, 109).
secondary (Cases 108-113).
Examination of witnesses, chief (Cases 151-
154).
cross (Cases 155-161).
re-examination (Cases 30, 162. 163).
Exceptions (Cases 33. 68. 113, 137. 140, 158).
bill of, authentication (Case 132).
as evidence (Case 113).
Experts (Cases 13, 24, 72-75, 156).
Explanatory facts (Cases 20, 21).
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INDEX. 
A 
Account books (Cases 44, 45, 59, ~. 
Accomplices, evidence of (Case 14i). 
Admissions (Cases 12, 15, 28-35, 45, 90, 91, 
163). 
by agents (Cases 28, 32, 35). 
by attorneys (Case 2S). 
by falling to deny statements (Cases la, 
28). 
by offer of compromise (Case 34). 
by person in possession (Cn::<e :.?ll). 
by JM'TBOn not in possession (Case 30). 
by referee (Case 33). 
1n cases of fraud (Ca1-1e 31). 
in ple1ullngs (Cases 00 and 91). 
Affidavits (Case 134). 
Agent, admissions of (Cases 28, 32, 35). 
declarations of (Case 11). 
Ahnanac, judicial notice of (Case i6). 
Ambiguity, parol evidence to remove (Case 
120). 
Andent documents (Cases 41, 104). 
Attorney, admissions of (Case 28). 
communications to (Cases 13i:i, 137-140). 
B 
Best evl<lence (Case i8). 
Btll of exceptions as evidence (Ca11e 113). 
Books, arcount (Cases 59-62). 
corporation (Cases 44, 45). 
medical and sC'lentitlc (Cuse i3). 
Burden of proof (Cases 6, 83, 122-127, and 
15i). 
0 
Character (Cases 24, 25, 162, 166, rnS-170). 
Children as witnesses (Case 129). 
Circumstantial evidence (Case 6). 
Collateral facts (Cases 2, 7, 8, and 161). 
Compulsory physical examination (Case 1711. 
Communications, privileged (f'a11P11 lHa--14::!). 
to attorneys (Cases 133, 137-HO). 
to husband or wife (CaRes 130- 1:12). 
to public officers (Cu!les 13i:i, 13fi). 
Confessions (Cases 14, 18, 36, 37, 39, 40, rn."l . 
before grand jury (C'ntce 3!l). 
fucts obtained by (Cm;e 38). 
lnducement11 to (Case 3i). 
C'orporatlon, books of (Oases 44 and 45). 
Corroboration of witnesses (Cases 19, 144-
147). 
Course of business (Cases 16, 19, 59, 60, and 
62). 
Cross-examination (Cases 57, 72, 77, 155-161, 
107). 
Custom, evidence of (Case 146). 
D 
Declarations, agent's (Case 11). 
against Interest (Cases n:~. 140). 
dying (cases 57, 58, 134). 
former (Case 163). 
public rights (Case 65). 
showing state of mind (Case 15). 
self-serving (Case 9). 
stranger's (Case 12). 
testator's (Case G4). 
Deeds, ancient (Cases 41, 104). 
oral evidence concerning (Cases 41, 102, 
121). 
Depositions (Ca11es 24, 102, 122. 149, 150). 
Direct evidence (Case 6). 
Discovery (cases 171-173). 
Documents, ancient (Cases 41, 104). 
public (Cases 41, 97, 98, 105-107. See 
writings). 
Inspection of (CaSE>11 72, 98). 
proof of (Cases 101-103). 
Doubt, reasonable (Cases G, a8). 
Dying declarations (Cases 57, 58, 134). 
E 
Equity, answer In (CaRe 145). 
I dlscoYery in (Case 172). E!'ltoppel (Case 127). 
Evidence, best (Case 78). 
circumstantial (Cuse H). 
corroborative (Cn!'les 11), 144-147). 
direct (Case 6). 
lneompetent (Cuse 11). 
Indirect (Case 6). 
prlma facle (Ca11e lG). 
primary (Cases 78, 97-100, 108, 109). 
secondary (CuseM lOS--113). 
Exnmlnutlon of witnesses, chief (Coses 151-
l:H). 
cross (C1111es 155-lGl). 
re-examination (Cases 30, 162, lG.1). C'onspiracy (Coses 13, 17). 
Contracts, pnrol evidence as 
121). 
to (Cases 114- EX<•eptlons (Cases 33. 68, 113, 137. HO, 158). 
Cople!'I, certified (C1111es 97, 103, 106). 
deeds (Case 102). 
letterpress (Cases 11(}-112). 
WILGUS, EV. 
blll of, authentication (Case 132). 
as evidence (Case 113). 
Experts (Cm;ps 13, 24, 72- 75, 156). 
Explanatory facts (Cases 20, 21). 
(6()'1) 
505 INDEX.
F Juror as witness (Case 134).
Jury to decide on evidence produced (Case 1).
Facts. collateral (Cases 2. 7. 8, and 161).
explanatory (Cases 20, 21). I
in issue (Cases 4. 5. 122). _ '
possibly connected with issue (Case 23). Laws Q1’ another state (Cases 80, 81, 107),
8110\\'iI1tI fo1"serv (Case-Q 2. 17. 18)- conflict between state and federal (Case
fraud (Cases 19, 77). 130).
plan, etc. (Case 3). Letter, mailing, presumption of delivery (Case
probable cause, etc. (Cases 14, 15, 57). 16).
tending to criminate (Cases 1-ii-143). press copies of (Cases 110-112).
Forgery, facts showing (Cases 2. 17, 18). Life tables as evidence (Case -12).
Former suit, evidence in (Case 51;).
Fraud. facts showing (Cases 1%), 31). M
Function of judge (Cases 3, 15, 133, 110).
Maps as evidence (Cases -13. 86).
‘ Money, judicial notice of (Case T9).
(' Motive. facts showing (Case 57).
Geographical facts, judicial notice of (Case MunMpa1_c°rp°mfl°ns’ evidence of ads or
86’ 8.” (Case 150).
Governor, communications to (Case 13(5). N
Natural history, judicial notice of facts of
H (Cases 86-89).
Notice to produce documents (Cases 172, 173).
Handwriting (Cases 17, T6. 77, 89).
Hearsay (Cases 6, 26, 27, 36).
Hostile witness (Case 167). O
Husband and wife as witnesses (Cases 130- Oath, requirement of (Case 143)_
132)- Objections to evidence, time of (Case 68).
Hyllfltlleiiciil questions (C1189 72)- Oflicers, public, judicial notice (Case 82).
Open and close, right to (Cases 123-127).
I Opinions (Cases 2-1. (SS--73).
of experts (Cases 72, 73).
Impeachment of witnesses (Cases 11' 159, Oral evidence in connection with writings
of one's own witness (Cases 164, 165). Owner’ admisslons by (Cases 29' 3”)‘
Indirect evidence (Case ti).
Infant as witness (Case 129). P
Insane person as witness (Case 128).
Inspection of documents (Case 98).
of injured limb (Case 72).
Parol evidence, in connection with writings
(Cases -iii, 97-100, 114-121).
_ , __ ., . - ancient deeds, etc. (Cases 41, 104).
I“1"T"1‘1*,‘, t° sh"“ ‘L“‘“S " 3" 14’ 1“' copies (Cases 97, 102, 105, 100, 110-112).
’ ' deeds (Cases -11, 102, 104).
J duplicates (Case 100).
public documents (Cases 41, 105-107).
Judge. function of (Cases 3, 15. 133. 1+0, 1-11). Pedigree (Cases 55, 66, GT).
discretion of (Case 15). Perjury (Cases 19, 1-1-1).
as witness (Case 133). P110i.O2‘i‘8])l1S (Case 43).
Judgments (Cases -l. ~11‘.-53. 55. S0, 113). Physicians, statements to (Case 72).
in criminal prom-c¢iin;:s (Case .32). Plan, facts sliowing (Case 3).
in ejectment (Case 5:2). Plats, etc. (Case 97).
in personam (Cases 50, 53). Possessor, admissions by (Cases 29, 30).
in rem (Cases 50, 51.). Preparation, facts showing (Case 3).
Judicial notice (Cases 74, 76. 79-89, 97). P1-esumptions (Cases 16, 92-96, 105),
almanac (Case 76). Primary evidence (Cases 78, 97-100, 108. 109,
appellate pro<~cedin,~:s ((‘ase S1). 158).
changes in oiiice (Case S2). Privileged communications (Cases 135-140).
character of 1-i\'cr(Casc >56). to attorneys (Cases 135, 137-1~i0).
coincidence of days of week and month to husband or wife (Cases 130-132).
(Case H9). to public ofiiccrs (Cases 135, 13(3).
laws of other st-ltv-= (Cases so and S1). l'rooi', burden of (Cases 6, S3, 12".:-12". 157).
location of places (Cases S3. NT). Public documents, records, etc. (Cases 41, 98,
seals. etc. (Cases HR. N4). 105-107, 101)).
seasons, etc. (Case SS). otiicers, judicial notice (Cases 82, 83).
signatures of officers, etc. (Case S3). communications to (Cases 135, iilti).
United States money (Case TU). rights, declarations as to (Case 65).G
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508 INDEX. 
F 
Facts, collateral (Cases 2, 7, 8, and 101). 
explanatory (Oases 20, 21). 
In IKMue (<.'nses 4. ;;. 122). 
pOf!Rlbly connected with Issue (CnRe 23). 
showlng forgPl"Y (CaseR 2, 17, 18). 
fraud (Cases 10, 7i). 
plan, etc. (CaRe 3). 
probable cause, etc. (Case11 14. 15, 57). 
tending to crlmllltlte (('allt'M Ht--14:-l). 
Forgery, facts showing (l'aHt!!! 2. 17, 18). 
Former suit. evlden<'e In (C'a11e :ill). 
Fraul'.l, facts showing (Callt's 111, 31). 
Function of judge (Cm1ee 3, 1:;, 133, 14Q), 
0 
Geographical facts, judldal notke of (Cases 
86, 87). 
Govemor, cowmunleatlone to (Case 136). 
H 
Handwriting (Cases 17, 76, 77, 89). 
Hearsay (Cases 6, 26, ZT, 36). 
H011tile witness (Case 1G7). 
Husband and wife as witnesses (Cases 130-
132). 
Hypothetical questions (Case 72). 
I 
Impeachment of wltnPSses (Ca11ee 11, 159, 
161--165, 168-170). 
of one's own witness (Cases 164, 165). 
Indirect evidence (Case 6). 
Infant as witness (Case 129). 
Insane person as witness (Case 128). 
Inspection of document!! (Case 98). 
of Injured limb (Case 72). 
Intent, evidence to show (Cases 2, 3, 14, l:l, 
17--W, 3.~. rii). 
J 
Judge. function of (Case11 3, 15. l:l.'t 140, 141). 
discretion of (Ca11e U)J. 
a11 witness (Cu11e ma). 
JudA"mPnts (Cases 4. 4u--:.:~. ii:i, 80, 113). 
In criminal 11ro<'(•edlnJ.,"8 (CnRe u2). 
In ejectment (Cnse :i2). 
In personam (Cases 00, J3). 
ln rem (Cases ao, ;)1). 
Judl<'ial notice (Cases H, 76. 79--l~n. !17). 
almanac (Case 7tl). 
aP11ellate pro<•eedhlJ:R (( 'n11e 81). 
changes In oftke (('ase 82). 
chm·n<'ter of rln•r (('a11e 8ti). 
colnddenct• of days of wet•k nnd month 
(('tlst~ Sil) . 
lawM of otlwr Mh1t<>s (Cas\'8 so nn<l 81). 
loc·ntlon of 11h11·l•K (( ·a~s X:i, M7J. 
Kt•nls. t't<'. (( 'llKl'K S:I, 141. 
11enR01111, etc. (( 'n11e 8-~l. 
slgnutureM of offi<.'!'rs, etc. (Cn11c 83). 
l.'nltecl States money (Cn11e W). 
Juror as witness (Case 134). 
Jury to decide on evhlen<'e produced (Case 1). 
1~ 
Laws of another state (Cases 80, 81, 107). 
contllct between state and federal (CaRe 
130). 
Letter, malllng, presumption of delh·ery (Ca111e 
16). 
press copies of (Cases 110-112). 
Life tables as evldenc.oe (Ca1W 42). 
M 
Maps as evidence (Cases 43. 8m. 
Money, judicial notice of (Case 79). 
Motive, facts showing (Case ai). 
Municipal corporations, evidence of acts ot 
(Case 100). 
N 
Natural history, judicial notice of facts of 
(Cases 86-89). 
Notice to produce documents (Cases 172, 173). 
0 
Oath, requirement of (Case 148). 
Objections to evidence, time of (Case 68). 
Oftlcers, public, judicial notice (Case 82). 
Open and clOl!e, right to (C'ases 123--127). 
Opinions (Cases 24, «.~7:l). 
of experts \Cases i2, 73). 
Oral evidence In connection with writings 
(Cases 46, 97-100, lH-121). 
Owner, admissions by (Cases 29, 30). 
p 
Parol evidence, In <'Otmectlon with wrltlngs 
t<.'llses 4U, 97-100, 114--121). 
ancient dePds, etc. (Cases 41, 104). 
copies (Cases 97, 102, 105, 106, 110-112). 
deeds (Cases 41, 102, 104). 
duplicates (Case 100). 
public documents (Cases 41, 105--107). 
Pedigree (Cases :>5, 66, 67). 
Perjury (Case11 19, 144). 
Photographs (('nse 43). 
Physicians, stntt>mPnts to (Case 72). 
Plan, facts showing (Case 3). 
Plats, etc. (Case 'J7). 
Possessor, admissions by (Cases 29, 30). 
Preparation, facts showing (Case 3). 
Presumptions (Cases 16, 92--UU, lOSJ. 
Primary evidence (Cases 78, 97--100, 108, 109. 
tri8). 
Privileged eommunlcatlons (Cases 13;'>-140). 
to attorneys (Cases 13;), 137-140). 
to husband or wife (Cnses 130-t:l2). 
to public officers (Cnses 135, 136). 
Proof, burden of (Cases U, 8.'l, 12'.!--127. 1::>7). 
1'11hli1• docmnents, record11, etc. (CHR<'S 41, 98, 
10!">--lOi, 109). 
officers, judicial notice (CnRes 82, 83). 
rowmunlcatlons to CC'1t!'eR 135, 130). 
rlg!Jts, !leclaratlonlil as to \Case o:i). 
lI\' DEX. 50';
Q
Questions, hypothetical (Cases T2, 75).
leading (Case 153).
R.
Reasonable doubt (Cases 6, 38).
Recitals in public documents (Cases 41, 54).
Records, public (Cases 41, 98, 105-107, 109).
custody of (Case 105).
inspection of (Case 98).
Re-examination of witness (Cases 30, 162,
163).
Referee, admissions of (Case 33).
Relevancy (Cases 2, 43).
Reputation (Cases 24, 25, 54, 55, 162, 166).
Res gestaa (Cases 6, 9, 10-12, 137).
Res inter allos (Cases 22, 113).
Right to open and close (Cases 12-'>-127).
Rights, public, declarations as to (Case 65).
S
Scientific books, etc. (Case 73).
Seals, etc., judicial notice of ((‘ases 83. 84).
Secondary evidence (Cases 108, 109, 113).
degrees of (Cases 110-112).
Signature of officers. judicial notice (Case 83).
Similar facts, occurrences, etc. (Cases 2, 3, 14,
15, 17-19, 77. 128).
State secrets (Case 136).
State's evidence. turning (Case 1-ii‘).
Stockholders and stock books of ('0i'porali<|n.\'
(Cases 44, 45).
Subpoena duces tecum (Case 173).
T
Telegrams, what is original (Case 158).
Telephone communications (Case 27).
Testator, declarations as to contents of will
(Case 64).
' U
Vsage. evidence of (Case 146).
‘T
Value, evidence of (Cases 22. 156).
Variance (Cases 5, 68).
Veracity, evidence of reputation (Cases 169-
170).
Verdlet, against evidence (Case 1).
W
Witness, absent or deceased (Case 56).
agreement to turn state‘s evidence (Case
147).
character of (Cases 24, 25, 1 '2. 166, 168-
170).
competency of husband or wife (Cases
130, 131).
infants (Case 129).
insane (Case 128).
judge (Case 133).
juror (Case 134).
- compulsory physical examination of (Case
171).
cross-examination of (Cases 57, 72, 77,
155-161).
examination in chief (Cases 151-155).
hostile (Case 167).
inipeaching (Cases 11, 159. 161-170).
one’s own witness (Cases 16-i, 165).
number of, in particular cases (Cases 144-
147).
privilege not to criminate himself (Cases
141-143).
re-examination of (Cases 162, 163).
Writings (see documents, public records, con-
tracts. deeds, etc.).
Cases -ii. 46, 97-121).
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Q 
Questions, hypothE>tlenl (Cases 72, 75). 
leading (Case 153). 
R" 
H.easonable doubt (Coses 6, 38). 
Uecltnls ln public documents (Cose11 41, 54). 
Uecords, public (Cases 41, 08, 10;)-107, 109). 
custody of (Case 100). 
Inspection of (Case 98). 
Re-exrunlnatlon of witness (Cases 30, 162, 
163). 
Referee, admissions of (Case 33). 
Relevancy (Cases 2, 43). 
Reputation (Cases 24, 25, 54, 55, 162, Hl6). 
Res gestre (Cases 6, 9, 10-12, 137). 
Res Inter allOR (Cases 22, 113). 
Right to open and close (Cases 12:'">--127). 
Rights, public, declarations as to (< ~1111e u:i). 
B 
Sclentlftc books, etc. (Case 73). 
8eal8, etc., ·judicial notice of (( 'ases 83, 84). 
Secondary evidence (Cases 108, 109, 113). 
degrees of (Cases 110-112). 
Signature of omcers. judicial not!C'e (Case S:-l). 
Similar facts, occurrences, etc. (Cases 2, 3, 14, 
15, 17-19, 77. 128). 
State secrets (Case 136). 
State's evidence, turning (CasE> 14i). 
Stockholders and stoek book11 of 1·or11111·11tlous 
(Cases 44, 45). 
Rubprena duces tecum (Case 173). 
T 
Telegrams, what Is original (Ca!ile ff•'I). 
Telephone communications (Case 27). 
Testator, declarations as to contents of will 
(Case 64). 
. u 
rsage, e,·ld<>nee of (Cu!ilc 14G). 
v 
Value, evidence of (('11st>s 22. liiii). 
Variance (Cases 5, 68). 
VPraclty, evldpm•e of reputation (Cases 168-
170). 
Verdict, against evidence (Case 1). 
w 
Wltnes.'!, absent or <leceased (Case r>G). 
aJ.'l'eemeut to turn eta te's evltlE>n<"e (Case 
147). 
character of (Cases 24, 2;-,, 162, rnH, 16S-
170). 
corn1J('tP11ey of husband or wife (Oases 
130, 131). 
l11funt11 f('m1<' 12!)). 
Insane (Case 128). 
judge (Cose 133). 
juror (Case 134). 
· compulsory physical examination of (Ca11e 
171). 
cross-examination of (Cases 57, 72, 77, 
15:>--161). 
examination In chief (Cases rn1-1;-,;>). 
hostile (Case 167). 
lmpea<>hlug (Cases 11, 159. 161-170). 
one's own witness (Cai;es 164, lfli>). 
number of, ln particular cases 1C11Res 144-
147). 
prlYlli>J'e not to crlmlnate himself (('uNeH 
141-143). 
re-examination of (Cases lfl2, Hl3). 
'Y1·lt1ni:11 (~!'l' dol'Ulllt!11t11, pul.lllc ret'tH'<lH, con-
tru<'tll, lleedR, l't<:.). 
Cases 41. 46, 97-121). 
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